THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145803. June 30, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENJIE PABIONA, ROSELO BASALATAN, ANTONIO SILARCA, ROBERTO METANO, and CHRISTOPHER DELOS REYES (at large), accused,

BENJIE PABIONA, ROSELO BASALATAN, ROBERTO METANO and ANTONIO SILARCA, appellants.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On appeal is the May 30, 2000 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 convicting appellants Benjie Pabiona, Roselo Basalatan, Roberto Metano and Antonio Silarca of the crime of murder, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim, Robert Pagayon, the amounts of P232,100.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

The Information[2] dated May 31, 1997 charging the appellants and accused Christopher de los Reyes with murder reads as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of November, 1996, in the Municipality of Passi, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with treachery and deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack and assault ROBERT PAGAYON with fist and kick blows and bamboo poles, as a result of which the said Robert Pagayon suffered multiple physical injuries on his body which caused his death thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment[3] on June 30, 1997, appellants pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial thereafter ensued. Their co-accused, Christopher de los Reyes, has remained at large.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses whose testimonies follow after their respective names:

Michael Pagayon (Michael), a cousin of the victim, testified that on November 20, 1996, at about 9 p.m. at Barangay Agtambo, Passi, Iloilo, while he was on his way to the house of his aunt, Rosalina Padernal, he heard a cry for help emanating from a nearby river. [4] When he was about ten (10) meters from the river, he saw appellants, including accused Christopher de los Reyes, wielding bamboo poles. All of the accused were striking and kicking an unidentified man who was crawling. He then heard appellant Pabiona say, “What did you tell, ha?”[5] Michael then proceeded to his aunt’s house and spent the night there.

The following morning, at about 6 a.m., Michael left his aunt’s house. On his way to work at Villa, Iloilo, he passed by the place where he saw appellants beating up the unidentified man. He saw two men at the area but he kept on walking and was not able to identify them.[6]

Two weeks later, he heard a radio news report that his cousin Robert died at Barangay Agtambo after falling into a well on the date he witnessed appellants mauling an unknown victim.[7] He then narrated what he saw on the night of November 20, 1996 to his wife. Two months after hearing the radio report, he recounted what he witnessed to the mother of the victim, Marina Pagayon.[8]

Marina Pagayon (Marina) who, like the rest of the accused, was a member of appellant Pabiona’s religious group, Catholic Movement of Jesus and Mary (CMJM), testified that at about 7 p.m. on November 20, 1996, appellant Pabiona and his brother Popoy went to her house at Gines Viejo, Passi, Iloilo and asked her to spend the night at his house in Dorillo Street, Passi, Iloilo and that Robert go along with them and resume work at his well. She acquiesced. Later that evening, appellant Basalatan, his wife Teresita and two others arrived at the Pagayon house and they all boarded appellant Basalatan’s jeepney and headed for appellant Pabiona’s house at Dorillo where she and Popoy Pabiona alighted. Appellant Basalatan and the rest of the passengers then proceeded to the well at Barangay Agtambo.

The morning after, Marina went back to her house to attend to her grandson. At about 11 a.m., Popoy Pabiona and Annie Ardales arrived at her house and told her to go to Barangay Agtambo.[9] Upon arriving thereat, she saw appellants Pabiona, Metano, Silarca, appellant Pabiona’s mother Avelina, and a certain Cheryl Pampag at Pabiona’s nipa hut. She then saw the lifeless body of her son-the victim on the floor of the hut. She cried and asked appellant Pabiona what had happened. Appellant Pabiona told her that her son died after falling into the well at about 9 a.m. She then asked why they did not bring him to a hospital to which appellant Pabiona replied that the victim was already dead when they found him. Marina then noticed that her son’s body was clean and he was wearing a pair of shorts which did not belong to him, prompting her to ask appellant Pabiona, “If he fell why is it there is no mud on the body and he is already clean.”Appellant Pabiona replied that they already bathed Robert before she arrived.[10]

A jeepney from Funeraria Pamplona later arrived to take the victim’s body. While on the jeepney, appellant Pabiona instructed Marina to keep quiet and not cry loudly as other people might hear her. He likewise instructed her to cover the victim with a blanket and made to sit beside the driver so that other people would not know that he was dead. Because the victim’s body had already hardened, however, he was laid down on the jeepney. His body was then taken to Funeraria Pamplona.

As Marina had misgivings about the cause of her son’s death, she went to appellant Pabiona’s house to talk to him and ask him again about what really transpired before the victim died. Appellant Pabiona told her to accept that what happened was an accident and suggested that there be no autopsy conducted on the victim’s body as it might cause trouble. Avelina, appellant Pabiona’s mother, then told her that she should not be saddened as they would shoulder all the funeral expenses.[11] As she still could not think clearly, she agreed to everything that appellant Pabiona and his mother had told her.

Emma Pagayon (Emma), the victim’s sister-in-law, testified that at about 6:30 a.m. on November 22, 1996, she was informed by Tessie Basalatan (Tessie), the wife of appellant Basalatan, and Gina Panerio (Gina), a member of CMJM, that the victim died after falling from the roof of appellant Pabiona’s nipa hut in Barangay Agtambo. [12] Emma thus woke up her husband Renato Pagayon and they interrogated Tessie and Gina about the circumstances surrounding the victim’s alleged fall from the roof. They were told that Robert fell face down on the ground and hit a hard object, [13] and that he was no longer brought to a

hospital as he died immediately. Upon further questioning by the Pagayons, Tessie and Gina told them that nobody reported the incident to the police as all of them were “demoralized” by the victim’s death.[14]

Emma thereupon repaired to Funeraria Pamplona and had photographs of her brother-in-law taken as she planned to request for an autopsy of his body. When she broached the idea of subjecting the victim’s body to an autopsy to Marina, the latter initially refused because of appellant Pabiona’s instructions. She later agreed upon Emma’s prodding.

