criminal justice in the golden state: rethinking the "three strikes and you're out law"

8/3/2019 Criminal Justice in the Golden State: Rethinking the "Three Strikes and You're Out Law"

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Criminal Justice in the Golden State:

Rethinking the Three Strikes and Youre Out Law

By Breeana Garrett


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I. Introduction and Background

In 1995, Leandro Andrade, a U.S. army veteran and life-long heroine addict, was given

two 25-years-to-life sentences for stealing nine childrens videotapes. Valued at $153.54, they

were intended as Christmas presents for his nieces. This judgment is comparable to sentences

given for first-degree murder, kidnapping and derailing a train. With two prior home burglary

and petty theft convictions none of which were violent the shoplifting offense was a

wobbler that could be tried as a felony. Andrade was convicted under the recently enacted

Three Strikes and Youre Out law in California - sentenced at age 37, Andrade will be 87 years

old before being released from state prison.

Public outrage over violent crime, the inability of the criminal justice system to address

rampant violence and the diffuse perception of leniency toward repeat offenders have found

political expression in the enactment of mandatory sentencing laws across the nation. These laws

require courts to order extended periods of incarceration to persons convicted of serious criminal

crimes on three or more occasions. Twenty-six states have passed such laws. California helped

launch this trend in the wake of outrage over the 1993 kidnapping and murder of a young girl,

Polly Klaas, by a repeat offender. Her death, as reported by the Los Angeles Times, had bruised

the psyche of a nation,i and Californians demanded action.

Although the law had previously been unable to garner adequate support for passage,

Klaas death sparked a new furor over the need to control repeat offenders, also known as

recidivists. In March 1994, the California legislature enacted the Jones-Costa Three Strikes

Bill,ii which mandated repeat offenders with two prior violent or serious felonies to be sentenced

to 25-years-to-life in prison for convictions of a third felony. Under the law, the third felony may

be any felony, making it the only state not to require it to be serious or violent.iii The Three

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Strikes law was then affirmed by ballot initiative in November 1994 by the passage of

Proposition 184, with 72 percent of Californians voting in favor and 28 percent against. The only

disparity between the two versions of the law is that the initiative did not explicitly state that

juvenile offenses and previous out-of-state convictions count as strikes, while the legislative bill

did.

Although other states passed similar laws, Newsweek called Californias Three Strikes

legislation the toughest in the nation.iv The law doubles the sentence for second strikes and

requires the time to be spent in prison, rather than probation or jail, and limits good time from

50 percent to 20 percent of prison sentences. The California law counts juvenile offenses and

wobbler offenses that is, offenses that can be a misdemeanor or a felony can be charged as a

felony if they are a third strike (as in the case of Andrade). It is also possible for an offender to

receive many third strikes, thus requiring him or her to serve multiple sentences consecutively.

Proponents of the Three Strikes law have stated that a reduction of crime will be achieved

through incapacitation and deterrence. The incapacitation effect is the removal of repeat

offenders from society so as to prevent them from committing additional crimes. The

deterrence effect relies on the assumption that the severe punishment options associated with

the law would deter some potential offenders, thereby preventing some crime that might

otherwise occur.v Therefore the goal of the law is the mitigation of crime through these

methods.

The Three Strikes law has been a subject of fierce debate between advocates of the laws

and those who believe that the law is flawed and should be revised. Since its passage in 1994,

there have been several endeavors to modify the law. However, the initiatives have failed to

garner the needed signatures to be placed on the ballot, and alterations through the California

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Legislature have died in committee. It is imperative to discover whether or not the law has

achieved its goal of a reduction in crime rates, as implementation of the law has had significant

fiscal impacts on California at the state and local levels. The efficacy of the Three Strikes law is

pertinent as it has far-reaching implications for the future of mandatory sentencing laws in the

United States Criminal Justice system.

II. Question and Hypothesis

The Three Strikes law in California has been a matter of fervent contention between

proponents, who believe that the legislation is working, and opponents, who believe that it is

imperfect and should be modified. Both groups have used statistical data on crime rates and the

fiscal impact in California to support their respective claims.

Thus the questions that must be addressed are:

1. Has the Three Strikes law in California been effective at curbing crime rates?

2. What are the costs of implementing the law, on the state and local levels?

3. Are the expenditures worth the results?

I hypothesize that the Three Strikes law has been unable to deliver on its promise of a

reduction in crime, and has caused a significant strain on the criminal justice system in

California. Implementation of the Three Strikes law requires vast monetary resources that are

unavailable, and has had adverse effects on the already burdened corrections, court and jail

systems in the California. Although it is generally accepted that the Three Strikes law has not

been as effective as lawmakers and supporters had hoped, it is imperative to discover the degree

of efficacy of the law and to determine whether the excessive costs of the legislation are worth

the minimal decrease in crime rates. If the crime rate decline is significant, then Californians

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need to decide whether the monetary expense is worth the result. If the crime rate decline is

limited and the costs are exorbitant, the findings will provide ample evidence for the reformation

or repeal of the Three Strikes law in California.

III. Methodology

Although 25 other states have passed similar laws, I chose California because it has the

most draconian and sweeping Three Strikes law. California, along with Washington State, was

instrumental in starting this trend of three strikes laws, as more than two dozen states have

followed suit. By 1998, the federal government and all the other three strikes states combined

had ordered about 1,500 sentences; California, by contrast, had sentenced roughly 40,000 and

50,000 by 1999.vi Thus the law has had a profound effect on the state. The terms of the law

were meant to give little leniency to repeat offenders, making it the most severe law in the

nation. As the law was passed in 1994, there is plentiful data on the subject, and the disparity in

implementation in the different counties of California makes it more manageable to research the

changes in crime rates. It has also been the most controversial mandatory sentencing law, thus it

obligates intensive study.

I will be utilizing a range of research tools, including books, governmental reports,

California penal code, scholarly articles, statistics on crime as well as newspaper articles, in

order to procure the most information. Although some of it will be qualitative research, the focus

will be on quantitative research, as crimes rates and fiscal impacts are stated in these terms. As

the Three Strikes law is a very political issue, inherent biases exist in most of the sources. This

makes it important to study research conducted by proponents and opponents of the law as well

as neutral parties, to cross-reference the statistics to combat the inherent partiality of these

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sources. As an example of this, the Office of the Attorney General in the State of California

published a report praising the laws positive effects. Hence I will also study the published

critique of the Attorney Generals assertions by The Loyola Law Review, as it presents another

interpretation of the law and the statistics available.

More specifically, in order to show that the Three Strikes law has had a minimal effect on

crime rates, I will study a variety of statistical evidence as well as scholarly interpretations of the

available data. I will first address the issue of crime rates in general, in terms of crimes

discussed. For the most part, I will be relying on the California Crime Index and the FBI Crime

Index.

vii

Crime Indexes are generated in order to analyze crime statistics, and rely on reported

crimes. Critics claim that this undermines their efficacy as they understate the actual level of

criminal activity. However, the alternative is victimization surveys, which are composed of

annual household interviews and are even more unreliable than crime indexes.

I will look at statistics for the State of California and how the crime rates reflect the

national drop in crime, as well as consider other variables which affect crime rates. A comparison

between California and other states, specifically New York (a comparable non-strike), will

follow. Although New York has a Persistent Felony Offender law that dates back to the 19th

century, sentences are not compulsory in every case and judges have more discretion as to the

sentence imposed than under the Three Strikes law in California. I will also investigate

implementation by county, as enforcement of the Three Strikes law varies drastically and

comparing counties with strict implementation to counties with lenient implementation will

further illustrate the laws effects on crime.

