cross-strait relations. roc (taiwan) yearbook 2011 ch06 cross strait relations

The signing ceremony concluding the sixth round of cross-strait talks was held in Taipei on December 21, 2010. The 15 formal agreements and one joint statement of understanding produced by the first six rounds of talks have considerably improved cross-strait relations. (Courtesy of the Straits Exchange Foundation)

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At a Glance

Over the past six decades, the societies on either side of the Taiwan Strait and relations between them have undergone momentous transformations. In 1949, as a result of civil war on the Chinese mainland, the government of the Republic of

China relocated to the island province of Taiwan to advance the ideals on which the Republic was founded. Since then, the two separately governed territories have evolved in different directions politically and economically: The ROC has become a thriving democracy with a well-developed free-market system, while mainland China, though gradually adopting free-market mechanisms, has remained authoritarian.

The relationship between the two has changed over the past two dec-

ades from one of estrangement and military confrontation to one char-

acterized by extensive people-to-people and economic exchanges and

semi-official consultations.

While the possibility of armed conflict across the Taiwan Strait remains

a matter of international concern, the resumption of institutionalized

cross-strait talks in mid-2008 and signing of agreements on a variety of

practical issues offer hope that steady progress can be made toward

building a framework for advancing mutual trust, peace and prosperity.

• SEF-ARATStalksproducetradepactandotheragreements

• Taiwan,HongKongestablishcooperationchannels

• Increasingcross-straitmovementofpeople

• NewlegislationallowsmainlandChinesestudentstostudyinTaiwan

6 Cross-strait Relations


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6Cross-strait Relations

Evolving RelationshipAtthetimetheRepublicofChinawas

foundedin1912,TaiwanwasunderJapa-nesecolonialruleasaresultof the1895Treaty of Shimonoseki, by which Qing-dynasty 清朝 China (1644-1912) cededtheislandprovincetoJapan.AttheendofWorldWar II in 1945, the ROC govern-ment declared Taiwan a province of theRepublic.Fouryearslater,afterfightingacivilwarwithChineseCommunistParty(CCP) rebels, the ROC government ledbytheChineseNationalistParty,orKuo-mintang (KMT) 中國國民黨, relocated tothe island. Since then, the ROC govern-ment’s effective jurisdiction has beenlimited to Taiwan and the Penghu 澎湖,Kinmen金門andMatsu馬祖archipelagos,inadditiontoanumberofsmallerislands.

Meanwhile, theCCPregimedeclaredthe establishment of “the People’s Re-publicofChina,”andthepreambletoitsconstitution asserts that “Taiwan is partofthesacredterritoryofthePeople’sRe-publicofChina,”implyingthattheROChasceasedtoexist.Manyfacts,however,demonstrate its continued existence:The ROC government exercises sover-eigntyoverterritoriesmorepopulousthanthree-quarters of the world’s nations; itmaintainsdiplomaticrelationswithothercountries;andROCpassportsarehonoredtheworldover.Moreover,itisconsistent-ly ranked by global surveys among thetop nations in terms of freedom, humanrightsandeconomicperformance.

1949-1987: From Mutual Denial to Initial Opening

DuringtheColdWar,theTaipei-based,KMT-led government and the Beijing-based, CCP-led government denied eachother’s legitimacy. Each claimed sov-ereignty over all of China inclusive ofthe mainland and Taiwan and attemptedor threatened to use force to resolve the

issue.In1979—eightyearsaftertheROCwas forced to withdraw from the UnitedNationsandtheChinaseatwastransferredto the Beijing government—Beijing’spolicystatementsbegan tostress theuseof “peaceful” means to achieve unifica-tion.Taipei臺北 respondedtothiswitha“three noes” policy—no contact, no ne-gotiationandnocompromise.

Beginning in the 1980s, the ROCunderwent political democratization aswellaseconomicliberalization.Sincetheliftingofmartial lawin1987,Taipeihasadoptedprogressivelymoreopenpoliciestoward Beijing, spurring economic, cul-turalandeducationalexchanges.

