ct/54 -t

COUNTER INFORMATION SERVICES - A TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE AFFIL IATE 90p

The Ford Motor CompanyCounter lnfonnat ion Services

9 Po land St ree t . London Wl . 01439 3764.\nt i -Report No.20

\\ . : r ;

C I S- .S . . . - . ' : i r i r e o f j ou rna l i s t s who pub -. . : : . : : , : : t3 t ion not covered or co l la tedr . : : .3 es labl ished media. I t is thei r a im- . : . ' ,3s: rsate the major socia l and econo-: ' ' . . . : . : r r iu t ions that govern our dai ly, . . ; : . . order that the basic facts and: : : - :u : t1L)nS behind them be as rv idely.\- \\ i i as possible. CIS is f inanced by, . . :s . subscr ipt ions, donat ions and grants.

Subscribel-+.00 UK, {,5.00 overseas, for six issues.Special Discount for bulk orders. Allr va i l ab le f r om C IS ,9 Po land S t ree t ,London Wl. (01-439 3164).

Dist r ibuted by Pluto Press, Uni t 10.Spencer Court , 7 Chalcot Road, London\wl 8LH.

rsBN 0 903660 l8 0

Design by Julian Stapleton.Published by Counter InformationSe rvices.Printed by the Russell Press Limited.- l - i Gamb le S t ree t . No r r i ngham NG7 4ET .

\ : :

Far right. Henry II

ERRATUM PAGE 26Table Fiesta Costings The f irst f igure $1,215 should reaci $215

ilry

The Ford Motor Company is in thebusiness of making money out of car-workers. To do this it mounts a constantthree-pronged attack: on wages, onproductivity levels, and on workers'attempts to organise themselves.

In order to extract greater productivity(more work for the same pay) from itsemployees, Ford plays workforces offagainst one another. This has traditionallybeen done by playing section againstsection, black worker against whiteworker, immigrants against nationais.skilled worker against unskilled worker.women against men. The increased global-isation which is the hallmark of currentFord strategy has now added a newdimension to the company's offensive.

Complementation - the assembly of asingle product or model from com-ponents made in many different coun-tries and plants - has been developedfurther by Ford than by any othercompany. This enables Ford to manipu-late its employees in many differentcountries as a single workforce gearedto a single programme. In the battlebetween workers and company theworkers remain fragmented organisa-

tionally by geography' and nationality.Ford, on the other hand. benefits iromits centralised control of manaqementstrategy.

In Europe. lor example. the UK work-force is threatened *rth an embargo onfurther UK investment unless continentallevels oi productivity are achieved.Dagenham workers are told that it takesthem i57 longer than Genk (Belgium)workers to oroduce the Cortina. Halewoodrr orkers are told that their record inmeeting production targets is abysmalcompared to continental plants. Mean-while. German Ford workers are told thattheir plants are less profitable than thoseof the UK or Spain owing to the appre-ciation of the Deutschmark!

At every turn the ultimate threat is <lfunemployment. The company works hardat fostering an image of national identitywherever it operates, representing itselfas a local employer and exporter, withthe country's interests at heart, and play-ing down the fact that its subsidiariesare controlled from the USA. Meanwhilethe host governments actively supportand complement its attack on the work-force. Wage increases are called inflation-

ary. and government wage freezes cited tojustify their refusal. Tax incentives andsubsid ies abound as nat ional govern-ments compete for Ford's favours. Fordflourishes in Europe while European carfirms struggle to survive. The company'sability to make record profits at theexpense of European workers and nationaleconomies gives us some indication ofFord's far greater muscle when dealingwith countries of the Third World inLatin America and South East Asia,Ford's other arenas of complementationinvestment.The Ford Motor Company wages war onits workers in order to increase its profits.Each victory won by the company, eachproductivity deal squeezed out of a weakplant and then used as a precedent toattack other plants, means bigger bonusesfor the multi-millionaires of top manage-ment, increased dividends from theirenormous shareholdings. And each defeatsustained by the workforce means moreinhuman working conditions, a greatersubordination to the tyranny of theassembly line, and a shorter route to thehuman scrapheap which is as integral apart of every Ford factory as a slagheapto a coalmine.

rIIiIti

I

ru

H'$,'

SrlU

r i . , :

,i$ ,fufo;,q#ah

r$ffi.€)

s*b

;\*ffi

ffi

i;$+:;,it::lrLn ::

;,[ji:,= * i

" ft&1; 'l

$Popperfoto

'A sixth of US jobs, a sixth of GNP, asixth of every retail dollar is locked intothe auto industry. A fifth of Americansteel, a third of zinc. a tenth of alu-minium, two thirds of rubber is tied toautos' (Rothschild).

Between 1977 and 1985 the Americanauto industry is expected to spend some-thing l ike $55 bil l ion on capital invest-ment in i ts home base. This is doublewhat the nation spent in putting a manon the moon. As befits the leader in thedomestic market, General Motors wil l bespending the l ion's share. a stupendous$3 l . 5b i l l i on . The Fo rd Moro r Companv .with an estimated $lbil l ion home inveit-ment each year berween 1977 and 1985should notch up a tota l o f g l8bi l l ion.Chrysler wil l come in a rnodest third at$0.:Uiit ion. (Auromotive News 21.11.77)

This, bi ' far the greatest investmentprogramme in the history of the industry,marks a totally new phase of productionand competit ion aimed at downsizingthe ent i re model range of a l l the com-panies rn order to meet federal legislationon fuel economy. l t is a lso a i -med atdealing u'ith the growing threat of impor-ted cars. mainly Japanese, which havepenetrated the USA market in l9 j7to a record level of nearly 20%. And, ofcourse. they are all embarking on theinvestment programme in ordei to s taycompetit ive with each other.

Competit ion has always been the mainstimulus to change in the auto industry,and as the pace has hotted up the weakeroperations have gone to the wall. Fromthe hundreds of small workshops produc-ing cars in the first decade of this centurv.the f ie ld has narrowed down to threemajor producers, General Motors, Fordand Chrysler, with American Motorshanging on as a shaky fourth which maywell not survive this latest surse ofcompet i t ion.

ProductivityThe North American motor industry isundergoing a unique crisis. It is an evolu-tionary crisis, a chrysalis change. Themajor monopolists, GM and Ford, areembarking on a radical restructuring of

The Arnerican RoadThe North American Motor Industry is undergoing a unique crisis. It is an evolutionary crisis, a

chrysalis change. For major monopolists, GM and Ford are embarking on a radical resiructuring oftheir global operations

their global operations. The ramificationsof this restructuring are so extensive asto require a reappraisal of what we meanby a multinational company, its power toaffect people's lives, and its relationshipwith the state.Both Ford and GM are geared over-whelmingly to the manufacture ofvehicles - in Ford's case over 90% ofturnover comes from vehicle sales. Themainstay of production remains theclassic assembly l ine developed by HenryI, on which large numbers of productionworkers perform short repeated cyclesof movements. Vast plants iuch as Ford'sat Rouge, Michigan, and GM's at Lords-town, Ohio, utilise basically the sameapproach as in Henry lsts original plantat Mack Avenue, Dgtroit, where the firstModel A's were produced. Despite com-puterisation, welding robots, and threequarters of a century of technical inno-vation, car manufacture is still firmlvdependant on the line worker. With 19North American plants operating on thisprinciple, there is no way in which Ford9an restructure production techniquesfrom the bottom up - even if the tech-nology were available for completeautomatl0n.

SaturationThe other consideration limitine thefuther development of Fordism is thehuman element - the limitations andresistance of the assembly workers them-selves. The work cyc les, movements andoperating speeds imposed on the lineworker have been refined over the yearsto the point where the at tempt to screwfurther ounces of effort and productivityare as l ikely as not to be counterproduc-tive, through deteriorating work, i l lhealth, absenteeism. or active resistance.

Between 1919 and 1930, productivity inthe US auto industry increased by anaverage. 8.6% p.a., while for US industryas a whole the figure was only 1.9% p.a.Between 1960 and 1971 however, lheaverage auto industry productivity in-crease was down to 3%. It has sincedropp_ed below 2%. (Rothschild) Whilethe 'f low-line' industries such as'oil and

chemicals, and the younger manuf'actur-ing industries such as electronics increasetheir productivity growth from year toyear in response to technological innovations, the auto industry is, in productiv-ity terms, over the hill.

Sloanism, the science and psychology ofselling cars and creating markets, is reach-ing a parallel impasse. This does notmean that the North American market isdead - far from it. The US still providesover 507o of sales and profits fbr Fordand g0% for GM. over lOmillion cars aresold in the USA evety year, but 8millionof these are replacements. A central aimof marketing policy in the industry hasbeen to create the appearance of newmodels every year. A large proportionof trade is with companies with largefleets of cars and car-hire firms, who seeit in their own competitive interest toalways have the most recent modelsavailable. But now the market is reachingsaturation.In l92O there was one car for every 13Americans. men. women and children.In 1930 this was up to one car per 5tbAmericans. In 1950, one car per 33/+Americans. In 1970, one car per 2%Americans. In terms of growth, the hey-day of the US car industry at home wasthe 20s and 30s. By thi t ime of theGreat Depression the US had achieved alevel of car ownership that the UK onlyreached in 1966, and Holland onlyreached in 1910.'Io

market saturation as a hindrance togrowth, is currently added the rocketingcosts of car ownership. In many areas olthe USA over the last two years autoinsurance costs have gone up 50%. As listprices, interest rates, fuel and repair billsall increase, the private owner is becom-ing less likely to trade in his car afterowning it for only a short time.

CompetitionUSA Advertising ExpenditureCars and Trucks - 1975-1976

us$General

MotorsFordChrysler

1976

247,59t ,300159 ,413 ,60079 ,100 ,000

19 7s

17 5,443,983108,662,4Q063 ,910 ,000

ffi$c

q $-',,ry

*#*-*'

* = .

. ' i

The advertising costs on a 'per car' basisare an important part of price competition.ln 1976 these were:

GM $+0.19, Ford $56.18,and Chrysler $67.28(Advertising Age)

On the home front competit ion has neverbeen so fierce. Advertising expenditure isat new record levels.Ford's advertising for the Autumn of19'17 is 60% geared to TV, and no expensehas been spared - they even brougnt inthe special effects man from 'Star Wars'

to do the TV commercial for the newZephyr.

But despite the enormous sums spent onadvertising, despite the attempt to com-pete throughout the model range anddespite the efforts of 5000 Ford PR men,the fact remains that Ford's share of theAmerican market is contracting.

Retail Car and Truck Sales inUS and Canada

Ford market shares (%)

I

USACars Trucks

t 970 26 .4 37 .3197 | 23.5 35.219'12 24.3 34.2t973 23 .5 32 .81974 24.9 32.51 9 7 5 2 3 . 6 3 1 . 5t976 22 .6 30 .9

CanadaCars Trucks23.0 35.72r.6 34.02 t .8 30 .82 r .6 31 .122 .0 31 .622.0 33.219 .6 32 .0

Between 1970 and 1975 GM's marketshare was as follows;

USA Canada

Cars Trucks Cars Trucks

1970 39.7 38.2 30.2 3s.71975 43.3 4r.l 40.4 40.8

(Automotive Task Force, Aprtl 1977)

ProfitabilityThe near saturation of the market in theUSA aggravates the falling rate of profitsexperienced by all the auto majors. Thereare a number of ways of expressing this.Straightforward profit figures are not agood indicator, as they tell us nothingabout the reldtionship between profitsand the size of the operation in termsof sales, assets, share capital etc, However,all the indicators demonstrate a fall inthe rate of return, and this is true for allfour of the large US motor manufacturers.

What these show most clearly is that theFord Motor Company aiong with theother major auto firms is showing adecline in profitabil ity. Ford's profita-bil i ty has, at least since the early sixties,been significantly and regularly belowthat of General Motors, and the auto in-dustry as a whole is now beginningto be less profitable than manufacturingindustry as a whole.

Ford's inferiority to GM has been largely

attributable to GM's vastly larger capitalbase, and its ability to profit from awider range of models and a concentratlonon the large car sector where profitmargins are highest. Ford has also suf-fered more than GM from the increasingpenetration of the US car market byimported cars, particularly from Japan.

ImportsThe imports '% has increased as fol lows:

1 9 6 5 6 . 31966 7.41967 9.41968 10 .61969 I 1.31970 14.81 9 7 1 l 5 . l1972 14.61973 15 .21974 15 .81975 18.2

Although 197'l has been a record year forvehicle sales in the US, the great bulk ofthe increase has come from the importers.October 1977 was the 8th consecut ivemonth in which imports smashed allrecords. The first ten months of the year

saw . total imports of 1 ,781 ,000 - up4l .08% on the same period in 1976.Import penetration for' the 10 monthswas 18.75% of the market, and in severalmonths in 1977 penetration has beenalmost 2O%.Ford, which for years extolled the virtuesof competition and the free enterprisesystem, is now sufficiently worried byimports to be talking about the possibilityof import tariffs to protect the homeproducers,

Ford, like the other American manufac-turers. hopes that the hugely expensivedownsizing programme will win backsome of the ground gained by imports.The other major reason for downsizing isto comply with government legislation onfuel efficiency. Average consumptionacross all model ranges has to be no lessthan 27 .5 miles per gallon by 1985up from 18 mpg at present. The new1978 models are already smaller, lighterand more fuel efficient than many of the1976 models. 'Cutting the weight of carsis going to be all the harder because oftougher safety and pollution laws thatforce the manufacturers to add newequipment to their models. The days ofthe eight cyl inder car are almost i t anend and four, rather than six cylinder

engines may well become dominantbefore long' (Times, 28.1 1.7 7 ).

The World OutsideFord is fighting to maintain its share ofa restricted market in the USA. A drop inimport penetrat ion. and the possiblecollapse of American Motor Corporationand fallback of Chrysler may take thepressure off for a while.

In 1950, the world product ion ofvehiclestotalled 7.8million, of which 85% wereproduced in North America. By 1911world production had reached 21.'7 .million, of which 417o were produced inNorth America. World production in1976 was 37.5 million, with only 34.7%coming f.66 North America. The USAis still undoubtedly the hub of the world'smotor industry. Geographically it is stillthe larget single market, and the Americanproducers are, with their overseas sub-sidiaries, still taking the largest slice ofthe overall cake. Ford had the hiehestnumber of European registrat ions in tSZO(11.9%), while GM came fourth with11%, after Renault and Peugeot/Citroenwith | 1 .5% each. All the indications arethat Ford, while continuing to strugglefor its share of the US market, will con-centrate its search for real profits growthin the strongest area of iis activities -the oveneas operations.

In 1976 Ford's International Automo-tive Operations division sold l.8millioncars and trucks. These sales totalled$7.9billion, cir 28% of total Ford MotorCompany sales. Pretax profits on thesesales were $705mil l ion, 'or 41% of totalprofits. Ford makes or assembles cars in18 countries, and distributes auto Dro-ducts through 3.860 dealers in 200countries. For the last 5 years Ford over-seas retail sales have been more than8%higher than GMs.

Ford's worldwide penetration was 8.4%of the total market in 197 5 . 9.5% in1976. and 10.37o in the f i rst quarrer of1977 . The Company es l imares ' tha t to ra ldverseas sales wi l l be l .gmil l ion unitsfor the whole of 1977.

The industrybeen talking

has for a number of yearsabout the 'world car' and

The 'Big Four' Motor Vehicle Manufacturers in USAAnnual Rates of Return:

Net holit divided by Total Assets %

GenerolMotors l-ord Total

Industry

9.68 . 13 . 67 . 89 . 19 . 13 . 03 . 0

AIIManufqcturing

Corporations8 . 71 1

5 .0J . f ,b . 57 . 96 . 17.'l

1 9 6 81969I9'7 019'7 |r9 '72197 319741 9 7 5

12.4I 1 . 54 . 3

1 0 . 61 1 . 81 1 . 84 . 65 . 8

't .05 . 9) . 26 .3/ . J

1 .0l . J

Source : C.alculated from fi nancial statements.All manufacluring- corporations ratios compiled from US rrederat rrade commissionAuarrerty futancqt Reports l9j l-75 and US IRS Stalistics of Incomes 1960_70.

IIIIII

I

o'

oo

River Rouge

|"',, ,q

Fd

world complementat ion. l t now seemsl ikely that the Ford Motor Company wi l lbe the f i rst of the auto companies seriouslyto embark on this development.'The day is not far off when manufac-turers and especial ly auto manufac-turers - wi l l be producing the same l ineof products for sale everywhere in theworld, with only the most minor var iat ionsamong countr ies' said Wil l iam O. Bourke,execul ive vice presrdent of Ford NorthAmerican Automotive Operat ions inNovember 1976. He went on to explainthat the reason for worldwide consol i -dat ion of automotive products was the'emergence' of a single world marketw i th a : i ng le 'w r ) r l d s t y le ' i n consumerpreferences. He saw as reasons for thisthe 'homogenizing of consumer tastes'through modern communicat ions. andthe economics of t ransnat ional produc-t ion which would'make the single-worldproducts less expensive'. Or more profit-able, depending on which way youlook at i t .

Bourke firmly indicated a recurringtheme o f Fo rd dee is ion rnakers when hcs ta ted tha t the g rowth marke t i s ove rseas ,and more than half of all vehicle salesnow take place outside the United States.'And, to take a longer look, while thosesales are mostly in devcloped coun-tries, no fewer than 72% of the world'speople live in the less developed coun-tr ies. These countr ies aren' t going tostay undeveloped for ever.' (AutomotiveIndustries)1 5 . 1 1 . i 9 7 6 ) .

Henry Ford has already mentioned a newfront-dr ive Escort to be launched in l98lto replace the Pin to in the US. (Automo-tive News, May 1917) The car will also bebui l t and sold in Europe, and there wi l lbe little or no difference between theEuropean and American models. Al thoughthe Fiesta was described as a worldcar, and is sold in the US, i t was neverplanned to produce i t in rhe States. andit wi l l be phased out of the US marketwhen the new Escort comes in. I t maywel l have been promoted and sold in theUS mainly in order to improve the Fordmile-per-gal lon averages for the 1977/8deadl ine of the Federal legislat ion. I t wi l l

have served i ts purpose by 198 I when thePinto replacement can take over, andforeign built cdrs will no longer be eligiblefor inclusion in fleet averages anyway.

The new rationalisation programme in theUSA, on which Ford wi l l be spending$2bi l l ion a year unt i l 1985, wi l l g ive thehome base the strength necessary for aradical overseas reorganisat ion.

We show elsewhere in this report how theopera t i ( )ns o f the Ford Moto r Companyinf luence the l ives of i ts workers. andhelp distort the economies of the lessdeveloped countr ies. The company'srelat ionship with the government of theUSA is based on i ts economic strensthrnd i t s po l i t i ca l musc le . The re la t i unsh ipis int imate and mutual ly benef lc ial . Fordbenefits from the influence it can brinsto bear on in te rna l l eg is la t i r , rn and cun t ro l s .and also, overseas, from the diplomaticprotect ion of i ts economic interests.

I t is, for example, one of the US manu-facturers operating in South Africa whosein terests have moved the US to opposecomplete trade sanct ions against the apar-theid regime. The US government, inturn, benefits from the political andpropaganda role Ford plays in othercountr ies. The motor car, af ter al l , is per-haps the most apposite packaged symbolof the American way of l i fe. And Fordhas aided the aims of the US sovernmentln more concrele ways too.

SabotageIn October l97l US Secretary of StateWil l iam Rogers told a closed meeting ofexecut ives frorn ITT, Ford, Anaconda,Purina, First Nat ional City Bank, BankAmerica. and others. that ' the NixonAdministration is a business Adminis-trat ion. I t 's mission is to protect Americanbusiness' . The subject under discussionwas the new government of the MarxistSalvador Al lende in Chi le. Accordins toJohn Pe t t y . Ass is ran r Sec re ra ry o f - thcTreasury, this was to be 'a new bal l gamewith new rules' .

The new rules included cutt ins off ofExpor t - l rnpor t Bank c red i t s o i wh ichdepended vi tal imports from the US, andpressuring mult inat ional inst i tut ions such

as the World Bank (under ex-Ford pres-dent Robert McNamara) and the Inre:-American Development Bank to dr_r-approve further loans. The corporations.including Ford. joined the campaign a:instructed by refusing to sel l v i tal sparepar ts fo r t rucks and mach ine ry . even I r ) :cash. Thus Ford was directly involrecin the economic sabotage of the Al lencirregime leading to i ts overthrow and theimposit ion of the current fascist regime

Global expansion and rat ional isat ion canonly increase the power of mult inat ionalsto inf luence pol i t ical developments, atrai t that has not gone unnot iced in thecorr idors of power. The US NationalWar College Strategic Research Grouphas produced a study which concludesthat, ' the phenomenon of growingmult inat ional enterpr ise, preponderant l l 'American, can play a major role inimproving our overall political, militaryand economic strength.'

Global corporations are seen as theengines bui lding ' the economic strengthof the Free World' . The study proposes apol i t ical strategy in which MNC's have aclearly defined role in the 'proliferation

of the American system of values andway of life.' It continues, 'lf we wish ourvalues and life styles to prevail, we areobliged to compete with other cultureand power centres. Multinational enter-prise offers a tremendous lever to thisend. Its growing arsenal of foreign-basedbusiness operations is working for usaround the' c lock. I ts osmotic act iontransmits and transfuses not only Ameri-can methods of business operation.bank ing and marke t ing techn iques : bu tour legal systems and concepts, ourpolitical philosophies, our ways of com-municat ing and ideas of mobi l i ty, and ameasure of the humanities and arts pecu-l iar to our civ i l isat ion. '

The study sees the Multinational Corpor-ations as part of the state's politicalarmoury which in times of crisis andwar would be 'committed in coniunctionwith other elemenls of natioiral andallied power . . . to weaken the enemy bydenying it resources and disrupting itsextemal commercial and industrial assetsand operations.' (Global Reach)

Ford WorldwideFrom its very beginning, Ford's success was built on mass production, mass production that needed a

market that could not be confined to one country or even one continent.