As the law was enacted in 1994, I plan on studying crime rates before the law was passed

(falling crime rates was a trend before Three Strikes was implemented), up until 2007. I will

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study various reports that have been published during this time interval, but will mainly focus on

the most recent reports, as results measured over a 10 year or more time frame are more reliable.

Most of the reports include different statistics, so I will attempt to include as many sources as

possible, in order to provide adequate context and validity.

After illustrating that the decrease in the crime rate is not solely due to the Three Strikes

legislation, it is necessary to address the significant fiscal impactsviiiof the law. I will be

discussing the monetary effects of the law on the state level as well as the local level, including

the costs required for implementation. On the state level, I will be primarily focusing on the

Corrections system, and on the local level, I will look at the impact on the judicial and jail

systems.

Although a complete study of the Three Strikes law would be remiss without mentioning

the constitutional, racial and moral controversiesixsurrounding the law, the focus of this paper is

on crime rates and the fiscal impact, as time and space limitations prevail.

IV. Research and Findings

Before proceeding, I want to acknowledge the limits to studying crime rates, as myriad

other social, economic and public policy factors have been cited as contributing to changes in

crime rates.x Thus the factors that have been influential in determining Californias crime rate

include, but are not limited to, basic demographics, a booming economy with real increases in

employment and wages, the stabilization of the crack trade that swept American in the late

1980s and law enforcement.xi Although scholarly research on the link between economic

prosperity and crime is mixed, offenders are disproportionately comprised of individuals with

limited earning potential in the legitimate labor market. Thus increases in the unemployment

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rate are associated with increases in crime,xii and the opposite may well be true as well. Many

factors have been instrumental in the decrease in crime rates in the state of California, thus it is

difficult to isolate the impact of any one.

However, the research has shown that crime rates were already decreasing in California

due to the other factors mentioned, and the Three Strikes law had a minimal role in decreasing

crime rates further. It is challenging to differentiate between the impact that the Three Strikes law

alone may have had, and the changes that may have occurred if the law had not been enacted.

However, I will attempt to isolate the effect that the Three Strikes law has had by studying crime

rates before and after the law was enacted as well as conducting county and state comparisons.

National Crime Rate Trends: Putting California into Perspective

In order to understand the impact the Three Strikes law has had on California, it is

important to inspect crime trends before the enactment. California, mirroring the nation-wide

trend, experienced an overall rise in reported crime rates in the 1970s and the 1980s, but both

the reported rates and the victimization surveys show crime rates steady or declining over the

past 15 yearsxiii(See Appendix A, Figure 1). As measured by the California Crime Index, the

overall crime rate in California started to ebb before the enactment of the Three Strikes law, by

10 percent between 1991 and 1994,xivand continued to decline after 1994. Thus California was

already experiencing a drop in crime rates, even before the Three Strikes law was enacted and

this trend emulated the national decline in crime rates.

It must be noted that because there was a drop in California crime rates before the

passage of the Three Strikes law, this does not prove that Three Strikes was responsible for the

drop. Similarly, the fact that the crime rates continued to drop after the adoption of the law does

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not prove that Three Strikes is the cause. However, the impact that the Three Strikes law may

have had on crime rates cannot be discounted, thus more information needs to be garnered.

Numerous studies have been conducted since the passage of the Three Strikes Law, and

most have concluded that it has had a limited effect on crime rates. Stolzenberg and DAllesio

(1997) analyzed serious crime trends in Californias 10 largest cities, using monthly data for

1985-1995. The authors came to the conclusion that the law did not reduce the California Crime

Index below the level that would have been expected given the prevailing downward trend that

had begun before the implementation of the law.xv Macallair and Males (1999) inspected

implementation rates in different counties and concluded that there was no clear pattern of

crime reduction associated with the rate of three strikes application.xvi This study also included

research by age group, as offenders in their 30s and 40s are eight to 10 times more likely to be

sentenced under the Three Strikes law. However, this offender population has grown more

rapidly, illustrating the lack of effect that the deterrence model has had on its target population.

Another study conducted in 1999 by Frank Zimring, a UC Berkeley professor and

criminologist, concluded that if the drop in Californias crime rate is attributable to the Three

Strikes law, then one would expect to see a decline in arrests of repeat offenders targeted by the

law. Although this study is similar to the one conducted by Macalliar & Males (1999), it does

not focus on age groups rather, the focus is on how many strikes an offender has had. Zimring

discovered that the decline in arrests was spread evenly between potential offenders not affected

by three strikes about 90 percent and repeat offenders affected by the law about 10 percent.

According to the data collected, before three strikes, 44.8 percent of all felony arrests involved

suspects with a felony conviction on their recordafter three strikes, that proportion remained

essentially the same, 45.4 percent.xvii Similarly, persons with one or two strikes made up 13.9

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percent of all adult felony arrests, and that number changed to 12.8 percent after the law went

into effect. Again, the deterrence effect seemed to have little influence over repeat offenders,

as they were still being arrested at the same rate as before the law was enacted.

A simulation study conducted by Auerhahn (2001) explored whether the incapacitation

effect is working. She hypothesized that if it is effective, the dangerousness of offenders

should be magnified in the prison population and decreased in the rest of the population.

However, Auerhahn concluded that the Three Strikes law has not made California streets safer

[but] the average dangerousness of the prison population has declined and that the rest of the

population has increased.

xviii

This is due in part to the conviction of most third-strikers for non-

violent and non-serious offenses. As one of the primary rationales for the Three Strikes law is

that it removes dangerous repeat offenders from the streets, this finding questions the efficacy of

the law.

Although most studies have concluded that the crime rate has not decreased due to Three

Strikes, several reports have determined otherwise. The validity of the reports must be

questioned, as the time frame for the first report is not extensive enough to truly assess California

crime rates and the political bias inherent in the second challenges the impartiality of the

findings. The RAND Corporation report, titled Three Strikes and Youre Out: Estimated Benefits

and Costs of Californias New Mandatory-Sentencingwas published in 1994 (the year the Three

Strikes law was enacted). The other report was written by the Office of the Attorney General in

1998, titled Three Strike and Youre Out Its Impact on the California Criminal Justice System

After Four Years. The political bias stems from the involvement of Dan Lungren, the Attorney

General from 1991-1999, in the passage of the Three Strikes law.

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The RAND Corporation predicted a reduction in serious felonies committed by adults of

22 and 34 percent below what would have occurred had the previous law remained in effect.xix

However, the report was issued the year the law was enacted, and the changes the authors

predicted have not occurred. In addition, the report discussed the financial burden as well as

reported that the majority of serious crimes prevented would be assaults and burglaries, not the

murders, rapes and robberies that many people believe to be the laws principal

targets.xx Proposition 184 was passed because the people of California believed that it would

prevent violent and brutal crimes, like the death of Polly Klaas. With an estimated cost per

serious crime prevented of $16,300,

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many non-violent individuals are being incarcerated for

25-years-to-life at a great expense to taxpayers. Writing in 2003 in the Duquesne Law Review,

Los Angeles County Deputy Public Defender Alex Ricciardulli stated that in 1998, 79 percent

of Los Angeles Countys third strike prosecutions would be for non-violent crimes, and two-

thirds of those cases would be for non-serious third strikes.xxii Thus it must be determined

whether the financial resources devoted to implementing the Three Strikes law are worth the

minimal decreases in non-violent crimes.

