crimproc case digest1

7/27/2019 CrimProc Case Digest1

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[G.R. No. 118821. February 18, 2000]MAYOR BAI UNGGIE D. ABDULA and ODINABDULA,petitioners, vs. HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, in hiscapacity as Presiding Judge, of Branch 14 of the RegionalTrial Court of Cotabato City, respondent.

CASE: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to set

aside the WARRANT of ARREST issued by the

respondent judge to ABDULA ordering the arrest

without bail

FACTS: On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder,

docketed as I.S. No. 94-1361, was filed before the

Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM

Regional Office XII against herein petitioners and six (6)

other persons[1] in connection with the death of a

certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar

of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao.[2] The complaint alleged

that herein petitioners paid the six other respondents

the total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Abdul

Dimalen

August 22, 1994, Provincial Prosecutor SALICKU PANDA dismissed the charges of murder except for

KASAN MAMA on the grounds that there was no prima

facie evidence of murder against them

September 13, 1994, respondent judge

returned the case to the prosecutor for further

investigation out of 8 accused, only 1 was filed with

information with the court without support on how they

arrived with the conclusion as required under Section 4

of Rule 112

2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw took

over the case. On December 28, 1994, he found a

prima facie case for murder against herein petitionersand three (3) other respondents.[8] He thus

recommended the filing of charges against herein

petitioners Bai Unggie Abdula and Odin Abdula, as

principals by inducement, and against the three (3)

others, as principals by direct participation.

December 28 1994 SALICK U PANDA state

that he was inhibiting himself from the case which may

be disposed without his approval on the ground that

the accused was the father in law of his son

On January 13, 1995 the respondent judge

issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners

ISSUE: W/N the WARRANT OF ARREST is null and voidon the ground that the respondent judge failed to

personally examine the evidences before issuing the

WOA as requred under the Philippine Constitution

HELD: YES. To be sure, we cannot determine

beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the

respondents examination of the records should be.

[42] The extent of the judges examination depends on

the exercise of his sound discretion as the

circumstances of the case require. In the case at

bench, the respondent had before him two different

informations and resolutions charging two different

sets of suspects. In the face of these conflicting

resolutions, it behooves him not to take the

certification of the investigating prosecutor at face

value. The circumstances thus require that respondent

look beyond the bare certification of the investigating

prosecutor and examine the documents supporting the

prosecutors determination of probable cause. The

inordinate haste that attended the issuance of the

warrant of arrest and respondents own admission arecircumstances that tend to belie any pretense of the

fulfillment of this duty.

it is not required that the complete or entire records of

the case during the preliminary investigation be

submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not

intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to

examine the complete records of every case all the

time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an

accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge

must have sufficient supporting documents (such as

the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn

statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic

notes, if any) upon which to make his independentjudgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the

findings of the prosecutor as to the existence o

probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and

entirely on the prosecutors recommendation, as

Respondent Court did in this case. Although the

prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in

the performance of his official duties and functions

which in turn gives his report the presumption o

accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the

judge to personally determine probable cause in the

issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has

consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty

if he relies merely on the certification or the report of

the investigating officer.

[G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004]SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIAS

ABUNADO,petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondent.

- On September 18, 1967, Salvador Abunado married

Narcisa Arceo

- On January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second

marriage with a Zenaida Bias

- On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by

Salvador against Narcisa.

- On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by

Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.

- Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on

December 24, 1955 and has four childrenwith her prior

to their separation in 1966.

- Salvador was convicted in the RTC for Bigamy.

- Case was appealed to CA claiming that his petition for

annulment poses a prejudicial questionthat should

suspend the criminal case until there has been a

decision for the civil case.

- CA still affirmed conviction of Salvador for bigamy.
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Issue:

Whether pending annulment case would suspend the

criminal case of Bigamy

Held:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the

first

marriage was immaterial because

prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had alreadybeen consummated. Moreover, petitioner's assertion

would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases

considering that an

accused could simply file a petition to declare his previ

ous marriage void and invoke thependency of that

action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.

The court cannot allowthat. Thus, under the law, a

marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be

deemed validuntil declared otherwise in a judicial

proceeding. In this case,

even if petitioner eventuallyobtained a declaration that

his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both

the first andthe second marriage were subsistingbefore the first marriage was annulled.

