crisis communication channels: google recommendations · the internews’ humanitarian media team...

By Matt Abud

2013

Crisis CommuniCation Channels: GooGle reCommendations

aCKnoWledGementsInternews and Google’s Disaster Response Team share a deep commitment to developing informa-tion tools that can mediate the challenges associated with humanitarian crises. Tech tools posi-tioned in the hands of the right people can reunite families, connect people to safe havens in the midst of a disaster, or help humanitarian organizations navigate the quickly changing terrain when normal life is disrupted by disaster.

In 2012, Google’s Disaster Response team and Internews’ Humanitarian Communication Program began to look at the range and use of tech tools by communities affected by crisis in the developing world. Internews’ Center for Innovation and Learning came forward to contribute a design meth-odology that could help answer basic questions about what tools have been used in three different disasters in Indonesia: Jakarta’s January 2013 floods; Aceh’s April 2012 earthquake and tsunami warning; and the ongoing volcano eruption in Rokatenda, Flores, which began in late 2012.

This document tells that story and opens up a broader dialogue of how we can understand the needs of people and organizations in the midst of crisis and develop new protocols, systems, and tools that enhance connection and save lives in times of crisis.

The Internews’ Humanitarian Media Team takes a leadership role in understanding how media and communications plays a role in humanitarian crises.

Many thanks are due to a great number of people who helped during this research. They include: the Google Crisis Response team, both for supporting the research and their questions and discussion along the way. Gladys Respati and the whole team at OnTrack Media Indonesia, for going beyond the call with all collaboration and support provided. Juni Soehardjo, for research and several insights in the section on national issues. Many others provided both their time, and greatly facilitated further interviews. They include: colleagues at Palang Merah Indonesia and several IFRC member societies operating in Indonesia, including American Red Cross in Banda Aceh. Staff of local disaster manage-ment agencies in Jakarta; in Kupang and Sikka in east Indonesia (BPBD); and in Aceh (BPBA); and of the national disaster management agency (BNPB). Staff at UNOCHA and at the Australia Indonesia Disaster Reduction Facility. The Urban Poor Consortium for facilitating much of the fieldwork in north Jakarta. And of course numerous journalists, editors, humanitarian workers and digital activists in each of the areas researched gave invaluable insights throughout.

Most of all, thanks are due to the residents along the Ciliwung River and in Muara Baru in Jakarta; to the residents displaced from Palue Island; and the residents in Banda Aceh who shared their experi-ences and perspectives.

CreditsDesign: Kirsten Ankers, Citrine Sky DesignFront cover photos (from left to right): Oren Murphy, Febi Dwirahmadi and Matt Abud. Back cover photo: Oren Murphy

Crisis CommuniCation Channels: GooGle reCommendations 1

Contents1. Introduction........................................................................................................ 2

2. Overview ............................................................................................................. 3

3. Methodology ...................................................................................................... 4

4. Google Services in Disaster Response: Broad Findings .................................. 64.1. Google Approaches to Indonesia .............................................................................. 6

4.1.1. Google Tool Design ........................................................................................... 64.1.2. Business Strategies .......................................................................................... 64.1.3 Targeted Audiences, Targeted Criteria, Targeted Input ............................. 74.1.4 Targeted Partnerships ....................................................................................... 7

4.2. Information Sources before the flood: Where Google tools fit .......................... 84.2.1 Information Sources Accessed ........................................................................ 84.2.2 Trust in Sources .................................................................................................. 8

4.3. Information Sources during the flood: Where Google tools fit .......................... 94.3.1 Google Tools accessed ...................................................................................... 94.3.2 Rokatenda and Aceh case-studies ................................................................. 104.3.3 Use of Google Tools in the Jakarta Floods: Some Observations .............. 10

5. Google Services in Disaster Response: Case Study Example ......................... 115.1 Disaster Agencies: Jakarta .......................................................................................... 115.2 Media: Metro TV, others .............................................................................................. 125.3 NGOs & Civil Society: RAPI .......................................................................................... 125.4 Coordination: Google groups mailing list ................................................................. 125.5 Digital Volunteers: ODOS ............................................................................................. 13 5.6 Digital volunteers: Blogger groups ............................................................................ 13

6. Potential Initiatives ........................................................................................... 146.1 Neighborhood Social Networks ................................................................................. 156.2 Government Agencies .................................................................................................. 166.3 Media ............................................................................................................................... 176.4 Telecommunications Sector ...................................................................................... 186.5 NGOs & Civil Society ..................................................................................................... 196.6 Coordination ................................................................................................................... 196.7 Digital Volunteers & Communities of Practice ....................................................... 19

7. List of Acronyms ................................................................................................ 21

2 Crisis CommuniCation Channels: GooGle reCommendations

IntroductIon

In keeping with the focus on information and communication as a life-saving resource in a disaster, Internews focused on the experiences of those most affected and in need, and on the responders whose efforts could meet those needs. The research does not, therefore, incorporate the experiences of those who were less affected and whose lives and wellbeing were not placed at serious risk, even though they may live in nearby or adjoining areas and therefore be affected to a lesser degree.

Overall findings in these Recommendations show a low level of use of Google and Google Crisis Response tools by both affected communities and, perhaps more surprisingly, respond-ers themselves. The report details the individual examples of Google tool use that were encountered, including a review of possible reasons or dynamics that prevent such use from reaching its full potential.

The goal of this research is not to point out limitations, but to suggest potential ways forward. The approach of Crisis Communication Channels, and of this accompanying Recommendations document, rests on an appreciation of the relationships that underpin effective communication. A single tool, service, or piece of information is frequently not enough to provide effective communication. Tools must be familiar and understood; information must be believed; data must flow rap-idly to and from actors who know how to use it best; communi-ties must be heard and receive responses to their concerns. All of these are necessary, with the absence of any one element potentially undermining all.

Finally, it is pertinent to note that Indonesia was selected as an example of a developing country that nevertheless shows a wide range of circumstances across a broad geographical area. Many of the features and dynamics identified in the report will have resonance with other developing contexts. However fur-ther comparative studies will help refine and isolate those fea-tures that generally hold true, and others which may be down to certain factors — environmental, policy, or otherwise – par-ticular to a specific country.

This Recommendations document is a specific discussion focused on Google and Google Crisis Response

in Indonesia’s disaster responses, accompanying and drawing on the findings of Internews’ broader Crisis

Communications Channels report. That report explores communications ecosystems in three recent disaster

response case studies.

1

Residents have been forced to adapt to frequent floods, with some closest to the river inundated eight times by late February. Photo by Oren Murphy.


2The Recommendations document first presents the methodol-ogy used to gather this data. It then discusses overall findings on the use of Google Tools, by disaster-affected populations, and by responders and other institutional actors. It then pres-ents detailed individual examples of how Google tools were used, drawn from the Crisis Communications Channels report and highlighting a range of actors. Finally, it outlines a series of potential initiatives that can support improved use of Google tools for the needs of specific actors.

The actors included in this discussion are the same as those in the Crisis Communication Channels, namely:

Neighbourhood Social Networks (networks among affected populations, largely generated through face-to-face or proxim-ity of contact)

overvIew

Government Agenciesn Media (meaning conventional media outlets: T.V., radio,

newspapers)

n Telecommunications sectorn NGOs and Civil Society organisations

n Coordination (while not an ‘actor’ this cross-cutting area is highlighted in recognition of the key role it plays in facilitat-ing an effective response, including effective communica-tion flows)

n Digital Volunteers and Communities of Practice (that is, networks connected over and mobilised through digital platforms to provide volunteer humanitarian response)

These Recommendations draw on the far more detailed case studies in the Crisis Communications Channels

report. Specific sections in that report are referenced when needed, rather than repeating large slabs of the

same detail here.