The Attorney Generals report claimed that the dramatic drop in the crime ratexxiii

occurred after the enactment of the Three Strikes law, but the drop in crime actually began in

1993, a year before the law was passed (See Appendix A, Figure 2). During 1993, the violent

crime rate declined by 4.1 percent. The AGs report conceals this by including 1993 in the years

1990-1992 during which the violent crime rate increased.xxiv The AGs report also discredits any

effect that the booming California economy may have had on crime rates, despite the fact that for

six of the seven years between 1989 -1996, the unemployment rates and violent crime rates

increased or decreased in the same direction. However, Figure 2 also illustrates the crime rates

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after 1994. The violent crime rate dropped by 6.3 percent in 1994 and by 4.2 percent in 1995,

whereas the property crime rate dropped by 6.7 percent in 1994 and continued to drop in 1995 by

8.2 percent. Thus the Three Strikes law may have had a modest impact on the decrease in

property crimes, but it did not affect the rate of violent crimes. In fact, violent crime rates

decreased in 1995, but nearly 2 percent less than in 1994.

Crime rates for California as a whole are useful, but a comparison between California and

non-strike states also provides a more encompassing view of the situation. After that comparison,

a study of crime rates by county will lead to additional insight, as implementation varies

drastically across California.

State Comparison: California and Non-Strike States

One way in which the question of whether the Three Strikes law has resulted in

successful reductions in crime is to compare states with three strikes laws to states that have not

enacted such legislation. If Three Strikes has been the cause of decreasing crime rates, then

states with three strike laws should experience superior reductions. An emphasis is placed on the

comparison between California and New York,xxv as both states are among the most populous in

the United States and face similar challenges. As with the county comparisons, I will include

studies from multiple years, in order to show the broad consensus among researchers.

The violent crime rate and the overall crime rate has decreased in the United States since

the 1990s and California, which is the only state to aggressively implement a three strikes law,

has shown no superior reductions in crime rates.xxvi This statement was the result of a study

conducted by the United States Justice Departments National Institute of Justice in 1999 of three

Three Strikes states California, Washington and Georgia as well as three states without Three

Strikes law Texas, Massachusetts, and Michigan. The consensus of the study showed that the

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Three Strike states did not experience superior reductions in crime, when compared to the non-

Three Strike states.

The Justice Policy Institute conducted a study in 2005, focusing on the average change in

the violent crime rate and index crime rate between Non-Strike states and Strike-states between

1990-2002 and 1993-2002. Overall, the findings show that states without Three Strikes laws

experienced a larger decrease in violent crime between 1990-2002, and 1993-2002. The study

also shows that Californias Crime Index Rate in 2002 was 1.8 percent lower than non-Three

Strike states.xxvii However, with the exclusion of Washington, D.C., a city known for its high

crime rates, Californias 2002 Index Crime rate was 2.2 percent higher than non-Strike states.

Thus California did not experience a higher reduction in crime, as compared to non-Strike States.

The same study also focused on a comparison between California and New York, as an

earlier report in 1997 compared Los Angeles and New York City. In that report, it was found that

from 1994 to 1995, New York City saw all crime categories decline at a much higher rate than

Los Angeles, despite Los Angeles Countys heavy use of the Three Strikes law.xxviii Although

Los Angeles is known for its strict implementation of the provisions of the law, it did not

experience superior reductions in crime rates.

The 2005 findings concluded the following (See Appendix B, Figures 1 and 2): between

1993 and 2002, the overall crime rates for New York decreased by 49 percent, as compared to 39

percent for California. During the same time period, New York experienced a 53 percent

reduction in violent crime whereas California experienced a 45 percent decrease.xxix The same

study compared the 2002 Crime Index rates for California and New York, and discovered that

Californias was 40.7 percent higher than New Yorks, with the violent crime index at 19.6

percent higher for California. Hence it can be concluded that California, even with the enactment

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of the Three Strikes law, experienced no more of a decrease in crime than a non-Strike state in

fact, the opposite was true. It was New York that experienced a steeper drop in violent crime

rates as well as index crime rates.

Another study reports that between 1993 and 1999, California experienced the steepest

drop in violent crime 41.8 percent of any state in the Union.xxx However, New York was a

close second with a 40.9 percent drop. Although the Three Strikes law may have been

instrumental in this small decrease, it can also be considered a statistical dead heatxxxi when

errors are factored in. As Peter Greenwood, the head of the Criminal Justice Program at the

RAND Institute, stated, crime has been going down significantly almost everywhere in the

country, and it isnt a three strikes law thats responsible for bringing crime down in all those

states that dont have such a law.xxxii Thus in comparison with states that do not have Three

Strikes laws, it appears that California has not seen any superior reduction in crime rates.

County Comparison: Issue of Implementation

A discussion of the effect that Three Strikes legislation has had on crime is not complete

without looking at the different implementation of the law in the fifty-eight counties in

California. Certain provisions of the Three Strikes law allow implementation to vary, such as

charging wobblers as misdemeanors or felonies and prosecutorial discretion. The latter refers

to the decision of prosecutors to file or not to file a Three Strikes case. San Francisco is a prime

example of resistance to implementation it was the only county in the state to vote against

Proposition 184. After Terence Hallinan became district attorney in San Francisco in 1995, he

announced a new policy: in the furtherance of justice, strike penalties would no longer be

sought for persons charged with nonviolent offenses.xxxiii Because of these provisions, the law

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has created a system of justice by geography, where similarly situated offenders are receiving

very dissimilar sentences,xxxiv because prosecutors have a vast amount of discretion when it

comes to implementation.

As such, many studies have compared implementation by county as it was hypothesized

that counties that employed a strict enforcement policy would experience higher levels of crime

reduction.xxxv However, the statistical data does not support this hypothesis; rather, it appears

that the reverse has proven correct.

A study conducted in 2004 shows that counties that had a higher rate of implementation

did not experience a higher rate of crime reduction than counties with lower rates of

implementation. In fact, San Francisco, with the lowest rate of implementation at

approximately one-fifth the average rate of the 12 largest counties, achieved higher reductions

in its violent crime rate than any other county.xxxvi It is important to note that the counties with

strict implementation saw slightly larger declinesfor property crimes.xxxvii Although these are

not the serious and violent crimes that the Three Strikes law was meant to prevent, a small

reduction has been attributed to the Three Strikes law. Another study shows that crime dropped

by 21.3 percent in the six most lenient three strikes counties, compared to the 12.7 percent drop

in the toughest counties.xxxviii Thus counties in California that rigorously enforce the law had no

greater declines in crime than did counties that used it far more sparingly.xxxix

A California Legislative Analysts Office study (2005) compared the four counties with

the strictest enforcement (Kern, Los Angeles, San Diego and Riverside) to the four counties least

likely to enforce the law (Ventura, Contra Costa, Alameda and San Francisco). The study looked

at the crime rates of the eight counties between 1994 and 2003 (See Appendix C, Figures 1 and

2). The former counties experienced a drop by an average of 37 percent from 1994 to 2003xl

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and the latter counties experience a drop by an average of 33 percent over the same time

period.xli Although the difference is minute with the addition of statistical error, the counties

with strict enforcement may have experienced a higher decrease in crime by several percentage

points. However, in regards to violent crime only, the four counties most likely to send strikers to

prison experienced a decline of 44 percent, while the four counties least likely to send strikers to

prison experienced a decline of 45 percent. Thus the reduction is almost identical, leading to the

conjecture that strict enforcement of the Three Strikes law may not play a large role in crime

reduction.