When is a civil action prejudicial to a criminal case:

1. The civil case involves facts intimately related

to those upon which the criminal prosecution

would be based;

2. In the resolution of the issue/s raised in the

civil action, the guilt and innocence of the the

accused would be necessarily determined

3. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodge

in another tribunal.

Based on the case at hand, the third requisite has not

been complied with, that is, the annulment case of the

accussed would not necessarily determine his

innocence. In an annulment case, the marriage is valid

until annuled. Hence, Salvador, who is validly married

to two individuals on a certain period is guilty of

bigamy even if the first marrige may be declared

annuled in the future.

[G.R. No. 149472. October 15, 2002]JORGE SALAZAR,petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,respondent.

FACTS:That on or about the 10th date of January 1986 in the

Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

above-named accused, being the Vice President and

Treasurer of Aurora/Uni-Group, Inc., received from

Olivier Philippines and Skiva International, Inc. as

represented by Teresita M. Tujan the amount of

$41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of

textile and labor in the manufacture of seven hundred

dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is duty

bound to deliver to said complainant, and the accused

once in possession of the same, far from complying

from his obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of

confidence and to defraud said complainant, did, then

and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously

misappropriate, misapply and convert the same for his

own personal use and benefit despite repeated

demands to return the said amount, failed and refused

and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and

prejudice of said complainant, in the aforementioned

amount of $41,300.00 or its equivalent in Philippinecurrency.

Petitioner maintains that Skiva has no authority to

institute the present action as estafa was not

committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group

on the basis of the finding that the transaction

between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was one o

sale. Thus, petitioner argues that pursuant to Section

3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,[48] the

complaint should not have been instituted by Skiva as

it is not the offended party contemplated by the

Rules and petitioner had no obligation to account to

Skiva the proceeds of the amount withdrawn from thejoint account.[49]

ISSUE: W/N the complaint for the purposes of

preliminary investigation must be filed by the

offended party

HELD: No. The complaint referred to in Rule 110

contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a

criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the

offended party is required by law, instead of an

information which is generally filed by a fiscal. [50]It is

not necessary that the proper offended party file a

complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by

the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense subject o

the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de

oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for

preliminary investigation.

Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is

commenced by a complaint or information, both o

which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly

in court, the same must be filed by the offended party

and in case of an information, the same must be filed

by the fiscal. However, a complaint filed with the

fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by anyperson.[52] Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was

validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower

court that petitioner had no obligation to account to

Skiva.

CIVIL CODE (SALE CONTRACT)

Art. 1597. Where the goods have not been delivered to

the buyer, and the buyer has repudiated the contract

of sale, or has manifested his inability to perform his

obligations thereunder, or has committed a breach

thereof, the seller may totally rescind the contract o
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sale by giving notice of his election so to do to the

buyer. (n)

Art. 1598. Where the seller has broken a contract to

deliver specific or ascertained goods, a court may, on

the application of the buyer, direct that the contract

shall be performed specifically, without giving the

seller the option of retaining the goods on payment of

damages. The judgment or decree may be

unconditional, or upon such terms and conditions as todamages, payment of the price and otherwise, as the

court may deem just. (n)

[G.R. No. 122274. July 31, 1996]USAN V. LLENES,petitioner, vs. HON. ISAIAS P. DICDICAN,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11,HON. AMADO B. BAJARIAS, SR., Presiding Judge,

Municipal Trial Court, Branch 7, and VIVIAN G.GINETE, respondents.

Doctrine: The rule that filing of complaint with

fiscals office interrupts the prescription of the

offense charged also applies to cases filed with

the Ombudsman for preliminary Investigation.

Facts: On October 13, 1993, Vivian Ginete, then OIC of

the Physical Education and School Sports Division of

the regional Office of region VII in Cebu (DECS) filed a

complaint for grave an doral defamation with the

deputy Ombudsmand for the Visayas against Susan

Llenes, an Education Supervisor II of the same office.

The information was filed with the MTC on 28 March

1994 upon recommendation and approval of the

investigation officer and the city prosecutor

respectively.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on

the ground that the offense of grave oral defamation

prescribed in 6 months and that since the information

was filed 6 months and days after the alleged

commission, the crime already prescribed.

Private respondent contends that Rule 110 of the Rules

of court provides that for offenses not subject to ther

ile on summary procedure, the filing of the complaint in

MTC or MTCT interrupt the period of prescription of the

offense charged.

