UNITED STATES, PETITIONERv.FRANCISCOJIMENEZ RECIO and ADRIAN LOPEZ-MEZANo. 011184 [January 21, 3003]

FACTS OF THE CASE:In this case the lower courts applied theCruzrule to similar facts: On November 18, 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada. They found, and seized, a large stash of illegal drugs. With the help of the trucks two drivers, they set up a sting. The Government took the truck to the drivers destination, a mall in Idaho. The drivers paged a contact and described the trucks location. The contact said that he would call someone to get the truck. And three hours later, the two defendants, Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza, appeared in a car. Jimenez Recio drove away in the truck; Lopez-Meza drove the car away in a similar direction. Police stopped both vehicles and arrested both men.A federal grand jury indicted Jimenez Recio, Lopez-Meza, and the two original truck drivers, charging them with having conspired, together and with others, to possess and to distribute unlawful drugs. A jury convicted all four. But the trial judge then decided that the jury instructions had been erroneous in respect to Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza. The judge noted that the Ninth Circuit, inCruz, had held that the Government could not prosecute drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the Government seized the drugs. The judge ordered a new trial where the jury would be instructed to that effect. The new jury convicted the two men once again.Thereafter, Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza appealed. They pointed out that, givenCruz, the jury had to find that they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada stop, and they claimed that the evidence was insufficient at both trials to warrant any such jury finding. The Ninth Circuit panel, by a vote of 2 to 1, agreed. All three panel members acceptedCruzas binding law. The Government sought certiorari. It noted that the Ninth Circuits holding in this case was premised upon the legal rule enunciated inCruz.ISSUE: Whether or not the conspiracy was terminated when the government seized the drugs?HELD/RULING OF THE COURT:InCruz, the Ninth Circuit held that a conspiracy continues until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. The critical portion of this statement is the last segment, that a conspiracy ends once there has been defeat of [its] object. The Circuits holdings make clear that the phrase means that the conspiracy ends through defeat when the Government intervenes, making the conspiracys goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators do not know that the Government has intervened and are totally unaware that the conspiracy is bound to fail. In our view, this statement of the law is incorrect. A conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the Government, unbeknownst to some of the conspirators, has defeat[ed] the conspiracys object.We conclude that the Ninth Circuits conspiracy-termination law holding set forth inCruzis erroneous in the manner discussed. We reverse the present judgment insofar as it relies upon that holding. Because Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza have raised other arguments not here considered, we remand the case, specifying that the Court of Appeals may consider those arguments, if they were properly raised.The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.NGO YAO TIT, ET AL., and CHUA ENG CHENG vs. THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILAG.R. Nos. L-9619 and L-9620 March 28, 1914FACTS OF THE CASE:Herein petitioners were charged for violation of Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 152. The Section 3 of said ordinance reads as follows:SEC. 3. Visiting places where opium is smoked or dealt in prohibited. No person shall visit or present at or in any place where opium, or any of its derivatives or compounds, is smoked or otherwise used in or upon the human body, or unlawfully sold, given away, or otherwise disposed of.Upon a final judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting them on a new trial, following an appeal from the municipal court of said city, of a violation of section 3 of Ordinance No. 152, the petitioners herein are detained under a commitment issued and sentencing each one of them to pay P100 fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment. In support of their Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, petitioners contend that, the Supreme Court having already held in the case of United Statesvs.Ten Yu (24 Phil., Rep., 1), that, before a conviction can be had under section 3 of Ordinance No. 152, "the defendants may prove, if the fact exists, that they visited the place described in the complaint lawfully and not in violation of the provisions