In researching crime rates in counties with different implementation, one would expect

the counties with stricter implementation to experience higher reductions in crime. However,

some studies have shown an identical decrease in crime and other studies have shown superior

crime reductions in low implementation counties, leading us to believe that the Three Strikes law

has not had a significant impact on crime reduction.

Summation of the Effect of Three Strikes on Crime Rates in California

California has mirrored the nation-wide trend of declining crime rates, and the Three

Strikes law has not led to any significant additional decreases in crime rates. The research shows

three instances in which crime rates declined minimally, which can be attributed to Three Strikes:

property crime rates in a 2004 study of county implementation, the drop of property crime rates

after 1994 and overall crime rates in the 2005 study of implementation in eight counties.

However, these declines were minimal and focused mainly on property crime rates, while the

rest of the reports bolster the assertion that Three Strikes has not led to a significant decrease in

crime. California has not experienced lower crime rates than non-Strike states, especially when

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compared with the state of New York. Similarly, counties with higher rates of implementation

have not seen lower crime rates than counties with minimal implementation. Thus the

effectiveness of the California strikes law in deterring crime has been, at best, limited.xlii

Fiscal Impact: State and Local Levels

After illustrating that the Three Strikes law has not generated the desired decrease in

crime rates in California, it is important to include a discussion of the excessive costs that the

legislation has necessitated. There is a strong argument that the detrimental effects and monetary

expenditures required are not worth the lack of reductions in crime rates. In order to affirm this

claim, a study of the adverse effects the law has had on the local and state levels in California as

well as the vast financial resources required for implementation needs to be conducted.

Many early estimates predicted a cost of $4.5 billion to $6.5 billion per yearxliii and a

doubling of the general funds used by the Department of Corrections. These estimates have not

come to fruition, due in part to the uneven implementation of the Three Strikes law discussed

under County Comparison. However, this does not negate that the Three Strikes has had a

significant fiscal impact on the State of California, and that these costs will only continue to

increase.

The total state spending on criminal justice rose from $15 billion in 1993-1994 to more

than $25 billion in 2003-2004.xliv This translates into a 6 percent increase annually, and spending

on corrections and the parole system increased at 7 percent. Of this cost, close to 62 percent is

supported by local governments, with the state supplying the monetary resources for the rest of

the expenditures. Fiscal costs of implementing the Three Strikes law are difficult to assess, as

there are myriad considerations that impact these numbers. However, there is evidence that the

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Three Strikes law has had a serious impact on the corrections, judicial and jail systems, which

are strained due to increased workloads.

A look at the budget of California adds some insight into this dilemma (see Appendix D,

Figure 1). A referendum passed in 1988 fixed the amount that the state must spend on public

education from kindergarten to community college, and federal laws have set spending for other

programs, such as Medicare.xlv As an increase in taxation is not probable, the rising costs of

incarcerating offenders must be taken out of expenditures for other government programs, such

as higher education, fighting brush fires, controlling environmental pollution and regulating

insurance companies. A New York Times article published on April 12, 1995 stated that, for the

first time, California will spend more on prisons than for its two university systems, the

University of California and the California state universities.xlvi This is not currently the case, as

the spending for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is roughly 7% of

the budget and higher education accounts for 10.4%. However, far too many resources are being

devoted to convicting and incarcerating individuals, often for non-violent crimes.

Local Level: the Judicial System and Jail Populations

The strains due to implementation of the Three Strikes law have been especially apparent

on the local level, including the judicial system and jail populations. As stated before, 62 percent

of the costs of the criminal justice system in California are paid for by local governments. While

funding for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has increased, the judiciary by

and large has had to use the same resources as before,xlvii despite the passage of the Three

Strikes law. In 1998, Los Angeles County known for its strict implementation of the law

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sought to have up to $200 million in added costs from Three Strikes reimbursed by the state by

taking their case to the Commission on State Mandates.xlviiiAlthough the Commission ruled

against giving money to Los Angeles County, it did not dispute the claims of additional

expenses. Thus institutions at the local level have struggled with the increased burden of

implementation of the Three Strikes law.

Defendants most often choose to have a jury trial rather than solve their cases through

plea bargaining, due to the longer sentences that second and third-strikers face if convicted. This

leads to problems in the judicial system, as jury trials are longer and more expensive. In a typical

felony case, approximately 60 jurors are chosen for the selection process. However, empaneling

a jury in a strike case requires more resources.xlix This is especially true in counties without

public support for the law, such as San Francisco. In such counties, it has been reported that at

least 75 jurors are needed for second strike cases and 100 to 120 for third strike cases. Jury trials

also place an extra burden on attorneys and investigators, as additional research and expert

witnesses are needed to try these cases. A review in Los Angeles of 12,600 two and three strikes

cases found that there was an increase of jury trials by 25 percent and that two-strikes cases

remained pending in court 16 percent longer and three-strikes cases 41 percent longer l than

non-strike cases.

An increase in the number and length of jury trials has highly impacted jail populations

as well, as offenders are held for longer. The same study of Los Angeles found an 11-percent

rise in the proportion of the jail population held in pretrial status,li up to 70 percent from 59

percent. Further impacting jail populations, second and third-strikers are often deemed higher

security threats even if they have committed non-violent offenses due to possible longer

sentences. Higher security level offenders are more expensive to hold, as they require added

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security measures. The Three Strikes law has also impacted civil cases due to more courts

diverting their resources from hearing civil cases to hearing criminal cases.liiSome District

Attorneys have warned that they may have to stop prosecuting misdemeanor cases altogether.

Thus resources have been diverted from other aspects of the judicial system, to compensate for

the increase and expense of second and third-strike cases.

The law has also changed courtroom dynamics, as it has expanded the power of

prosecutors while limiting the role of the judges discretion.liii District Attorneys, elected by the

public, have the ability to decide whether to prosecute cases or dismiss them, as well as what

penalties to seek. Thus San Francisco County elects District Attorneys without an agenda of

implementation, as it was the only county to vote against Proposition 184. Under the wobbler

clause, prosecutors can make the decision to try an offense as a misdemeanor or a felony. They

can also decide whether to include juvenile offenses as prior strikes. Increased prosecutorial

discretion has vested the sentencing power in the prosecutor, not the judge,liv leading to a

violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Although this is not a direct cause of financial

strain, it is an important development to note, as it has changed the nature of criminal sentencing

in California.

In response to these strains, the 1996-1997 State Budget Act included $3.5 million for the

Three Strikes Team, which consists of retired judgesformed to assist trial courts that are

swamped with three strike cases. This has helped to alleviate the burden that these cases have

placed on the judicial system, while costing taxpayers a significant amount. Specific counties

have also created programs to alleviate the burden, such as the Delay Reduction Program

implemented in one of Los Angeles Countys Superior Court districts. This has resulted in a

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significant decline in the pending caseload of criminal cases, albeit at an additional cost of

implementing the program.lv

State Level: the Department of Corrections

On March 7, 1994, Governor Pete Wilson said the Three Strikes law sends a clear

message to repeat criminals. Find a new line of work, because were going to start turning career

criminals into career inmates.lvi This prophecy has been attained, as the law has had a significant

impact on the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. With 32 facilities across

the state, the CDCR is projected to consume 7.0 percent of the California state budget in 2007-

2008 (See Appendix D, Figure 2).Although the Department of Corrections has not consumed the

18 percent of the state budget by the year 2002 that the RAND Corporation predicted, it has

increased steadily every year.

