Crisis in Cambodia: A Defense of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine

By Cody Phillips

A Junior Paper submitted to the Department of Politics

in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Arts

Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey

3 May 2016

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Introduction

On April 17, 1975, Saloth Sar—henceforth known as Pol Pot—and his Khmer Rouge

army converged on Phnom Penh and declared the establishment of a new age of Cambodia

under the name Democratic Kampuchea. In the following three years, eight months, and

twenty days, one in four Cambodians—almost 2 million people—would die at the hands of

this regime.1 As the state took control of agriculture and industry, rigidly controlling every

aspect of society, famine, disease, and state crackdowns on dissenters resulted in widespread

death, across all social and economic classes. How was it that such massive atrocity occurred

unabated? How could the international community stand by for almost four years as a quarter

of the population of a nation was wiped out? Questions like these continue to ring loud in

human rights discourse as scholars and politicians alike look back on the atrocities and the

lack of international response in Cambodia and ask what more should or even could have

been done. While critics on each side acknowledge that violations of human rights leading to

genocide by a state government against its own citizens are deplorable and ought never be

allowed to occur, debate rages over who has authority to prevent such atrocities, and how

such prevention ought to be carried out. In this short piece, I seek to demonstrate how the

way forward for the international community in preventing future atrocities against human

rights lies in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, advocated and recently adopted by the

UN. In light of the crisis in Cambodia, I attempt to chart a path forward, contingent on the

cooperation and coordination of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as they help to

redefine international norms and coordinate new understandings of state sovereignty.

Definitional Overview 1 David Chandler, “Revolution in Cambodia,” A History of Cambodia. Vol.4. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008. Print. 258 2 J.L Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” Humanitarian Intervention:

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In this endeavor, it first must be understood what is to be defined as humanitarian

intervention. In his political handbook on humanitarian intervention, political theorist J.L

Holzgrefe specifically demarcates humanitarian intervention as

“the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at

preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human

rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state

within whose territory force is applied.”2

This definition focuses debate on cases where states must act with the explicit threat or use of

military force in order to stop atrocities. The question of intervention, therefore, comes down

to definitions and responsibilities of state sovereignty, because any humanitarian intervention

inherently involves one or more outside actor imposing its collective political, diplomatic,

and military will over that of the offending state. In 1966, Stanley Hoffman found that the

World Court defined state sovereignty to mean that the state “is subject to no other state, and

has full and exclusive powers within its jurisdiction.”3 Even recently, realist political theorist

John J. Mearsheimer has written in a defense of realism that sovereignty “inheres in states,

because there is no higher ruling body in the international system. There is no ‘government

2 J.L Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 18. Print. 3 Stanley Hoffman, “International Systems and International Law,” in The Strategy of World Order, vol. II: International, ed. Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (New York: World Law Fund, 1966), 164, accessed in Keck, Margaret E. and Katrhyn Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics: Introduction,” Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 36.

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over governments.’”4 This realist understanding of state sovereignty as absolute in the

international landscape demonstrates the traditional understanding of the great magnitude of

a state engaging in military intervention, even for human rights purposes; intervention is

tantamount to war, as each requires states to breach the walls of sovereignty. Additionally,

Mearsheimer provides three more assumptions of states within a realist understanding of

international politics:

“states are potentially dangerous to each other,” because of their military power;

“states can never be certain about the intentions of other states…because intentions

are impossible to divine with absolute certainty”; and finally, “the most basic motive

driving states is survival.”5

From these assumptions of states, Mearsheimer and other realists deem international

institutions as incredibly ineffective and unimportant in determining state actions. They ask,

if state sovereignty is absolute, then why would states worry about international norms,

courts, or doctrines? International law theorists like Bruce Broomhall have continued to

argue in favor of a realist dogma of state sovereignty, stating that “either one supports the

rule of law, or one supports state sovereignty. The two are not…compatible.”6

Therefore, because state sovereignty continues to hold such a solid place in

international politics, in order to justify humanitarian intervention and encourage states to act

in order to halt human rights atrocities, most political theorists promote moral or rational

4 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, 10. 5 Ibid 10. 6 Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, at 56, accessed in Robert Cryer, “International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?” The European Journal of International Law 16 no.5 (2006): 979-1000

