Q: Three Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging Matuday and Bayas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019; and two counts of malversation through falsification They were charged in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively. During their arraignment petitioners pled “not guilty.”  The pretrial conference was cancelled and reset because the counsel for the accused was not prepared. The pretrial was again cancelled because of the absence of the counsel for the accused, who was allegedly “suffering from the flu.”  Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman.  They were asked to do so, so that at the resumption of the pretrial, they could expeditiously pass upon all other matters that still remained to be resolved. The parties submitted a “Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents,” which had been duly signed by the two accused.

The counsel moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused.   The accused, represented by their new counsel, moved to withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. They invoked their constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents.

May a new counsel be allowed to withdraw unilaterally from the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents made by a party and his former counsel?

A: No. Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound public policy. When made before the court, they are conclusive.  And the party who validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the court’s sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.

Furthermore, a new counsel cannot justify such withdrawal by the simple expedient of passing the blame on the previous counsel, who had supposedly not sufficiently discharged his duty to the client. Petitioners may not assail it on the mere ground that it would allegedly put the accused at a disadvantage

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victim’s body and the parents and police were informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. Arnel verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations (On June 13 and 14), the police came to know and recovered from appellant’s house, Khazie Mae’s green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. Appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. After appellant’s plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. The only evidence presented by the appellant was the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal to prove that the proximate cause of the death was asphyxia by strangulation. The Trial Court found appellant guilty of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death by electrocution , which shall be changed into gas poisoning as soon as facilities are provided for by Bureau of Prisons.

Q: Whether or not the arraignment of Alicando was valid.

A: No.The arraignment is null and void. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it

known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption.

Q: Whether or not the plea of guilt made by appellant is valid.

A: No. The plea of guilt is likewise null and void. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.

Q: Can a conviction in a capital offense rest alone on a plea of guilt by the accused?

A: No. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. 

Q: Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Calapan Branch, Oriental Mindoro) requested Peñaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of totalling P150,000.00.

The bank initiated investigations. All of these investigations concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person primarily responsible was the bank’s Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce.

A Civil Case for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment was filed against petitioner and her husband, Antonio Burce. 

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. On petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court ruled that there was no prejudicial question.

Petitioner was arraigned and assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty. While the trial of the criminal case was suspended, the trial of the civil case continued. At the time of arraignment, the civil case was already submitted for decision. Hence, during the pre-trial conference of the criminal case, the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case as their respective evidence in the criminal case. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their written agreement pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, petitioner, duly assisted by her counsel, with the conforme of the public prosecutor, entered into the pre-trial agreement.

The trial court rendered a consolidated decision finding petitioner guilty.

Petitioner seasonably appealed her conviction.

Was there a valid trial of the criminal case

A: Yes. The records clearly show that the pre-trial agreement was prepared by petitioner with the conforme of the public prosecutor. Thereafter, petitioner

filed a consolidated memorandum for both civil and criminal cases. Section 5 of Rule 110 requires that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The rationale behind the rule is "to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons." The records show that the public prosecutor actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case from its inception. It was during pre-trial conference when the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under Section 2 (e) of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which provides that during pre-trial conference, the parties shall consider "such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118, reduced to writing such agreement. Petitioner, her counsel, and the public prosecutor signed the agreement. Petitioner is bound by the pre-trial agreement, and she cannot now belatedly disavow its contents.

Q: Yap was convicted of the crime of  estafa

for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00. After the

records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion

to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to

post bail in the amount of P5,500,000 on condition that he will secure “a

certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a

resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is

rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the

court and private complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was

denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting

bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also

contests the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a

certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and

travel.

Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right

against excessive bail.

A: Yes. The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable,

excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The

purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or

whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to

assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is

reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount

equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case,

P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an

exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow

because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil

liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

Q: When can an accused be denied of bail or have his bail cancelled by the court?

A: If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a)  That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b)  That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c)  That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;

(d)  That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e)  That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.

Q: What is the nature of a bail sought in appeal on non-capital offense?

A: Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal in non-capital offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years and circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled. In the same vein, the Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact convicted by the trial court.

Q: When is there a proper provisional dismissal?

A: A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur:1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the

accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of  his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal;

2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;

3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and

4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

Q: Hill accidentally killed the son of Elcano. He was acquitted from the

criminal case due to the defense of minority. Elcano filed a civil case alleging

damages against Reginald and his father from whom the latter was receiving

subsistence. Hills moved to dismiss the case on the ground that case was

barred by res judicata and that the father was relieved from guardianship of

the defendant through emancipation by marriage. The case was dismissed thus

this appeal.

Is the civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of accused in the

criminal case.