The number of inmates incarcerated in California has drastically increased. From 1980 to

2000, Californias prison population rose by nearly 600 percent nearly twice the national

rate.lvii In terms of number of inmates, the prison population has expanded from 59,000

inmates in 1986 to 173,000 inmates in 2006lviii a 5 percent average annual growth. Most of

this growth occurred between 1986 and 1998, thus there is a possibility that the prison population

will cease to increase at the same astonishing rate. However, other reports have predicted a

steady increase in the future.

According to a 2005 LAO report, as of December 31, 2004, there were almost 43,000

inmates serving time under the Three Strikes law, making up about 26 percent of the total prison

population.lix As these numbers are from 2004, the current figures are likely to be higher. This

has resulted in massive overcrowding, as the prison system is not built for the current capacity

(See Appendix E, Figure 1). For example, the California Rehabilitation Center, located in Norco,

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was once considered one of the states best prisons. Originally built to hold 1,800 inmates, it

now bulges with more than 4,700 and is under nearly constant lockdown to prevent fights.lx

Thus the California state prison system cannot adequately house all of the offenders that have

been sentenced.

The cost of incarcerating these individuals is significant, and has risen since the passage

of the Three Strikes law. A 1998 report conducted by the Bureau of State Audits reported that the

annual costs per inmate for the 32 prisons ranged from $18,562 to $38,554 for fiscal year 1996-

97 [and] the statewide average was $24,807.lxi This number has increased, as the Legislative

Analysts Office estimated the annual cost of incarceration in 2006-2007 to be $43, 287

lxii

(See

Appendix E, Figure 2).In comparison, the average cost of one year of tuition and housing at

Stanford University in 2007-2008 is $45,608.lxiii Additionally, the cost of incarcerating second

and third-strikers is significantly higher than non-strikers. This is due to the increased length of

sentences as well as higher security classifications for strikers, even if they were sentenced for

non-violent offenses.

The inmate population of California has also been steadily increasing in age, due to

sentencing laws that dictate longer incarceration time, as well as the overall aging of the baby

boom generation.lxiv The average third striker enters prison at age 36, and the number of inmates

50 years of age and older has increased from about 5,500 to 16,000 between 1994 and 2004. lxv

This has caused a significant increase in costs, as the Campaign for Effective Crime Policies

notes that the cost of incarceration for older prisoners is two to three times that for younger,

healthier ones.lxvi There were also findings of inadequate health care provided in California state

prisons, due in large part to the overcrowding problem. In order to ameliorate this situation,

compliance with court requirements in the three health care programs is expected to result in

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significant additional costs to the department [expected to] exceed $1.2 billion annually by 2010-

11.lxvii The costs of incarcerating the inmate population are already high, and will continue to

increase as the inmates get older.

Although most of the growth was between 1986 and 1998, the 2007 LAO report projects

an increase of 17,000 inmates over the next six years, which would significantly exceed thetotal bed capacity of the prison system in the near term, including housing in nontraditional beds

in gyms and dayrooms.lxviii A dire situation has already occurred, as the Governor had to

announce a state of emergency in October 2006 that would grant him the right to send inmates to

prisons in other states in order to address the overcrowding issues. As a crisis has already been

declared, the projected growth will exacerbate the strain that is currently being felt by the CDCR.

Summation of the Fiscal Impacts of Three Strikes in California

Implementation of the Three Strikes law has impacted the already strained judicial

system and jail populations, as well the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

The increased number of second and third strikers going through the Criminal Justice system in

California has caused a significant fiscal impact. This has resulted in an increase in jury trials, a

rise in jail populations, diversion of resources from civil cases to alleviate the load of second and

third-strike cases as well as alterations in courtroom dynamics. California state prisons have been

overcrowded for years, and the increase in inmates as well as the higher costs of incarceration

has exacerbated this situation. As state funding is not unlimited, the costs of maintaining these

systems at the local and state level are taken out of allotments for other programs, such as higher

education and environmental initiatives.

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V. Conclusion

The question of whether the monetary expenditures required by the Three Strikes law are

worth the impact on crime rates must be addressed. From my research, I have concluded that the

Three Strikes law has had a minimal effect on curbing crime rates and has resulted in inordinate

costs. Crime rates were already declining nation-wide and in California before the passage of the

Three Strikes law. Through county and state comparisons, the findings show that the law has had

little effect on decreasing rates of crime. The only type of crime which the Three Strikes law

may have influenced is property crime, and the result has been minute. The price of

implementation has been high, requiring additional funds at the state and local levels. The

judicial system and jail populations have been significantly impacted, as well as the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

As the United States Sentencing Commission states, most observers of mandatory

sentencing laws agree that the ultimate aim of the law itself, and of punishment in particular, is

the control of crime.lxix If the Three Strikes Law does little to fulfill this aim and is costly to

execute, then there is ample evidence for the modification or repeal of the law. One option is to

mandate that the third strike be violent or serious, as a RAND report revealed that applying the

laws penalties only to violent felons would save half its extra cost but retain two-thirds of its

effectiveness.lxx Changing this provision of the law could increase its efficacy at targeting the

violent offenses that it was initially aimed at, while lowering the costs associated with

incarcerating non-violent offenders for long periods of time.

However, the many barriers to altering the Three Strikes law must be addressed. Under

California law, amendments to initiatives passed by the electorate require a two-thirds vote of

each house of the legislature or another voter initiative. There have been numerous attempts to

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amend the law since its enactment, only one of which has been successful. Approved in 2000,

Proposition 36 provides treatment for drug offenders (first, second and third-strikers), as an

alternative to incarceration. Unfortunately, politicians have at last found a cause that will offend

no powerful interest group,lxxi which makes altering the Three Strikes law nearly impossible.

As no criminal justice system can ensure a crime-free society, lxxii it is imperative to

look at alternative ways to curb crime. Our system is designed to be reactive, but a proactive

approach is necessary. In order to ameliorate the problem of crime, the root causes of criminal

behavior must be addressed, such as poverty, broken and dysfunctional families, and the

influence of the drug culture. One option is to look at fiscally sound preventative strategies

which would achieve superior benefits while requiring fewer funds. It has been suggested that

money spent on such strategies, which range from from early childhood development programs

to mentoring and education to behavioral intervention programs targeting at-risk juveniles and

their familieshave the potential to reduce crime at a much lower cost than incarceration. lxxiii

Californians need to be made aware that such alternative strategies exist and can be more

successful and less costly than incarceration.

Additional research of the crime control impact of the Three Strikes law, the financial

funds required for implementation as well as viable preventative measures should be pursued.

These findings could lead to important implications for the future of mandatory sentencing laws

in the United States, as well as affect the Criminal Justice system as a whole. As the capacity of

society to punish is not infinite, it is essential to study existing policies and laws in order to

increase the efficacy of the system.

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APPENDIX A

Figure 1: Rise and Fall of California Crime Rates

This figure charts the rise and fall of Californiascrime rates per 100,000 population, from 1960-2005. It includes Total Crime, Property Crime andViolent Crime. This shows the increase in all threecrime rates during the 1970s and 1980s, and thesubsequent decrease during the 1990s (Californiamirrored the nationwide trend). Californiaexperienced a decline in crime rates for nine

consecutive years, from 1992 to 2000 (startingbefore the Three Strikes law). During this period,the overall crime rate decreased by 56 percent.