The Ford Motor Company is the thirdlargest company in the world. It employsalmost half a million people and at leasttwo million more depend on Ford fortheir jobs. With assets of over $18bi11ion,the Ford Motor Company is as wealthyand powerful as many dozens of smallernation states - but its ruler Henry Fordis accountable to no electorate, least ofall to those whose livelihoods are affectedby his decisions.

Second largest motor firm in the world -only General Motors is bigger - for thepast thirteen years Ford has been 'the

number one US-based auto firm outsideNorth America'. It sells more cars inEurope than any other manufacturer -including the European car companies.

ln 1916, Ford sold 5.4million vehiclesworth $28.8bi l l ion or nearly f l7bi l l ion.ln 19'/7 it looks set to Dass its record of6 million vehicles in one year. (Drivennose to bumoer. these would circle theequator one and a half t imes!;

Every year Ford's investment decisionsallocate millions of dollars, and the verysize of these investments send primeministers and presidents rushing to curryFord's favour. ln 197 6, $5 5 I million wasspent on modernisation and expansion.

Every year Ford employees producemillions of dollars of profits for Ford'sshareholders. In 1976 profits after taxwere $983million, or an average $2,214from each worker. $263.4million washanded out to shareholders. Results for1977 wtll be even higher. Between 1948and 19'76, no less than $5,208.lmillion(roughly 12,900million) has been givenout to shareholders by the Ford MotorCompany.

OverseasFord sells and builds cars, trucks andtractors all over the world. It also makesmissi les and satel l i tes: is in the toothir ty companies supplying the USarmed forces is involved in propertydevelopment, f inance and insurance. Butthe name Ford means cars. And Fordmeans cars al l over the world, cars manu-factured assembled or sold in over 100countries.

Outside the United States, the most im-portant car manufacturing and assemblycentres are in Germany, Britain, Canada,Brazil, Australia, Mexico, Argentina,South Africa and Spain. While NorthAmerica accounts for some 7O% of Ford.cars and trucks sold. no less than 41% ofthe Company's profits in 1976 weregenerated outside North America.

In times of recession in the US, theseprofits from outside the US become evenmore important. ln 1975, when US autosales were hit by the worst recession forforty years, profits from Ford's overseasoperations accounted for no Iess than71% of the total . Perhaps even moresignificant, Ford's international operations(i.e. outside North America) have beenthe major area of growth over at least thepast decade. The lower saturation of thecar market outside North America. andthe larger populace, together with theFord vision of gradual world-wide deve-lopment and rising living standards, meanthat the company sees its internationaloperat ions as pt-r tent ial ly even more im-portant to prof i ts. Certainly. the rate ofincrease in the number of vehicles of allmakes sold outside North America hasbeen almost double that within it inrecent years, and today more than halfthe vehicles sold in the world are outsidethe United States.

Control DecisionsThe Ford approach to the world wassummed up by Henry Ford I I speakingin 1967'. "At the moment, we are payingour attention to the big markets whereour penetration is large. That's where wesay we can afford the top talent. I saythat we need the top talent in the smal lmarkets. That's the only way to makethem big."

But despite the spread of the Ford MotorCompany, it remains very much anAmerican company. Control of the vastempire is firmly held in World Headquar-ters, Dearborn. Michigan. Nothing essen-tial is ever done in the whole corporationunless it has been approved by HenryFord II. 'As a multinational companyestablished on the five continents, em-ploying a total of 450,000 people, Ford

necessarily has rigid structures. Tasks.functions and responsibilities are clearlydef ined. . . . Obviously the f inal decisioncan be taken onty by top management,but countless other ranks are involved inthe preliminary skirmishes which lead upto the final decision'. (Seidler p.22) Topmanagement of Ford is the Ame ricanboard - and in particular one man,Henry Ford II. Any decisions on invest-ment involving more than $25m (about! l4m) must be referred to the mainboard in Detroit - headed by him.

Speed upFrom its very beginning, the success ofthe Ford Motor Company was built onmass production, mass production thatneeded a market that could not beconfined to one country or even onecontinent. No less today, mass produc-tion, the economies of scale and inter-nationalisation of production and marketsare the keys to Ford's route to power.

The Model T was the first and only worldcar a concept that Ford is tryingextremely hard to recreate today. InI 9l I i t was being bui l t in Manchester,England, becoming England's best sellingcar the next year. In 1913 assemblybegan in France, and in i916 the f i rstSouth American car assembly plant wasbuilt in Argentina. New assembly plantsstarted in 1916 in Denmark, 1920 inSpain, Brazi l and Uruguay, 1922 in I talyand Belgium, 1924 in Sweden and Chileand 1925 in. Japan. Through Ford ofCanada the Model T penetrated theBritish Empire with assembly in Australia,New Zealand and South Afr ica. By 1924Ford had bui l t and sold ten mil l ion cars.

Already, many of the factors that charac-ter ise Ford today were apparent in theproduot ion of the Model T: mass inter-nat ional product ion; assembly l ine tech-niques with work organised so that eachoperat ion was subdivided into i ts simplest,fastest components, and the workerbecame just an adjunct to the machine;and a daily struggle for control on theshop floor. When profits fell, as in 1925,Ford had only one response: make thecar cheaper - which for the embattledworkforce meant speed-up. The infernal

working conditions and the bloodybattles over unionisation are part of Fordhistory.But the logic of fal l ing prof i t marginsleading to constant attempts to impose\ l )eed-up on t l t e work l i , rec re rn l i ns .Assembly l ine technology has not radl-cai ly al tered since i ts introducrion andr, : f inemenl in thc l9l0s. which l i rni tsthe increases in product iv i ty to be gainedb r t l r e i n s t l l l a n r r n ( , 1 n e \ , r n a e r r i n c r y .Managcment problems within assemblyplants are notor ious. and become over-whelming i t the workforces in suchp lan ts become lo r r l a rge . An emp i r i ca ll im i t t o the s i ze o f ca r assemb ly p lan tsof around 150.000 vehrcles a year hasbeen set by Ford. So when prof i t marginsfal l . as they have done steadi ly since the1950s, Ford has one response push upthe product iv i ty of the workforce bymaking l t work harder. Speed-up, cuts tnmanning levels. increased f lexibi l i ty ofworkers. fewer workers producing morevehicles: these are facts of l i fe for Fordworkers. The process is assisted by Ford'scapability to play one group of workersoff against another. threatening workersin country after country with no newinvestment. or the ultimate Ford threat-- withdrawal.

Economies of scaleToday Ford organises i ts product ionacross the flve continents achievinsenormous ectrnomies (Jf scale thanks tothe sheer volume of i ts product ion. I talso achieves considerable independencefrom, and control over, local iconomicand social conditions. Workers in anyone of Ford's hundreds of factories aredaily subject to management decisionsthat appear arbitrary and unjustified.What is not apparent is that these deci-sions are part of global strategies, involv-ing workers in many other countries.Their effects are known only to Ford'scentralised management.

"Just over a year ago we compared thecosts of producing a Cortina with thoseof a close competitor in terms of design,but which was only being produced ata third of the Cortina's volumeThe difference in cost, attributable toeconomies of scale only was !170 per

car." (Terry Beckett , Chairman ForduK.4 .5 .71 )

Prof i t margins in ' the motor industry areeverything and to increase the prof i ton each car sold, the lowering of unitcosts by making more of each com-ponen t and each ca r i s c ruc ia l . I n 1971 ,before the oi l cr is is, Ford was complain-rng that i ts prol i t margin. at 4. lc/c ofsales compared unf 'avourably with anrve rage 5 .7 ' l f i ' r t 1 , . ' n r ' t eo r l tpan ie5in the Dow-Jones industr ial index. and1.7% Ior the nat ion's 500largest industr ialf i rms.

Prof i t margins have fal len steadi ly: f rom8.5% in 195O: 8 .1% in 1955 ; 6 .77n in1960 . 5 .1% in 1966 . to 4% in 1913 .Real ist ic accounts fbr Ford betbre thewar just do not exist . but certainly theGeneral Motors prof i t per vehicle in the.record year of 1973 was lower in realterms (adjusted for inf lat ion) than i t hadbeen in 1928 . In the ba t t l e to i nc reasethese margins, economies of scale arecen t ral to protr tabi l i ty.

I t has been est imated that in order to beprof i table at competi t ive pnces! a newsmall car in Europe has to be on a scaleof at least 500,000 cars a year. TheVolkswagen Golf sold .120,000 in 1 975,with a 500,000 a year targer for follow-ing yearsl the Fiat 127 (on which Ford'sFiesta is largely based) sold 490,000 unitsthat year, and the Renault 5 350,000.The Fiesta has now been launched with atarget output of over 500,000 a yearfrom 1977 onwards. This is desoite thefact thar there is already considerableover-capacity in the European small carmarket - estimated at some 30%. (Capitaland Aass 2.)

CapacityThe level of international integration ofproduction on the Fiesta is unpreceden-led . and p roduc t ion on lh i s sc ; l e meansthat component factories are running atopt imum levels. This al lows massiveautomation, for component factories areeasier to automate than assembly plants.The two Bordeaux planrs that

-pioduce

all the gear boxes, transmissions and axlesare highly automated, and on Ford'sown accounting, are their most productive

European factcries. They produce onemil l ion gear boxes a year.

Assembly Flants are more labour intensiveand management 's problems l imit their

size. The Fiesta is being assembled inthree centres. Dagenham, Valencia (Spain)and Saarlouis (Gennany), producing100,000. 250,000 and 150,000 cars ayear respectively.

As a comparisot i . consider Bri t ish Ley-larrd's product ion record. ln 1976,Leyland produced less than 700,000 carsover its entire range , including r/zreehigh volume low cost cars, the Mini ,the Al legro, and the Marina.

Or take the larger cars Ford has thccapacity to produce 300.000 Granadas ayear at Cologne. whi le Leyland's totalcapacity for Rovcr and Jaguar combinedis on ly 190 .000 un i t s a \ ,ea r .

The garns to Ford in terms of cutt ingcosts are clearlv enormous - and Ford'spol icv ol sel l ing cars at whatever pr icethc markel * i l l bear rransfers these gainsstraight in to p ro t l t s.

PricingThe Fiestas sold in Finland and in Belsiumr re bo th assemb led in Dagenham Fr , ,mparts fronr al l over Europe but theFinnish one costs two and a half t imesas much. 'Not al l the di f ference can beaccounted for by tax and tr im. ' (Economist 12.2.771 Small wonder Ford execu-tives dream of 'a world car in a worldmarket ' . 'The'day is not far off whenauto manufacturers will be producing thesame line of products for sales everywherein the world, with only the most minorvariations among countries.' (ExecuriveVice President W. Bourke)

Terry Beckett, managing director of FordUK 'sees it as a conscious return to thephi losophy of Ford's or iginal f 100Popu la i o f 1935 , o r even ro - :he : :mousModel T: that is bui ldins u: l r lumeth rough low p r i ce . . . Fo rJ : i : . , eoodpos i t i on to s t r i ke ha rd : . : : : . : . , n i t hsuppl iers and to reap the re-. : ' .=. : . : largescale product ion' . (Finat lc u. 7l ' r . -s I - .75)

No l on ly d ( ' es For ; - ' : E - - . : . : : - , i uceo n a s c a l e t h a t c a n b : : . = : : : : : : . : : r i . i f

r-

Generalissimo Franco,negotiations

any of i ts European competi tors, i t alsohas all the advantages of being part ofthe world-wide Ford organisat ion. Forexample a large part of the Research andDevelopment costs are borne by Detroi l .At the same time Ford in Europe can runits plants at optimum capacity - with alarger in-company market for its com-ponents than any of the Europeans. Ofthe first million gearboxes produced inBordeaux, 640,000 went to the US -cheaper gearboxes for Ford all round.There is too, a degree of world-wideintegration from which Ford of Europe

benefi ts. Cort ina bodies l rom the Phi l ip-pines, engines from Brazil, and kitsexported al l ovel the world, al l con-tr ibute to Ford's abi l i ty to operate atthe opt imum level, cutt ing costs andraising prof i ts.

Control'Henry Ford II wants to control every-thing that has his name on it' (BootonHerndon). And a lot more besides.Profits mean power, and power protectsand maintains profits. The Ford Motor

Company will not tolerate constraintson its behaviour. and its multinationaloperation, and sheer economic musclegive it a great degree of independenceof and control over conditions in anyone country.

Therc are bound to be conf l icts ofinterest between the company and thecountr ies in which i t oDerates onesmall example is the way Ford gave itsUK workforce a wage deal significantlyoutside the government 's pay l imits inlate 1977, while the government, fear-ful of putting the new Bridgend invest-ment at risk, did an d said nothing. Inmost cases which lead to confrontation,Ford will pull out rather than accom-modate.

As early as l9l9 Ford engaged in a wel lpublicised show-down with the fathersof the ci ty of Cork. Ford had negot iatedextremely favourable terms for a lease onproperty owned by the ci ty, and part ofthe deal was a promise to employ 2000workers. In the event only 1600 weretaken on. and the ci ty fathers threatenedpubl ic ly to cancel the lease unless 400more workers were employed. HenryFord immediately announced that hewould close the factory unless the threatwas withdrawn, stopped work there andlaid off 500 workers. He had no moretrouble from Cork . . .

Immediately al ier the second world war,Ford of l taly was reduced to a distr ibu-t ion operat ion 's ince governmental restr ic-t ions made i t ihrpossible to compete withFiat in manufacturing'. In Britain at thet ime, Ford i tsel f was receiving just suchfavourablc treatment. 'The British govern-ment in the postwar years desperatelyneeded exports in order to get outsidemoney, and enabled the Ford plants toobtain equipment and raw mater ials. '(Herndon)

Even more desperate about its foreignexchange position was the Indian govern-ment, which vainly tried to insist thatFord manufacture within the country aswell as assemble imported kits. 'In I 945the company placed the Indian operationin voluntary liquidation, which is cor-porationese for saying the hell with it.'( ib id)

fascist dictator of Spain at the time of the ValenciaPopperloto

..rr:::!l|.

* r

Similarly, in Spain after World WarII, when Franco tried to demand manufac-ture as well as assembly, Ford abandonedthe operat ion rather than bend. Twentyyears later, the Spanish government passeda special statute al ter ing many condit ionsof the laws on local-man ufacture d contentand minimum exDort reouirements forforeign investors, especially so that Fordwould bui ld i ts new plant at Valencia.

In early 1966 the Palest ine Automobi leCorporation Ltd., which had been dis-tr ibut ing Fords for 30 years, and wassel l ing some 25,000 vehicles a year, begannegotiat ions for a local assembly plant.Assembly from ki ts made in the UnitedStates, Bri tain and Germany was al ieadyworking wel l in Morocco, Pakistan,Turkey, Thai land and the Phi l ippines.

The Arab League protested, and threat-ened to put Ford on i ts boycott l ist .At the t ime there were Ford dealershiosin Lebanon . Sy r ia . Jo rdan . l raq . Yemen.Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Ford, as usual,refused to back down, and for once, sodid his opponents. Henry Ford I I admit-ted that the decision was ' inf luenced inpart by the fact that the company st i l lsuffers from a .resentment asainst thean t i - semi l i sm u f rhe d i : t an r pas l We war ] tto overcome that. ' (Herndon)

NazismThroughout the 1920s Henry Ford I hadused his personal newspaper the DearbornIntleperulent to write violently anti-semit ic signed art ic les. F r i lz Kuhn,leader of the American Nazis was on theFord payrol l , and as late as 1938 HenryFord I r cceprcd r i re Naz l German Eag le{ f i r s t c lass l f rom H i r l e r ' s governmenr .

The Cecorat ion was in thanks for Ford'sact ive help in Nazi Germany'\ prewarpreparat ions. In 1938 i t opened a truckassembly plant whose purpose, accordingto US Army Intel l igence, was to producetroop transport vehicles for the Wehr-macht. I ronical ly, af ter the war, Fordreceived almost a million dollars from theUS government, as compensation for thedamage done to their German factoriesby Allied bombing.

By the end of 1966, Ford was on theArab League boycott list, and has re-mained there ever. since. Now it seemslikely that the ban will either be dropped,or at least partially, if not wholly, cir-cumvented. in the foreseeable future-After three years of negot iat ion, Fordand the Egyptian government have agreedon the construct ion of a $l45mil l ionfactory to produce 10,000 trucks and50,000 diesel engines a year. The projectwill be 30% owned by Ford and 40% bythe Egyptian government - unusual forFord which likes to have total control.The plant at Amneye, Alexandria, willassemble kits from Langley in the UK.When local content reaches 1O%, in somecight years time, local manufacture willbegin in Egypt itself. lor President Sadatof Egypt, this investment is vital. It marks

the f i rst success of his 'open-docrr ' s-- ; . -r 'o I t r i i ng to a t t rac t fo re ign inve t r : :n rfrom the West, and Sadat is clear lr : re-pa red to l ake on rhe res t o f rhe 'A : :bl-eague and go ahead with it ,*heiheror not the Arab League agrees.

The Egypt ian deal also sheds l ighi onFord's f inancial relat ions *, i th i ts sur ' -s idiar ies. The Egypt ian Minister ciIndustry, Mr Issa Shaheen tr ied trr jnsisttha t Fo rd ' s re tu rn un i t s rn re . tnen i rel imited to 10% per 1ear. Th ree day sbefore agreement was finalll reached.he was dismissed from his post. Ford $ iilmaintain' i ts r ight to take prot l ts aJ.ord-

Henry Ford II leaves Downing St aiterthreatening to end UK inyestment I 9 7 I

Popperiotos

:'ll

i , s

l 0

l l

Ke!stone

Edsel Ford II, heir to the empire

ing to normal practice, while limiting itsdividends to 2A/; (Financial Times2'1.1O.77).

Some idea of the way Ford deals withnational governments on equal terms isgiven by looking at the negotiationsbehind the decision to site Ford's newengine plant in South Wales. For sixweeks, Henry Ford and his company werewooed by two Prime Ministers, andoffered millions by three Europeangovernments in their efforts to u'in theplanr.

In fact, the decision to site the factoryin Wales had been as good as taken asearly as July 17 - when the board ofFord Europe met and made this recom-mendation. From then till September9th three governments were kept inthe dark - and their financial offerscrept up. The final amount of govern-ment money going to the f,I 85millioninvestment is in the reeion of f,70million.

Besides Bri tain 's wel l developed engineering infrastructure, i ts low wage levels.and the proximity to Ford's only Euro-pean foundry at Dagenham, there weresound political reasons for placing thenew factory in the UK. About one-thirdof Ford's sales in the UK are of vehiclesimported from Continental plants, andalthough the Fiesta is assembled inBritain, over 50% of its parts come fromoverseas. Although Ford of Europe isplanning to increase its output froml. lmi l l ion to l .Tmil l ion units in theearly 1980s, it is unlikely that manymore of these vehicles will be made inthe UK. The company already importslarge numbers of cars to take advan-tage of British tryland's weakness itwill have to import even more. Theseimports are a highly sensitive area, andfor a company like Ford to maintain itspolitical goodwill, some counter-invest-ment is necessary. 'With the new SouthWales engine plant, the biggest singleinvestment in the UK motor industrysince the 1960s, Henry Ford has demon-strated his intention to win the battlefor acceptability in the most dramaticway possible.' (Financial Times 1O.9.77)

Own and ControlThe desire for total control extends tothe Ford Motor Company i tsel f , an dparticularly to its subsidiaries. HenryFord I set out quite ruthlessly to gaincontrol of the company from the or iginalshareholders who had put up al l theoriginal capital, and successfully forcedrhem out. By 1907 he had a 5l% interest,by I 9l 9 i t was total ly owned by the Fordfamily. In 1950 the company bought outthe control l ing interests of the Fordaff i l iates in l taly, Egypt, Spain, Hol land,Denmark, Sweden and Finland. In 1961,i t bought up the outstanding shares ofFord UK desoite the fact that thiscaused a nat ional outcry, about capitalgoing abroad.

In America part icular ly, Ford controlsi ts raw mater ials by producing themitself. whenever this is feasible. It makes asubstant ial amount of the i ron and steelthat the parent company requires, andhas been expanding i ts steel capacity.The Steel Division maintains a fleet offive vessels on the Great Lakes, whichtransDort some six mi l l ion tons of i ronore, coal and limestone each year. TheGlass Dvision produces almost all theglass Ford uses, and sells to outsidemarkets. Ford even owned a rubber plan-tat ion in Brazi l at one point, but whenthis was devastated by disease, sold itto the Brazi l ian sovernmen t .

Transfer PoficyLike any other multinational company,Ford can choose where it wants its profitsto show - and within wide margins howlarge they should look. The financialflows - the movement of money fromone company account book to another -often bear no resemblance at all to thereality of cars and parts shipped aroundthe globe and the making and selling ofvehicles.

For example, Cortina bodies produced atthe body stamping plant in the Philippines(together with engines produced inTaiwan) are exported to England. Thecompany is managed by Ford Asia-Pacific Inc of Australia. But financially,money from the Philippines goes to Ensite

Phil ippines Ltd. which is whol ly ownedby Ensite Ltd of Canada, i tsel f whol lyowned by the Ford Motor Company.