Emma then went to Dr. Leonardo Deza, the municipal health officer of Passi, Iloilo, and requested for an autopsy of the victim’s body. Dr. Deza was astonished and told Emma that he had already released the victim’s death certificate[15] upon processing by an unidentified woman.[16] He then immediately caused the cancellation[17] of the death certificate at the Office of the Civil Registrar. Upon examination of the cancelled death certificate, Emma noticed that her mother-in-law’s signature therein was forged.[18]

On November 25, 1996, Emma went to Dr. Owen Jaen Lebaquin, medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Service in Camp Delgado, Iloilo City, and requested for an autopsy of the victim’s body.

Gathered from the postmortem examination conducted on the body of the victim on December 2, 1996 by Dr. Lebaquin are the following:

FINDINGS:

Fairly nourished, fairly developed previously embalmed male cadaver. Embalming incision sites are noted at the right lateral of the neck and at the umbilical area.

HEAD, TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES:

1) Hematoma, left periorbital area, measuring 4 x 4 cm, 5 cm from its anterior midline.

2) Abrasion, left mandibular area, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm, 9 cm from its anterior midline.

3) Area of multiple abrasion, right infraclavicular area, measuring 11 x 6 cm, 5 cm from its anterior midline.

4) Area of multiple abrasion, sternal notch area extending to the left supraclavicular area, measuring 8 x 6 cm, 5 cm from its anterior midline.

5) Area of multiple abrasion, left parasternal area extending to the left clavicular area, measuring 24 x 6 cm, 13 cm from its anterior midline.

6) Area of multiple abrasion, right costal margin extending to the epigastric area, measuring 29 x 11 cm, 9 cm from its anterior midline.

7) Abrasion, left iliac area, measuring 6 x 5 cm, 11 cm from its anterior midline.

8) Abrasion, distal 3rd of the right thigh, measuring 9 x 3 cm, 7 cm medial to its anterior midline.

9) Abrasion, umbilical area, measuring 7 x 5 cm, 3 cm from its anterior midline.

10) Area of Multiple Abrasion, nape area along the paravertebral area extending to the lumbar area, measuring 30 x 13 cm bisected by its posterior midline.

A linear fracture is noted at the left sphenoid.

A blood clot measuring 2 x 1 cm at the parietal lobe of the brain left side is noted.

Scalp hematoma is noted at the occipital area of the head.

Hemorrhagic areas are likewise noted at the underlying tissue of the left clavicular area.

Stomach is ½ full of partially digested food consisting mostly of rice.

CONCLUSION:

Cause of death is Cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple traumatic injuries to the body.[19]

Upon the other hand, the defense presented appellants and Rosalina Padernal whose testimonies follow after their respective names:

Appellant Pabiona testified that at about 7 p.m. on November 20, 1996, he was told by his mother that Marina went to their house earlier to inform him that her son-the victim would resume work at his well.[20] He thereupon asked his brother to accompany him in fetching the victim. On arrival at the Pagayon house at about 7:30 p.m., Marina told them to wait while she prepared Robert’s belongings. In the meantime, appellant Basalatan, together with his wife Teresita, arrived. The six of them, on board appellant Basalatan’s jeepney, then left for appellant Pabiona’s house where Marina and appellant Pabiona’s brother alighted as they were to spend the night there. The rest of them proceeded to appellant Pabiona’s farm in Barangay Agtambo at about 9 p.m. as they planned to continue digging at the well the following day.[21]

Appellant Pabiona and company arrived at the farm at about 9:30 p.m. and proceeded to a nipa hut, ten (10) meters away from the well, where they met appellants Metano, Silarca and accused de los Reyes.[22] They took supper after which appellant Basalatan and his wife Teresita left for home. The five remaining men then slept at the nipa hut.

Appellant Pabiona woke up the next day at about 5:45 a.m. and joined his companions who were drinking coffee. At around 7 a.m., he told them to stay at the nipa hut while he walked around the farm. His companions then told him that they would start digging shortly after he leaves.

At around 11:00 a.m., when appellant Pabiona was about 500 meters from the nipa hut, he was startled to find appellant Silarca running towards him, shouting that the victim fell down the well.[23] Both of them thus repaired to the well and found appellant Metano crying while accused de los Reyes was inside the well cradling the victim. Appellant Pabiona then instructed appellants Metano and Silarca to help the victim. After much difficulty, the victim being heavy, they were finally able to lift him from the 15 meter deep well by spreading his legs, placing him astride appellant Silarca’s shoulders, tying a blanket which was connected to a rope around his armpits, pulling the rope (by appellant Pabiona) as appellant Metano and accused de los Reyes helped appellant Silarca climb the bamboo ladder inside the well.

After lifting the victim from the well, appellant Silarca performed mouth to mouth resuscitation in order to revive Robert, but to no avail. [24] They thereupon brought him to the nipa hut. Appellant Pabiona instructed accused de los Reyes to look for a vehicle so they could bring Robert to a doctor. He likewise ordered him to inform Marina that her son was involved in an accident.[25]

At about 12 noon, Marina, together with Annie Ardales, arrived at the nipa hut. Appellant Pabiona left for home at about 2:30 p.m.[26] while appellants Metano and Silarca remained in the hut with Marina and Annie.

Appellant Silarca testified that at about 9:30 p.m. on November 20, 1996, he, together with appellant Metano and accused de los Reyes, was at appellant Pabiona’s nipa hut at Barangay Agtambo to work on the nearby well when appellants Pabiona and Basalatan, Teresita Basalatan and the victim arrived.[27] He then substantially corroborated appellant Pabiona’s testimony regarding the events that transpired that night.

The following morning, with appellant Metano, accused de los Reyes and the victim, appellant Silarca prepared to work on the well. An iron bar, two bamboo poles and a shovel were inside the well.[28] While the victim was going down the bamboo ladder, he slipped on one of the rungs and let out a cry.[29] Appellants Silarca and accused de los Reyes were about seven meters away while appellant Metano was about a meter away when the victim slipped. Accused de los Reyes and appellant Metano went down the well to help the victim who fell on the objects earlier placed therein while he ran to find appellant Pabiona. He then corroborated appellant Pabiona’s version of the events that transpired thereafter, adding only that they washed the victim’s body after lifting him from the well in order to check his injuries, his body being covered by mud from the well.[30]

Appellant Basalatan corroborated his co-appellants’ version of what happened on the night of November 20, 1996 and added that he and his wife Teresita left the nipa hut at Barangay Agtambo at about 11:30 p.m. and proceeded to their home.[31] The following day, at about 6:30 a.m., he traveled to Iloilo City for some business and went home to Passi, Iloilo at about 4 p.m. He was then informed by his wife that the victim died after falling from the well at appellant Pabiona’s farm.[32]

Appellant Metano corroborated his co-appellants’ testimonies.