The motion to quash was denied by the MTC and said

decision was affirmed by the RTC, hence this petition.

Issue: W/N the filing of a criminal complaint with the

Ombudsman interrupts the prescription period.

Decision: Yes. In the case of People vs. Olarte, it was

said that the filing of the complaint with the MTC even

for purposes of preliminary investigation only suspends

the running of the prescriptive period. This decision

was further broadened by the case of Francisco vs. CA

where the court reiterated that the filing of the

complaint in the fiscals office for preliminary

investigation also suspends the running of the

prescriptive period.

The constitution vests upon the ombudsman powers to

initiate or conduct preliminary investigations in

criminal cases filed against public officers o

employees. The Ombudsman-Visayas then has

authority to conduct preliminary investigation of theprivate respondents complaint against Llenes. The

rationale of the Olarte and Francisco cases must then

be applied to the present case. Since the complaint

was filed on 12 October 1993, or barely 20 days from

the commission of the crime charged, the filing of the

information was very well within the six moth

prescriptive period.

The petition was dismissed.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138596. October 12, 2000]

SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO,petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION LAQUI,SR. HELEN OJARIO and SR. BERNADINE

JUAREZ, respondents.FACTS: The offense of libel allegedly occurred on

December 21, 1993 when petitioner circulated a letter

containing allegedly malicious imputations against

private respondents Srs. Helen Ojario and Bernadine

Juarez. At this point, the period of prescription for the

alleged crime had already started to run.

The one-year period of prescription for the

crime was interrupted on February 2, 1994

when respondents filed a joint complaint

affidavit[8] for libel against petitioner before

the Office of the city Prosecutor in Quezon

city. At this point, the prescription period had

already run for forty-two (42) days.

April 27, 1994 Asst. Prosecutor issued a

resolutiona stating that a probable cause exists

and recommended the filing of an information

for libel against the accused on May 18, 1994

in the Metropolitan Trial Court

September 18, 1996 the MTC tried the case

even if it has no jurisdiction over it where it

issued on order on November 8, 1996 to

forward the case to RTC.

April 27, 1997 the prosecutor re-filed the casein the RTC where the petitioner tried to have

the case dismissed on the ground of

prescription

It is the contention of petitioner that the

prescription period for the crime of libe

charged against her commenced to run again

when the Assistant City prosecuto

recommended the filing of the information for

libel. Petitioner further argues that the

prescriptive period could have been interrupted

again had the information been filed with the
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Regional Trial Court, the court with the proper

jurisdiction to try the case for libel. Considering

however that the case was filed before the

Metropolitan Trial Court, which under the law

does not have jurisdiction over the crime of

libel, the period of prescription continued to

run its course. Consequently, petitioner

concludes that when the information for libel

was finally filed with the Regional Trial Court,

the crime had already prescribed and the Statecan no longer pursue the case against her.

ISSUE: W/N public respondent committed grave abuse

of discretion or grossly erred in holding that the offense

of libel in the instant case has not yet prescribed

HELD: The right to a speedy trial is violated only when

there is an unreasonable delay without the fault of the

accused. Petitioner-accused is not without fault in the

delay of the prosecution against her.

Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, the crime of libel prescribes in one (1) year, to wit:ART. 90. Prescription of crime.- Crimes punishable bydeath, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shallprescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shallprescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shallprescribe in 10 years; with the exception of thosepunishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe infive years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shallprescribe in one year. (underscoring supplied)

The said prescriptive period is computed underArticle 91 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - Theperiod of prescription shall commence to run from theday on which the crime is discovered by the offendedparty, the authorities, or their agents, and shall beinterrupted by the filing of the complaint orinformation, and shall proceed to run again when suchproceedings terminate without the accused beingconvicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped forany reason not imputable to him.