Ford companies selling to other Fordcompanies can, in fact, charge whatsuits their overall best interests. to showa prof i t where they wish. For example,Ford of Venezuela is clairning large lossesas i ts reason for not contplying withincreases in the local-man uf act ured con-len l i rw5 t l t e Venezue lan g , rve r r r r t ren l i strylng to inipose. 'One off ic ial pointedout that both 'ends' of thc systenttoreign rnanut 'acturer and local retai ldealer can real ise handsonre prof i tswhi le the local assembler takes a loss' .(r t - inancial Times 2.\ 1.76) No counrryhas yet establ ished lbol-proof rnethodsof counter ing such transl 'er pr ic ing. andFord. of al l companies. would be the lastto respond to pressure.

Funny MoneyThe pay claim submitted by Ford'shourly paid workers in the UK showshow, even when the money has finallycome to rest in a given company's books,profit figures are immensely manipulable.Stated prof i ts for 1976werc l l2 i .6mil l ionbefore tax, d59. lmi l l ion after tax. ( lnfact only tTmillion of tax was reallypaid - the rest was 'deferred', whichmeans i t wi l l never be paid. Delerred taxis now financing more than a fifth ofcapital employed.) But Ford went onfrom this to claim that currenr coslprof i ts (al lowing fbr the effects of in-f lat ion on the costs of replacing plantand machinery) were only !25. l mi l l ionbefore tax, or f .5.6mil l ion after tax. Notsatisfied by these figures, the unionnegotiators cal led in a highly respectedf irm of stockbrokers to give an indepen-dent analysis of the accounts. Theyagreed that Ford's stated current costprof i t of f .25-1mil l icn was a gross under-est imate, and put forward the f igure of,e46.6mil l ion as more real ist ic. 127.1-million after rax. Even the FinancialI inres was prompted to ask'So why doesthe CCA (current cost account ing) f igurecome to be so krw? I t hardly makes sensein the context of a lT4mil l ion improve-ment in l iquidi ty ar a t ime of r is ingactivity.' (Financial Times 26.3.77) Thedirectors of the company, despite the

claimed prof i ts of only f .5.6mil l ion aftertax, decided that the amount avai lablefor distr ibut ion {o shareholders was infact !67., lmi l l ion.

An irnportant insight into the company,sf inancial deai ings came in I 961 , whin .Henry Ford set about buying up the 45%outstanding interest in the UK company.I t was a t ime of auster i ty in the UnitedSlates. and there was a publ ic outcryabout the US gold shorfage, and thiwickedness of spending abroad. HenryFord I I was forced to admit that 'a l l e i-penditures abroad came out of earningsabroad. and that in the decade frorn l gi l

to l96l- the company had repatr iatedalmost $2bi l l ion of prot i ts l t r the US'(Herndon). By 1972. Ford s sharenoldingsin i t s European ho ld ines \ \e re \ \ , ' r t l t )ome$ l b i l l i on . Th is rep rese-n red a lm, , r t en l l re l vthe re inves ted ea rn ings o i du inc Lu i i nes rin Europe for some b0 \ 'e3r. i : r r s, ,udyear . l rowever . d i v idenJs i : , ' l t t r r , , pebr ing pe rhaps $ l lOmi l l i on in r . , : h r US. '(Forbes 1.7.72')

The new engine plant in Sourh \ \ 'e les.fbr example, wi l l be ent ireh i lnrncedf ro rn UK sources t l t e le i : r : - . rp l l 31export by the Ford luor. , : Crncany.only repatr iat ion of prot i rs

lqT t 20 ,194

millions of dollanNet hofir

9 8 3 . 1322. ,13 2 7 . 1906.58 70 .06 5 6 . -5 1 5 . -5.16.5616 .68.+. 1

6 : 1 . 0703 05 0 5 . 6488 .5.180.7,109.64 )7 .945 t .4116.2294.0248.2154.2212.6t79 .112.4.8136.4259.61 7 1 . 8103 .868 .8d 1 . 2

E,nplI ees',,.t , rlJ vid e ).1.r,i.900.+ I 6.1 00464.700474,300442,600433, I 00431,700436.1004l 5 .000l q 4 i . l

388.00036.+.-i00336. r003 1 6 . 6 0 030:.600: 6 1 . I r 0:66 -,r'l

' \ ! r l l l

l ro.- 'r ' r

: O. . . , ' , ':r '- . ,: : , : . : ' ,l : - : - , , _r ; i "

Year

t976197 51974t973

28,84024,00123,62123,015

1 , 5 8 6 . 9436.4 '605.2

1 , 5 5 3 . 81 , 6 1 7 . 91,267.4I ,014.81 , 1 1 0 . 01,278.9

149.81 , 1 5 7 . 5I ) R ) s

985.81,028.2I ,007.18 l 8 . 4842.4933.1253.7632.8142.6929.2463.9478.9256.v346.65t2.6287.2160.89 5 . I

d,14.3

Earnings for Year ended December 3lst inNet Sales Operating Profit

197119701969r 968196719661 9 6 5196419631962l 96119601 9 5 91 9 5 819571 9 5 61 9 5 51 9 5 41 9 5 31 9 5 2r 9 5 l1 9 5 01949194819171946

16,43314,980t 4 , 7 5 6t4,075l 0 , s r 6122.4011,5379,6718,7428,0906,7096,7986,6495 , 2 8 16,8394,6415,5944,0624,2112,640) ' 7 4 1

3,0292.2491 . 9 7 21 . 5 0 2

894(Source: Moody's Industr ial Manual 1977)The value of sales per employee rose steadi ly from $13,332 in 1952 to alm., : : : : :per worker in 1976. At the same t ime the number of vehicles produced : : . -a lmos t doub led f ro rn 6 .2 in 1952 to 12 .2 pe r year i n 1976 . Ne t p ro f i r - . .has also r isen, though more errat ical ly, l rom $630ln 1952 to $1214 i ; l9-^

l 2

On The Line

7'

Car product ion is the most e\rren,teexample of modern in dustr ial isat ion. I tis the birth place of automation and thebirth place as well of the assembly line'sinescapable byproducts: drudgery. stress.and the dehumanisation of work.

At the River Rouge plant near the Dear-born headquarters of the Ford N{otorCompany, the ent ire manufactur ing pro-cess is carr ied on in one vast industr ialcomplex. From the moment the ore.coal and l imestone arr ive at the plant.unt i l a worker jumps into the f inishedMustang. turns on the engine and speedsoff the l ine, only 33 hours have passed.This cornplex alone, the largest sel f-contained faci l i ty in the world, consumesnlore than six mi l l ion tons of i ron ore,coal and l imestone each year

Every day i t generates enough electr ic i tyto l ight a ci ty of a mi l l ion people, burnsenough coal to heat the homes of330,000,consumes enough gas lbr a ci ty of I tul-rni l l ion. and uses , l25mil l ion gal lons of$ater. I t operates 20 diesel locomotivesand some 860 rai l wagons on more than100 miles of rai lway track. Within thecomplex are 229 coke ovens, 3 blast fur-naces, rol l ing mi l ls, a gigant ic foundry,an engine plant, a glass plant, an assemblyp l a n t . . .

The 35.000 employees are dwarf 'ed bymachinery and plant, but at every stageo{ product ion. singly or in groups. t f teydo the work. They cast the enginesin the foundry: They operate the pressesas the steel is stamped in to shape. Thevpiece together the body, bui ld up theengines. and f inal ly assemble the car fromthousands of bi ts.

Throughout the length and breadth ofthe complex, rol lers, conveyor belts,chains and gatel ines pul l the componentparts of thc car relent lessly ro complet ion.

In the Rouge plant. the t inal assemblyl ine is 1200 feet long. travel l ing at 1700feet an hour. Cars are put together. andvehicles rol l of f the end at a rate of60 each hour.

The assembly line is noisy and chaotic,the air filled with the smell of oil andrubber, with automatic wrenches giving

".

I

t ' \

l " i

Ei \

2g

F

l 3

off piercing screams. Bumpers. bonnetshang ing on hooks I i ke ca rcasses . rumb leoverhead and are fed onto the linc.Co.qputers match colours and styles withdi l ' ferenr body models. Tyres rhud downchu tes and a re ins ta l l ed by worke rs w i thpower wrenches that t ighten al l thewheel bolts simultaneo us- ly. Seats arecar r ied lo rhe l i ne and then jugg le t l i n r , ,posi t ion. Final ly, a worker jumps into theseat, turns on the engine, and with ascream of tyres the car spr ints away fromthe l ine. At Rouge this process is repeatedday and night, f ive days a week 60 carsan hour, .140 cars a shi f t , 880 cars a day,13,000 parts into each car.

A New Type of WorkerThe work of the modern car assemblvworker leaves nothing to him. Automaticmachines show a transfer of thought, skilland intelligence from person to machine.

The pace of the l ine dictates the speed ofwork on and t-r f f the l ine. for everythingin a car plant eventually finds it way ontothe assembly l ine.

ln any car plant the worklbrce is madeup of machine tenders, assemblers,ski l led workers, inspectors and testers,helpers and jani tors. In recent years theproport ion of tenders and assemblers hasincreased considerably. Physical st rength,ski l l and experience are no longer scri rnpur tan t . Sk i l l has been l rans fe r ied t , ,complex machines and brute fbrce togigant ic l i f t ing and conveying gear. ( lnmodern plants there wi l l be maybe 200dif ferent kinds of mechanical devicefbr carrying an d conveying mater ials. )Along with the devekrpment of auto-matic and handl ing machinery has cornea level l ing of wages_ At the sarne t i rne thetotal number of workers needed in amodern plant is reduced. For example inR ive r Rouge in l g lg l hc re were 101 ,800workers. By 1970 thcre were less thanr5,000.

Between 1957 and 1976, carproduction by the big threemakers rose from 6. Tmillionmillion - an increase of 62%.force, however, rose by oniythe same period.

and truckUS autoto 10.9-

The work-7 -7'/o over

Car Productioq

Some operat ions are almost ful lyautomatic, whi le others requireeons ide rab le amuun t s o f l abour .

Panel production: This involves thestamping of body parts. The PressShop typical ly has l5-20 l ines, eachproducing some 20 parts per minute.The s tamp ing opera l i on i s nowIargely automatic, employing about10%, of the labour fbrce.

Body Assembly: Car bodies areconstructed by welding various bodypanels and stampings into sub-assemblies that finally form a rigidbody- Sub-assemblies are spot wel-ded manually, final welds are oftenfully automatic. The process re-quires about 30% of the workforce.Powertrain Production: The mostcostly sector of production, supply-ing engines, transmission and axles.Rough castings are heated, dropforged 'and machined; most of themochinery is very soph ist icated.This secttrr accounls for about 25%of the workforce.

Painting: Here the welded bodiesare cleaned, pr imed and painted.The workforce is small. less thanIO%, but considerable skill is re-quired in paint work.

Trim and Final Assembly: Thou-sands of parts and componenls areinstal led onto the painted body.This is a long and complex processinvolving separate sub-assemblies.Workers are located at stations. Atr im l ine might have 70-80 stat ions,with specif ied parts stocked at eachstat ion. This sector is very labourintensive. account ing for about 25%or more of the workforce

Automatic machinery has also al terer lmanagement methods. By using machineswhose operat ions and output are uniform,standardised and automatic. the laboureffort has become rigidly defined anclmeasurable. The workers' contr ibut ion isdictate d simply by the speed of the l ine.

This makes demands on nervous andmental activities, such as watchfulness,quick judgement, dexterity but perhapsmost important of all the nervous en-durance to carry through dull, monoto-nous, fatiguing, rhythmic ope rations.

But automation in the car factory is notcomplete. Despite technological advancesand scientific management, the necessityfor human labour in production has neverbeen and cannot be completely removed.No more graphic illustration is neededthan a picture of a car plant during aslr ike. Automatic tools hang l imply onthe end of air lines. Panels hans fromoverhead conveyors. A completid carslopes awkwardly half way down theramp. Without human labour the machin-ery, the m:rnagement, the product, theprofit is nothing.

Life with the UnesEveryday management of productiondepends on organising the min in sucha way that more and more can be extrac-ted from them. The contribution of themachine is fixed. Only the worker canwork harder. Organised in different ways,in combination with different machines.his con t r ibut ion can be increased morework from him means more Drofits forFord.

"Save ten steps a day for each of 12,000employees" said Henry Ford of his systemof br inging stocks to employees insteadol having rhe worker move around freelv."and you w i l l . have saved 50 m i les t , f\easted motion and misspent energy."

The organisat ion of labour and technol-ogy of a car plant are devoted to oneend the product ion of cars as prof i t ,ab ly as poss ib le . An essen t ia l e lementin this process is the progressive el imin-at ion of any control r . l f rhe job by theworker, in so far as is possible. and thetransfer to a device r ihich is control ledby management frc,nr rrulsrde the directprocess. The control does nor sroo atthe mach ine . Sc renr r r l : n lan f , sementa lso seeks r , ' l nuu l i t he n la l l l u thetask even before he ! .nters rhe car factory.James R. Bright oi rhe Harr.ard BusineisSchool u,rote () i 'aJi i t . rnt ;a progress'and'au tomat ion ' i n these le ins :

t 4

'I suggest that excessive educdtional andskill specification is a serious mistake, apotential hazard to our economic andsocial system. We will hurt individuals,raise labour costs improperly, createdisillusion and resentment and destroyvalid job standards by setting standardsthat are not truly needed for a giventask. ' (Braverman, p.21 a)

It's a matter of chance which particularjob a new starter ar Ford f inds hi is given.I f the company wants 20 operators, acouple of janitors and a dozen foundryworkers, in that order, the job the newman gets wi l l most probably be decidedby his position in the queue thc morningof the interview. As early as 1925 HenryI admitted that many of the new recruitsonly needed a days training. It's the sameat Ford today. A morning in the 'Con-

ference Room' (Dagenham) with a talkfrom Personnel about the 'big Fordfamily' and a conducted tour with thetraining officer, then new recruits arebriefed by the Safety Officer. "The con-venor was supposed to see us. He didn' tturn up. So the training officer intro-duced us to the union saying much thesame thing as he'd said before and thatFord liked everyone to join the union,because in Ford all the problems areso lved by ta l k ing and p rocedure . " (Fo rdworKer )

After the morning session they go straightonto the l ine "You know the sort oithing. This is Fred, he' l l show you whatto do. 'Hel lo ' says Fred. 'You st ick thisin here and that in there - I 'm not paidfor this you know.' You ei ther do i t oryou don't . I f you don't you're unsuitableand you get your cards." (Ford worker,New Society 12.6.7 5)

StenchThe atmosphere in the car plant is re-marked on by al l Ford workers youmeet. "Walk through the main doorwayof the plant on any day of the week andthe atmosphere seen. ls to knock you offyour feet. Fumes from the Heat Treat.Fumes from the Foundry. The stenchof burnt oi l . The air seems ful i of swarf.Oi l everywhere. Your clothes are black-ened jusi by standing in the atnrosphere

for an hour or two. The machines arefilthy with a mixture of metal dust, oiland dir t ." (Ford worker)

On the l ines the work isn' t hard . . . I t 'sthe never-ending pace, the monotony,the debi l i tat ing tedium.

"The job gets so sickening, day in dayout, plugging in ignition wires. I getthrough with one motor, turn around andthere's another staring me in the face. It'ssickening. The assembly line is no placeto work I can tel l you. There's nothingmore discouraging than having a barrelbeside you with ten thousand bolts in i tand using them all up. Then you get abarrel with another ten thousand boltsand you know every one of those boltshas to be picked up and put in exact lythe same place as the last ten thousandbo l t s . " (Wa lke r and C ues t )

Phi l Stal l ings is a spot welder at the FordAssembly plant on the south side otChicago. He's 27, and works on the thirdshif t , 3.30pm rnidnight. His job consistso f the f i r s t we lds on the ca r bodr . l hewelding guns hang frorn the roof.

" l stand on one spot al l night. The onlyt ime a person stops is when the lrne stops.We do abou t 3 l j ub : pc r ; r i . pe r un i t .48 unrts an hour. 8 hours a da1 . -11 11-. t48 t imes 8. Figure l t ()ur. That 's howman)' t imes I push the butt trn. The noiseis tremendous. I ou open ) 'our mouth andyou're hable ro get a rnoutht l l of sparks.T h a t ' s a b u r n . r h e s e i t r r ' b u r n s . . . I t d o n ' tstop. I t just goes and goes and goes. I betthere's men uho have l i led and died outthere, never se! 'n the end of that l ine . . .

" l don' t l ike the pressure, the int imi-dat ion. Ho* sould you l ike to go up tosomeone and sa1 ' l would l ike to go tothe bathroom?' I i the foreman doesn'tl ike you he' l l make you hold i t . Justignore you. (Turkel p.220 f f)

"You can work next to a guy for monthswithout even knorving his name. One thingyou're too busy to talk the other youcan't hear. You have to hol ler. They gotthese l i t t le guys cornrng around in whitesh i r t s an t i i f t he l sec yuu runn ing y t ru rmouth they say 'This guy needs morewor k ' .

"Everyone has a station. You're suppo:e:to get your work completed within :certain area, usually around ten ma) befifteen feet. If you get behind, y'ou'rebumping into the next worker." (Fordworker, Chicago)

I t is not simply the automation, themonotony and unpleasant condit ions thatdetermine the dai ly rout ine of the workerat Ford. The competitive drive of thecompany and the slow decline in automanufacturing profit margins leads Fordmanagement to push for ever greaterproductivity levels and even faster linespeeds.

'You wi l l know that the new Cort ina isone of the best sel l ing cars that we haveever bui l t In order to imorove thesupply si tuat ion we have advised yourshop stervards of our intent ion to runthe Cor t i na l i ne a t 55 jobs pe r hourinstead of the present 45 jph. '

This ul t imatum was given to Ford workersat Dagenham in January 1977. The samenumber of men would be confrontedwith an extra ten jobs per hour, an in-crease of 22V,'. The line worker wouldbe expected tcl do almost a quarteras much again. The'supervisors'br ief toemployees ant ic ipated quest ions and gavethe answers. The final question 'What's

in i t for me?', was answered: 'There isno tangible benef i t 1o you or me, but we.al l have an interest in ensuring that thecompany is eff ic ient and prof i table forthat is what secures jobs' .

PressureA month later workers al the engineplant at Dagenham were told that manage-ment were going to speed up from 120to I . 13 eng ine : pe r h , ' i t r . onc eng incevery 27 seconds.

Engine workers felr that they were begin-ning to operate l ike machines t l iemselves:they were gett ing less arrd less space towork in. and less freedom of manoeuvre.This was especial ly true of workers onfreehand operat ions who fel t that thct imings establ ished by the Company wereimpossibly r igid. The intensity of pro-duct ion meant that every day wc'rkers

l 5

were being warned or suspended lbr notworking hard enough, or for not main-taining qual i ty. l t a lso meanr a high levelof absenteeism and labour turnover incertain sect ions.

At Langley workers st i l l ta lk about theTransit assembly l ine. Demand was sohigh that management ran the l ines as f)stas they could get away with i t . "We hadto do 20 jobs an hour. We l i teral ly chasedtrucks down the l ine. one every threerninutes." Many couldn' t st ick i t andleft . Turnover was a brg problem. Transitassernbly was, eventual ly transferred toSou thampton . " l t was a mad l i ne andwe were glad to see the back of i t . "(Langley steward ) Southampton wasexpanded to take i t and an al l greenlabour t i r rce recrui ted to assemble i t . Formanagement at Ford this was the mosteffet ive way of overcoming the resistanceol an experienced workfbrce to suchspeed up.

Work StudyThe day to day methods ol speed up areless crude but equal ly eff-ect ive. Knowna5 ' l ru lnan ' Ur ' i ndus t r i a l ' eng ineer ing . i tinvolves the management and organisa-t ion of the individual worker. I t invariablyen ta i l s spee t l up o r reduc t i r )n i n mann ingleve ls.

Ford has i ts own method of 'human

engineering' which has changed l i t t lesince the early days of Henry Ford I .I ts aim is simple. To t ie the individualoperator as t ight ly and eff ic ient ly aspossible into the pace and ntot ion of themachine.'Work measurement is the appl icat ionof techniques designed to establ ish theTIME to carry out a specif ied job' (FordWork Standards Training Course p4).'Time Study' is the most widely usedof al l work measurement and ' involves

direct observat ion of work whi lst i t isbeing performed, t iming i t with a sui tablestop watch, and the application of arating technique' (p5).

One job is broken down into n ine ele-ments, each element divided up bybreak points. Each of these elementsis t imed and ret imed. Any 'human'

deviat ion is a lso t imed. but e. l in lnatedfrom the f ina l t imc - 'c i rc led

out ' . Inthe example wq have, the operatorta lks to another ernployee, and th isis c i rc le d out .