Church delivery to aid post in Ende regency, Flores. Photo by Matt Abud / Internews


Crisis Communications Channels rests on three disaster response case studies: Jakarta’s January 2013 floods; Aceh’s April 2012 earthquake and tsunami warning; and the ongo-ing volcano eruption in Rokatenda, Flores, which began in late 2012. Case studies were selected to provide a wide range of contexts, and included locations that are rich in communication infrastructure (Jakarta) and poor in infrastructure (Rokatenda); sudden early-warning scenarios (Aceh) and both long- and short-term disasters (Rokatenda and Jakarta); and different

Methodology Crisis Communications Channels rests on three disaster response case studies: Jakarta’s January 2013 floods;

Aceh’s April 2012 earthquake and tsunami warning; and the ongoing volcano eruption in Rokatenda, Flores,

which began in late 2012. Case studies were selected to provide a wide range of contexts, and included loca-

tions that are rich in communication infrastructure (Jakarta) and poor in infrastructure (Rokatenda); sudden

early-warning scenarios (Aceh) and both long- and short-term disasters (Rokatenda and Jakarta); and dif-

ferent disaster types (earthquake and tsunami; volcanic eruption; and urban flood), among other variations.

3disaster types (earthquake and tsunami; volcanic eruption; and urban flood), among other variations.

Internews conducted over one hundred key interviews in the course of gathering case study material. These included inter-views with affected communities (approximately 36 people);1 Local Government and Government Disaster Agency staff (10); media, both journalists and editors (20); telecommunications company staff (3); NGOs and civil society (27); and digital vol-unteers (11).

In each interview Internews asked several questions about both the use of online tools in general, and — if the respon-dent had any online engagement at all — Google and Google Crisis Response tools in particular. These were open questions, to ensure any tool utilised would be mentioned. Follow-up questions included asking whether Google Maps of any sort were used; and subsequently whether Google Crisis Maps were used specifically.

In addition, Internews independently funded in-depth quan-titative surveys of selected flood-affected communities in Jakarta to contextualise and triangulate findings from the key interviews. 300 respondents answered questions both on their regularly accessed channels of information pre-flood, and the channels of information accessed during the flood. Questions placed online services, including those provided by Google, in the context of broader communication channels. Jakarta was targeted for more in-depth surveys as the disaster response

1 Some interviews were with small groups, with input from both a group representative and some detailed contributions from group members; the actual number of contributors is therefore higher than this

Aceh 2004 tsunami damage. Photo by Oren Murphy.


had the most involved communication channels, including significant penetration of online services; and because Google Crisis Response specifically provided services towards this response effort. The sample size is adequate to draw informed conclusions and make subsequent recommendations.2

2 Internews contracted an independent research organisation to conduct surveys on media and information access among flood-affected communities. This targeted the same communities along the Ciliwung River and in Muara Baru visited by Internews’ researchers themselves, in order to correlate information from those qualitative interviews with quantitative data. In addition for further comparison the survey covered three other locations: broader areas of Pluit (of which Muara Baru is a part); and Rawa Terate and Kampung Melayu, both in East Jakarta.

The survey sample size was 300, high for the size of the target population and giving a level of reliability to the results. The sample targeted citizens 15 years old and over; in order to adequately represent younger demographics whom interviews indicated had different information consumption habits, especially using online platforms, 10% of all respondents were between 15 and 18 years old. Respondents were purposively selected to target the flood-affected, as flood impact was highly-localised even within individual neighborhoods. This meant that randomised selection of households would not necessarily yield an accurate sample, as households within a short distance of each other may not have all been flood affected. 90% of respondents were purposively selected to target flood-affected households, with demographics randomized using the Kish grid methodology. A further 10% were purposively selected to target those who were not flood-affected themselves, but resided nearby and assisted those who were affected. This attempted to draw out differences in information access caused by diverse individual circumstances that were nevertheless in close proximity. Given the fact that this study was conducted using non-probability convenience sampling methods, the results are not projectable to any population beyond the respondents themselves.

Interviewers received training and briefings from the research company, with Internews in attendance at the start-up for any orientation and clarification. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, with results recorded on paper and subsequently entered into the data-base. 130 of those approached for interviews refused, at a rate of 20%, with the most common reason being lack of time to participate.

The team field coordinator witnessed 10% of interviews on-site. Call-back for quality control covered a further 20% of the total respondents, completed by phone. Quality control thus covered 30% of total interviews. In the event of any error discovered, the questionnaires of the interviewer concerned were then double-checked.

The survey targeted three main areas: information sources regularly accessed before the floods; information sources accessible during the floods, to provide a comparison of how sources changed or were impacted by the disaster; and which sources were useful in accessing assistance or making decisions. Throughout, questions also focused on influences that were changing The survey targeted three main areas: information sources regularly accessed before the floods; information sources accessible during the floods, to provide a comparison of how sources changed or were impacted by the disaster; and which sources were useful in accessing assistance or making decisions. Throughout, questions also focused on influences that were changing communication in some detail, in particular the use of mobile phones and online platforms.


Google tools were sometimes used, but only occasionally and incidentally for specific response purposes. No citizens, respond-ers, or media reported using either the MyMap or the Crisis Response Map to get flood status updates; no responders report-ing using the Maps to help plan or organise their response. The exception was an extremely limited use of the general Google Maps platform by ODOS (One Day One Service) volunteers (see Section 3.11 in Crisis Communications Channels).

google ServIceS In dISaSter reSponSe: Broad FIndIngS4From the key interviews, the almost universal feedback indicates that, in general, Google Crisis Response

tools were either under-utilised or not well-known among public and local crisis response practitioners in

Indonesia.

4.1. Google Approaches to IndonesiaThe suggested initiatives to potentially improve this practice, outlined at the end of these Recommendations, largely rest on developing partnerships with key actors, with the purpose of aligning Google Crisis Response tool, expertise, and resources with other specialist roles and skills others hold in a response effort. Internews recognizes that the practicality any initiative depends upon how it fits with the core roles and ambitions Google Crisis Response defines for itself; this includes whether a greater number of partnerships ‘on the ground’ in a response is desirable or even operationally feasible.

However some initiatives also rest on the approaches and resources Google Crisis Response, and Google itself, have in developing tools for markets like that of Indonesia. These fac-tors, and accompanying potential initiatives, are noted here. They include:

4.1.1. GOOGlE TOOl DESIGnThe design of some Google Crisis Response tools appears to hamper their utility in disasters in developing contexts such as represented that represented by Indonesia. In particular, in Internews’ own experience the Crisis Response Map is opti-mised for desktop browsers (as is the Crisis Response website itself). But Indonesian citizens, and especially those most vulnerable, rely heavily on mobile connectivity. Potential ini-tiatives include optimizing Crisis Maps for mobile use, or — if practical from an engineering point of view, an assessment of which is beyond Internews’ expertise — as layers for mobile Google Map apps.

Informal networks play an essential role in emergency communi-cation flows — especially when conventional media is not geared to meeting these local needs. But even in information-rich Jakarta, informal networks in marginalized communities are often forced to take up a greater role than they can handle effectively. Photo by Febi Dwirahmadi.