In the landmark case ofPeople vs. Olarte, thisCourt speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, finallyresolved the then conflicting views as to whether or notthe filing of a complaint with the Municipal Trial Courtfor purposes of preliminary investigation suspends the

running of the prescriptive period for the crime. TheCourt restated the correct and prevailing doctrine, asfollows:

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order toprovide guidance for the Bench and Bar, this Court hasreexamined the question and, after matureconsideration, has arrived at the conclusion that thetrue doctrine is, and should be, the one established bythe decisions holding that the filing of the complaintwith the Municipal Court, even if it be merely forpurposes of preliminary examination or investigation,should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription ofthe criminal responsibility, even if the court where thecomplaint or information is filed can not try the case on

the merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion:first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal code, indeclaring that the period of prescription shall beinterrupted by the filing of the complaint orinformation without distinguishing whether thecomplaint is filed in the court for preliminaryexamination or investigation merely, or for action onthe merits. Second , even if the court where thecomplaint or information is filed may only proceed toinvestigate the case, its actuations already representthe initial step of the proceedings against theoffender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured partythe right to obtain vindication on account of delays thatare not under his control. All that the victim of theoffense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution isto file the requisite complaint.

And it is no argument that Article 91 also expressesthat the interrupted prescription shall commence torun again when such proceedings terminate withoutthe accused being convicted or acquitted, therebyindicating that the court in which the complaint orinformation is filed must have the power to convict oracquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on the meritsusually terminates in conviction or acquittal, nototherwise. But it is in the court conducting a

preliminary investigation where the proceedings mayterminate without conviction or acquittal, if the courtshould discharge the accused because no prima faciecase had been shown.

Another important teaching in Olarte is that it isunjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtainvindication on account of delays that are not under hiscontrol. This is because in criminal prosecutions, theonly thing that the victim of the offense may do on hispart to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisitecomplaint.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

SPO4 EDUARDO ALONZO VS. JUDGE CRISANTO C

CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of

Malolos City, Branch 12, Province of BulacanA.M. No. RTJ-04-1879. January 17, 2005

Facts: In a wedding party, SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo, Jun

Rances, Zoilo Salamat and Rey Santos were drinking

together at the same table. While waiting to be seated

Pedrito Alonzo was introduced by SPO4 Alonzo to

Rances as his nephew and as the son of ex-Captain

Alonzo. SPO4 Alonzo then introduced him to Salamat

Pedrito and his companions took their seats and

started drinking at the table across SPO4 Alonzos

table. After some time, Pedrito stood up to urinate at

the back of the house. Santos passed a bag to

Salamat, and they followed Pedrito. Rances likewise

followed them. A shot rang out. Salamat was seen

placing a gun inside the bag as he hurriedly left. The

wedding guests ran after Salamat. They saw him and

Rances board a vehicle being driven by Santos

Pedritos uncle, Jose Alonzo, sought the help of SPO4

Alonzo to chase the culprits. He refused and even

disavowed any knowledge as to their identity

Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against

Salamat, Rances, Santos, SPO4 Alonzo and a certain

Isidro Atienza. A preliminary investigation1 was

conducted by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor where
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Jose Alonzo and his four witnesses testified. Upon

review of the records of the case by the 3rd Assistant

Provincial Prosecutor, it was recommended that

Salamat be charged with murder as principal, and

Santos and Rances as accessories. With regard to SPO4

Alonzo and Isidro Atienza, the prosecutor found that no

sufficient evidence was adduced to establish their

conspiracy with Salamat. Judge Concepcion of the RTC

issued an Order directing the Office of the Provincial

Prosecutor to amend the information, so as to includeall the aforenamed persons as accused in this case, all

as principals.

Issue: Whether or not the court has authority to review

and reverse the resolution of the Office of the

Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable cause against

a respondent for the purpose of amending the

Information.

Held: The function of a preliminary investigation is to

determine whether there is sufficient ground to

engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been

committed and the respondent is probably guiltythereof, and should be held for trial. It is through the

conduct of a preliminary investigation that the

prosecutor determines the existence of a prima facie

case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. As a

rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor's

discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. The

reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the

direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent

malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.

However, while prosecuting officers have the authority

to prosecute persons shown to be guilty of a crime

they have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when

after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not

sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

In a clash of views between the judge who did not

investigate and the prosecutor who did, or between the

fiscal and the offended party or the accused, that of

the prosecutor's should normally prevail.

G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987NVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN,

JOSE SAYSON, CESAR TABILIRAN, and MAXIMOADLAWAN,petitioners,

vs.HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO

LABANG, MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO GUILLERMO, INTHEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR,CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE

PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC.,respondents.