1988-2000: Lee Teng-hui Administration

In addition to promoting political re-forms that greatly advanced democracy,theadministrationofPresidentLeeTeng-hui 李登輝 took steps to put the cross-straitrelationshiponarealisticfooting.In1990, just as democratization was goinginto high gear, an advisory panel calledthe National Unification Council 國家統

一委員會wasestablishedundertheOfficeof the President. In February 1991, thecouncilissuedtheGuidelinesforNationalUnification 國家統一綱領, which affirmsa “one-China principle” and outlines athree-phase approach to unification. Thefirst phase calls for the mainland to de-mocratizeandcarryouteconomicreform.

In May of the same year, PresidentLee announced the termination of thePeriodofNationalMobilizationforSup-pressionoftheCommunistRebellion動員

戡亂時期, inferring that the ROC govern-mentnolongerlookedupontheCCPanditsmainlandgovernmentas seditiousor-ganizations thatmustbesuppressed,andindirectly acknowledging the reality thatthetwowereonanequalfooting.

In response to the increasing levelofexchanges across the Taiwan Strait, the


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Cabinet-level Mainland Affairs Council(MAC) 行政院大陸委員會 was founded in1991 to serve as the official agency re-sponsiblefortheoverallplanning,coordi-nation,evaluationandimplementationofcross-straitpolicies.Atthesametime,thesemi-officialStraitsExchangeFoundation(SEF)海峽交流基金會wassetupunderthedirectionoftheMACwiththemissionofnegotiatingagreementsandconsultingontechnicalandpracticalmatterswithmain-land authorities. In addition, laws andregulations were enacted or amended tofacilitate economic and cultural interac-tionwiththemainland.

The establishment of the SEF and,soon thereafter, its mainland Chinesecounterpart, theAssociationforRelationsAcrosstheTaiwanStraits(ARATS)海峽兩

岸關係協會,signaledtherealizationinbothTaipeiandBeijingthat,despitecontinuingmutual non-recognition of each other’slegitimacy, it was imperative to begininteracting on a basis of mutual respect.The semi-official nature of the SEF andARATS allows the two governments tonegotiate practical issues without affirm-ingthesovereignstatusoftheotherside.

InOctober1992,theSEFandARATSheld preparatory talks in Hong Kong—thefirsttimeauthorizedrepresentativesofthe Taipei and Beijing governments haddoneso.There,theyreachedaninformal,oralconsensusthattheirtalkswereprem-ised on the assumption that there existsonlyoneChina,inclusiveofthemainlandand Taiwan, while agreeing to differ onitsprecisepoliticaldefinition.This“1992consensus”servedasthebasisforhistoricfirst agreements on practical issues suchasexchangeofmail,signedinSingaporeinApril1993.

To protest the United States’ deci-sion to allow President Lee to visit thecountry in June 1995, the mainland in-definitelypostponedfurtherSEF-ARATSnegotiations that had been scheduled forJuly 1995 in Beijing. That same month,

tensionsescalatedwhenmainlandarmedforces test-fired missiles into waters offthecoastofTaiwan. In therun-up to theROC’sfirstdirectpresidentialelectioninMarch 1996, Beijing intensified militaryexercisesintheTaiwanStraitregion,onceagain shooting missiles into Taiwan’scoastalwaters.

InOctober1998,theSEFandARATSresumed talks in Shanghai but made noprogress on substantive issues. In July1999,BeijingonceagainsuspendedtalksinprotestagainstPresidentLee’scharac-terization of cross-strait ties as a “state-to-state relationship or at least a specialstate-to-state relationship” during aninterviewwithDeutscheWelle,aGermanradiostation.

