criminal law as public law

Criminal Law as Public Law

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PhilosophicalFoundationsofCriminalLawR.A.DuffandStuartGreen

Printpublicationdate:2011PrintISBN-13:9780199559152PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:May2011DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001

CriminalLawasPublicLawMalcolmThorburn

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0002

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapterarguesthatcriminallawscholarshavetendedtodrawtoocloseananalogybetweenthesystemofcriminallawandthatofprivatemorality.Inplaceofsuchalegalmoralistaccount,thischapteroffersapubliclawaccountofthecriminaljusticesystem,whichconceivesoftheoperationsofthecriminaljusticesystem,insofarastheyarelegitimate,asconcernedwiththebasicquestionofpubliclaw:whentheuseofstatepowerislegitimate.LikethenewlegalmoralismofDuffandGardner,thisaccountisanattempttojustifytheworkingsofthecriminaljusticesystembydemonstratingthattheyarejustwhatisrequiredforustobetruetoasetofrolesandrelationshipsthathaveintrinsicvalue.Buttherelevantrolesandrelationshipsforcriminaljusticearenotthoseweunderstandfromordinarymorality.Rather,theyarethelegallydefinedrolessuchasprivatecitizen,policeofficer,judge,etc.thatwetakeupwithinalargerconstitutionalorderthat,wecouldnotabolishwithoutabandoningnecessarypreconditionsforourmorallife.


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Keywords:criminallaw,privatemorality,publiclawaccount,criminaljusticesystem,legalmoralism

1INTRODUCTIONWhentryingtomakesenseofaninstitutionthatcausesasmuchhardshipasoursystemofcriminaljustice,itisperfectlynaturaltoaskwhatgoodwemeantobringaboutthroughallthissuffering.Indeed,thisquestionhasbeenthecentralfocusofbothmajorschoolsinpunishmenttheoryforcenturies.Utilitarianssuggestthatthishardshipisultimatelyworthwhilebecauseitpreventsmoreharmthanitcauses(throughdeterrence,1rehabilitation,2etc).Mostretributivistssuggestthatpunishing(p.22) theguiltyisitselfanimportantgoodtobepursued.3TheproblemsassociatedwithbothviewsarealltoofamiliarandIdon'tmeantorehearsethemhere.Thepointformypurposesissimplytonotethatbothapproachestakeitforgrantedthatthewaytojustifytheworkingsofthecriminaljusticesystem,ifthatcanbedoneatall,istodisplayitsvalueasatoolforpursuingsomeindependentlyidentifiablegood.

Butnotallinstitutionscanbejustifiedbyreferencetothegoodstheybringabout.Takethefamily.Withinthisinstitution,therearesomeclearlydefinedroles(parent,child,sibling,etc)andthereareappropriatewaysforoccupantsofeachroletorelatetoothers.Oneofthemostimportantwaysformembersofafamilytorelatetooneanother,ofcourse,istoshowloveandconcernforthem.Ifoneweretoaskwhatisthepointofshowingloveandconcernforafamilymember?theanswerwouldinvolvemuchmorethanjustthegoodsonemeanttobringaboutbydoingso.Instead,theanswerwouldidentifytheintrinsicvalueofstandinginthesesortsoffamilialrelationshipstoothers,howoccupyingthesesortsofrolesmakesourlivesricher,etc.Giventhatitisvaluabletooccupythesevariousfamilyrolesandtostandinfamilialrelationstoothers,itfollowsthatthereisvalueinactinginaccordancewiththedemandsofthoseroles,whatevertheymightbe.Soifweareaskedtojustifythepracticescharacteristicofaparentorsibling,wewouldnotsimplyidentifyanygoodsthatactinginthiswaywouldbringabout;instead,wewouldsimplypointoutthatthesepracticesarepartofwhatitmeanstoplayourpartinaninstitutionthatisintrinsicallyvaluable.

TwoofthemostinfluentialcriminallawtheoristsofrecenttimesAntonyDuffandJohnGardnerhavesuggestedthatweshouldpursueajustificatorystrategyofthissortfortheinstitutionsofcriminaljustice.ForbothDuffandGardner,thecoreofthecriminaljusticesystemisthetrial,foritisherethatwecanseemostclearlytheintrinsicvalueoftherolesandrelationshipsthatmatterinthecriminaljusticesystem.Inacriminaltrial,theyargue,wearesimplydoinginasomewhatmoreformalwaywhatwedoprivatelyallthetime.Whensomeonecommitsamoralwrong,wefeeltheurgetodemandanexplanationfromher:didyoureallydowhatIthinkyoudid?Canyoujustifywhatyoudid?Doyouhaveanyexcuseforyourconduct?Andsoon.Wedon'tnecessarilythinkthatanyfurthergoodwillcomeofaskingthesequestions;wesimplyfeelthatitisappropriateinthesecircumstancestodemandanexplanationand,ifasked,wefeelthatitisappropriatetoprovideone.Thereasonwhyweundertakethisexerciseboththequestioningandtheansweringisthatitispartofwhatitmeanstorelatetooneanotherasresponsiblemoralagents.Answeringforyourwrongdoingisjustwhatresponsiblemoralagentsdo.Togiveupthispracticewouldbetantamounttogivingupour


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conceptionofourselvesandofourfellowsasresponsibleagents.(p.23)

MypointhereisnottoendorseDuffandGardner'saccountofthecriminaljusticesystem.Instead,Imeantoendorseoneaspectoftheirprojecttheideathatwemayjustifyasetofpracticesbyshowingthattheyarerequiredtobetruetoasetofrolesandrelationshipsthatwetaketobeintrinsicallyvaluablewhilerejectingtheparticularwaythattheygoaboutjustifyingthepracticesofthecriminaljusticesystem.ThetroublewithDuffandGardner'saccount,Ibelieve,isthattheytooquicklyassumethatthepracticesofthecriminaljusticesystemarenothingmorethanformalizedversionsoftheprivatepracticeofcallingotherstoaccountfortheirmoralwrongdoing.Asaresult,theyveryquicklytrytore-shapethecriminaljusticesystemtomakeitfitthecontoursofordinarymorality.Theyaretherebycommittedtotheviewthatlegitimatecriminalwrongsmustallbemoralwrongsandthatcriminaljustificationsshouldtrackthestructureofmoraljustifications.Mostcontroversially,theyarguethatthepracticeofcriminalpunishment,insofarasitisjustifiableatall,isnothingmorethanaformalized,institutionalizedversionofthesortsofthingsthatprivatepeopleareentitledtodotooneanotherinresponsetomoralwrongs,aswell.4

DuffandGardner'snew-fangledlegalmoralismcannotsucceed,Ibelieve,becauseitispremisedontryingtoturncriminaljusticeintosomethingthatitisnot.Therearethreeimportantdifferencesbetweenthestate-dominatedpracticesofcriminaljusticeandtheprivatemoralpracticeofcallingoneanothertoaccountthatmakeitimpossibleforustothinkofoneasnothingmorethanascaled-upversionoftheother.First,thecriminaljusticesystemisgenerallythoughttobelegitimatelycoerciveinawaythatourprivatepracticesneverare.AsJohnLockeputit,Everymanisentitledtoadmonish,exhort,andconvinceanotheroferror,andleadhimbyreasoningtoaccepthisownopinions.Butitisthemagistrate'sprovincetogiveordersbydecreeandcompelwiththesword.5Second,becauseoftheuniquelycoerciveandstate-dominatednatureofthecriminaljusticesystem,itisthoughttobenecessarilysubjecttoliberalprinciplesthatrespectourindividualfreedomtoarrangeourprivateaffairsasweseefitthatgrantuswhatJeremyWaldroncallsarighttodowrong6insuchmatters.Andthird,thelegalmoralistviewjustdoesnotfitwithexistingdoctrine:criminalwrongsandjustificationsinthecommonlawworlddonotevenapproximatelyfollowthecontoursofmoralwrongdoingandjustification.7(p.24)

Inthischapter,IproposeadifferentwayofjustifyingthepracticesofthecriminaljusticesystemapositionIcallapubliclawaccountofcriminaljustice.Icallitapubliclawaccountbecauseitconceivesoftheoperationsofthecriminaljusticesystem,insofarastheyarelegitimate,8asconcernedwiththebasicquestionofpubliclaw:whentheuseofstatepowerislegitimate.LikethenewlegalmoralismofDuffandGardner,myaccountisanattempttojustifytheworkingsofthecriminaljusticesystembydemonstratingthattheyarejustwhatisrequiredforustobetruetoasetofrolesandrelationshipsthathaveintrinsicvalue.Buttherelevantrolesandrelationshipsforcriminaljusticearenotthoseweunderstandfromordinarymorality.Rather,theyarethelegallydefinedrolessuchasprivatecitizen,policeofficer,judge,etcthatwetakeupwithinalarger


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constitutionalorderthat,Ishallargue,wecouldnotabolishwithoutabandoningnecessarypreconditionsforourmorallife.9

Theadvantagesofthisapproachareseveral.First,becausetheliberalconstitutionalorderisconcernedwithprotectingourlibertyratherthanwithguidingourmoralchoices,itisconsistentwithalessmoralisticcriminaljusticesystemthantheoneDuffandGardnerfeelimpelledtoendorse.Second,becausetherelationsintheconstitutionalorderaresetoutintermsoftherightfuluseofcoercion,thepubliclawaccounthastheresourcestoexplainwhenthestateisjustifiedinusingcoerciveforcetowarditscitizens.Thismeansthatweareabletoprovideanaccountofcriminaljusticethatdoesnothavetoexplainawaythecentralityofcoercivestatepower.Andfinally,becauseAnglo-Americancriminallawdoctrineisfundamentallyconcernedwiththerequirementsofliberalconstitutionalismratherthantheenforcementofmorality,wefindthatthepubliclawmodelisamuchbetterfitwithexistingdoctrinethanthemoralistalternative.