Source: http://www.lao.ca.gov/2007/cj_primer/crim_j1.jpg

Figure 2:Annual Changes in theCalifornia Crime Index 1988-

1996Y

ear Total Violent Property

1988

1.0% 0.6% 1.2%

1989

3.5% 5.7% 2.6%

1990

-0.2% 6.9% -3.0%

1991

1.8% 2.3% 1.5%

1992

-0.3% 2.2% -1.5%

1993

-3.5% -4.1% -3.3%

1994

-6.5% -6.3% -6.7%

1995

-6.9% -4.2% -8.2%


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1996

-12.6% -10.8% -13.5%

Source: Beres, L.S., & Griffith, T.D. (1998). Did Three Strikes Cause the Recent Drop in California Crime? An Analysis of theCalifornia Attorney Generals Report.Loyola, Los Angeles, Law Review. v32-issue10

This table shows the Annual Changes in the California Crime Index from 1988-1996 (total, violent and

property crimes). This illustrates the discrepancy in the Attorney Generals report as he claimed that thecrime rate dropped due to Three Strikes. However, the violent crime rate declined by 4.1 percent in 1993,which the AGs report conceals by including 1993 into the years 1990-1992 during which the violentcrime rate rose.

APPENDIX B

Figure 1: Drops in Violent Crime in Three Strikes and Non-Three Strikes StatesVIOLENT CRIME THREE STRIKES

STATESNON-THREE

STRIKES STATESCALIFORNIA NEW YORK

Average Change in

Violent Crime Rate1990-2002

-13.77% -17.16% -43.23% -58%

Average Change inViolent Crime Rate

1993-2002

-20.24% -22.48% -44.94% -53.80%

AverageViolent Crime Rate

2002

457.48 418.48 593.4 496

Source: 1990-2001: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, prepared by the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (downloaded: Oct. 20, 2003); 2002:FBI, 2002 Uniform Crime Report.

This figure illustrates the drops in violent crime in Three Strikes and Non-Three Strikes States, utilizingthe Average Change from 1990-2002, the Average Change from 1993-2002 and the Average ViolentCrime Rate in 2002. In all the categories, Non-Three Strikes States had superior reductions in crime thanStates with Three Strike laws. For the comparison between California (a Three Strike State) and NewYork (a Non-Three Strike State), New York had higher reductions and a lower overall violent crime ratein 2002.

Figure 2: Drops in Overall Crime in Three Strikes and Non-Three StrikesINDEX CRIME THREE STRIKES

STATESNON-THREE

STRIKES STATESCALIFORNIA NEW YORK

Average Change inIndex Crime Rate

1990-2002

-24.49% -20.55% -40.28% -55.94%

Average Change inIndex Crime Rate

1993-2002

-22.14% -17.18% -38.92% -49.49%

AverageIndex Crime Rate

2002

4089.82 4018.08 3943.7 2803.7

Source: 1990-2001: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, prepared by the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (downloaded: Oct. 20, 2003); 2002:FBI, 2002 Uniform Crime Report.


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This figure illustrates the drops in overall crime in Three Strikes and Non-Three Strikes States, utilizingthe Average Change from 1990-2002, the Average Change from 1993-2002 and the Average ViolentCrime Rate in 2002. Although the Non-Three Strikes States had slightly higher reductions in crime thanStates with Three Strike law, the percentage is very small and the Average Index Crime Rate in 2002 wasstill higher in Three Strikes States. For the comparison between California (a Three Strike State) and NewYork (a Non-Three Strike State), New York had much higher reductions and a significantly lower overall

crime rate in 2002.

APPENDIX C

Figure 1: Similar Decreases in Overall Crime by County, Regardless of Strike

Enhancements (1994-2003) .

This figure illustrates the decrease in overall crimeby county, from 1994-2003. Eight countries areincluded, four of which have strict implementationof the Three Strikes law and four of which haveweak implementation. Figure 1 illustrates thatcounties with disparate implementation experienceda similar decrease in overall crime rates.

Source: California Legislative Analysts Office (2005, October).

A Primer: Three Strikes The Impact After More Than a Decade

Figure 1: Similar Decreases in Violent Crime by County, Regardless of Strike

Enhancements (1994-2003)

.This figure illustrates the decrease in violent crimeby county, from 1994-2003. Eight countries areincluded, four of which have strict implementationof the Three Strikes law and four of which have


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weak implementation. Figure 2 shows that all counties experienced a decline in violent crime rates,regardless of strike enhancements

Source: California Legislative Analysts Office (2005, October).

A Primer: Three Strikes The Impact After More Than a Decade

APPENDIX D

Figure 1: 2007-2008 Projected California State Expenditures

This pie chart reflects for each Agency the expenditureamount and percentage of the total proposed for the budgetyear. Figure includes general, special, and selected bond fundexpenditures. Note funding for Corrections and Rehabilitation($10,065 at 7.0%), Higher Education ($14,909 at $10.4%)and Environmental Protection ($1,474 at 1.0%).

Source:http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/BudgetSummary/SUM/1249561.html

Figure 2: Total

Expenditures for

CDCR Programs

(2006-07 and 2007-08)

Total Expenditures for CDCRa Programs

(Dollars in Millions)

Program2006-07

(Estimated)2007-08

(Proposed)

Change

Amount Percent

Administration b $554 $650 $96 17.3%

Juvenile Institution andParole Operations

531 523 -8 -1.5

Adult Institution andParole Operations

7,983 8,496 513 6.4

Board of Parole Hearings 103 109 6 5.8

Totals $9,170 $9,777 $607 6.6%

a

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.b Includes Corrections Standards Authority, Sentencing Commission, and Community Partnershipsprograms.

Detail may not total due to rounding.


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Source: http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2007/crim_justice/cj_04_5225_anl07.aspx

Proposed General Fund operating expenditures for the budget year total $9.6 billion, an increase of$611 million, or 6.8 percent, above the revised current-year estimate.

APPENDIX E

Figure 1: Percentage of Overcrowding in California State Prisons

This figure illustrates the percentage ofovercrowding in California State Prisons. Itshows that all of the prisons are experiencingsevere levels of overcrowding, due to theincrease in the inmate population. The courtfinding of inadequate health care is also aresult of this crowding, as the CaliforniaDepartment of Corrections and Rehabilitation(CDCR) has been unable to provide basic careto these inmates.

Source:http://www.fdungan.com/prison.htm


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Figure 2: California Annual Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison (2006-2007)

Type of Expenditure Per Inmate CostsSecurity $19,561

Inmate Health Care $9,330

Operations $6,216

Administration$3,351

Inmate Support $2,527

Employment/Training $2,053

Miscellaneous $246

TOTAL $43,287Source: http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2007/crim_justice/cj_04_5225_anl07.aspx

This figure illustrates the high cost of incarcerating individuals in the California prison system. Thisnumber has increased significantly from the statewide average of $24,807 in 1996-1997.

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Austin, J., Clark, J., Hardyman, P., & Henry, A. (2000) Three Strikes and Youre Out: TheImplementation and Impact of Strike Laws. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice - U.S.Department of Justice.

Beres, L.S., & Griffith, T.D. (1998). Did Three Strikes Cause the Recent Drop in CaliforniaCrime? An Analysis of the California Attorney Generals Report. Loyola, Los Angeles, LawReview. v32-issue101.

