Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

vs.

Mariano A. Albert for appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.

Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the information.

FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS

G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM, J.:

This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.

Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.

In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficiofor the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by medical experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:

Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a single moment during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.

Final Diagnosis

Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.

THE FACTS

The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this motivation was determined in the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.

Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.

His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an individual with a sound mind.

On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.

What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in la Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.

All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship especially in relation to rationalization about the consequences of his acts.

In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.

In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he committed on the date in question.

Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:

FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES

On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.

After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.

Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacaan, or following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.

On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:

I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.

I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to spare, I would not have hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.

Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.

Hurrah for a free Philippines.

Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.

May God pity on me.

Amen.

JULIO C. GUILLEN

I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future generations. For these reasons he should not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.

These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in my performance of my said act.

A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.

When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.

General Castaeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) who died on the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.

THE ISSUES

Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the explosion.

The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.

During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at the same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police headquarters.

Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the trial of this case.

In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the commission of crime."

The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.

Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:

Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.

The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.

In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)

Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de c de imprudencia temeraria? La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un ao de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.

Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.

The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim.

There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.

In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.

The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporalin its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)

The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-9426, U.S. v. MarasiganRepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANCDECISION

15-Aug-14G.R. No. L-9426

vs.

Silvester Apacible for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.

To this the accused replied: "This is false." Saying this he drew his knife and struck at Mendoza.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

FILOMENO MARASIGAN, defendant-appellant.

Moreland,J.:In this case it appears that about 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the 23d of January, 1913, Francisco Mendoza, while engaged in examining his sugar crop growing upon his lands in the barrio of Irucan, now called Calayan, in the municipality of Taal, Batangas Province, was asked by the accused and his wife to approach them.

On arriving near them the accused said to Mendoza: "Why is this line curved?" [indicating the division line between the lands of the two.] "Let us make it straight."Francisco replied saying: "Why do you want to make the line straight? If you make the line straight, it will put certain logs and trees on your land.?"

On attempting to ward off the blow Mendoza was cut in the left hand. The accused continued the attack, whereupon Mendoza seized the accused by the neck and the body and threw him down. While both were lying upon the ground the accused still sought to strike Mendoza with his dagger. The latter seized the hand which held the dagger and attempted to loosen his hold upon it. While they were thus fighting for the possession of the knife, the wife of the accused came forward and took the dagger from her husband's hand, throwing it to one side. She then seized who after various maneuvers, struck Mendoza a blow which knocked him senseless.

As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the latter being the most serious, the extensor tendor in one of the seven days at a cost of about P45, but the middle finger of the left hand was rendered useless.

The story of the affair told by the accused is quite different from that just related, but the facts as stated were as found by the trial court and the evidence given fully supports the findings. We have examined the case carefully and see no reason why it should be reversed upon the facts. We may say the same as to the law.

The accused asserts that he should have a new trial upon the ground that if he should be given another opportunity to present evidence he would be able to show by a physician, Gregorio Limjoco, that the finger which the court found to have been rendered useless by the cut already described was not necessarily a useless member, inasmuch as, if the accused would permit a surgical operation, the finger could be restored to its normal condition. He also asserts that he could demonstrate by the physician referred to that it was not the middle finger that was disabled but the third finger instead.

We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new trial. It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the finger, the usefullness of which was destroyed, was the middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the left hand was rendered useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger it was.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza.

BRINAS VS. PEOPLE Case Digest

BRINAS VS. PEOPLE (125 SCRA 687)

Facts: In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo. The two were bound for Lusacan in Tiaong, Quezon.

They boarded the train of Manila Railroad Company at about 2pm. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag at 8pm, the train slowed down and the conductor, accused-appellant, Clemente Brinas, shouted Lusacan, Lusacan!

The old woman walked towards the train exit carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with the other. When they were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. The old woman and the child stumbled from the train causing them to fall down the tracks and were hit by an oncoming train, causing their instant death.

A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver, Hermogenes Buencamino, the assistant conductor and Clemente Brinas for Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the lower court acquitted Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent CA affirmed the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling the accused-appellant was negligent?

Held: There was no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the conclusion drawn from the findings.

It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able to disembark; there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped. The appellant was negligent because his announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a full 3 minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. The premature announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked and picked up speed. The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellan

24-Aug-14

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

MAGALLONA V. ERMITA (CASE DIGEST)

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands.

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

ORLITO VILLACORTA,Accused-Appellant.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

- versus -

D E C I S I O N

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, which affirmed the Decision[2] dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, finding accused-appellant Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus the costs of suit.