4.1.2. BuSInESS STRATEGIESGoogle’s business structures and approach in Indonesia emerged as a significant influence in the development of digital crisis communications practice, as supported by Google Crisis Response. Internews does not have broad knowledge of Google’s overall approach to the Indonesian market. Some of the issues raised are noted here, as they may help inform Google’s internal deliberations.

Service Charges: data bases. Jakarta’s Local Disaster Management Agency (BPBD, Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah) informed Internews that it was unable to use Google services for data management because they were too expen-sive. While this may require confirmation, if it is the case, it is possible that some of Google’s overall business decisions or imperatives run counter to some of its humanitarian crisis response goals.

It may be possible to calibrate the two – for example, by grant-ing humanitarian exceptions for the use of some needed data services by specific institutions, or through other arrangements.

Service Charges: Mobile Apps. Humanitarian programmers and independent mobile app developers also cite cost for avoid-ing the use of Google Maps in their app development; several are turning to Open Street Maps instead. Humanitarian apps aim for high use at no cost to the user; however as explained to Internews, if the number of users increases, charges incur for the use of Google Map data. Again, this may be an example of business imperatives hampering potential humanitarian appli-cations. The detail of these charges, or whether calibration or exceptions for humanitarian applications approach is even technically practical, is beyond Internews’ area of expertise; however the feedback from local developers was consistent on this point.

Google Play. A further barrier to mobile app development and dissemination targeting Indonesia’s humanitarian needs is the fact that Indonesian-based credit cards are not accepted on Google Play. Independent app developers are therefore limited to providing apps to Indonesian companies, for delivery via those companies’ own websites. This inhibits integration with and adoption through Google’s own ecosystem, and fragments and restricts distribution capabilities. Again, Internews is not aware of the business reasons underlying this situation.

Access and Awareness. Although the wide range of thematic areas required by Crisis Communications Channels meant Internews only met a limited number of developers, several indicated confusion or lack of clarity on decisions surrounding Google’s approach to the Indonesian market — for example, why it did not have an office in country, and so on. This had

practical outcomes inasmuch as some developer informants were unsure of what costs may be involved in designing or deploying certain applications, and how to find out those costs. Greater clarity of Google’s approach, and of potential collabora-tion, utilisation, or co-leverage of Google Crisis Response, may assist in boosting involvement of key digital humanitarian ini-tiatives within the country.

4.1.3 TARGETED AuDIEnCES, TARGETED CRITERIA, TARGETED InPuTGoogle Crisis Response supports tools targeting different actors and audiences, ranging from data base services for responders, to crisis maps for both responders and the pub-lic. Individuals and organizations that did use or access tools happily gave feedback. However it is difficult to measure this feedback beyond individual assessments of efficacy. A clear set of criteria from Google Crisis Response itself, shared and pub-licised with the targeted audience for a given tool or service, could help evaluate effectiveness and point towards future improvements. The very development of such a set of crite-ria, if it draws in representatives of target audiences, can itself clarify further positive directions.

4.1.4 TARGETED PARTnERShIPSAs Crisis Communication Channels documents, and these Recommendations refer to, communication flows in a cri-sis incorporate a wide range of dynamics. Effective ‘last mile’ communications, particularly in developing contexts such as Indonesia, must take account of the perceptions and concerns of local communities; that is, they must inevitably draw on community development approaches. Effective communica-tions flows within key institutions — such as disaster response agencies — are inevitably caught up in those same institutions’ development trajectory. Reporting by journalists is affected by maturity of the country’s media sector; and so on.

Google and Google Crisis Response naturally would not aim to become community development, institutional development, or media development specialists. A key question, therefore, is what kinds of partnerships are feasible in order to connect Google Crisis Response to those skills and approaches that can enhance ongoing development and deployment of its tools in targeted areas. Many of the initiatives suggested at the end of these Recommendations rest on developing such partnerships. Those initiatives are exactly that – suggestions – and naturally need to be balanced against the broad range of priorities and programs that Google Crisis Response carries out.


4.2. Information Sources before the flood: Where Google tools fit4.2.1 InFORMATIOn SOuRCES ACCESSEDFrom the Jakarta survey of affected communities, around 14%

of respondents indicated they used Google Search on a regular

basis, with a tendency both towards youth and male users.

(Facebook, despite impressive overall figures within Indonesia,

registered lower at 11%.) Google Maps rated 2% within the

target population. These were the two Google tools included in

this question on pre-flood information sources, which feedback from face-to-face interviews indicated were the most widely-used tools in the target context.

4.2.2 TRuST In SOuRCESTrust in online tools is mixed, likely reflecting unfamiliarity in their use by most users who are on the wrong side of the digital divide. Trust in Google tools reflects this. This may be due to the fact that digital sources are new, and other sources — T.V., local government, family and friends — are well-established and their nature more ‘understood’.

ChART 1: IMPORTANT SOuRCES OF INFORMATION

Q8: What are important sources of information for you? select as many answers as relevant.

0.99 0.96 0.91 0.83 0.81

0.76

0.35 0.24

0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11

0.05 0.07

0.24 0.23

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

TV

Family

and

friend

s

Local g

overnm

ent o

fficials

Mob

ile pho

ne calls

New

spap

er

Religious

lead

ers

Goo

gle search

Goo

gle map

s

Trustworthy

Untrustworthy

ChART 2: TRuST IN INFORMATION SOuRCES

Q11: now i would like to ask how much you trust the news and information you hear from different source. From what you know, is the news and information on………very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, somewhat untrust-worthy or very untrustworthy?


4.3. Information Sources during the flood: Where Google tools fit4.3.1 GOOGlE TOOlS ACCESSEDDuring the floods, around five per cent of respondents — that is, a total of 14 people — accessed any given Google tool, with the breakdown as follows:

Less than two percent of total respondents said they got infor-mation that could help them from Google Search, the most accessed tool; fewer identified Google Maps as giving them information that they then used. (All of those who used Google tools accessed Google search; some also used other Google tools as well.) However affected residents also travelled little, either because the floods curtailed movement, or because they preferred to stay close to monitor their homes; Crisis Maps, which in Jakarta’s case particularly showed what routes were flood-affected for those travelling from one area to another, are not designed to meet the information needs of those stay-ing within their own neighborhood.

Q43a: From which sources did you receive information about aid during the flood?

ChART 3: uSEFuL SOuRCES OF AID INFORMATION DuRING FLOOD

79%

47% 43% 43%

29% 22%

14% 11% 9% 3% 2% 1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Loca

l gov

ernm

ent

officials

Neigh

bour

s

TV

Fam

ily and

friend

s

Mob

ile pho

ne calls

Mob

ile pho

ne SM

S

Oth

er com

mun

ity

lead

ers

From

com

mun

ity

volunt

eers

BPBD

Sta

ff/

Volunt

eers

Goo

gle Se

arch

BPBD

Hot

line

Goo

gle M

aps

TABLE 1: DID yOu uSE ANy GOOGLE TOOLS TO FIND INFORMATION ABOuT ThE FLOODS?