Butterfield, Fox. New Prisons Cast Shadow Over Higher Education. New York Times 12 April1995.

California Legislative Analysts Office (1995, February 22). The Three Strikes and Youre OutLaw. Retrieved 10/10/2007 from http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_1995/3strikes.html

California Legislative Analysts Office (2007, January 31). Californias Criminal Justice System:a Primer. Retrieved 11/30 from http://www.lao.ca.gov/2007/cj_primer/cj_primer_013107.aspx

California Legislative Analysts Office (2005, October). A Primer: Three Strikes The ImpactAfter More Than a Decade. Retrieved 11/8/2007 fromhttp://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_Strikes/3_strikes_102005.html

California State Auditor Bureau of State Audits (1998, September). California Department ofCorrections: The Cost of Incarcerating Inmates in State-Run Prisons Is Higher Than theDepartments Published Cost. Sacramento, California.


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Clark, J., Austin, J., & Henry, D.A. (1997, September). Three Strikes and Youre Out: AReview of State Legislation. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, NationalInstitute of Justice.

Countrywide Criminal Justice Coordination Committee. (1995, November 15). Impact of the

Three Strikes Law on the Criminal Justice System in Los Angeles County.

Crime States Capture Both Arguments. Contra Costa Times. 27 February 2000.

Domanick, J. (2004). Cruel Justice: Three Strikes and the Politics of Crime in Americas GoldenState. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Ehlers, S., Shiraldi, V. & Ziedenberg, Jason. (2004, March 5). Still Striking Out: Ten Years ofCalifornias Three Strikes. San Francisco, CA: Justice Policy Institute.

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Greenwood, P.W. & Hawken, A. (2002, March).An Assessment of the Effects of CaliforniasThree Strikes Law. Greenwood & Associates

King, R.S. & Mauer, M. (2001, August).Aging Behind Bars: Three Strikes Seven Years Later.The Sentencing Project. Washington, D.C.

Macallair, D. & Males, M. (1999). Striking Out: The Failure of Californias Three Strikes andYoure Out Law. San Francisco, Ca: Justice Policy Institute. As quoted in Greenwood andHawken An Assessment of the Effects of Californias Three Strikes Law, pp. 4

Males, M., Macallair, D. & Taqi-Eddin, K. (1999, March). Striking Out: The Failure ofCalifornias Three Strikes and Youre Out Law. San Francisco, CA: Justice Policy Institute.

Marks, A. (1994, March 10). The Impact of 3 Strikes Laws a Decade Later. The ChristianScience Monitor. Retrieved 10/10/2007 from http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0310/p02s02-usju.html?s=widep

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Stolzenberg, L. & DAllesio, Stewart J. (1997). Three Strikes and Youre Out: The Impact ofCalifornias New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime Rates, Crime and Delinquency.vol. 43, pp. 457-469. As quoted in Greenwood and Hawken An Assessment of the Effects of

Californias Three Strikes Law, pp. 3-4.

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Vitiello, M. Three Strikes Laws a Real or Imagined Deterrent to Crime. Human RightsMagazine: American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities.Retrieved 10/16/07 from http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/spring02/vitiello.html

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i Joe Domanick. (2004). Cruel Justice: Three Strikes and the Politics of Crime in Americas Golden State . Berkeley and LosAngeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 126.ii While a petition for a voter initiative was circulated in 1993, the three strikes law was introduced in the 1994 legislativesession. This was done in hopes of circumventing the ballot initiative, which is more difficult to amend.iii Of the three types of crimes infractions, misdemeanors and felonies felonies are the most serious and offenders can besentenced to state prisons. According to State Law, Penal Code 667.5 defines violent felonies to include robbery, rape,murder and other sex offenses. Penal Code 1192.7 defines serious felonies to include violent felonies with the additionof other offenses, such as assault with intent to commit robbery and burglary of a residence.iv Joe Domanick. (2004). Cruel Justice: Three Strikes and the Politics of Crime in Americas Golden State . Berkeley and

Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 3.vCalifornia Legislative Analysts Office (2005, October).A Primer: Three Strikes The Impact After More Than a Decade,pp. 10.

vi Peter W. Greenwood & Angela Hawken. (March 2002).An Assessment of the Effects of Californias Three Strikes Law .

Greenwood & Associates, pp. 2.vii The FBI Crime Index is the most often employed means of tracking the level of criminal activity, and is composed of fourviolent crimes and four property crimes. The California Crime Index is equivalent to the FBI index except that it doesnot include the property crimes of arson and larceny-theft.viii Scott Ehlers, Vincent Shiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg. (2004, March 5). Still Striking Out: Ten Years of Californias ThreeStrikes. Justice Policy Institute, pp. 22.ix

For more information regarding these issues, see Part 1 and Part 4 of David Schichor & Dale Sechrests Three Strikes andYoure Out: Vengeance as Public Policy.x James Austin, John Clark, Patricia Hardyman & Alan Henry. (2000) Three Strikes and Youre Out: The Implementation

and Impact of Strike Laws. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice - U.S. Department of Justice, pp. 105.xi Vincent Shiraldi, Jason Colbum & Eric Lotke. (September 2004). Three Strikes and Youre Out: An Examination of the

Impact of 3-Strike Laws 10 years after their Enactment. San Francisco, CA: Justice Policy Institute, pp. 11.xii Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith. (1998). Did Three Strikes Cause the Recent Drop in California Crime? AnAnalysis of the California Attorney Generals Report. Loyola, Los Angeles, Law Review. v32-issue101, pp. 111.xiii David Schichor & Dale K. Sechrest. (1996). Three Strikes and youre out: Vengeance as public policy . Thousand Oaks,

London & New Delhi: Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 56.xiv California Legislative Analysts Office (2005, October). A Primer: Three Strikes The Impact After More Than a

Decade,pp. 11.xv Lisa Stolzenberg & Stewart J. DAllesio. (1997) Three Strikes and Youre Out: The Impact of Californias New

Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime Rates, Crime and Delinquency. vol. 43, pp. 457-469. As quoted inGreenwood and HawkenAn Assessment of the Effects of Californias Three Strikes Law , pp. 3-4.xvi Dan Macallair & Mike Males. (1999). Striking Out: The Failure of Californias Three Strikes and Youre Out Law. (1999)San Francisco, Ca: Justice Policy Institute. As quoted in Greenwood and HawkenAn Assessment of the Effects ofCalifornias Three Strikes Law, pp. 4.xvii Joe Domanick. (2004). Cruel Justice: Three Strikes and the Politics of Crime in Americas Golden State. Berkeley andLos Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 191.xviii Kathleen Auerhahn. (2001).Incapacitation, Dangerous Offenders, and Sentencing Reform . Albany, NY: State Universityof New York Press. As quoted in Greenwood and Hawken, pp. 4.xix Peter W. Greenwood, C. Peter Rydell, Allan Abrahamse, Jonathan P. Caulkins, James Chiesa, Karyn Model & Stephen P.Klein. (1994). Three Strikes and Youre Out: Estimated Benefits and Costs of Californias New Mandatory-Sentencing Law.Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, pp. xii.xx Ibid. 19.xxi Ibid. xii.xxii Joe Domanick. (2004). Cruel Justice: Three Strikes and the Politics of Crime in Americas Golden State. Berkeley andLos Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 165.xxiii Office of the Attorney General. (March 1998). Three Strikes and Youre Out Its Impact on the California Criminal

