crimrev crimes against prop

7/27/2019 Crimrev Crimes Against Prop

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1. People v. Buyagan

G.R. No. 187733.February 8, 2012 BRION, J.

Buyagan Appealed. CA affirmed, but modified the RTC

decision wherein Buyagan was found guity of the special

complex crime of robbery with homicide. Sentenced todeath.

10.30.00 RTC found Buyagan guilty of the

aforementioned crime. It gave credence to the prosecution

witnesses who said that Buyagan shot Jun Calixto and

PO2 Osorio. Jun grabbed Buyagans robbery partner

(John Doe) who robbed WT Construction Supply. This was

when Buyagan shot him. PO2 Osorio what shot by

Buyagan when the former was chasing him after the

incident

The testimony of the witnesses were straightforward andconsistent with the medico-legal findings.

Penalty: Death plus 50k civil, 22400 as actual, 592k as

unearned income. To heirs of Osorio: 50k as civil, 200k

moral 50690 as actual, 1588600 as unearned income.

CA: affirmed but modified penalty to RP. CA said that

there was conspiracy between him and Doe. The special

complex crime of Robbery with Homicide exists as long as

the intention is to rob and the killing may occur before,

during or after the robbery. Buyagan failed to impute ill-

motive on the witnesses to falsely testify against him.

ISSUE: W/N the lower courts correctly ruled that there was

a complex crime of Robbery w/ Homicide. (SC: YES)

HELD:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of

a direct relation, an intimate connection between the

robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or

subsequent to the former or whether both crimes were

committed at the same time.5 In the present case, we find

no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as

affirmed by the CA. The eyewitness accounts of the

prosecution witnesses are worthy of belief as they were

clear and straightforward and were consistent with the

medical findings of Dr. Vladimir Villaseor. They positively

identified the appellant as the person who shot Calixto at

the back of his head as the latter was grappling with John

Doe; three others all declared that the appellant shot PO2

Osorio at the market while the latter was chasing him

Significantly, the appellant never imputed any ill motive on

the part of these witnesses to falsely testify against him.

The lower courts correctly ruled that the appellant and

John Doe acted in conspiracy with one anotherConspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and

decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be inferred from the

acts of the accused before, during, and after the

commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are

indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and

community of interest. For conspiracy to exist, it is no

required that there be an agreement for an appreciable

period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the

time of the commission of the offense, the malefactors had

the same purpose and were united in its execution.

The records show that after John Doe robbed the WT

Construction Supply store, he casually walked away from

the store but Calixto grabbed him. While John Doe and

Calixto were grappling with each other, the appellan

suddenly appeared from behind and shot Calixto on the

head. Immediately after, both the appellant and John Doe

ran towards the Hilltop Road going to the direction of the

Hangar Market. Clearly, the two accused acted in concert

to attain a common purpose. Their respective actions

summed up to collective efforts to achieve a common

criminal objective.

In People v. Ebet,7 we explained that homicide is

committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if its

commission was (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape

of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culpri

of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of

the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the

commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus

between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime

may be committed in a place other than the situs of the

robbery.

Under the given facts, the appellant clearly shot Calixto to

facilitate the escape of his robber-companion, John Doe

and to preserve the latters possession of the stolen items.

The Proper Penalty

The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is

penalized, under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised


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Penal Code, with reclusion perpetua to death. Since the

aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed

firearm had been alleged and proven during trial, the lower

court correctly sentenced the appellant to suffer the death

penalty pursuant to Article 638 of the Revised Penal Code,

as amended. Nonetheless, we cannot impose the death

penalty in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, entitled

"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the

Philippines." Pursuant to this law, we affirm the CAs

reduction of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua

for each count, with the modification that the appellant

shall not be eligible for parole.

Civil Liabilities

For the deaths of Calixto and PO2 Osorio, we increase the

amounts of the awarded civil indemnities fromP50,000.00

to P75,000.00, as the imposable penalty against the

appellant would have been death were it not for the

enactment of R.A. No. 9346.9

We affirm, to be duly supported by evidence, the award of

P1,588,600.00 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity to

PO2 Osorios heirs. We, however, delete the award for

loss of earning capacity to Calixtos heirs because the

prosecution failed to establish this claim. As a rule,

documentary evidence should be presented to

substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity. While

there are exceptions to this rule, these exceptions do not

apply to Calixto as he was a security guard when he died;

he was not a worker earning less than the current

minimum wage under current labor laws.

With respect to actual damages, established jurisprudence

only allows expenses duly supported by receipts. Out of

the P50,690.00 awarded by the RTC to PO2 Osorios

heirs, only P15,000.00 was supported by receipts. The

difference consists of unreceipted amounts claimed by the

victims wife. Considering that the proven amount is less

than P25,000.00, we award temperate damages in the

amount of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages, pursuant

to our ruling in People v. Villanueva.10 For the samereasons, we also award temperate damages in the amount

of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages, to the heirs of

Calixto since the proven actual damages amounted to only

P22,400.00.

The existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits

the grant of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the

New Civil Code. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we

award exemplary damages of P30,000.00, respectively, to

the heirs of PO2 Osorio and of Calixto.11

Finally, we uphold the award of moral damages to the

heirs of PO2 Osorio and to the heirs of Calixto, but reduce

the amount awarded from P200,000.00 to P75,000.00 to

conform to prevailing jurisprudence.12 However, weobserved that the dispositive portion of the RTC decision

as affirmed by the CA, only awarded moral damages to the

heirs of PO2 Osorio. " While the general rule is that the

portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution

is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof

there are recognized exceptions to this rule: (a) where

there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion

may be referred to for purposes of construing the

judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision mus

find support from the decision's ratio decidendi; and (b)

where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement o

the issue is found in the body of the decision."13

We find that the second exception applies to the case. The

omission to state in the dispositive portion the award of

moral damages to the heirs of Calixto was through mere

inadvertence.1wphi1 The body of the RTC decision

shows the clear intent of the RTC to award moral damages

to the heirs of Calixto.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated

December 19, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01938

isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Teofilo

"Rey" Buyagan is hereby declared guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide

and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua without eligibility for parole. For the death of

Calixto, the appellant is ordered to pay the victims heirs

the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity

P75,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary

damages; andP25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu

of actual damages. For the death of PO2 Osorio, the

appellant is ordered to pay the victims heirs the amounts

of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as mora

damages;P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; P25,000.00as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages

andP1,588,600.00 as loss of earning capacity. No costs

SO ORDERED.

2. People v. Suyu

3. People v Cabbab


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4. People v Basao

5. People vs. Michael Hipona

Facts: Michael Hipona was convicted by the RTC of Rape

with Homicide (and Robbery) for the death of her aunt

AAA, the youngest sister of her mother. AAA was founddead in her house. She was raped, physically manhandled

and strangled, which led to her death. Her necklace with

two heart-shaped pendants bearing her initials and

handbag were missing. Upon investigation, the police

found a hole big enough for a person to enter - bored

into the lawanit wall of her comfort room. They also found

that the main electrical switch was turned off, drawing the

police to conclude that the perpetrator was familiar with the

layout of AAAs house.

The police thus called for a meeting of AAAs relatives,

during which AAAs sister BBB, who is Michaels mother,declared that her son had told her that "Mama, Im sorry, I

did it because I did not have the money," apologizing for

AAAs death. BBB executed an affidavit affirming this

confession. On the basis of BBBs information, the police

arrested appellant. He was at the time wearing AAAs

missing necklace. He was likewise presented to the media

and his relatives, he apologized claiming he did it because

of his peers and poverty, but qualified his participation in

the crime, claiming that he only acted as a look-out, and

attributed the crime to his co-accused Romulo B. Seva

alias "Gerpacs" and a certain "Reypacs."

Seva was arrested while Reypacs remained at large. The

RTC, after considering the circumstantial evidence found

Michael guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special

complex crime of Rape with Homicide (and Robbery) and

sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death:

Based on the foregoing circumstances, specially of his

failure to explain why he was in possession of victims

stolen necklace with pendants, plus his confession to the

media in the presence of his relatives, and to another radio

reporter"live-on-the-air" about a day after his arrest, sealed

his destiny to perdition and points to a conclusion beyond

moral certainty that his hands were soiled and sullied by

blood of his own Aun

Seva was acquitted for failure to prove guilt beyond

reasonable doubt. The case was elevated to the CA, which

affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty to

reclusion perpetua. Hence, the appeal to SC arguing that

his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and tha

he should only be held liable for robbery and not for Rape

with Homicide (and Robbery).

Issue: WON appellant should be liable for Rape with

Homicide (and Robbery)

Ruling: SC affirmed the conviction but modified the crime

to Robbery with Homicide.

Michael cited the testimony of the DNA expert that the

vaginal smears taken from AAA were negative o

appellants DNA. SC said argument has no merit

Presence of spermatozoa is not essential in finding that

rape was committed, the important consideration being not

the emission of semen but the penetration of the female

genitalia by the male organ. However, SC said that from

the evidence, robbery was the main intent of appellant

and AAAs death resulted by reason of or on the o ccasionthereof. Following Article 294(1) and Article 62(1)1 of the

Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated

as an aggravating circumstance instead.

*Just in case: For circumstantial evidence to suffice to

convict an accused, the following requisites must concur

(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from

which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the

combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce

a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The confluence of

the following established facts and circumstances sustains

the appellate courts affirmance of appellants conviction

First, appellant was frequently visiting AAA prior to her

death, hence, his familiarity with the layout of the house

second, appellant admitted to his relatives and the media

that he was present during commission of the crime, albeit

only as a look-out; third, appellant was in possession of

AAAs necklace at the time he was arrested; and

fourth,appellant extrajudicially confessed to the radio

reporter that he committed the crime due to his peers and

because of poverty.

6. People v Evangelio

7. Marquez v People

FACTS: On April 6, 2002 in Caloocan City, Ricky "Totsie

Marquez (Marquez), Roy Bernardo (Bernardo), Jome

Magalong (Magalong) and accused Ryan Benzon

(Benzon) confederating together and mutually aiding each

other, destroyed the door lock of the Rice in a Box stall of


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one SONIA VALDEROSA and passing/entering thru the

same, once inside, did then and there willfully, unlawfully

and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following

items, to wit:

Two (2) pieces Rice Cooker (heavy duty),One (1) piece of

[Teppanyaki] (big), 1,000 pieces of Boxes,

Kitchen Utensils, Fresh Meat (48 kls), Three (3) boxes of

Teriyaki Sauce,One (1) Heavy duty blender

One (1) Programmer Calculator and One (1) Transistor

Radio.

