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Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected] 1 Some Puzzles 2 Internet Security Overview 3 Need For Formal Methods G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected] Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

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Page 1: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

G. Sivakumar

Computer Science and EngineeringIIT Bombay

[email protected]

1 Some Puzzles

2 Internet Security Overview

3 Need For Formal Methods

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 2: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Exchanging Secrets

Goal

A and B to agree on a secret number. But, C can listen to all theirconversation.

Solution?

A tells B: I’ll send you 3 numbers. Let’s use their LCM as the key.

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 3: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Exchanging Secrets

Goal

A and B to agree on a secret number. But, C can listen to all theirconversation.

Solution?

A tells B: I’ll send you 3 numbers. Let’s use their LCM as the key.

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 4: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Mutual Authentication

Goal

A and B to verify that both know the same secret number. Nothird party (intruder or umpire!)

Solution?

A tells B: I’ll tell you first 2 digits, you tell me the last two...

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 5: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Mutual Authentication

Goal

A and B to verify that both know the same secret number. Nothird party (intruder or umpire!)

Solution?

A tells B: I’ll tell you first 2 digits, you tell me the last two...

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 6: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Goal

A to prove to B that she knows how to solve the cube. Withoutactually revealing the solution!

Solution?

A tells B: Close your eyes, let me solve it...

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 7: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Goal

A to prove to B that she knows how to solve the cube. Withoutactually revealing the solution!

Solution?

A tells B: Close your eyes, let me solve it...

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 8: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Paper, Scissors, Rock Game

Goal

How to play over Internet? Using email, say?

Solution?

You mail me your choice. I’ll reply with mine.

Coin Toss

Simpler Version of problem?

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 9: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Paper, Scissors, Rock Game

Goal

How to play over Internet? Using email, say?

Solution?

You mail me your choice. I’ll reply with mine.

Coin Toss

Simpler Version of problem?

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 10: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Paper, Scissors, Rock Game

Goal

How to play over Internet? Using email, say?

Solution?

You mail me your choice. I’ll reply with mine.

Coin Toss

Simpler Version of problem?

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 11: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Sharing a Dosa

Goal

All should get equal share of dosa. No envy factor. No trustedumpire.

Solution?

2 people case is easy- you cut, i choose!

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 12: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Sharing a Dosa

Goal

All should get equal share of dosa. No envy factor. No trustedumpire.

Solution?

2 people case is easy- you cut, i choose!

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 13: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Sharing a Secret

Safety in numbers. Do not trust any one (or few) person(s).Real World Examples

Pirates sharing a treasure map.

Who can authorize launching a missile?

From Computer Domain

Secure Storage (Archival)

Distributed storage of Logs

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 14: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Online Voting Protocols

Are we ready for elections via Internet?

George Bush (Nov 2000, dimpled chads)

Pervez Musharaf (April 2002)

Maharashtra (Oct 13, 2004)

E-Voting Protocols Requirements

No loss of votes already cast (reliability)

No forging of votes (authentication)

No modification of votes cast (integrity)

No multiple voting

No vote secrecy violation (privacy)

No vulnerability to vote coercion

No vulnerability to vote selling or trading protocols (voter isan adversary)

No loss of ability to cast and accept more votes (availability,no denial of service)

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 15: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Other Desirable Properties

must not only be correct and secure, but also be seen to be so byskeptical (but educated and honest) outsiders.

Auditability:Failure or procedural error can be detected and corrected,especially the loss of votes.

Verifiability: Should be able to prove

My vote was countedAll boothes were countedThe number of votes in each booth is the same as the numberof people who votedNo one I know who is ineligible to vote did soNo one voted twice...

without violating anonymity, privacy etc.Zero Knowledge Proofs

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 16: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Security Requirements

Informal statements (formal is much harder)

Confidentiality Protection from disclosure to unauthorized persons

Integrity Assurance that information has not been modifiedunauthorizedly.

Authentication Assurance of identity of originator of information.