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justifications for intervention; indeed, they are necessary so as to provide grounds for

undertaking this massive step of imposing on state sovereignty, as it has been traditionally

understood. Specifically, Holzgrefe delineates a few main tracks of justification within the

realm of humanitarian intervention theory, specifically as it relates to the enforcement and

guarantee of human rights. From naturalist theories, which “contend that morally binding

international norms are an inherent feature of the world”; to consensualist theories, which

“claim that the moral authority of any given international norm derives from the explicit or

tacit consent of the agents subject to that norm”; to individualist theories, “concerned

ultimately only with the welfare of individual human beings”, political theorists have

advocated every spectrum of moral justification for why human rights ought to be applied

and protected universally.7 As far as justifications for humanitarian intervention is concerned,

Holzgrefe delineates utilitarian arguments for intervention8—in line with Bentham—natural

law justifications for intervention9, and social contractarianist arguments10—in the vein of

Rawls “veil of ignorance”11—as valid lines of reasoning towards justifying military

intervention. Although philosophers and political theorists have argued such a plethora of

moral arguments to justify the necessity of universal human rights and the moral imperatives

for transnational use of force in order to enforce those rights, in an international landscape

defined by self-interested states, such justifications may not be enough to motivate action to

actually protect human rights.

7 J.L Holzgrefe, 19. 8 Ibid 20 9 Ibid 25 10 Ibid 28 11 John Rawls, “The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice,” A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 208

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Even in his defense of non-intervention, a foil to most traditional political theorists,

John Stuart Mill advocates on moral and philosophical grounds. He argues that “all,

therefore, who either speak or act in the name of England, are bound by the strongest

obligations, both of prudence and of duty, to avoid giving either of those handles for

misconstruction.”12 Mill beseeches English statesmen in this piece to stop their pursuit of

intervention, because of their failure to uphold their patriotic and moral duty of representing

English values well internationally. Aside from poor rhetoric, however, Mill’s true complaint

with English intervention in the 19th century stems from English greed and self-interest, as he

states:

“But, of all attitudes which a nation can take upon the subject of intervention, the

meanest and worst is to profess that it interferes only when it can serve its own

subjects by it.”13

Intervention, according to Mill, is an extremely base endeavor when it is only undertaken in

order to advance imperialist or economic interests—as was often the case with 19th century

England. While this may serve as a qualified critique of the justifications for humanitarian

intervention, it also may provide a clear look into realist political theory as well. If states, in

reality, act largely out of self-interest, either for self-promotion or self-protection, any

motivation for humanitarian intervention must take this into consideration. Moral arguments

provide the essential starting point for any explanation of why humanitarian intervention is

necessary, in order to guarantee natural rights and in order to contribute to the security of

every international citizen, but states react to real world incentives. Positive and negative

12 John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical. New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1882. Print. 242 13 Ibid 243

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reinforcement inform states decision-making processes in ways that philosophical or moral

justifications are unable to duplicate.

In observing the action and inaction of the United States on the international scale

over the last century, the world has seen a maverick for personal liberty and the primary

advocate for human rights fail time and again to intervene when its own political incentives

didn’t line up with the moral justifications for intervention. Therefore, because such moral

arguments or ethical thresholds are not sufficient motivations for states to intervene to halt

atrocities, an international system of incentives is necessary in order to ensure that atrocities

like Cambodia will never occur again. As will be made clear in what follows, Cambodia

provides an excellent look at impediments to intervention, and offers a crucial opportunity to

learn from history’s mistakes in order to create a system to lay a clear framework for

intervention moving forward.

Case Study in Cambodia

In examining the specific case of the Cambodian genocide at the hands of the Khmer Rouge

and the ensuing failure of the United States and the international community to intervene, we

can clearly see the necessity and possibility of international intervention, and find a specific

path forward via institutions of the United Nations working in concert with nongovernmental

actors.