Mallari confessed to his brother of his participation to the

crime and then eventually to the stall owner Valderosa.

RTC gave credence to the testimony of Mallari and held

that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things but did not

discuss whether the robbery in this case was committed in

an inhabited house or in an uninhabited place.

It was different, though, when the case was decided by the

CA. Unlike the trial court, the appellate court discussed

about robbery in an inhabited house Article 299 of the

RPC in its assailed Decision. Pursuant to the same

provision, it then proceeded to affirm the penalty imposed

by the trial court upon the petitioners after finding them

guilty of the crime charged.

Issue: W/N CA erred in finding that the accused are guilty

of robbery under Art. 299.

Held: Yes. It should have been under Art. 302

ART. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public

building or edifice devoted to worship. - Any armed person

who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public

building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be

punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property

taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if

(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in

which the robbery is committed, by any of the following

means:

1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or

egress;

2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door

or window;

3. By using false keys, picklocks, or similar tools;

4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise

of public authority.

Or if

(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following

circumstances:

1. By breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any othe

kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle;

2. By taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or

forced open outside the place of the robbery.

xxxx

ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private

building. - Any robbery committed in an uninhabited placeor in a building other than those mentioned in the first

paragraph of Article 299, if the value of the property taken

exceeds 250 pesos shall be punished by prision

correccional in its medium and maximum periods, provided

that any of the following circumstances is present:

1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening

not intended for entrance or egress;

2. If any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has

been broken;

3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of

false keys, picklocks, or other similar tools;

4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed

furniture or receptacle has been broken;

5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the

preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if the same

be broken open elsewhere.

When the value of the property taken does not exceed 250

pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.

The records show that the store alleged to have been

robbed by petitioners is not an inhabited house, public

building or building dedicated to religious worship and their

dependencies under Article 299 and as defined under

Article 301. From Valderosas testimony, it can be

deduced that the establishment allegedly robbed was a

store not used as a dwelling. In fact, after the robbery took


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place, there was a need to inform Valderosa of the same

as she was obviously not residing in the store. "If the store

was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and

was not used as a dwelling, since the owner lived in a

separate house, the robbery committed therein is punished

under Article 302. Neither was the place where the store is

located owned by the government. It was actually just a

stall rented by Valderosa from a private person. Hence,

the applicable provision in this case is Article 302 and not

Article 299 of the RPC.

8. Laurel v Abrogar

DOCTRINE: The general rule is that, only movable

properties which have physical or material existence and

susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of

theft. Only those movable properties which can be taken

and carried from the place they are found are proper

subjects of theft.

Facts: Baynet Co., Ltd. Is being sued for network fraud.

Laurel is the board member and corporate secretary of

Baynet. 2 other filipinos and two japanese composed the

board. (Baynet) sells "Bay Super Orient Card" which uses

an alternative calling patterns called International Simple

Resale (ISR). ISR is a method of routing and completing

international long distance calls using International Private

Leased Lines (IPL), cables, antenna or air wave or

frequency, which connect directly to the local or domestic

exchange facilities of the terminating country (the country

where the call is destined). The operator of an ISR is able

to evade payment of access, termination or bypass

charges and accounting rates, as well as compliance with

the regulatory requirements of the NTC. Thus, the ISR

operator offers international telecommunication services at

a lower rate, to the damage and prejudice of legitimate

operators like PLDT.

Search warrants were issued against baynet through

PLDT's complaint. The seach was followed by an inquest

investigation. The prosecutor found probable cause for

THEFT and filed Information. After preliminaryinvestigation the information was amended to include

Laurel and the other members of the board for THEFT

using ISR.

Accused Laurel filed a "Motion to Quash (with Motion to

Defer Arraignment)" on the groundS that RPC does not

punish use of ISR, The telephone calls belong to the

person calling not to PLDT, and that

no personal property was stolen from PLDT. There is no

crime when there is no law punishing the crime

Issue: whether or not international telephone calls using

Bay Super Orient Cards through the telecommunication

services provided by PLDT for such calls, or, in short

PLDTs business of providing said telecommunicationservices, are proper subjects of theft under Article 308 of

the Revised Penal Code

Held: RTC denied MQ MR denied. Petition for Certiorar

with CA, dismissed. SC, granted.The petition is

meritorious.

An information or complaint must state explicitly and

directly every act or omission constituting an offense and

must allege facts establishing the conduct. the Amended

Information does not contain material allegations charging

the petitioner of theft of personal property under Article308 of the Revised Penal Code.

The international telephone calls placed by Bay Super

Orient Card holders, the telecommunication services

provided by PLDT and its business of providing said

services are not personal properties under Article 308 of

the Revised Penal Code.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as

follows:

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed byany person who, with intent to gain but without violence

against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things

shall take personal property of another without the latters

consent.

For one to be guilty of theft the accused must have an

intent to steal (animus furandi) personal property, meaning

the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawfu

possession of personal property which intent is apart from

and concurrently with the general criminal intent which is

an essential element of a felony of dolo (dolus malus).