Q43c – Google tool used

(n=14)number of responses

Q43e – Google tool that

yielded most useful information

(n=14)number of responses

Google Search 14 12

Google Maps 3 0

Google Crisis Map

0 0

You Tube 4 0

Google Images 1 0

Lainnya Other 3 2

As the table above also shows, of the 14 people from flood-affected communities who used Google tools, 12 reported this information proved useful to source aid. This is far below other sources of information, in particular local government officials (who were themselves often responsible for distributing aid), with TV and family, friends, and neighbors following. The num-ber of respondents who used Google tools means caution is


needed when drawing any broader conclusions; however in pure percentage terms those who used both Search and Maps, and were successful in finding useful information, is high. The issue first and foremost is access to the tools themselves, not necessarily their utility.

The exception to this limited use in Jakarta is at the top level of crisis response institutions, such as the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana), UNOCHA, and Red Cross / Red Crescent (PMI, Palang Merah Indonesia). The Local Disaster Management Agency (BPBD, Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah) used online tools to a lesser degree. However awareness among these circles does not translate to widespread utilisation of these tools by affected populations during a disaster, as shown by the survey numbers.

4.3.2 ROKATEnDA AnD ACEh CASE-STuDIESThe survey only targeted flood-affected in Jakarta. Google tools were not utilised by affected communities in the other two case studies, Rokatenda and Aceh. In Rokatenda, this can be attributed to a lack of infrastructure and connectivity for the affected populations themselves. In Aceh, this can be attrib-uted to the short time-frame of the earthquake and tsunami warning, with its accompanying power blackout and GSM con-gestion also rendering both desktop and mobile access largely impossible.

While some institutions in Jakarta used Google tools to a greater degree than the affected population, this also was much reduced in the Rokatenda and Aceh case studies. In Rokatenda, this can be attributed to a combination of lack of awareness, and reduced connectivity. In Aceh, it can be attrib-uted to the same power cuts and GSM congestion that affected the general population. (For examples where Google tools were used in these case studies, see Sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.6 of these Recommendations.)

4.3.3 uSE OF GOOGlE TOOlS In ThE JAKARTA FlOODS: SOME OBSERvATIOnSThe low levels of Google use, and broad absence of Crisis Response tools utilized during the Jakarta floods by both affected communities and response organizations was some-what unexpected. Jakarta is Indonesia’s capital, and it’s media and communication infrastructure — while sometimes over-crowded — is the most extensive in the country. Technology has a high profile among consumers, with Google’s leading ser-vices including search and maps well-known, and gaining mar-ket share on mobile platforms with the fast take-up of Android-powered handsets; social media participation numbers are also

extremely high.3

Some reasons for low levels of access are clear for the most affected citizens. Although crowded, Jakarta’s communications infrastructure for the most vulnerable is also precarious, with survey data confirming widespread electricity blackouts cutting off all media and telephony services for around half of those directly flood-affected.4

Internews is not privy to the number of hits various Google and Google Crisis Response services may have received during the Jakarta floods, but given Google requested direct interrogation of how these same tools were used, assumes said use was of a meaningful level. If this is the case, the most likely explanation is that those accessing the services are from the more afflu-ent, and less vulnerable, urban middle class. Internews believes this is a safe assumption, although further research would be required to definitively confirm it.

While this may explain the lack of access to Google Crisis Response tools (and Google services in general) by those resi-dents who could benefit from them most, it does not explain their apparent low level of utilisation by the bulk of responder organisations as indicated through the key interviews. Many organisations, including civil society, government, and vol-unteer networks, have extensive experience and practice in disaster response, and it is somewhat unexpected that the new generation of ICT tools is not utilised to a greater extent.

All of the examples Internews directly encountered are described below. Observations drawn both from these specific examples, and from the broader appreciation of communica-tion ecosystems underpinning the research, are then used to inform a range of suggested possible initiatives.

3 For more detail, see Crisis Communication Channels, 2.3

4 Ibid, 3.5


5.1 Disaster Agencies: Jakarta5

The national disaster management agency BNPB plays a criti-cal role both in the Jakarta case study, and in supporting and building up the capacity of local and provincial disaster man-agement offices around the country. The agency uses Google Documents, in particular, extensively; however it has not used nor promoted Google Crisis Response tools. Data collated by the BNPB formed the basis for the Crisis Response map; how-ever due to institutional delays in utilising the data, they were usually uploaded approximately six hours later — a significant limitation in a situation that changed by the hour or faster.

Many of the Agency’s other office systems are still being devel-oped, both for specific functions (such as flood prediction) and more generally. This includes, for example, systems to ensure the office itself is disaster-resilient and can keep functioning once a crisis strikes. As they are put in place it may be possible to incor-porate a wider range of services including from Crisis Response; however at this stage that possibility is somewhat speculative.

Jakarta’s local disaster management agency, BPBD, reportedly asked for greater deployment of a range of Google tools prior to the floods, to assist with better data flow. However as related by one source, the response was that the tools are too expensive for this purpose, and so adoption was not pursued. At this point such information is hearsay, but it bears further investigation.

The Governor’s Office utilised Google Maps in the early stages of the floods, mapping reports received via SMS to their location, and logged directly using Android phones with geo-tagging. The office’s use of digital tools evolved as the floods unfolded, developing some practices and understanding that allow for further development. This included incorporating Bukapeta and Mapbox in the later stages of the disaster.

UNOCHA’s Jakarta office supported and disseminated aware-ness of many of these initiatives. This included circulating details of the Google Crisis Response tools throughout the


google ServIceS In dISaSter reSponSe: caSe Study exaMpleS 5

humanitarian sector.6

As the Jakarta case study shows, for agencies with intensive coordination functions there remain significant bottlenecks in data flow. This both affects institutional operations themselves, and the ability of outside actors – ranging from media to vol-unteers to, for example, mobile developers willing to produce applications for disaster response – to use emergency data in the most effective ways possible. This means that while for example BNPB data gain in functionality through using Google tools, other factors impose delays and limitations on this potential.

Disaster agencies in the other case studies in Aceh and Rokatenda / Sikka did not report using Google tools to any significant degree (Sikka’s BPBD7 did not use any online tools, inclusive of email).

6 See http://indonesia.humanitarianresponse.info/news/google-crisis-response-resources-related-2013-jakarta-flood (accessed June 07, 2013)


Children in Jakarta’s January 2013 floods. Photo by Febi Dwirahmadi.

http://indonesia.humanitarianresponse.info/news/google-crisis-response-resources-related-2013-jakarta-flood

http://indonesia.humanitarianresponse.info/news/google-crisis-response-resources-related-2013-jakarta-flood


5.2 Media: Metro TV, others8

By and large even the largest, most sophisticated players made little use of specialised digital response tools in the case study crisis reporting. Metro TV was the only outlet interviewed that utilised Google Maps. They took screen-shots for news report background graphics. This under- utilisation is likely driven by a range of factors, including skill levels and awareness: a media news narrative that emphasises government failure or sensa-tional scandal also potentially does not prioritise new practices.

A couple of print publications had greater engagement and awareness. Kompas did publicise both My Map9 and Crisis Map10 flood resources. However while it is the leading print outlet with a strong online presence, it was not a significant source for those most affected by the floods, and as the research shows this cov-erage did not result in uptake of the tools for those communities — although it may have helped promote the tool’s use among others with broader online access. However the paper’s engage-ment and interest may be something to build on.

A few journalists from other outlets also used Google Maps as a general navigational tool, although this was reportedly some-what limited as they already knew their targeted areas. Beyond this, a number of media outlets also have Android applications for audience access.