In the interview, Lee explained thatthis view was based on his belief that a1991amendmenttotheROCConstitutionineffect acknowledges the legitimacyofthePRCgovernmentonthemainland,inaddition to that of the ROC governmenton Taiwan. CCP leaders neverthelessclaimedthathisassertionoftheexistenceof“twoChinas”wastantamounttoadec-larationof“Taiwanindependence.”

Despitethefailureofcross-straittalksto steadily build on the initial successesof1992and1993, theROCgovernmentgraduallyeasedrestrictionsonthemove-ment of people, goods, capital and tech-nology from Taiwan to mainland China.It shared with the governments of otherdemocraticnationsthebeliefthatpromot-ing prosperity in mainland China wouldencouragedemocraticdevelopmentthere,whichwouldfacilitate thepeaceful reso-lutionofcross-straitdisputes.

2000-2008: Chen Shui-bian Administration

In2000,ChenShui-bian陳水扁oftheDemocraticProgressiveParty (DPP)民主

進步黨 was elected president and was re-electedin2004.TheDPP-ledgovernment


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refused to affirm the existence of a “oneChina”orthedesirabilityofpursuinguni-fication.Itinsistedthatalthoughanyformof future relationship, including variousmodesof integration,couldbediscussed,noadvanceagreementonanyspecificfu-ture relationship could be a preconditionforconductingtalks.

Inhisfirstinauguraladdress,however,PresidentChenpledgednottoinitiateanymove—such as pushing to adopt a newofficial name for the nation—that mightbe interpreted as altering the status quo.On several occasions, he urged Beijingtocooperateinestablishinga“peaceandstabilityframework.”

The Chen administration took a num-ber of further measures that demonstratedTaiwan’sgoodwill.Theseincludedrelaxingrestrictions on imports from the mainland,mainland-bound investment, and the func-tionsandscopeofoffshoreshippingcenters.

In addition, the Chen administrationbegan permitting journalists from themainlandtovisitTaiwan(althoughitlaterwithdrew this privilege); opened Taiwanto visits by people of the mainland wholivedin,orfirsttraveledto,athirdcoun-try; and took steps to negotiate cross-strait charter flights for ROC citizensduring holidays and for humanitarianpurposes.Further,Taiwan-basedfinancialinstitutionswere authorized toopen liai-sonofficesinthemainland.

At the time, cross-strait shipping andmovementofpeople fromTaiwan to themainland had to make inconvenient, ex-pensive detours through Hong Kong orthird countries.With booming growth incross-strait tradeandvisitsofTaiwanesebusinesspeople and tourists to the main-land, the Chen administration often ex-pressedhopethatcross-straitnegotiationscould resume, with a priority on signingagreements to open up “three links”三通—direct transportationofpeopleandgoodsaswellasdirectpostalserviceandcommercialtransactions.

Beijing rejected calls for resumptionof dialogue, however, insisting that thiswould be possible only if the Chen ad-ministrationaffirmedthatTaiwanandthemainland constitute a single China andmusteventuallybeunified.Ithasadvocat-eda“onecountry,twosystems”formulawherebyterritoriesunderthegovernanceof the ROC will, like Hong Kong andMacau, become a “special administra-tive region” under Beijing’s jurisdiction.Opinion polls in Taiwan, however, haveconsistentlyshownthatthevastmajorityofitspeoplerejectsuchanarrangement.

In the face of the impasse in negoti-ating the establishment of direct links,PresidentChenearlyinhisfirsttermuni-laterally approved the opening of directseaborne passenger transportation forROC citizens on ROC-registered boatsbetween the Kinmen and Matsu islandsandanumberofmainlandseaports.Withno objection forthcoming from Beijing,this arrangement—known as the “minithreelinks” 小三通althoughitdidnotin-volvepostalorcommercialtransactions—beganonJanuary1,2001.