Rosalina Padernal, the aunt of Michael Pagayon, testified that, contrary to her nephew’s testimony, Michael did not spend the night at her house on November 20, 1996.[33] She likewise testified that sometime in April 1997, Michael, together with a companion, went to her house and told her that if anyone asks whether he spent the night at her place on November 20, 1996, she should answer in the affirmative.[34]

By Decision of May 30, 2000, the trial court found appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive portion reads, quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Benjie Pabiona, Roselo Basalatan, Antonio Silarca and Roberto Metano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER hereby sentencing the aforenamed accused to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and further condemning all of the said accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim actual damages in the amount of P232,100.00 and death compensation in the sum of P50,000.00

The bail bond posted by the accused are ordered cancelled and their subsequent arrest and confinement is ordered. The Jail Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, is ordered to remit (sic) National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City at the earliest opportunity.

Let there be issued an alias order of arrest to the accused Christopher de los Reyes who remained (sic) at-large up to the present time.

SO ORDERED.[35]

Dissatisfied with the decision, the four appellants filed their Notice of Appeal [36] on July 20, 2000.

In their joint brief of February 4, 2002, appellants Basalatan and Silarca assign the following as errors of the trial court:

I

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVEN (sic) CREDENCE TO THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION MICHAEL PAGAYON

II

THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE IS PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUFFICIENCY OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED

III

THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT OVERCOME THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT[37]

In his brief of March 9, 2002, appellant Pabiona imputes the following errors:

I

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF LONE EYE-WITNESS MICHAEL PAGAYON

II

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THERE IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED

III

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT[38]

Per certification[39] dated April 9, 2003 issued by Assistant Director Joselito A. Fajardo of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, this Court was informed of the death of appellant Metano on August 30, 2002.[40]

In rendering its decision, the trial court disregarded appellants’ version of what transpired and relied on circumstantial evidence culled from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which it enumerated as follows:

a) the accused Benjie Pabiona and Roselo Basalatan personally brought the victim Robert Pagayon to the crime scene in the evening of November 20, 1996 situated on the property of the Pabiona family;

b) the presence of all the accused in the scene of the crime immediately before, during and immediately after the incident;

c) no one reported the death of the victim to the police authorities nor to any barangay officials;

d) the victim was not brought by the accused to the hospital immediately after the incident;

e) the driver and a laborer of Pamplona Funeral Homes were instructed not to bring any casket when they got the cadaver of the victim from the crime scene;

f) the cadaver of the victim was washed by the accused and seen by the victim’s mother naked with his clothes nowhere to be found except for a stripe (sic) short pants on not belonging to the victim;

g) the well where the victim accidentally fell as claimed by the accused is only five (5) meters deep with sandy soil and one (1) foot deep water at the bottom thereof; and

h) no other person/persons were present before, during and after the incident except the five (5) accused.[41]

The trial court likewise relied upon the testimony of Michael Pagayon, the pertinent portions of which read:

Q: Because you said you slept in the house of your aunt Rosalina Padernal because you were not able to catch up (sic) a ride at 6:00 o’clock, at 9:00 o’clock in the evening, where were you specifically at Brgy. Agtambo?

A: At around 9:00 o’clock I went to a store to buy cigarettes but the store was already closed.

Q: Because the store was already closed at 9:00 o’clock when you intended to buy cigarettes, what happened next?

A: I walked home because there was no cigarettes.

Q: From the store where you intended to buy cigarettes from the house of your aunt Rosalina Padernal, how far is that in terms of meters, more or less?

A: About 300 meters.

x x x

Q: When you were walking from the store where you intended to buy cigarettes back to your house, to the house of your aunt Rosalina Padernal, did you notice of (sic) any unusual incident?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that about?

A: I heard a shout asking for help.

Q: When you heard a shout asking for help, what did you do?

A: I went near.

Q: From where [did] that shout of help came (sic) from?

A: From the river.

Q: From where you were standing at that time towards the place in the river where the shout came from, how far from (sic) you?

A: 10 meters.

Q: Were you able to reach the river where the shout for help came from?

A: No, sir.

Q: You said you were not able to reach the river where the shout came from, how many meters more or less were you from the place where the shout came from?

A: 10 meters.

x x x

Q: You said you saw them mauling and kicking a person, why were you able to see those people mauling and kicking a person?

A: Because I went there.

x x x

Q: How many people were mauling that person?

A: Five.

Q: How many persons were being mauled and kicked?

A: One.

Q: Do you know these persons who mauled the person?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you mention their names?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Please tell the Court?

A: Benjie Pabiona, Antonio Silarcan (sic), Roberto Metano (Witness pointing to persons seated on the accused bench), Roselo Basalatan, Christopher delos Reyes.

Q: This Benjie Pabiona that you mentioned, is he inside the Courtroom?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Please point to him? (Witness pointing to a person inside the Courtroom who when asked answered to the name of Benjie Pabiona.

Q: How about Antonio Silarca, is he inside the Courtroom?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Please point to the accused. (Witness pointing to a person when asked answered to the name of Antonio Silarca).

Q: How about Roselo Basalatan? (Witness pointing to a person when asked answered to the name of Roselo Basalatan).

Q: How about Roberto Metano? (Witness pointing to a person who answered to the name of Roberto Metano).

Q: How about Christopher delos Reyes, is he inside the Courtroom?

A: No, sir.

Q: You said that these people were mauling aperson (sic), what was Benjie Pabiona particularly doing at that time you saw (sic)?

A: Holding a bamboo.

Q: What was he doing with the bamboo?

A: Striking.

Q: While he was striking the person with the bamboo, was he saying anything?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did he say?

A: What I have heard, “What did you tell, ha?”

Q: How about this Antonio Silarca, what was he doing actually?

A: Also holding a bamboo.