By beginning this discussion with an understanding of state sovereignty as carrying

serious weight on the international landscape, we may begin to understand processes of

interstate intervention. In the specific case of Cambodia, the United States clearly treated

sovereignty as individually and supremely held by the state, which seriously impeded any

possible incentive for intervention. Specifically, this view of sovereignty stemmed from the

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recent political history of Cambodia. After finally gaining independence from France in

1953, after a decade long process of France slowly releasing its hold on Indochina, Cambodia

stood under the authority of Norodom Sihanouk, the King of Cambodia. However, in 1955,

the Geneva Convention which had granted Cambodia military autonomy, also stipulated that

elections be held, which promptly led to a reorganization of a “Democrat” party, as well as

an opposition Communist party.14 Although in the early stages of this attempt at democratic

practices Sihanouk maintained much of the political authority, it provided the groundwork

for the possibility of a transfer of power. As parties continued to grow in power, elections

grew continually more representative, and power became less centralized in the person of

Sihanouk. David Chandler writes that in the 1966 elections, “candidates favoring local

interests triumphed over those whose main credentials were based on their loyalty to

Sihanouk.” Additionally, these elections were “the first since 1951 in which candidates had

to relate to the voters.”15 Although Sihanouk maintained high approval and continued to

wield the majority of the political power in Cambodia, the political institutions were in place

for a transfer of power.

This understanding of the Cambodian state is essential for understanding its relations

with the international community, specifically the United States, as they ultimately failed to

intervene because of their respect for the sovereignty of Cambodia and of its surrounding and

allied states. In the early 1960s, the United States’ primary concern with Southeast Asian

political systems was to promote democracy and fight the spread of communism. While

actively supporting South Vietnam against the Communist Viet Cong in the Vietnam War,

14 David Chandler, “Revolution in Cambodia,” A History of Cambodia. Vol.4. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008. Print 235 15 Ibid 238.

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the U.S demonstrated their commitment to supporting any kind of democracy rather than

seeing communism spread. The U.S had largely supported Sihanouk and the Cambodian

pursuit of independence via military aid, beginning in 1955, with the establishment of a

Military Advisory Group, but after Sihanouk broke off all U.S aid in 1963, the U.S began to

question its loyalty to democracy.16 Therefore, when the U.S’s interests in Vietnam crossed

into Cambodia as Viet Cong militants took refuge in North Cambodia, the U.S looked within

the Cambodian political system, namely Sihanouk’s opposition party, in order to utilize the

institutions in place to transfer power to a more pro-American leader. By providing air

strikes, military support and aid to Lon Nol, the leader of a 1970 coup, the U.S attempted to

prop up yet another weak, disorganized, vaguely pro-American regime in Southeast Asia.

However, this campaign was doomed to fail, as Samantha Power points out in A Problem

From Hell, because Lon Nol was “corrupt, repressive, and incompentent,” and his troops

were “equipped for parades, not warfare.”17

The U.S failed to see this corruption, which ultimately laid the path for communism

to prevail, because they were blinded by what Samuel Huntington has described as the

“second reverse wave” against democratization in Asia. Cambodia mirrored Korea, where,

Syngman Rhee’s new ‘semiauthoritarian’ regime “was legitimated by elections in 1963 but

turned into a full-scale highly authoritarian system in 1973.”18 As Cambodia turned in the

same direction, the U.S withheld any harsh reaction for fear of upsetting the already fragile

16 From the U.S Federal Records, “Records of Interservice Agencies.” 334.5.2 Records of MAAG Cambodia http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/334.html#334.5.2 17 Samantha Power, “Cambodia: ‘Helpless Giant,’” A Problem From Hell. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2013. Print. 92, 93. 18 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 20

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political makeup of the region. In line with its severe anti-communist foreign policy, the U.S

refused to intervene and failed to stop the Cambodian state from pursuing an authoritarian

regime type, largely because it remained anti-communist initially, and had been legitimated

by pseudo-democratic institutions, such as elections and political parties. The problem in the

case of Cambodia may, therefore, be termed as a problem of “regime recognition.” Because

they were unable to correctly identify the weakness of the incumbent regime, and the

inevitability of the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge, but instead deemed it a legitimate

regime, with international political clout, the United States failed to prevent its rise to power

in the early 1970s.