Refusingtorenouncetheuseofarmedforce to assert its claim of sovereigntyoverTaiwan,theBeijingauthoritiescon-tinued to expand military deploymentsopposite Taiwan throughout the eightyearsoftheChenadministration.Bymid-2008, the number of missiles targeted atTaiwanhad increased toover1,000,andlarge-scale military exercises simulatingattacks on Taiwan continued to be heldannually. Meanwhile, Beijing maneu-vered to block Taipei’s participation ininternationalforumsandtohinderitsdip-lomaticendeavors.

On March 14, 2005, the NationalPeople’s Congress in Beijing enacted an“anti-secessionlaw,”whichauthorizesthePeople’s Liberation Army to use “non-peaceful means” to achieve cross-straitunificationshouldTaiwan’speopleattemptto “secede” from the People’s Republic.


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Oceania, one of the first mainland-operated vessels to engage in direct cross-strait shipping, arrives at the Port of Kaohsiung on December 18, 2008.

In response, President Chen issued a six-point statement, stressing that Taiwan’ssovereigntybelongsonlytoits23millionpeople,andthatanylawcallingforviola-tionofthebasicrightsandinterestsofoth-erswasasetbackforhumancivilization.

Ayearlater, inFebruary2006,Presi-dent Chen declared that the Guidelinesfor National Unification had “ceased toapply” because they had been drawn upbyanadhocpresidential commission inthe days before citizens had the right toelect their leader and make their voiceseffectivelyheard.Additionally, the fram-ers of the guidelines had premised themon a “one-China principle” and the pre-sumption of eventual unification withoutconsultingthepeopleofTaiwan.

2008-Present: Ma Ying-jeou Administration

After decades of tension, relationsbetweenTaiwanandmainlandChinahavewarmedsincePresidentMaYing-jeoutookoffice in May 2008. The administrationhas implementedinitiatives tocreatecon-ditions conducive to promoting regionalpeace,stabilityandprosperityonthebasisoftheaforementioned“1992consensus.”

In President Ma’s inaugural address,he enunciated the imperative of main-taining the statusquoduringhis termofoffice under the framework of the ROCConstitution. This means no unifica-tion talks with the mainland, no pursuitof Taiwan independence and no use offorce to settle sovereignty issues. In theaddress,healsocalleduponthetwogov-ernments to “face reality, pioneer a newfuture, shelve disputes and pursue win-winsolutions,” therebyenabling themtostrike a mutually beneficial balance astheypursuetheirrespectiveinterests.

Immediately after taking office, thenew administration moved to reactivateinstitutionalized SEF-ARATS negotia-tionsthathadbeeninhiatusforadecade.The historic first round of talks, held inJune 2008 in Beijing, produced the firstcross-strait agreements in 15 years. Thesecond round held five months later inTaipeiwasalsohistoricas itmarked thefirsttimeamainlandChinesenegotiatingteamhadcometoTaiwan.

AsofDecember2010, six roundsoftalks had been held, producing 15 for-mal agreements and one joint statementof understanding (see box “Cross-strait


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Talks andAgreementTopics”).This hashelped reduce cross-strait tensions andenhance prospects for lasting regionalpeaceandprosperity.

Theagreementsaddresstheeconomicinterests and general welfare of peopleon both sides of the Taiwan Strait anddonot touchon sovereignty issues.ThisconformswithPresidentMa’sstatedprin-ciples of putting economics before poli-tics,pressingmattersbeforelesspressingones, and easily resolved issues before

difficultones toensure thatdevelopmentofcross-straitexchangesandinteractionscan steadily progress based on a solidinstitutionalfoundation.

Believing that greater harmony be-tweenthetwosidesshouldbringtheROCgreater freedom toparticipate in interna-tional affairs, the Ma administration hasgivenattentiontocreatingmoreopportu-nities for cross-strait cooperation in theinternational community (see Chapter 5,“ForeignRelations”).