On June 21, 2002, an Information[3]was filed against Villacorta charging him with the crime of murder, as follows:

That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which caused his immediate death.

When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.[4]

Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas.Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendejas store. At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendejas store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruzs body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruzs body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruzs body.[5] Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.[6]

Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital.When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient.Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital onFebruary 14, 2002, where he died the following day, onFebruary 15, 2002.While admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruzs medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.[7]Dr. Belandres specifically described the cause of Cruzs death in the following manner:

The wound was exposed x x spurs concerted, the patient developed difficulty of opening the mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain and the cause of death is hypoxic encephalopathy neuro transmitted due to upper G.I. bleeding x x x.Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage III.[8]

In his Appellants Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of errors:

I

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.

The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who attended to Cruz at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution and defense agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias testimony based on the stipulation that it would only corroborate Dr. Belandres testimony on Cruz dying of tetanus.

For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz.Villacorta recounted that he was on his way home from work at around two oclock in the morning of January 21, 2002.Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby store.When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacortas shoulder.This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home.Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got hurt.Villacorta only found out about Cruzs death upon his arrest onJuly 31, 2002.[9]

On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito Villacorta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetuaand to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim plus the costs of suit.[10]

Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal to assail his conviction by the RTC.[11]The Court of Appeals directed the PAO to file Villacortas brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.

Villacorta filed his Appellants Brief[12] on May 30, 2007; while the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief[13] on October 2, 2007.

On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.

Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.

Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as he was adopting the Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of Appeals.[14] The OSG, likewise, manifested that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief. [15]

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

We are not persuaded.

x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently and there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME, HE COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.[16]

Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing incident. It was Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one who stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts that Mendejas account of the stabbing incident is replete with inconsistencies and incredulities, and is contrary to normal human experience, such as: (1) instead of shouting or calling for help when Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja attempted to run after and catch Villacorta; (2) while, by Mendejas own account, there were other people who witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after Villacorta, yet, oddly, only Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and suddenly as Mendeja described, then it would have been physically improbable for Mendeja to have vividly recognized the perpetrator, who immediately ran away after the stabbing; (4) after the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran in opposite directions; and (5) Mendeja had said that the bamboo stick, the alleged murder weapon, was left at her store, although she had also stated that the said bamboo stick was left embedded in Cruzs body. Villacorta maintains that the aforementioned inconsistencies are neither trivial nor inconsequential, and should engender some doubt as to his guilt.

To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect.Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.[17]

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of Appeals rejected Villacortas attempts to impugn Mendejas testimony, thus:

Appellants reason for concluding that witness Mendejas testimony is incredible because she did not shout or call for help and instead run after the appellant, fails to impress the Court because persons who witness crimes react in different ways.

Equally lacking in merit is appellants second reason which is, other persons could have run after the appellant after the stabbing incident.As explained by witness Mendeja, the other person whom she identified as Aron was left to assist the appellant who was wounded. Further, the stabbing occurred at 2:00 oclock in the morning, a time when persons are expected to be asleep in their house, not roaming the streets.

His [Villacortas] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident rendered impossible or incredible the identification of the assailant cannot likewise prosper in view of his admission that he was in the store of witness Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the morning and that he assaulted the victim by boxing him.

Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot support appellants argument.Appellant and the victim were known to witness Mendeja, both being her friends and regular customers. There was light in front of the store.An opening in the store measuring 1 and meters enables the person inside to see persons outside, particularly those buying articles from the store.The victim was in front of the store buying bread when attacked.Further, immediately after the stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional opportunity to identify the malefactor.Thus, authorship of the attack can be credibly ascertained.[18]

Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for Mendeja to fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz onJanuary 23, 2002.We have ruled time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both the victim and accused, and where thelocus criminisafforded good visibility, and where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused, then her version of the story deserves much weight.[19]

The purported inconsistencies in Mendejas testimony pointed out by Villacorta are on matters that have no bearing on the fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002, right in front of Mendejas store.

In the face of Mendejas positive identification of Villacorta as Cruzs stabber, Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial.Denial, likealibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence.Likealibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[20]

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.[21]

In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

InUrbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[22]the Court was confronted with a case of very similar factual background as the one at bar.During an altercation onOctober 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound on Javiers hand.Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses.OnNovember 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with lockjaw and convulsions.Dr. Exconde, who attended to Javier, found that Javiers serious condition was caused by tetanus infection.The next day, onNovember 15, 1980, Javier died.An Information was filed against Urbano for homicide.Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court found Urbano guilty of homicide, becauseJavier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act.Urbano appealed before this Court, arguing that Javiers own negligence was the proximate cause of his death.Urbano alleged that when Dr. Meneses examined Javiers wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and that Javier could have acquired the tetanus germs when he returned to work on his farm only two (2) weeks after sustaining his injury.The Court granted Urbanos appeal.