As it became evident that American support was failing to prevent the Khmer Rouge

from gaining authority in the early 1970s, President Nixon faced serious public and political

outcry against any further involvement in the region, largely because the American public

saw Cambodia as just another domino in the line of Southeast Asian states that would fall to

communism, despite American efforts—even though this was far from the truth. In

Congressional meetings in May, 1970, House member Dante B. Fascell expressly opposed

any further involvement in Indochina, saying he “was expressing the spirit of the concerned

citizens.”19 Additionally, he brought forth a May 3 article from the Miami Herald article

which stated that “it is a desperate gamble taken in the belief that the war may be ended more

quickly by cutting the Communist supply line through Cambodia…ultimately, Southeast

Asia will be lost to the West no matter what course we pursue.”20

19 Congressional Record for May 18, 1970, House Proceedings, Volume 116, part 12. Sourced from ProQuest Congressional, April 14, 2015. 20“John S. Knight’s Notebook: Grave Peril Embodied in the President’s Decision.” From the Miami (Fla.) Herald, May 3, 1970, accessed in Congressional Record of proceedings May

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Although incredibly persuasive, this public sentiment was largely off base, as the new

administration of the Khmer Rouge had no clear ties to Vietnam, as Saloth Sar had

descended on Phnom Penh without approval from his Vietnamese allies, and had no desire to

pursue collective, Communist interests.21 This fact didn’t matter, however, for perception

among the general public and Congress was that the Khmer Rouge was simply just one of

many conjoined in the network of Asian Communism, and that they were “simply an

extension of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.”22 Although it soon became all too

clear that Saloth Sar had an extremely unique, radical ideology in mind for his new regime,

and didn’t align himself with either the Vietnamese, or Chinese Communist Party, the U.S

refused to address the Khmer Rouge independent of its region or see the ensuing disaster as a

singular issue, and simply washed their hands of all things related to the region. John Roush

brought forward testimony indicative of the sentiment towards U.S involvement in Cambodia

in 1975, as he argued for complete economic and political withdrawal from the region,

saying:

“day after day we see pictures and hear reports of the human suffering in Cambodia,

suffering that occurs because of the war that is going on in that faraway land.

Suffering that is being prolonged because of our continual support of that war.”23

In advocating for simply accepting the Khmer Rouge’s victory over Lon Nol and the

incumbent regime, Roush and others acknowledged it’s political legitimacy over the nation,

18, 1970, House Proceedings, Volume 116, part 12, 15808-15857. Sourced from ProQuest Congressional, April 14, 2015. 21 David Chandler, “Revolution in Cambodia,” A History of Cambodia. Vol.4. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008. Print. 258.22 Samantha Power, “Cambodia: Helpless Giant,” 97 23 Senator Roush, addressing the House on situation in Cambodia from Congressional Record, February 27, 1975, House Proceedings Volume 121, part 4, 4590

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placing blame on the wrong actors, rather than identifying the KR as the guilty perpetrators.

This sentiment ultimately got as far as the White House, as President Nixon, in his statement

on the evacuation of the U.S Mission in Phnom Penh, which signaled the official withdrawal

of the U.S from the nation, acknowledged the legitimacy of the nation under the new regime,

and stated, “The United States wishes Cambodia to find its place in the world as an

independent, neutral and united country, living in peace…Despite that evacuation, we will

continue to do whatever possible to support an independent, peaceful, neutral and unified

Cambodia.”24 Such rhetoric left the Khmer Rouge open to implement their genocidal

policies, and tied the U.S’s hands significantly for any future intervention. Returning to a

region where it had previously failed was all but impossible with what the lack of public

interest, which has been referred to as “Southeast Asia Fatigue,” that was so prominent in the

U.S.25

Here, then, lies the ultimate problem with the lack of intervention in Cambodia, as the

U.S had no political incentive to intervene because they had previously validated the

regime’s presence by leaving the region in 1973. Sovereignty had been granted to the Khmer

Rouge, so any ensuing intervention would not only have to justify the present intervention,

but also make sense of the past decision to halt military and political action. Incentives for

U.S interaction in Southeast Asia, let alone intervention in the region, were severely limited

during this time, however, and not nearly sufficient to overcome the lack of political will that

prevailed in this period. Incentives to intervene wouldn’t come from the power of the