First round, June 12, 2008 (Beijing)

• Cross-straitcharterflights(commencedJuly4,2008)DirecttravelofmainlandtouriststoTaiwan(startedJuly18,2008)•

Second round, November 4, 2008 (Taipei)

Directcross-strait• maritimeshippingDirectcross-strait• postalserviceMechanismforconsultationon• foodsafetyExpansionofcharterflights•

Third Round, April 26, 2009 (Nanjing)

Regular,scheduled• cross-straitpassengerandcargoflights(flightsincreasedfrom108to270perweek)Financialcooperationin:•-Supervisionofbanking,securitiesandfutures,andinsuranceindustries(threesubsequent

MOUsweresignedNovember15andcameintoeffectJanuary16,2010)-Currencymanagement(authorizationoffinancialinstitutionstoengageincurrencyexchange,

supplyandbackflow;cooperationincombatingcounterfeiting;futureestablishmentofcurrencyclearingmechanism)

Mechanismforjudicialmutualassistanceandcombatingcrime•Inaddition,ajointstatementofunderstandingonmeasurestoallowmainlandinvestmentinTaiwan

wasreleased.Fourth Round, December 22, 2009 (Taichung)

Agriculturalproductinspection,quarantineprocedures•Productqualitystandards(metrology,testing,certification,accreditation)•Laborstandards,rulesregardingfishingboatcrews•

Fifth Round, June 29, 2010 (Chongqing)

Liberalization,facilitationofcross-straittradeingoods,services(Cross-StraitsEconomic•CooperationFrameworkAgreement,orECFA)Intellectualpropertyrightsprotection,cooperation•

Sixth Round, December 21, 2010 (Taipei)

Medical,healthcooperation:controlofcommunicablediseases;medicalandpharmaceutical•R&D,safetymanagement;emergencytreatmentofeachother’scitizens

Cross-strait Talks and Agreement Topics


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Meanwhile, in mid-2010,Taiwan andmainland China’s Hong Kong SpecialAdministrative Region established theTaiwan-HongKongEconomicandCultur-alCo-operationCouncil(THEC)臺港經濟

文化合作策進會andtheHongKong-TaiwanEconomicandCulturalCo-operationandPromotion Council (ECCPC) 港臺經濟

文化合作協進會 as platforms for fosteringclosereconomicandculturalties.

In June 2010, MAC Minister LaiShin-yuan 賴幸媛 became the first MACchief to visit Hong Kong. Two monthsthereafter, Hong Kong Financial Secre-taryJohnC.Tsang曾俊華 ledanECCPCdelegationtoTaiwanfor itsfirstmeetingwith theTHEC.During themeeting, thetwo sides reached broad consensuses onmechanisms for further exchanges, areasofcooperationandspecificobjectives.

As a result, in July 2011, the ROCrepresentative office in Hong Kong, for-merlycalledtheChungHwaTravelServ-ice 中華旅行社, was renamed the TaipeiEconomic and Cultural Office in HongKong, reflecting an enhancement of itsfunctionalstatusanditsROCpersonnel’sdiplomatic privileges. That same month,for the same reasons, the name of theROCrepresentativeoffice inMacauwaschanged from the Taipei Economic andCultural Center to the Taipei EconomicandCulturalOfficeinMacau.Further,thegovernments of Hong Kong and Macauhave been granted permission to openrepresentativeofficesinTaipei.

Cross-strait Movement of People

Cross-straitmovementofpeoplehasincreasedrapidlysincetheROCgovern-ment began allowing private visits tomainland China in 1987. The numberof visits made by ROC citizens to themainland (including Hong Kong andMacau) each year grew from 437,000

in1988to5.1millionin2010.Overthatperiod, ROC citizens made a total of61 million visits to the mainland, whilemainlandChinesemade4.8millionvisitstoTaiwan.