An information or complaint for simple theft must allege the

following elements:

(a) the taking of personal property;

(b) the said property belongs to another;

(c) the taking be done with intent to gain; and


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(d) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence

or intimidation of person/s or force upon things.

"Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code must

be considered in tandem with the word "take" in the law.

The statutory definition of "taking" and movable property

indicates that, clearly, not all personal properties may bethe proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only

movable properties which have physical or material

existence and susceptible of occupation by another are

proper objects of theft. only those movable properties

which can be taken and carried from the place they are

found are proper subjects of theft.

Intangible properties such as rights and ideas are not

subject of theft because the same cannot be "taken" from

the place it is found and is occupied or appropriated.

movable properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal

Code should be distinguished from the rights or interests

to which they relate. A naked right existing merely in

contemplation of law, although it may be very valuable to

the person who is entitled to exercise it, is not the subject

of theft or larceny. Such rights or interests are intangible

and cannot be "taken" by another.

There is "taking" of personal property, and theft is

consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires

possession of personal property even if for a short time; or

if such property is under the dominion and control of the

thief. The taker, at some particular amount, must have

obtained complete and absolute possession and control of

the property adverse to the rights of the owner or the

lawful possessor thereof.t is not necessary that the

property be actually carried away out of the physical

possession of the lawful possessor or that he should have

made his escape with it. Neither asportation nor actual

manual possession of property is required. Constructive

possession of the thief of the property is enough. The

essence of the element is the taking of a thing out of the

possession of the owner without his privity and consent

and without animus revertendi.

gas and electricity are susceptible of taking since they can

be appropritated.

Business and services cannot be taken thus, not a subject

of theft. They both have different definitions.

RPC could not have included human voice or ISR in theft

since such was not existing at that time.

Respondent PLDT does not acquire possession, much

less, ownership of the voices of the telephone callers or of

the electronic voice signals or current emanating from said

calls. The human voice and the electronic voice signals o

current caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible

of possession, occupation or appropriation by the

respondent PLDT or even the petitioner, for that matter

PLDT merely transmits the electronic voice signals through

its facilities and equipment.

Congress did not amend the definition of theft rather they

passed RA 8484 and 8792.

Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access

Devices Regulation Act of 1998, on February 11, 1998

Under the law, an access device means any card, plate

code, account number, electronic serial number, persona

identification number and other telecommunication

services, equipment or instrumentalities-identifier or other

means of account access that can be used to obtain

money, goods, services or any other thing of value or to

initiate a transfer of funds other than a transfer originated

solely by paper instrument. Among the prohibited acts

enumerated in Section 9 of the law are the acts o

obtaining money or anything of value through the use of an

access device, with intent to defraud or intent to gain and

fleeing thereafter; and of effecting transactions with one or

more access devices issued to another person or persons

to receive payment or any other thing of value. Under

Section 11 of the law, conspiracy to commit accessdevices fraud is a crime. However, the petitioner is no

charged of violation of R.A. 8484.

Significantly, a prosecution under the law shall be without

prejudice to any liability for violation of any provisions o

the Revised Penal Code inclusive of theft under Rule 308

of the Revised Penal Code and estafa under Article 315 o

the Revised Penal Code. Thus, if an individual steals a

credit card and uses the same to obtain services, he is

liable of the following: theft of the credit card under Article

308 of the Revised Penal Code; violation of Republic Ac

No. 8484; and estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of theRevised Penal Code with the service provider as the

private complainant.

The petitioner is not charged of estafa before the RTC in

the Amended Information.

Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8792, Electronic

Commerce Act of 2000 provides:


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PetRev on Cert wherein Briones is appealing theaffirmation of the CA. He was convicted of the crime ofRobbery.RTC: charge was robbery but convicted for simple theftCA: Briones appealed but convicted him of Robberysaying that force and intimidation was employed byBriones.

Facts:

1) Info: on or about the 6th day of January 1998, in theMunicipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and against the will ofthe complainant S/G Dabbin Molina, and by means offorce, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,unlawfully and feloniously divest from him a .38 cal. gunworth P8,000.00, more or less.CONTRARY TO LAW.

2) S/G Molina was a security guard and was issued a .38cal.

3) S/G Molina and S/G Gual were manning the northwestgate of BF homes in Paraaque. They noticed thatBersamina was being mauled by 4 individuals, includingBriones and his brother.

4) the S/Gs tried to stop the mauling. At this point, Molinalost his gun to Briones. It was unsure though if violenceand intimidation was used to get the gun.

6) Briones denied participating and said that he was in his

house during the incident.

7) RTC found Briones guilty of Simple Theft. It relied onthe positive testimony of Gual. It ruled that it is only simpletheft because violence and intimidation was not proven.Gual merely testified that Briones grabbed the gun ofMolina.

8) CA found Briones guilty of robbery sating that force andintimidation attended the taking of Molinas gun as heapproached the latter with the intent of taking the gunaway.

9) On MR/MNT/MTD, Briones said that he was merelyprotecting his brother when he took the gun. CA deniedhence petition.