A: No. Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal law while civil

negligence is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having

always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal

negligence. Culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may

be punishable by law. It results that the acquittal of Hill in the criminal case

has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence the acquittal is not a

bar to the instant action against him.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is

entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence

under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act

or omission of the defendant.

Likewise, emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into

transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely,

killing someone else invites judicial action.

Q: Despite the absence of a reservation to file a separate civil action, may private respondent nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under Art. 2176, 2180, 2177 of the Civil Code?

A: The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, §1, otherwise it should be dismissed. A reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. The right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes ( ex delicto ) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for recovery of the civil liability must be tried in a single proceeding has always been regarded a matter of procedure and, since the rule making power has been conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the keeping of this Court.

Q: What is the exception to the general rule that a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action?

A: a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only:

(1) When such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived;

(2) The right to bring it separately is reserved or

(3) Such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action.

Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.

Q: Is the admission made by the counsel for the accused in the pleading binding upon his client?

A: No. An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and that the same is conclusive as to him, it is also hornbook doctrine that the authority of an attorney to bind his client as to any admission of facts made by him is limited to matters of judicial procedure.  An admission which operates as a waiver, surrender, or destruction of the client’s cause is beyond the scope of the attorney’s implied authority.

Q: Is it mandatory under the Rules that a hearing be conducted before granting bail?

A: Yes. we held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion.  Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not

the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge.  In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.

Q: The Manager of the Bank requested the Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of totalling P150,000.00.

The bank initiated investigations. All of these investigations concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person primarily responsible was the bank’s Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce.

A Civil Case for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment was filed against the accused. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. On petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court ruled that there was no prejudicial question.

Petitioner was arraigned and assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty. While the trial of the criminal case was suspended, the trial of the civil case continued. At the time of arraignment, the civil case was already submitted for decision. Hence, during the pre-trial conference of the criminal case, the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case as their respective evidence in the criminal case. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their written agreement pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, petitioner, duly assisted by her counsel, with the conforme of the public prosecutor, entered into the pre-trial agreement.

The trial court rendered a consolidated decision finding petitioner guilty.

Petitioner seasonably appealed her conviction.

Was there a valid trial of the criminal case?

A: Yes. The records clearly show that the pre-trial agreement was prepared by petitioner with the conforme of the public prosecutor. Thereafter, petitioner filed a consolidated memorandum for both civil and criminal cases. Section 5 of Rule 110 requires that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The rationale behind the rule is "to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons." The records show that the public prosecutor actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case from its inception. It was during pre-trial conference when the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under Section 2 (e) of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which provides that during pre-trial conference, the parties shall consider "such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118, reduced to writing such agreement. Petitioner, her counsel, and the public prosecutor signed the agreement. Petitioner is bound by the pre-trial agreement, and she cannot now belatedly disavow its contents.

Q: What are the two modes of taking bail?

A: (1) by bail bond and (2) by recognizance. A bail bond is an obligation given by the accused with one or more sureties, with the condition to be void upon the performance by the accused of such acts as he may legally be required to perform. A recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual condition in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for trial. 

Q: The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as

amended, which provides: "Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right”; what would be the exception under this rule?

A:  All persons in custody shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a

matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong." Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong."

Q: Is correct to say that certiorari will not lie unless the inferior court has, through a motion for reconsideration, the opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it?

A: No. The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration should first be availed of before a petition for certiorari and prohibition is filed. However, this rule does not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. A motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution has been ordered and the need for relief is extremely urgent.

Q: Does a private prosecutor has an authority to act for the People of the Philippines in criminal cases?

A: No. A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to act for the People of the Philippines before this Court. It is the Government's counsel, the Solicitor General who appears in criminal cases or their incidents before the Supreme Court. 

Q: How does the court exercises its discretion to grant bail in capital offenses?

A: The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether of not the evidence of guilt is strong. 

Q: An information was filed charging spouses A and B with murder. The information recommended no bail for the provisional liberty of the accused spouses in the murder case. The judge issued a warrant for the arrest of both accused. However, the accused were nowhere to be found. The counsel of the accused filed a motion to grant and fix bail before the same trial court, even before the trial acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Notwithstanding the above, respondent judge entertained said motion for bail and set the same for hearing. Did the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the motion for bail despite failure of the same to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the accused spouses?

A: Yes. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, bail is defined as the security given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions herein specified. When you say "in custody of law" it refers to one who is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest or even without a warrant but such arrest is considered legal as provided by law or when accused voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. The law expressly establishes that only those persons who have been arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of the law on bail. Since, in the case at bar, the accused were not yet arrested, the lower court under the

judgment of respondent judge cannot acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the accused. Hence, the accused have no standing in court to file a motion for bail. More so, that respondent judge is not justified in setting the hearing for said motion. Indeed, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in setting a hearing for the motion of bail of accused with which he did no acquire jurisdiction.