No. L-34162 December 29, 1987

Facts:

petitioner Bienvenido Ebarle was then provincialGovernor of Zamboanga anda candidate for re-election in the 1971 local elections

Anti-Graft League of the Phils. filed differencomplainst with the City Fiscalagainst the petitionefor violations of provisions of the Anti-Graft Law(RA3019) as well as Arts. 171, 182, 183, 213 & 318 othe Revised Penal Code

on the bidding for the supply of gravel and sand forthe province of Zamboanga del Sur in favour of TabiliranTrucking Company

on the collection of advances under the truckingcontract of Tabiliran Trucking Company, making iappear that it was collected by Teoson TruckingCompany, who held the subsisting contract

on the bidding for the construction of the right wingportion of theCapitol Building of the Province oZamboanga del Sur, in favour of supposed winningbidder who is the brother-in-law of Ebarle

on petitioners testifying falsely under oath that heacquired a certainlot by purchase but the lot was infact owned by the provincialgovernment oZamboanga del Sur (where the provincial jail islocated) on the simulated bidding in favour of Tabiliran TruckingCompany on appointments of people related to Ebarleto different positions inthe government

petitioner filed for prohibition and certiorari in theCourt of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur but the case

was dismissed in the petition filed before the SC, petitioner claims

that the respondents CityFiscal and the Anti-GrafLeague failed to comply with the provisions of

EO264 preliminary to their criminal recourses

OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BYWHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING THE GOVTOFFICIALS AND EPLOYEES WITH THECOMMISSION OFIRREGULARITIES SHOULD BEGUIDED

petitioner assails the standing of respondent AntiGraft League to commencethe series of prosecutions

petitioner contends that the respondent Fiscal (in G.RNo. 34162) in givingdue course to the

complaints notwithstanding the order the SC hadissued(in G. R. 33628) which he claims applies aswell thereto, committed a graveabuse of discretion

petitioner claims that the prosecutions were politicallymotivated, initiated byhis rivals

Issues:

WoN respondents had to comply with the provisionsof EO 264

WoN Anti-Graft League had standing to commencethe series of prosecutions

WoN the complaints are politically motivated and thusshould bedismissed

Ruling: Petitions Dismissed.

Held: the petitioners reliance upon the provisions oEO 264 has no merit

it is plain from the very wording of the Order that ithas exclusiveapplication to administrative, and nocriminal complaints

Title: Commission of Irregularities

no mention, not even by implication, of criminaoffenses, orcrimes

while crimes amount to irregularities, the EO couldhavevery well referred to the more specific term had Iintended tomake itself applicable theretoprocedureprovided by law and regulations pertains to existingprocedural rules with respect to thepresentation o


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administrative charges against erringgovernmentofficials the aforequoted paragraphs arebut restatements of existing rules Paragraph 3 = Sec.33 of RA 2260, Civil Service Act of 1959 Paragraph 4= Decentralization Act of 1967 Paragraph 5 = Police

Act of 1966 specific reference to erring officialsor employeesremoved orotherwise vindicated if itwere to apply to criminal prosecutions, it wouldhaveemployed such technical terms as

accused, convicted, oracquitted is herematerial in construing the intent of themeasure more compelling is the Constitutionalimplications if the petitionersarguments wereaccepted EO 264 was promulgated under the 1935Constitution in whichthe legislative power was vestedexclusively in Congress if the EO was to beconsidered law, SC would be forced to saythat it is anamendment to RA 5180 which would give rise to aConstitutional anomaly Challenge against thepersonality of Anti-Graft League has no merit. acomplaint filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial actionmay be filed byany person

the TRO issued in G.R. No. 33628 does not embracethe complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162 because thecharges are not identical to one another

the proper venue for determining whether the caseswere filed to harasspetitioner is the preliminary wisheshe wishes to block

Petitions dismissed, TROs lifted and set aside.

[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1837. March 23, 2004]SITACION L. ESTODILLO, ET AL., complainants, vs. JUDGE

TEOFILO D. BALUMA, respondent.3/23/04 The information need not be under oath, there

ason therefore being principally that theprosecuting off

icer filing it is charged with thespecial duty in regard

thereto and is acting underthe special responsibility of

his oath of office.*

A complaint filed but not sworn to or signed is

stillvalid. It is a formal defect. It can be cured.Generally

, the signature is not needed.