2THERISEOFLEGALMORALISM

2.1Hart'sfalsepromiseThelegalmoralistpositionsofDuffandGardnerthathavecometoplaysuchanimportantpartincriminallawtheoryinrecentyearsarebestunderstoodaspartofalongerhistoricaldevelopment.Thirtyyearsago,thecriminallawtheoryworldinwhich(p.25)contemporarylegalmoralismwasbornwasdominatedbythewritingofHLAHart.10ForcenturiesbeforeHart,thephilosophyofcrimeandpunishmentconsistedlargelyinawarofattritionbetweenutilitarianandretributivistaccounts.Retributivistsinsistedthattheirswastheonlyaccountthatcouldshowwhyparticularindividualsdeservedtobepunished.Utilitarianscounteredthatthereasonsforpunishmentprofferedbyretributivistswerelittlemorethanprimalinstinctsforrevenge;11theonlyadequateaccountofpunishment,theyinsisted,wouldhavetoshowthatitwaspartofalargerstrategythatpromotedthegeneralwelfare.Tothis,theretributivistsrepliedthattheutilitarianaccountofpunishmentwasmorallyindefensible:itwasnothingmorethanastrategyforusingthecensureandpunishmentofparticularindividualsasinstrumentsforthepromotionofpoliciestheymightnotshare.Andonitwent.

Inhisfamousessay,ProlegomenontothePrinciplesofPunishment,Hartpromisedtoresolvethedisputebyfindingthevalueineachapproachandputtingeachinitsproperplace.12HartclaimedthatwhathecalledtheGeneralJustifyingAimoftheinstitutionofpunishmentasawholewaslikelytobeutilitarian,buttheprinciplesbywhichwedistributepunishmenttoparticularindividualsmustberetributivist.Bythis,Hartmeantthatthedecisionwhetherornottopunishaparticularindividualoughtnevertobedeterminedsolelybyconsideringthebeneficialoutcomesitwouldbringabout.Instead,weoughttobesurethattheaccusedwasgivenfairnoticeoftheprohibitionandthathewasalsogivenafairchancetoavoidcommittingtheoffence.Onlyiftheaccusedchosetocommittheoffencedespitethefairnoticeandthefairopportunitytoavoiddoingsoshouldwepunishhim,foronlythencouldwesaythathewastrulygivenafairchancetoavoidpunishmentandmadeameaningfulchoicetobringituponhimself.


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Formanyyears,Hart'saccountwasthoughttobeaworkableresolutiontothelong-standingdisputebetweenretributivistsandutilitarians.Buteventually,theweaknessinHart'sargumentbecameclear.AlthoughHartclaimedtohavegivendueregardtobothsidesinthedebate,hispositionwasreallyafundamentallyutilitarianone,for,asJohnGardnerpointsout,[t]heonlyHart-approvedreasoninfavourofpunishingtheguilty(oranyoneelse)isthereasongivenbypunishment'sgeneral(p.26) justifyingaim,vizthatfuturewrongdoingistherebyreduced.13Hart'sprinciplesofdistribution,whichheclaimedwouldensurethatpunishmentwasonlyimposeduponthedeserving,werenothingmorethanside-constraintsontheimpositionofpunishment.Thatis,theyweremechanismstoensurethatnofurtherinjusticewasdonebypunishingthosewhowerenotgivenfairnoticeoftheprohibitionorwhodidnothaveafairopportunitytoavoidoffending,buttheydidnotofferanypositiverationaletotheindividualwhowasabouttosuffercensureandpunishment.DespiteHart'sproteststothecontraryhesimplyprovidedanotherutilitariancontributiontotheongoingpunishmenttheorydebate.

2.2ThemoralistresurgenceOverthepast30years,AntonyDuffhasledamovementtoreplaceHart'sutilitarianismasthedominanttheoryofcriminaljusticewithasortoflegalmoralism.Duff'snewmoralismshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeratherdifferentlegalmoralistpositionchampionedbyPatrickDevlininthe1960s,however.Devlin'sbrandoflegalmoralismwasnotreallyconcernedwiththeenforcementofmoralityforitsownsake;rather,hiscentralobjectivewastousethecriminallawasawayofpreventingsocietalcollapse.This,hebelieved,requiredthatthecriminallawenforcebroadlysharedmoralconvictionsaboutrightandwrong,whetherornotthoseconvictionswereinfactmorallysound.Asocietywithoutsomesharedsetofmoralconvictions,hethought,wasdoomedtocollapse.ThemainpointofDevlin'slegalmoralism,then,wassimplytoenforcesomesortofsharedsocietalnormsnotfortheirownsakebutonlyasawayoffosteringsocialcohesion.14

TheadvocatesofthenewmoralismsuchasDuffandGardner,bycontrast,takemoralityveryseriouslyonitsownterms.Indeed,forDuff,theprojectfromtheverybeginninghasbeentoexploretheimplicationsoftheKantiandemandthatweshouldrespectotherpeopleasrationalandautonomousmoralagents.15AnditisonpreciselythesegroundsthatheattacksHart'sutilitarianaccount.Heputsthepointmostsuccinctly,asfollows:

Ifwearetojustifymaintainingasystemofcriminallaw,asaparticulartypeoflegalinstitution,wemustexplainwhythestateshouldregulatecertainkindsofconductby(p.27) definingthemaswrongsPartofthatexplanationwillconsistinanaccountofwhythisapproachisconsistentwiththerespectthatisduetothosewhoseconductthestateseekstoregulate16

Andonthatscore,Duffargues,theutilitarianaccountofpunishmentfailsentirely.Theonlywaytosatisfythisdemandistore-thinkthenatureofthecriminaljusticeenterprisefromthegroundup.

Ratherthanthinkingofthecriminaljusticesystemasadeliverymechanismfor


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punishment,Duffsuggeststhatweshouldthinkoftheproceduresofcriminallawespeciallythetrialasendsinthemselves.17Ifwedoso,thenitbecomespossibletoconceiveofthecriminaljusticesystemassimplyanothermanifestationofourordinarymoralpracticesofholdingoneanothertoaccountformoralwrongdoingand,thus,asanessentialpartofoursharedmorallife,crucialtoourclaimofbeingresponsiblemoralagents.18JohnGardnernicelydrawstheparallelbetweenthecriminaljusticesystemandourextra-legalmoralpracticeswiththefollowingrhetoricalquestion:Doesn'tthecriminaljusticesystemattempt,initsinevitablyclumsyway,toinstitutionalizecertainmoralpractices,includingthepracticeofpunishmentwithitsfamiliarrelationshipstowrongdoingandguilt,thatalreadyexistquiteapartfromthelawanditsinstitutions?19

Duffevengoessofarastosuggestthatthecriminaljusticesystemisjustamechanismforcallingpeopletoaccount,eliminatingalmostentirelytheusualrolegiventolegislativechoiceincraftingthescopeofcriminalprohibitions.Hearguesasfollows:

[W]eshouldnotseethecriminallawasprohibitingtheconductthatitdefinesasmalainseasofferingthecitizenscontent-independentreasonstorefrainfromsuchconduct.Weshouldseeitinsteadasdeclaringsuchconducttoconstituteapublicwrongproperlycondemnedbythecommunity,forwhichtheagentisanswerabletothecommunitythroughacriminalprocess.20

(p.28)

Indeed,giventhatwearedealingwithgenuine,freestandingmoralwrongs,Duffargues,itwouldbedisrespectfulforusnottocallourfellowcitizenstoaccountfortheirgenuinemoralwrongdoing.Theonlyoneswedonotbothertocalltoaccountfortheirconductarethosewhomwebelievetobeincapableofexplainingtheirconduct:smallchildren,animals,andtheinsane.JohnGardnerputsthepointevenmorestrongly,asfollows:iftheyarebasicallyresponsible,allwrongdoershaveaninterestinbeingpunished.Sinceallrationalbeingswanttoasserttheirbasicresponsibility,allelsebeingequaltheycannotbutwelcomewhatevercontributestothatassertion.21SoforDuffandGardner,thecoreofthecriminaljusticesystemisthetrial,andthetrialshouldbeunderstoodasthemechanismthroughwhichapoliticalcommunitycallsitsmemberstoaccountfortheirfailurestoliveuptoitsstandardsandprovidesthemwiththeopportunitytorespondtoallegationsagainstthembydenyingtheallegation,byprovidingananswer(bywayofjustificationorexcuse),orbyconfessingwrongdoing.22

Onthenewlegalmoralistaccount,criminalpunishmentnotonlycedescentrestagetothetrial,itactuallyfadesawayfromthepicturealmostentirely.Itisnotsurprising,then,tofindthatbothDuffandGardneradmittoasortofscepticismaboutthepossibilityofeverjustifyingtheelementofpunishmentinthecriminaljusticesystem.AntonyDufftriestore-definecriminalpunishmentasasortofnon-coercive,communicativeprocessdesignedtobringaboutwhathecallssecularpenance.23AndJohnGardneradmitstoasortofscepticismaboutjustifiedpunishment.Hisbestdefenceofthepracticeofcriminalpunishmentisthatitisjustifiedonthesamegroundsasprivateactsofpunishmentwithperhapssomeaddedreasonsinfavourofpunishmentsuchasthedisplacementofprivate


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instinctsforrevenge.24Heputshispointasfollows:

Thecriminallaw(evenwhenitsresponsesarenon-punitive)habituallywreakssuchhavocinpeople'slives,anditspunitivesideissuchanextraordinaryabomination,thatitpatentlyneedsallthejustificatoryhelpitcanget.Ifwebelieveitshouldremainafixtureinourlegalandpoliticalsystem,wecannotaffordtodispensewithordisdainanyofthevariousthings,howevermodestandlocalized,whichcanbesaidinitsfavour[T]otheextentthatanyofthemlapseorfail,thecaseforabolitionofthecriminallawcomesastepclosertovictory.25

(p.29)

Thenewlegalmoralistprojectseemstocomeveryclosetoeliminatingtheplaceoflegitimatecoercioninthecriminaljusticeprocessaltogether.