24 “Statement on the Evacuation of the United States Mission in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.” Unnumbered Executive Orders, Directives and Proclamations, sourced from ProQuest Congressional, originally sourced from Public Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1983. April 12, 1975. Accessed 21 April 2016. 25 Samantha Power, “Cambodia: Helpless Giant,” 110

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selectorate, as Power writes, because “as soon as U.S troops returned home, the American

public’s appetite for news from the region shrank.”26 Power notes that in 1976, the year after

foreigners were expelled from Phnom Penh, the Washington Post and New York Times

published only 126 stories concerning Cambodia, down from over 700 per year in the

previous half of the decade during the U.S’s involvement in the region. Few of these stories

even addressed the important issues in the region, as Power found that only two to three per

year discussed the human rights violations occurring in Cambodia.27

Additionally, even when information regarding the authoritarian brutality and social

cleansing of the Khmer Rouge began to leak out of Cambodia, the United States still didn’t

respond with intervention because it lacked incentives to invest either its political capital or

its military might. In July 1977, the U.S Foreign Service’s chief Cambodian officer, Charles

H. Twining and Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke brought one of the first

government reports on the atrocities in Cambodia to the House International Relations

subcommittee. Holbrooke noted that while some “guess that between half a million and 1.2

million have died since 1975,” what is certain is that “the number of deaths appears to be in

the tens if not hundreds of thousands.”28 Holbrooke and Twining also testified to the

thousands of Cambodian refugees still fleeing the country, and to the fact that only one in

five refugees would make it out of the country due to Cambodian “scorched earth policy”

near their border. While Holbrooke and Twining stipulated that it was necessary to continue

providing aid to those fleeing the region, little else came of the meeting. Power notes that

26 Ibid 110 27 Ibid 11128 Murrey Marder, “The Tragedy of Cambodia,” Washington Post, July 27, 1977. Accessed online https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/07/27/the-tragedy-of-cambodia/6f1f370d-7d35-4226-b68e-fdafbd13737e/

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Twining, who had seen firsthand the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge, bemoaned, ““It was easy

to come before Congress because I was so sure about what was going on. When it came to

‘what to do’ though, I just had this overwhelming feeling of helplessness.’”29 While the

genocidal tendencies, blatant human rights violations, and brutal practices of the Khmer

Rouge against its own citizens became painfully clear throughout 1977 and into 197830, the

U.S had no sustained push for intervention from the political elite, no constitutional or

international mandate to follow, and very limited public pressure to incentivize state action.

Additionally, because information was so limited coming out of Cambodia, there was

no clear path forward even if the incentives to intervene were present. Because journalists

and foreign nationals had been expelled from the country in 1975 and limited firsthand

accounts were available, the majority of information regarding the Khmer Rouge came from

refugee reports. Power notes that the problem with such reports was not that they weren’t

being published and disseminated throughout the U.S, but rather, that reports were rarely

taken at face value. She states,

“The words were available, describing death marches, roadside executions, and the

murder of the rich, the intellectuals and even office assistants. But…with the country

sealed tight, statesmen and citizens could take shelter in the fog of plausible

29 Power, “Cambodia: Helpless Beast,” 130. 30 An entire congressional report, filed by Senator McGovern resulted in an extenuated push for military action, although it failed to gain any traction because, as noted in the congressional hearings, “it is not clear what course of action the world community will decide to take.” From Congressional Record from September 28, 1978, Senate Proceedings, Volume 124, Part 24, 32133

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deniability…It would take years to promote the raw, unconfirmed data to the status of

knowledge.”31

Because the U.S lacked all these incentives to intervene, they justified the crisis in political

terms, refusing to violate the sovereignty of the Cambodian state for fear of distressing the

political makeup in the region. Therefore, any answer to the question of what would a system

that can prevent genocide look like, must begin by addressing these incentive issues.

Responsibility to Protect

This clear way forward has been most recently argued as the Responsibility to Protect

Doctrine, recently adopted and codified as official UN doctrine concerning humanitarian

intervention. In their groundbreaking report on the topic, Gareth Evans and Mohamed

Sahnoun of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)

articulated the importance of changing the understanding of humanitarian intervention from a

motivation to intervene, to a right to protect. Specifically, they alter the definition of state

sovereignty in order to place the burden of achieving equal and accessible rights for all world

citizens not only on a citizen’s home country, but also on the entire international community.