Baluma's worries started when Visitacion Estodillo has filed anadministrative complaint against Baluma in December of 2002.Baluma, who was the Regional Trial Court Branch 1 (Family Court)judge dismissed a criminal case, originally filed for preliminaryinvestigation with the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin. At the preliminary investigation, Judge James StewartHimalaloan found sufficient ground for the case of Other Acts of

Child Abuse to prosper. With the case transmitted to ProvincialProsecutor Macario Delusa, the provincial prosecutor also filed aninformation dated October 28, 2002. Baluma however dismissedthe information on November 21 arguing that the recordsforwarded in the case were not subscribed and sworn by theprosecutor. Baluma, said the prosecutor's lapse would militate thevalidity of the information towards nullity and worthlessness of the[case] same. In response to the dismissal, Prosecutor Delusa fileda Motion for Reconsideration and Revival on December 12,stressing that there was no need to put the information under oathsince it was a concurrence of the Judge Himalaloan resolution,which was already properly subscribed. By January 10, Balumaissued an order granting the motion for reconsideration andreviving the case, but also asking the public prosecutor to file anew information incorporating the formalities he was asking

earlier. Twenty days later, the prosecution filed an ex-parte motionto increase bail bond of the accused but Baluma refused to act onit pending compliance of the order to file new information. Theprosecution manifested that it would not file a new information asordered for it would be contrary to law and jurisprudence and isunprocedural. In the impasse for bail bond request, complainantEstodillo asked for the Court intervention, citing that Baluma hasalso dismissed another case on strikingly similar grounds.

SIMILAR CASE

On that Baluma dismissed case, the prosecution through a motionfor reconsideration explained that only complaints are required to

be under oath, not a properly subscribed information. With theargument, Baluma granted the motion and revived the casewithout asking for new information refiling. Using the argument,complainant charged that what Baluma was doing was a cleargross ignorance of the law.

BALUMA'S REPLY

Commenting on the charge, Baluma cited that the complaintlacked a certification of non-forum shopping. He alleged furtherthat the complainant, upon instigation by Prosecutor Eric Ucat andAtty Esther Gertrude Biliran were mentally dishonest for notmentioning that before the complaint was filed March 2003,Baluma had issued the order in February. With that, Baluma filed acounter-complaint against Prosecutor Ucat and Atty Biliran withadministrative case for disbarment or disciplinary action for grossviolation of the Code of Professional Conduct, deceit, dishonesty,

failure to exercise candor, fairness, good faith, doing falsehood orconsenting to its doing and abuse of procedures. While doing so,Baluma stressed that he efficiently discharged his duties evenwhen his Branch is one of the most burdened branches inTagbilaran. In their rejoinders, both Ucat and Biliran deniedparticipation in filing the complaints except taking the oath ofcomplainants

SUPREME COURT FINDINGS

Court Administrator Velasco stressed that indeed, informationneed not be under oath, knowing that the prosecuting officer isacting the special responsibility of his oath of office. Velascoadded that the respondent erred, though not seriously, indismissing the information for not being under oath. With this,Velasco recommended a reprimand for Baluma with a sternwarning that a recurrence would merit more drastic action of thecourt. While the Supreme court dismissed for lack of merit the

counter complaint against Prosecutor Ucat and Atty Biliran, it alsofound Baluma guilty of violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.0.1 of the Codeof Judicial Conduct. The violation deserves a reprimand with astern warning that a repetition of the same would be dealt withmore severely.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

In his defense, Baluma filed a motion for reconsideration statingthat his dismissal of the information was being innovative in thesearch for truth assuring validity of the information by making sureit goes without infirmity. Pleading further, considering that hisdecision was erroneous, his failure to interpret the law does notnecessarily render him administratively liable. He said adisciplinary sanction goes for gross, malicious, deliberate or errorsdone in bad faith. Absent proof, he said a judge's decision ispresumed to have been issued in good faith. (Ramir Mina vs

Judge Rodolfo Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ 00-1264) Moreover, citingMorada vs, Judge Taya, 48 SCAD 131, he said as a matter ofpolicy, without fraud, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacityeven though erroneous are generally not subject to disciplinaryaction. In view of the above arguments, Baluma prayed fordismissal of the administrative case or at least a lesser sanction, awarning. The imposition of a reprimand will surely leave anindelible mark which altogether blackens and does not considerthe sincere, dedicated plight and efforts to be an exemplar amongthose privileged to wear the robe, he said. Offering an apology forthe lapse being an honest error, which was timely rectified, Balumabegged the court for only a plain warning. But in a resolution datedJuly 12, 2004 , the Second Division of the Supreme Court deniedBaluma's motion for reconsideration with finality.


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