Justice system After Four Year,supra note 4, at 2.xxiv Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith. (1998). Did Three Strikes Cause the Recent Drop in California Crime? An

Analysis of the California Attorney Generals Report. Loyola, Los Angeles, Law Review. v32-issue101, pp. 107-108.xxv It is important to note that during the 1990s, New York Mayor Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Brattonfocused significant resources on combating crime in New York City. Brattons policies were especially effective, as he was aproponent of the broken windows theory, used technology to map high-crime neighborhoods, and hired a significant


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number of cops. Because of these efforts, New York experienced a drastic decrease in crime rates (albeit with multipleinstances of police brutality).xxvi James Austin, John Clark, Patricia Hardyman & Alan Henry. (2000) Three Strikes and Youre Out: The Implementationand Impart of Strike Laws. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice - U.S. Department of Justice, pp. 105.xxvii Scott Ehlers, Vincent Shiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg. (2004, March 5). Still Striking Out: Ten Years of Californias ThreeStrikes. San Francisco, CA: Justice Policy Institute, pp. 20.xxviii Scott Ehlers, Vincent Shiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg. (2004, March 5). Still Striking Out: Ten Years of Californias ThreeStrikes. San Francisco, CA: Justice Policy Institute, pp. 19-21.xxix Ibid. 19-21.xxx Joe Domanick. (2004). Cruel Justice: Three Strikes and the Politics of Crime in Americas Golden State . Berkeley andLos Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 190.xxxi Ibid. 90.xxxii Joe Domanick. (2004). Cruel Justice: Three Strikes and the Politics of Crime in Americas Golden State . Berkeley andLos Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 189.xxxiii James Austin, John Clark, Patricia Hardyman & Alan Henry. (2000) Three Strikes and Youre Out: The Implementation

and Impact of Strike Laws. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice - U.S. Department of Justice, pp. 43.xxxiv Ibid. 107.xxxv Mike Males, Dan Macallair & Khaled Taqi-Eddin. (March 1999). Striking Out: The Failure of Californias ThreeStrikes and Youre Out Law. San Francisco, CA: Justice Policy Institute, pp. 3.xxxvi Scott Ehlers, Vincent Shiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg. (2004, March 5). Still Striking Out: Ten Years of Californias ThreeStrikes. Justice Policy Institute, pp. 15.xxxvii Ibid. 17.xxxviii Michael Vitiello. Three Strikes Laws a Real or Imagined Deterrent to Crime. Human Rights Magazine: AmericanBar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, pp. 2.xxxix Crime States Capture Both Arguments. Contra Costa Times. 27 February 2000.xl California Legislative Analysts Office. (2005, October).A Primer: Three Strikes The Impact After More Than a

Decade,pp. 12.xli Ibid. 12.xlii James Austin, John Clark, Patricia Hardyman & Alan Henry.. (2000) Three Strikes and Youre Out: The Implementation

and Impact of Strike Laws. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice - U.S. Department of Justice, pp. 32.xliii Peter W. Greenwood, C. Peter Rydell, Allan Abrahamse, Jonathan P. Caulkins, James Chiesa, Karyn Model & Stephen P.Klein. (1994). Three Strikes and Youre Out: Estimated Benefits and Costs of Californias New Mandatory-Sentencing Law.Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, pp. xii.xliv California Legislative Analysts Office (2007, January). Californias Criminal Justice System: a Primer, pp. 31.xlv Fox Butterfield. New Prisons Cast Shadow Over Higher Education. New York Times 12 April 1995.xlvi Ibid.xlvii David Schichor & Dale K. Sechrest. (1996). Three Strikes and youre out: Vengeance as public policy. Thousand Oaks,London & New Delhi: Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 268.xlviii Scott Ehlers, Vincent Shiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg. (2004, March 5). Still Striking Out: Ten Years of Californias ThreeStrikes. San Francisco, CA: Justice Policy Institute, pp. 28.xlix James Austin, John Clark, Patricia Hardyman & Alan Henry. (2000) Three Strikes and Youre Out: The Implementationand Impact of Strike Laws. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice - U.S. Department of Justice, pp. 44.l John Clark, James Austin & D. Alan Henry. (September 1997). Three Strikes and Youre Out: A Review of State

Legislation. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, pp. 3.li Ibid. 3.lii California Legislative Analysts Office (February 22, 1995). The Three Strikes and Youre Out Law, pp. 1.liii Michael Vitiello. (1997). Three Strikes: Can we Return to Rationality.Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 87,pp. 3.liv Lois G. Forer. (1994).A Rage to Punish: the Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Sentencing. New York/London:W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 3.lv John Clark, James Austin & D. Alan Henry. (1997, September). Three Strikes and Youre Out: A Review of State

Legislation. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, pp. 3.lvi Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer. (2001, August).Aging Behind Bars: Three Strikes Seven Years Later. The SentencingProject. Washington, D.C.lvii Joe Domanick. (2004). Cruel Justice: Three Strikes and the Politics of Crime in Americas Golden State . Berkeley andLos Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 227.lviii California Legislative Analysts Office (2007, January). Californias Criminal Justice System: a Primer, pp. 17.


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lix California Legislative Analysts Office (2005, October).A Primer: Three Strikes The Impact After More Than a Decade ,pp. 5.lx John Pomfret. Californias Crisis in Prison System a Threat to the Public. Washington Post. 11 June 2006.lxi California State Auditor Bureau of State Audits (September 1998). California Department of Corrections: The Cost of

Incarcerating Inmates in State-Run Prisons Is Higher Than the Departments Published Cost. Sacramento, California, pp. 1.lxiiCalifornia Legislative Analysts Office (2007, January). Californias Criminal Justice System: a Primer, pp. 33.lxiii www.stanford.edu 2007-2008 Student Budget (Undergraduate Admissions)lxiv

Aside from the excessive cost of incarcerating older inmates, it has been pointed out that the time during which offendersare most prolific is during their teens and twenties. Thus the argument is that these older offenders should be released asthey most likely present little threat to public safety.lxv California Legislative Analysts Office (2005, October).A Primer: Three Strikes The Impact After More Than a

Decade, pp. 7.lxvi Scott Ehlers, Vincent Shiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg. (2004, March 5). Still Striking Out: Ten Years of Californias ThreeStrikes. Justice Policy Institute, pp. 22.lxvii California Legislative Analysts Office (2007, January). Californias Criminal Justice System: a Primer, pp. 23.lxviii Ibid. 36.lxix Lois G. Forer. (1994). A Rage to Punish: the Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Sentencing. New York/London:

W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 63.lxx Peter W. Greenwood, C. Peter Rydell, Allan Abrahamse, Jonathan P. Caulkins, James Chiesa, Karyn Model & Stephen P.Klein. (1994). Three Strikes and Youre Out: Estimated Benefits and Costs of Californias New Mandatory-Sentencing Law.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, pp. xiv.lxxi Peter W. Greenwood, C. Peter Rydell, Allan Abrahamse, Jonathan P. Caulkins, James Chiesa, Karyn Model & Stephen P.Klein. (1994). Three Strikes and Youre Out: Estimated Benefits and Costs of Californias New Mandatory-Sentencing Law.Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, pp. xiv.lxxii Lois G. Forer. (1994).A Rage to Punish: the Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Sentencing. New York/London:W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 167.lxxiii California Legislative Analysts Office (2007, January). Californias Criminal Justice System: a Primer, pp. 35.

criminal justice in the golden state: rethinking the "three strikes and you're out law"

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