We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days.Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafterthe hacking incident ormore than 14 daysafter the infliction of the wound. Therefore, theonset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.[23]

The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the Court that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We explained in Urbano that:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)[24]

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality.Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.

We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved during trial.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability.Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder.[25]

We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because the prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill. In fact, the Court of Appeals expressly observed the lack of evidence to prove such an intent beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:

Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick, hitting him on the left side of the body and then immediately fled.The instrument used is not as lethal as those made of metallic material.The part of the body hit is not delicate in the sense that instant death can ensue by reason of a single stab wound.The assault was done only once.Thus, there is doubt as to whether appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which should be resolved in favor of the appellant.x x x.[26]

The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor.Theonus probandilies not on accused-appellant but on the prosecution.The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt.When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.[27]

Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for medical treatment immediately after the stabbing incident.Right after receiving medical treatment, Cruz was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-patient.There was no other evidence to establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical attendance for more than nine days.Without such evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.[28]

The Information specified that accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x.

Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.[29] Likewise, even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.[30]

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this case, and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without provocation. It was two oclock in the morning of January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out buying bread at Mendejas store, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard down and was totally unprepared for an attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his body, then swiftly ran away. Villacortas treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with no opportunity at all to defend himself or retaliate.

Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

SO ORDERED.

ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party from labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.[31] The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since said law excludes from its coverage cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed one (1) year.[32] With the aggravating circumstance of treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in the maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days. Consequently, we impose upon Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has been in jail since July 31, 2002 until present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence, we order his immediate release.

Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages compensate for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim and his family as being a proximate result of the wrongful act.An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss.Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) moral damages is appropriate for less serious, as well as slight physical injuries.[33]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor. Considering that Villacorta has been incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacortas immediate release, unless Villacorta is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance with such order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

G.R. No. 186412

Present:

Chairperson,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO, and

Promulgated:

7-Sep-11

CORONA, C.J.,

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Cecille VILLACORTA, Defendant-Appellant.

Decided: September 28, 2010

GONZALEZ, P.J., ANDRIAS, ACOSTA, RENWICK, ABDUS-SALAAM, JJ. Tacopina, Seigel & Turano, P.C., New York (Joseph Tacopina of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Britta Gilmore of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J.), rendered July 6, 2009, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of grand larceny in the third degree and 144 counts of falsifying business records in the first degree, and sentencing her to concurrent terms of 90 days, with 5 years' probation, a fine and community service, unanimously affirmed. The matter is remitted to Supreme Court, New York County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50(5).

The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007] ). On the contrary, we find the evidence to be overwhelming. There was ample proof that defendant was not authorized to manipulate sales records, such as by recording fictional transactions, so as to benefit herself at her employer's expense. Furthermore, her pattern of behavior demonstrated her fraudulent intent and awareness that her actions were unauthorized.

The court properly exercised its discretion in restricting, to matters relevant to the charges, defendant's discovery of her employer's computerized records (see People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 547-551 [1979] ). Defendant's subpoena duces tecum was overbroad. Although afforded an opportunity to make more targeted discovery requests, she failed to do so. Instead she requested an impermissibly open-ended fishing expedition into the company's records based on speculation that relevant information might be found. Defendant received extensive discovery as to relevant matters, and there is no reason to believe she was deprived of any exculpatory or impeaching evidence.

The record does not support defendant's claim that a defense witness was intimidated by the court and the prosecutor into declining to testify. The court simply, and correctly, advised the witness that if she admitted having engaged in the same kind of transactions that led to the charges against defendant, and if those transactions were not authorized by the employer, she could be prosecuted as well (see People v. Lee, 58 N.Y.2d 773 [1982] ). The People properly refused to immunize the witness (see People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 247 [1981] ), and the court properly assigned her an attorney. On advice of counsel, the witness indicated she would invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege as to potentially incriminating matters, and defendant chose not to call her. We do not find any evidence of intimidation (compare People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747, 761-762 [1980] ).