DuffandGardnerareonlytwoofthebest-knownlegalmoraliststoday.Therearemanyotherswhodonotprovideanycomprehensiveaccountforwhycriminallawdoctrineoughttofollowthestructureofmoraltheory,butsimplyassumethatthisisso,withoutexplanation,andproceedaccordingly.Thepointformypurposes,however,isnotthedetailsofthesepositionsbutsimplytonotehowtheyhavereorientedcriminallawtheory.BecausetheDuff-Gardnerversionoflegalmoralismconceivesofthecriminalprocessassimplyaformalizedversionofprivatepracticesofcallingtoaccount,theysaythatthestructureofcriminallawdoctrineshouldfollowquitecloselythemoralstatusoftheaccused'sconduct.Unlessthereissomeoverridingreasontodothingsotherwiseinaparticularcase,theyassumethatcriminallawwrongsaremoralwrongs;criminallawjustificationsaremoraljustifications;andcriminallawexcusesaremoralexcuses.

2.3LegalmoralismandcriminalwrongsOnceweturnfromtheoreticalconsiderationsaboutthejustificationofthecriminalprocesstothebusinessofexplainingactualcriminallawdoctrine,thingsbecomeagooddealmorecomplicatedforlegalmoralists.Forthefactisthatcriminalwrongdoingdoesnottrackmoralwrongdoingevenremotelyclosely.SolongaswearesimplyarrangingourownaffairsratherthandeterminingtheaffairsofothersAnglo-Americancriminallawdoesnotconcernitselfwithourmoralwrongdoing.Forexample,eventhoughalmostallplausiblemoraltheorieswouldrequireustomakeeasyrescues,26thereisnogeneraldutytorescueincriminallaw.Thecriminallawleavesituptouswhattodowithourmoneyandourbodies.27Anditisnotgenerallyacrimetoengageinimmoralactsperse28onourownorwithotherssolongaswehavetheirvalidconsent.29(p.30)

Thelegalmoralists,ofcourse,arewellawareoftheseconcernsandtheyhavewell-rehearsedanswerstothesechallenges.JohnGardnerseekstoexplainthelaw'sreluctancetointerfereinourprivateaffairsbyrecoursetotheharmprinciple;30andDuff(togetherwithSandraMarshall)suggeststhatwemayexplainmostoftheseconcernsbyrefiningthenotionofmoralwrongdoingtowhathecallspublicwrongs.31Itmightbepossibletoadjusttheclaimsoflegalmoralismthroughoneormoreofthesemechanismstofitbetterwiththestructureofcriminallawoffences,butthequestion


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remainswhetherthescopeoftheadjustments,andtheirseeminglyadhocnature,makeslegalmoralismlessplausibleasanaccountofcriminalwrongdoing.Tosomeextent,theonlywaytoshowtheweaknessofmoralismonthisscoreistoofferupabetteralternative(achallengeIshalltakeuplaterinthischapter).

2.4LegalmoralismandcriminaljustificationLegalmoralismisnotsimplyatheoryaboutcriminalwrongdoing;itisalsoatheoryaboutjustificationdefencesincriminallaw.Followingthelogicoflegalmoralism,AntonyDuffinsiststhatitisaplausiblepresumptionthattheconceptofjustificationshouldfunctioninlegalthoughtinatleastroughlythewaythatitfunctionsinextra-legalmoralthought.32Anditisforthisreason,too,thatJohnGardnerfeelsthatheisabletoslidebetweenmoralandlegalconceptionsofjustificationwithease:Ourinterest,hewrites,isintheordinaryphenomenon,thatofjustification,whichstillplaysamajorroleinthethinkingofmostcriminalcourts.33

Sincethereiswidespreadagreementamonglegalmoraliststhatjustificationdefencesshouldmirrorthestructureofmoraljustification,mostofthemhavesimplytakenthispointforgrantedandmovedontoanareawherethereisgenuine(p.31) disagreement:viz,whatisthebestmoraltheoryofjustification?TheoristsofautilitarianpersuasionsuchasPaulRobinsoninclinetowardabalanceofharmapproachtojustifications.34Whenwecauseharmtopreventagreaterharm,Robinsonargues,duetothespecialcircumstancesofthesituation,noharmhasinfactoccurred.35JohnGardnerandAntonyDuff,borrowingheavilyfromGeorgeFletcher,argueforadistinctivelynon-utilitarianaccountofjustification.36AccordingtoGardner,whenwesaythatsomethingismorallywrongful,wearesimplysayingthattherearestrongmoralreasonsnottodoit.Whenwesaythatsomethingisjustified,wedonottherebysuggestthatitisnolongerwrongful.Indeed,itispreciselybecauseitiswrongfulthatitcallsforjustification.Ajustificationdoesnotundothewrongfulnessoftheact,Gardnerargues;instead,itsimplyprovidesstrongcountervailingreasonsinfavourofdoingtheact.

ButdoeseitheraccountofjustificationfitexistingAnglo-Americancriminallawdoctrine?Absolutelynot.Themainpurposeofthenextsectionistoshowthatthesettleddoctrineofjustificationdefencesinthecommonlaw,justlikethestructureofcriminalwrongdoing,isconcernedwiththeprotectionofjurisdiction,bothpublicandprivate,ratherthanwiththeidentificationofmoralwrongs.Althoughmyoverarchingconcerniswithrivalaccountsofcriminallawasawhole,Ifocusonjustificationdefencesherefortworeasons.First,justificationdefencesappeartopresentthestrongestcaseinfavourofthelegalmoralistview.Sincejustificationdefencespermitindividualscaughtinextraordinarycircumstancestodothingsthattheyarenotnormallypermittedtodo,theymightseemtoprovideproofthatcriminallawisprimarilyconcernedwiththedemandsofmoralityratherthanwiththeallocationofjurisdiction.IfIamabletoshowthatajurisdictionalaccountofjustificationsispossible,thiswillmaketherestoftheaccountagooddealeasiertomake.Second,Ibelievethatjustificationdefencesarenotonlyconsistentwiththeprotectionofjurisdiction;theyare,infact,crucialdevicesforgivingeffecttoclaimsofjurisdictionindifficultcircumstances.Developingthejurisdictionalaccountof


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justifications,Ibelieve,willallowustomakesenseofagreatmanyotherfeaturesofcriminallawdoctrinethathavehithertobeenleftunexplained.AfterIhavedevelopedthisaccountofthestructureofcriminaloffencesanddefencesinsection3,Iwillreturninsection4tothejustificationofthecriminaljusticesystemasawholeandshowhowthepubliclawaccountofcriminallaw,unlikelegalmoralism,isfocusedonthequestionofjurisdiction.(p.32)

3CRIMINALLAWANDJURISDICTION

3.1Necessity:theparadigmaticjustificationThenecessitydefencesometimescalledthedefenceoflesserevilsisoftenreferredtoastheparadigmaticjustification.37IntheAmericanModelPenalCode,itissimplyreferredtoasjustificationgenerally.38Itsexistenceisoftentakentobeproofpositiveofthetruthofthelegalmoralistposition.Accordingtothemoralistview,thecriminallawisconcernedwithmoralwrongdoing,soitisappropriatethatmorallyjustifiedconductshouldalsobetreatedasjustifiedincriminallaw.Whenthingsbecomedifficult,thenecessitydefenceappearstoallowustoignoreclaimsofjurisdictionasmerelegaltechnicalitiesthatgetbetweenusanddoingthemorallyrightthing.Butthatreadingofthenecessitydefence,Ibelieve,isdeeplymisguided.AcrossAnglo-Americancriminallawindeed,evenundertheModelPenalCodethedefenceofnecessityiscentrallyconcernedwithquestionsofjurisdiction.