Q: What was he doing with the bamboo?

A: Striking with the bamboo.

Q: How about Roselo Basalatan, what was he doing at that time?

A: Also holding a bamboo.

Q: What was he doing?

A: Also hitting.

Q: How about Roberto Metano, what was he doing at that time?

A: Also the same.

Q: How about Christopher delos Reyes, what was he doing at that time?

A: Also the same.

Q: Have you seen how big is the bamboo being held by Benjie Pabiona?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please show?

A: As big as my wrist which is about 2 inches in diameter.

x x x

Q: At thattime (sic), at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening that you saw these people mauling the person, do you know the person being mauled at that time?

A: No, sir.

Q: Because that night you did not know who the person being mauled (sic), what did you do?

A: I went home.

Q: You went home to whose house?

A: Antie (sic) Saling.

Q: The following morning what time did you wake up?

A: 6:00 o’clock.

Q: When you woke up where did you go?

A: I went back to Iloilo to my work.

x x x

Q: Were you present when Robert Pagayon died?

A: No, sir.

Q: So you do not personally know at what time did Robert Pagayon die?

A: No, sir.

Q: Also you do not know on what date Robert Pagayon died because you were not there?

A: I do not know the time, place on November 21 and November 20 when he died.

Q: Also you do not know the actual circumstances and how Robert Pagayon died because you were not there?

A: I know.

Q: You were there when Robert Pagayon died?

A: No, sir.

Q: So how did you know how Robert Pagayon died because you said you do (sic) were not there?

A: When he was mauled he is not yet dead.

Q: Did you see Robert Pagayon being mauled?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You are very positive that you saw Robert Pagayon being mauled?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You said that because you saw the person being mauled?

A: The one being mauled I do not know him when he was being mauled.

Q: And you are saying that you are merely making a conclusion and your opinion that the person mauled was Robert Pagayon?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: That is your own belief?

A: Yes, sir.[42]

The fundamental issue in the instant appeal is whether or not there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain the trial court’s judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.[43] Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.[44]

Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules on Evidence provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites are complied with: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person. [45] All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[46]

From a considered scrutiny of the evidence in the case at bar in light of the standards set forth above, this Court holds that the evidence adduced by the prosecution does not prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of appellants.

The evidence does not rule out the possibility that there had only been an accidental death. Hitting one’s head on a hard object such as an iron bar or shovel after accidentally slipping could account for the fracture, blood clot and scalp hematoma found on the back of the victim’s head which, in turn, could have caused his death soon thereafter. As testified to by Dr. Lebaquin:

Q: Of these injuries mentioned, what could have been considered as the fatal injury which caused the death?

A: Fracture of the skull.

x x x

Q: In terms of minutes, how many minutes or hours will death occur after these injuries were sustained?

A: There was a blood clot. I think immediately, it is possible the victim could have died minutes after.

Q: 5 minutes?

A: Possible.

Q: 10 minutes?

A: Possible.[47]

The victim’s injuries, contrary to the trial court’s evaluation, are more consistent with appellants’ version of the events that transpired on November 21, 1996. While the victim sustained a fracture, a hematoma and a blood clot on his head, the rest of the injuries on his body are mere abrasions.[48] Abrasions are injuries characterized by the removal of the

superficial epithelial layer of the skin caused by rubbing or friction against a hard rough surface.[49] Such abrasions found on the victim’s body are more likely to have been caused by his slipping from the bamboo ladder and falling into the well rather than by force applied by five able-bodied men striking him with bamboo poles and kicking him as claimed by the prosecution. As testified to by Dr. Lebaquin:

Q: Next item, Injury No. 2. Abrasion, left mandibular area, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm. 9 cm. from its anterior midline. Please point to the Court where is this situated?

A: Left jaw.

Q: In the layman’s language, please kindly explain to the Court this injury?

A: In our dialect this is called “gasgas”, caused by rubbing in a rough surface.

Q: Please explain what could have caused this?

A: Rubbing of the skin at hard object.[50]

The mere presence of appellants at an alleged locus criminis does not suffice to implicate them in a crime,[51] more so as in the case at bar where appellants’ presence was sufficiently explained to have been due to their digging of the well on appellant Pabiona’s property which commenced long before November 20, 1996.

While the motive of the accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence of the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it.[52]

In the case at bar, the prosecution was unable to establish motive of the appellants in allegedly perpetrating the offense charged. In fact, prosecution eyewitness Michael Pagayon testified:

Q: Before November 20, 1996, do you know if there was any misunderstanding or quarrel between Robert Pagayon on the one hand and any or all of the accused here in Court?

A: No, sir, he has no enemy.[53]

The records reveal, on the other hand, that the Pagayons enjoyed close relations with appellants, Marina being, as reflected above, a co-member of the appellants in CMJM. It was even shown that she was accustomed to sleeping over at the Pabiona residence at every opportunity.[54]

This Court likewise notes prosecution eyewitness Michael Pagayon’s inordinate delay in reporting what he allegedly saw on the night of November 20, 1996. Even after hearing the radio news report on his cousin-the victim’s death on December 1, 1996 and deducing that he was the victim of the mauling that he claimed to have witnessed, he only reported such incident to his aunt Marina and the authorities two months later. It is but logical for a relative who was an eyewitness to a crime to promptly and audaciously take the necessary steps to bring the culprit into the hands of the law and seek justice for the poor victim.[55]

It may be relevant to note too that while in his direct examination, Michael categorically declared that he saw only five persons mauling an unidentified man,[56] in his cross examination, he testified that there were actually seven men:

Q: In this affidavit of yours you stated that aside from the five accused here, there were 2 other persons because you said there were seven (7) persons mauling another, do you remember that?

x x x

A: I saw the two but I do not know them.

Q: But during the direct examination you said there were five (5) persons who mauled (sic)?

A: Yes, sir.[57]

That appellants were the malefactors cannot be simply inferred from the mere fact that appellant Pabiona and his family offered to shoulder the expenses for the burial of Robert. As the victim was in appellant Pabiona’s employ and died while working at his well, it was not unnatural for him to make an offer to bear the expenses that Marina would incur attendant to the burial of her son.