- See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-supreme-court-appellate-division/1539509.html#sthash.oa8RqqT9.dpuf

We have considered and rejected defendant's challenges to the court's evidentiary rulings and the prosecutor's summation. Defendant's repugnant verdict claim is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject it on the merits.

- See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-supreme-court-appellate-division/1539509.html#sthash.oa8RqqT9.dpuf

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA,

Accused-Appellants.

D E C I S I O N

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Criminal Case No. Q-01-100061

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal by Henry Milan and Jackman Chua from the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934 dated May 10, 2006.Said Decision affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting them and one Restituto Carandang for two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder in Criminal Cases No. Q-01-100061, Q-01-100062 and Q-01-100063, the Informations for which read:

That on or about the 5th day of April 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO, by then and there shooting the latter several times with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber hitting him on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the immediate heirs of said PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO.

That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.[2]

Criminal Case No. Q-01-100062

That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, by then and there shooting the latter several times with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber, hitting him on the different parts of the body and as soon as the said victim fell on the ground, by placing a hand grenade (sic) underneath the body which directly caused an explosion and mutilated the body which directly caused the death of SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR,to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063

That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.[3]

That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of SPO1 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, by then and there shooting the latter with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber, hitting him on his neck, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries, the offender thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reasons or causes independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said SPO1 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.[4]

On May 15, 2001, accused-appellants Carandang, Milan and Chua pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.

The prosecution evidence, culled from the testimonies of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Wilfredo Montecalvo, SPO1 Rodolfo Estores, Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Virgilio Calaro, P/Supt. Manuel Roxas and Dr. Wilson Tan, yielded the following version of the facts:

In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the La Loma Police Station 1 received a request for assistance from the sister of accused Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take place in her house at Calavite St., Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon City.The station commander called SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and instructed him to talk to Milans sister, who was in their office.SPO2 Red, accompanied by Police Officer (PO) 2 Dionisio Alonzo, SPO1 Estores and SPO1 Montecalvo, talked to Milans sister.Thereafter, SPO2 Red formed a team composed of the officers who accompanied him during the interrogation, with him as team leader.The team received further instructions from the station commander then proceeded to Calavite Street aboard two vehicles, a mobile patrol car and an unmarked car.[5]

When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m.,[6] they alighted from their vehicles and surrounded Milans house.SPO1 Montecalvos group went to the left side of the house, while SPO2 Reds group proceeded to the right. The two groups eventually met at the back of the house near Milans room. The door to Milans room was open, enabling the police officers to see Carandang, Milan and Chua inside. SPO2 Red told the group that the persons inside the room would not put up a fight, making them confident that nothing violent would erupt. However, when the group introduced themselves as police officers, Milan immediately shut the door.[7]

PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and propelling them inside the room.PO2 Alonzo shoutedWalang gagalaw!Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red who dropped to the floor one after the other.Due to the suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not able to return fire and were instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots.SPO1 Montecalvo, who was right behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the assailants when Carandang shot and hit him.SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground.SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan,Sugurin mo na!Milan lunged towards SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire his gun and hit Milan.SPO1 Estores went inside the house and pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out.[8]

Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival of P/Sr. Insp. Calaro, Chief Operations Officer of the La Loma Police Station 1, and P/Supt. Roxas, the Deputy Station Commander of Police Station 1 at the time of the incident.[9] SPO1 Montecalvo was brought to the Chinese General Hospital. Milan stepped out of the house and was also brought to a hospital,[10]but Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside the house for several hours. There was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender of Carandang and Chua, during which they requested for the presence of a certain Colonel Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo.[11] It was around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight when Carandang and Chua surrendered.[12] SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were found dead inside the house, their bodies slumped on the floor with broken legs and gunshot and grenade shrapnel wounds.[13]

Dr. Winston Tan, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted the post-mortem examination of the bodies of SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo.He found that the gunshot wounds of Red and Alonzo were the cause of their deaths.[14]

The defense presented the three accused as witnesses, testifying as follows:

According to SPO1 Montecalvos account, Dr. Bu Castro of the Chinese General Hospital operated on him, removing a bullet from the right portion of his nape.SPO1 Montecalvos hospitalization expenses amounted toP14,324.48.He testified that it was a nightmarish experience for him as he feared that he might be paralyzed later on.[15]