But thc deviat ions may be less innocuous.The worker 's ntovements may not bet ight enougj l . cer ta in act ions may besuperf luous. The manual reminds thetra lnee industr ia l engineer : ' l f the operatorpers is ts in us ing excessive mot ions dur ingthe obse^rvat ions. rhe srudy wi l l be sroppedl o r [ h e I o r e m e n t ( ' r e i n s l r u c l t h e o p e r a t o ri n t h e p r e s c r i b e d m e l h o d . ' ( p q )

The Rating FactorThe impression given throughout thetraining programme is that every stageis scient i f ical ly d 'etermined. But anoperator 's speed can vary and be varied._'The most detai led descriDt ion and ob-servat ions are of l i t t le value' the manualadds, ' i f the performance of the operatori s no t p roper l y eva lua red ' (p9 ) . A r rh i spo in r the Indus r r ra l Ene ineer h : j s toal ter al l the t imings i f , for example. het l r i nks rhc opera to r i s no r work ing fas renoug l ) . Th is i s known rs r l re ' i a r i nsfa r t ( ) t ' Jnd i s en r i re l y a t t l r c t i i se re t i . r io i menagement al though i t appears to bearr ived at 'soient i f i cal ly ' .'Each operating area is responsible forcarrying out periodic rating sessions inorder to ensure that Industrial Ensineenare able to rale operator perfoinancecompetent ly. ' (pl I )

SqueezeThe times that are established in this wavare then enforced. In the inhuman lan-guage of the manual, this is the'al l davpace ' . (p | 7 )

For management money is success, andthe difference between success andfailure often lies in the extra car or twothat they can squeeze out of the men.Every minute of the day throughout theFord empire management is trying toreduce manning levels and speed upoperatrons.

"This guy comes out and he's got a l i t t leclip board and he's got four stop watches

on i t , and he's standing there watchingme work. Everything I do he puts down.They time me for a day . . . He said nowlook. don't walk around this way fromleft to r ight, why don't you try walkingfrom right to left. I had nuts and boltsover on the table and I was supposed towa lk ove r to i r . p i ck rhem up jnd wa lkback. And he says don't do that. So hebought me a l i r t le pouch to put aroundme. Now I 'm supposed to put the boltsin the pouch. Al l I 've got to do is reach inthe pouch prck out the bolts and screwthem on." (Wilbur Haddock, blackworker in Ford Mahwah, New Jersey)

TensionThrough the da) rension increases on thel ine. There is an alntosr audible sish ofre l i e f as a gap appear : . , n rhe l i ne . Therest lasts as long as a.;ob *ould normal lytake, thir ty, maybe f i f r l seconds. On theseoccasions when the st;adr. movementu i the l i ne s lows doun . rh j hupe i s fe l rby many and expressed bl some that thcl ine might be stopping. 'You get the feel-ing, everybody gers the teei ing and every-body is wishing * heneve r rhe l inejerks: 'breakdown babl ' . " A11 carworkerssay that when the l ine does srop a greatcheer goes up , echo ing d . r *n i i r c ' l i ne ;the pressure, just for a nloment or maybehalf an hour. is off .

One worker told of a l ine on which hewas working, which not onl l stopped,but then began to go backwards. Theutter absurdi ty, and an auareness of theconsequences i f i t cont inued causedhysterical amusement among the men."The faces of all the men around me werewreathed in smiles. The line which hadeveryone in its grip had not only' forgottento be i tsel f but was even contradict ins i tsown logic." (Chinoy. p.6+ )

The light moments are tew and farbetween. Ford workers recount themwith rel ish. The butron boxes whichhang down from the roof which theworkers can use to stop the l ine in anemergency are buckled and chipped.Pressing the button tel ls managementwhich worker or slar ion was responsiblefor the stoppage. Someone at Dagenhamdiscovered thar swinging them hard

l 6

against the wall had the same, effectwithout the button being depressbd andgiving away who stopped the line. For amoment, not more, the men on the l inecan stand back bemused as men in whitecoats rush around gett ing the l ine started.

What proportion of the stoppages, sabo-tase and insubordination at Ford aredeiperate moves by desperate men toovercome the sheer monotony or stressof i t al l , can never be assessed. Butrepetitive assembly work alone places ahealy burden on those who do it. Researchcarr ied out in 1973 by Ford's MedicalOfficer. Dr Allardice, in the company'splants, provided substantial evidencethat this kind of work exposes workers toexceptionally high levels of stress. Thereport was never published. Ford sup-pressed i t .

Turnover of labour in a car factory is alsoextremely high.

On a normal day at Ford in Britain, morethan 3,000 workers will be off sick.Another 3,000 will just not bother tc,turn uD. So constant is sickness andabsenteiism that Ford have two ways ofcounting its workforce. Those on thepay roll and those actually there. Thereis a permanent 'reserve pool' on Ford'spayroll partly to compensate for theheavy tol l taken by the work of makingcars.

Pressure and strain are structured into thevery heart of the assembly plant.

The CostThe inexorable pace of the line takes aheavy toll in the lives and health of theworkforce. Ford production methodsare among the most ruthless in the world.Continuous shifts, constant speed up andincreasing work loads reduce the shopfloor to a kind of battleground betweenprofit and the capacities and needs of theworkforce. Ford evaluat ions of the orof i t -ab i l i t y o f i t s p roduc t i on in no way takeinto account the human and social coststhat are i ts inevi table consequences.

Every day in the US 65 carworkers dropdead at their jobs on the factory l loor.On average some 16,000 of them die inthe plants every year, oi whom over haif

have had heart attacks. The reality is evenworse. These figures do not include theresults of accidentsl t work on these l ines.Added to which are the 63,000 workerswith disabl ing diseases, the 1,700,000with lost or impaired hearing. The carindustry reaps as hearry a toll upon theAmerican working class as did the Viet-nam war. (New Society 12.6.75)

Deathln May 1972, a worker at a Ford engineplant in Ohio fell to his death throughthe Foundry roof. He was the fourthworker ki l led at that plant during the f i rsthalf of 1972. The US Occupat ion, Safetyand Health Administrat ion ruled that thecompany was at fault in three of the fourdeaths. Ford was fined $200 for the fourthworker's d,earh. (llall Street Jounnl| . 1 1 . ' 7 2 )

'At approximately 4. l5am on the nrshtshif t on the night ofSeptember I I to l l .1964, Tommy Tumer col lapsed on thel ine which assembles Cort inas. One oi hrsmates not iced this, quickty stopped thel ine and attempted to help the sick man.He was sent back to his job by the super-visor who then dragged Tommy to theside of the l ine, placed another operatoron the fal len man's task and restarted thel ine. Only then was a message sent to theMedical Department who later arr ivedwith a stretcher. Owing to pal lets stackedhigh at each side of the l ine i t was foundimoossible to reach him. so a'stac-a-truc'was sent fcrr . I t was some l3 minutesbefore the sick man reached the MedicalDepartment. by which t ime he rvas dead.'Many weeks later the PTA shop stewardscommittee was informed by maiagement

Ford llorkers' Group Dagenhanl

{*.#.t:. g,.:c,cr,*u ,

that "Turner would have died in anv case.he I rad a med ica l cond i t i on " . ' lSo l i j a i t v lI l t h i s was r rue . why was rh i s man wo ik -ing at one of the most strenuous jobs inthe p lan t?

Uves in Danger'On Thursday night shi f t , January 27th,1977 , there was a fire in the Hot Test inthe Engine Plant. Someone saw a glowunder rhe Hor Tes t , and r r i ed tu ra i se awarning. The f i re alarm was pul led, butth i s i s connec led to thc Secur l t v Deoar r -ment, and only r ings when they tum i ton 2 minutes later l Meantime there wasa great roar, and the metal ventilatorshaft fronr the HT turned red-hot. thenwhite-hot. Everyone ran l ike hel l . But thewhite-hot shaft was right next to the exit,so they had to run past i t to get ou1. I twas also right next to the fuel tanks forthe Hot Testl Luckily nobody was hurtthis t ime. But Ford, true to form, wantedto restart hal f the Hot Test at once! (aswel l as blanring workers for the aecident).The HT workers refused, until the placehad been given a thorough check-out . . .'

Another Fire'The Hor Test in rhe Engine Planr con-t inues lo be a scandal, s ince the last f i rewe reported. Short ly after the f i re onJanuary 21th, Ihe Safety Alarm startedgoing off. Each time the workers stoppedwt-rrk . . but each rime Nfive times.t1'theywere talked into retulning to work. Onthe f inal occasion, somihow, miracu.lously, the Alarm didn' t go offal l throughthe fol lowing night shi f t . The reason forthis was because a foreman had switchedthe alarm off completely.'The fol lowing shif t , the Hot Test workersre fused to s ta r r work t i l l a p roper repa i rhad been done. They threatened to cal lin the Factory Inspector and the repairwas done.'But fol lowing this there has been anexplosion on the new Hot Test on theFiesta l ine. A worker was hurt and had tobe taken away by ambulance. And now,just last week, there has been yet anotherfire in the Hot Test.' (Ford Workers'Croup Dagenham 1977)

'Ford Motor Co said an explosion yester-day at i ts Michigan Cast ing Centre nearDetroi t in jured l2 wolkers, none seriously,and forced the company to send homeal l cast ing p roduct ion workers for the day.

The United Auto Workers union cal ledthe explosion "the latest in a ser ies ofshocking examples of how l i t t le attent ionFord has paid to protect ing the wel l-being of the workers."

During the recent contract negot iat ions,the UAW charged that 75 workers havebeen bumed this year at the new $200million facility due to flames leapingfrom fumaces.' (lMall Street Joumal30 . 10 .73 )

Ibalth and Safety'The Body Plant (Dagenham), with aworkforce of 7,000 staff and hourly paid.has 80 to 140 eye injur ies reportedto Medical each month.' (Ford News12.1 1 .7 6)

The main health problems in Ford's carplants are apparent even to the outsider.Noise is by far the most obvious. Somany jobs involve metal to metal contact.Deafness is an 'occupational hazard'.Ear muffs are provided, and the Companyducks any further responsibility for itseffects. Many workers tell of not beingable to speak or even shout above theconstant racket. The Press shop seems tobe the worst. When the ( Bl iss) presses areat work at Dagenham, the noise is l ikestanding up close to a lot of church bel lsin ful l peal. A Company-conducted testof noise levels registered 112 decibels.

Another danger is immediately vis ible -oi l . Oi l mist is said to be much betterthan i t used to be. There was a t ime whenyou couldn' t see 25 yards across themachine shop at Dagenham. But the f i t tersand toolsetters are st i l l in some consider-able danger. I t is st i l l said that 'you couldsink an oi l wel l at Ford' . In fact there isso much waste that Ford finds it Drofitableto co l l ec r i r and recyc le i r . The dangertrom oi l is that i t produces cancer, par-t icular ly cancer of the skin. I ronical ly,used oi ls are even more danserous.

Parnts and solvents pervade the engineplant and paint, t r im and assembly plant.The workers there claim vou set usedto i l , but the fumes are a sir ious- hazard.The fumes from paint spraying penetratebeyond the booths. Workers inside thebooths often wear nothinq more thancloth face masks. total ly i iadequate tostop the dangerous inhalation of fumes.Very little is known about the con-stituent elements, of paints and solvents.Those that are measured are measuredseparately. Nothing is done to measurethe effects of all the chemicals combined.

With many of these chemicals, treatmentis limited to dispersing the fumes into thegeneral environment. One of the de-greasers used at Ford (Tetrachloroethane)illustrates the problem. The Govern-ment's technical data notes that smokinsshould not be al lowed in the vicini tv oithe chemical due ro the danger oi i tsreacting with the lighted cigarette andproducing deadly phosgene gas. Ford'sown medical department were not consul-ted about its introduction. It was onlyworkers'complaints about a conside rableand unpleasant smell that alerted theSafety Department to the danger.

Coke oven emissions are very dangerousfor the 300 or so who work nearbv.Apart f rom the heary smoke, theieare the by-products ammonia, tar andbenzene. Anyone working here has a fourto five times greater chance of contract-ing cancer than a heavy smoker.

Ford have no noiie reduction engineer.For the 00.000 workforce in the UK thevhave 6 medical people and one industr i i lhygienist and an assistant (1975). Theyseem to be unable and unwilline toest imate the cost to the workforc-e inhealth and lives of producing cars in thepresent environment. Ford's reluctanceto take steps to impro.ve the safety oftheir cars, or to remedy specific faultseven in the face of pressure from con-sumer groups and governments, is adepressing omen for Ford's workforce.To date no-one has anv idea of thetoll in workers lives losi and impairedth rr .rugh producing cars in Ford fai tor iesaround the world.

l 8

Shiftwork'The scheduling of hours of work isundoubtedly one of the major socialproblems of industrial society. As tech-nology advances, the natural rhythm ofhuman life and the pace of industrialproduction move progressively furtherapart and become increasingly out of stepwith one another.' (Maurice)

All car manufacturers make their workerswork shifts around the clock, to keep themachinery moving and maximise its

Ford workers at Sv)dnsea occupy the[rfactory

profitability. But the human and socialcosts of working. shifts are enornous.

"lf John is working on nights, he'll justwant to get up on Saturday afternoonand turn the box on. Ford has mucked upour whole weekend. There is just abouttime to do some of the shopping. I getall irritable because I haven't seen him allweek. Things get really tense when he'son nights. You've got to get used to l iv ingon your own. I t gets real ly hard on thekids. You have to tel l them to shut up al lthe time because Dad is trying to getsome sleep. You get tense al l the t ime,because you think they are going to wakehim up. Scme blokes find it really toughto sleep during the day. You can't blame

;'.Gl ] l I - 1

I1 . '

' l * '

igrt

:ii'

them when they get all ratty. but ir':tough on the kids." ( ls there a l i te af ie:Fords. .8rg Flame Dagenham Bullerin t

"You walk into the plant and the t-lrsrthing that hits you after the racial compo.sition of the workers are the displays ofPlayboy type nudes in every availablespace. Like being wrapped tp in The,San. The naked woman becomes thesymbol, however distorted and distort ingof 'real' life outside the factory. And anywoman who happens to pass through isseen in this 'extremist' way. What a life.K. got married at twenty during theholidays, came back a couple of dayslate. Looking rosy. But two nights laterhe was thinking of leaving. Used to gethome after his life had left for work.getting up in the usual stupor as shecame homc: saw each other for two hoursand then he was off to work. Anotherguy who used to go on about fucking,how big some woman's breasts were, wasin fact so wiped out he hardly ever madelove with his wife. Pretty common. Ascommon as the other. That after a nishtt r r day , ' f rens ion be ing bu i l t i n to you bythe l ine al l you want to do is get out ofthere and fuck, and come as soon as youern . Wi th assemb ly l i nes runn ing in yourhead, i t 's no fun." ( lnterview Big Flame,Dagenham)

Workplace $rugglesOn thc approach road to Ford's RiverRouge plant in Detroi t , a worker haswri t ten: 'WE COME HERE FOR EIGHTHOURS A DAY. DO WE HAVE TOWORK AS Wt,LLI '

The shop floor of a car assembll plantis a batt le ground. To the visi tor rnaybe.t l t c impress ion i s o t ' au lo l r l a t cd L r rde r . Bu ton the shop f loor. l r rrong the rnachines.the ba t t l e i s cons tan t . as cons tan t as thel ine i tscl f and the dr ir ,e b1' managententto pror luce prof i ts. To thc rnen on andoff ' the l ine the cornpler i ty of car produc-t ion has no immediate relevance. Thereare two preoccupat ions, the need fornroney and the desire to survive. TheBeatles hi t of the sixt ies 'Money don'tget ) ou everything i t 's t rue . . . but whati t don' t buy I can' t use' , was wri t ten bya Ford worker in Detroit, whiling away

t 9

thc hours at work. Just as rmportanr rsthe ba t t l c to 5x* |u " i ns ide the ohnr . roimposc some k in t l o l con t ro l on t l t c i obend the ru thu r i t y ( r f I n i l n tgement .

Ford workers can do little about monevon the shop f loor. The rate for the iob isagreed nationally between Ford and theunions. There are no incent ives. no pro-ductivity deals negotiated inside theplant, no piece work. Confrontationon the shop floor invariably involvesquestions of control; control of speed ofwork, of job content, and manning.Figures for industr ial disputes ar Fordbear this out.

Industrial Disputes at Ford 1975(Brirain)

Hourslost(%)Grievancc

PayWork con tcn tLabour Ficxibi l i tyMovement bclween gradc sl lernarcat ionWorking e nviron nten tHours of workOvert inrcDiscipl ine' Iradc [Jnion nta t te rs

Misccl lancous

4 . 86u..1u.o

0..+t . 4l . lI 0

1 0 . 4l . l

9 . E

Tota l lnurnbcr ) I .8 -+-5 .750( l 0 0 l z )

(Ford Motor Company)

A wl iole network ot organisat ions anddetence rout ines lras becn bui l t . Thisprotects the worklbrce frorn the cxccsscsof management, whi le at the sarne t ime i tprovides a base f iom which the workersthemselves assert and clai tn certainbenef i ts.

That 's the overview. On the shop f loorthings are di f ferent. More often than notproduct ion f lows srnoothly. Suddenly,out of nowhere a mad scramble occurs asa rnanager or a foreman infringes somewrit ten or unwri t ten rule. Men wi l l justdown tools and go home i f provoked. Orremain in position refusing to budge,

Vehicleslos t(%)

9 . 96 t " 7

0 8

0 .17 . 90 .31 . 4

1 ) . 1) . 60 . 1t . 3

-r 7.i96( 100%)

.t

'"'i3f.kn**.

conlrontrng management, refusing towork. I f contacts are good on the l ine,dcfensivc act ion by one wi l l be supportedD) ' ,O tnc rs .

For managenrent any stoppage, no matterhow srnal l . is a cr is is. though there arecases where l lanagement themselves pro-voke a stoppage to get themselves out ofa flx. Crucial work is not being done. Forin assembly work any stoppage can causea bottleneck with repercussions farbeyond the point of stoppage. Jobscoming down the line pass by and workersfurther down the line cannot carry on, orparts needed in another section fail to beproduced.

Workers step back from the l ine or standup. Foremen threaten or cajole theworkers causing the product ion stoppage.Supervisors run about. For the momenta I l eas r the i i ne may con t inue runn ing .I f the convenor can' t ef fect a ouickso lu l i on then the l i ne i s s topped . I l a p i l eup t l i reatened i t may already have beenstopped when the dispute arose.

At the point of the dispute foremen willbe taking names. Each man is askedindividual ly i f he wi l t start work. l f herefuses he wi l l be told he is "off pay". orhe may be told to go to the office ofthe superintendent. I f sol idar i ty is good,the men will nrore than likely stay put,refusing to budgo, holding their positionson the line. The shop steward will becal led. More than l ikely he' l l knowexact ly what the dispute is about beforehe is czr l led. Sometimes he' l l be at thecentre of i t , the mouthpiece of the sec-tion. Taking the men off pay is offensive.To the steward a provocation. He argues.The men must be put back on pay beforethe dispute or gr ievance can be discussed.At this point the dispute can erupt ordissipate. The steward wi l l know thefeelings of the men in his section, thecontext in which the dispute is takingplace. Should they st ick on i t , or shouldthey let it go? What about the questionof pay? A meeting may be necessary.The numbers involved may be high,and the wishes of the men mieht have

T ravelling chapel built on Model T chassis

I

I

20

to be registered, or time may be neededto spread the dispute to other sections.Should it be here. or in the canteen?The trip to the canteen means passingother workers who may still be working,or with no idea what the stoppage is allabout.

The convenor will be called. If the disputeis a general issue already - a unionissue - the stoppage may be prolonged aday or maybe more. The convenor'ssupport for the lads in dispute will betempered by how much support hecan get from the union executive on thisone, as well as by concern for thoseworking in the rest of the plant. For ifthe dispute is not resolved, many morethan those at its centre will be laid offwithout pay, and nobody will thank himfor that.

The men cluster round the convenorarguing, shouting. More than likely hewill try to get them back to work. Per-haps the condition will be that they getpaid for the period ofthe dispute. Manage-ment will not give way on that unlessthey're desperate for production. Themen and the steward want a meeting todiscuss the issue. The canteen is suggested.The convenor stalls. kave it to him. Theissue is being discussed already by theunion.

Balance of PowerMeanwhile the foremen will be at workon the less militant suggesting that theygo back to work. If he judges it right

jthe convenor will have a quick vote - ashow of hands. I f there's a major i ty fora return to work they go back and leaveit to liirn. Maybe there'll be a section

imeeting later. The angry ones may evenrrow down tools and go home angryshou ls a in red a l l hose rema in ing o rsupcrvisory staff. No one takes anynot ice.

The l ine starts up. perhaps with a dou bl ingup of workforce in the sect ion to get r idof a backlog. Sometimes ( i f the menpermit) the tbreman wi l l help. As the l inestarts the men move back into posit ion,unasked, ahnost on a ref lex. A r ipple olexci ted shout ing and singing passes downthe l ine. Whatever i t was. nranagement

will be a bit more careful about trying iton another t ime.

There is no doubtthat in the long run thebalance oi power lies in management'sfavour. Few believe they can really takeon Ford Motor Company and win. Butthe level of organisation among theworkers in vehicle assembly, and thedevices they have developed have giventhe workers considerable strength - thestrength of a guerrilla force. In the day today running of the plants, the balanceis about even.

Car workers pay a heavy pnce tor rhe::militancy. More often than not. takrnrany action means 'going off payroli'.Although this is bitterly resented b1' theworkforce, it will not stop them takingaction. The immediate reason for a drs-pute may seem trivial to an outsider, butcarworkers within a car plant knowquite clearly when a practice by manage-ment has to be stopped. I t may not be alarge issue, but the car workers can onll'be pushed so far, and if they have agrievance they will take on the manage-ment over i t .

The following list is taken from a Ford convenor's report to his union executiveon specific acts by managenrent that have caused trouble and walk outs. Theyindiiate the complexity and extent of the daily struggles on the shop floor ofFord car plants.

l. 5 men in the Paint Shop sent home for not accepting new manning stan'dard, they were refused a Shop Steward. No one else would do the job,2 plants laid off.