Specifically, they state

“although this responsibility [to protect] is owed by all sovereign states to their own

citizens in the first instance, it must be picked up by the international community if

that first-tier responsibility is abdicated, or if it cannot be exercised.”32

By changing this terminology from humanitarian intervention to the responsibility to protect,

the mandate on the international community becomes increasingly more proactive and all

31 Ibid 12132 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81.6 (2002): 99-110. Print.

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encompassing in order to ensure that the UN Charter, which guarantees every international

citizen his or her innate human rights, is upheld. Specifically, it “implies evaluating the

issues from the point of view of those needing support, rather than those who may be

considering intervention.”33 In the case of Cambodia, this issue was preeminent for the

United States’ decision-making process. Because they viewed Southeast Asia in political

terms, they were only incentivized to intervene militarily as they deemed it would benefit

their political goals of stopping Communism, but ultimately didn’t because of issues of

sovereignty. Under the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, however, military intervention in

any region is only permissible with just cause, which is defined as when

“civilians must be faced with the threat of serious and irreparable harm”—large-scale

loss of life, actual or anticipated , with genocidal intent or not, which is the product of

deliberate state action, state neglect, inability to act, or state failure. The second is

large-scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or anticipated, whether carried about by killing,

forced expulsion, acts of terror, or rape.” 34

Therefore, the U.S would’ve been contractually obligated to intervene, because Cambodia

had failed in its duties to protect its citizens.

While this justification provides the necessary mandate for outside state protection, it

is only helpful inasmuch as the mandate would work. The UN General Assembly adopted a

resolution at the 2005 World Assembly, which clarified the definitions of state sovereignty,

specifically to

“acknowledge that collective security depends on effective cooperation, in

accordance with international law, against transnational threats,” such that “each

33 Ibid 10034 Ibid 103

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individual state has responsibility to protect its populations…[and] the international

community, through the UN, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,

humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of

the Charter, to help to protect populations.”35

This international commitment to protecting the rights guaranteed every international citizen

by the UN Charter is an essential first step towards preventing future genocides. Indeed, in

the case of Cambodia, the State Department opposed intervention, even after information

regarding the atrocities was clear, stating in a press release that although the Carter

administration was aware of the situation, it “had no intention of resolving ‘the terrible

situation in Kampuchea by military force,” adding that they were not “aware of any

international support for [such] a plan.”36 While it should have been clear in this case that the

Khmer Rouge was massively abusing the Genocide Convention, nothing was done. Although

tying all consenting members of the UN to this doctrine of the responsibility to protect

provides legal incentives for intervention, the problem of sufficient political will that was so

prevalent in the case of Cambodia, still prevails.

Non-Governmental Organizations

Political will, specifically within democracies, must necessarily come from the voting

public, because it is from them that politicians ultimately draw their authority and ability to

act. However, as we have seen in the case of Cambodia, because information issues and

access often prove to be important roadblocks that keep the voting public from calling for

35 UN General Assembly, “Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 September 2005,” 60th Session, Resolution 138-139. 24 October 2005.36 State Department press release, Facts on File, September 1, 1978 cited in Power, A Problem from Hell, 135-36.

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political action, the political will for intervention never reaches the threshold necessary to

incentivize action. Because of these informational issues, the U.S couldn’t be completely

certain regarding the political situation in Phnom Penh during the three year period under the

Khmer Rouge, and weren’t comfortable intervening. Unsure of the motives or goals of the

new government, they were unwilling to engage diplomatically or militarily in order to halt

the rise of the regime. Unable to validate or disseminate the testimony of refugees or other

firsthand witnesses, the American public remained unconvinced of the scope of the tragedy

occurring at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. Finally, because no Western organizations or

institutions remained within the closed borders, the U.S had no recourse for interceding

humanitarianly by providing resources or aid to citizens in the country. Nongovernmental

organizations and actors could serve extremely well in providing solutions to these three

problems.