Issue/s:

W/N Robbery was the correct crime. (SC: NO)W/N the lower courts were correct in convicting Briones(SC: YES)

HELD:

I. To show that robbery was committed, the governmentneeds to prove the following elements: (1) the taking ofpersonal property be committed with violence orintimidation against persons; (2) the property takenbelongs to another; and (3) the taking be done with animolucrandi.32

On the other hand, the elements constituting the crime oftheft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking bedone with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done withoutthe consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking beaccomplished without the use of violence against orintimidation of persons or force upon things.

33Thus, the

distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery andtheft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means oftaking the property belonging to another; the element ispresent in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of

theft.

We have no doubt that the elements of taking of personalproperty which belongs to another person without hisconsent have been established in the case, while theintent to gain is presumed from unlawful taking and canonly be negated by special circumstances showing adifferent intent on the part of the perpetrator.

34We

previously held that intent to gain is a mental state whoseexistence is demonstrated by a persons overtacts.

35Briones' overt acts in this case were in grabbing

S/G Molinas firearm and running away with it. We stressthat these pieces of evidence, showing his unlawful taking

of the firearm and running away with it immediately after,were not refuted by the defense's evidence before theRTC. There is also evidence, as testified to by S/G Gual,that the firearm was not found nor retrieved after thisunlawful taking. Further, these pieces of evidence defeatBriones belated contention that he threw away the firearmimmediately after he got hold of it.

Under the circumstance, we are left to consider the natureof the crime committed, as proven by the evidence onrecord. We agree with the RTC that only the crime of theftwas committed in the case as S/G Gual's testimony doesnot show that violence or intimidation attended the taking

of the firearm; S/G Gual only testified that Briones merelygrabbed the firearm and ran away with it. Thus, we canonly convict Briones for the crime of theft for taking S/GMolinas firearm without his consent. Theft is produced themoment there is deprivation of personal property due to itstaking with intent to gain.

36

In arriving at this conclusion, we are keenly aware that theaccused was indicted under a charge for robbery, not theftThe failure to specify the correct crime committed,
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however, will not bar Briones conviction for the crime oftheft.

37The character of the crime is not determined by the

caption or preamble of the information, or by thespecification of the provision of law alleged to have beenviolated. The crime committed is determined by the recitalof the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint orinformation.

38In this case, the allegations in the

Information are sufficient to make out a charge of theft.

II. As S/G Gual is a credible eyewitness to the incident, wefind no reason to doubt that he was with S/G Molina whenthe incident happened, and saw all the incidents of thecrime.

As against this credible and positive testimony of S/GGual, Briones could only set up denial and alibi as hisdefenses. We have previously ruled that for thesedefenses to deserve merit, they must be substantiated byclear and convincing proof.

18Under the present facts,

these defenses were without corroboration. On the

contrary, Briones and his new counsel desperately nowmove to try the case again at the expense of Brionesformer counsel; based on allegedly newly discoveredevidence.

19They blame the former counsels allegedly

erroneous legal strategy when he raised denial and alibi asBriones defenses, instead of invoking self-defense ordefense of a relative. They also now foist on this Court anAffidavit of Desistance dated July 29, 2002

20executed by

Fuentes, as well as an Affidavit dated July 22,2002

21executed by one Oskar Salud. These documents

allegedly prove that Briones had no intent to gain and, infact, threw away the firearm after grabbing it from S/GMolina.

A change of Briones' defense from denial and alibi to self-defense or defense of a relative is effectively a change oftheory of the case broughtonly during appeal. We cannotallow this move. Law and fairness to the adverse partydemand that when a party adopts a particular theory andthe case is tried and decided on the basis of that theory inthe court below, neither party can change his or her theoryon appeal.

22While this rule is not absolute, no exceptional

reasons in this case exist to justify a deviation .23

1avvphil

Additionally, an error or mistake committed by a counsel inthe course of judicial proceedings is not a ground for new

trial.

From the facts, it does not appear that Briones was deniedcompetent legal representation in the proceedings beforethe RTC.

What significantly remains on record is the unopposedtestimony of S/G Gual that Briones grabbed the firearmfrom S/G Molina; no evidence on record exists to show

that this firearm was pointed at Briones or at hiscompanions.

For these reasons, we find that the CA did not commit anyreversible error when it denied Briones' motion for newtrial. Likewise, we find no error in the RTC and CAconclusion that he is criminally liable under the criminalinformation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitionis PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 17, 2002and Resolution dated November 13, 2002 of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24127 are hereby MODIFIED.Petitioner Rommel Briones is found GUILTY beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of THEFT under Article 308of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentencedto suffer a straight penalty of imprisonment of four (4)months of arresto mayor. SO ORDERED.

15. Belen Real v People

16. Francisco v People

17. People v Lourdes

18. Milla v People

19. People v Montaner

20. Gonzalez v People

Facts: Gonzales was charged of arson after setting fire totheir room in an apartment building, burning the units

occupied by the other tenants. Tenants testified that theyheard Gonzales quarrelling with his aunt, yelling that hewill burn the house down. Afterwards he set a pile oclothes on fire which smelled of LPG gas. The testimonieswere corroborated by the police investigator who testifiedthat when they arrived at the crime scene, Gonzalesadmitted responsibility for the fire. However, he laterdenied it claiming that the fire was caused by faultyelectrical wiring and also denied fighting with his aunt. Hesaid she was partially deaf so he had to speak in a loudvoice for her to hear him. He also sought police protectionfrom his neighbors who accused him of starting the fireAfter investigation, the evidence was found negative of any

flammable substance. Nonetheless, RTC found Gonzalesguilty of arson (penalty: Prision Correccional to ReclusionTemporal as max). Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCCA held that the denial of Gonzales cannot prevail overthe positive identification of a witness and that theprosecution established circumstantial evidence sufficiento support the conviction of the accused beyondreasonable doubt. Although there were discrepancies inthe oral testimony and affidavits of witnesses, thediscrepancies did not necessarily discredit them because
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as for instance when the latter is the person or one of thepersons last seen with the victim immediately before andright after the commission of the crime.