From July 18, 2008, when touristsfrom mainland China were first allowedto travel directly to Taiwan, to the endof April 2011, they made 2.24 millionvisits.Arrivals on average topped 3,000perdayin2010,reachingthetargetsetinthe Cross-Strait Agreement ConcerningMainlandTouristsTravelingtoTaiwan海峽兩岸關於大陸居民赴臺灣旅遊協議, signedinJune2008.Thedailyquotaforinboundtourists from mainland China was liftedto4,000,startingonJanuary1,2011.

TheROC’ssemi-officialTaiwanStraitTourismAssociation(TSTA)臺灣海峽兩岸

觀光旅遊協會 opened an office in BeijingonMay4,2010.Itsprimarymissionistoexpand channels of communication andcooperation with government agencies,private companies, media organizationsand Taiwanese business associationson the mainland. It researches marketdemand in mainland China and cooper-ateswithlocaltravelagenciestodevelopquality tourism products to be promotedthrough seminars and trade shows. Fur-ther, the association invites mainlandtravelagentsandmediarepresentativestoTaiwan to get a firsthand understandingofitsdiverseofferings.

Meanwhile,theTSTA’smainlandChi-nesecounterpart,theCross-StraitTourismExchange Association 海峽兩岸旅遊交流協

會, openedanoffice inTaipeionMay7,2010.The two openings marked the firstexchangeofsemi-officialofficesbetweenthe two sides of the Taiwan Strait sincetheybecameseparatelygovernedsixdec-adesago.

Until recently, only groups, not indi-viduals, were allowed to travel directlyfrom mainland China to Taiwan fortourism. Starting June 22, 2011, Taiwanopened its doors to independent tourists


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from three mainland cities—Shanghai,Beijing and Xiamen 廈門. Initially, thedaily arrival quota has been set at 500people,withamaximumstaypervisitof15days.

Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement

Signed by the SEF and ARATS onJune29,2010,theCross-StraitsEconom-ic Cooperation Framework Agreement(ECFA)海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議wasrati-fiedbytheLegislativeYuan(Legislature)inAugust2010andcameintoforceinthefollowingmonth.

TheprimaryaimoftheECFAistofa-cilitate systematization and liberalizationoftradeandeconomicrelationsacrosstheTaiwanStrait.Itcallsfortheprogressiveeliminationorreductionoftariffsonmostgoodsaswellastheopeningoftheserv-icesectortoinvestmentandcompetition.Foritspart,TaiwanalsolooksforwardtoutilizingthepacttostrengthenitspositionintheAsia-Pacificeconomy.

Goodsandservices thathavealreadybenefited from such liberalization areenumerated in the agreement’s “earlyharvest” lists. As of mid-2011, the listof goods comprised 267 mainland-produceditemsand539Taiwan-produceditems. The list of services included, ontheTaiwan side, banking and eight non-financialsectors.Onthemainlandside,itincluded banking, insurance and securi-tiesaswellaseightnon-financialsectors.

In accordance with the ECFA, thetwo sides’ negotiating teams on Janu-ary 6, 2011 established the Cross-StraitEconomicCooperationCommittee (ECC)兩岸經濟合作委員會,whichhelditsfirstreg-ularmeeting inFebruary.At themeeting,thetwopartiesagreedtosetupsixwork-ing groups responsible for consultationsontradeingoodsandservices,investment,dispute settlement, industrial cooperationand customs cooperation; to review the

ECFA “early harvest list”; and to launchthreesetsofnegotiationsontradeingoods,tradeinservicesanddisputesettlement.

As with the other cross-strait agree-ments discussed above, the ECFA’s in-tangible benefits are as important as itspracticalones:Developmentofmutuallybeneficial economic relations across theTaiwanStraitcanbean impetus forsus-tainedpeace.

Other DevelopmentsIn addition to the negotiation of

agreements, sinceMay2008centralandlocal governments have implemented anumber of measures to improve cross-straitinteractions.