5.3 NGOs & Civil Society: RAPI11 The volunteer association of hand-held radio users RAPI (Radio Antara Penduduk Indonesia, sometimes translated as Indonesian People’s Radio Network) was the single most resil-ient form of communication in the Aceh earthquake and tsu-nami warning in April 2012, meaning it did not shut down with power blackouts, or suffer congestion as did the GSM networks, and had practitioners who were well-integrated into various communication flows. It provided vital information to an infor-mal network of local officials, responders, media, and residents. Staunchly analogue, since that event they have begun explor-ing ways in which they can prepare to respond faster and better in the future.


9 See http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2013/01/17/1157270/Pantau.Banjir.Jakarta.dari.Google.Maps (accessed 07 June 2013). however several observers stated that the data on this map was frequently inaccurate or out-of-date when it was posted, and so became targeted for criticism.

10 See http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2013/01/18/11044499/Inilah.versi.Resmi.Peta.Banjir.Jakarta.dari.Google (accessed 07 June 2013)

11 Ibid, 5.8

One of these initiatives has been to plot the locations of their volunteer members on Google Maps. This would enable them to directly identify and contact a given volunteer to find out and share what was happening in their area in any future disaster, a capacity they currently don’t have. As a digital platform, Google Map allows RAPI far more flexibility in plotting and tracking its members and the information sources they represent, which can enable faster sourcing of targeted information from where those members are located in the event of a disaster. However while plotting locations online gives great flexibility, any such map would still need to be downloaded and printed, given the risk or even likelihood of connectivity breakdowns and power blackouts at the moment of need.12

RAPI isn’t the only one considering such moves. One failure of the April 2012 warning was the lack of clearly-identified evacuation locations and routes. Aceh’s Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Centre TDMRC has begun producing more detailed maps to support better disaster-preparedness mea-sures, including pinpointing and possibly developing evacua-tion locations, using satellite data from Quickbird. All of these efforts naturally cannot be fully effective on their own; mapped evacuation points also require clear signs on the ground, and so on. But they can fill an important, neglected gap.

5.4 Coordination: Google groups mailing listThe Milis Bencana Google group and its mailing list, [email protected], is a significant resource for disaster responders across the country, providing disaster responders with both updates and access to information and support; it has over 4,400 members. (As one of many examples, Caritas used it to gain technical information on how to purify water in the Rokatenda response.) On the technology front, for example, it allows responders to connect, to support provided by individuals and groups such as Air Putih, and its Ushahidi-powered media centre.13

12 RAPI isn’t the only one considering such moves. One failure of the April 2012 warning was the lack of clearly-identified evacuation locations and routes. Aceh’s Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Centre TDMRC has begun producing more detailed maps to develop better disaster-preparedness measures, including pinpointing and possibly developing evacuation locations, using GIS data from Skybird. All of these efforts naturally cannot be fully effective on their own; mapped evacuation points also require clear signs on the ground, and so on. But they can fill an important, neglected gap.

13 See http://www.mediacenter.or.id/ (accessed 07 June 2013)

http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2013/01/17/1157270/Pantau.Banjir.Jakarta.dari.Google.Maps

http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2013/01/17/1157270/Pantau.Banjir.Jakarta.dari.Google.Maps

http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2013/01/18/11044499/Inilah.Versi.Resmi.Peta.Banjir.Jakarta.dari.Google

http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2013/01/18/11044499/Inilah.Versi.Resmi.Peta.Banjir.Jakarta.dari.Google

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.mediacenter.or.id/


5.5 Digital Volunteers: ODOS Indonesia has developed an active network of volunteer digital responders, whose roles in several disasters has been nothing short of ground-breaking. An extended community of practice has emerged, with participants in one disaster able to access different levels of support and suggestions from those with previous experience. ODOS (One Day One Service, a short-term volunteer mobilisation effort; see Crisis Communication Channels, Section 3.11) in Jakarta,14 and Flobamora Bloggers in the Rokatenda response,15 are two case study examples.

As described in the main report, ODOS did use Google Maps and Google Docs, but in a piecemeal or haphazard way, together with a collection of other tools. Use was limited to volunteers occasionally using Maps on Android phones to find directions; and mark coordinates locating displaced residents — but these were then mapped manually to an Ushahidi map. Google Docs were used for some data on volunteers, donations, and so on, although they were then publically displayed as screen-shots transferred to a Wordpress blog.

There are a variety of reasons for this. One is the organic rapid assembly of tools by volunteer groups at the time of the response. However a potentially more fundamental question is why the most skilled and leading digital volunteers are not using Google Maps along with other tools more extensively in the first place. Several developers involved in crisis response efforts — ranging from freelancers to NGO staff to private sector mobile app devel-opers — cited cost structure as a major reason: charges for use in apps of Google Maps in particular was beyond their capacity and indeed ran counter to their goals. (Internews received dif-ferent explanations of the charging structure, but understands it links cost to the number of hits. An application with a humanitar-ian goal wants as many hits as possible, but requires them to be unpaid to promote access.)

As a result, several developers were moving towards Open Street Maps for such functions instead, along with the already-established Ushahidi platform. It is this regular, if not daily, engagement with a given platform that provides the familiarity and awareness that makes it useful at the time of a disaster. Without greater knowledge of Google’s market strategy, at face value this appears to be an example in which business decisions surrounding a platform undermines that platform’s potential in crisis response. Whether possible means exist to circumvent such a Catch-22 is an internal Google question and beyond our capacity to suggest.

14 Ibid, 3.11

15 Ibid, 4.10

5.6 Digital volunteers: Blogger groups As mentioned in the Crisis Communication Channels report (section 4.1), blogging generates an ‘infrastructure’ or network for online participation across the country, with many bloggers forming local groups and engaging with issues in their area. They are often among the communities that directly respond to disasters, as Flore’s Flobamora community demonstrates in the Rokatenda case study. One of the main platforms used is Blogger.com, which was the fourth most visited site in the country in 2011.16 (Some blogs were also established in Jakarta specifically in response to the floods, such as ODOS’ own; many of these also reportedly used Blogger.)

These are the examples encountered across Crisis Communication Channels’ case studies. There are of course a number of other initiatives outside the case studies them-selves, including by Yogyakarta’s Universitas Gajah Mada (UGM) to trial means of crowdsourcing humanitarian needs using Google Maps,17 building on the 2010 Merapi volcano eruption experience. However the case study examples, including the data from the Jakarta neighbourhood survey, gives a detailed illustration of the use of both general Google and dedicated Crisis Response tools in disasters; and of several of the factors influencing greater adoption and utilisation.

16 lim, M., 2011. @crossroads: Democratization & Corporatization of Media in Indonesia. Participatory Media lab Arizona State university, and Ford Foundation. Available at: http://participatorymedia.lab.asu.edu/files/lim_Media_Ford_2011.pdf (accessed 23 May 2013).

17 See http://merapi-partisipasi.ugm.ac.id/ (accessed 07 June 2013)

http://participatorymedia.lab.asu.edu/files/Lim_Media_Ford_2011.pdf

http://participatorymedia.lab.asu.edu/files/Lim_Media_Ford_2011.pdf

http://merapi-partisipasi.ugm.ac.id/


The strongest influence driving expansion and adoption of Google Crisis Response tools is Google’s own growing presence in the Indonesian market. The use of these tools — or indeed of any communication channel — is underpinned by familiar-ity and engagement built up over an extensive period before a disaster occurs. In times of crisis, people overwhelmingly turn to what they already know; while there may be some adoption of new practices, this is unlikely to occur with a wide num-ber of people, especially in emergencies occurring over a short time-frame. (Crises that extend over months or years may be different, but these are not the contexts targeted by Google

Crisis Response itself.) The more actors are familiar with Google Maps, Google Drive, and so on in daily life, the more likely they are to turn to these and closely-associated tools in a disaster response.