2. The same thing happened on 2 following shifts.3. Shop Stewards suspended on wet deck for 4 days for advising his members'

against Supervisors decision to cease pract ice of job rotat ion.4. Man suspended for going to toi let without permission. 30 col leagues went

off in sympathy.5. Steward and l0 men suspended for not contplying with instruct ion to take

clock card to Supervisor after clocking on.6. Mate r ial Handl ing Ste ward suspen ded for taking 20 ni inutes over permit ted

t ime to col lect for widou. His members went out. Assembly Plant laid off .l . Qual i ty Control Steward sent home with some of his members tbr not

accept ing addit ional work. Same thing happened on fol lowing shif t .E. 300 men rn Press Shop sent home for protest ing about foremen sett ing

irnes during st r ike.9. Bodl in \ !hi te Line sent home for not accept ing new work al locat ion

*hrch thel 'c laimed was inrpract icable. 200 men supported them. Plant$ .r : l r td , r f l ' .

10. -10 Tool Tr1'out men sent home for coming 9 minutes late back from lunchaiter having a rneet ing. Foremen attended to Press Lines. which clused;-

I I . t r Press Operators sent home for refusing to work on l ines set b1 t 'oremen.The rest ot ' the Press Shop went off in sympathy.

I l . Simi lar happened on the fol lowing shif ts.13. i Press Shop Stewards suspended. one for one day. onc for tuo dars l i r r

cal l ing r leet ings regarding above. The result of t l t is was that al l Opr 'rators.Tr1 out and Torr l roonr went off for the two shif ts the Ste*ard \ \ 'as suspen-ded tbr and the Body and Assembly Plants were laid oi f .

14. Mater iai Handler suspendcd for refusing to dr ive truck loaded bl Forert tan.Rest of Mater ial Handl ing went honre in sympathl .

15. Steward suspended tbr swearing at Forenran. who * as reading the ' r iot act 'to his sect ion.

16. Sewing machine f l t ters told to accept addit ional funct ions or go home.Distr ict Off ic ial told managenrent i t was not in his opinion. their funct ion.Men were taken 'of f payrol l ' .

2 l

ln April 1977 Hentie man who fannounced anhad decided totive position wi

lee Iacocca,and Phi l ip Calchief of intethe new post o

Henry Ford I Ia recent histsett ing up theleadership tcrment unt i l anthe seat at theprobable candid28, who is curr

But in case anyonesion that the o ld f i rmcase of democracy, Fothat he st i l l retains thc r iul t imate decisions. " l atn tequals" said the marr with hthe bui lding. " l f sornething hat h e r e ' s n o w a y t o w o r k i t u u t t r n asensus basis, then l 've got. uh, an extravote." (Time, 25.5.77)

The shuffle at the top seenrs to giveCaldwel l the edge on lacocca as a can-d i t l a t e f , r r l h e p r i r n e j o h i n l n i n t e r -rcgnum which rnust be humi l ia t ing forsomeone l ike Iaambit ion ishis desk bearingSti l l , h is annual$970,000, is equmany other top Fyears he is no

Henry Fordjc t - se t te r ' , i s fabuglamorous secondFord fLequcn ts thethe jungles of Afr ilo work, togetherwhite striped(Dan 's NovernberClass B shares,shares, his annual Forstock exceed $2. in his$970,000 a year , and we

any is PhiJded for theAutomotive

rdship - thedivision of

tosyc

'lnside Forda prolesslonal in wno ls ven iranipulate the I

f:" i! 1 y".'v.' i

you see one man earning almost $4milliona year just from Ford - let alone hisother investment income. His family areprovided for independently too. ihey

go

to hold thdown.' (Life

"Heer assoctale- ;ves the skin

aro that had beenthe Philco hot'The family was sitting around a dinnertable in Moscow in 1970 when theAmerican executive decided to break thenews to the children. Hours before they,left Detroit for a Russian vacation. his

at the Ford Motor Companv offerednew assignment: running the

diary. Henry Ford I I had him-co "a can of worms"- And

, Ford is known for itsphilosophy its

their shields, or upondren knew about

year-old daughteroesn't work out,u un the scrap

13.3 .17)' t such a hard-e men at the

n E. Knudsonpany only 18way from GM

Ford stock.not less than

e presidency ofhandshake was

he still had thatord shares. Multi-could say of his

the least important

ord's 48 top execut ivesover $l0million in salaries

ses. Whi le tens of thousands ofs have known the poverty of un-

oyment as Ford decides it does notneed them any more, at the other end ofthe spectrum the company's history ispeppered with those it has made richbeyond comprehension.

ther in teBenson an

Ford mult i -1,490,169

. This givesa year each,uses as Fordilies have tohold over agives them

Ford brothers$2Omillion in

year after

The third t r imo to r ' t ha t

Fordts Gommon MarketThe creation of the Common Market reflected the needs of private capital - just how much is evident

from looking at the benefits Ford reaps from operating internationally in Europe.

While Ford has operated in many coun-tries across the globe for decades now,the methods by which it does so havechanged dramatically. Initially it waslargely a matter of producing or assembl-ing one model, the model T, in many dif-ferent plants for an even larger numberof markets. Then, gradually,local assemblybecame local manufacture and differentmodels were developed for largely separatemarkets: American Fords for the US,Canada and Latin America, BritishFords for the UK and the Empire, GermanFords for Germany and so on. Partly thisemerged from the inter-war protectionistera. As early as I 91 2 Ford Times hadnoted that in Germany 'the use of homeproducts is regarded as a duty almostamounting to religion' (Hu, p25).

Also, the different models reflectedlocal lifestyles and standards of living.In the US, large cars dominated andpeople could afford them. In Europesmaller roads. distances and incomesgenerally ruled them out. And sinceEurooe and America constituted thedevelbped world at that point, it wasthese two areas that dictated the desienand development of the car.

Now, however, the industry is turningfull circle, with European, American,Japanese, Brazilian and Australian cars allcoming closer together in terms ofdesign and size. And this has repercussionsin terms of production. While methodshave remained relatively uniform through-out, based on llenry Ford's originalprinciples of mass assembly, the oppor-tunity has arisen over the last decade fornew methods of organisation of produc-tion, on a much wider scale than at anyperiod since the fint two decades of thecentury. Ford have grasped this oppor-tunity, to internationalise both productsand production, and nowhere is thisclearer than in their European operations.

Before the MergerJust a decade ago, before the formationof Ford of Europe, Ford had only twoproduction, as opposed to assembly unitsin Europe. The first, and clearly the mostimportant, was Ford LIK, centred aroundthe major complex at Dagenham and the

new llalervood plant rvhich had startedproduc t ion in 1963 . In 1967 . Fo rd UK 'sworkforce of 60.000 produced 591,000cars. t rucks and tractors. ln al l , thatmeant some 9-10 vehicles per employeeper year, many of them the higher valuetrucks and l ractors.

By comparison Ford-Werke of Germanywas small and its product range narrow.Its main capacity at that point was atCologne in Germany and Genk in Bel-gium. The Genk plant was the newer,having been bui l t in 1963, just after theHalewood plant, on a greenfield site. Itwas run as an integral part of the Ford-werke operation. Including Genk, Ford-Werke's 33,000 workers produced in1967 378,000 vehicles of which the fewcommercial vehicles' were small ones.That meant just over I I vehicles "per employee per year.

These levels of production made Ford UKand Ford-Werke together the third largestcar manufacturer in the world outsidethe US. Only Volkswagen and Fiat pro-duced more, and even the Japanesecompanies were smaller. But the twocompanies were not integrated; each hadits own management, i ts own range ofcars. i ts own comDonents. i ts own outsidesuppl iers and i ts oivn product ion iaci l i t ies.And the two companies even competedwith one another in some markets.

Transit SuccessThere *as one except ion to this, theTransit l isht van. and in manl wavs this*as the ire;urs.r , uf *hat hai happenedsince. Previousl l Ford-Werke had notproduced commercial vehicles. The Transitwas developed bi the UK subsidiary, andthen produced bl both IJK and Germany,for sale right across Europe. Instead ofthem competing with one another formarkets with rhe Transit, the marketswere allocated between them accordingto the respective strength of the salesorganisations in those markets.

The Transit was a great success, and stillis. Not only has it become market leaderin Europe but, just as important to Ford,it opened up for the company newmarkets such as Italy. Largely on the basisof this one van, Ford became Europe's

largest producer of commercial vehicles.

The lesson was clear. From having no CVproduction capacity at all, Ford-Werkewere able to become Germany's thirdlargest CV producer after Mercedes andVolkswagen. What could have been a veryexpensive process had been achievedalmost painlessly by exploiting the resour-ces already available at Ford of Britain.

Problem FearsFord of Eurooe was created in 1967 norder to integiate Ford's European wideoperations. The management would haveus believe that it was an innovative strategythought out purely to strengthen thecompany's positicin in Europe. In fact itis quite clear that it was devised essentiallyas a rescue operation to solve Ford-Werke'sproblems. 1967 was a disastrous year fortl.re Germany subsidiary, with total pro-duction of only 378,000 vehicles. Factorysales were even worse, at 330,000 carsand trucks - down 25% ftom 1966. Ofthe product ion, only 173,000 vehicleswere produced in the German plants,where output was down by 32% on theprevious y 'ear. Worse was to come, foralthough production was increased by 1%in 1968, actua[ factory sales were afurther 77o down.

Ford-Werke was being caned by the com-petition, particularly Opel, Fiat andRenault.

Ford-Werke did not have a good or com-plete model range, nor was it a largevolume producer, especially without theGenk plant. But it was based in Europe'sfastest growing market, and the Euro-pean market as a whole was growing veryrapidly. Those manufacturers who couldkeep in the running could expect rapidgrowth: in 1969, West European (EEC +EFTA) car production was to exceed USproduct ion for the f i rst t ime.'A new management organisation (Fordof Europe) was created to make all thecritical decisions for both the British andGerman companies. There were obviousoperating economies in the arrangement- the duplicate dealer organisations inthird markets could be eliminated ..Body development work was concentratedin Germany, power train development

L J

concentrated in Bri tain. "The pool ing ofthe two contpanics," says Ford-Werke's(then) rnanaging director t lans-AdolphBartclmeh, "cut the engincering bi l l inI tal f for each company. provided ccono-mies of scale, with double the volumc interms of purchase commonizat ion ot 'purchase, comrnon components p rovi-ded the f inancial resources for a goodproduct programme at a real ly good pr icethat we could st i l l make money on." '(Fo rbes , I . 7 .72 )

For instance, while Ford UK was welladvanced with preparations to launchthe new Escort , Ford of Germany hadno small car with which to compete inits rnarkets. Ford of Europe urged themto take the Escort . " 'We kept saying tothem," one Ford of Europe exccut iverecalls, "Are you sure there's no marketfor i t? l t 's going to be cheap. You don'thave to pay for the tooling, it's alreadybeen tooled." ' (rbrd) Not surpr is ingly,Ford-Werke put the Escort into produc-t ion at Genk in I 968.It was followed irr quick succession bythe Capri in 1969, then a new Cort ina/Taunus range (which lcant heavily onexperience gained by Ford UK with theextremely successful Mk I and II Cortinas)in 1970. and the Granada ranse in 19J2.ln just four years Ford-Werki 's posit ionhad been transformed. It now had a fulland competitive model range. In addition,it had added another maior manufactur-ing plant, at Saarlouis niar the Frenchborder, in 1970. In that year, i t overtookthe UK subsidiary as Ford's leadingEuropean producer of can and CVs, andhas continued to go from strength tostrength.

Yet looking at the accounts you canmake no sense of it whatever. Over thelast ten years Ford-Werke claims to havcincreased product ion by 215%: salesrevenue 35096: and prof i ts by 2,305%(admittedly fiom an unusually lorv baseto a suspiciously high peak). I t has, quiteclearly, expanded considerably. Yet overthose ten years, total assets ( i .e. themoney invested in plant equipmcnt andstocks etc) have r isen by just 13%, fromDM2,53 I mi l l ion to DM2,868mil l ion.

I t would seem that Ford-Werke was

having problems gett ing i ts surns r ightbe_tween 1969 and 1975. Turnoverrose steadily durlng that period, aparlf iom the slump ycar of 1971. Yet i t wasnot unt i l 1973 that prof i ts exceededtl tosc of l9(r9, and then by only DM43-n r i l hon .

Cooked BooksOne explanation for these accounts tsthat since 1967 the company has runespecially hcavy depreciation charges,tlius reducing profitability and holdingtotal assets down. Over the ten vear period' t l ep rec ia r ion and loo l amor t i za t ion ' hasexceeded 'additions to fixed assets andspecial tools 'by DM306.2mil l ion: at thatrate, by the year 2007, Ford-Werke wi l lhave modern, up to'date plants capableof produci4g 6 million or more cars andCVs a year . . . and the value of the assetsproducing them will be written into theaccounts as a few DMs . . .It makes sense only in the context ofFord's aim of rapid expansion in Europe,and paricularly around the Ford-Werkeoperation. What was the point of declar-ing profits which would be taxed, whenheavy capital expenditure could bewritten off by heavy, untaxed depre-ciation; Ford could write up the accountswhichever way suited them best. Smallwonder then that, after the Germangovernment had announced that from1977 profits remitted overseas would betaxed at a higher rate, the Ford-Werkeprofits for 1976 revealed the massiveincrease. Conveniently, they were justlarge enough to allow a full t00% divi-dend for the parent company.

The Price is RightOn Iy the Ford Motor Company manage-ment knows what pr ices are charged for

lntercompany transactions. When theEscort was put into Genk, for instance,what charge was levied by Ford tIKagainst Forci-Werke for the research anddevelopmcnt charges, let alone the tool-rng? According to the Ford t IK Reportand Accounts. al l research and develop-menr cos ts e re wr i i l en o f f as incu r red ;to which subsidiary was the R&D for theFiesta, to be produced by Ford ofspain,charged as il was incurred? Why doesFord-Werke borrow funds from the FordInternational Capital Corporation ofHamil ton, Bermuda? And how is i t that,in a year when Ford-Werke needs toboost profits so tllat a 100% dividend canbe paid, a major part of that profit boostarises from a combination of 'exchanse

rale gains achieved in payment transai-tions' and 'revenues for services chareedto aff i l iated companies' (Report indAccounts 1976)? When Ford wantedthe -German subsidiary to produce highprofits, what '*,as there to stop themadjust ing the pr ice charged foi Caprisor Granadas sold to Ford UK accordingly?This becomes apparent when you lookclosely at the record of Ford of Br i tain.The Annual Report and Accounts revealsonly vehicle sales, rather than production.Over the ten year period 1967-76, salespeaked at 712,000 as far back as 1968.And in that year. product ion was evenhigher at 722p00 vehicles. Compare thisto 1976, a year of record prof i ts forthe Br i l i sh company . Sa les

'were on ly

644,000, and product ion just 600,000 -122,00O vehicles. less than in I 968.

This 'decline' is even more marked interms of t l ie number of vehicles producedby each worker. This also peaked in1968 . a t I 1 .8 veh ic les pe r worke r . In1976, t t was just 8.8 each worker,apparent ly. made three less cars than his

Product ion (can + CV) ( l ,00Cs)Sales revenue (DMmil l ion)Prof i ts (DMmil i ion)

Total Assets (DMmil l ion )

*erc lud ing d iv idends

Ford-Werke all things to all accountants

I 9 6 7378

-) 4q l

)6l i l l

1969 19756 1 4 6 3 5

3,884 6 ,366209 283

2,816 2,796

19 768 1 3

8,6s7628

2,868*

24

.&. k" k'::

Top: UAll leaders pledge support toDagenham strikers. I 97 l

Bottom: Dagenham at a halt over lay-of f pay. 1977

@b e f o r e . . .

Ford of ljritainfear l'ehiclc l'ehicles llork- Vehiclesl

,lcles Ptoduced lorce l|orker1 9 6 8 ? 1 2 , 0 0 0 7 2 2 , 0 0 0 6 1 , 0 0 0 1 1 . 8 3r973 674,000 652.000 71,000 9.181974 602,000 s80,000 70,000 8.291975 534,000 s32,000 67,000 '1.9s1976 644,000 600.000 68,000 8.83

Ford-Werke1968 395 ,790+ 38 t .194 37 ,098 10 .281 9 7 6 8 l l , l 4 0 * 8 1 2 . 7 9 8 5 2 , 9 2 9 1 5 . 3 6*cxc lud ing in lpor ted veh ic lcs : 1968r976 10 ,498 .

a - ^ y e . , . a

Poppetoto

vo*

By the same crude nteasure, the produc-trvl tv oi the * orkiurce of Ford-Werkeincreased rapidl l over the same period,so tha t b \ 1976 i t was near doub le tha tof the Bri t ish $ ()rkiorce.

Is this just anorher manifestat ion of the'Bri t ish disease . of low product iv i ty anda recalci t rant u orkt i rce? At f i rst s ight i twould seem so. Yet does anyone real lybel ieve that Ford would have acceptedsuch a decLne in product iv i ty? Theanswer l ies in the increasing amount ofcomponent manuf 'acture in Ford's Bri t ishp lan ts.

ScapegoatsThe constant vi l i f icat ion of the car-worker as one of the pr ime culpr i ts of

Bri tain 's economic O"ct ine frrs t#i i ' iconstant theme of both l^abour nndConservat ive pol i t ic ians over the pastdecade and beyond . In I969 , fb r i ns tance .Harold Wilson, then Prirne Minister. wasbusy warning str ikers of ' the danger thatin the Ford factor ies ol- Europe. theremay be a growing determinat ion not tobe dependent in the tuture on Bri t ishcomponents whose del ivery can be sofrivolously imperilled'. (Fittancial Times16.3.69) The speech was doubt less in-spired by Ford management. They havebeen as quick as any to exploi t thepo l i t i ua l c l ima te .I t was in l97l that Henry Ford I I launchedhis famous attack on Bri t ish Ford workers,threatening no new investment. Asrecent ly as July l9l1 Bi l I Hayden, a

2 5

Ford of Europe VP, returned to thetheme: 'Ford UK has ruled out all oros-pect of investment in further car capacityin Britain until productivity at its twoplants at Dagenham and Halewood showsigns of reaching Continental levels . . . '

According to him, Bri tain is 'bottom ofthe league in its ability to compete as asecure and profitable supply source'(Ford News\.

Tails You LoseThen there are the constant. insidiouscomparisons with Ford plants in othercountries. Workers at Dagenham are toldthat it takes them 75% loneer to buildthe Cort ina than i t takes thi workers arGenk. Ford .Ay'ews tells the Halewoodworkers that that plant has an abysmalrecord in meeting production targets incomparison with the European plants.And, of course, the German workersare told of the great difficulty that theappreciation of the Deutschmark iscausing, making the German plants lesscompetitive than those in Spain andBritain.

The impression put across is that Fordis the victim of circumstances. forcedto act through worker militancy, appre-ciating currencies, political constraintsor whatever. Nothing could be furtherfrom the truth. The company's strate-gies are directed at extracting more -more work, more cars, more profits.They are not a response to probiems asthey arise.

Ford's decision to switch maior invest-ment to Cermany was takin in themid-60s. It was made despite the strengthof the British subsidiary, rather thanbecause of its problems. And that decisionwas being put into effect well beforeHarold Wilson and Henry Ford II issuedtheir stern warnings.

The significance lies in the way in whichFord of Europe was developed. At Ford-Werke assembly was expanded rapidly.whi lst increasingly Ford of Br i tain hasemerged as a component manufacturingoperation.

The reason lies in the different nature ofthese operations. Assembly is labourintensive, heavily dependent on the

workers on the line. It is also the weakestpoint in Ford's production chain, whereall the components are brought together.When the line stops, all the money thatthe company has poured into those com-ponents is fiozen, and the only way outis to get the line going again.

It obviously makes sense for Ford toconcentrate assembly where it has themost strength vis-a-vis the workforce.In Saarlouis, for example, there is highunemployment. The company recruitsmigrant workers for the worst jobs:they are dependent on Ford for permis-sion to stay, and that depends on goodbehaviour. What's more, wildcat strikesare illegal. Small wonder that productiontargets are met day in and day out.

The SqueezeComponent production, on the otherhand, is more capital intensive: theemphasis shifts more to the machine.Militancy is usually less in componentmanufacturing plants, and Ford has morecontrol of production in that stockpiling, dual sourcing or shifting toolingare possible. So the power impartedby anti-strike laws and the status ofmigrant workers is less important. Ex-panding assembly in Germany and com-ponent operations in Britain offered Fordthe chance of squeezing the maximum

productivity out of the combined work-iorce of the two countries.

Ford can largely afford to ignore thewage differentials between plants indifferent countries. One reason is thatdirect labour costs represent only acomparatively small proportion of thetotal cost of a car, and with Ford'sintegrated European production thelabour cost in any one car is spreadbetween different countries (see table).

Even in Germany, direct labour costsaccount for less than 15% of the netprice Ford receives for the car. And thedifferential between Spain and Germanyis insufficient to justify sourcing theGerman market from Spain. This wouldmean extra costs in the form of freiehtand insurance from Spain to Cermaiy,($106), and import duty into the Com-mon Market ($96).