ConsiderthefamousEnglishcaseofSouthwarkLondonBoroughCouncilvWilliams.39Inthatcase,thecouncilinchargeofthepublichousingfortheLondonboroughofSouthwarkleftmuchofitvacantforlongperiodsoftimeeventhoughtherewasanextremehousingshortageinLondonatthetime.Noticingthatthepublichousingwasleftvacant,anumberofhomelessfamiliesdecidedtoseekshelterthere.Theyenteredpeaceablyanddidnotcausesignificantdamagetotheproperty(indeed,someofthesquattersmadeconsiderablerepairstotheproperty).40Thecouncil,noticingthatthepropertywasoccupiedwithoutitspermission,broughtanactionfortheimmediateevictionofthefamiliesfromthepublichousing.Thesquattersclaimedthattheiroccupationofthepublichousingwasjustifiedon(p.33) groundsofnecessity.Onalmostanyplausiblemoraltheory,thesquattersclaimwouldsurelyhavesucceeded.Theirreasonforsquattingwasaveryweightyone:thatitwasnecessaryinorderforthemselvesandtheirfamiliestoliveunderhumaneconditions.Thereasonagainsttheirsquattingwasratherthin:simplythatthecouncilhadnotgrantedthempermissiontodoso.Nevertheless,theCourtofAppealforEnglandandWalesinsistedthat,howevermorallyjustifiedthesquattersdecisionwastomoveintothevacanthousing,itwassimplynottheirdecisiontomake.Citizensmustdefertothepublicofficialswhosejobitistomakedecisionsabouthowbesttousepublichousing.LordDenningstated:Theymustappealtothecouncil,whowill,Iamsure,doalltheycan.TheycangototheMinister,ifneedbe.But[w]ecannotallowanyindividuals,howevergreattheirdespair,totakethelawintotheirownhandsandenteruponthesepremises.41

Next,considerthecaseofconcernedcitizensengagedincivildisobediencetoprevent


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othersfromcarryingoutseriousharm.Consistently,courtsdenythemajustificationdefenceonthegroundsthat,howevernobletheiractions,somedecisionsaresimplynotuptoordinarycitizenstomake.Ifwedisagreewithourgovernment'smilitaryorotherpolicies,thenthepropercourseofactionistoappealtopublicofficialstochangetheirminds.42Thisisusuallycapturedintherequirementthattheactormusthavenolegalalternativestoviolatingthelaw.43Whetherornotwearerightaboutthemoralityofthesituation,itissimplynotwithinourjurisdictiontodecidesuchmatters.And,ofcourse,thesameistruewhenindividualstrytousurpthejurisdictionofotherprivateactors,aswell,nomatterhownobletheirmotives.RobinHood,whotakespropertyfromtherich(whomaynotevennoticeitsabsence)andgivesittothepoor(whomayneeditdesperately),isstilltreatedasathiefbyAnglo-Americancriminallaw.Thedoctorwhoperformsabloodtransfusionagainstacompetentpatient'swillcommitsacriminalassaultevenifitisnecessarytosaveherlifeandherreasonsagainstitaretrivialorevensilly.Thequestionofwhetherornottoacceptabloodtransfusionisinthepatient'sjurisdiction,notthedoctor's,nomatterhowmorallysuperiorthedoctor'sviewofthemattermightbe.44Onceagain,thecriminallaw'sfocusisontheallocationofjurisdictionratherthan(p.34) onthemoralityofparticularacts.Nomatterhowvirtuousourconduct,thelawwillnotgrantusajustificationifweareusurpingsomeoneelse'sauthoritytodoit.

TheWilliamscaseandthecaseofcivildisobediencearebothfailedclaimsofcriminallawjustificationwheresomeonetriestousurpanother'sjurisdictiononthegroundsthatheisdoingthemorallyjustifiedthing.Puttogether,theyseemtosuggestthatnomatterhowstrongthemoraljustificationforouractions,thelawrequiresusnevertointerfereinmattersthatareoutsideourjurisdiction;theyseemtoprecludethepossibilityofanyoneeversuccessfullyclaimingacriminallawjustification.Butifthatisso,thenitseemsthatthecriminallawofjustificationscannomorebesquaredwithaconcernforjurisdictionthanitcanwithlegalmoralism.Thekeytoreconcilingaconcernforjurisdictionwiththenecessitydefenceindeed,withjustificationdefencesgenerallyistoconsiderhowitmightbepossibletojustifyinterferinginanother'sjurisdiction.Theonlywaywecouldrendersuchinterferingconsistentwiththevictim'sclaimofjurisdiction,Iargue,isbyintroducingtheideaofassuminganother'sjurisdictionprotem.45

Consider,onceagain,thecaseofthedoctorwhobelievesthatthebestcourseofactionforhisunconsciouspatientistoperformabloodtransfusion.Shouldthepatienthavemadeclearherdesirenevertohaveabloodtransfusionunderanycircumstances,thenthedoctorwouldhavenorighttoperformthetransfusionthepatienthasdecidednottoacceptatransfusionanditisherdecisiontomake.Butifsheisunconsciousandhassimplynotmadeherwishesclearonthemattereitherway,thenthedoctorisinaverydifferentsituation.Now,itissimplyunknownwhatthepatient'swishesmightbeherjurisdictionhasnotbeenexercisedonewayortheotheronthismatter.Ofcourse,thereisadefaultpresumptionagainstinterferingwithaperson'sbodywithoutherconsent,butitisadefaultpresumption,nothingmore.Andinthiscase,thereisapressingsituation:thepatientwillsufferirreparableharm(possiblyevendeath)shouldshenot


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receivethebloodtransfusion.Inacasewherethefailuretomakeanydecisionwillresultinirreparableharmandwheretheprimarydecision-maker'swishesareunknown,thecriminallaw(indeed,thelawmoregenerally)willthenpermitsomeoneelsetomakethatdecisioninherstead.Butthisisnotbecausethelawconsidersthatgettingtotherightanswerismoreimportantthantheproperallocationofjurisdiction.Rather,itissimplybecausethewholepointofallocatingjurisdictionistoallowittobeexercised;wherethepartytowhomithasbeenallocatedissimplyunabletodoso,thenthebestwaytoapproximateherexerciseofjurisdictionistoallowsomeoneelsetostandinherplace.Indeed,evenwhenthepatientisunconscious,thelawdoesnotallowjustanyonetotakechargeofthesituation.Itstillproceedsaccordingtothelogicofjurisdictionandlooksforthepartywiththebestclaimtomakedecisions(p.35) onthebehalfofthepatient:firsthernext-of-kinandsecond,onlyifnext-of-kinareunavailable,thedoctor.

Itisimportanttohighlighttwokeypointshere.First,thetransferofjurisdictionisnotrequiredbysomeothervaluethattrumpstheallocationofjurisdiction,butbytheveryprincipleofjurisdictionitself.Wearenotlettingthedoctordecidethematterinsteadofthepatient.Rather,weareallowingthedoctortomakethedecisioninthenameofthepatient.Andsecond,thepartywhoassumesanother'sjurisdictionprotembearsspecialresponsibilitiesthatthepartytowhomitbelongsdoesnot.Thepatient,whendecidingwhetherornottoacceptabloodtransfusion,maydecidethematteronwhatevergroundsshelikes,nomatterhowtrivialorhowsilly.Butwhenthedoctormakesthisdecisioninherstead,heisrequiredtodosoasagoodstewardofherinterests:reasonablyandconsideringonlyherbestinterests(subject,ofcourse,toanyclearwishesthatshemighthaveexpressed).Thatis,wescrutinizethewisdomofthedoctor'schoicescarefullywhenhedecidesforhispatient,butthatisnotbecausehemustshowthathischoiceismorallyjustifiedtoutcourt.Rather,itisbecausetheonlygroundsonwhichheisentitledtomakeadecisiononthepatient'sbehalfisthatheisactingashersteward,deferringtowhateverchoicesshehasmadeexplicit,anddecidingreasonablyinherbestinterestsonquestionswhereshehasbeensilent.

3.2PrivatejustificationsandpublicpowerNow,thisaccountofthedoctor'sprivatenecessityclaimmightseemreasonablysatisfying,butitdoesnotyetexplaintheworkingsofthejustificationsthatarethefocusofmostdebateincriminallawtheorycircles.Thenecessityclaimsthathaveattractedthemostinterestamongcriminallawtheoristsconcernindividualswhoassumeaformofpublicjurisdictionratherthantheprivatejurisdictionofanotherperson:forexample,wherecitizensburndownbuildingstocreateafirebreak,46breakintoahouseinordertosavetheoccupantfromasphyxiationfromagasleak,47andsoon.Incasessuchasthese,oneindividualdoesnotsimplymakeadecisioninplaceofanother.Rather,hemakesadecisionthatisusuallythoughttobewithinthestate'sjurisdiction:itisusuallyuptostatefiredepartmentofficialstodecidehowtopreventthespreadofawildfire,anditisusuallyuptopoliceorotheremergencyresponseofficialstodecidehowbesttodealwithagasleak.48(p.36)

Althoughthesepublicemergencieslookquitedifferent,thesamejurisdictionallogicisat


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workhereasinthecasesofprivatenecessity.Inpublicemergencies,thestatemaybeinasituationverymuchlikethatoftheunconsciouspatient:althoughitmighthaveapreferenceaboutwhattodo,itisunabletocommunicatethatpreferencebeforeirreparabledamageisdone.Thisisthecasewhereafireoragasleakoccursinaremoteareaandnoproperlyauthorizedstateofficialsareavailabletodealwiththesituation.Incasessuchastheseandonlyincasessuchasthesethecriminallawallowsprivatecitizenstotakeituponthemselvestodecidewhatisthebestcourseofaction.Privatecitizensareprecludedfromtakingthesituationintotheirownhandsinanycasewherethestateisinapositiontotakecareofit.Aprivatecitizenwhotriestotakemattersintoherownhandswhenstateofficialsareavailabletotakechargeofthesituationisbrandedavigilanteandtreatedasacriminalwithoutjustification.49Thisisthemeaningofthenolegalalternativerequirementinthejustificationofnecessity:ifthepartywhosejurisdictionitis,isabletodecidehowtodealwiththesituation,thenothersmustnotinterferenomatterhowmorallyworthytheirplanofactionmightbe.