However, even as expansion strategies increase the potential uptake of crisis tools and lay the foundation for future use, this does not mean Crisis Response tools reach their potentialAs suggested in Communication Crisis Channels. Natural mar-ket expansion among populations already familiar with what Google has to offer does not enable the most vulnerable popu-lations to manage better during a crisis. As Communication Crisis Channels explores in detail, gaps are not only due to sim-ple lack of access by individuals or communities. Gaps occur because the ‘links in the chain’ of communication ecologies are often fragmented and poorly-aligned to meet urgent needs. Just because a particular tool or service is taken up in one sec-tor of this ecology, or even by a few actors in one sector, does not mean that the information it can provide will flow through to others and deliver to those who need it.

Communication ecosystems go beyond the need to provide ready-made tools and services. Instead they highlight the relationships and methods needed to make sure those tools work. A service that gathers and presents emergency needs data perfectly, even if disseminated to all the emergency data-gathering institutions (something which still has a long way to go), will still not fulfil its function if the institutions charged with gathering that data do not share the same understanding, practise together, and collaborate to provide the information needed. Communities with established media consumption habits will not turn to new sources unless prompted by those they already trust; and so on. Developing or adapting a tool or service in and of itself is not a recipe for success.

Palue residents displaced to host family houses in Ende regency, Flores said the island was their home, and the place of their an-cestors. But remembering local history going back several decades, they feared eruptions might continue for another three years. They were afraid for their relatives still in their home village, but there was nowhere else for them to stay. Photo by Matt Abud / Internews.

potentIal InItIatIveS6A number of initiatives can boost the use of online tools and Google services in disaster response. Many are

informed by the factors highlighted in the Crisis Communications Channels report. Others respond to more

general trends in Indonesia’s market, and Google’s engagement in particular.


For Crisis Response tools and services to best meet potential, their implementation needs to leverage the synergies and fos-ter or build on the relationships that drive information flows through communication ecosystems. This can take place at a greater or lesser depth. It means learning from the experience of others as they have gone down the same path – for example, the work of AIFDR and Open Street Maps18 in building disaster mapping capacity at the local government level; or World Bank initiatives promoting better data capacity among key govern-ment response institutions;19 or drawing on general lessons from the ground-breaking experiences of Jalin Merapi’s 2010 volcano response.20

But beyond that, it means establishing partnerships that can help place Crisis Response tools among the channels vulner-able communities and disaster response organizations already use. This will help promote the effective use of and familiar-ity with those tools before a disaster takes place. Given the various influences at work in communications ecologies, this is most likely useful through targeted small pilots before expand-ing to wider dissemination, methodologies common in institu-tional and community development settings.

The potential initiatives outlined below follow this approach, grounded in Internews’ understanding of the challenges, learn-ing processes, and long-term hands-on experience of what works in such contexts. Each set of initiatives is preceded by a brief contextual outline, drawing on the examples of existing Google tool use above; the themes and features of the overall Crisis Communication Channel report (including relevant page references for more detail); and observations raised by inter-locutors on relevant existing Google strategies in the country.

6.1 Neighbourhood Social NetworksEach community is complex. Access to communication, informa-tion flows, trust, and translating communication into action usu-ally involve multi-layered dynamics, especially in locations with significant digital — and social — divides as in Indonesia. But this is the essential ‘last mile’ where communication received and shared by individuals can make the most difference.

At the mass scale, existing market strategies aimed towards promoting tool adoption are the single biggest factor. But

18 See http://hot.openstreetmap.org/updates/2011-07-03_hot_in_indonesia (accessed 07 June 2013)

19 See https://www.gfdrr.org/ (accessed 07 June 2013)

20 For a summary of Jalin Merapi’s efforts, see http://www.amarc.org/documents/Caribbean_Conference/CR_ResponseJAlIn_MerapiEruption_En.pdf (accessed 23 May 2013).

effective adoption within vulnerable communities also calls for community development approaches. This is not typically a skill-set towards which companies are geared; efforts along these lines therefore require appropriate partnerships that can bring community development approaches into the process.

POSSIBLE InITIATIvES: n Initiatives seriously targeting ‘last mile’ neighbourhood

social networks will necessarily be involved, and require partnerships that can test and pilot approaches. This may well be beyond the remit and operations of Google Crisis Response. However it would be disingenuous to propose a simple ‘one-step’ improvement — a particular tool or device — that could definitively improve impact here, given the inevitable diversity and unpredictable factors at work. Possibilities therefore include:21

n Ensure tools are engineered to be accessible to the most vulnerable. In particular, the Crisis Map is not optimised for mobile access, nor as an app. Yet in Indonesia, mobile access is king, particularly at the moment of a disaster when internet cafés are far less practical. (Re-designing and testing such tools can be part of or incorporated into the next point, pilot projects, below.)

n Partnership with local NGOs to pilot local projects using digital tools to cross ‘last mile’ communication barriers. This would include the design phase of the project, including any adaptation of particular tools (for example to feature phone requirements). Candidate partners may include technology NGOs such as Air Putih or ICT Watch; or community develop-ment NGOs such as World Vision International22 or PMI.

n Develop training materials on use of crisis response tools, including YouTube videos, in local language with accessible and attractive local case studies, targeting both community members and community development workers.

n Support — whether technically, financially, or in public or private forums — advocacy efforts that seek to promote connectivity policy that will enhance last-mile communica-tions. This may include support for business lobbies that aim for greater clarity on spectrum regulation or ISP provision;

21 Many possible initiatives have repeat iterations under the categories below. For example, localised training materials appear under several categories including neighbourhood Social networks, Digital volunteers; and nGOs and Civil Society. This is not repetition for repetition’s sake; again with the example of training, materials that target only neighbourhood Social networks would necessarily differ from material that also targeted additional areas.

22 WvI is mentioned here as they have engaged in community flood preparedness in Cawang, Jakarta, with some successes and some lessons learned as highlighted in the study. See Crisis Communication Channels 3.4.1, 3.4.3

http://hot.openstreetmap.org/updates/2011-07-03_hot_in_indonesia

http://hot.openstreetmap.org/updates/2011-07-03_hot_in_indonesia

https://www.gfdrr.org/

http://www.amarc.org/documents/Caribbean_Conference/CR_ResponseJALIN_MerapiEruption_EN.pdf




or support for less intrusive surveillance as proposed in upcoming ‘convergence’ regulation. These issues will drive the nature of connectivity in the future for Indonesia, including whether it meets last mile requirements as much as it could; Google’s high profile gives it an immediate plat-form. Any potential advocacy support must necessarily be congruent with business strategies in the country.

The processes and relationships outlined here may result in new or re-calibrated tools that target neighbourhood social networks. These may, for example, integrate with neighbour-hood-level SMS ‘trees’, used by some local Indonesian Red Crescent operations;23 or by drawing on models of ‘local’ or ‘bound’ social networks (international examples being Path or Nextdoor). They may include tools that enhance or connect to local volunteer communication associations such as RAPI or local community radios; or means of better leveraging the con-solidated penetration of feature phones.

However for neighbourhood social networks, and for the other sectors noted below, the technicalities of the tool or service are not the point at this stage. It is possible to compile a long

23 Crisis Communication Channels 3.9

list of potential tools for each one of these sectors. The point, however, is to establish the relationships that allow the tool to be developed, or calibrated, and trialled, in a specific context that integrates within communication ecosystem dynamics.

*Note: Many possible initiatives have repeat iterations under the categories below. For example, localised training materi-als appear under several categories including Neighbourhood Social Networks, Digital Volunteers; and NGOs and Civil Society. This is not repetition for repetition’s sake; again with the exam-ple of training, materials that target only Neighbourhood Social Networks would necessarily differ from material that also tar-geted additional areas.

6.2 Government Agencies.Whether key government agencies use online data tools, including Google tools, is one issue; whether they are set up to use them effectively is another, as shown by the informa-tion flow between in particular the BNPB (national) and BPBD (local) in the Jakarta floods.

It is beyond Internews’ brief to engage in deep institutional

Aceh 2004 tsunami damage. Many communities highlighted communication as a major concern. Warnings were poorly understood, unclear, late, or did not come at all. When warnings did come, many were confused regarding their meaning, and about what action to take. Photo by Oren Murphy


analysis of BNPB or other agencies, as it is beyond the goals of Google Crisis Response to engage in direct institutional develop-ment. Yet improvements in a key institution’s data capacity can have many flow-on effects. Faster availability of BPBD data would have cut delays in uploading to the Google Crisis Map; if such data were available it would also enable a range of secondary actions including for example apps by independent mobile devel-opers, and access by groups ranging from ODOS to PMI.

Initiatives can range from practical engagement or accompani-ment; or simply by making sure the capacity of key national institutions in a response are fully-understood, as a first step towards appreciating what practical applications of digital crisis tools can be achieved.24 In the end, this is not just about what tools are used, but what ongoing relationships and coopera-tion is needed to make sure data flows through and is used effectively (for example, the relationships between BPBD and the various government departments such as health and police that provide initial reports must be functional before a disaster hits, not merely established or revived at that moment).

POSSIBlE InITIATIvES: n Develop training modules targeting the needs of staff in

Government agencies.

n Draw on lessons of others involved in supporting govern-ment disaster response capacity — such as AIFDR,25 the World Bank, or UNOCHA. This may inform further individual initiatives on the part of Google; or it may point to ways in which Google can integrate with and support existing initia-tives currently being implemented by these partners.

n Review existing Google business operations in Indonesia to see if calibration to better meet humanitarian needs is pos-sible (see Google Business Strategies, below).

6.3 MediaConventional media maintains most if not all of its power to drive discussion and generate awareness across the country. It is a potentially powerful way to disseminate awareness and promote use of new crisis communication tools among the public — but as the Metro TV example shows, media outlets

24 For example, the BnPB as part of its institutional development is considering establishing specialized mapping rooms for emergency control centers, a potential connection-point for some Google Crisis Response services. Accompanying this development process, even on an occasional basis, can help identify whether such connections are useful as they emerge.

25 For example, the AIFDR is already reviewing and gathering lessons learned from the data management experiences during the Jakarta floods across the main government agencies

need first to be aware themselves of what is possible. While outlets such as Kompas have covered and so promoted aware-ness of some tools, their audience does not include the most vulnerable who typically access popular TV channels above all else. Buy-in by local media to both use, and promote, crisis communication tools has the potential to fuel a major uptick in awareness, incorporation into preparedness, and use of such tools in time of need.

There are challenges to this — conventional media, especially the most profitable, by and large follow the immediate news agenda and do not engage in long-term reporting or program-ming in support of behaviour change, a real challenge for disas-ter preparedness.26

However new technology, and humanitarian needs, have enor-mous appeal among many audiences and consumers. This means a level of media buy-in to promoting awareness of digi-tal crisis tools has more chances of success than many other more ‘mundane’ disaster preparedness measures.

26 There are some exceptions to this. For example, interviewees cited the efforts by Kompas newspaper, as well as several other local media including the radio station Rumoh PMI FM, for efforts to review and promote disaster preparedness in their reporting.


POSSIBlE InITIATIvES:n Develop training materials outlining how journalists and edi-

tors can leverage Google tools for better reporting

n Target increased media coverage of the potential and uses of Google tools in a disaster response. This can be through direct advertising, or by using a strategy that encourages greater media news coverage of the same. (See the follow-ing two points for possible means of achieving this.)

n Promote prizes, for example for best use of technology in humanitarian reporting

n Highlight local case studies of technology for humanitarian response in Google ads (some of which has already been done, for example a Google ad two years ago featured the Blood for Life initiative27), with links pointing to training and case study material.

n Ensure Google Crisis Response spokespersons are avail-able and reach out to leading media outlets at the time of a disaster. This includes press releases, any compilation of citizen video that is appropriate, and so on. Providing a news story at the time of need is the best way to build awareness of available tools and resources that can most help.

Several of these initiatives may require a local partner, whether an NGO, professional media association, or other.

6.4 Telecommunications Sector Ongoing developments in Indonesia’s mobile telecommunica-tions sector, and moves towards providing greater connectivity around the country, will create major shifts in the landscape into the future — but exactly how is difficult to predict, given the mix of policy, political, economic, and legal factors at work.28 Some telecommunications companies, or their local offices, are more involved in providing crisis response support than others; some initiatives have moved forward, while others are somewhat in limbo.29

27 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XkutEJtv46u (accessed 07 June 2013)

28 For more detail, see Crisis Communication Channels, 2.2 and 2.4

29 One positive example is the ongoing manner in which Telkomsel in Aceh has developed its response operations, and Indosat’s CSR efforts – although in Indosat’s case, initiatives to provide emergency communications are vetted through its marketing department, thus likely mixing mandates and imperatives and creating bureaucratic delays. One example that has been held up is efforts by PMI and IFRC to introduce the emergency SMS gateway TERA to the country (see http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/beneficiary-communications/tera/); unresolved issues surrounding who would ‘control the button’ to send out messages – PMI or government – along with complications surrounding the fragmented telecommunications sector itself, have slowed progress on this.

Nevertheless the eventual, inevitable rollout of more advanced technologies, smooth or otherwise, can only help accelerate the take-up of more sophisticated devices and the expand-ing mobile data sector. This represents opportunities, as does Android’s rapidly-increasing share of the market; however the mix of technologies across the digital divide, in particular the expected ongoing prevalence of basic feature phones for the most vulnerable, also needs to be taken on board in any com-prehensive initiatives.30

POSSIBlE InITIATIvES: n Co-sponsor with telecommunication companies initiatives

noted above, such as ‘lessons learned’ sessions, humanitar-ian hackathons, and competitions.

n Sponsor humanitarian mobile application design using Google tools, and data made available by those tools.31

n Partner with telecommunications providers to test, and if necessary design and adapt, apps or services that can effec-tively operate in a range of contexts across the country. This may include, for example, providing services in low-bandwidth areas using feature phones; identifying where less-popular but more resilient CDMA phones can serve as a critical bridge to a vital area, and so on. In one illustration, CDMA phones with effective feature-phone data delivery could potentially serve as a bridge to local media or net-works like RAPI in Aceh, ensuring data availability connects to the essential communication resilience and redundancy that these entities provide.32

6.5 NGOs & Civil SocietyIndonesia’s NGOs and civil society are, typically, a mixed bag when it comes to adoption of technology, including in crisis response. As outlined in Internews’ New Digital Nation report,33 there is generally a significant disconnect between national or local Indonesian NGOs and the developer community, inhibit-ing the uptake and adaptation of digital tools. For smaller NGOs, this is often due to lack of awareness, time, or access to those with skills. For larger NGOs, it can also be an issue of


31 For example, Indosat already sponsors app development for educational purposes through its CSR program.

32 Crisis Communication Channels, 5.8

33 For more detail, see https://www.internews.org/research-publications/indonesia-new-digital-nation (accessed 07 June 2013)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XkUtEJtV46U

http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/beneficiary-communications/tera

http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/beneficiary-communications/tera

https://www.internews.org/research-publications/indonesia-new-digital-nation

https://www.internews.org/research-publications/indonesia-new-digital-nation


bureaucracy that makes replication of practice difficult.34

However as noted under above Neighbourhood Social Networks and elsewhere, civil society and NGOs have extensive engage-ment and expertise in many other areas essential to ensuring digital crisis response tools meet their potential, including community development, some cases of institutional develop-ment, and so on. If effective ways of engaging with actors in this sector can be found without diverging from existing opera-tions and mandates of Google Crisis Response, this may lead to examples of practice that can be disseminated and replicated elsewhere.

POSSIBlE InITIATIvES: n Target partnerships for Neighbourhood Social Networks pur-

poses, and potentially in support of Digital Volunteers; see respective notes above on each of these areas.

n Develop training materials targeted civil society and NGO staff, incorporating local context as noted above.

6.6 Coordination While not a direct ‘actor’, as demonstrated throughout the Crisis Communication Channels’ case studies, coordination in a humanitarian response is critical, including for communi-cation and the roles of platforms such as those provided by Google within this. Such coordination is far from Google Crisis Response’s function. However an appreciation of its impor-tance may help inform some other initiatives.

POSSIBlE InITIATIvES:n Provide a direct Google contact and spokesperson during a

disaster response, who is able to demonstrate the use of appropriate tools, deliver and / or point towards rapid train-ing materials, and respond to media and other PR enquiries (also noted under ‘Media’, above). This may be a Google Crisis Response staff person, or it may be a representative from a local organization or network who has been briefed and / or trained, and brought into the role.

These include, again, training materials that highlight how par-ticular tools and services can support coordination efforts and why they’re important — such as open data formats and so

34 For example, some Red Cross / Red Crescent societies developed groundbreaking communication practices across a range of platforms in the response to the 2004 tsunami in Aceh. however a number of IFRC members noted that many of these practices are only now being adopted by PMI and other societies operating in Indonesia, due to difficulties in ensuring enough people across the organization both appreciate the importance of such measures, including digital communication tools; and to commit to the extent necessary to get organizational buy-in to take them forward in other contexts.

on. Coordination forums are themselves key mechanisms to disseminate awareness of tools and any training materials, as well as other activities noted above, including prizes and so on. Coordination forums can also serve to inform any locally-tar-geted activities, including for Neighbourhood Social Networks.

6.7 Digital Volunteers & Communities of PracticeVolunteer digital responders are a leading community of prac-tice for new technology tools, but — as demonstrated by ODOS and on a smaller scale Flobamora — they are extremely organic in their genesis and the process whereby skills and systems are learned and disseminated. For example, the key individuals driving ODOS had prior experience in the 2010 Merapi response, which has become the benchmark of digital mobilisation in crisis response within Indonesia. Several of the individuals involved in such efforts have high profile in blog-ger communities; Flobamora volunteer bloggers reached out to these same individuals when they began their effort. Sharing and support is a big part of such networks’ strength, with examples of practice laid down in one response then informing the next. However this also means that sub-optimal practices can be improvised — and then replicated in future responses, simply because they are what was used before.

The role of such networks need therefore to be appreciated as ‘catalysts’ for an emerging set of practices, as well as for their direct contributions.

Volunteer digital responders form loose, organic, and often temporary networks. However they regularly draw on or are facilitated by a small number of key players, several of whom play roles in related NGOs including ICT Watch, Air Putih, and Combine Resource Institute.35 This means it is possible to posi-tively influence emerging practice through targeted engage-ment with a few practitioners, notwithstanding the fluid nature of the networks themselves.

Any positive evolutions in practice developed in this way would then be positioned to disseminate to other actors in humani-tarian response over time, as digital technology and its human-itarian uses become more appreciated and widespread.

FuRThER COMMunITIES OF PRACTICEBeyond digital responders themselves, Indonesia has a wide range of developer and consumer user groups, with many local ‘chapters’, and frequently high levels of enthusiasm. These can

35 Internews understands Google already holds relationships with some if not all of these examples.


range from Android user groups to Google Developer Groups, Red Hat developers, and more. They represent real potential to engage in and promote digital platforms and tools.

POSSIBlE InITIATIvES:n Support or facilitate ‘lessons learned’ sessions with digi-

tal volunteers after significant disaster deployments. This includes capturing the ‘lessons learned’ for subsequent dissemination.

n In partnership with leading digital responders — either organisations or influential individuals — develop or adapt a suite of tools responsive to the range of past and likely future disasters experienced by the country. This includes ‘lessons learned’ sessions after the suite has been deployed. This may include local hackathon sessions and so on, depending on what is practical with the skills present in country.

n Develop training materials, again including video, and in local language using local case studies, explaining the suite of tools and their deployment, targeting digital volunteers.

n Foster further developer and user group networks with a humanitarian focus. To some degree this already exists, but the prevalence of Android user groups, as well as specific Google developer groups and business groups, suggests this can be expanded far more with some targeted effort. This may include regular G+ hangouts, Facebook groups, and further Google group email lists, that foster interaction. Methods can include events or gatherings; prizes for a range of activities (best proposed tool adaptation, most active local group, etc.), and so on.

n Review existing Google business operations in Indonesia to see if calibration to better meet humanitarian needs is pos-sible (see Google Business Strategies, below).


lISt oF acronyMS

BBM BlackBerry Messenger

BNPB National Disaster Management Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana)

BPBD Local Disaster Management Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah)

CDMA Code Division Multiple Access

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

GIS Geographic Information System

GSM Global System for Mobile Communications

HT ‘Handie-talkie’ or hand-held radio

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

NGO Non Government Organization

ODOS One Day One Service

PMI Indonesia Red Crescent (Palang Merah Indonesia)

RAPI Indonesia People’s Radio Network (Radio Antar Penduduk Indonesia)

RT ‘Neighborhood administrator’ (Rukun Tetangga)

RW Administrators of a larger geographic area and level of responsibility above Rukun Tetangga (Rukun Warga)

SMS Short Message Service

TDMRC Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Centre

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

7

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Internews provides communities the resources to produce local news and information with integrity and independence. With global exper-tise and reach, Internews trains both media professionals and citizen journalists, introduces innovative media solutions, increases coverage of vital issues and helps establish policies needed for open access to information.

Internews programs create platforms for dialogue and enable informed debate, which bring about social and economic progress.

Internews’ commitment to research and evaluation creates effective and sustainable programs, even in the most challenging environments.

Formed in 1982, Internews is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in California. Internews has worked in more than 75 countries, and cur-rently has offices in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, latin America and north America.

internews Washington, dC office1640 Rhode Island Ave. nW Suite 700Washington, DC 20036 uSA+ 1 202 833 5740

internews administrative headquartersPO Box 4448 Arcata, CA 95518 uSA+1 707 826 2030

www.internews.orgE-mail: [email protected] Twitter: @internewsfacebook.com/internews

www.internews.org