In Cambodia, Amnesty International may have been able to serve in this important

role if they had been more established at the time of the atrocities, but having been founded

in 1961, their scope was limited. Even so, they provide a glimpse at the course NGOs may be

able to take in functioning on the borders of state conflict, providing essential information,

and exerting pressure on offending countries. For example, in their 1975-76 Annual Report,

they documented the fall of Phnom Penh and the ensuing detrimental human rights atrocities,

even while lamenting that “in the absence of any independent observers, allegations of mass

executions and reprisals were impossible to substantiate.”37 Power notes that Amnesty was

unable to dispatch field monitors to closely monitor the situation, and were reticent to shame

the Khmer Rouge publicly, but did “send letters to the regime requesting further information

37 “Cambodia”, Amnesty International Annual Report 1974/75,. London: Amnesty International Publications, 86

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on specific reports of torture and disappearances.”38 While in the early 1970s organizations

like Amnesty International were limited in their ability to serve as watchdogs for the

international community by providing information and serving as indicators of human rights

crises, the future of protection would seem to provide every opportunity for cooperation

between NGOs and the UN in pursuing peaceful resolutions to flare-ups. Although the U.S in

the 1960s and 1970s failed to correctly diagnose and identify the Khmer Rouge as a truly

genocidal regime, in the 21st century, NGOs may fill these gaps, as they work internationally,

on every continent and nearly every country across the globe, reporting on regimes’ actions,

goals and policies accurately and thoroughly. These transnational actors provide great hope

for providing the missing information and guidance to alert nations to opportunities to

engage in intervention to protect human rights.

NGOs like Amnesty International ought to provide the way forward in this pursuit of

an international community tied together by the Responsibility to Protect, because as Keck

and Sikkink write, nongovernmental organizations, specifically Transnational Advocacy

Networks (TANs), are “organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms and they

often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a

rationalist understanding of their ‘interests.’”39 Because advocacy organizations, NGOs and

other idealistic organizations carry extremely limited ulterior motives or outside interests,

they are uniquely suited for interacting within the gaps between state sovereignty. NGOs are

unique as well in the type of power they are able to wield within the international

community:

38 Power, A Problem From Hell, 114.39 Keck, Margaret E. and Katrhyn Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics: Introduction,” Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 8-9.

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“Since they are not powerful in the traditional sense of the word, they must use the

power of their information, ideas and strategies to alter the information and value

contexts within which states make policies. The bulk of what networks do might be

termed persuasion or socialization, but neither process is devoid of conflict.”40

These tactics of persuasion and socialization are imperative for stimulating public opinion,

creating political will, and pressuring governments to follow through on commitments.

NGOs and TANs primarily serve in this capacity as they construct “cognitive frames”

for general publics and political actors to understand crises.41 By providing information, and

firsthand, validated accounts, NGOs are able to provide “not only facts but testimony.”42 This

lack of testimony—the inability to turn raw data into knowledge, or a true understanding of

the situation—severely inhibits states from ever moving towards action, as was the case in

Cambodia. Because people were unable to understand and contextualize the atrocities that

were occurring in the region, and were unable to reconcile the actual political consequences

of an intervention, they simply embraced isolation and abstention. Additionally, politicians

failed to intervene because they had worked to create distance between themselves and

Southeast Asia, so while reports from refugees of deaths and famine and disease were painful

to hear, politicians were devoid of exact information, named victims, or precise figures in

order to truly understand the scope of the effects of the Khmer Rouge. Advocacy

organizations specialize in framing stories and presenting information in ways that are

compelling to a general audience. Framing, therefore, not only plays an essential role for

political actors, but also lowers the perceived domestic political costs by informing the

40 Ibid 1641 Ibid 16-17 42 Ibid 19

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general public in innovative ways in order to bring energy to a crisis that is occurring across

the world in a foreign, and unloved region of the world.