For Ford, cutting labour costs does notinvolve chasing cheap labour round thecontinent. It means, rather, ensuring thatthe maximum is extracted from each andevery worker. The spread of plants enablesthe company to engage in an internationalmerry-go-round: winning or claimingproductivity increases at one plant, andthen demanding that they be acceptedelsewhere. The underlying threat behindthese demands is that of withdrawal of

Fiesta costings - Ford intemal data Autumn 1977 for 1977Car assembled and sold in

Bitain Germanyi n : $ $Direct labour costs I

BritainGermanyFranceSpain

Totals

Total direct costs2Gross profit per car3Net sales revenue per cara 2,700

3. Corpora t ion economic p ro f i t .4 . Corpora t ion sa les revenue.

the number o f un i l s p roduced - raw

,,21s705 l3 8

293705 l3 8

Spain

$28J I

50r82

374 488 297

I q 7 s

I ,0913p66

2,190I I ( 1

; --l--

1,8'79821

Labour costs portion of variable costs.Total corporation variable costs.

Variable costs are those that vary according tomaterials. labour costs etc.

26

the work, but the threat is more rhetoricthan truth.

Ford's LawThe playing off of one workforce againstanother is matched in Ford's relationshiowith governments and consumers. Inboth cases the identification of thenational subsidiary company with eachcountry is important. Ford exploits itsacceptance as a domestic manufacturerin many countries of Europe. It lapsup the benefits, from customer con-fidence to state support. Each nationalsubsidiary goes to the government inturn, asking for more public support thanhas been offered elsewhere. The invest-ment ends up where it would have beenanyway, but the cost to the public purseis just that much greater. Yet, as we sawwith the recent Bridgend investmentdecision, Ford emerges at the end as the'model ci t izen' . lauded by pr ime minis-ters and press pundits alike.

Though the company exploits its nationalidentification. it is dependent on andbeholden to no state butside the US.The Spanish government passed 'Ford's

l:w' - a special statute exempting thecompany from many conditions of thelaws regulating foreign ownership ofinvestments, minimum local contentetc. , but even this wl l not ensure thecompany's allegiance. Ford's integratedinternat ional operat ions ensures that thecompany remains free to shift profitswhere i t wishes. and to concentrateinvestment in those countries that bestsuit i ts purpose.

Dumping?The'Federal ' Fiestas bui l t in Germanv.for example, are exported to NorihAmerica. 85,000 were sent in 1977.Ford's internal t igures show that onsales of the Fiesta in Germany the com-pany makes a gross prof i t of $1,150per car. Their figures for those exportedto North America show a gross profit ofjust $662 - meaning that almost certainlythe car is being sold at a loss in the US.The benefits to Ford US are marketexpansion, lower average fuel consump-tion and emission, and another oppor-luni ty lo transler prof i ts. Does the'US

parent fully compensate the Germansubsidiary? It seems unlikely. In the sameway, despite the Breat claims Ford makesfor the success of the German subsidiarv.i t is not iceable that al l major recentexpansion has been placed outside thatcounrry.

Acceptance of Europe as a single unit interms of both product ion and salesmeant much more to Ford, as a US basedcar manufacturer, than it did to theEuropean automakers. Above all, Ford ismuch freer to move within the confinesof the EEC than they are.

Border ClashThe location of the Saarlouis plant illus-trates this clearly. The company hadoriginally intended that this plant shouldbe bui l t in the Strasbourg area c f NorthernFrance. Whi le convenient ly close ro rheGerman border, i t would have the pol i t icaladvantage of establishing a Ford manu-facturing presence in France. But thenationalistic rnood prevailing in Franceat the time meant that the deal waseffectively blocked. Ford simply founda new site, just across the border inGermany and built the plant there. Itdrew heavily on French workers, 'who

::rossed the border every day to work,paid taxes to the Genran government,credited the German Balarrce of Payments.and exported Escort cars to France'( H u p . 1 7 2 ) .

Ford's freedom to dodge from onecountry to another is in stark contrast tothe pressures on domestic companies tonot only stay within national borders butto go to prescribed areas within them.When Alfa-Romeo set up a huge newplant to produce the Alfa-Sud. forins tance . po l i t i ea l and econorn ic p ressurecould easily be applied to ensure theplant was establ ished in less industr ial isedSouthern Italy . Similarly, in 1911 ,Renault canre under heavy pressure tobui ld a large new plant in a less developedpart of France. No such pressure couldbe appl ied to Ford.

The French soon learned to play thingsthe Ford way, however. Ford was stilleager to establish a manufacturing pres-ence in France, but on i ts own terms.

Eminent politicians, particularly Chaban-Delmas, soon to succeed Pompidou asPrime Minister, wanted to make politicalcapital out of at tract ing new investment.Not surprisingly the site chosen forthe next major new Ford factory wasBordeaux. Chaban-Delmas' own con-st i tutency. As an added incent ive, HenryFord I I promised Georges Pompidou atthe same t ime that Ford's next Europeanassemhly plant u 'ould be bui l r in France.

Ironically the Bordeaux plant's productsonly served to underline the increasinglyinternat io nal nature of Ford's product ion.I t would bui ld just one major component,automatic transmissions to fit smallerengines (up to 3 l i t res). al l for export .The plant was opened in 1973, and byFebruarv 1977 had oroduced I millionunits. Oi these 645.000 went to the USAfor the Pinto and Mustang, 249,000 wentto the UK. Genk and Germany. and therest went to South Afr ica and Austral ia.

FiestaThe increasingly international nature ofFord's production is best shown in thecase of the Fiesta. The Fiesta was deve-loped as an ent irely new addit ion to Ford'srange of cars. As a result the companystarted with an almost clean sheet whenit came down to both i ts design and therlecisions on how rnd where i t should beproduced.

The Fiesta had to be a front wheeldr ive mini-car to enable Ford to pene-t ra te l he imponanr mr rke rs o f Sou ihe rnEurope where such cars account for amajor part of the total market. Ford, atthe time the project was first conceivedin 1969-7 1, had had no recent smal l carexperience; had only bad experiences offront wheel drive; did not have sufficientspare capacity in Europe to support whatwould necessarily have to bc a largevolume project; and had no capacitywhatever for front wheel drive comoo-nents.

What was clear was that a huee totalinvestment would be necessary.- In theevent it was over $l billion - almostbeyond the capabi l i t ies of Ford ofEurope alone. That it was undertakenpartly in the midst of the severest reces-

i !

27

sion since World War I I and withoutany huge traumas such as Volkswagenexperienced in the development of i tsnew models, demonstrates the impor-tance of the US parent company's farlarger resources for Ford of Europe --a major internat ional carmaker in i tsown r ight.

Into SpainIn fact the parent company undertookthe ini t ia l two years' development work,which was carried out in Detroit. It wasthe parent company's AAA credit ratingthat made raising what finance wasneeded for the Ford Spain investrnentno more than a matter of technical i t ies.As in all major projects, it provided con-siderable manpower and tcchnologicalinput. And, above all, the fact thatultimately it was the Ford main boardthat took the decisions, placed i t in a verydifferent perspective from that of aEuropean manufacturer contemplatinga $lbi l l ion investment.

Given that the parent company spendsbetween $lbi l l ion and $l .4bi l l ion an-nual ly on expansion, modernisat ion,replacement offaci l i t ies and special tools,$lbillion or so over five years on theFiesta is little more to the company thana hiccup. And to place i t in t ts true pers-pect ive, note that in 1976 alone theshareholders' gross prof i ts aniounted to$l .Tbi l l ion.

The Fiesta prograrnmc hac.l two mainelements: the creat ion of new or expan-ded manufactur ing faci l i t ies on the onehand, and the product ion of a new Fordmini on the other. ln i t ia l ly, these wereconsidered as two separate projects;Ford intended to start manulacture inSpain with or without the mini, andvice-versa. And the company anywaysees investments in new manufacturinsfaci l i t ies as a much longer rerm rnat teithan it does its inyestnrent in one par-t i cu la r mude l . T l re o r ig ina l i n ten l i on wasthat Cort inas and Escorts for southernEuropean markets should be sourced inSpain.

Pastures NewForcl's plants form the nucleus from

which the company hopes that futureproduction will be expanded. As such,new additions arB located to fit itslong term global perspective. Ford'sEuropean sales in recent decades havebeen concentrated in the north: inGermany and Britain, Belgium and theNetherlands. In the rich markets ofFrance, I taly and Spain, as wel l as in theother poorer, but developing Mediter-ranean markets, the company's saleswere and are comparatively tiny.The extent of Ford's desire to set intothose markets is revealed by companydocuments from 1972. At that time Fordwas selling Escorts and Taunuses in thosemarkets at a price that meant a loss ofaround $95 a car.There was also the attiaction of the cheaplabour available in Spain compared toother European countr ies ( includingBritain, when the project was first con-sidered), and the repressive ruling regime.

Spain was geographically an integral partof Europe, and a Ford plant there couldbe an integral part of Ford's Europeanproduction. At the same time, it wouldlocate the company in yet another coun-try, further spreading the long termpolitical and economic risks that mightlace the American multinational.

The new Spanish plant and the Fiestacame together because both were pitchedcentrally at thc same target rapidgrowth through opening up the south-ern European market. Iacocca hadhis own way of putt ing i t . " 'We are notFord-Eurooe. We are Ford of a half ofEuropel And that is what we'll remain aslong as we can't provide the cars that theother half wants . . We can't go on for-ever importing foreign workers intonorthern Europe. I t 's t ime to go andbuild our cars in the places where themanpower already exists. l-et's exportthe factories and stop importing themcn !" ' (.lerdler p4 1 )Planning the Fiesta for product ion any-where and with components to form thebasis of Ford's next Benerat ion of smal lUS cars was a maior oDerat ion. I t meantdesigning not jusi a saieable car, but torprof i t , taking into account al l the complexrelat ionships involved in manufactur in_e.

That meant considering not just the useand shape of a component or assembly,but also the way in which it would beproduced .- including by whom, and atwhat rate. lt meant taking decisions onwhat productivity levels could be achievedwithout taking the worker past the pointof revolt, and then judging methods anddesigns accordingly. The target through-out was the maximisation of Ford profit.the constant increase of Ford product ion:as much to be won as possible at theexpense of the worker.

.Cost CuttingThe Fiesta uses fewer different parts -1394 compared to 214O for the Escort -and each is produced in larger numbersand by fewer workers as a result. Fewercomponents means less to be assembled,so that fewer assembly workers per carare needed. And the new techniques andDrocesses introduced round the Fiestaare centred round increased productivity.But i t al l depends on the workers'accep-tance of what the company demands.Small wonder the operations manager atDagenham was so pleased with the Fiesta."From a production point of view it's thebest design we've ever had to handle. It'sa straight -forward assembly job . . . "( Ford News 10.12.19"7 6)

Because of this the Fiesta is cheap forFord to produce it was designed tocost the company significantly less thanthe very profitable Escort. There is nodoubt that the company is achieving itscost targets, but this is not reflected inthe pr ice to the customer. The motorindustry is an oligopolistic business - acomparatively small number of manu-facturers dominate each sector in eachmarket. As a result they do not competeon pr ice. Instead. pr ice ievels ref lectthe costs of the less efficient manufac-turers and the larger companies withlower costs such rs Ford make disoro-port ionatel ] large prof i ts.

There seems l i t t le doubt that the comoanvcuu ld se l l t he c : r p ro f i t ab ly . i n i t s es tab -l ished markets in part icular, at a muchlower pnce. But Ford does not need todo so: r t can take a large prof i t and st i l lsel l the cars competi t ively, as many as i t

2 8

has the capacity to make. In Britain, forexample, the basic Fiesta is pr iced abovethe basic Escort - even though the Fiestawas designed from the first to cost Fordless than the Escort.

The international pattern of the Fiesta'sproduction was planned within the samerationale. It involves the transoort ofcomponents and sub-assemblies over vastdistances. and the assemblv of the car

i tsel f at not one but three locat ions tnEurope. What is certain though is thatany extra cost involved in this complexmult inat ional product ion operat ion is,or will be, amply compensated for bysavings elsewhere.

Fiesta JigsawT.he main manufacturing centres for theFiesta are as follows:

Engine:Castings for all engines Dagenham, UKMachining and assembly:

l ,000cc Valencia SPainI ,100cc Valencia Spainl,300cc Dagenhant UK1,600cc Dagenham UK

tsody Panels:Dagenham UKGenk Belgium

Saarlouis GermanYValencia Spain

Transaxle gearbox (for front wheel drive):Dagenham UKValencia Spain

Saarlouis GermanyBordeaux France

Final assembly:

In addit ion, other important componentsand sub-assernbl ies arc also produccd atthe fol lowing plants:

Basi ldon. Dagenhlnr, En f ic ld, l rant ing-ton. Tret i rrest in Bri tain: Ge nk in Belgiurn;Belfast in Nort l rern l relandl Cologne,Slar louis and \ ! ul i rath tn West Germany.Sonre conrponents f i r r the US version areeven suppl ied from Ford divis ion in theUSA.

So we havc the picture of carburettorsbeing suppl ied to Saarlouis. Dagenhamand Valencia fronr Ford's Belfast plant.Dic cast transaxle casings and Sear com-ponents are sent fronr Cologne to Bor-deauxl the conrpletcd transaxles are sentfronr there to Saarlouis, Dagenham andValencia. These three asscmbly plants,each with i ts own stamping plant, sharewith Genk the supply of body stampings.Al l cyl inder block and head cast ings fort l re | . 000cc and I . l 00cc eng ines a reproduced in Dagenham, and then sent toValencia to be machined and assernbled.Some bui l t up engines are then sent backto Britain, for installing in Dagenhanrbuilt Fiestas. At the same time, Dagenhamis the sole source for the 1300cc andl600cc (US) engines simply verylightly modified Escort engines. The USengines are sent to Saarlouis, where theyare mated up with transaxles from Bor-deaux before being installed in the saferFiestas assembled there and sent to theUS. And so the list goes on.

29

Balancing ActWhat Ford has done is juggle with thedifferent factors: economlJs of scale;transport costs; market locat ionsl dualsourcings; existing capacity and special-isat ion; attainable product ion rates; pol i -t ical considerat ions. Possible combin-ations have then been costed as far aspossible down to, for instance, thccost of extra stocks to al low for transitt ime, including 40 day stocks of com-ponent sole-sourced from Britain asopposed to the usual 20 days. There iseven an al lowance of an exrr i 2% on UKFrench and Spanish labour costs toallow for a lower 'confidence level ofachieving the total capacity installed asagainst Saarlouis'. (Ford internal docu-ments) The decisions on what is madewhere are then made on the basis ofboth cost data and the unquantifiedcr i ter ia - such as the pol i t ical aspects andMr Ford's personal whims. As tlie Econo-mist Intel l igence Unit put i t , the Fiesta'is the first car to make full use of theintegrated Ford of Europe manufacturingbase . . The p recise.political and engin-eering br lancing act has been del icatelyachieved' (March I 976).

The BattlegroundThe Ford Motor Company has investedenormous sums of money in the Fiesta,purely in ant ic ipat ion of lucrat ive prof i ts.Jus l how luc ra t i ve depends on lhe cx len tto which the company can keep theplants at Dagenham, Saarlouis andValencia churning out car after car, dayin, day out. Every interrupt ion to produc-t ion, every car lost, nteans a sl iver ofic ing lost f roni the top of the cake.

I t means that Ford must ensure a con-stant f low of components and mater ialsto the assembly l ines and, having doneso, keep the l ines mt-rving as fast as p.rs-sible. I t 's part ly a technical problem.par t l y one o f dea l ing w i rh ou r i i de sup-p l i e rs . Bu t above a l l i t ' s a mat te r o fFord's abi l i ty to cope with the constantbatt les for control of the shopf loor.

The internationalproduct ion wi l l ,

nature of the car 'sthe company hopes,

serve it weil in this respect. Partly it'sa matter of f lexibi l i ty. Many components,sub-assemblies andeven complete cars aree i the r dua l sourced o r can b i subs t i t u tedby similar products made elsewhere. Inthe event of a dispute at one plant, forinstance, the company can attempt toboost production at the alternativesource. Coupled with stockpiles and stocksin transit , this may enable i t to withstandlengthy disputes. Even the long supplychains may be an asset; stretching rightacross Europe the goods in transit can beused during the dispute, and then re-placed by rush transport af ter the dispute.

So in the event of a shutdown of theDagenham Fiesta engine line, the com-pany's aim would be to boost outputof the Valencia englne l ine to supplyextra units to the Daqenham and Saar-louis assembly lines. With a higher out-put of the Valencia engined cirs fromthese two plants, stocks of the Dagenhamengrnes could be stretched out to mini-rnise interruptions in supply of anymodel. Similarly, if the Valencia engineplant were shut down, the Dagenhamengines plus stocks of Valencia inqineswould enable the Saarlouis and Disen-ham assembly l ines to maintain produc-t ion even i f the dispute were long drawnou t .

Control TacticsNot all components are dual sourcedthough, for the temptation of higherprofits through economies of scale-hastempted Ford to single source a numberof components. These include the trans-axle units (Bordeaux), engine castings(Dagenham), radiatori (nisilOon) an?carburettors (Belfast) on the Fiesta, aswel l as a number of body panels pro-ouceo at va no us DIants_

An effective dispute in the sole sourceplants could hi t the company hard. Insome cases, i f the si tuat ion warranted.it might be possible to take out thetool ing and shif t product ion elsewhere.But that is not always possible. Closureof the Bordeaux piant, for instance,would inevitably halt all Fiesta produc-t ion the moment that stocks were ex-

hausted, bringing the flow of profitsfrom Fiesta sales into Ford's coffersto an abrupt halt .

It is most unlikely that the companywould take such a risk without carefulprotective measures. That would indicatein the first place an established monitor-ing system to gauge militancy in themore important plants, for while con-tinuously high stock levels would beprohibitively expensive, a strategic buildup of stocks before a dispute would beinvaluable. Again, it would be better forFord to provoke a strike at a time of itschoosing, than wait until militancy. com-commitment and confidence on the shoo-f loor have bui l t up. This also depends onsuccessful monitor ing of the i i tuat ionon the shop floor. But such tactics can

. be very successful for the company.

All these options, and ultimately Ford'sability to retain control of the shopf loor. depend on a lack of concerledaction by the workforce. The companydepends on management's flexibility tooutflank workers' actions. The mostserious threat to that flexibility is organ-isation of the workforce across thecompany as a whole. The trouble is thatthe international spread of productionposes a major barrier to wider shop floororqanisat ion.

It's difficult enough for Ford workers inone country, sharing a common languageand separated by comparatively smalldistances, to organise effectrvely againstthe company on anything more than alocal plant or shop level. Even here, maiorproblems of communicat ion. sect ional i imand cumbersome national union machin-ery ar ise. On a European scale the prob-lems are mult ipl ied many t imes. Workersin France. Germany. Belgium. Spain andthe UK use six di i fereni languages plusthose of the intmigrants. I t means muchgreater distances ovbr a thousand milesfrom Halewood r o !'alencia. with dis-proport ionatelv larse rravel and telephonecos ts as a resu l r . There r re tha t manynrore unions anC another laver. thein te rna t iona l un i1 .n , . r9Jn is3 t ions . on too .Bu t those i rn i s ho r : : , , t e bu i l t and thebatt les foughr *hen and where theya nse .

Working on the Workersi"The reason they're frightened is that they

ment round these partsknow if they lose their job at Ford, there's such unemploy-that they might never get another job."

In the day to day struggles on the shopfloor, it is immensely advantageous toFord that the workers do not see beyondthe local management to the world-widestrategy that governs Ford.

The national character of workers' orsan-isat ion. both of shop stewards and ofTrade Unions, only assists Ford manage-ment. A multinational company like Fordcan only be the winner if its workforce isdivided between nations. There areseveral strategies that Ford managers usein the constant attempt to maximiseprofits that we can isolate and examine.

Ford selects the sites for its new factoriescarefully. Proximity to markets is impor-tant. But there are long term advantagesto management in locating plant inindustrial areas where traditional indust-ries are being run down, where workersarc already industrially trained, andwhose commitments and expectationsincrease their dependency on' the workFord will offer.

Ford's arrival in Halewood in 1963 wastypical. 'Merseyside and lancashire wasa depressed arBa. Traditional industrieswere in decline. Unemployment figureswere high and wages were low. Ford'shad the pick of the labour market, andthe Company followed a recruitmentpolicy which was consistent with its aimof obtaining a trouble-free plant onMerseyside It aimed to recruit thecream of the labour market . . . the un-employed were regarded with someelement of suspicion.' (Beynon p.89)This was 1963 . In . the same year Fordwere building a plant in Genk, Belgium.'lt is situated in the countryside outsidethe small industrial town of Genk . . . In

t

ffiui--D

the early 60s Belgian coalmining was indecline. As it formed the backbone ofeconomic activity in the province ofLimburg there was large scale unemploy-ment and anticipated unemployment.The provincial authorities and the tradeunions constantly pressed the govem-ment for other forms of employment andnew investment' (Solidaity Vol 5 no 6).Both outside and inside the UnitedStates, Ford has grown on the backs ofthe mining, engineering, steel and ship-building industries. The privations andstresses of working in a Ford plant havebeen forced on people brought to des-peration point - victims of the fluc-tuations of capital.Phce Date Local IndustriesHalewood 1963 Shipyards, docksGenk 1963 Coal miningSwansea 1965 Coal mining, steelSaarlouis 19'lO Coal, steelBordeaux 1973,1976 ShipyardsValencia 19'76Bridgend 1980 Steel

At Genk, 'The Ford company welcomedthis situation. It was prepared to erect anew factory but only on its own terms."