This is the second type of positive identification, whichforms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken

together with other pieces of evidence constituting anunbroken chain, leads to the only fair and reasonableconclusion, which is that the accused is the author of thecrime to the exclusion of all others.

If the actual eyewitness are the only ones allowed topossibly positively identify a suspect or accused to theexclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convictedunless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic andelementary that there can be no conviction until and unlessan accused is positively identified.

Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is

settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime isnot the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw itsconclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantialevidence would not be allowed to prove identity of theaccused on the absence of direct evidence, then felonswould go free and the community would be denied properprotection.

The following circumstances form an unbroken chain thatpoint to no other than that appellant is the arsonist, to wit:

First: Prior to the burning incident, the Bravo family,including the accused, had denounced Mauro Camacho

and his wife of engaging in witchcraft. The Bravos blamedthe witchcraft to be the cause of the illness of the father ofthe accused.

Second: A week after the rumors had spread that MauroCamacho, Sr. and his wife had subjected the father of theaccused to their witchcraft, their house got burneddowned.

Third: The accused was present at the scene of the crimeat about 9:30 pm on August 10, 1989, daring MauroCamacho, Sr. to go down from his house. The accusedhimself even went up the house of the Camachos and

pointed his long firearm at Mauro, Sr.

Fourth: The accused was heard uttering while going downthe stairs of the house the Camachos: Matay kayo aminen,po-urak daytoy balay yo (all of you will die. I will burn yourhouse). Fifteen seconds later, Mauro Camacho, Sr. heardgunshots and then saw a big fire in the room occupied byShirley Camacho and her son.

And fifth. Barangay councilman Alejandro Marzan, while ata wake in Barangay Ambaracao Sur, Naguilian, La Unionat about 9:30 pm of August 10, 1989, heard gunshots thatprompted him to go outside. He then saw a fire to the northabout a kilometer away from where he was.

He rushed towards the place of the fire. Midway, heencountered Benjamin Bravo running from the oppositedirection and carrying a long firearm.

23. Taguinod v People

G.R. No. 185833 October 12, 2011

ROBERT TAGUINOD,vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,

Facts: at the parking area of the Rockwell Powerplan

Mall. Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his

Honda CRV (CRV) from the 3rd basement parking, whileRobert Taguinod (petitioner) was driving his Suzuki Vitara

(Vitara) from the 2nd basement parking. When they were

about to queue at the corner to pay the parking fees, the

respective vehicles were edging each other. The CRV was

ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried to overtake, which

resulted the touching of their side view mirrors. The side

view mirror of the Vitara was pushed backward and

naturally, the side view mirror of the CRV was pushed

forward. This prompted the private complainant's wife and

daughter, namely, Susan and Mary Ann, respectively, to

alight from the CRV and confront the petitioner. Petitioner

appeared to be hostile, hence, the private complainan

instructed his wife and daughter to go back to the CRV

While they were returning to the car, petitioner accelerated

the Vitara and moved backward as if to hit them. The CRV

having been overtaken by the Vitara, took another lane

Private complainant was able to pay the parking fee at the

booth ahead of petitioner. When the CRV was at the

upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the

CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until it hit the

stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of the

ramp.As a result of the collision, both cars sustained

damages, the CRV having most of it.

An information was filed for malicious mischief agains

Taguinod to which he pleaded not guilty. He was convicted

of malicious mischief with a punishment of 4 months and

damages. RTC affirmed. CA modified only the penalties

Petition for review to SC

Issue: WON taguinod has committed malicious mischief.


12/16

Held: This Court finds the petition partly meritorious.

Affirmed modifications only on omission of attorney's fees.

The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under

Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code has been proven

beyond reasonable doubt which are:

(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the

property of another;

(2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes

involving destruction;

(3) That the act of damaging another's property be

committed merely for the sake of damaging it.

The incident of the collision of the side mirrors of both

cars, the pounded hood of the vitara and the bad

mouthing of the wife and daughter of the complainant are

proof enough to establish existence of the element of hate

revenge and other ill motive , for in his mind he was

wronged.

First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the

petitioner was clearly deliberate control his speed in view

of the gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the

rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other

crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara

bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his

anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between

him and the private complainant.

24. Intestate estate of Manolita Gonzalez v People

25. People v Cerbito

26. Tan v People

27. Wong vs. CA and People

Facts:

Wong was an agent of Limtong Press, Inc (LPI), a

manufacturer of calendars. Since Wong had a history ofunremitted collections, LPI required Wongs customers to

issue postdated checks before LPI would accept their

purchase orders.

Wong issued 6 postdated checks and drawn payable to

the order of LPI. These checks were initially intended to

guarantee the calendar orders of customers who failed to

issue postdated checks but LPI refused to accept the

checks as guarantee. They instead agreed to apply the

checks to the payment of Wongs unremitted collections.