Oncewehavere-conceivedoftherationaleofthenecessitydefenceinthemannersketchedabove,wemayagreewiththelegalmoralistsonatleastonepoint:necessityistheparadigmaticjustification.Butbecausenecessityisnotconcernedwiththebalanceofreasonsforandagainstacourseofconduct,butratherwiththeappropriatecircumstancesunderwhichtoallowonepartytoexerciseanother'sjurisdiction,thisalsomeansthatweshouldthinkofotherjustificationdefencesquitedifferently.Ihavearguedelsewherethatself-defenceandcitizen'sarrestarecases,likenecessity,whereanirreparableharmwillbedoneunlessjurisdictionisexercised,butthepartytowhomthatjurisdictionbelongsisunabletodoso.50Inbothcases,thepowerinvokedbythecitizen(touseforcetoprotecthimselfortoapprehendafleeingfelon)belongstothestate.51Aswithnecessitygenerally,itisonlyinsituationswheretheappropriatestateofficialisunavailabletodischargehisdutiesthatordinarycitizensareentitledtoactinself-defenceortomakeacitizen'sarrest.(p.37)

4THEPOLITICALMORALITYOFCRIMINALLAW

4.1JustifyingstatepowerOuranalysisofclaimsbyprivatepartiestobeexercisingpublicpowersdoesnotanswerallourquestionsaboutjustificationdefences;itonlychangesthefocusofdebate.Now,wecomefacetofacewiththeproblemwithwhichthischapterbegan:howmightwejustifytheexerciseofpublicpowerthroughthecriminaljusticesystem?Thisquestion,difficultthoughitistoanswer,movesourdebateaboutthenatureandjustificationofthecriminaljusticesystemtotherightplaneofdebate:mostclaimsofcriminallawjustificationaredirectlyconcernedwiththejustifiedexerciseofcoercivepowerbythestate.52Itshouldcomeasnosurprisethatlegalmoralistsvirtuallyignorethemanywaysinwhichthecriminallawregulatespublicpower.Sincetheircoreideaisthatthereisnothingimportantlydifferentaboutthecriminaljusticesystemandextra-legalmoralpracticesofholdingoneanothertoaccountformoralwrongdoing,itisconvenientforthemtoleaveasidetheareaofcriminallawdoctrinewhereourtheoryofthestateplaysacrucialrole.53EarlyworkonjustificationdefencessuchasGeorgeFletcher'sRethinking


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CriminalLawandPaulRobinson'sCriminalLawDefencesatleastcataloguedthejustificationdefencesavailabletopublicofficials(beforegoingonthespendthebulkoftheirtimedealingwithprivatejustifications).54Butmorerecentworksincriminallawtheoryhavedoneawayevenwiththispreliminarytreatmentofpubliclawjustifications,goingdirectlytojustificationsclaimedbyprivatecitizens.Thelawofself-defenceandnecessityhavebothbeensubjecttonumerousdetailedtreatmentsincriminal(p.38)lawtheorybutthejustifieduseofforcebypoliceofficersseemstohavebeenallbutforgotten.55

Althoughlegaltheoristsmighthaveforgottenaboutjustificationsfortheuseofforcebypublicofficials,thosewhoworkinthecriminaljusticesystemhavenot.AsJohnKleinigpointsout,[p]olicearenotgenerallyexemptfromcriminalandcivillaw,orfromtheregulatorypowerofthelegislature.56Everyday,policeofficersthroughoutthecommonlawworldrelyonjustificationdefencesinordertorendertheirconductpermissible.Withoutsuchjustifications,agreatdealofpoliceconductwouldconstitutecriminaloffences:arrestswouldbecriminalassaults,searcheswouldbetrespasses,imprisonmentwouldbeunlawfulconfinement,executionwouldbemurder,andsoon.57And,asAVDiceyremindsus,theprinciplesoftheruleoflawtellusthat,withoutavalidjustificationdefence,publicofficialsshouldexpectcriminalconvictionforengagingincriminalconductinthesamewayasprivatecitizens.58Hewrites:

[E]veryofficial,fromthePrimeMinisterdowntoaconstableoracollectoroftaxes,isunderthesameresponsibilityforeveryactdonewithoutlegaljustificationasanyothercitizen.TheReportsaboundwithcasesinwhichofficialshavebeenbroughtbeforetheCourts,andmade,intheirpersonalcapacity,liabletopunishment,ortothepaymentofdamages,foractsdoneintheirofficialcharacterbutinexcessofthelawfulauthority.59

AlthoughDiceymighthavebeenoverstatingtosaythatthereportsaboundwithcasesinwhichofficersarebroughtforwardoncriminalchargesfortheuseofexcessiveforcewhenmakinganarrest,fortrespassingwhenmakinganillegalsearch,andsoon,suchcasesdoexist.60OneoftheleadingcasesonjustificationdefencesinEngland,RvDadsonisacaseofjustthissort.61Dadsonwasapoliceofficerwhoshotafleeingfelonwithoutbeingawareatthetimethatthemanhewasshootingatwasinfactafelon.Sincehewasunawareofthejustifyingreasonforhisactions,theofficerwasdeniedaclaimofjustificationand,withoutavalidjustificationdefence,hewas(p.39) convictedofintentionallycausinggrievousbodilyharm.ThesamerequirementforpoliceofficerstoofferavalidjustificationappliesinCanada.InearlycasessuchasFreyvFedoruk62andmorerecentcasessuchasLangloisandBdardvCloutier,63theCanadiancourtshaveconsistentlyheldthattheassaultelementofanarrestisacrimeunlessthepersonperformingithasavalidjustificationdefenceoflawfularrest.

Itisclear,then,thatpoliceofficersandotherpublicofficialsrequirejustificationdefencestorendermuchoftheirquiteroutineconductpermissible.Butonwhatgroundscanofficialsmaketheirclaimsofjustification?Sofar,wehaveseenthatclaimsofjustificationhaveallbeenconcernedwiththeconditionsunderwhichitisappropriateforonepartyto


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exerciseanother'sjurisdiction.Intheprivatecontext,weconsideredthecaseofthedoctorwhomustdecidewhetherornottoperformabloodtransfusiononanunconsciouspatient;inthepubliccontext,weconsideredthecaseofthecitizenwhomustdecidewhethertodestroyahomeinordertocreateafirebreakwhenstateofficialsareunabletotakecareofthewildfire.Inbothcases,Iargued,thepartymakingthedecisionaboutwhattodoisnottheonetowhomthejurisdictionbelongsoriginally.Jurisdictionbelongstothepatientherselfinthefirstcaseandtothestateinthesecond,butthepartyactingoutofnecessityisentitledtodosobecauseofthepressingneedforthatjurisdictiontobeexercisedbysomeoneunderthecircumstances.

Whenlookingforthegroundsofjustificationopentostateofficials,itishelpfultoconsiderananalogouscaseamongprivatejustifications.Althoughprivatejustificationsconcernindividualswhoareonlytemporarilyunabletoexercisetheirownjurisdiction(suchastheunconsciouspatient),thereareotherswhoareunabletoexercisetheirownjurisdictionasalong-termcondition.Takethecaseofminorchildren.64Liketheunconsciouspatient,minorchildrenareunabletoexercisetheirjurisdictionoverthemselves,butunliketheunconsciouspatient,minorchildrenaregenerallyunabletodoso.Soalthoughthelawpermitsparentstoexercisethatjurisdictiononbehalfoftheirchildrenforsimilarreasonsasitpermitsthedoctortomakedecisionsforhisunconsciouspatient,itwouldbesomewhatmisleadingtocallthesituationofchildhoodassuchanemergency.Nevertheless,thesamelogicapplies:parentsareentitledtomakedecisionsonbehalfoftheirminorchildren,buttheyarenotentitledtomakedecisionsbasedonallavailablemoralreasons;rather,theyarerequiredtoactonlyinthebestinterestsofthechild,evenifthatmeanssometimesignoringthesignificantmoralclaimsofotherswhenactingonthechild'sbehalf.

Howdoesthecaseofparentsandchildrenhelpustojustifystatecoercioninthecriminallaw?Drawingtheconnectionrequiresonefurtherstep.Childrenare(p.40) unabletoexercisetheirjurisdictionovertheentireperiodoftheirlegalminority,sotheyareinneedofsomeonetostandinapositiontoexerciseitforthemforthelongterm.Butthereareotherswhoarealsoincapableofexercisingtheirjurisdictionoverthelongtermforquitedifferentreasons.Considerthecorporation.Itisalegalpersondistinctfrombothshareholdersanddirectors,butitcannotactonitsownbehalf.Instead,thedirectorsofthecorporationaregivenfiducarypowerstoactinthecorporation'sbestinterests.Bysimilarlogic,stateofficialsarefiduciariesofthepeopleasawhole.Inallfiduciarycontexts,thosewhoexerciseanother'sjurisdictiononthelatter'sbehalfareentitledtodosoonlyinsofarastheymaybeseenasactinginthenameofthelatter.Inthecorporatecontext,thismeansthatinsofarassomeonepurportstobeactinginthenameofthecorporation,hemustbeactingreasonablyandinthebestinterestsofthecorporationdischarginghisdutiesofloyaltyandcare.Andloyaltytothecorporationsometimesmeansthatwearerequiredtodisregardcertainweightymoralreasonsforaction.65

Therightofstateofficialstoactonbehalfofthecitizenryasawhole,then,canbeunderstoodintermsofthejustificationofnecessityinthesamewayastherightofcorporateofficerstoactinthenameofthecorporation.Althoughtherighttodecide