Nor can appellants’ failure to report the victim’s death to police authorities and barangay officials be considered as an indication of their guilt, as the records show that they, through their relatives,[58] immediately informed the victim’s mother and brother that he died.

The other circumstances enumerated by the trial court are too equivocal to establish appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In People v. Capili,[59] this Court similarly ruled that the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution was utterly inadequate to justify a judgment of conviction:

In fact, there is even some possibility that Badua’s identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator was a mere afterthought, there being no definite lead as to the identity of the author of the crime even after the lapse of several days following the finding of the cadaver of the victim by the riverside on October 7, 1994. The foregoing considerations taken together cast reasonable doubt on the culpability of accused-appellant as killer of Alberto Capili. The evidence which stands on record does not eliminate the possibility of absence of foul-play, i.e., that there had been only an accidental death by drowning. Striking a rock after accidentally slipping could cause contusions similar to those found at the back of the victim’s head and shoulders and result in the loss of consciousness leading to drowning. Only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which requires moral certainty, may the presumption of innocence be overcome. Moral certainty has been defined as “a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it”. Absent the moral certainty that accused-appellant caused the death of the victim, acquittal perforce follows. [60]

It is a basic principle in criminal law that where the evidence is capable of two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other compatible with a finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and therefore is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction.[61] Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.[62]

In the case at bar, two antithetical interpretations may be inferred from the evidence presented. The pieces of circumstantial evidence do not inexorably lead to the conclusion that appellants are guilty of the crime charged.

The circumstances proffered by the prosecution and relied upon by the trial court only create suspicion that appellants probably perpetrated the crime charged. However, it is not sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or probability of guilt.[63]

The basis of acquittal in this case is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the prosecution not being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants with moral certainty. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. [64] An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the appellants’ innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[65]

WHEREFORE, the May 30, 2000 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Benjie Pabiona, Roselo Basalatan, and Antonio Silarca are ACQUITTED of the charge of murder on the ground of reasonable doubt. Their immediate release from custody is hereby ordered unless they are being held for other lawful causes.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 157039. October 1, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOSEFINA M. DIMALANTA, appellant.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, in Criminal Case No. C-58083 (99), which disposed of the case thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused JOSEFINA M. DIMALANTA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA and sentences her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 30 years of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the private complainant Elvira D. Abarca the sum of P383,826.00.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.[1]

On November 10, 1999, appellant was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, in an Information which reads:

That sometime during the month of October, 1998 in Caloocan City, MM. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after misrepresentation that she has more than enough fund, defrauded and deceived one, ELVIRA D. ABARCA in the following manner, to wit: said accused purchased and received assorted jewelries from herein complainant in the total amount of P408,826.00 and in payment thereof, accused simultaneously issued the following Panasaid [should read: Panasia] Banking, Inc. checks, to wit:

Check No. Date Amount

0002598 Nov. 30, 1998 P 37,166.00

0020952 Dec. 15, 1998 37, 166.00

0020953 Dec. 31, 1998 37, 166.00

0020954 Jan. 15, 1999 37, 166.00

0020956 Jan. 31, 1999 37, 166.00

0020957 Feb. 15, 1999 37, 166.00

0020958 Feb. 28, 1999 37, 166.00

0020959 Mar. 15, 1999 37, 166.00

0020960 Mar. 31, 1999 37, 166.00

0020961 Apr. 15, 1999 37, 166.00

0020962 Apr. 30, 1999 37, 166.00

---------------

P408,826.00

when said accused knew fully well that at the time the said checks were not covered with sufficient funds in said bank and would not have such fund even on the date stated on the faces thereof, and when the said checks were presented to the drawee bank for encashment, the same were dishonored for the reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite due notice as required by Republic Act 4885 and further amended by PD 818 and despite repeated demands, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to make good her checks and still refused and fails to do so, to the damage and prejudice of herein complainant ELVIRA D. ABARCA in the aforestated amount of P408,826.00.

Contrary to law.[2]

On January 24, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, was arraigned. She entered a plea of “not guilty.”[3] Trial on the merits followed in due course.

The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that in the first week of October 1998, appellant, who was then employed at the Caloocan City Engineer’s Office, called up complainant Elvira D. Abarca on the telephone to express her desire to purchase jewelry. Complainant went to appellant’s house, located at No. 89 P. Jacinto Street, Caloocan City, where the latter purchased twelve pairs of jewelry. In payment thereof, appellant issued twelve postdated checks with the representation that the same will be sufficiently funded on their respective maturity dates.[4]

The first check issued by appellant was honored and paid by the drawee bank. However, the eleven checks, which are enumerated in the Information, were all returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason that appellant’s account was closed. [5] Thus, on May 28, 1999, complainant’s counsel wrote a letter to appellant informing her of the dishonor of the eleven checks and demanding payment of the value of the checks within five banking days from receipt thereof.[6] The letter was sent to appellant by registered mail on June 7, 1999.[7]

Appellant failed to pay the value of the checks despite the lapse of the five-day period contained in the demand letter. On June 21, 1999, appellant filed with the Prosecutor’s Office a complaint charging appellant with the crimes of Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.[8]

In her defense, appellant denied that she purchased jewelry from complainant, saying that she could not afford them. She alleged that it was complainant who approached her asking for help in selling jewelry. In turn, appellant asked her friend, Levinia Maranan, to look for buyers for the jewelry. Appellant and complainant agreed that Maranan will sell the jewelry and, upon the latter’s confirmation that the items had been sold, appellant shall deliver to complainant the postdated checks in payment therefor. They further agreed that the unsold pieces of jewelry shall be returned to complainant.[9]

In the middle of September 1998, complainant delivered to appellant the pieces of jewelry to be sold, which were then picked up by Maranan. After one week, appellant issued to complainant postdated checks representing the purchase price of the sold jewelry, with the understanding that Maranan will fund the same. Maranan was able to remit to appellant money to cover the first check, hence it was honored by the drawee bank.[10]

Maranan failed to fund the second check. In order to cover its amount, appellant gave complainant P25,000.00 out of her own money as partial satisfaction. Subsequently,

Maranan, who had apparently encountered financial problems, went into hiding. As a consequence, the rest of appellant’s checks were dishonored.[11]

On October 16, 2002, the trial court rendered the appealed decision convicting appellant of Estafa.