(So lidority) These conditions resembledFord Workers' Group Dagenham

3 l

those accepted earl ier by the trade unionsat f{alewood : 'a running period, in thisinstance of f ive years, with lower wagesthan were being paid in other Ford plantsin the country' (ibid). The Belgian tradeunions, just l ike the Bri t ish, s igned theagreement on Ford's terms.

Although Ford had to invest in new plantin Europe, therc was rnoney to be madeby playing hard to get.

Site for Saleln December 1976, the Bri t ish Steel Cor-porat ion took out advert isements in thefinancial pages of the newspapers. Tl.reBri t ish steel industry was being run down,and the government and Bri t ish Steel haclessembled a paekage to rry and encouragenew invcstment in the areas affected.Worst hi t would be Blaenau Gwent, Car-di f f , l lart lepool, Deeside, Cambuslangand Motherwel l .'Wc can provide a unique mix of resourcesand services to incoming industry.+ A reliable and flexible workforce,

comprehensive retraining faci l i t iesx First c lass ful ly serviced industr ial s i tes

ncw factor ies or custom bui l t+ Att ract ive f inancial incent ives. 'Business managcrs who responded to theadvcrt werc sent glossy brochurcs packedwith infbrmatioq on si tes, workforcesrnd l inancial 'g i f is ' for the investor. ' .TheI lr i t is l l Stecl Corporat ion's East Moorsworks in Cardif f wi l l be closed sometimel l ier January 1980 and a workforce ofabout 4000 people will become progres-sively available for recruitment into newindustr ies. Appoxinrately 50% of thesept 'ople wi l l be under -50 years of age . . .

Tlrc ' ntanagerlent and workforce have arv idc range o f sk i l l s . . . The Eas t Moorsworks has a long history extending over.10 years of first class industrial relationsand can boast that over this periodproduction has never been seriouslvaffccted by anv major dispute.

Thc rvorkforce has adapted readi ly tonew processes . . . and the recent achieve-mcnts of the works over a number ofdi t ' f icul t years, have rel ' lected a high degreeo1' rcsi l ience and loyalty. ' (Cardi f f Bro-c h urc. Br i t ish Steel. o.4)

In September 1977, Ford announced thatit was to come to the area and set up anew engine plant at tsridgend. The WelshDevelopment Agency was overjoyed. Thepapers were f i l led with pictures of smil inglocal ntrrables stancl ing on a piece oTwasteland in front of a sign saying: 'cedwirsafle hwn ar gyfer ffatri newyd"d FordMotor Company'.

Just who had the trump card in the wholedeal can be guesserl.

-Holland, Belgium,

France. Wesr Germany. Spain and Irelandhad all competed for the plant, as well asinternal competition within Britain. TheBerlin authorities had offered Ford a'package'that 'staggered the city officials'so desperate were they to 'inject newlife into a dying city'. Saarland was alsooffered to Ford. Site.after site, wholecommunities, workforces, futures wereoffered up as govemment officials viedfor the investment. offering bigger anclbigger inducements. ll was even suggestedthat British taxpayers should pay for theinvestment, should pay Ford to produceengines in Britain. In the event, and giventhe s i ze o f the government s r rbs id ies , th i sis vir tual ly what happened.

After the decision was announced, it wasrevealed that Henry Ford himself hadbeen to Britain to see prime ministerCal laghan and the union leaders Scanlonand Jones. He had won commitmentsfrom them in return for the new invest-ment. Ford had visited the Swansea fac-tory and spoke in private to Brian Phillipsand Ter ry Benne t t , t he lwo ma in con-venors at the Ford factory in Swansea.Ford concluded: "Wales has the mostintel l igent and art iculate labour force intlre worf d." (Surulay Times 9.1O.77)

The people within working distance ofthe Bridgend plant were not aware of i t ,but they had had their f i rst taste ofFord's mult inat ional strategy. The invest-ment is coming half paid for by theBri t ish taxpayer anyway and alreadythe onus is on the area to shovr i ts srat i -tude t t-r the Ford Motor CunrJanv.Resistance to ant torO decisions wi l l bemet with threats to pul l out unsat is-l'actory levels of production will bematched against what workers in Dagen-ham, Valencia or Cologne are doing.

I

Bridgend is no* on the Ford 'merry-go-round'. and the hallmark of that merry-go-round is a feeling of helplessness inthe face of the company's decisions.Certainll government and unions sac-rificed considerable political control andindependence in return for the short termeconomic benefits Ford offered.

The People Say Yes to Ford'The tr lo men stepped on to the balconyand looked down on the crowd."l have some news for you", said themavor. "Good news. Ford is comins toAlmusafes."

Bosch hugged Ford's envo1,. The crowdwent wi ld with joy. Thel jumped, theydanced, they embraced each other. Theparty went on late that nieht. Next day,the papers in Valencia and.\ tadr id carr i jdbig headlines: "The people sav Yes toFL.rrd!" ' \Seidler)

B y t h e b e g i n n i n g u t l J - . : . e \ c t \ o n e i nSpa in knew tha r F , . : , . ' . . . , . : r . rn i i nc u fbu i l d ing r ne* t r . ' : . : : . : :< . fheyalso believed. as rr: r-.., :.:\'. !elievedbe fo re them. tha t r t , . i - - - : . : . . , bonanzal b r t l r e t t l w n l l l 3 r ' , , . . : i - . : r i :

'At Talavera Je t .

they didn't waste any time. JustinianoLuengo, the 'fascist' mayor, launched apublic appeal to the townspeople, mobil-ised the inhabitants of the surroundingvillages and set everyone, children,grown-ups, old people, to work on hisplan. The plan was to persuade every-body to write to Henry Ford to ask himto build the new factory in their town.Soon nearly 75,000 cards and lettersarrived in Dearborn.' (Seidler)

The fascist trade unions in Seville offeredFord free land 'with no limitation' and'as much help as we are able to give'.

The site that Ford actually chose wasoutside Valencia. The Mediterraneanis three mi. les away, with access via alagoon. Between the orange groves werefields of artichokes, onions and lettuces,and beyond them rice fields. The landwas divided into tiny plots, all around thevillage of Almusafes. And the villagers ofAlmusafes were by no means enthusias-tic about the new factory. 636 of them,who owned plots on the proposed site,showed a marked reluctance to sell. TheSpanish government authorised com-pulsory purchare.

The resistance was limited. The Govern-ment \l,anted Ford, and so did the civic

The people of Almusafes meet HenrYFord II

authorities. Many families already hadsons and fathers scattered around the carfactories of Europe: 'Dear Sir, my papahas to work in Germany and I do notsee him very much. I f you come to mYtown, my papa can work for you. Heworks very hard and will be able to comehome every day to play with me. ' (ht terto Ford from Pepe Lopez) In the event,most of the local families signed awaytheir land.

"Just look at those fields" intoned JohnMcDougall of Ford Europe. "Down therewe're going to make 400,000 engines ayear. Here on this bare hillside we'regoing to instal the Press Shop. And overthere, where you see that old onion f ield,we shall be assembling 300,000 cars ayear. Fantastic." (.Seidler pl54)

The only orange tree that remains standson a pl inth outside the entrance to thefactory. It has been chromium plated -for poster i ty.

Less than three years later, in September1976, teargas drifted across the assembly

line and into the Press shop of the newfactory at Almusafes. This was the State'srespons" to the Ford workers' demandsfor better wages and conditions.

The jubilation which had greeted thearrival of llenry Ford and his factory hadsoon turned sour. Wages were lower thanexpected and many workers had to takesecond jobs. (Sunda1, Telegraph 14.8.77)After two years, the first contract wasdue for renegot iat ion and renewal. Theworkers at Ford Almusafes were due tosee another side of the Ford MotorCompany.

DemandsThe demands made by the 9000 strongworkforce were formulated during aperiod of political resurgence in Spain. Asurvey of all the workers was taken, andthe demands drawn up were:

l. No victimisation, no sackings2. 30 days hol iday3. 10,000 pesetas monthly increase4. 40 hour week(from42k)5. Tax and insurance to be paid by

6 .1 .

8 .

9 .

1 0 .1 1 .

FordWage reviews every three monthsExtra payments, three t imes yearly,of 30 working days eachThe right to hold workers' meetingsin company t imeFord to recognise the workers'elected delegates100% wages for sick payImproved social conditions: nur-series, cheaper food, family al-lowance' and transport to work.

The company gave a resounding'no' , andsuggested among other things, a wage risein line with the cost of living plus l%, anda 6% rise in the amount of overtime.

The workers were reinforced by the factthat the whole Valencia region was ex-periencing a wave of militancy and agit-ation. In line with all the metal workersin the province, Ford workers began aseries of strikes.

lmmediately, Ford began to back-pedal.They accepted all the demands except thei0,000 pesetas a month wage increase,offering instead an extra 7,000 pesetas(f,62) a month, but pending consultation

-

J J

with Ford of tsritain. The offer wasacceptedMiiitancybecamestrugglesValencia

it was after all a good deal.decreased, and the Ford workersseparatcd from the wave ofthat cont inued throughout the

reglon.

Three days later, when the unrest seemedto have dissipated, Ford came back to theworkers at Almusafes. Ford of Britain,and_ Ford of Germany had rejected thesettlement agreed by Ford of Spain, andso the local management were ieturningto their original cost-of-living plus l%offer.

The answer o f the worke rs was an imme-diate and unannounced indefinite walk-out str ike. Ford retal iated by withdrawingeven its original offer, and took on itsworkers head on. There would be nonegotiations until a retum to work.Workers delegates addressing a meetingto convey this news and plan the nextsteps were dragged from the platformby supervisors and Ford security men.The workers drove them off. Then Fordcalled in the State arrned riot police todrive lhe workers out of the lactory.'Tear gas. smoke bombs and rubblrbullets were used by police to try toclear the factory. But barricades were putup and the police were successfullyrepelled.' (Newsline 19 .l .77)

Police AttackThe workers occupied the f.800millionfactory, but not for long. As they lef tthey were attacked by the wait ing r iotpol ice, and many were injured. A lockout fol lowed. Attempts by groups ofworkers to re-cntcr thc t 'actory wereprevented by armed pol ice.The act ion had the ful l support of thecnt ire workfbrce, but every attempt bythe workers to assemble or meet wasprevented or broken up by the riotpolice. The workers responded by organ-ising 'area assemblies' of workers fromthe entire area in churches. The SunddyTimes wrcte: 'The (formerly) illegilworkers' commissions have demonstratedtheir increasing power to call workers outin the streets. Churches have day afterday been occupied sporadically for strikemeetings. ' (16.1 .77)

Nationally the government was hastilylegitimising the Socialist and Communistparties and their $oliticians, but inValencia at least, delegates to the areaassemblies were arrested, and many hadto go on the run. At the same time Fordbegan sacking named workers from itsIactory-

The company was now losing 450 carsand 1000 engines a day. Some parts werebeing smuggled out to Dagenham, but theshop f loor there was already react ing tothe rumours of 'blacked' parts. In spita ofcompany intimidation, the workforceremained solid behind their demands.

In desperation, Ford Spain referred thedlspute to government arbitrationwhich has the force of law. Few weresurprised when this fo'und in favour ofFord, and offered even less than hadalready been conceded by the company.

Ford presented this as an ultimatum tothe workers. Already Saarlouis andDagenham were dangerously short ofcomponents. 7000 Fiestas had been lost.Yet the workforce showed no sisn ofgiving . in. ei ther to the government orIo l ' Ord .

In the face of this solid resistance, Forddecided its only escape was to buy offthe, worken. They conceded the prin-ciples of the workers' demands.

-and

offered production workers 8l25 pesetas(f,69) a month extra.

This was a considerable victorv for Ford'sSpanish workers: wages before tax roselrom approximalely t2,200 a year in1974-76 to f ,3,000 a year in 1977-j9,an increase of 55%. After tax, wages rosefrom about 11,930 to t2.600. They alsowon four weeks paid holiday and amonth's extra pay a year.

Ford had suffered a set back. But overthe next year no less than 20 of the'7 2 elecIed, worker's dele eates at Almu-safes were sacked, along

-with 34 other

workers. Significantly, Ford made surethat the 'unurganised' union strueturewas. formalised, and negotiations wereroutrnlsed.

" l f I had a bet" rcmarked f lanns Brand,the German manufacturing director at

Almusafes, "it will be that things willmove more in the direction of Germanythan of Britain, and finish up some-where between Germany and- France. . . The unions here are mild and reason-able, and I think they'll play a very calmpart in tlle future." (Sunday Telegrapht4 .8 .77 )

Fear Eats the Soul"Everybody wanted to come here. Theywere coming here from all over Lanca-shire. You know, expecting the pave-ments of the hess Shop to be lined withgold." (Halewood worker 1963)

"I left ltaly. I had a contract in mypocket that really looked like gold to mb.I thought this was going to be the answerto everything. But then, when I arrivedin Genk, I was presented with anothercontract, that wos quite different. "(Migrant worker, Ford Genk 1969)

"The Turkish worker at Cologne oftenlives in Fortl barracks, four to a room.They have no pivate or family life. "(German worker, Ford Cologne)

"A major part of the workforce areimmigants. Italians, Greeks, Yugoslavs,Turks and Lebanese are the major grcupsat Ford. Australia's immigration schemewas started to supply hbour for thepostwar boom. " (Ford worker, Broad-meadows, Melboume, Australia)

Ford builds its factories virtually on itsown terms. Its wages are low, conditionsare bad, and car production remainsessentially 'casual' labour. The relief athaving a job soon fades in the face of theprice that has to be paid to Ford.

In order to achieve its ends. Ford needs asl'rplus of labour outside the plants. Ifthis is not available, then Ford will createit. This 'pool' of workers has a dualpurpose. It helps defuse workers' mili-tancy -within the factory. and to compen-sate for the very high rate at whichworkers walk out.

The worst example of this. and the oneover which Ford exerts greatest control,is, the use of migrant workers in Europe.This is an extreme manifestation of anemployment policy common through-

34

\

l

out Ford the use of insecure sectionsof the community to carry out the mostunpleasant and onerous parts of carproduction.

In Germany, France, Belgium and Holland,the bulk of production line work, atleast 7 0-80%, is done by migrant workers

men who have left Turkey, Spain ,Morocco and Italy for work in theindustrially developed areas.

Approximate numbers of migrantworkers in Ford Germany 1976

Number %of % produc-workforce ti.on

tlneCologne 14,600 55 90Saarlouis l ,800 30 10

(Kommission der Europaischen Gemein-schaften)

Just as Ford's American plants were filledwith migrant labour from the SouthernStates, and Dagenham filled with workersfrom lreland in the 1940s and 1950s, soin Europe today, workers are 'imported'

by the trainload from the Mediterraneancountnes.

"They (Ford) go down to Italy andTurkey, where they have a sort of recruit-ing office. The workers arrive with acontract in their hands. And when theyget here they find they're presented withanother contract and they're expected tosign. And this contract isn't quite so nice.But there's no choice. We come here sothat we can eam enough money to beable to send back home. to support ourwives and kids. because there's notenough work there for us." (ltalianworker, Genk)

The migrant workers work long and un-social hours and are encouraged to seetheir wages in terms of their homeeconomy and not of the host country.They live in hostels, often in barrackcondit ions.

In the plant they are intimidated. "Thereason they're frightened is that theyknow if they lose their job at Ford, there'ssuch unemployment round these partsthat they might never get another job.And what's more if you're an immigrant

J+: "

Cologne 1973. Forti attentpted to reduce manning levels by sacking Turks returningfrom holiday. The subsequertt j ive tla1, strike broadened into a demand for IDM perhour increase for all vorkers. But Ford and the German Press successfully campaignedto divide the strikers alortg national. lines. The.police helped by attacking a peaceful

detnonsl rd l ron.

rvithout a job in Limburg. you havethe pol ice on your back al l the t ime."(Migrant worker. Genk)

There are many examples of Ford threat-ening migrant workers over renewal oftheir contracts. The most recent was atFord Amsterdam. Line speeds were suchthat many product ion workers becameil l . Despite the authent ic i ty of their i l l -ness Ford threatcned not to renew thecontracts ol t l iose 'migrants' who stayedhome sick tocr often. (F.D.2.6.76)

The treatment and condit ions of immi-grant workers in Ford's employment ledto a five day strike at the huge Colognefactory in 1973. (See photo capt ion)

Comparison of production sched ulesbetween Ford Britain and Germany showsjust what Ford can expect of a work-force based on 'contract labour ' .

Plant l|orking Days on whichdays the schedule

was metCologne 224Genk 234Saarlouis 230Dagenham 234llalewood 234(Ford News 20.5.71)'In Dagenham it takes 42 man hours tobui ld a basic two door Cort ina.In Beleium

) ' \ A

23423014329

5 f ,

i t takes 24 man hours to make a simi larTaunus.' (Ford News June 1975)

The use of migrant contract labour byFord in Europe pays dividends. 'They arebrought here to work, nothing else. Infact I would say they're imported, becauseFord sees them as workers, not as humansbut as so much new material for theproduclion lines.' (Migrant worker, Genk)

General unemployment in the areas ofFord's new factor ies adds another con-straint. 'Fourteen workers chase everyjob, and more than one in ten of theyouth is registered as out of work, in theonce prosperous Saar region of WestGermany.' (Newsline 22.7.77) The Neun-kirchen Ironworks is being run down, theRochling Burbach steelworks intends toreduce it. labour force by 1,500. 'By

1980, between 10,000 and I 5,000 iobsare to go ir Saar steel industry alone. '(ibid\

Thirty thousand Saarlanders have alreadyleft the area in recent years, and by 1985the labour Board estimates tfat another85,000 wi l l have to leave.

I t wi l l surpr ise no-one to know that Fordis seriously considering taking advantageof this situation to expand its site alSaarlouis.

Casual LabourOne burning issue in Ford factor iesthroughout the world is securi ty ofemployment and income. Pl i rased andrephrased in different languages, thedemand reoccurs Guaranteed pav.work or no work.

I t is the recessions. when thousands ofcar workers are made idle, that gain thepubl ic i ty, but lay-offs are a dai ly occur-rence in the car industry. Whenever theyhappen, the costs and consequences areb orne by the workforce.

Even in the US where the nesotiatedagreements belween Ford and the UAWare the most sophisticated in the world,car workers were put out of work by thecompany with an ease that was astound-ing. In a period of l8 months during1974 and iq75 Ford la id o f f 4b .000 UScar workers.

Healeyina

save $oundOodtll

As the recession developed around theworld, it hit different countries at dif-ferent times. Between 1973 and, l9i6Ford laid off nearly 70,000 workers, puttens of thousands more on short- t imeworking, and thus protected its profits atthe expense of its workers' wages.

[-ayoff agreements vary enormouslythroughout Ford's operations. Wherethey exist, they serve to under-write theessentially casual nature of the work-force at Ford. US workers are covered bva Q5% guaranteed wage agreement. buithe Supplement Fund had run out longbefore product ion picked up again anJworkers were reemployed. Medical anddental insurance ran out too. 'Guvs whothought they had made it are now gettinga taste of what the poor and the blackshave always had. I'll say this, when theSupplement runs out it won't only bethe blacks who'll be picking up a brick toget some food.' (Doily Minor 28.2.7 5l

RepatriationIn Europe too, Ford workers suffered.Ford of Germany shed nearly 9000 of itsworkers between 1974 and I975. Thiswas done in the context of a nationalcampaign against 'migrant' workers. andmost of those who lost their iobs werenrigrants. Many , ; f these were working

under ; . .ni : i : r . *htch meant that i f thevhad no r . ' 1 . rhev had ro leave Germanv .Ford eriiereo :golden handshakes' iotermrnate prematurelv many of thesecontracts. and the uorkers were then sentback t c . Tu rke r ' ( - \RC 18 .12 .74 )

Layoff hyTte fight against layoffs, endemic in thecar industry . is behg led by Ford workersin the UK Ford's policy of laying off* orken * ithout pay if men are made idlebl d.isputes internal to the company hasled to a massive build up of resentmentagainst the casual nature of the work. Thedepth of feeling on this issue has led tomore disputes in Ford than any other inrecenl vears.

Ill-intbrmed and out-of-context industrialreponing in the press and television failst0 point this out. The car worker ispresented as petty minded and work shy.Disputes are portrayed as resulting fromthe act ions of a few bloody mindedindividuais. layoffs are presented asthe inevitable result of actions by a selfishfe rv.

Nothing could be further from the truth.The disputes which have received themost publicity have invariably been strikesagainst the provocative use of lay-offs bymanasement,

36

; l' + i! . J r - . r

. f i

The day Dagenham workers v)ere pushedtoo fdr. September I 976

In July. 1973, just before the summershut-down, Ford ran out of con-rods asa result of a strike at their sole supplier,Smethwick. Lay-offi would have to bepaid by Ford. But then managementtook a course which Ford workers say isnot uncommon. They provoked a strikewithin Ford, in this case over Ford drivers'insurance. The whole of Halewood andDagenham were laid off v,ithout p^y.

This action turned the whole issue oflayoffs into a running sore. On August29th, after the summer hol iday. thc nightshift at Dagenham was laid off for anhour and lost an hour's pay. The follow-ing night they announced a lay-off atI l .50pm -- too late for many workersto get home. Tl t is had happened before.and workers faced the prospcct ofspend-ing the whole night in the factory with nowork and no pay. Anger mounted,windows were snrrshcrl anJ t l re supcrvisors

blockaded in their of f ice.was paid.