Non-Repudiation Originator cannot deny sending the message.

Availability Not able to use system or communicate when desired.

Anonymity/Pseudonomity For applications like voting, instructorevaluation.

Traffic Analysis Should not even know who is communicating withwhom. Why?

Emerging Applications Online Voting, Auctions (more later)

And all this with postcards (IP datagrams)!G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 17: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Internet’s Growth and Charter

Information AnyTime, AnyWhere, AnyForm, AnyDevice, ...WebTone like DialTone

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 18: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Internet’s Dream

Why should a fridge be on Internet?

Will security considerations make this a nightmare?

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 19: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

What are Cyber crimes?

Against People

Cyber Stalking and Harrassment(Child) Pornography

Against Property

CrackingVirus and SpamSoftware/Entertainment Piracy

Cyber Terrorism!

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 20: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Security Concerns

Match the following!Problems Attackers

Highly contagious viruses Unintended blundersDefacing web pages Disgruntled employees or customers

Credit card number theft Organized crimeOn-line scams Foreign espionage agents

Intellectual property theft Hackers driven by technical challengeWiping out data Petty criminalsDenial of service Organized terror groupsSpam E-mails Information warfare

Reading private files ...Surveillance ...

Crackers vs. Hackers

Note how much resources available to attackers.

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 21: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Cyber Terrorism?

Some examples from http://cybercrimes.net/

1989: Legion of Doom group took over the BellSouth telephonesystem, tapped phone lines, re-routed calls, ...

1996: A white supremacist movement took out a Massachusettsinternet service provider

1997: A cracker disabled the computer system of an airport controltower at the Worcester, Mass. Airport.

1997: a hacker in Sweden jammed the 911 emergency telephonesystem all throughout west-central Florida.

1998: NASA, Navy, and Defence Department computers wereattacked.

2000: in Maroochy Shire, Australia, a disgruntled consultant hackedinto a waste management control system and released millions ofgallons of raw sewage on the town.

2001: Two post-graduate students cracked a bank system used bybanks and credit card companies to secure the personalidentification numbers of their customers accounts. [38]

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 22: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Emergency Response: http://www.cert-in.org.in/

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 23: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Internet Attacks Timeline

From training material at http://www.cert-in.org.in/G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 24: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Internet Attack Trends

From training material at http://www.cert-in.org.in/

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 25: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Indian IT Act 2000

Basic Legal Framework

Electronic documents, signatures as evidence

Cyber Crimes & Punishments

Secn 43: Damage to Computers/NetworkSecn 65: Tampering source codeSecn 66: “Hacking” (cracking)Secn 67: Obscenity (bazee.com!)Secn 69: Interception

Several Initiatives (PKI, CERT-IN, Cyber cells, ...)

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 26: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Security Mechanisms

System Security: “Nothing bad happens to my computersand equipment”virus, trojan-horse, logic/time-bombs, ...

Network Security:Authentication Mechanisms “you are who you say you are”Access Control Firewalls, Proxies “who can do what”

Data Security: “for your eyes only”

Encryption, Digests, Signatures, ...

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 27: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Security Mechanisms

System Security: “Nothing bad happens to my computersand equipment”virus, trojan-horse, logic/time-bombs, ...

Network Security:Authentication Mechanisms “you are who you say you are”Access Control Firewalls, Proxies “who can do what”

Data Security: “for your eyes only”

Encryption, Digests, Signatures, ...

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 28: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Security Mechanisms

System Security: “Nothing bad happens to my computersand equipment”virus, trojan-horse, logic/time-bombs, ...

Network Security:Authentication Mechanisms “you are who you say you are”Access Control Firewalls, Proxies “who can do what”

Data Security: “for your eyes only”

Encryption, Digests, Signatures, ...

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 29: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Cryptography and Data Security

sine qua non [without this nothing :-]

Historically who used first? (L & M)

Code Language in joint families!