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questionsofcollectiveconcernbelongstothecitizenryasawhole,thecitizenryareliketheshareholdersofacorporationtakenonebyoneincapableofexercisingthatjurisdictionforthemselves.Stateofficialsareentitledtomakedecisionsonbehalfofthecitizenrybecausetheymakeitpossibleforthecitizenryasawholetoexerciseitsjurisdictioninsofarastheyactasthestewardsofthecitizensjurisdiction.Courtsoftensaythatpublicofficialsoweafiduciarydutytothepublicinwhosenametheyareexercisingpublicpower.66Theyhavealsoinsistedthattherightofpublicofficialstoengageinotherwiseprohibitedconductisconstrainedbyconstitutionalrights-protectiondocumentssuchastheBillofRightsintheUnitedStatesandtheCharterofRightsandFreedomsinCanada.Onceagain,theseconsiderationsaretreatedbylegalmoralistsasquestionsthathavelittletodowiththeinternalstructureofcriminallawdoctrine.Buttheunderstandingofthenecessitydefenceintermsofjurisdictiongivesusreasontothinkotherwise.Thepointisthat,giventhestateofficialsspecialplaceasfiduciariesofthepeopleasawhole,theyareconstrainedinwhattheymaydobeyondtheordinaryrulesthatmightgoverntheconductofindividuals(p.41) towardoneanother.Thejurisdictionalconceptionofthenecessitydefencehelpstoexplainwhybothconstitutionalrightsguaranteesandpubliclawnormsimposeimportantconstraintsontheabilityofpublicofficialstoclaimjustificationonthegroundsthattheyaredischargingthedutiesoftheirpublicoffice.67

4.2PubliclawandpoliticaltheoryAnglo-Americancriminallawdoctrineofbothcriminaloffencesandjustificationdefencesexhibitsaclearfocusontheprotectionofjurisdictionfromusurpation.Criminalwrongsareallconcernedwithattemptstousurpeithertheprivatejurisdictionofanotherpersonorthepublicjurisdictionofthepeopleasawhole;andthelogicofjustificationdefencesisbestcapturedthroughtheideathatwhatmightatfirstlooklikeausurpationofanother'sjurisdictionis,infact,avalidactonbehalfofthepartytowhomthejurisdictionrightlybelongs.Thisunderstandingofbothoffencesandjustificationdefencesisclearlyatoddswiththelegalmoralistsfocusonthemoralwrongnessorjustificationoftheaccused'sconduct.Italsoprovidestheoutlinesofanalternativeaccountofhowwemightbeabletogoaboutjustifyingtheoperationsofthecriminaljusticesystem.

Attheoutsetofthischapter,Isuggestedthatthenewlegalmoralistswererighttotrytojustifythepracticesofthecriminaljusticesystembyshowingthattheyarethewayswemustactinordertoliveuptoacertainconceptionofourselves.Thetroublewiththemoralistaccount,Isuggested,wasthattheconceptionofourselvessimplyasresponsiblemoralagentswasnottherightoneuponwhichtofoundatheoryofcriminaljustice,forthreereasons:becauseitimportsanilliberalconceptionoftheroleofthecriminallaw;itisunabletojustifytheuseofstatecoerciveforcethroughtheinstitutionsofcriminaljustice;anditfitsverypoorlywiththestructureofAnglo-Americancriminallawdoctrine.Butthereisanotherconceptionofourselvesthat,Ibelieve,isonethatweshouldbejustasunwillingtojettisonbutwhichwillallowustojustifyaliberalandcoercivecriminaljusticesystemthatlooksverymuchliketheoneweseeinoperationthroughoutthecommonlawworld.Itisthe(p.42) conceptionofourselvesasfreeandequalmoralagentstheconceptionthatisattheheartofmoderntheoriesofliberal


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constitutionalism.68

Thebestwaytomakesenseofthisconceptionofourselvesanditsdemandsistoconsiderhowlawandthestatemightberequiredinordertosolveaparticularsortofmoralproblemaboutlifeincommunitywithothers.Theproblemisthis:ifIamoperatinginaworldwithoutlaworstate,mychoicetoleadmylifeaccordingtothedemandsofmoralityhasadeeplymorallyunsatisfyingresult.ForalthoughIwouldlikeallmyactionstobedeeplymoral,thereissomethingaboutthecontextwithinwhichIperformthoseactionsthatunderminesthatpossibility.ForwhenIdecideunilaterallytoactaccordingtothedemandsofmorality,Ifindmyselfinasituationvis--visothersthatisdeeplyunequal.IamcommittedtoactingaccordingtomoralprinciplesbutIhavenoassurancethatanyoneelsewill.So,farfromactingaccordingtoprinciplesthattreatthemoralworthofallpersonsequally,myactionsactuallyunderminemystatusasanequaltothoseamongwhomIlive.Theonlyoptionavailabletomeinthestateofnatureistoimposemoralconstraintsuponmyselfwithoutanyassuranceofsimilarconstraintsonothers.Putanotherway:inthestateofnature,thereissimplynomorallyacceptablecourseofactionopentome.

Liberalconstitutionalismoffersasolutiontothisproblemthroughthecreationoflawandthestate.Inaworldwithouteitherofthese,Isimplydonothavethetoolsatmydisposaltoactmorallywithoutunderminingmyclaimtoequalmoralstatuswithothers.Butinaworldwithastatethathaseffectivepowerandthatcanmakealegitimateclaimtoactingonbehalfofusall,Icangetaroundthisproblem.Thestateguaranteesusallthatwecanfocusonthemoralityofourownchoiceswithouthavingtoworryaboutwhetherthiswillundermineourstatusasmoralequalsofthosearoundus.Aswefocusonthemoralityofourchoices,thelawfocusesoneachperson'sjurisdictionthesetofissuesthatitisuptothemtodecideandthestatepromisestoenforcethelimitsofjurisdictioninthenameofusall.

Accordingtothispicture,thestate(throughitsofficials)isnotconcernedwiththemoralrightnessofourconducttoutcourt.Justasbefore,itremainsuptoeachofustomakesurethatweactmorally.Thestate'sconcerniswithensuringtheconditionswithinwhichitisevenpossibleforuseachtomakemoralchoiceswithouttherebyunderminingourownstatusastheequalofthosearoundus.Thestatedoesso(throughitsofficials)bypatrollingtheboundariesofeachperson'sjurisdiction,usingcoerciveforcetoresistanyattempttousurpthejurisdictionofothers.Theuseofforcebystateofficialsinresistingattemptstousurpanother'sjurisdictionarenotjustifiedbecauseitwouldbemorallyrightconductifperformedbyaprivate(p.43) party;indeed,whenprivatepartiesattempttodothesamethings,theyarebrandedasvigilantesandcriminals.Rather,theuseofforcebystateofficialsisjustifiedinsofarasitsetsoutthenecessarypreconditionstoalifeincommunitywithothersasfreeandequalmoralagents.

5CONCLUSIONThepubliclawaccountofthecriminaljusticesystemIsketchheresatisfieseachofthethreeconsiderationsthatDuffandGardner'snewlegalmoralismdoesnot.Unliketheir


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account,itrecognizesthatstatecoercionisacentralaspectofthecriminaljusticesystemsomethingquitedifferentinkindfromthesortofthingthatprivatepartiesareentitledtouseagainstoneanotheraspunishmentforperceivedmoralwrongdoing.Itisbasedaroundthefundamentaldistinctionbetweentherightofprivatepartiestocriticizeoneanotherformoralwrongdoingandthestate'srighttousecoerciveforcetoresistcriminalwrongsexanteandtopunishcriminalwrongdoersthemexpostfacto.Second,becauseitisfocusedentirelyontheprotectionofjurisdictionboththeprivatejurisdictionofeachpersontodecidehowtousehisbodyandpropertyasheseesfitandthepublicjurisdictionofthestatetodealwiththepreconditionsofindividualfreedomthroughbindinglawsandcoerciveenforcementitfitsnicelywiththewidelysharedliberalconceptionofcriminallaw.Andthird,aswehaveseenfromourreviewofAnglo-Americancriminallawdoctrine,thepubliclawaccountfitsmuchmoreneatlywithexistingdoctrinethandoesitlegalmoralistrival.

Notes:(1)Thisisthemechanismemphasizedbymainstreamutilitarians,suchasJeremyBenthamandHLAHart.

(2)Therehabilitativeidealhadwidespreadcurrency,especiallyintheUnitedStates.ItwasattherootoftheAmericanindefinitesentencingschemessoprevalentinthatcountryuntilquiterecently.Butithasbeeninprecipitousdeclineinrecentyears.SeeFAAllen,TheDeclineoftheRehabilitativeIdeal:PenalPolicyandSocialPurpose(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1981).Sometimes,rehabilitationwastakentoimportawholesaletheoryofre-education,asinthetheoryofLadyBarbaraWooton,SocialScienceandSocialPathology(London:George,AllenandUnwin,1959).

(3)MichaelMoore,themostfamousretributivisttoday,putthepointasfollows:whatisdistinctivelyretributivististheviewthattheguiltyreceivingtheirjustdesertsisanintrinsicgood.MMoore,JustifyingRetributivism[1993]27IsraelLawReview15,19.Thoughmyownaccountcouldbeseenasabrandofretributivism,ImeantodistancemyaccountfromthosesuchasMoores.

(4)JGardnerIntroduction,inPunishmentandResponsibility(2ndedn;Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),l:Itisverycommonforoneestrangedspousetopunishtheother,forexample,bypreventinghimorherfromspendingtimewithhisorherchildren,fullyintendingthatthisshouldbeaterribleexperience.Iknowofnoreasontothinkthatsuchpunishmentissub-standardorsecondaryascomparedwith,say,imprisonmentbythecourts.

(5)JLocke,LetteronToleration(1689),19.

(6)JWaldron,ARighttoDoWrong(1981)92Ethics21.

(7)MBermanhaspreviouslypointedthisoutinJustificationandExcuse:LawandMorality[2003]53DukeLawJournal1.