Besides this access to and dissemination of information, NGOs also may play an

essential role on the international scale via leverage politics, or in their ability to influence

political actors by reinforcing humanitarian situations with political and economic

incentives.43 Here is where NGOs are essential in the implementation and enforcement of the

Responsibility to Protect doctrine. While R2P provides an essential hope for the future of

international enforcement of human rights law, it is only as effective as its ability to actually

be implemented. Therefore, NGOs provide the solution, by exerting moral and political

leverage both over perpetrators of human rights abuses, but also over target actors and

signatories of the R2P doctrine. Keck and Sikkink write that,

“Network activists exert moral leverage on the assumption that governments value

the good opinion of others; insofar as networks can demonstrate that a state is

violating international obligations or is not living up to its own claims, they hope to

jeopardize its credit enough to motivate a change in policy or behavior.”44

Therefore, by linking states to international codes and norms of intervention, namely the

Responsibility to Protect, NGOs may motivate states to act for fear of backlash from either

the domestic or international audience. In pursuing this type of accountability politics, in

order to expose and bring charges against states—both offenders and failed responders—

NGOs begin to meld into the new, more fluid understanding of state sovereignty, and help to

create new, international norms. Keck and Sikkink write, “When a state recognizes the

legitimacy of international interventions and changes its domestic behavior in response to

43 Ibid 2344 Ibid 23-24

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international pressure, it reconstitutes the relationships between the state, its citizens and

international actors.”45 The establishment of new international norms is imperative if the

Responsibility to Protect Doctrine is to achieve any real results and change the narrative

around intervention. Norms are only established, however, as states are able to practice

engaging in behavior that treads down a path towards that new norm. NGOs are essential in

this process, as they form the necessary framework for intervention, provide essential

information, and exert pressure on those who refuse to uphold their responsibility.

Additionally, NGOs may serve essential roles in strengthening the existing

international institutions in order to reinforce these norms. By taking advantage of their

international presence and working to inform the international community, NGOs could

serve in important roles as liaisons to state officials and institutions. Political historians

Charlotte Ku and Joaquín Cáceres Brun point to the work of the International Committee of

the Red Cross (ICRC) as an example of an international NGO working in concert with

military and political actors to provide impartial communication in addition to aid in times of

conflict46. In this manner, NGOs may prove to provide the important missing piece, which

will allow future prevention of atrocity as states fulfill their responsibility to protect.

Additionally, NGOs play an essential role in facilitating peaceful resolutions to

conflict. Such resolutions to intervention may be every bit as important as the initial

intervention itself, as every case of military intervention inherently consists of one state

breaching another’s sovereignty. Such serious breaches carry significant post-conflict

45 Ibid 3746 Charlotte Ku and Joaquín Cáceres Brun, “Neutrality and the ICRC Contribution to Contemporary Humanitarian Operations,” Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs. London, England: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. Print. 60.

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implications for the infrastructure and political makeup of the offending country. Canadian

political theorist Francis Kofi Abiew writes,

“the primary task in securing peace today is one of assisting in the longterm political

and social transformation of war-shattered societies. Comprehensive peace operations

thus need to address not only the immediate military and humanitarian concerns, but

also the longer-term tasks of state building, reforming the security sector,

strengthening civil society and promoting social reintegration.”47

Here is where NGOs thrive. By working with NGOs that already exist on the ground in

countries where intervention has just taken place, the international community may more

efficiently and effectively implement aid distribution, and pursue strategies for infrastructure

rebuilding and institutional reform.

Conclusion

As we have seen with the example of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, genocide has

often occurred over the past two centuries of world history while the international

community stands by, lacking incentives to intervene, even if they embrace the moral or

ethical justifications for intervention. Any realist understanding of state sovereignty offers no

hope for altruistic solutions; rather a system of incentives is necessary to achieve any real

results. In recent years, the UN commitment to the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect has

provided an essential framework for intervention, which provides the necessary incentives

for an international response to human rights atrocities and genocide. By analyzing both the

legal framework of this doctrine, and with an understanding of the reasons for the failure of

the U.S in Cambodia, it becomes exceedingly clear that NGOs may offer the international

47 Francis Kofi Abiew, “NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations,” Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs. London, England: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. Print. 32.

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community’s best hope for any realistic, normative solution to humanitarian intervention. As

they minimize information problems, frame conflict and atrocities in consumable and

provocative ways, and provide frameworks for post-conflict aid distribution and institutional

reform, NGOs may yet offer a solution towards ensuring that crisis in Cambodia will never

repeat itself.

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This paper represents my own work in accordance with University regulations. X Cody Phillips