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 30: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

One way Functions

Mathematical Equivalents

Factoring large numbers (product of 2 large primes)

Discrete Logarithms

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 31: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

One-way Functions

Computing f(x) = y is easy.Eg. y = 4x mod 13 (If x is 3, y is —?)

n 4n mod 13 10n mod 131 4 102 3 93 12 124 9 35 10 46 1 17 4 10...

......

Note: need not work with numbers bigger than 13 at all!

But given y = 11, finding suitable x is not easy!

Can do by brute-force (try all possibilities!)

No method that is much better known yet!

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 32: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Network Security Mechanism Layers

Cryptograhphic Protocols underly all security mechanisms. RealChallenge to design good ones for key establishment, mutualauthentication etc.

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 33: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Motivation for Session keys

Combine Symmetric (fast) and Asymmetric (very slow) Methodsusing session (ephemeral) keys for the following additional reasons.

Limit available cipher text (under a fixed key) for cryptanalyticattack;

Limit exposure with respect to both time period and quantity ofdata, in the event of (session) key compromise;

Avoid long-term storage of a large number of distinct secret keys (inthe case where one terminal communicates with a large number ofothers), by creating keys only when actually required;

Create independence across communications sessions orapplications. No replay attacks.

How to establish session keys over insecure medium where adversary islistening to everything?

Can be done even without any public key! Randomization to rescue (like

in CSMA/CD of Ethernet).G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 34: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment Protocol

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 35: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Man-in-the-middle attack

Authentication was missing!

Can be solved if Kasparov and Anand know each other’s public key(Needham-Schroeder).

Yes, but different attack possible.

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 36: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Needham-Schroeder Protocol

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 37: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Attack by Lowe (1995)

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 38: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Why Are Security Protocols Often Wrong?

They are trivial programs built from simple primitives, BUT, theyare complicated by

concurrency

a hostile environment

a bad user controls the networkConcern: active attacks masquerading, replay, man-in-middle,etc.

vague specifications

we have to guess what is wanted

Ill-defined concepts

Protocol flaws rather than cryptosystem weaknessesFormal Methods needed!

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 39: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Need for Formal Methods

Countermeasure: formal design and analysis

Formal Modelling and Specification of ProtocolAbstract encryption model, formal specification

Specification of Required Properties

Verification of PropertiesInductive proofs, state-space search, authentication logics

Generation of Counter-ExampleAnalysis can find flaws, suggest improvements, proveconditional correctness

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 40: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Formal Approaches Overview

Why so many approaches?When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail!

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 41: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Specification of Protocol

Common Authentication Protocol Specification Languagehttp://www.csl.sri.com/users/millen/capsl/

High-level message-list based language with abstractencryption operators

A -> B: {A}K

Declarations:

strong typing and abstract data type extensionsinitialization, named expressionssecurity goals

Actions between messages: tests, assignments

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 42: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Emerging Picture

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 43: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

Tools for Security Analysis and Verification

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security

Page 44: Cryptographic Protocols and Network Securitysiva/talks/sndt05.pdf · E-Voting Protocols Requirements No loss of votes already cast (reliability) No forging of votes (authentication)

Some Puzzles Internet Security Overview Need For Formal Methods

References

Books

TCP/IP Illustrated by Richard Stevens, Vols 1-3,Addison-Wesley.Applied Cryptography - Protocols, Algorithms, and SourceCode in C by Bruce Schneier, Jon Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1996Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practiceby William Stallings (2nd Edition), Prentice Hall Press; 1998.Practical Unix and Internet Security, Simson Garfinkel andGene Spafford, O’Reilly and Associates, ISBN 1-56592-148-8.

Web sites

www.cerias.purdue.edu (Centre for Education and Research inInformation Assurance and Security)www.sans.org (System Administration, Audit, NetworkSecurity)cve.mitre.org (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures)csrc.nist.gov (Computer Security Resources Clearinghouse)www.vtcif.telstra.com.au/info/security.html

G. Sivakumar Computer Science and Engineering IIT Bombay [email protected]

Cryptographic Protocols and Network Security