The said checks were dishonored. Wong was notified

about the dishonor but he failed to settle the same within 5

days.

Wong was charged for 3 separate Informations for

violation of BP 22.

The trial court convicted Wong. On appeal, the CA

affirmed the trial court.

Hence this petition.

Issue: What is the crime committed by the accused?

Held: He is liable for violation of BP 22. There are two (2)

ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22:

(1) by making or drawing and issuing a check to apply on

account or for value knowing at the time of issue that the

check is not sufficiently funded; and

(2) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee

bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient funds

therein or credit with said bank to cover the full amount o

the check when presented to the drawee bank within a

period of ninety (90) days.

The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the first situation

pertinent to the present case, are:

(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to

apply for account or for value;

(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at

the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in o

credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check

in full upon its presentment; and

(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee

bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the

same reason had not the drawer, without any valid causeordered the bank to stop payment.

Petitioner contends that the first element does not exis

because the checks were not issued to apply for account

or for value. He attempts to distinguish his situation from

the usual "cut-and-dried" B.P. 22 case by claiming that the

checks were issued as guarantee and the obligations they

were supposed to guarantee were already paid. This


13/16

flawed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and CA

having both ruled that the checks were in payment for

unremitted collections, and not as guarantee. Likewise, the

argument has no legal basis, for what B.P. Blg. 22

punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the

purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and

conditions relating to its issuance.

As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a

presumption juris tantum that the second element prima

facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense

are present. Thus, the makers knowledge is presumed

from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds.

Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the

checks on June 5, 1986, or 157 days after the December

30, 1985 maturity date, the presumption of knowledge of

lack of funds under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 should not

apply to him. He further claims that he should not be

expected to keep his bank account active and funded

beyond the ninety-day period.

Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making,

drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is

refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or

credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)

days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie

evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or

credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof

the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for

payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)

banking days after receiving notice that such check has

not been paid by the drawee.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the

part of the maker or drawer of the check of the

insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover

the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state

of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a

prima facie presumption of such knowledge where

payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because

of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when

presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the

check." To mitigate the harshness of the law in its

application, the statute provides that such presumption

shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of

the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes

arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or

pays the holder the amount of the check.22

Contrary to petitioners assertions, nowhere in said

provision does the law require a maker to maintain funds

in his bank account for only 90 days. Rather, the clear

import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumptionof knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the

following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from

date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and

failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in

full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the

check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply

one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of

knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of

the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his

duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a

reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the

Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented

for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the

drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the

extent of the loss caused by the delay." By current banking

practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6)

months, or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited

the checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence

said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the

presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was

lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or

circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private

respondent did not deposit the checks because of thereassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks

Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposi

the said checks. After the checks were dishonored

petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make

arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days

thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence tha

petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in

or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of

the checks. And despite petitioners insistent plea o

innocence, we find no error in the respondent courts

affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations

of the Bouncing Checks Law.

However, pursuant to the policy guidelines in

Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which took effect on

November 21, 2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner

should now be modified to a fine of not less than but no

more than double the amount of the checks that were

dishonored.


14/16

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

28. Domagsang v CA

Josephine Domagsang obtained a loan from Ignacio

Garcia in the amount of P573,800.00. In consideration of

the loan, Domagsang issued eighteen (18) postdatedchecks to Ignacio. When presented for payment, the said

checks bounced for the reasons "Account

Closed". Ignacio demanded payment by calling up

Domagsang at her office. However, Domagsang failed to

pay. Both the RTC and Court of Appeals convicted

Domagsang of the crime. The latter appealed to the

Supreme Court.

Will a verbal notice of dishonor or demand to pay enough

to convict a person for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.

22 (Bouncing Checks Law)?

The Supreme Court held that Although Section 2 of B.P.

Blg. 22 does state that the notice of dishonor be in writing,

Section 3 states that where there are no sufficient funds in

or credit with the drawee bank, such fact shall always be

explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. A mere

oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be

insufficient for conviction under the law. Both the spirit and

letter of the Bouncing Checks Law require for the act to be

punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a

check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has

actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The

consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed

strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the

accused. Domagsang was acquitted of the crime.

However, she was ordered to pay Ignacio the total face

value of the dishonored checks as it was established that

she failed to pay her debt.

29. Griffith v CA

GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN A.

VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE MANUEL D.L. VILLAMAYOR

and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC., respondents.

G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002. QUISUMBING, J.

Griffith was found guilty by the RTC on two counts for

violation of BP22. CA affirmed. Was to suffer imprisonment

of 6 mos, to be served consecutively.

FACTS:

1) 1985 Phelps Dodge Philippines (PDP) leased its lot andfactory to Lincoln Gerard Inc (LGI) for two years at a

monthly rate of 75k.

2) LCI defaulted on some of the rentals. Griffith, as

president of LGI issued two checks (1 is 100K, 2 is

115442.65) both from FEBTC. The vouchers for the

checks indicated that:

a) checks are not to be presented without prio

approval of LGI to be given not later then May 30, 1986

b) But if written approval is not given by LCI before

the date, PDP shall present checks for payment. This is

final and irrevocable.