Carandang claims that he had no firearm during the incident, and that it was the police officers who fired all the shots.He was in Milans house during the incident in order to ask Milan to accompany him to convert his cellular phones SIM card.When he arrived at Milans place, he found Milan and Chua playing a card game.A short time later, there was banging on the door.The door of the house was destroyed and gunfire suddenly erupted, prompting him to take cover under a bed.Chua cried out to him that he was hit and that he might lose blood.Milan ran outside and sustained injuries as well.There was an explosion near the door, causing burns on Carandangs left arm.Gunfire continued coming from different directions for two to three minutes.Suddenly, the place became dark as the lights went out.[16]

Since gunshots were still heard every now and then, Carandang stayed in the house and did not come out.Col. Tor, the new Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Sikatuna, negotiated for Carandang to come out.Carandang requested for the presence of his wife, Col. Doroteo Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo.He went out of the house at around midnight when the three arrived.[17]

Milan testified that he was at home in Calavite St. at the time of the incident.He knew Carandang for seven months.Chua was their neighbor.While playing a card game inside his room, they heard someone pounding at the door.He stood and approached the door to check.The door was destroyed, and two unidentified men barged in.Gunshots erupted.He was hit on the left side of his body.He ran out of the room, leaving Chua and Carandang behind.As he was doing so, he saw his mother lying down and shoutingItigil niyo ang putukan; maraming matatanda dito!Milan was then hit on his left leg by another gunshot.[18]

Chua testified that he went to the house of Milan at around noontime of April 4, 2001 to play a card game.They played inside Milans ground floor room.Five to ten minutes later, Carandang arrived and laid down on the bed.Chua did not pay much attention as Milan and Carandang discussed about cellular phones.Later, they heard a loud banging in the door as if it was being forced open.Milan stood up to see what was happening.Chua remained seated and Carandang was still on the bed.The door was forcibly opened.Chua heard successive gunshots and was hit on his left big toe.He ducked on the floor near the bed to avoid being hit further.He remained in that position for several hours until he lost consciousness.He was already being treated at the Chinese General Hospital when he regained consciousness.In said hospital, a paraffin test was conducted upon him.[19]

P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, later testified that the paraffin test on Chua yielded a negative result for gunpowder nitrates, but that performed on Carandang produced a positive result.She was not able to conduct a paraffin test on Milan, who just came from the operating room when she saw him.Milan seemed to be in pain and refused to be examined.[20]

On April 22, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision[21]finding Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder:

To the heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder described and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 63 of the same Code, for the killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each other, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder and to indemnify the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, as follows:

1. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

To the heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo:

2. P50,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P149,734.00 as actual damages; and

4. P752,580.00 as compensatory damages

1. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. P50,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P139,910.00 as actual damages; and

4. P522,960.00 as compensatory damages.

Likewise, finding the accused Restituto Carandang, Henry Milan and Jackman Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder, described and penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2, having acted in conspiracy with each other and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years of prision mayor to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, and to indemnify the victim Wilfredo Montecalvo as follows:

1. P14,000.00 as actual damages;

2. P20,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P20,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees; and

4.To pay the costs.[22]

Carandang, Milan and Chua appealed to this Court.[23] The appeals were separately docketed as G.R. Nos. 160510-12.[24]Pursuant, however, to the decision of this Court in People v. Mateo,[25] the appeals were transferred[26] to the Court of Appeals, where they were assigned a single docket number, CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934.

On May 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision modifying the Decision of the trial court:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061-63 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Frustrated Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

1) In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red an indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of P2,140,980.69 andP2,269,243.62, respectively; and

2) In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, accused-appellants are hereby instead sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

With costs against the accused-appellants.[27]

I.

Milan and Chua appealed to this Court anew.[28] Carandang did not appeal, and instead presented a letter informing this Court that he is no longer interested in pursuing an appeal.[29] On April 9, 2008, Milan and Chua filed a Supplemental Appellants Brief to further discuss the Assignment of Errors they presented in their September 28, 2004 Appellants Brief:

II.

The court a quo erred in holding that there was conspiracy among the appellants in the case at bar.

Assuming arguendo that conspiracy exists, the courta quogravely erred in convicting them of the crime of murder and frustrated murder instead of homicide and frustrated homicide only, the qualifying circumstance of treachery not having been duly proven to have attended the commission of the crimes charged.[30]

The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite the established fact that it was Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all three accused were held equally criminally responsible therefor. The trial court explained that Carandang, Milan and Chuas actuations showed that they acted in concert against the police officers. The pertinent portion of the RTC Decision reads:

Milan, Carandang and Chua were all inside the room of Milan. Upon arrival of police officers Red, Alonzo and the others and having identified themselves as police officers, the door was closed and after Alonzo and Red pushed it open and as Alonzo shouted,walang gagalaw, immediately shots rang out from inside the room, felling Alonzo, then Red, then Montecalvo. Chua was heard by Estores to shout to Milan: Sugurin mo na (tsn, October 16, 2001, page 8). And as Milan lunged at Montecalvo, the latter shot him.