In the instant appeal, appellant alleged that the Regional Trial Court committed reversible errors:

I

IN FINDING APPELLANT JOSEFINA M. DIMALANTA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA;

II

IN SENTENCING HER TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF 30 YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA; AND

III

IN ORDERING HER TO PAY COMPLAINANT ABARCA THE SUM OF P383,826.00.[12]

The Office of the Solicitor General thereafter filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief, recommending that a judgment of acquittal be rendered in Criminal Case No. C-58083 (99) without prejudice to appellant’s civil liability as found by the trial court. [13]

The appeal has merit.

Appellant was charged with and convicted of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, defined as follows:

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxx xxx xxx.

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

xxx xxx xxx.

Presidential Decree No. 818 amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code insofar as the penalties for felonies under paragraph 2 (d) are concerned, viz:

SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of reclusión temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed

thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusión perpetua;

2nd. The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By prisión mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos.

The elements of this form of Estafa are: (1) postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficient funds to cover the check; (3) knowledge on the part of the offender of such circumstances; and (4) damage to the complainant.[14]

Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense and must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the issuance of the bad check. [15] Thus, the drawer of the dishonored check is given three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the check. Otherwise a prima facie presumption of deceit arises.[16]

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish beyond a shadow of a doubt that appellant employed deceit. Its evidence was overcome by the defense’s proof that the pieces of jewelry were not purchased by appellant for her own use; rather the same were merely given to her for resale. This much is admitted by complainant, to wit:

ATTY. QUIROZ:

Q. Is it not a fact, Madam Witness, that it was your agreement with Mrs. Dimalanta that these jewelries were subject of a reselling, that she will sell them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You were very aware of that?

A. Yes, sir.[17]

In point of fact, appellant was able to show that she was merely requested by complainant to assist in the sale of the jewelry. In her desire to help, she was able to convince Levinia Maranan to dispose of the items. Appellant further testified that the checks she issued to complainant were to be funded by Maranan everytime she was able to sell pieces of jewelry.

Significantly, the Office of the Solicitor General’s own findings sustain appellant’s position. Thus, in its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Appellee’s Brief wherein it joined the prayer for appellant’s acquittal, it made the following observations:

This admission lends credence to the claim of appellant that she subsequently delivered the jewelry to Maranan. It was only after notice from Maranan that the jewelry had been sold on installment that appellant issued the postdated checks. The issuance of the checks was merely to facilitate collection by Abarca of payments due. Thus, the checks were not the efficient cause of the defraudation. The bad checks were not issued prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud, but rather, for a pre-existing obligation. This fact is evidenced by Abarca’s own testimony that appellant signed a piece of paper acknowledging receipt of the jewelry, the individual items of which were listed therein. Abarca went on to say that she no

longer had the receipt signed by appellant, which was why she had to rely on another list on a pink slip of paper during her testimony in court (TSN, April 23, 2001, p. 4). If indeed appellant issued the postdated checks as payment for the jewelry on the same occasion that the said jewelry were delivered, why then would she need to sign a receipt for the same? Moreover, why was the said receipt no longer in the possession of Abarca? It is entirely possible that Abarca surrendered the receipt upon the subsequent delivery of the checks to her by appellant.

xxx xxx xxx.

Thus, even assuming that the checks were indeed issued simultaneously with the delivery of the jewelry as Abarca claims, she was not induced to part with the jewelry because of the checks. Abarca admitted that she knew that appellant was just a secretary at the Caloocan City Hall and that the latter was merely renting the place where she was residing. These facts tend to show that Abarca was aware of the financial status of appellant, that is, that the latter could not afford the P408,826.00-price of the jewelry. Consequently, Abarca must have likewise known at the time the checks were issued that appellant had no money of her own to fund the checks on their maturity. She was well aware that the jewelry were to be sold by appellant and that the proceeds of the sale would be deposited by the latter in her current account to fund the checks. It was a business arrangement she entered into with appellant whereby the latter would assist her in selling the jewelry. Abarca had been in the business of buying and selling jewelry for around ten years already. Abarca was thus fully aware of the conditions, advantages and disadvantages of the arrangement and cannot now allege to be the victim of deceit.[18]

In effect, therefore, appellant issued the checks as evidence of indebtedness to cover the value of the jewelry. It has been ruled in this connection that a drawer who issues a check as security or evidence of investment is not liable for Estafa.[19]

Furthermore, we find that appellant acted in good faith during the transaction. After the first check was dishonored, she exerted best efforts to make good the value of the check, albeit only to the extent of P25,000.00. Good faith is a defense to a charge of Estafa by postdating a check. This may be manifested by appellant’s act of offering to make arrangements with complainant as to the manner of payment.[20]

In the recent case of People v. Ojeda, et al.,[21] it was held:

The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie presumption of deceit was successfully rebutted by appellant’s evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check. Good faith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtor’s offer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not only made arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.

It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up the “criminal mind” behind the “criminal act.” Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.

Indeed, any allegation of intent of malice or deceit on appellant’s part was rebutted by her extraordinary effort to pay complainant notwithstanding her own financial situation.[22]

In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution is concededly weak. In such cases, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit.[23]

Courts are mandated to “put prosecution evidence under severe testing.” Furthermore, the constitutional presumption of innocence requires them to take “a more than casual consideration” of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused. [24] The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. [25] Considering the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of proof and overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence, it is not only appellant’s right to be freed; it is, even more, this Court’s constitutional duty to acquit her.[26]

Anent the civil liability which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, it appears that Levinia Maranan, in whom resided the duty to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry or to return the same if unsold, must be impleaded either as a co-defendant or a third-party defendant. Since she was not a party in the case at bar, a separate action should be instituted for the full determination of the civil liability.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, in Criminal Case No. C-58083 (99), is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Josefina M. Dimalanta is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The civil action is DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of a separate action to recover the civil liability under the transaction. The bail bond posted for her provisional liberty is CANCELLED and RELEASED.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Facts:

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.

VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:

No

Ratio:

To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias “BONG” (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD DELIM alias “BONG”, accused-appellants.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are “related” for modesto is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge.

*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.

appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:

TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:

a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity

to defend himself

b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted

in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.

Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:

APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)

FIRST DIVISION

ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL G.R. No. 166326

RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA,

Petitioners, Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

- versus - CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. January 25, 2006

FACTS:As the victim, Ruben Rodil, went to a nearby store to buy food, accused Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange of words ensued. In the evening of the following day, when Ruben and his three-year-old daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo, together with his brother Esmeraldo Rivera and Ismael Rivera, emerged from their house and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house only when the policemen arrived. Ruben sustained injuries and was brought to the hospital. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. An appeal was made by the accused, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification, changing the crime to attempted murder and imposed an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.

ISSUES:1) Whether or not there was intent to kill.2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder.3) Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.4) Whether or not the correct penalty was imposed.

HELD:1) Yes. The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may

consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. In the present case, Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death, intent to kill was presumed.

2) Yes. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Although the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death, it does not negate criminal liability of the accused for attempted murder. The intent to kill was already presumed based on the overt acts of the accused. In fact, victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened.

3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case, the accused attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as he was walking with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He was overwhelmed with the assault of the accused and had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.

4) No. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the accused were guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced by two degrees, in accordance to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, under Article 61 (2), in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty should be prision mayor. In the absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the accused were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.

JOY LEE RECUERDO

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, First Division, Callejo, Sr. J.

Facts:

In September 1994, three separate Criminal Informations charging Joy Lee Recuerdo of Estafa under Article 315,paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code involving 18 worthless bank checks were simultaneously filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. Evidence adduced by the Prosecution tend to establish that herein private respondent Yolanda G. Floro is engaged in the business of buying and selling of jewelry since 1985. Herein accused-appellant/petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo, on the other hand, a dentist by profession, who was introduced to Floro by the latter’s cousin Aimee Aoro in the first week of December 1993, became her customer. Sometime in the second week of December 1993, at around 7:30in the evening, Recuerdo went to the house of Floro and purchased from her two pieces of jewelry, to wit: a 2.19carat diamond round stone in white gold setting worthP220,000.00 pesos, and one piece of loose 1.55 karat marquez diamond with a value of P130,000.00 pesos.

For the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the complainant then and there ten post-dated checks each in the amount of P22,000.00 drawn against Unitrust Development Bank. For the 1.55 carat marquez loose diamond, accused issued and delivered to complainant then and there ten (10) post dated checks, each in the amount of P13,000.00 drawn against PCI Bank, Makati. In yet another transaction that transpired in the early evening of February 7, 1994, Recuerdo once again proceeded at Floro’s house and bought another set of jewelry, this time a pair of diamond earrings worth P768,000.00 pesos. She was given seven (7) postdated checks one for P168,000.00 as down payment and another six (6) postdated checks drawn against Prudential Bank, Legaspi Village, Makati Branch, each for P100,000.00 representing the balance in the aggregate amount of P600,000.00 pesos. Floro deposited the aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Upon presentment for encashment by said depositary bank with the different drawee banks on their respective maturity yates, the six (6) Prudential Bank checks were all dishonored for having been drawn against closed accounts

Issue: Is Recuerdo guilty of estafa under Art. 315 par. 2(d)?

Ruling:

The crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has the following basic elements:- Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at the time the check was issued;- The postdating or issuance was done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or that his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and- Damage to the payee thereof The existence of the foregoing elements of the crime was concretely established by the prosecution through convincing evidence, warranting petitioner’s conviction of the offense of Estafa.

The trial court found private complainant Floro’s testimony that petitioner issued the subject checks as payment for the purchase of pieces of jewelry simultaneous to their transactions

to be categorical and credible. There was sufficient evidence established by the prosecution that the checks were issued by the accused to the complainant in exchange of the pieces of jewelry given to her on two separate occasions.

The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

En Banc

Carson, March 19, 1910

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts:

The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province

Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho

"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building

No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building

This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height

The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room

He called out twice, "Who is there?"

He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room

The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."

Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual

Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded

Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds

Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day

The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that the door and acquaint his companion with his identity

The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley

Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite the defendant's warnings

Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible

Holding:

No.

Ratio:

By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)

The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith

"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"

The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist

"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."

If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide

The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense

He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts

RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

Loney vs. People

G.R. No. 152644, Feb. 10, 2006

Facts:

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez are the Pres. and CEO, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corp., a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings (mine waste) from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makulapnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end.On March 24, 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, Mt. Tapianpit had discharged millions of tons of tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. In August 1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac, Marinduque with violation of Art. 91 (B), subparagraphs 5 and 6 of P.D. No. 1067 or the Water code of the Phil., Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 984 or the National Pollution Decree of 1976, Sec.108 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Phil. Mining Act of 1995, and Art. 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property .In the Consolidated Order of MTC, granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order quashing the information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC assailing that the portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and the petition was raffled to Br. 94while public respondent’s appeal assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Info. for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984 and this appeal was consolidated with petitioners petition. MTC Br. 94 granted the public respondent’s appeal but denied petitioner’s petition. Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Br. 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because 1.the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA7942 and the Art. 365 of the RPC “proceeded from are based on a single act or incident of polluting the rivers thru dumping of mine tailings, and the charge for violation of Art 365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges since the element of “lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence” is common among them, 2. The duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Br. 94 ruling.

Issue:

1. Whether or not all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand2. whether or not Br. 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit. Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. As early as the start of the last century, the court ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense and the only limit is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishing for the same offense. In People vs. Doriquez, the court held that two or more offenses arising form the same act are not the same. And so, double jeopardy is not an issue because not all its elements are present. On petitioners claim that the charges for violation of Art. 365 of the RPC “absorbs ”the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se elony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942). What

makes the former felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) and what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them. Petitioners reiterate their contention in that their prosecution contravenes ruling in People vs. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the court’s statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by “multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or over lapping sets of technical elements. Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not an issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever fall under the first sentence of Sec. 21, Art. III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.