3) May 20, 1986, PDP advised LGI that it was transferring

the contents of the LGI warehouse in the leased premises

since a new tenant was moving in and that the properties

of LGI will be placed in PDPs custody.

4) On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote PDP not to presen

checks for payment because they could not be funded due

to the four-week labor strike which paralyzed the

operations of LGI.

5) June 2, 1986, PDP did not receive further comms from

LGI, PDP then presented the checks for payment. The

checks were dishonored. LGI was notified but failed to

refund the checks. As such, PDP foreclosed the LG

properties in its possession despite the latters protest.

6) November 6, 1987, LGI lodged a complaint for damages

against PDP and the notary who conducted the auction

sale. RTC ruled for LGI saying that the sale was invalid,

applied the proceeds to the arrears and ordered PDP to

return 1.07M since it was the excess of the sale. CA

affirmed.

7) May 10, 1988, two informations for BP22 were filed

against Griffith before the RTC. Thereafter remanded to

the MeTC due to the subsequent expansion of the latter

courts jurisdiction over BP22 cases.


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8) MeTC found Griffith guilty for both counts. But did not

judge the civil aspect of the case due to Res Judi or Litis

Pen. RTC affirmed in toto. CA denied appeal.

9) Griffith assails the decision due to the fact that PDP

knew that the checking accounts did not have sufficient

funds and the latter presented it for payment despite suchknowledge.

ISSUE:

W/N the conviction was correct. (SC: NO)

HELD:

The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the

interest of the banking system and the legitimate public

checking account user."25 It was not designed to favor or

encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through

manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the

law.26 Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000,

this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as

penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than

imprisonment to "best serve the ends of criminal justice."

Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal

system leans toward the classical school that imposes

penalties for retribution,27 such retribution should be

aimed at "actual and potential wrongdoers".28

Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge

against petitioner, the checks issued were corporate

checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a

valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it

bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a notarial

foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially

declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerard's property for cash

amounting to P1,120,54029 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim

for unpaid rentals. Said property was already in Phelps

Dodge's custody earlier, purportedly because a new tenant

was moving into the leased premises. The obligation of

Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said rentals was

onlyP301,953.12.30 Thus, by resorting to the remedy offoreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able to

collect the face value of the two checks, totalling

P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln

Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This

was the situation when, almost two years after the auction

sale, petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of

B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard,

Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting

though respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment

thereof as involuntary.31 That the money value of the two

checks signed by petitioner was already collected

however, could not be ignored in appreciating the

antecedents of the two criminal charges against petitioner

Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge

was ordered to pay or returnP1,072,586.88 to Lincoln

Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig

Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the

appellate court. We cannot, under these circumstances

see how petitioner's conviction and sentence could be

upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness

and justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in our view, already

exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure

and auction sale as its chosen remedy.

That is why we find quite instructive the reasoning of the

Court of Appeals earlier rendered in deciding the petition

for Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v. Judge Milagros

Caguioa, CA-G.R. SP No. 20980, in connection with the

petitioner's motion to quash the charges herein before they

were tried on the merits.32

Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices

Reynato S. Puno and Asaali S. Isnani:

"We are persuaded that the defense has good and solid

defenses against both charges in Criminal Cases Nos

73260-61. We can even say that the decision rendered in

Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 55276, well-written as it is

had put up a formidable obstacle to any conviction in the

criminal cases with the findings therein made that the sale

by public auction of the properties of Lincoln was illega

and had no justification under the facts; that also the

proceeds realized in the said sale should be deducted

from the account of Lincoln with Phelps, so that only

P47,953.12 may only be the rentals in arrears which

Lincoln should pay, computed at P301,953.12 less

P254,600.00; that out of what had happened in the case

as the trial court had resolved in its decision, Phelps is

duty bound to pay Lincoln in damages P1,072,586.88 fromwhich had been deducted the amount of P47,953.12

representing the balance of the rental in arrearages; and

that consequently, there is absolutely no consideration

remaining in support of the two (2) subject checks."33

Petitioner's efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the

charges against him was frustrated on procedural grounds

because, according to Justice Francisco, appeal and not


16/16

certiorari was the proper remedy.34 In a petition for

certiorari, only issues of jurisdiction including grave abuse

of discretion are considered, but an appeal in a criminal

case opens the entire case for review.

While we agree with the private respondent that the

gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance ofworthless checks that are dishonored upon their

presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws

mechanically.35We must find if the application of the law is

consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law.

Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the

law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but

the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially

so in this case where a debtor's criminalization would not

serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor

having collected already more than a sufficient amount to

cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via

auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to

answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after

said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or

equitable considerations.

In sum, considering that the money value of the two

checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively

paid two years before the informations against him were

filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner

herein could not be validly and justly convicted or

sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of

checks issued determines the number of violations of B.P.22, or whether there should be a distinction between

postdated and other kinds of checks need no longer detain

us for being immaterial now to the determination of the

issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 19621

dated March 14, 1997, and its resolution dated July 8,

1997, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner

Geoffrey F. Griffith is ACQUITTED of the charges of

violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and

41679. Costs de officio. SO ORDERED.

30. People v Lagat

31. People v Dimat

crimrev crimes against prop

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