Q:  Is that an extra-judicial confession of an accused is binding only upon

himself and is not admissible against his co-accused?

A: While the general rule is that an extra-judicial confession of an accused is binding only upon himself and is not admissible against his co-accused, it has been held that such a confession is admissible against a co-accused where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator and where the co-conspirator's confession is corroborated by other evidence.

Q: On 20 January 1986, counsel for accused filed a Motion for Extension of Time, or until 8 February 1986, within which to present a Demurrer to Evidence, which motion was granted. The counsel for the accused, however, failed to seasonably file his Demurrer to Evidence such that on 1 April 1986, the prosecution moved that the case be submitted for decision. Thus, the Trial Court rendered its Decision on 12 April 1986. On 14 April 1986, counsel for the accused belatedly filed his Demurrer. On 20 May 1986, the Trial Court, in an Order, denied the said Demurrer.

Appellant submits that the Court a quo, notwithstanding its denial of his Demurrer to Evidence, should have given him a chance to present evidence on his behalf and that the filing of the said Demurrer should not have been taken to mean a waiver of the right to present evidence. Is the contention made by the accused correct?

A: Rule 119, Section 15 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on 1 January 1985, provides: When after the prosecution has rested its case, the accused files a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

Q: Is the absence of a preliminary investigation impairs the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective?

A: No. It is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. 

If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.

Q: What is the effect if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits.

A: Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation, so may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.

Q: Define Arrest. How is it effected?

A: "Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

Q: When the accused objects the jurisdiction of the court over his person, may he move to quash the information?

A: Yes. if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court.

Q: Is the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case?

A: No. Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution listed in the Information, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the complaining witness is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case.  Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private complainant or the complaining witness is however not required.  Even the presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court.  It is enough that the accused is represented by his counsel. Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State appeared for the pre-trial, the same can and should proceed.  After all, the public prosecutor appeared for the State.

Q: What are the three (3) requisites to raise the defense of double jeopardy? When can a Legal jeopardy attach?

A: To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused

Q: When can a bail be made as a matter of right?

A: The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides: "Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong." Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

Q: Is there any condition before a bail may be granted even the granting of the same is discretionary upon the court under the Rules of Court?

A: Yes. Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong.  However, admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance

with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

Q: Distinguish Bail Bond and Recognizance

A:  A bail bond is an obligation given by the accused with one or more sureties, with the condition to be void upon the performance by the accused of such acts as he may legally be required to perform. A recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual condition in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for trial. The bail bond executed by the appellants, though so denominated, is essentially a recognizance, an "obligation" contracted with the State by the appellants, not requiring as an indispensable condition for its validity, the signature of the accused.

Q: Was the duplicitous information a valid indictment?

A: Yes. When an appellant fails to file a motion to quash within the time prescribed under Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, he is thus deemed to have waived the defect in the Information. An accused, who fails to object prior to arraignment to a duplicitous information, may be found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged therein and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the elements of such component crimes in the said information has satisfied the constitutional guarantee that an accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he or she is being charged. Verily, duplicitous information is valid since such defect may be waived and the accused, because of such waiver, could be convicted of as many offenses as those charged in the information and proved during trial.

Q: Who may appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case? Define Party?

A: Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party", except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy. The word "party" must be understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the offense.

Q: Is Certiorari the proper remedy in case of a final order of dismissal?

A: No. The remedy against such a judgment is an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on appeal, whether of fact, or oflaw, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. The party aggrieved did not have the option to substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari."

Q: What are the grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information?

A: he rules governing a motion to quash are found under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court.  Section 3 of this Rule enumerates the grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows:

(a)  That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b)  That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c)  That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d)  That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e)  That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f)  That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g)  That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h)  That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i)  That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

 

Q: Should the Secretary of Justice refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in the court?

A: Yes. to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in the Court.  The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

Q: What is the effect of the findings and conclusions of the Provincial Prosecutor, being the final disposition on the reinvestigation, in the judge’s final action with respect to reinvestigation?

A: The Provincial Prosecutor's opinion that the prosecution should present its "evidence that makes out a prima facie case" clearly indicate that he was convinced that there is at the very least a reasonable ground to believe that the crime was committed and the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The findings and conclusion of the Provincial Prosecutor, being the final disposition on the reinvestigation, should have been the sole and only valid basis for the Judge's final action with respect to the reinvestigation in the light of the foregoing provisions of the Rules of Court and R.A. No. 5180, as amended.