or the spirit of said ordinance," and that, in effect, it must be shown, to sustain a conviction under said ordinance that the house visited was one generally used for the smoking of opium, and it appearing by an affirmative statements in the decision of the Court of First Instance that the house in question was a Chinese Club and was not destined or generally used for the smoking of opium, and there being no finding that the accused were unlawfully there, the judgment of conviction has nothing to sustain it and is, therefore, absolutely void. That such being the case, a writ ofhabeas corpuswill lie, it is contended, as imprisonment under a judgment absolutely void is an illegal imprisonment. ISSUE:Whether or not Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy to be availed of by the committed petitioners herein?HELD/RULING OF THE COURT:While the authorities cited sustain the propositions advanced, neither the one nor the other applies, in our judgment, to the case before us. It is admitted that the court had jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and that it had jurisdiction to try a person accused of violating section 3 of Ordinance No. 152. There was, therefore, jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. It is equally undoubted that, if the acts of the petitioners constituted the crime defined in that ordinance, they were properly convicted. It having been demonstrated by the evidence, as stated in the decision of the trial court, that the petitioners were found in the club house in question and that opium was being smoked therein, it became the duty of the court to determine, by he exercise of its judicial functions, whether such acts constituted the crime defined by the ordinance. This was a judicial determination admittedly within the jurisdiction and authority of the court to make. That being so, the exercise of that jurisdiction would not result in void judgment, provided the court kept within the limits thereof. In the determination of the case before it, it is clear that the court kept fully within the limits of its jurisdiction and, exercising the authority which it had a right to exercise within that jurisdiction, determined the question whether the acts developed by the evidence fell within the prohibition of the ordinance. This same question is one which is passed upon by a court every time it tries a criminal cause. That is one of the necessary adjudications. If it is to be held that a wrong determination of that question deprives the court of jurisdiction, then the correctness of a judgment of conviction in a criminal case will nearly always be determined by a writ ofhabeas corpus. (Ex parteCoy, 127 U.S., 731.) This, of course, is not the function of that writ, and makers of legislation and constitutions which preserve the writ never intended that it should be used in that manner and for that purpose.It is urged that, in view of the decisions of this court in the case of theCity of Manila vs. Rizal(p. 50,ante), the action should have been in the name of the United States and not the city of Manila; and that, the action having been wrongly entitled, the court acquired no jurisdiction of the person or the subject matter of the action and that its judgment of conviction was absolutely void. This being the case, it is argued,habeas corpuswill lie as the imprisonment is illegal.We cannot agree with this contention. The bringing of the action in the name of the city of Manila instead of the United States is an error merely and not a jurisdictional defect. It is not similar to the case where, as claimed by petitioners, an information is filed by a person who is not authorized in law to file it. The fact that the city of Manila was the plaintiff in the action does not signify that said city was the person who signed and filed the information. The accused where prosecuted by the same officials, before the same court, and in the same manner as they would have been if the action had been brought in the name of the United States, and they received the benefits of the same rights and the same privileges which they would have received if the action had been properly entitled. They have been in no sense injured or prejudiced.The defect is one which could have been cured at any stage of the trial by an amendment on the motion of the court itself or upon the motion of any person interested in the prosecution. Defects of that character which are not taken advantage of in the court below in the manner prescribed by law cannot be raised for the first time here, and especially in a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus.The writ ofhabeas corpuswas not intended and cannot be used to correct mere errors or defects in proceedings, and accordingly does not lie in the present application.The writ is denied.