On the economic front, the regula-tory cap on Taiwan-based companies’investmentsinmainlandChinahasbeenraised from 40 percent to 60 percent oftheir net worth. Further, a number ofnew regulations have been promulgatedin line with the April 2009 joint state-ment on allowing mainland investmentinTaiwan. From July 2009 to February2011,theInvestmentCommissionunderthe Ministry of Economic Affairs 經濟

部投資審議委員會 approved 120 mainlandapplications for investment in TaiwanworthUS$138.74million.

Meanwhile, various other measureshave advanced people-to-people ex-changes. ROC government prohibitionson visits of its high-level officials tothe mainland have been relaxed, whilecentral- and local-government agenciesarenowpermittedtoinvitemainlandoffi-cialstovisitTaiwan.AndamendmentstotheActGoverningRelationsbetweenthePeopleoftheTaiwanAreaandtheMain-land Area 臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例havestrengthenedmainlandspouses’em-ploymentandinheritancerights,andhavereduced the waiting period for acquiringROCidentitycardstosixyears.


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• Mainland Affairs Council: http://www.mac.gov.tw

• Straits Exchange Foundation (Chinese only): http://www.sef.org.twRelated

Websites

In the area of media exchanges, themainland’sXinhuaNewsAgency新華社,People’s Daily人民日報andfivemainlandlocalmediaareallowedtopostpermanentcorrespondents in Taiwan. Additionally,mainlandreportersnowenjoystreamlinedapplication procedures and are allowedtovisit forup to threemonthsata time,extendable for a further three months ifnecessary.Meanwhile,thenumberofvis-iting reporters permitted for each mediaorganization has increased to five. AllmainlandcorrespondentsarefreetotraveltoanylocationinTaiwanwithouthavingtogivepriornotice.

In the academic sphere, restrictionson students from mainland China wish-ingtopursuehighereducationinTaiwanhave been relaxed and their diplomasare now recognized. To facilitate theirenrollment in Taiwan’s universities, inAugust2010theLegislativeYuanenact-edamendmentstothreelawsconcerningmainland Chinese students—the ActGoverningRelationsbetweenthePeopleof the Taiwan Area and the MainlandArea, the UniversityAct 大學法 and theJuniorCollegeAct專科學校法.TheMin-istryofEducationhasmappedoutprin-ciples and implementation guidelinesconcerning the admission of mainlandChinese students, who are expected tobeginstudiesatuniversitiesinTaiwanasearlyasSeptember2011.

It ishoped that theseandothermeas-urestopromotepeople-to-peopleexchang-es will enable the residents of mainlandChina to understand Taiwan’s free anddemocraticsocietywhileatthesametime

helpingpeopleinTaiwangetabetterun-derstandingofthemainland.

Looking Forward Overthethree-plusyearssincePresi-

dent Ma called on the two sides of theTaiwan Strait to seize opportunities toadvancepeaceandprosperity,cross-straittensionshaveeased.ThetoneofTaiwan-mainland relationshas shifted fromcon-frontation to cooperation, from conflictto conciliation—a development widelyapplaudedintheinternationalcommunityasconducivetopeaceandstabilityintheAsia-Pacificregion.

With ongoing talks on further agree-ments, economic and cultural ties be-tweenTaiwanandmainlandChinacanbeexpected to steadily mature, with hopesfor creating a “golden decade” of pros-perity for Taiwan as it integrates moreclosely with the regional economy. Be-causethemainland’smilitarybuilduphascontinuedunabated,however,Taiwanwillcontinue to make necessary upgrades toitsdefensecapabilities.

Inviewoftheimpossibilityofresolv-ingcross-straitissuesovernight,theROCgovernmentwillendeavortomaintainthestatus quo while cultivating harmoniousrelations step by step through negotia-tion and cooperation. The developmentof common values is also an essentialingredient incross-strait relations, as theprospects of peaceful interaction willbe greatly enhanced if mainland Chinamovesinthedirectionofgreaterfreedomanddemocracy.


cross-strait relations. roc (taiwan) yearbook 2011 ch06 cross strait relations

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