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(8)Inwhatfollows,Idonotalwaysmakethisqualificationexplicit.IhopethatitwillbeclearfromcontextwhenIamtalkingaboutthestructureoflegitimatecriminallawaccordingtothepubliclawmodelratherthansimplythestructureofwhatevercriminallawdoctrinewehappentohaveinaparticulartimeandplace.

(9)WhatMichaelOakeshottcallsourpersonae.MOakeshott,TheRuleofLaw,inOnHistoryandOtherEssays(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1983).

(10)AsGardnernotesintheintroductiontotheneweditionofPunishmentandResponsibility,vii,asurvey[of]subsequentworkinthefieldthateitherdevelopedorreactedtoHartsthinkinghasprovedunfeasible.Thereisavastamountofsubsequentworkinthefieldbyphilosophers,lawyers,andpolicymakersand,directlyorindirectly,ithasalleitherdevelopedorreactedtoHartsthinking.

(11)Hartfamouslysaidofretributivismthatitisuncomfortablyclosetohumansacrificeasanexpressionofreligiousworship.HLAHart,Law,LibertyandMorality(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1962),65.SanfordKadishechoesthissentimentinTheCriminalLawandtheLuckoftheDraw(1994)84JournalofCriminalLawandCriminology679,6989:Ifindpositiveretributivismtobeaprincipleunworthyofourallegiance.Whyisitgoodtocreatemoresufferingintheworldsimplybecausethecriminalhasdoneso?

(12)HLAHart,ProlegomenontothePrinciplesofPunishment(195960)60ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety1,34.

(13)Gardnercontinues:TomountanadequatedefenceofpunishmentonemustshowhowanalreadycommittedwrongisareasonforPtomakeDsuffer.Hartsdefenceofpunishmentdoesnotmeetthisadequacycondition.Introduction,inHLAHart,PunishmentandResponsibility(2ndedn;Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),xxv.

(14)PDevlin,TheEnforcementofMorals(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1965).RonaldDworkinonceremarked,[w]hatisshockingisnot[LordDevlins]ideathatthecommunitysmoralitycounts,buthisideaofwhatcountsasthecommunitysmorality.RDworkin,LibertyandMorality,inhisTakingRightsSeriously(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1977),255.

(15)RADuff,TrialsandPunishments(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986),6.

(16)RADuff,AnsweringforCrime(Oxford:Hart,2009),8788.

(17)TheroleofpunishmentforDuffisbutacommunicativeadd-ontothetrial.Ifanaccusedisfoundguiltyofacrime,thentheproperwaytocommunicateappropriatemoralcensure(whichitselfisrequiredinorderproperlytocommunicaterespectfortheoffender)mightbetotakemeasurestoallowtheoffendertoundergopenanceforthewronghecommittedandtotrytore-establishhispositionwithinthecommunity.IdiscussDuffshighlyoriginalviewabouttheplaceofpunishmentinthecriminaljustice


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systeminTheModelsofCriminalJustice:Deterrence,AccountabilityandtheRuleofLaw(forthcoming,UniversityofTorontoLawJournal).

(18)ThispointwasmademostfamouslyinthephilosophicalliteraturebyPeterStrawsoninhisessay,FreedomandResentment(1962)48ProceedingsoftheBritishAcademy1,25.Asheputit:Ourpracticesdonotmerelyexploitournatures,theyexpressthem.

(19)IntroductioninHart,PunishmentandResponsibility,xlix.

(20)RADuff,Punishment,CommunicationandCommunity(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2003),64.JohnGardnerdoesnotshareDuffsopiniononthispoint,however.Inarecentarticlerespondingtomyearlierworkonjustificationdefences,Gardnermakesclearhisexclusivelegalpositivistleanings:Inasmuchastheycallformoraljudgmentintheirapplication(andtheyinvariablydo)thelegalnormsthatsupplyjustificationdefencesinthecriminallawshouldalwaysberead,likeallotherlegalnormsthatcallformoraljudgmentintheirapplication,asellipticallyinvestingauthorityinsomeonetodeterminetheirapplicationbyexercisingsuchmoraljudgment.JGardner,JustificationsUnderAuthority(2009)23CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence71,74.

(21)JGardner,TheMarkofResponsibility(2003)23OxfordLawJournal157,192.

(22)Duffalsoconsidersotherpossibleanswerssuchasdenyingthejurisdictionofthecourt,pointingtoastatuteoflimitations,orallegingabuseofprocessthatwouldwarrantastayofproceedings.Duff,AnsweringforCrime,ch8.

(23)Dufftriestore-definepunishmentasaformofsecularpenanceinPunishment,CommunicationandCommunity,17594.

(24)Gardnersjustificationofpunishmentiswhathecallsaggregative.Thatis,insofarasitcanbejustifiedatall,weshouldsimplyaddupallthereasonsinfavourofpunishmentinthehopethattheymightbeweightiermoralreasonsthantheonesagainst:Thereal,problemtoputitanotherway,isnotthattheHartiandefenceofpunishmentistoomixedbutthatitisnotmixedenough.Gardner,Introduction,inPunishmentandResponsibility,xxix.

(25)JGardner,Crime:InProportionandinPerspective,inOffencesandDefences(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),21415.

(26)Utilitariansseethisastheeasycase.Theysometimesextendthisreasoningeventoquitedifficultrescues.EgPSinger,Famine,AffluenceandMorality(1972)1PhilosophyandPublicAffairs229.ImmanuelKantwouldinsistthatwehaveaperfectmoraldutytomakeeasyrescues.SeeEJWeinrib,TheCaseforaDutytoRescue(1980)90YaleLawJournal247.

(27)Theconditionsunderwhichthecriminallawimposesanypositivedutiesarenotoriouslyfew.OneofthemostegregiousexamplesistheAmericancaseofPeoplevBeardsley150Mich206,113NW1128(MichSupCt,1907)inwhichitwasheldthat


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eventhoughtheaccusedowedamoraldutytoprovidehismistresswithreasonablemedicalcareforamorphineoverdose,hewasundernolegaldutytodoso.

(28)Ofcourse,thereareplentyofimmoralactsthatarecrimes.But,Ishallargueinsection4below,theyarebestunderstoodtobecrimesnotbecausetheyareimmoralbutforotherreasons.

(29)Thereare,ofcourse,counter-examplestothisclaimsuchastheEnglishcaseofRvBrown[1993]97CrAppR44,HLinwhichtheHouseofLordsrefusedtorecognizeasvalidtheconsentgiventoparticularlycruelformsofsado-masochism.WemightalsoaddtheCanadiancaseofJobidonvTheQueen[1991]2SCR714inwhichtheSupremeCourtofCanadaheldthatthelawwillnotrecognizeasvalidanyconsentgiventoanassaultcausingbodilyharmwithinthecontextofastreetfight.Itisnoteworthy,however,thatthesewerebothformsofextremeviolencethatcouldresultinpermanentinjury.AsIshallsuggestinsection4below,however,therearedifferentreasonsforprohibitingsuchconductthansimplyitsimmorality.

(30)JGardner,JustificationsandReasons,inhisOffencesandDefences,119.But,asBernardHarcourthaspointedout,theprecisemeaningoftheharmprincipleisnotoriouslyunclearperhapstothepointofbeingaltogetheruselessasalimitonthescopeofthecriminallaw.BHarcourt,TheCollapseoftheHarmPrinciple(1999)90JournalofCriminalLawandCriminology109.

(31)RADuffandSMarshall,CriminalizationandSharingWrongs(1998)11CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence7.

(32)Duff,AnsweringforCrime,266.

(33)Gardner,JustificationsandReasons,inOffencesandDefences,945.Gardnermakesitclearthatalthoughanexclusivelegalpositivist,hestillinsiststhatthelawoughttohaveacertainstructure:OnepartofthelawthatIhaveoftenreflecteduponinthis(youmaysay)conspicuouslymoralisticwayhasbeenthepartrelatingtocriminaldefences.Hereandthisisnocoincidencethelawmakesparticularlypervasivecallsforofficialstomakemoraljudgmentsconcerningallegedlyillegalactions.JGardner,JustificationUnderAuthority(2010)23CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence71,73.

(34)MichaelMoore,too,adoptsthisbalanceofevilsapproachtojustificationeventhoughhewouldresistcategorizationasautilitarian.HemakesthisclearinMMoore,PlacingBlame:AGeneralTheoryofCriminalLaw(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1997),66.

(35)PHRobinson,ATheoryofJustification:SocietalHarmasaPrerequisiteforCriminalLiability[1975]23UCLALawReview26,272.

(36)JGardner,FletcheronOffencesandDefences,inOffencesandDefences,141;RADuff,RethinkingJustifications(2004)39TulsaLawReview829.AlthoughDuffremainsanti-utilitarianinhistheoryofjustification,henowsubdividestheterritoryintojustified


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andwarrantedconduct.Duff,AnsweringforCrime,267ff.

(37)IborrowthisexpressionfromLAlexander,LesserEvils:ACloserLookattheParadigmaticJustification(2005)24LawandPhilosophy611.IdosobecausethisistheonepointonwhichIaminagreementwiththestandardstyleincriminallawtheory:necessityisindeedtheparadigmaticjustification(thoughnotwhenconceivedofasadefenceoflesserevils).Ishouldpointoutthatnotwithstandingthiscommonassumptionamongcriminallawtheorists,thenecessitydefenceatleastasitrelatestoprivatecitizensisconsideredtobeanexcuseinCanadiancriminallaw(RvPerka[1984]2SCR232)andithasanunclearstatusinEnglishcriminallaw(RvDudleyandStephens[1884]14QBD273,DC;SouthwarkLondonBoroughCouncilvWilliams[1971]2WLR467;butseealsoReA(Children)(ConjoinedTwins:SurgicalSeparation)[2000]4AllER961,CA).