That the three acted in concert can be gleaned from their actuations.First, when they learned of the presence of the police officers, they closed the door.Not one of them came out to talk peacefully with the police officers.Instead, Carandang opened fire, Alonzo and Red did not even have the chance to touch their firearms at that instant.[31]

In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals further expounded on the acts of Milan and Chua showing that they acted in concert with Carandang, to wit:

In the present case, when appellants were alerted of the presence of the police officers, Milan immediately closed the door.Thereafter, when the police officers were finally able to break open said door, Carandang peppered them with bullets. PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result while SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally wounded. Then, upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on the floor and seriously wounded, Chua ordered Milan to attack the police officers. Following the order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but the latter, however, was able to shoot him.

At first glance, Milans act of closing the door may seem a trivial contribution in the furtherance of the crime. On second look, however, that act actually facilitated the commission of the crime. The brief moment during which the police officers were trying to open the door paved the way for the appellants to take strategic positions which gave them a vantage point in staging their assault. Thus, when SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were finally able to get inside, they were instantly killed by the sudden barrage of gunfire. In fact, because of the suddenness of the attack, said police officers were not able to return fire.

Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in the conspiracy consisted of lending encouragement and moral ascendancy to his co-conspirators as evidenced by the fact that he ordered Milan to attack the already fallen police officers with the obvious intention to finish them off.Moreover, he did not immediately surrender even when he had the opportunity to do so but instead chose to stay with Carandang inside the room until their arrest.[32]

Milan and Chua object to the conclusion that they were in conspiracy with Carandang due to their acts of closing the door and not peaceably talking to the police officers. According to them, those acts were caused by their being frightened by the police officers who were allegedly in full battle gear.[33] Milan and Chua further assert that the fortuitous and unexpected character of the encounter and the rapid turn of events should have ruled out a finding of conspiracy.[34] They claim that the incident happened so fast, giving them no opportunity to stop Carandang.[35]

Appellants contest the factual finding that Chua directed Milan to go after SPO1 Montecalvo, alleging that they were both unarmed and that there was no way for Milan to attack an armed person.What really happened, according to them, was that Milan ran out of the room for safety and not to attack SPO1 Montecalvo.[36]Milan claims that he was already injured in the stomach when he ran out, and it was natural for him to seek safety.

Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered Sugurin mo na! to Milan, appellants argue that no crime was committed due to the same as all the victims had already been shot when said words were shouted.[37] Furthermore, it appears to have been uttered as a result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and did not inherently carry with it inducement or temptation.[38]

In the Supplemental Brief, Milan and Chua point out that the assault on the victims was the result of the impulsive act of Carandang and was not a result of any agreement or a concerted action of all the accused.[39] They claim that when the shootout ensued, Chua immediately dove down near the bed while Milan ran out of the room out of fear.[40] It is allegedly hard to imagine that SPO1 Montecalvo with certainty heard Chua utter the phrase Sugurin mo na, considering that the incident happened so fast, there were lots of gunshots.[41]

To summarize, Milans and Chuas arguments focus on the lack of direct evidence showing that they conspired with Carandang during the latters act of shooting the three victims.However, as we have held inPeople v. Sumalpong,[42]conspiracy may also be proven by other means:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime.Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient.When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each.[43]

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milans following such instruction).Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct participation.

Appellants attempt to instill doubts in our minds that Chua shoutedsugurin mo nato Milan, who then ran towards SPO1 Montecalvo, must fail.SPO1 Estoress positive testimony[44]on this matter prevails over the plain denials of Milan and Chua.SPO1 Estores has no reason to lie about the events he witnessed on April 5, 2001.As part of the team that was attacked on that day, it could even be expected that he is interested in having only the real perpetrators punished.

Furthermore, we have time and again ruled that factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[45] It was the trial court that was able to observe the demeanors of the witnesses, and is consequently in a better position to determine which of the witnesses are telling the truth.Thus, this Court, as a general rule, would not review the factual findings of the courts a quo, except in certain instances such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.[46]

Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy.Unlike evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection.Instead, conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.[47]

As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act of closing the door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush.The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to defend themselves.Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualif