crisis deterrence in the taiwan stra

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CRISIS DETERRENCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Douglas McCready

November 2003


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ISBN 1-58487-136-9


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PREFACE

The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military ofcers andgovernment civilians to reect and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategicissues. To assure that the research developed by Army War College students is available to Army andDepartment of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its CarlislePapers in Security Strategy Series.

In this paper, Chaplain (Colonel) Douglas McCready examines the most volatile issue of the complexrelationship between the United States and the Peoples Republic of ChinaTaiwan. He considers thesituation in terms of deterrence theory and its application across cultures. Colonel McCready looks atthe perceptions and misperceptions of the involved parties; and their interests, capabilities, and possibleintentions. He concludes with courses of action and ways to increase the likelihood of successful U.S

deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.

STEVEN METZ

Director of ResearchStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DOUGLAS MCCREADY, an Army Reserve colonel, is a chaplain currently assigned to the 104thArea Support Group in Germany. He received a direct commission in the Chaplain Corps in 1982.Chaplain McCready is a Special Forces veteran of Vietnam and has served as a chaplain frombattalion to installation level. He was a Senior Service College Fellow at the Fletcher School of Lawand Diplomacy. Chaplain McCready has published articles in a number of scholarly and professionaljournals, including Interdisciplinary Humanities and the Christian Scholars Review. His Learning fromSun Tzu was published in the May/June issue ofMilitary Review. He is the author ofJesus Christ for theModern World, published by Peter Lang, and has contributed to the Dictionary of Historical Theology andHistorians of the Christian Tradition. Colonel McCready graduated from the University of Pennsylvaniawith degrees in Chinese studies and international relations. He holds an M.Div. from Gordon-ConwelTheological Seminary, an M.A. and Ph.D. from Temple University, and studied at the University ofTbingen. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.


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ABSTRACT

For more than 50 years, Taiwans unresolved international status has been the cause of repeatedcrises in East Asia. While the parties involved could be willing to live with the status quo, the domesticpolitical transformation of Taiwan has called the status quo into question. China, Taiwan, the UnitedStates, and Japan have national interests in how the conict is resolved, and these interests will bedifcult to reconcile. By conventional measures, China cannot gain Taiwan by force before the end ofthis decade. Chinese leaders believe that, by using asymmetrical means, they will be able to overcomethe military advantage of the United States and Taiwan. While the United States will be able to delayChinese action against Taiwan, it is unlikely to be successful at long-term deterrence. Deterrence, asused against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, will not be effective with China without signicantmodication. The cultural divide affects not only deterrence theory, but also how China and the UnitedStates understand and communicate with each other. Crisis deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is unlikelyto succeed due to conicting national interests and several crucial mutual misperceptions.


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Despite the recent warming of PeoplesRepublic of China (PRC)-American relations, theTaiwan Strait retains a great potential for directU.S. military involvement. Although Taiwan

is only one part of the complex relationshipbetween the United States and the PRC,1 it isthe most volatile part. A December 2000 RANDstudy of foreign policy and national securityissues concluded, Critical differences betweenMainland China and Taiwan about the future oftheir relations make the Taiwan issue the mostintractable and dangerous East-Asian ashpointand the one with the greatest potential for bringingthe United States and China into confrontation inthe near future.2 Similarly, an ofcial of ChinasMinistry of Foreign Affairs wrote in September2001, The issue of Taiwan is the most sensitivesore issue in Sino-American relations. And it isthe only issue that could derail Sino-Americanrelations in the foreseeable future.3 Thesesomber conclusions reect the nearly unanimousview of American and Chinese specialists in Sino-American relations. The concern increases whenwe consider that China has both nuclear weaponsand a primitive but improving intercontinental

delivery system. More broadly, the challengepresented by a rising China is the principal issuefacing American policy.4 Denny Roy puts thisinto regional perspective:

Taiwans security problem is Asiassecurity problem: cross-Strait conictwould disrupt regional trade and forceother Asian states to side with or againstthe Peoples Republic of China. Taiwanssecurity problem is also Americas: onelikely consequence of such a conict would

be unambiguous Chinese opposition to,and corresponding action against, the U.S.military presence in Asia.5

The question facing U.S. policymakers iswhether they can deter the PRC from its declaredwillingness to use force to achieve political controlover Taiwan. If so, how? If not, what alternative

CRISIS DETERRENCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

does the United States have? The challengefacing the U.S. Government is to convince boththe PRC and Taiwan to refrain from precipitousaction toward unication and independence

respectively. This will be much less difcult withrespect to Taiwan than the PRC.

For more than 50 years, the deliberateAmerican policy of strategic ambiguity hassuccessfully deterred both the PRC and Taiwanfrom major conict. Domestic developments inboth the PRC and Taiwan are requiring all threeparties to reevaluate their policies and increasingthe likelihood of the use of force by the PRC togain control over Taiwan. The future success ofAmerican deterrence is questionable. The statedAmerican policy that resolution of the conict,whatever the result might be, must be by peacefumeans appears increasingly unlikely and doesnot adequately address U.S. interest in the regionThat the United States can delay Chinese actionsis almost certain; that it can indenitely deterChinese action is unlikely.6

This paper considers the Taiwan situation interms of deterrence theory and its applicationacross cultures to see under what conditions

the PRC might be convinced not to use force toresolve the Taiwan situation to its satisfactionThe author also examines the perceptions andmisperceptions of each of the parties involved;their interests, capabilities, and possibleintentions; and how the PRC intends to deter U.Sintervention in the Taiwan Strait. An examinationof the options available to each party concludesby suggesting the most likely courses of actionand ways to increase the likelihood of successfulU.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. There

is no presumption here that China will soonbecome a peer competitor to the United StatesChinese decisionmaking and actions regardingTaiwan will be driven by what the PRCbut notnecessarily other nationsviews as its domesticconcerns. Unable to defeat the United States ina direct military confrontation any time in theforeseeable future, China is likely to seek to


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develop niche weapons and strategies thatwould make U.S. intervention too difcult or toocostly.

The complexity of the Taiwan Strait situationsuggests any future American attempt at crisisdeterrence will be exceedingly difcult, andsuccess is unlikely unless at least one party to theconict makes enormous concessions to the others.

The tangled relationship involves a combinationof deterrence and coercive diplomacy. As theUnited States seeks to deter Chinese militaryaction and Taiwanese provocation in the Strait,the PRC seeks to deter U.S. intervention andformal Taiwanese independence. China is alsoseeking to coerce Taiwan to reverse its tentativesteps toward formal independence. A dangerousaspect of the relationship is the confrontationbetween an inconsistent U.S. policy regarding

Taiwan and the PRC on one hand, and a PRC thatexhibits simultaneous characteristics of paranoia,entitlement, victimization, and arrogance arisingout of its history, on the other. This paranoia leadsChina to view all actions of potential adversariesas directed primarily against China. Its historicalself-image as the paramount state in Asia causesChina to view the behavior of regional rivals, theUnited States and Japan, as intended to weakenor marginalize China and deny it its rightfulplace in the international community.7 The

complexity of Chinas self-image can be seen in itssimultaneous expectation of being accorded theprestige and authority of permanent membershipon the United Nations Security Council withthe right to a decisive say on events in Asia, theclaim to foreign aid from developed nations, theexpectation of the preferential treatment givento developing nations, and opposition to anymodication of the United Nations Charter topermit Japan a permanent Security Council seatbecause this would dilute Chinese primacy as thespokesman for Asian interests.

Both the United States and the PRC seethemselves as occupying the moral high groundin their international dealings.8 This makescompromise and communication difcult becauseeach presumes it is in the right, while the other isacting wrongfully and must be brought around

to its way of thinking. This moral self-image isdeeply ingrained in both Chinese and Americanculture.

The most desirable outcome would be forChina to transform into a pluralistic, democraticsociety where Taiwan could be accommodatedand feel comfortable but not necessarily requiredto integrate politically with the mainland. This is

highly unlikely in the short term, so we need toplan now for alternatives. This paper explores arange of alternative courses of action based onthe assumption that good crisis management wilmake a long-term peaceful solution possible.

That the Taiwan Strait is the locus of crisis,how there came to be a state on Taiwan separatefrom Mainland China, and U.S. involvement inthe situation are all matters of recent historyWithout a sense of the post-World War II history

of the region, nothing else about its potential forcrisis will make sense.

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

The conict in the Taiwan Strait involvingthe United States, the PRC, and Taiwan datesfrom the early days of the Korean War in 1950 Jurisdictional claims to the island are shroudedin nationalistic myths of the PRC, Taiwan, andtheir respective international advocates, although

China gained control of the island only in the 17thcentury. The relevant background to the conict isthat Taiwan was a Japanese colony during WorldWar II and had been so since the Japanese victoryover China in 1895. Chiang Kai-shek, the wartimeleader of China, insisted that the restoration ofChinese sovereignty over Taiwan be included inthe 1943 Cairo declaration of Allied leaders. Priorto this, Taiwan does not appear to have guredin the concerns of Mainland Chinese, Nationalistor Communist. Following Japans surrender,Nationalist Chinese soldiers occupied the islandTheir initially brutal occupation of the islandmoderated only after American intercession.

As the forces under Mao Zedong successivelydefeated Nationalist armies during the ChineseCivil War, the Nationalists found themselves by1950 limited to control of Taiwan, the Pescadores


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Islands, and several groups of small islands just offshore of Mainland China. At this point,conquest of Taiwan became a major goal of theChinese Communists as they sought to bring thecivil war to a successful conclusion.9 In late 1949,the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff advised PresidentHarry Truman that Taiwan was strategicallyimportant, but warned that the United States was

too overextended militarily to defend it.10 Theyexpected the PRC to invade and conquer the islandin late 1950 or early 1951. Some State Departmentofcials, including George Kennan, proposed thatthe United States take direct control of Taiwanand ask the United Nations to hold a plebisciteon the island to decide its future.11 They favoreddistancing the U.S. Government from ChiangKai-shek and offering Taiwans population theopportunity for independence or union with the

Mainland. This would have required revokingthe Taiwan portion of the Cairo Declaration.12Events developed too rapidly for this proposal togain a hearing. Trumans interposition of the U.S.Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the Mainlandin response to the North Korean attack on June25, 1950, frustrated both PRC invasion plans andalternatives to U.S. support for the Kuomintangon Taiwan. In late 1950, the PRC probably couldhave invaded Taiwan successfully.

Thus, since 1950, the Taiwan Strait has been

a source of international tension. In 1954-55 and1958, this tension involved military force andthe potential for escalation. A 1962 crisis wasless serious. Until the U.S. opening to Chinain 1972, the PRC harassed the offshore islandswith artillery re every other day. After thewarming of U.S.-PRC relations, China appearedwilling to live with the status quo for decadeswith relations between the PRC and Taiwangradually becoming friendlier. The evolution ofdemocracy on Taiwan since 1987, however, hastransformed what had been a relatively stableenvironment once again into a source of regionaltension. This time the reason was that Taiwansmove toward democratic government appearedto imply a move toward formal independencefrom the Mainland and a denial of the one-Chinapolicy that both the PRC and the Nationalist

government on Taiwan had afrmed since 1949This led to military confrontation between thePRC and the United States in 1995-96 and periodsof tension during the summer of 1999 and in early2000. Several of these periods of tension had thepotential to become large-scale wars, due as muchto misperception and miscalculation by one partyor another as to conicting national interests.

This review reveals the stunning complexityof an issue formed from elements of history andgeography; the experience of colonialism; a worldwar; the Cold War; domestic interests in fourpolitical entities (United States, PRC, Taiwan,and Japan); and the East Asia-Pacic strategicbalance.

The experience of repeated conict in theTaiwan Strait during the past half century hasresulted in a variety of mutual perceptions and

misperceptions on the part of each of the politicaentities involved as they have learned andmislearned the lessons of each conict. China andTaiwan have sharply different views of Japansproper international role as a result of theirdifferent colonial and World War II experiencesChina and Taiwan each have an image of theother that does not fully reect the history of itsdevelopment or its aspirations. The PRC ignoresthe fact that Taiwan has had a separate historyand developmental path for more than a century

Both the PRC and the United States view eachother through the lens of their participation inthe Korean War and handling of the TaiwanStrait crises since 1954. Japans images of itsAmerican ally and Chinese neighbor are basedon their words and deeds, particularly duringthe last 25 years. Some of these perceptions arewell-grounded, but others lack substance. Bothmisunderstanding and lack of understanding canspark a new Taiwan Strait crisis as easily as canirreconcilable national interests. The author willargue that each of these conditions is characteristicof the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan relationship.

Chinese leaders believe that, had the UnitedStates not intervened in 1950, they would havesuccessfully invaded Taiwan and concluded theircivil war. There remains a residue of bitternessamong Chinese leaders toward the United


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States dating back to the earliest days of the PRCand even earlier, when the United States sidedwith the Chinese Nationalists during much ofthe 1945-49 civil war. This distrust promptedPRC intervention in Korea in late 1950. DespiteAmerican assurances to the contrary, PRC leadersviewed the attempted reunication of Koreaunder the Seoul regime as one part of a concerted

American attack on the PRCs continued existence.Believing war between China and the UnitedStates was inevitable, PRC leaders decided theirbest hope lay in choosing the time and place forthat war.13

PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONSIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Wars result most often from real conicts

of national interest. They may also, and toooften do, arise from the misunderstandings andmisperceptions between nations. John Stoessingerconsiders misperception the most importantsingle precipitating factor in the outbreak ofwar.14 In many cases, misunderstanding andmisperception exacerbate the clash of nationalinterests. The situation becomes more complicatedwhen adversaries have different culturalbackgrounds and different histories. During thepast 60 years, the United States has been involved

in three major Asian wars: with Japan, in Koreawith the PRC, and in South Vietnam. In each case,misperceptions held by both sides played a majorrole. In the Korean case, better understandingand clearer communication between the PRCand the United States might even have avertedwar between them. Since 1950, China and theUnited States have confronted each other severaltimes in the Taiwan Strait; misperceptions,misunderstandings, and miscommunicationbrought the two nations close to war on morethan one of those occasions.15

This does not mean conict of nationalinterest is not involved. For China, the UnitedStates, Taiwan, and even Japan, the resolution ofTaiwans international status involves important,even vital, national interests. Probably the mostdangerous misunderstanding in the entire

conict scenario is the belief, prevalent in boththe United States and China, that the UnitedStates has no signicant national interest at stakeThis mistake alone could cause the two nations tostumble into war in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore,it is imperative that U.S. political leaders deneand explain, both to the American public andChinese decisionmakers, what interests it has

why they are important, and to what extent theUnited States is prepared to defend them.

What could possibly be so important aboutTaiwan that U.S. leaders should speak and actas forcefully as they have on several occasions?The United States has a legal commitment underthe Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan indefending itself against forcible integration intoChina; it also has a moral obligation going backmore than a half century to provide for Taiwans

defense. This moral obligation has only becomestronger in the 15 years since Taiwan has takenthe path of democracy. American failure to keepits word regarding Taiwan would cause regionalallies to doubt U.S. commitment to them. InJapans case, this might lead to rearmament andeven development of a nuclear capability backedup by a long-range missile delivery system. Thisis in no ones interest, least of all Chinas. Finallyabandonment of Taiwan would be followed bya decrease of U.S. inuence in the Asia-Pacic

region and an increase in Chinas ability to controthe sea lines of communication Japan and SouthKorea need for their economic well-being anddomestic stability. Some who do not see Taiwansdemocratic society, the security of Japan, and thecredibility of American commitments as vitalinterests, still view conict in the Taiwan Strait asa danger to the peace and stability of the regionFor them, regional peace constitutes a vitalAmerican interest.16 In any case, what happensin the Taiwan Strait is a concern for the UnitedStates, which needs to understand and proclaimthis interest. Not to do so would weaken whateverability the United States has to deter China fromusing military force to gain political control overTaiwan.

In the Taiwan Strait case, the problem ofmisperception and misunderstanding includes a


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difference of cultures and, for the United States,a lack of agreement on what constitutes therelevant Chinese culture. Alistair Iain Johnstonhas recently challenged the conventional wisdomabout China by suggesting that modern Chinesestrategic thinking is not simply a repetition of theancient classics such as Sun Tzus The Art of War.Instead, Chinas strategic culture resembles much

more the hard realpolitik of western internationalrelations theory with a greater potential forexibility.17 Johnston also found the PRC hasbeen much less reluctant to use force in strategicconcerns involving territory than have othermajor powers.18 This contrasts with the Chineseimage (which is promoted by the PRC) of Chinaas a gentle Confucian nation that must be sorelyprovoked before it will resort to force. AndrewScobell has taken Johnsons construct a step

further in suggesting that China has a dualisticstrategic culture comprising Confucian-Mencianand realpolitik elements which he calls a Cult ofDefense.19 In practice, this means that Chineseelites believe strongly that their countrysstrategic tradition is pacist, nonexpansionist,and purely defensive but at the same time ableto justify virtually any use of forceincludingoffensive and preemptive strikesas defensivein nature.20 Which of these interpretations iscorrect makes a difference in how the United

States should approach the possibility of conictin the Taiwan Strait. Chinese misperceptions ofthe world around it are affected by its history ofxenophobia, a sense of having been humiliatedby the West and Japan, a measure of paranoia,and a sense of cultural superiority (which is notunique to China). No matter which interpretationof Chinese strategic culture is correct, domesticconcerns will always inuence how it operates inspecic situations (especially Taiwan).

Misperceptions come in several varieties. Theone that comes most naturally to mind occurswhen the other party incorrectly interprets whatwe have said or done. No less serious, althoughmuch more difcult for us to understand, is themisperception arising when we communicatewith the other party in a way it cannot understandor nds unconvincing because we do not see that

party as it really is. This happens when we fail tounderstand the other partys culture and historywhen our actions and words appear to conict,or when our message seems unbelievable. Thesecond kind of misperception frequently leadsto the rst kind. A third kind of misperceptioninvolves how each party sees itself. Few nationssee themselves as others see them, but they are

prone to believe everyone else does see themas they see themselves. Each of these forms ofmisperception has occurred more than once inthe century-and-a-half relationship betweenChina and the United Statesthe 1949 communisrevolution in China only made it more acute.

Those unfamiliar with their adversarys cultureoften presume their adversary looks at the worldand at the issues being contested in the same waythey do.21 They tend to project their own cultural

values and historical experiences onto theiradversary. In a conict situation, this means eachside misjudges the price its adversary is willingto pay, the suffering it is willing to endure, andwhat constitutes a compelling deterrent to thatadversary. They have difculty seeing how theiractions will affect their adversary domesticallyregionally, and internationally. They also believetheir own actions are as transparent to theiradversary as to themselves and do not understandwhy their adversary would look for a hidden

agenda. They forget people see what they expectto see and interpret the unfamiliar in terms of thefamiliar. This means they interpret our actionsin terms of their expectation, not our intentionPeople are also prone to see as intentional whatin reality is accident, unintended consequence, orjust plain muddling through.22

Neither the United States nor China hasconsidered sufciently how the other countryviews it in terms of their relationship over thepast 150 years. Each country knows full well whatthe other has done to it, but it thinks much lessabout what it has done or what the other thinksit has done to the other country.23 Each sees itselfin terms of its intentions and interestswhichit puts in the best lightnot the other countrysperceptions and experience of it. This does notmean we need to agree with the other countrys


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actions or beliefs, only that it is essential we try tounderstand the other country on its terms. Thenwe can predict better how it will interpret andrespond to our words and actions and craft ourmessages in a way more likely to be understoodby the Chinese in the way we intend them to beunderstood.

There are at least four areas of mutual

misperception whose correction is necessaryfor peace in the Taiwan Strait. Although suchcorrection will not remove the conict of nationalinterests involved, it will enable us to see thatconict more clearly. These areas are the natureof the national interest involved, the level ofcommitment to that interest, the governmentaldecisionmaking process, and the attitudes thatdrive each nations international behavior.American China watchers and Chinese America

watchers now have a good sense of the othernation in each of these areas, but they appear tohave had limited success in communicating thisto their national leadership. Due to the natureof the regime, the problem is greater on thepart of Chinese leaders. What makes correctingthese misperceptions and misunderstandingsso difcult is that people tend to see what theywant to see, especially when they have made aninvestment in that conclusion. One example is theapparent direct correlation between American

estimates of Chinese strength and of Chineseintentions: those who see a strong China alsosee an aggressive China and argue for a policy ofcontainment; those who see a weak China also seea relatively benign China and argue for a policyof engagement.

Chinese leaders appear to have a basicmisunderstanding of how the U.S. Governmentis organized and how it makes policy. SeniorChinese leaders do not appear to understandthe balance of power among the branches ofgovernment, particularly the limits to presidentialauthority. They have a hard time understandingAmerican idealism and a political system socomplex that even the president cannot ignorespecial interests.24 Some of Chinas Americawatchers say they understand the process, butappear to have been unsuccessful in explaining

it to the decisionmakers. This means Chineseleaders do not understand that the TaiwanRelations Act directs American policy despitethe various communiqus signed by Americanpresidents and Chinese leaders. One Chineseanalyst even complained that many Chineseanalysts dont understand the domestic politicaland bureaucratic motivations underlying U.S

policy. They see it as a coherent, hostile, anti-China strategy, not a series of ad hoc decisionsmade in response to competing interests.25 Theymay also misinterpret the open debate in the U.Snews media as expressions of U.S. Governmentpolicy, particularly the hostile portion. Thismisperception could lead China into precipitousaction in response to what it sees as hostile U.Sintent. Additionally, Chinese leaders appear notto fully appreciate the inuence of public opinion

on American foreign policy.26

Possibly the most dangerous Chinesemisperception is the oft-stated belief that theUnited States lacks the political will to ghtdespite its clear military superiority. This derivesfrom U.S. interventions in Somalia and Haitiduring the 1990s. Chinas perception is eerilyreminiscent of that of some Japanese leaders in1941, who believed a devastating surprise attackagainst U.S. forces would destroy the Americanwill to ght without regard to American capacity

to ultimately defeat Japan. This is, however, aawed reading of American history and ignoresthe war that opened the 1990s, the Persian GulfWar, where the United States was preparedto sustain heavy casualties to evict Iraq fromKuwait. Richard Halloran here comments on thismisperception: A careful reading of U.S. historyin the 20th century . . . shows that Americanswill ght for causes they understand to bevital to their principles or national interest.2

Richard Sobol, a Harvard scholar who studies therelationship between public opinion and foreignpolicy, agrees that the American public is willingto make sacrices when their leaders make thecost and benet of a policy clear to them.28 ShouldChina act on the basis of this misperception,it risks unleashing what some have called theAmerican crusade mentality, the response that


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did occur after the September 11, 2001, terroristattacks. China also views Taiwan as a softsociety of people who would sooner ee overseasthan ght to defend their island.29

This misperception means China views theAmerican will to ght as our weakest link. So itwill threaten casualties in an effort to break thatwill early in any confrontation. One scenario

would combine threats of massive casualties withexemplary demonstrations on a third party ofthe PRCs ability and willingness to inict suchcasualties. The most powerful threat would beone that placed the continental United States atrisk.

A source of serious American misunder-standing of China involves the matter of face.The United States does not appreciate the impactof its behavior on Chinas sense of public honor.

Given the great disparity between the twonations military power, this can be a seriousmatter. In 1996, the United States was very slowin appreciating that the Chinese missile testsand coastal war games required some reactionfrom the United States. When that reactioncame, it signaled clearly and overpoweringlythat the United States still was supreme in Asianwaters. One well-publicized deployment of acarrier battle group and a rm public diplomaticwarning would have sufced. The two carrier

battle groups actually employed were overkill apublic humiliation administered to the PRCleadership. Chinese military leaders have vowedthis will never happen again. Next time, theyintend to have destroyers and naval cruisemissiles in place to sink one of the carriers.

Another problem lies in the different waysthe United States and China perceive their ownand the others actions. For example, the UnitedStates tends to separate the military and politicalin such a way that it often ignores the politicalimplications of its military actions. China,however, sees political implications behind everymilitary decision (even when none is intended).30In part, this may result from the differentrelationship that exists between civilians and themilitary in American and Chinese society. Wherethe United States mandates for the military a clear

separation from and subordination to the civilianChina has emphasized a close interrelationshipbetween the two.31

Chinese have described the most dangerousAmerican misperception as our failure tounderstand the seriousness of their intent toregain Taiwan. This leads the United States tointerpret Chinese warnings as mere rhetoric, to

conclude China is blufng, and to underestimatethe price China is willing to pay to achieve itsaim. It also leads American policymakers toconclude that because China has no reasonablehope of victory, it would not use force againstTaiwan since people dont start wars they expectto lose. Chinese leaders respond that, quite tothe contrary, Taiwan is such a serious matter ofregime legitimacy that any government wouldsooner ght a war it knows it would lose than

allow Taiwan to go its own way unchallenged.32

Chinese have stated repeatedly that no cost is toogreat if the issue is political control of Taiwan. InJanuary 2001, a Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)senior colonel told a group of visiting Americanacademics that China is willing to suffer a 20- or30-year setback to its economy in order to gaincontrol of Taiwan.33 The ip side of this Americanmisperception is Chinas failure to recognize thatthe United States may have interests related tothe status of Taiwan no less vital than Chinas.

Another crucial difference seems to lie in howthe United States and China understand victoryFor the United States, victory is measuredin military terms. For China, the politicaland psychological (and moral) are at least asimportant. This is one of the lessons the UnitedStates should have learned from the VietnamWar.

China, with its fundamentally realpolitikapproach to international relations, does notunderstand that American foreign policy is anoften inconsistent blend of realism, idealism,naivet, and ad hoc solutions. Instead, theysee American behavior as carefully thoughtout, devious, and always directed towardsome strategic interest. For this reason, it wasincomprehensible to the Chinese that the UnitedStates could have bombed their embassy in


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Belgrade by accident. Likewise, U.S. humanitarianintervention in Somalia and Haiti must have somemotive beyond helping the sick and starving.China has described NATO intervention inKosovo, with NATO always described asU.S.-led, as a warm-up for intervention inChinas domestic affairs. The US bombing ofKosovo was upsetting to the Chinese from the

beginning because it indicated that the UnitedStates was willing to bomb another country forthe way it was treating its own people. . . . TheChinese worried that the action signaled that nounderlying principle would prevent Americansfrom bombing China because of the way it wastreating Taiwan or Tibet.34

Likewise, the U.S. anti-terrorist campaign putthe PRC in an awkward position. To remain onthe sideline would hurt Chinas international

image, but to support the American campaignwould mean acquiescing in U.S. involvement inChinas backyard and U.S. intervention in theactivities of other sovereign states (the PRC maybe the last major supporter of a pure Westphalianconcept of the sovereignty of the nation-state).The second aspect of Chinas realpolitik approachis its belief that the costs to the United States ofchallenging China in regard to Taiwan are somuch greater than any possible gain as to makesuch a challenge unlikely.35 Despite this, Chinese

America watchers are beginning to believe theUnited States will intervene in any militaryconfrontation between the PRC and Taiwan.

Chinas xation on a Japanese threat is theone great exception to its realist approach,but given the recent history between the twocountries it is understandable and not uniqueto China among Asian nations. Nonetheless,China has an exaggerated picture of Japaneseinterest and involvement in the Taiwan areaand invariably interprets Japanese actions aloneand in conjunction with the United States asthreats to Chinese interests and sovereignty. Atthe same time, it is unable to understand howJapan can interpret threatening Chinese behaviornegatively. This reects a pattern wherein Chinasfocus on bilateral relations prevents it from seeinghow its actions appear to other nations. The 1996

missile rings in the vicinity of Taiwans portsare an example of this. China was shocked thatcountries around the world reacted unfavorablyto Chinas coercive diplomacy. It had expectedthat other countries would ignore its effort topunish Taiwan.36

Closely associated with this is what Johnstoncalls Chinese leaders failure to understand the

security dilemma: Where a defensive actiontaken by one status quo actor is interpreted asthreatening by another, the second actor thentakes what it believes are defensive counteractionsthat, in turn, are interpreted by the rst actor [asthreatening].37 Although the PRC is not normallyconsidered a status quo actor,38 Johnstons pointstill applies to misperceptions about weaponryby all parties involved in the Taiwan problem,but especially the Chinese, who appear not

to understand the unintended impact of theirmilitary actions on other parties and are proneto misinterpret those parties responses. This wasclear in 1997, when Chinese leaders professedshock at Japans willingness to establish newsecurity guidelines with the United States (whichappear to have been a response to Chinas actionsagainst Taiwan) and described them as part of anew U.S.-Japan conspiracy to prevent Chinesecontrol of Taiwan.

A nal misperception is Chinas failure to

understand the history and perceptions of thoseliving on Taiwan. Few Taiwanese have the WorldWar II experience of Mainland Chinese or sharetheir perception of Japan. In fact, many olderTaiwanese speak Japanese and have a favorableview of Japan from their colonial experienceBecause of the limited extent of cross-Straitdialogue, PRC leaders are predisposed to viewapparently innocuous actions and statementsby Taiwans leaders as covert moves towardindependence. The result has been a Chinese lossof patience, setting of time and behavioral limitsand other coercive actions. For almost 40 years, thePRC had been able to deal with its Kuomintangadversaries over the heads of the people ofTaiwan. This is no longer possible. Since the late1980s, native-born Taiwanese have increasinglytaken political control from the Mainlanders who


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arrived after World War II. Taiwanese publicopinion now constrains the options of the islandsleaders, but China does not appear to understandor appreciate this new reality (just as it discountssentiments of the American populace). Taiwanesepublic opinion is overwhelmingly opposed tounion with Mainland China. The PRC has beenattempting to work with the opposition parties on

Taiwan in circumventing the elected leadership.

MISCUES DURING THE 1995-96TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS

The 1995-96 crisis in the Taiwan Straitshows how cumulative misperceptions andmiscommunication can create and thenexacerbate a crisis. The underlying cause of thecrisis was a new practice of Taiwan President

Lee Tung-hui dubbed vacation diplomacy.Lee and other Taiwanese leaders informallyvisited countries Taiwan lacked diplomaticrelations with in order to present Taiwans storyand gain a public forum. Either ignoring ormisunderstanding Chinas sensitivity to thesetrips, Lee and the nations involved dismissedChinese objections. The last straw for China wasLees visit to Cornell University, his alma mater,during which he delivered a speech lauding theachievements of democratic Taiwan. The State

Department had assured China Lee would notreceive a visa, but Congress saw China as tryingto intimidate Taiwan and the United States. Itpassed overwhelmingly a resolution urging Leebe given a visa and threatened stronger actionif the administration didnt comply. Chinaresponded by staging two series of missile testsin the sea off Taiwans two main ports duringJuly and August 1995. This was to show Chinasdispleasure with U.S. actions and teach Taiwan alesson, said Chinese spokespersons. The UnitedStates and other major states showed littleresponse although the test areas were less than100 miles from the ports and put commercialshipping at risk.

Both Taiwan and the United States failedto understand Chinas sensitivity about itssovereignty claims over Taiwan. China viewed

vacation diplomacy as an attempt by Taiwansleaders to gain international standing and actas an independent nation. Chinas anger atAmerican duplicity resulted from its inabilityto understand how the U.S. Government works,especially the relationship between the executiveand legislature. U.S. failure to respond vigorouslyto Chinas missile diplomacy sent the message

to Beijing that the United States wouldntget involved. That, at least, was how Chinainterpreted American inaction. This would comeback to haunt both countries 6 months later.

With Taiwans legislative elections scheduledfor December 1995 and the rst open presidentiaelection the following March, China decidedto use coercion to discourage Taiwanese votersfrom supporting pro-independence parties andcandidates. The plan included more amphibious

exercises in November followed in March byanother series of missile tests and combinedarms invasion exercises on a Chinese islandsimilar to Taiwanese-held territory. The missilerings were close enough to Taiwans majorports to affect ship trafc and cause panic inTaipeis nancial markets. This time, the UnitedStates dispatched two carrier battle groups tothe scene to ensure China didnt attack TaiwanThe Chinese were publicly outraged at whatthey saw as an American overreaction. China

was threatening war in order to avoid the needto go to war and expected that the United Stateswould understand this. They were also publiclyhumiliated because it was evident to all thatthey could do nothing about the presence of thecarriers. The deployment did bolster Taiwanscondence in U.S. support.

On Taiwan, advocates of independence wererunning for the legislature and the presidencyThey made clear their support for independencewithout considering how China would respondto such sentiments regarding a subject that,until recently, it had been illegal to discuss onTaiwan. China considered coercion to be a mattersolely between itself and Taiwan, somewhat likethe relationship between the U.S. Governmentand Rhode Island. It misread the Clintonadministrations inaction of the previous summer


16/4910

as signaling a lack of interest. China believedthe United States would understand the missiletests and invasion exercises posed no immediatethreat to Taiwan. It also believed Japan andother regional states would not interpret Chinasactions as potentially threatening to themselves,even though many of them also had territorialdisputes with the PRC. The United States waited

too long after China announced its exercises torespond. Following the weak response to therst set of exercises, this delay signaled to BeijingAmerican indifference. When the United Statesdid nally respond, it overreacted by deployingtwo carrier battle groups. China probably haslearned from this crisis that the United States willrespond forcefully should China attempt to useovert military force against Taiwan, but if Chinaopts for a less confrontational approach, such as

a blockade, the United States will be unsure howand when to react.If China had plans extending beyond

intimidating Taiwan, it certainly got themessage not to attempt to implement them.But the American overreaction highlightedChinas relative military weakness in contrast toAmericas ability to operate in the area virtuallyunimpeded. How close the two nations came towar is debatable, but it is clear that, while thecrisis is over, the consequences are not. A series

of basic misperceptions, and the actions andcommunications based on them, led to a crisisthat could have ended in war. Clearing awaythe misperceptions and miscommunications isno guarantee the crisis would not have occurred,but it makes the possibility of crisis less likely andless serious.

Andrew Scobell warns that PRC behaviorduring the crisis offers four reasons for concern.It reminds us that China is serious about usingforce to gain control of Taiwan should thatbecome necessary. It warns that China ndsthe possibility of a preemptive strike againstTaiwan attractive.39 It shows Chinas preferencefor using missiles against Taiwan, emphasizingChinas development and deployment of theseweapons and Taiwans impotence against them.It also demonstrates a dangerous lack of clear

communications between the United States andChina. Although each side thought the signalsit sent were clear, the other side misinterpretedthem.40

INTERESTS

Each of the parties involvedChina, Taiwan

the United States, and even Japanhas importantnational interests at stake in the Taiwan Straitconict. The situation is complicated because notevery party recognizes the intensity or validity ofthe others interests. China has stated its interestsin terms of national sovereignty, territorialintegrity, and the respect due a major stateIn a White Paper issued just before TaiwansMarch 2000 presidential election, the PRC listeda number of basic interests including: desire for

settlement of the Taiwan issue and reunicationof China, afrmation that Taiwan is an inalienablepart of China, conviction that resolution of theTaiwan issue is an internal Chinese affair, desirefor peaceful reunication, view that use of forceis a last resort, position that no one must attemptto change Taiwans status by referendum, and theU.S. obligation to deal with China and Taiwan onthe basis of the Three Communiqus of 19721979, and 1982.41 China has unacknowledgedinterests that are no less important than the

acknowledged ones. Chinese leaders fear that ifthey permit Taiwan to become independent, thiswill provide an incentive for separatist groupsin Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia. Taiwan alsothreatens the Chinese Communist regime becauseit offers a successful political and economicalternative to the Mainland in a Chinese culturalsetting. To achieve what it views as its properrole as the paramount state in Asia, China needsto remove American power and presence fromthe region. It sees regaining Taiwan as essentialto achieving this. China has recently backtrackedon its contention that U.S. power is waning, butcontinues to believe the United States is a statein long-term decline. While China talks aboutthe importance of a multipolar world, it appearsto see itself as the preeminent Asian state in thatworld. China is more like the Middle Kingdom


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of Chinese history than a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist state. One consequence of this is thathaving discarded their Marxist ideology, Chinascommunist leaders are increasingly dependenton the theme of national unication to legitimizetheir rule.

Taiwans interests seem obvious, but becauseof the hostile response their open expression

would receive from the PRC, they remain muted.Very few residents of Taiwan can remember atime when the island was linked politically tothe Mainland (1945-49), and few have familiallinks to the Mainland. So Taiwan has no realincentive to unite with the Mainland. Taiwansgoal is freedom to continue its development as ademocratic society and economically successfulstate. Anything China might interpret as amove toward independence would jeopardize

everything Taiwan has gained because of thelikelihood of war, but union would inhibitTaiwans development even though it wouldbring peace to the island. Taiwan desires a degreeof international recognition and membership ininternational organizations commensurate withits democracy and economic power, but Chinaopposes both and has been able to enforce thisopposition through diplomatic and economicmeasures. Taiwan faces a conict between itsinterests in promoting its status and its survival.

Taiwan has the greatest stake in maintaining thestatus quo, but its slow drift away from Chinapresents the greatest threat to that status quoand the PRC appears to understand this betterthan anyone else.

The United States, consistent with its policyof strategic ambiguity, has been vague about thedetails of its interests in the PRC-Taiwan situationdespite the blunt language of President GeorgeBush in April 2001.42 The December 2000 NationalSecurity Strategy said a key American securityobjective in the region is enhancing stability inthe Taiwan Strait by maintaining our one Chinapolicy, promoting peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, and encouraging dialogue betweenBeijing and Taipei.43 The statement contains anambiguity because the United States and PRCdo not understand the term one China in the

same way. This same document denes vital,important, and humanitarian and other interestsThe continued existence of Taiwans democraticsociety could be associated with any of the threecategories, depending upon how one interpretseach level of interest. Few would describeTaiwan itself as a vital national interest, althoughit might be linked to vital interests. Taiwans

existence as a democratic society is the result ofAmerican encouragement, however, so for theUnited States to acquiesce in any solution to theTaiwan Strait situation that ignores or rejects theviews of Taiwans population would appear tobe inconsistent with the stated American goal ofpromoting democracy around the world.

The 2000 National Security Strategy only brieyaddressed U.S. commitments to other nations andthe importance of maintaining the credibility of

these commitments. This credibility is crucial fora successful U.S. foreign policy. As displeasedas they are by it, PRC leaders appear convincedthe United States is committed to Taiwanssecurity to the extent that a PRC attack on Taiwanwould result in American military interventionAmerican failure to act would cause allies in theregion who have treaty commitments with theUnited States to reconsider the worth of thosetreaties.

The recent 2002 National Security Strategy plays

down the PRCs place in the American strategicoutlook. It emphasizes the importance of Chinasdeveloping into a democratic society, holding upTaiwan (along with South Korea) as an exampleof the same type of political and economicdevelopment the United States would like tosee occur in the PRC. The document warns thatChinas attempt to develop advanced militarycapabilities is outdated and self-defeatingWhile the document praises economic/traderelationships and cooperation in ghtinginternational terrorism, it highlights Taiwan as asubject of profound disagreement and reafrmsthe U.S. commitment to Taiwans self-defense.44

Soon after passage of the Taiwan RelationsAct (TRA), Senator Jacob Javits explained hisunderstanding of how the TRA affects Americaninterests and commitments to Taiwan:


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I was particularly concerned with otherdangers which in fact seemed morerealistic than an outright invasion fromacross the Strait. The language nallyadopted in the House-Senate Conference,therefore, referred to U.S. concern foractivities which jeopardized not only thesecurity, but also the social and economic

system, of the people on Taiwan.45

Similarly, Ralph Clough describes Taiwan as animportant economic partner that has been linkedto the United States for many years by a diverseand growing web of interrelationships.46

The United States has at least three basic typesof interest in how the Taiwan Strait situation isresolved. The United States has been a Pacicpower for more than a century. For it to allowsome other state to dominate the East Asia-

Pacic region is contrary not only to current U.S.policy, but also to American grand strategy sincethe late 1800s.47 The United States has securitycommitments to several key East Asian and Pacicstates. It has had a legal and, many would argue,moral obligation to assist Taiwan in defendingitself against forcible assimilation by the PRC.Regional states view the United States-Taiwanrelationship as a signicant commitment; theconsequences of U.S. failure to support Taiwan

would be more far-reaching than the defeat ofSouth Vietnam in 1975.48 This could mean thatAmerican allies in the region would rethink theirrelationship with the result that the United Stateswould be marginalized in the region.

It is unclear that the United States wouldnd acceptable even a peaceful assimilation ofTaiwan by the PRC. This would provide Chinawith the technology the United States has givenTaiwan and that Taiwan has developed itself. Itwould also project PRC military power eastward

into the Pacic through naval and air bases onTaiwan with the potential to control the sea lanesvital to the economies of Japan and South Korea.The United States also has a longstanding softinterest in encouraging and supporting the spreadof democratic societies. Simply ignoring Americanidealism is not realistic.49 Taiwan is an example ofdemocratic transformation while the PRC is not.

Abandonment of Taiwan would contradict valuesenshrined in Americas founding documents. TheUnited States has a stated interest in the peacefulsettlement of the conict between Taiwan andthe PRC, but this may not be reconcilable withother U.S. interests. For rst-term presidents, thebottom line may be domestic: Any US Presidenthoping for a second term cannot stand by and let

China seize Taiwan.50

Japan also has interests in the situationIt wants to retain its relationship with theUnited States without antagonizing ChinaAny obligation to provide basing or logisticalsupport for U.S. assistance to Taiwan could resultin military retaliation and certainly economicretaliation. Refusal to assist the United Stateshowever, could be the end of the mutual securityrelationship. Japan also has an interest in Chinas

not becoming so powerful that it could threaten Japanese security. This includes the ability tcontrol the sea lanes east of Taiwan that arevital to the Japanese economy. Balancing theseinterests will require Japan to walk a ne lineThis is especially the case because the Japanesebody politic has a strong pacist elementMoreover, the countries of East and SoutheastAsia have unpleasant memories of the Japaneseoccupation during World War II.

There is a clear conict among the interests

of the parties involved. The danger inherent inthis is that the parties do not fully recognize oracknowledge the interests of the others. Chinadoes not believe U.S. interests relating to Taiwanare sufcient to justify it in going to war. TheUnited States is skeptical about Chinas territoriaclaim, may not fully appreciate its regime survivaconcern, and probably has concerns about howresolution of the Taiwan situation would enhanceChinas standing as a rising power.

CAPABILITIES

Most studies of the Taiwan Strait situationfocus on the relative military capabilities of thePRC and Taiwan (and sometimes the UnitedStates). This is a necessary task because intentionsand capabilities are related, but by itself it is


19/4913

misleading. The relationship between capabilitiesand intentions is mutual, with each inuencingthe other, but neither determining the other.Because different viewers evaluate capabilitiesdifferently, what we see as capabilities do notnecessarily limit our adversarys intentions. Inthe Taiwan Strait case, this comparison usuallyleads to the evaluation of a conventional military

confrontation. This is particularly true with respectto the PRC. But, as the United States learned toits chagrin in Vietnam, military capability is notalways the key factor for engaging in or winninga war.

The PRC has stated its desire to complete thenational reunication that would signal the endof Chinas civil war. China would prefer to settlethe Taiwan conict by negotiation, but failing thatis willing to resort to force to gain its end. Chinese

leaders have said repeatedly that they would goto war rather than allow China to be permanentlydivided. That they might not win such a wardoes not preclude their use of force.51 Fordomestic reasons, China appears willing to useforce even when defeat is certain. Most westernanalysts nd this incomprehensible, but theyshouldnt. In doing so, they impose their senseof rationality and sense of values on the Chineseleadership, which may have its own reasons forreaching a different conclusion. There are several

precedents for this irrational course of action.In 1941, because every other option seemedworse than war, Japan initiated a war against theUnited States that it doubted it could win. Japansleaders had concluded the nations survival wasat stake.52 In 1973, the Arab states attacked Israelalthough they realized Israel was militarily morepowerful than they were. Achieving surprise,they almost won, but they understood a militarydefeat could still be a political victory. Chinasperspective appears little different.

China intends to claim what it sees as itsproper place in the region and the world. It hasnot yet explained what this would mean forChina, other regional states, or the internationalcommunity. It would appear to require thatChina both exercise sovereignty over Taiwan andseriously weaken or remove altogether American

inuence in the East Asia-Pacic region.The difculty in planning for a Taiwan

Strait crisis lies in the measure of disagreementamong U.S. analysts about Chinas capabilities,intentions, goals, and strategy. Key areas ofdisagreement include the PRCs ultimate regionaland international goals and where Taiwan tsinto them, whether the PRC and the United States

are on an inevitable collision course in East Asia,whether the PRC will be subtle or heavy-handedin its dealings with Taiwan, how much the PRCis willing to pay to gain control of Taiwan, andthe PRCs willingness to use nuclear weapons toachieve its goals.

Comparisons of the military capability of thePRC and Taiwan usually begin with the majorweapons systems each side has on hand orexpects to receive from an arms supplier. They

also cover topics the parties mention in theirdoctrine or public statements (e.g., informationwarfare, special operations). Only occasionally dothe comparisons probe behind the numbers to askif the military has integrated the various weaponssystems into its force, if there are sufcientlytrained personnel to maintain, operate, andsupport the systems, if all the various systems canbe employed in the Taiwan area, and what otherthreats or responsibilities the military must beprepared to handle.53 Questions about the ability

of the military to engage in joint operations andconcerns about command and control reectunfavorably upon the military capability of boththe PRC and Taiwan. The 2000 Department ofDefense report to Congress on Taiwan and thePRC listed signicant U.S. intelligence gapsregarding logistics, maintenance, and trainingof both PRC and Taiwan militaries.54 In a studyprepared for the 2002 Commission on the UnitedStates and China, Michael Pillsbury declaredknowledge of PRC and Taiwanese traininglogistics, command and control, doctrinespecial operations, and mine warfare to be U.Sintelligence shortfalls.55 Far more important thanhow these militaries function on a regular basisin peacetime is their capability to increase theirtempo in a combat environment and maintainthat operational tempo for the duration of a war.


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Not only does capability affect intentions,but intentions inuence capability. For example,analysts who look at the structure of the PRCmilitary, Taiwans west coast geography, andthe likely Taiwanese air superiority over theStrait conclude that an invasion of Taiwan wouldbe unsuccessful. It is likely that PRC leadershave reached the same conclusion and decided

to develop their military accordingly. Thus,having decided not to pursue the cross-Straitamphibious invasion option, the PRC is notinvesting heavily in amphibious assault craft orassociated weapons. Instead, China has chosento concentrate resources on weapons that willpermit it to intimidate Taiwan and deter U.S.intervention. This is a situation in which intentionshelp determine capability. Even so, a pessimistic1999 Department of Defense report concluded,

The PLA likely would encounter great difcultyconducting such a sophisticated campaign [jointamphibious assault of Taiwan] by 2005 [, but]the campaign likely would succeedbarringthird party interventionif Beijing were willingto accept the almost certain political, economic,diplomatic, and military costs that such a courseof action would produce.56 Other analysts thinkthe PRC could overcome Taiwan through a war ofattrition without an invasion, but believe the PRCconsiders the cost far too high unless unication

becomes a matter of desperation.57The different cultures involved in the Taiwan

Strait conict make more difcult an accurateassessment of military capabilities becausethey have different attitudes toward publicdisclosure. American capabilities, apart fromclassied details of various weapons systems,are widely available in open source materials, asis the U.S. order of battle. As the sole remainingsuperpower, the United States is able to projectmilitary power to most regions of the world. Thethree main military areas of concern are how otherpotential conicts would affect U.S. deploymentin the event of military confrontation in theTaiwan Strait; the amount of support U.S. allies,especially Japan, would provide; and the size,conguration, and armament of U.S. forces 10or 20 years from now. As Mark Stokes notes, the

United States tries to deter opponents by lettingthem know how powerful it is.58 In contrastthe PRC attempts to deter potential adversariesby denying them knowledge of its militaryorganization, doctrine, plans, and capabilitiesThis attitude toward information has long been apart of Chinese strategic culture. As to its effect onU.S. decisionmaking, Jason Ellis says, Signicant

information gaps have intensied the effects ofChinese deception, internal debate, and lack oftransparency, which have further hampered U.Sability to discern the nature, purpose, and likelyextent of Chinese plans in this area and to craft anappropriate policy response.59

It is one thing to have modern weapons. It issomething quite different to be able to maintainthese weapons and use them to their full potentialIt is even more difcult to employ these weapons

in a joint scenario where communications andcoordination are essential. It is doubtful that thePRC has sufcient training or experience to mountsuch operations. The Secretary of Defense, in hisJune 2000 report to Congress on Chinas military,said, While Beijing understands the theoreticalaspects of integrating various weapons systemsand strike assets, the PLAs principal obstacles liein doctrinal and tactical deciencies. . . . So-calledjoint exercises appear to be highly scripted, withlittle or no free play. . . . China is not expected to

develop comprehensive joint power projectioncapabilities for at least the next two decades; asa result, its ability to control a multidimensionalbattlespace likely will remain limited. 60 Nothinghas happened since to warrant a changedassessment.

An additional difculty facing the PRC isthat, although the United States has a reasonableidea of where it intends to focus its weaponsdevelopment and acquisition, it is far from clearwhether the PRC can move from developmentto production, integrate its various systemsinto a coherent warghting force, implement itsdoctrine for joint operations, and sustain its forcesin a combat environment. American analysts havea far better idea of Taiwans general capabilitiesbecause PRC pressure on other potential armssuppliers has resulted in the United States


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becoming Taiwans only major source of arms.But such Chinese pressure also has resulted insome distancing between the U.S. and Taiwanesemilitaries, meaning that the United States nolonger has the close military relationship withTaiwan that would enable it to evaluate Taiwansmilitary readiness, maintenance, commandand control, and weapons survivability. The

quality and quantity of Taiwans domestic armsproduction is likewise unclear. Congressionalpressure in November 2002 to increase thelevel of U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation wassuccessfully resisted by the Bush administration,which feared this would unnecessarily provokethe PRC.

Chinas capabilities lie primarily in thefuture. The consensus is that the conventionalmilitary balance is shifting slowly in the PRCs

favor. In addition, China is working on anInformation Warfare (IW) capability to attackTaiwanese, Japanese, and American commandand control centers, nancial markets, and themany other key electronic facilities so essentialto the functioning of modern society.61 The PRCis suspected of testing its IW capability againstU.S. Government computer networks.62 In theaftermath of the EP-3P incident in April 2001,many commercial and private American websitesclaimed disruptions caused by computers located

in the PRC. In assessing Chinas efforts towardemploying asymmetrical warfare against Taiwan,Stokes says, Emphasis on preemptive, long-range precision strikes, information dominance,command and control warfare, and integratedair defense could enable the PLA to defangTaiwans ability to conduct military operations.63Carefully targeted, such an approach could alsoseriously degrade U.S. capability for militaryaction in the region, especially the mobilizationand deployment that would be required shouldthe United States have to support the self-defenseof Taiwan against attack. Yet, as James Mulvenonhas pointed out, while we know the extent anddirection of Chinas interest in IW because theseare discussed in open source literature, we do notknow Chinese capabilities in the eld becausethat information is highly classied.64

China cannot mount a conventional invasionof Taiwan today. It lacks sufcient sealift capacityand would be unlikely to gain air superiority overthe Taiwan Strait in less than a month. The westerncoast of Taiwan, consisting primarily of broadmud ats, is notoriously unsuited to amphibiousoperationsand the eastern coast is worse.65 ThePRC has shown no intention of improving its

amphibious capability, but it is making majorimprovements in its air force, naval combatants,and missile forces. During the past 5 years, Chinahas focused its development and acquisitionprograms on weapons whose greatest utilitywould be against Taiwan. The PRC recognizes itis unlikely to improve its conventional militaryforces to the point where it could successfullyinvade Taiwan in the face of U.S. intervention inthe near to mid term. Thus, it is building on its

strengths by improving the quality and accuracyof its ballistic and cruise missiles, exploring thepotential of information warfare, and trying todevelop other unconventional capabilities thatcan take advantage of what it sees as U.S. andTaiwan weaknesses.

China has a large inventory of ballistic missilesthat can quickly reach neighboring states and afew primitive liquid-fuel missiles that can delivernuclear weapons to the continental United StatesMore than once, Chinese ofcers have threatened

to use nuclear weapons against American citiesif the United States intervenes to defend TaiwanObviously, it remains unclear whether this wasmore than a bluff. In any case, Chinas currentintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forceis susceptible to destruction before it could bereadied for launch. With the solid fuel and mobileICBMs under development, however, the PRC isattempting to move from a minimal deterrent to asecond strike capability.

While Chinese ballistic missiles are limited intheir accuracy, their number is sufcient to attackand damage all of Taiwans major airelds, portsand key infrastructure with the probability ofdegrading Taiwans ability to launch its ghteraircraft and coordinate its air defense. Chinasgoal is to develop within the decade guidancesystems that will improve the accuracy of its


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ballistic missiles to a circular error probable of10 meters. If they are successful, this will createa threat to U.S. Navy ships deployed to the eastside of Taiwan and will seriously affect Taiwansability to defend itself. The PRC is also workingon accurate cruise missiles with an over-the-horizon capability that could y under currentand projected missile defense systems. As part

of its recent purchase of two destroyers fromRussia, the PRC is receiving SS-N-22 SUNBURNanti-ship cruise missiles, which the United StatesNavy is said to be unable to defend against.

China was shocked and impressed by U.S.technological warfare in the Persian Gulf andKosovo. It decided it needed to develop at leastsome of these capabilities for its own military.As a result, China has shown great interest inthe Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that

has become such a popular discussion topicin Western military circles. Pillsbury saysadvocates of a Chinese RMA have been callingsince 1993 for the PRC to attempt to leapfrogAmerican technology by investing in exoticweapons systems, developing new doctrines,and deploying new organizations.66 They alsobelieve that the United States is particularlyvulnerable to militaries possessing the same sortof technological prowess as its own. Becausethe United States military has built information

technology into every aspect of warghting,interference with that technology would havedevastating consequences for American ability touse its military. Chinese military leaders believeif they focus their efforts on disabling these high-tech systems, they can keep the United Statesout of the ght or defeat it when it engages.67Interestingly, while China considers the UnitedStates vulnerable to RMA developments becauseof its dependence on technology, it believes it canexploit technology to deter or defeat the UnitedStates in a regional conict without sufferingfrom the same vulnerability. Chinese advocatesof an RMA seem to understand the RMA in aninstrumental sense without clearly understandingthe organizational elements required and havea nave expectation that the RMA can quicklyand inexpensively transform Chinas offensive

military capability and enable a weaker nation todefeat a stronger one. Pillsbury says these ideasgo by the name Assassins Mace and InferiorDefeats the Superior in the Chinese militaryliterature.68

Chinese military authors have writtenextensively on the potential role of IW in enablinga country like China to bypass several generations

of technology to defeat a more powerful andadvanced adversary. PLA leaders believe manyaspects of IW can be found in embryonic form inthe Chinese military classics. Drawing on these forinspiration, China is likely to develop innovativeIW strategies that will look very different fromAmerican IW programs.69 To the extent they aredifferent and the United States fails to recognizethe differences, they will be difcult for U.Sforces to counter.

The United States has the most powerfulmilitary in the world. This is not the samehowever, as being able to deploy that powerin support of Taiwan. As a world power, theUnited States must be prepared to deploy forcesto many places around the world at the sametime, limiting its effort in any one, whereas Chinaas a regional power can focus its efforts in itsimmediate vicinity. For future Taiwan crises, theUnited States is likely to need to deploy morethan carrier battle groups. American ability and

willingness to support Taiwan militarily willdepend on the magnitude of the crisis, whetherother international situations require a U.Spresence, the willingness of allies, especiallyJapan, to allow the United States to use bases ontheir territory and even to provide some directassistance, American public support, and thenature of Chinese deterrence. The answers tothese questions cannot be known until a crisisoccurs. A 2000 symposium at the U.S. NationalDefense University concluded that regionalstates do not want the United States to ask themto help in the event of a conict in the TaiwanStrait; nevertheless, they expect the UnitedStates to intervene in support of Taiwan shouldit become necessary.70 The most important factorfor Americas regional allies will be how Chinathreatens to respond.


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American support of Taiwan can range frompolitical and diplomatic intervention, throughprovision of replacement and supplementaryweapons systems and intelligence, to some formof direct military involvement with naval and airforces. Deployment of American ground forces tothe island is unlikely. The United States stationedone carrier battle group in the region and has

land-based aircraft in Japan. For anti-submarinewarfare and minesweeping, the United Statesmight need to call for Japanese assistance if thepolitical climate permits.

Today, Taiwan can defend itself against directattack by PRC conventional air, land, and surfacenaval forces, and will continue to be able to formuch of this decade. Taiwans anti-submarinewarfare capability is limited as is its submarineforce. It cannot defend itself against ballistic

or cruise missile attack and likely would facedifculty in responding to a concerted specialoperations attack. Taiwan has virtually no self-defense capability against a preemptive attack ofthe sort China has been talking about.71 It coulddefeat many of the individual thrusts, apart fromballistic missiles, but if the PRC were able tocoordinate a multifaceted surprise attack, Taiwancould not protect itself. Taiwans ability to defendagainst IW operations is unknown, but manyaspects of its IW capability are at least equal to

those of the PRC.Taiwans military needs to refocus its

emphasis away from ground forces toward airand naval forces. The battle will be at least halflost if the PLA gains a foothold on Taiwan itself.Historically, the army has been the most powerfulelement of Taiwans armed forces, and it remainsskeptical that the air force and navy can preventa successful PRC invasion. Therefore, it wantsweapons such as tanks to be able to defeat thePLA on the beach. Anti-submarine ships andhelicopters have not been high on Taiwans listof desired purchases, and it has been unable tond anyone willing to sell it modern submarines.China has effectively used the threat of economicretaliation to deter countries other than theUnited States from selling weapons to Taiwan.

As important as acquiring new weapons are

assistance in integrating the systems Taiwansarmed forces already have, improved pilotand crew training, hardened aireld facilities,improved air defense command and control, andbetter interoperability with U.S. forces.72 This typeof military spending is less glamorous than someof the new weapons systems Taiwan would like,but it is no less essential to a successful defense of

the island.Because it cannot defend against the increasing

number of ballistic missiles deployed acrossthe Strait, Taiwan faces the possibility it will nolonger be able to maintain the air superiorityover the Taiwan Strait needed to defeat anyPRC invasion attempt.73 This risk would appearhowever, to depend on China attaining sufcienprecision with its missiles to render runways atleast temporarily inoperable, slowing the Taiwan

air forces sortie rate, decreasing the number ofdefensive aircraft that can be in the air at anyone time, and destroying airborne warning andcontrol system (AWACS) aircraft on the groundTaiwan is also concerned by the PRCs declaredinterest in developing an electromagnetic pulseweapon. Detonated high over Taiwan, such aweapon could destroy all unshielded electronicson the island without causing any casualties.

With its modern, technological economy andeducated population, Taiwans capacity for IW

is at least as great as the PRCs.74 This includesdeveloping both defensive measures to protectagainst PRC IW attacks and offensive means thatwould target PRC military and civilian systemsand the computers that support them. Becauseit is more technologically advanced, Taiwan ismore vulnerable to IW, but it also has a strongerbase from which to develop its own defensiveand offensive programs. The same asymmetryargument the PRC makes regarding smaller andweaker states in relation to the United Statesapplies to Taiwan and the PRC. A smaller,weaker Taiwan can focus its strengths against alarger, stronger PRCs weaknesses.

A disquieting note is that Taiwanstechnological capability also includes the know-how to develop nuclear weapons and deliverysystems. Taiwan put its nuclear program on


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hold more than 30 years ago because of strongU.S. pressure. China has declared that Taiwansdevelopment of nuclear weapons now wouldconstitute grounds for war. Stokes notes,however, that if Taiwan should lose the sense ofsecurity it enjoys with the universal presumptionof U.S. intervention, it might try again to developnuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

Stokes adds that, absent a viable defense againstChinese missiles in Fujian province, Taiwanmay plan for such counterforce operations aspreemptive strikes.75

INTENTIONS

The only party that has made its intentionsclear is the PRC. It seeks the political integrationof Taiwan with Mainland China, and is willing

to use force if necessary to achieve this goal. Invarious white papers and public pronouncements,the PRC has stated conditions that would cause itto use force against Taiwan and nations aidingTaiwan and drawn a rm line on acceptableinternational and domestic behavior by Taiwan.Taiwan has refused to accept PRC conditionsfor continued discussion of its status because itbelieves the conditions would predetermine theoutcome of those discussions, but has carefullyavoided any public statements hinting at formal

independence (although Lee Tung-hui cameclose in 1999). The United States has followeda policy of deliberate strategic ambiguity since1954. Especially since 1979, the United States hassought to leave unclear to both Taiwan and thePRC its willingness to intervene in cross-Straitconict, saying only that it expected a mutuallyagreeable, peaceful resolution of the differencesbetween Taiwan and the PRC. In 1997, PresidentClinton tilted sharply in the PRCs direction, onlyto have President Bush tilt equally sharply in theother direction in 2001. It is likely that at leastsome portion of this strategy of ambiguity resultsfrom U.S. uncertainty about the action it wouldtake in various contingencies. Japan is the fourthactor whose intentions must be considered.Despite PRC complaints, it is unclear how muchsupport Japan would provide for U.S. military

assistance to Taiwan. The preference of all fourparties involved appears to be a continuation ofthe status quo, but this consensus may not last.

The PRC says Taiwan is and always hasbeen part of China. As the October 2000 PRCDefense White Paper says, Settlement of theTaiwan issue and realization of the completereunication of China embodies the fundamental

interests of the Chinese nation. . . . Settlement ofthe Taiwan issue is entirely an internal affair ofChina.76 In the PRCs view, Taiwan has becomea matter of national sovereignty and nationalhonor. Separatist tendencies in Tibet, Xinjiang,and Inner Mongolia lead Chinese leaders to viewincorporation of Taiwan as a matter of regimesurvival. They believe Taiwanese separatismencourages minority separatist groups on theMainland. For the current generation of Chinese

leaders, who are not part of the revolutionarygenerations of Mao and Deng and lack theirlegitimacy, the nal unication of China thatbegan with Hong Kong and Macao must includeTaiwan. The PRC considers gaining politicalcontrol over Taiwan to be a vital national interestIt is not clear that the United States recognizesthe emotional and nationalist depth of Beijingsinterest in Taiwan or the widespread support ofthe Chinese public for unication.

Because China considers Taiwan a renegade

province, it views U.S. support of Taiwan since1950 as interference in its domestic affairs. Chinadoes not consider its dealings with Taiwan tobe a matter of concern to other nations. Thus,the PRC reserves the right to treat Taiwan thesame way it does the Mainland provinces. Tomany Americans, what China considers quellingdomestic disturbance or concluding a civil warwould appear as aggression and evidence ofPRC belligerence. As a rm supporter of theWestphalian view of national sovereignty, thePRC has opposed international interventionsin what it considers domestic matters (such asKosovo). The primary reason for this positionis its fear that a similar argument could be usedto justify intervention by other nations in suchChinese domestic concerns as Taiwan, Tibetor Xinjiang or government suppression of


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dissident groups such as the Falun Gong.Traditionally, China has seen itself as a nation

that prefers to settle disputes peacefully. This iscalled the Confucian-Mencian strategic culture.Based on his reading of new evidence, Johnstonhas challenged this self-image. He says Chinasdispute behavior in some cases has been higherrisk, more militarized, and less connected to

specic limited political demands than was oncebelieved. He suggests China will be morelikely to resort to forceand relatively high levelsof forcewhen disputes involve territory andoccur in periods when the perceived gap betweendesired and ascribed status is growing or large.77Taiwan is such a situation, and China believesthis is such a time.

Considering Taiwan legally part of oneChina, the PRC views the U.S sale of weapons to

Taiwan, ofcial and unofcial visits between U.S.and Taiwan government ofcials, congressionalresolutions supporting Taiwan, and possibleinclusion of Taiwan in an East Asian regionalmissile defense system as interference in domesticChinese affairs. The Taiwan Security EnhancementAct (TSEA), arising from congressional concernabout Clinton administration policy towardTaiwan and China, and proposing the inclusionof Taiwan in a regional missile defense programand ofcial military-to-military contacts between

Taiwan and the United States, are especiallyprovocative. Since current U.S. law already offersadequate support for Taiwan, and the proposedTheater Missile Defense (TMD) could protectTaiwan against neither the current PRC ballisticmissile threat nor future land-attack cruisemissiles, both measures would be needlesslyprovocative. A threat to deploy TMD in theTaiwan area might be useful as a bargaining chipto induce China to decrease its ballistic missileforce across the Strait from Taiwan, but it offerslittle of military value.

Many Chinese leaders believe Americansview a rising China as a threat to the United Statesthat must be countered with political, economic,and military measures. This view affects theirperception of U.S. actions with regard to Taiwan,other regional states (especially recent military

deployments to Central Asia), and deploymentof any missile defense system. While China viewsthe inclusion of Taiwan in any missile defenseas a political statement because it would requiresome U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation, it seesthe existence of any form of missile defense asintended to threaten what it considers legitimateChinese action in the region and deny it a credible

nuclear deterrent. Unless American leaders canconvince China this is not the case, plans todeploy a missile defense will encourage Chinato speed its development and deployment of anICBM force that will have a quick response timeand be difcult to detect and destroy. This couldenhance Chinas ability to deter future Americanand allied intervention in support of Taiwan.

Taiwan can probably defend itself against PRCattack today and for at least the next 5 years. It may

be able to do so without U.S. assistance for as longas a month. Taiwan almost certainly can repel aninvasion and maintain air superiority over theTaiwan Strait and Taiwan. Its ability to controlthe sea east of Taiwan is doubtful because it lacksa blue water navy and the proper equipment todefend against PRC submarines or sweep minesfrom its ports and their sea approaches. Withoutair superiority over the Strait, however, the PRCcould not achieve surface naval superiorityeither.

Since martial law ended in 1987, Taiwan hasbeen moving rapidly toward full democracy, evento the point where the opposition party won thepresidency in 2000. This has been accompaniedby rapid economic growth that has improved theTaiwanese standard of living far beyond that ofMainland Chinese. As the relationship betweenthe PRC and Taiwan improved during the 1990s,many Taiwanese visited the Mainland. The resulthas been a decreased interest in incorporation intothe PRC. They are willing to construct factoriesand do business on the Mainland, but they donot want to become part of it. Replacement of theNationalists who ed the Mainland in 1949 bynative-born Taiwanese makes it far less likely thePRC will be able to cut a deal over the heads of theislands residents, who show little support for thePRCs one China claim. Extensive investment on


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the Mainland has given Taiwanese businessmenan interest in peaceful and expanding cross-Straitrelationships, and they are not shy about sayingso.

CRISIS DETERRENCEAND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Deterrence theory is a major part of westerninternational relations theory. There is somequestion, however, about its application to non-western and cross-cultural settings. Apart fromthe Taiwan Strait, the United States has hadlimited success in deterring Asian adversaries.We hope that with a proper understanding ofourselves and our adversary and an openness tosolving our disagreements we can achieve eithera peaceful resolution or successful deterrence, but

this is not always the case.

78

Deterrence theory presumes that our adversaryis rational, reasonable, and generally predictable.It also presumes that each side knows its own andthe other sides interests. Only when we knowour interests do we know what we are trying todeter, and only when we know the other sidesinterests do we know what deterrence is likely tocost. The problem is that adversaries frequentlymisunderstand one another and act in ways theother considers irrational, making it hard for us

to know our adversary. What we often miss in allthis is that our standard of rationality does notnecessarily apply to our adversarys situation,especially in the interplay between domesticand international concerns.79 The adversary wecall irrational might be crazy like a fox. Whenthe adversary has a different culture and history,the gap only increases unless each party makes aserious effort to understand the other.

According to classic deterrence theory,successful deterrence of an adversary requiresthreatening to exact a cost greater than anypotential gain the adversary might achieve orremoving a benet the adversary currentlyenjoys.80 It can also mean reducing the expectedbenet the adversary hopes to gain,81 a courseof action to

crisis deterrence in the taiwan stra

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