(38)AmericanModelPenalCode(1962),s3.02.

(39)SouthwarkLondonBoroughCouncilvWilliams[1971]2WLR467,467(perLordDenning).Itshouldbenotedthatthiswasnotacriminallawcase.Nevertheless,thenatureoftheclaimofnecessityisthesameapointthatisborneoutbythefactthatthiscaseisfrequentlycitedasgoodprecedentonthenecessitydefenceincriminallawcases.

(40)Onedefendanttestifiedthatsothatwecouldlivetogetherasafamily,we,therefore,onthe10thSeptember,1970,squattedin38HardersRoadintheBoroughaforesaid,ahouseinwhichthefloorboardshadbeenrippedup,windowsashessmashed,andthetoiletconcretedup.Sincewehavemovedin,wehaverepairedallthese(SouthwarkLondonBoroughCouncilvWilliams[1971]2WLR467,468).

(41)SouthwarkLondonBoroughCouncilvWilliams[1971]2WLR467,473.

(42)SeeegUnitedStatesvSchoon955F2d1238(USCtofApps(9thCir),1991);StatevCozzens490NW2d184(SupCtofNeb,1992);StatevWarshow410A2d1000(SupCtofVt,1979).Seealso:RvMorgentaleretal[1985]22CCC(3d)353:Withrespect,thedefenceofnecessityisnotpremisedondissatisfactionwiththelaw.

(43)UnitedStatesvSchoon955F2d1238(USCtofApps(9thCir),1991)123940.ItisalsocapturedintheModelPenalCodeslanguageins3.02(1)(b)and(c)whichlimitthedefencetocaseswhereneithertheCodenorotherlawdefiningtheoffenceprovidesexceptionsordefencesdealingwiththespecificsituationinvolved;andalegislativepurposetoexcludethejustificationclaimeddoesnototherwiseplainlyappear.

(44)InthewordsofJusticeCardozo(SchloendorffvSocietyoftheNewYorkHospital,211NY125,129(NYCtofApps,1914)):Everyhumanbeingofadultyearsandsoundmindhasarighttodeterminewhatshallbedonewithhisownbody.

(45)Ifirstsetoutthisideainanearlierarticle,Justifications,Powers,andAuthority(2008)117YaleLawJournal1070.

(46)KGreenawalt,ThePerplexingBordersofJustificationandExcuse(1984)84


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ColumbiaLawReview1897.

(47)Duff,RethinkingJustifications,829.

(48)This,ofcourse,raisesdeepissuesaboutthelegitimacyofcontractingoutcoregovernmentservices.IaddresssomeofthesequestionsinRethinkingtheNight-watchmanState?(2010)60UniversityofTorontoLawJournal425.

(49)Ofcourse,therearesituationswhereofficialsareavailableinthesensethattheyarephysicallyproximateandawareofthesituationbutthecitizenmightstillbeentitledtotakeaction.Incaseswhereitisabsolutelyclearthattheofficialsareunwillingtoperformtheirlegalduties,thelawmightalsograntajustificationtoacitizenwhotakesmattersintoherownhands.ThankstoAntonyDuffforpressingmeonthispoint.

(50)Thorburn,Justifications,Powers,andAuthority.

(51)Theuseofforceagainstothersisnotpartofourprivatejurisdictiontodecidewhatshallhappentoourselvesandtoourproperty.Rather,thesemattersconcerntheenforcementofthelawandtheprotectionofthejustallocationofjurisdictionfromattemptsatusurpation.MaxWebersfamousformulationofthispointis:ThestateisthathumancommunitythatlaysclaimtothemonopolyoflegitimatephysicalviolencewithinacertainterritoryMWeber,TheProfessionandVocationofPolitics,inPLassmanandRSpeirs(eds),PoliticalWritings(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994),31011(emphasisinoriginal).

(52)WithduedeferencetoAlanBrudner,PunishmentandFreedom(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),192,n10,Idonotclaimthatallclaimsofjustificationareclaimstoactinthenameofthestate.Asindicatedabove,thereisanimportantclassofjustifications(whichincludestheclaimofparentstoactinthenameoftheirchildren)thatarefundamentallyprivate.

(53)Itissomewhatsurprising,then,toseeonecriminallawtheoristwhoputspoliticaltheoryfront-and-centreofhisaccountdoingthesamething.InhisrecentbookPunishmentandFreedom(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),192,AlanBrudnerwrites:Theprimarydivisionisbetweenjustificationsclaimedbypublicofficialsandthoseclaimedbyprivateagents.Intheformercategorybelongthelegalauthoritytosearch,arrest,detain,punish(andpenalize),andthepublicnecessitytoviolatepropertyortooverrideconstitutionalrightsingeneralIsaylittleaboutthisclassofjustificationsformytopicisthelimitonthestatespenalauthorityposedbythejustifieduseofnormallyunlawfulforcebyprivateagents.Thus,Idealhereonlywithprivatejustification:self-defence,defenceofothers,defenceofproperty,andjustificatoryprivatenecessityandduress.

(54)GPFletcher,RethinkingCriminalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1978);PHRobinson,CriminalLawDefenses:ASystematicAnalysis(1982)82ColumbiaLawReview199.


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(55)OnesalutaryexceptiontothistrendisHamishStewartsTheRoleofReasonablenessinSelf-Defence(2003)16CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence317.Ishouldadd,ofcourse,thatmyclaimisonlythatcriminallawtheoristshaveforgottenthem.Criminalprocedurescholarsaswellascriminologistsspendmuchoftheirtimediscussingtheconditionsunderwhichtheuseofpolicepowerisjustified.

(56)JKleinig,TheEthicsofPolicing(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),225.

(57)MDDubber,APoliticalTheoryofCriminalLaw:AutonomyandtheLegitimacyofStatePunishment(MS,15March2004)http://ssrn.com/abstract=529522.

(58)Thescopeofcriminallawjustificationsopentopoliceofficersisgrowing,especiallyintheareaofundercoveroperations.SeeEEJoh,BreakingtheLawtoEnforceIt:UndercoverPoliceParticipationinCrime(2009)62StanfordLawReview155.

(59)AVDicey,AnIntroductiontotheStudyoftheLawoftheConstitution(8thedn;Indianapolis:LibertyFundInc,1982),124.

(60)IntheUnitedStates,wheremostofthesecasesseemtobetiedtoquestionsofrace,mostsuchcasesariseunders20oftheUSC,dealingwiththedenialofanindividualscivilrights.SeeegScrewsetalvUS325US91(1945).

(61)[1850]2Den35,169ER407.

(62)[1950]SCR517.

(63)[1990]1SCR158.

(64)Ofcourse,thereareothers:thementallydisabled,thosesufferingfrompsychiatricdisorders,etc.

(65)Thisgoesbeyondthesortsofpartialitythatissometimesthoughttoplayapartinmoralthinking.Here,directorsareabsolutelyprecludedfromactingonanyreasonsotherthanthebestinterestsoftheshareholders.

(66)DriscollvBurlington-BristolBridgeCo86A2d201,2212(SupCtofNJ,1952)perVanderbiltCJ:Asfiduciariesandtrusteesofthepublicwealtheyareunderaninescapableobligationtoservethepublicwiththehighestfidelity.Indischargingthedutiesoftheiroffice,theyarerequiredtodisplaysuchintelligenceandskillastheyarecapableof,tobediligentandconscientious,toexercisetheirdiscretionnotarbitrarilybutreasonably,andabovealltodisplaygoodfaith,honestyandintegrityTheseobligationsarenotmeretheoreticalconceptsoridealisticabstractionsofnopracticalforceandeffect;theyareobligationsimposedbythecommonlawonpublicofficersandassumedbythemasamatteroflawupontheirenteringpublicoffice.

(67)Thepointisnotthatsomedefendantsaretobetreateddifferentlyfromothersinthe


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criminalcourtsinvirtueoftheiroffices.Rather,thepointisthatsomeconductisproperlytobeunderstoodastheconductofthepeopleasawholeactingthroughaparticularindividual.Asuccessfulclaimofjustificationofthissortsimplyestablishesallthenecessaryconditionsforsayingthatonesconductwasreallyundertakenonbehalfofthepeopleasawhole.Thus,contrarytowhatJohnGardnersuggests,everythingturnsonthefactthattheywerethepowersofpublicofficials.Gardner,JustificationsUnderAuthority,71,97:[E]verydefendantcomesbeforethecriminalcourtsimplyasanordinaryperson,unencumberedandunenhancedbyanyrobesorsealsorbadgesofoffice[.]Ofcourseitistrue,aswesaw,thatoccasionallythecriminallawmustrecognizepeopleslegalpowers(eg,theirpowertoarrest)aspartoftheprocessofdeterminingwhethertheirprimafaciecrimeswerejustifiedButnothingturns,forthecriminallaw,onthefactthattheyarethepowersofpublicofficials.

(68)TRSAllan,ConstitutionalJustice:ALiberalTheoryoftheRuleofLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001);EFox-Decent,TheFiduciaryNatureofStateLegalAuthority(2005)31QueensLawJournal259;DDyzenhaus,TheConstitutionofLaw:LegalityinaTimeofEmergency(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006);MDWalters,WrittenConstitutionsandUnwrittenConstitutionalism,inGHuscroft(ed),ExpoundingtheConstitution:EssaysinConstitutionalTheory(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008).

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