JESUS T. TANCHANCO and ROMEO R. LACSON versus THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 141675-96November 25, 2005

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Tanchanco served as NFA Administrator from 1972 to 1986, during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. His co-petitioner Romeo Lacson (Lacson) was the Deputy Administrator of the NFA when he was the Administrator.On 6 May 1988, Tanchanco and the PCGG entered into aCooperation Agreement,occasioned by the desire of Tanchanco to cooperate with the Philippine government in connection with the latters efforts in the location and pursuit of government properties purloined by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, their agents and others who hold property on their behalf. In theCooperation Agreement, the parties stipulated as follows:NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties agree as follows:1.Tanchanco shall cooperate with any and all Philippine Government investigations or prosecutions pursuant to Executive Order No. 1;2.Cooperation means that Tanchanco shall provide complete, candid and absolutely truthful disclosures, in response to any and all questions and inquiries that may be put to him/her in connection with the Philippines investigations, civil actions, criminal prosecutions, or any other proceedings whether in the Philippines, the United States or elsewhere. Further, upon the request of the Philippines, Tanchanco will offer such cooperation in investigations and proceedings brought by other governments, including but not limited to the United States and Switzerland;Cooperation also means a disgorgement of assets, if any, acquired in violation of Philippine laws, rules and regulations. Cooperation further means a full disclosure of assets and liabilities, beneficially owned by Tanchanco. Any assets not therein listed as Tanchancos personal property, and thereafter discovered to be in Tanchancos name or under his/her legal or beneficial control, directly or indirectly, as of the date of this Agreement, shall become the property of the PCGG.3.Should any of Tanchancos statements or testimonies be false, misleading or materially incomplete, or should Tanchanco knowingly fail to act with total honesty and candor in any such matters, the Philippines shall no longer be bound by any of its representations contained herein. Immunities and other considerations granted in reliance thereof, shall be null and void.In return for the above, the Philippines hereby represents and agrees as follows:(1)At a time to be mutually agreed upon between Tanchanco and the Philippines, the Philippines shall move to dismiss all actions that are presently pending against Tanchanco before the Sandiganbayan and any such other courts;(2)The Philippines shall lift any sequestration orders against Tanchancos properties, if any, and rescind hold orders it may have issued against his/her actions;(3)The Philippines shall not bring any additional civil or criminal charges against Tanchanco, arising from:(A)Service in or for the Marcos government;(B)Any other actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to his/her cooperation as defined in this Agreement.Significantly, Tanchanco was called upon as one of the witnesses for the prosecution in the case filed against Imelda Marcos in New York for violation of the so-called RICO Act. It appears that his testimony was elicited concerning the transfer ofP10,000,000.00 rebate obtained by the NFA from the Philippine National Lines to the Security Bank, as well as the matter of the use of discretionary and/or intelligence funds by the Marcos administration involving the funds of the NFA during Tanchancos administration.Nonetheless, a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16950, was filed in 1991 against Tanchanco with the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds in the amount ofP10,000,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank. Tanchanco filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, wherein he argued that the case should be dismissed as he had been granted immunity from the said suit by the PCGG. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan First Division agreed with Tanchanco and in a Resolution dated 27 October 2000, the case was ordered dismissed. However, Criminal Case No. 16950 proved to be only just one of several attempts of the government to prosecute Tanchanco. In 1997, a total of 22 Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Tanchanco. He was charged with 21 counts of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and one count of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the same Code. Lacson was charged as a co-defendant in four of theinformations for Malversation of Public Funds.These cases were consolidated and raffled to the Sandiganbayan Second Division. On 2 September 1997, Tanchanco and Lacson pleaded not guilty to all of the charges. On 26 November 1997, Tanchanco and Lacson filed aMotion to Quash and/or Dismissall 22 cases, citing as basis theCooperation Agreement which was said to have granted immunity to Tanchanco from criminal prosecution. Still, the motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan examined Section 5 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 14, which empowered the PCGG to grant immunity from criminal prosecution, and ruled that the grant of immunity by the PCGG pertained only to offenses which may arise from the act of a person testifying or giving information in connection with the recovery of supposed ill-gotten wealth. The Sandiganbayan likewise concluded that even assuming the immunity granted by theCooperation Agreementcovered the offenses charged against Tanchanco, the same could not benefit Lacson, as he was not a party to the immunity agreement. AMotion for Reconsiderationwas filed by Tanchanco and Lacson, however, the same was denied.

Hence, this Petition by the Petitioners arguing that the grant of immunity under theCooperation Agreementencompassed the subject charges. ISSUE:Whether or not Jesus T. Tanchanco and Romeo R. Lacson can be granted immunity under the Cooperation Agreement?RULLING:Tanchanco is entitled to immunity. We hold that Cooperation Agreement, validly undertaken between the PCGG and Tanchanco as it was, precludes the prosecution of Tanchanco under the subject changes. The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the charges despite its lack of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case against Tanchanco. The present petition, in so far as it relates to Tanchanco, must be granted. It goes without saying though that this ruling does not shield all grantees under section 5 of E.O No.14-A from all kinds of criminal prosecution. The extent of immunity available to each particular grantee depends on their respective immunity agreements with the PCGG and the surrounding facts.Lacson Not Entitled to Immunity.It may seem unsettling to some that Lacson will have to endure criminal prosecution while Tanchanco would be discharged, or that Tanchanco will need not answer for whatever culpable acts of his during his service in the Marcos government. Yet the Court is not the guarantor of karmic warrants, but only of legal ones. TheCooperation Agreement, entered into in the judgment of the State that it would serve a higher end of justice, is a valid document, enforceable as to Tanchanco before this Court and other courts of the land.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of the SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES INSOFAR AS PETITIONER JESUS TANCHANCO IS CONCERNED. No pronouncement as to costs.

1Vernon Basnics Case Digest