THIRD DIVISION

ARSENIA B. GARCIA,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 157171

- versus -

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES, and

TINGA, JJ.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

March 14, 2006

In 1980, Dynetics Inc, through its president, acquired a P25M export loan from Security Bank. In 1982, a credit accommodation (SWAP loan) was opened by Security Bank in favor of Dynetics allowing it to acquire an additional $700k loan. This loan was secured by an Indemnity Agreement signed by Garcia acting as a surety. This loan was not availed of by Dynetics however.

In 1993, the SWAP loan was renewed but it was reduced to $500k. This time, Dynetics availed of it. Garcia still acted as surety but there was no Indemnity Agreement involved. Later, Dynetics, without Garcia’s knowledge, executed several Chattel Mortgages in favor of Security Bank.

Dynetics defaulted from paying. Security Bank foreclosed the mortgages. The proceeds were applied to the SWAP loan leaving a balance of P3.5M. The Export loan has a balance of P464M.

Security Bank is now demanding Garcia, as surety, to pay for the deficiency in both loans.

ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia is liable for both loans.

HELD: No. The Indemnity Agreement specifically secured the $700k SWAP loan which was not availed of. The Continuing Suretyship, on the other hand, specifically secured the reduced $500k SWAP loan. The Indemnity Agreement is not involved in the reduced SWAP loan. There was no reason for SBTC to require the execution of the Continuing Suretyship if its intention were to have the earlier Indemnity Agreement secure the SWAP loan in both the original and in the reduced amounts.

Garcia is not liable for the deficiency on the SWAP loan because Dynetics executed chattel mortgages in view of the export loan in favor of Security Bank. And this was w/o Garcia’s knowledge. This does not technically release Garcia as surety but since it is a chattel mortgage which has nothing to do with Garcia (it does not bind him), then the deficiency will have to be shouldered by Dynetics.

Amado Alvarado Garcia vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 171951 28 August 2009

FACTS:

The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down to which Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him. Two days later, the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chy’s sister, Esquibel. Chy was about to come out of his house and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him. Chy continued to parry the blows and when he found an opportunity to escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the mauling. He also complained of difficulty in breathing. He was found later unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating.

Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as violent in nature as to have caused the death of Chy. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide. The autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the victim’s heart is healthy. What could have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions concerning the violence inflicted upon him.

ISSUE:

Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should be appreciated

RULING:

The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, said circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner. The fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically caused the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart is in good condition.

Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Urbano v. IAC

Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A

quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there

intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

People of the Philippines vs Orlito Villacorta

657 SCRA 270 – Criminal Law – Criminal Liability – Proximate Cause – Efficient Intervening Cause

On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of nowhere, Orlito Villacorta appeared and thereafter stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a sharpened bamboo stick. After that, Villacorta fled.

Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital where he was treated as out-patient. He was discharged on the same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21 days after the stabbing incident, he returned to the same hospital where he was treated for severe tetanus. The next day on February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The medical report states that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.

The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.

HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the stabbing done by Villacorta upon Cruz. There was an efficient intervening cause which appeared between the time of the stabbing and the time of the death of Cruz.

In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that severe tetanus (the kind of tetanus which causes immediate death) has an incubation period of 14 days or less. In this case, the stabbing made by Vilalcorta could not have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days already lapsed from the time of the stabbing until the date of death of Cruz. Something else caused the tetanus other than the stabbing – in short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less before February 15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.

The court explained further:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time [Cruz] was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based on the facts. Neither is he guilty of attempted nor frustrated murder, his intent to kill was not proven by the prosecution.

People of the Philippines, appellee

-versus-

Noel Sales, appellant

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries, respectively. The Information[3] for parricide contained the following allegations:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby] inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the latter’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

On the other hand, the Information[5] in Criminal Case No. RTC’03-789 alleges that appellant inflicted slight physical injuries in the following manner:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of the victim’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the charges of parricide[7] and slight physical injuries[8] respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to by the defense.[9] During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is

the father of the victims, Noemar Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellant’s family was living in the conjugal home located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.[10]

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.

Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His body was never examined by a doctor.

The Version of the Defense

Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate occasions without the permission of their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might happen to them. During those times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.

However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents’ permission on September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant received information that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8 o’clock in the evening of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping his sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing. When Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which was seven kilometers away from their house.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing. The pupils of Noemar’s eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.

The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain.[11] Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.[12]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,[13] the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised Penal Code. Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[15] which was given due course in an Order[16] dated September 21, 2005.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its Decision[17] reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Issues

Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:

I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.[19]

Our Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

The Charge of Parricide

Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to death. He believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would take a vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.

The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on children of tender years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.

Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby

putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only when Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the child’s life. It bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.

Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

x x x x

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.[20] Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.

Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemar’s cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his contention, the latter’s testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Maria’s testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.

Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case.

All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.

We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

“Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.”[21]

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemar’s Death Certificate[22] was also presented in evidence.

There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much for Noemar’s frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.

As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While Noemar’s birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered.[23] As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under oath.[24] Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.

There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent “to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture”[25] which is the essence of voluntary surrender.

However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. “The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim.”[26]

The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[27] “In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.”[28]

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

x x x x

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.[29]

The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries

The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter.[30] Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.[31]

Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings were (1) muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of Junior’s face just below the eye and on both legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks.[32] But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal in a week.[33]

We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria, and supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.

Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries

We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Intod vs. CA, 215 SCRA 52

Facts: Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandaya’s house to ask him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangan’s house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out

the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime {Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent. Further, In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that “xxx. The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other that petitioner’s and his co-accused’s own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, m not impossible.

Issue: Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime?

Held: Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: 1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or 2) the means employed is either a) inadequate or b) ineffectual.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either 1) legal impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete would not amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other had, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the cot pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

PERALTA, J .:

A petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Facts:

Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam. Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then called and relayed the message through accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam. Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco. Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino further testified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the dishonored check. Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan. Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was theP10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.

A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle. RTC rendered its Decision finding them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and sentenced each imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum. The three appealed to the CA and the decision of the trial court was MODIFIED, in that:(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted

Issue:

Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.

Held:

As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,

the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen. In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the post dated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced. The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod (see doctrines laid out inIntod), the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.