K e I s t o n e

I l r p n r o h r < h r r r

AngerThe lessons of this experience spreadvery quickly. and the demand for aguaranteed 8 hours pa1 emerged. I t wasvery quickly extended to e guaranteed40 hours pa) ever) * eek rrtrrk r.rr nt.ru.,ork. Feelings ran high particularly atDagenham in the Bodl Plant and thePTA. (The PTA *as. on average, ex-periencing one unpaid la1'-off each week.)The idea also developed that the best wayto resist la1 oi l i * 'as to refuse to leavethe plant when a la1 -off occurred.

A run of la1 o t ' l i in the PTA in Septen-ber provoked a r iot . l t ib l lowed a meetingin the canteen during a lay-off . This waspart icular l) u 'el l at tended with manyWest Indians, rvho usual ly boycotted suchmeetings. turning up. The 'Garage' wasst i l l working, and the convenor 's refusalto cal l i t to a halt inf lamed the workersat the meeting. Most of them went downto the garage.

Cars and tools were smashed, car radioswere turned on, the doors locked and thekeys disposed of. The plant manager'soffice was then occupied and pictures ofcompany executives torn down anddestroyed.

Neither the company nor the unionscould control the si tuat ion, But leadershipand coordinat ion across the plant wasweak and Ford was able to split theworkers from the Body shop from thosein the PTA. A black worker, WinstonWilliams, from the Body Plant, wassacked. The union officials dropped theguaranteed week demand in favour ofreinstatement of Williams, whereas thePTA stuck to its original demands over aguaranteed week. With the two mainplants divided, the demand for guaran-teed layoff pay went into procedure,frorn which i t never emerged.

Ford were clearly rnore reluctant to uselay-o ffs after the riot.

RampageIt was the eve of the launching of the newCort ina at Dagenham. The Ford UKunions were negot iat ing a new contract(nothing on lay off pay) and the f, hadcol lapsed to an al l - t i rne low with Chancel-lor Healey and prime minister Callaghanlaying into the Labour Party Conferenceat Blackpool.

On 29th September 1976, at midnight,the Body Plant were laid off. It was thefifth week running that they had beenlaid off . Anger turned into a r iot . Thiswas how the Daily Mirror descrlbed it.

"Riot ing car workers went on a rampageof destruct ion at Ford's Dagenham earlytoday. They smashed cars and startedf ires in the factory. Hundreds of pol icesurrounded the area but the car menlocked the gates and bombarded themwith a hai l of missi les."Resentrnent srnouldcred into 1977. TheEngine Plant developed a strategy tof ight layoffs. I f any onc assernbly sect ionwas laid off, everyone rvould go out andpicket. In May a dispute over unsafecondrt ions led to lay-off and this planbeing inrplernented. The picket lasted two

.r{";-

days and nights but was eventual ly under-mined by convenors and senior stewardscalling a halt.In the Assembly Plant a different strategydeveloped. Future Iay-offs would hc mitwith total stoppage and occupat ion, withthe act ion cont inuing unt i l the Companyagreed to pay 80% of the basic pay duringthe lay -off.

It was this plan that canle nearesr roforcing Ford's hand over lay off pay. Twothousand Body workers were laid off inJune. The Assembly stewards began toimplement the previously agreed plan.Pickets were set up on all main gates anda token occupation installed. Incomingsupplies wcre turned back at the gatesas drivers refused to cross the picket. andFord's rai lway I ine was r ipped up.The men's convenor Brian Elliot suppor.ted, Ihe 8O% claim and Ford refused tonegotiate with him. Union officials werecalled and the Dagenham Panel of Con-venors 'negotiated a new disciplinarycode'. A mass meeting was called topresent this negotiated deal to the strikingworkers. It said nothing about lay offpay- the officials were thrown off the plat-form, and the rank and file took over,voting to continue the strike and rejectthe 'sel l out ' .

Workplace StrugglesWithin days another meeting was calledby the union. This inc luded workers f romother sect ions who had not been d i rect lyi n v o l v e d i n t h e d i s p u t c . A c o m p r t r m i s eof fer had been worked out by the unionand ntanagement , a l lowing 24 hoursn o t i c e o l l a y o f 1 s . T I r e N a t i o n a l J o i n tNegot ia t ing Cort r r r r i t tee. a lso cornni t te t li tse l l to pursuing 'v igorousl l , '

t l0 , , i )ay of t 'p a y i n t h e n a t i o n a l p a y c l a i r n

l 'hc vote was c lose. but the st r ike waso v c r . T h e N J N C p u r s u e d t l i e q u e s t i o n o 1 'la1, ot ' f p ly in the ncgot ia t ions ovcr thcnat ior ta l pay c la i r l . But not v igorousl lenough. Ford rnanager lent rc tused to bel r roved.

Tl t ings l rave eonte J long woy s intcHenry Ford 's open host i l i ty to t radeunion organisation in his plants. TheUnion of Auto Workers (UAW) ex-

President Walter Reuther often recalledbeing cracked over the head and beatenup by Ford's secrel police during hisattempts to organise the unions inside theFord plants. The new President DouglasFraser 'wi l l have nu personal memo;iesof UAWs formative struggles, of therough old days', rejoiced Automotive.ly'ews. 'Pcrhaps that's all to the good. Itseems to us that the auto industry hasreached a matur i ty which demandi thatthe union emphasise diplomacy ratherthan m i l i t ancv . ' (23 .5 .77 |

Blue BookThe Unions are unlikely to disagree.Outside America, wherever Ford hasset up factories, the Company has beenable to impose its own.structures on theunions. In Britain, the Ford National JointNegotiating Committee is typical. A1lmatters including pay, conditions, theorganisation of work and manning insideFord plants are decided there. Such isthe constitution agreed by the unions,that al l issues and gr ievances ar is ing onthe shop floor are ultimately referred tothe officers of the NJNC.

The function of the Unions (there are 20representing Ford workers in the [IK) iscarefully defined in Ford's 'Blue Book'.This is the handbook of rules and oroce-dure that governs the relat ionship beiweenthe unions and the company. This recog-nises the unions right 'to exercise theirfunctions' but 'within the framework ofthe Blue Book' (Agreements and Con-dit ions of Employment).

This l iamework imposes an elaboratep roceL iu re un lhe un i ( )ns whenvc r an i ssuearises; 'At each stage of procedure everyattempt wi l l be made to resolve issuesraiscd, and t l iat unt i l procedure has beencarr ied through there wi l l be no stoppageor o thc r uncons t i t u t i ona l ac t ion ' ( i l l t l ) .

T lus severe l \ res t r i e t s t l r c un i ( )ns ' r ( ' ( rmtor manoeuvre. ln t l re UK. as elservhere.the unions have chosen to cont irrnt tcrFord's instruct ion. This gives the companya dccisive advantage. By cont inual ly r i -assert ing the'const i tut ional ' authori ty ofr l re NJNC, Ford I ras been rb le to e iodethe strength and militancy of organisationon the shop floor itself. It has also been

able to twist lhe ams erf lhe unions, tothe point where it rs ther ',r ho are key incontrol l ing shop t1o.. : ' * . . rkers. I t comesas no surpdse to F,',:: * -,:kers to findthat some of rhe n.. : : : \ : : .ne warnmssfrom the unions ar: :3.- . : r l j nut for thiecompany , bu t i ; l - . : r : - r J m i l i t an tworkers.

Labour relations in Ford in the 1970shave been dominared br rn o thinss.First , Ford's threat to pul i out of Br i ta- inif the workforce diln'r co-ooerate. andsecond. the building of an authoritativenational negotiatine body. For Fordmanagement, the- i* . . r : : : n. , t ent i relyseDarate.

Two major srnkes i.ir: sr-::.:: the unionstructures *irhrn F..:: LI :,-'car'. Thef irst was in lq6o. - . : .1 -3:. : :3i rn Hale-wood. The s€!-or: ; . : : . l : - . . :s st i l l re-membered a: rhe ' : i : : : . s: : :ke' . Bothwere ostensiblr iL,- r : : . : . : : : : : ' : : , . but hadvast ly di f ferenr J, ' : . |e i - : : . : a :

The 1969 str ike * ' - : : . : -- : . r tor theshoo- f l o , ' r -ha<e : * r - r - , . . . : : i . move-ment . The la - l s l : - i ' . : - : . . t : : t o rv fo rt h e t r r J e u : : : . : . : : ' r ' : : D r ' , n o t h ei.i; i;;o' .f . ,:---,-. ...

-- ';;,;.;;i

n l o t o r p r L , J u J : : . ' : B . : : t : . : o f t h eI 9 7 l F L , r . s : : : i : : r - . : ' l : : l i l i t a n c yI t l , . l h , " ' c ' r . , . . ' . : . " - l - . ' r u n i o l l, . , f f i , i . - r l i . . A . i ' . : ' : 3 - - : r i r ' e r c r r tq u a l i N , . ' i , . : : : , t . - . : : : : : - : : : : : : : . s a n t a t i v er i g h t * i l i i . ' : . r t - , - : . . : - : . i : . i , . i t r t l U g hS c a n l o n . , : t - J : - , . J : . : , 3 - : : : t a s t h e s ente l t r r l t . , \ : t r - : - . : ' i - , i i : r l sevcra lg i ) \ 'e In l ) r ' t . l : : i : . : : r : . : - : - : . . (See CISPa.v i t t r 1 ' r i l : i Cr ;s ; , i : : l r Ther checkedthe grorr t i t JuJ : ! , , i e : . : the stewardsn)oventenL

The method n'asl ic ly supported the shop

First they pub-stewards, and

38

The National JointNegotiating Committee

L,ocked into procedure, lhe unionnegotiating team sound militantenough. The minutes of the NJNCmeetings between Ford and theunions in no way convey a pictureof ident i ty of aims and inreresrs.Points are invariably hotly contes-ted, and the atmosphere is oftenhost i le. Certainly rhe impressiongiven by Ford management is ofconcessions being granted only veryreluctantly.

The Pay Claims too, apart from thefact that they are becoming increas.ingly sophisticated, are also couchedin the language of confrontationand class politics. The informationgiven and the case made is givenweighl by the research and ani lysisprovided by Ruskin College TradeUnion Research Unit. In the 1977Claim, even a firm of City stockbrokers were commissioned toanalyse the company's accountingmethods, showing that the accountsunderstate the true Drofits Dositionof the Company.

But the batt les are set pieces.Procedure. the professional ism ofthe union off ic ials. the gap betweenthe shop f loor and the NJNC is aswide as ever. Only those aspects ofrank and file feeling which theunion is prepared to deal with getan airing. Even the 1977 Claim,the 'most advanced of its kind',was never put before a mass meet-ing either before or after it wassubmitted to the company. No planof action was laid out to achievethe claim at shop floor level. Shopstewards were not allowed theopportunity to make proposals oramendments, nor to discuss it at ashop stewards conference. Theclaim remains a reflection of whatthe union side of Ford NationalJoint Negotiating Committee con-sider to be the aspirations of theshop floor.

opened up the union structures to theirinf luence. ' l t is the members who mustdecide,' Jack Jones wrote to the ly'elvStatesman in 1971. But power would notbe allowed to remain with the shop floor.The un ion wou ld lead . l t wou ld be theNational Joint Negot iat ing Conrmit teethat would decide. but the shop f loorwould be represented. Two or three yearsago there were no lay memberson the negot iat ing team. the TGWU hastwo senior lav convenors. The shopstewards are involved rn the rvhole olthe process of submitt ine and agreeingthe terms of sett lement ' . (op.crr.y

Despite the talk. the agreemenr withFord at the end of the l97l ntne weekstrike reflected none of these high prin-ciples. l t was a new kind of agreement,to run for two years and with 'no str ike'clauses. But the decision on i t was not tobe made in the traditional way, by showof hands. It was to be ratified by asecret bal lot of the Ford workforce.

One worker described the event. 'Afternine weeks of strike you read somethingin the paper, or hear i t on the news. Per-haps you go round to your mates. Youtravel out to the plant. A few placards.'No bal lot show of hands. ' You lookround. No one to talk to. 'Ah, fuck i t . 'Put your cross. Back home.' (Beynonp298)

There are limits to union democracy.This was clearly put by Scanlon at thet ime of the bal lot . 'There comes a t ime. when there are responsibilities onthe president of the union that exceedthe responsibilities of everyone else'(Beynon p304).

'Ball and Chain'The Secret ballot followed by the ragged-ness of the return to work left everyoneat Ford confused. This confusion leftthe lads on the line, and particularly thestewards, lulnerable. lt was, Beynonnotes, 'a wlnerability that was to provefatal'. The stewards had been isolatedby the 'new revolutionary American styleagreement', with its two year contract,its no strike clause, and its reaffirmationo f the 'B lue Book 'p rocedure .

Ford management used it to take on the

tightly knit stewards organisation. Fintthey announced to the stewards thatfrom now on 'everything would be playedby the book'. Stewards were to receivea full work allocation. They weren't tobe allowed off their jobs without theexpress permission of the supervisors."'Either do the job or get off the pay-rol l ' , became the 'Requirement to Oper-ate'. Day and night local agreement onmanning and conditions were ignored.Men were physically prevented fromseeing their stewards." (Socialist llorkert6 .6 .7 I )

Moss Evans of the T&GWU publiclvexpressed his concern at the deter ioi-ation of labour relations in the Fordplants (Guardian 17.6.71). But he didnothing. Shop stewards were regularlysuspended. In Halewood the attack onthe stewards was most overt. The menhad been without a wage packet for20 weeks, and they were unprepared forthe confrontat ion. 'A long str ike, areturn to a speeded l ine, walkout afterwalkout, debts still unpaid and the sum-mer holidays just round the corner. Inthe second week of June their resolvewas put to the test. John Dillon, thesteward for the lads on the Masic Round-abou t . was sacked . ' (Beynon p i l 0 ;

Ford management had decided to makean 'example' of him following the refusalof his 'section

to follow procedure. Theviolent response of the flalewood workerscaught both the unions and Ford manage-ment by surpnse. Di l lon was reinstaiedbut his shop steward credentials were notrestored. The stewards committee did notfeel confident enough to insist. Thesenior stewards decided to plav i t coollor a whi le. As they pur i r : ' ihey'd comewithin a hairs breadth of destruction'.The 'ball and chain' was lifted. As far asmanagement was concetned a new erahad dawned at Ford.

A leaflet put out by flalewood workers in1975 headed 'The Sackins of JohnDil lon' read: 'The Ford bosies and theunion had made a deal. John had to bemoved away from his section to theGarage, and he would never be stewardagain. The Wet Deck (his old section)rejected the deal. For months they re-

39

fused any other stewardl but the thinghas gone through. ln 1972 Ford used thepretext of a sympathy str ike in supportof a rent demonstrat ion, to break up-theWet Deck, sending 29 mcn to di f ferentsections. Ford have managed to have ittheir own way for nearly two years. 'The defeat of the shop stewards left theshop floor in Fords plants without acoherent leadership and little direction.Although Ford certainly did not getthings all their own way, shop floormilitancy lacked unity and the struggledeveloped haphazardly.

AftermathThe Spring 197 4 Pay Claim was a sq ualidaffair . I t was sett led with l i t t le or noconfrontat ion, within Phase 3 of theConserval ive government 's Pay Frccze.I t lef t considerable i l l - feel ing on thcshop l1oor. By Septenrber 1974. withthe government defeated and the run upto the General Elect iorr , thc whole issueof pay and condit tons was bust r ightopen at Ford wi lh a determined walkout by 1,800 Press Shop workers atDagenl iam.Ford workers l l l t that the wages gapt lrat had lef t t l rent the klwest pard carworkers in Bri tain rvas widening. Bit ter-ness s t i l l hung ovc r f ron r the 1971 de iea tafter a nine week str ike f i r r par i ty. Thelhad got an 18 increase over two years outo f tha t . I n 1973 ( l , hase 2 ) they go tanother f1.40 and in the Phase 3 f iascojust l l .60.In July 1974, whcn govcrnmenr wagerestraint was f inal ly abandoncd, thc basicrvage f i rr day{ ime l inc workcrs at Fordrvas C38, f t rr a 40-hour weck. They didn' thave to look far to gauge just hotv rniser.ablc that wage real ly was. Cl i rysler wor.kers in Coventry for example, had justsett led tbr a basic ratc of €53.57, almost116 a week more for the same work.Turnover at Fords, l lways high. bccanteworse than ever. There wcrc also an unpre-cedented nuniber of disputes or iginat ingon the shop f loor, t l iat Ford managementfound they could not handle. Ford wor-kers, unable to improve overal l wages byshop f loor act ion, were trying everythingto lighten their workload, fronr simple in-subordinat ion to the demand for less work.

These skirmishes eventually focused onone issue the fight against lay-off. Forone thing inevitably followed from thesedisputes. Wherever a dispute or iginated i tled to bott lenecls in prodrrct ion. Ford'ssolution was to lay workers off withoutpay. (see Casual Labour)But fbr the moment, Ford faced with amajor product ion cr is is, were ready bySeptember 1974 to abandon the contractmade in the Spring, and reopen nego-t iat ions with the union on the quest ionof pay. This effcct ively def lated thegrowth of shop f loor mi l i tancy, and onceagain placed the union side of the NJNCat the centre of the stage. The menwanted an end to lay-offs without pay,and an interim pay award. They wereto get much more than they bargained1o r .The dai ly attack on Ford product ion b1the shop f loor had seriously eroded theauthori ty of the unions. They had taci t l l 'supported the Tory wage freeze. This hadl imited the negot iat ing arm of the NJNCand shifted the action to the shop floor.The October 1974 inter im pay agreement,was designed, among other things. to setr ight this inrbalance, in favour of Fordand t l re otf ic ial union negot iat ing team

the NJNC.

DisciplineSupcrf ic ial ly the pay offer was attract ive.An addit ional {7 to tq gross, with in-creases in I I and l8 months. Once againthe contract was to run for 2 years. Butwri t ten into t l lc agreement alongside themoney were harsh product iv i ty and ntan-ning deals.

Central to the 'new discipl ine code' wasthe requirctnent that workers should beprepared to move around i fnccessary frofrom job to job, and that a pool of 'Ut i l i ty

Men' should be on hand for use wherenecessary. A huge recrui tment campaign(on TV and in the press) fol lowed theagreement. Incoming workers were del ib-erately placed to break up and recomposewhole sect ions, and shif ts. The Press Shopat Dagenham, lbr instance, which has ledthc October lg74 str ike, found i tsel f withtwo to three hundred new workers.

The unions in the plants co-operated.The informal organisation that hadexisted before could not survive theturnover. absenteeism, the addit ion of'green' labour. and the imposit ion ofprocedure supported bir union officials.Speed up was inevitable.

Without anl coherent shop f loor leader-ship For,J had it all their own way. Thisalso lef t Ford with exccpt ional ly highstocks of cars. When the expected reces-s i t rn h i t B r i ta in i n rhe Spr ing 1975 theunlons were tn a strong posit ion tocontrol shop f loor resistance to closuresand short t ime working.

Moss Evans was first to speak "Disruptiveact ion wi l l not persuade people to buycars". The Secretary of the Ford Con-venors supported this view: "Thris is not' the

t inre to go off at a tangent. I t is asi tuat ion when the trade unions have tokee p clear heads ." (Evening News 19 .2.7 5)And from the NJNC came the message"We have already collected over 1.000srgnatures . . . and we shall have a meetingwith our MPs at the House of Comnrons."

One fifth of Ford workers were put onshort- t ime. They would get 80% of basichourly rates during rhe period they werelaid off . But a Ford spokesman added:'The fund is not ine-rhaustabl,- ' ' .

Ford's workforce \ \ 'as isolated. Shopsteward power in both Dagenham andf lalewood had been sapped. The tradeunion leaders were in ciose partnershipwith the Labour Government, nlore con-cerned with i ts survival than the interestsof the Ford i rorkers. Union leaders des-c r ibed the s i tua t ion e r Fo rd as 'unaccep-table' but hlstened tL) point out "We'vegot a good NJNC. and rhey're r ightbehind us".Ford's war against the power of shopstewards and mil i rants on the shop f loorcont inues. In June 1977 a part icular lystrong 'shop' in the Body plant wasdivided into two. The stewards wereconfined to one half of the shop only."They're chasing the stewards aroundail the time. Every time they go offtheir jobs to see to an issue they aretaken off pay." (Dagenham Ford WorkersGroup)

40

I

A lot of changes have been made sinceHenry Ford I set out in a hired oceanliner full of fellow pacifists to try andstop the first World War. The secondWorld War demonstrated to the car-maken just how profitable the warbusiness is, and they have not lookedback since.

Ford's war-t ime programme produced8,600 B-24 Liberator bombers, 57,000aircraft engines and over a quarter of amil l ion jeeps, tanks and other assortedwar machines, all in less than three years.Without the war contracts the companymight well have collapsed before HenryFord I I could take over. The lesson wasnot lost. and Forr l has become a majorcontender for the increasingly lucrativecontracts emanating from the UnitedStates Department of De fence.

The technologies of space research,satellite communications and modernweapon systems are ever more cl( 'selyrelated. Government contracts for al lthese sectors are carried out by theFord Aerospace and Communicat ionsCorporat ion. This subsidiary also pro-duces rad i r r s . a i r cond i t ron ing compo-nenls and electronic devices for Fordvehicles. Its original name was the Philco-Ford Corporat ion. This was changed toAeronutronic Ford Corporat ion in 1975.and i t became the Ford Aerospace andCommunicat ions Corporat ion rn Decem-6er 1976.

ln war or in peace military business makesrnoney, but actual hostilities alwayswiden the market. In 1967 Businessl leek ran an art ic le ent i t led'What VietNam is Teaching Philco'. which begins'The company's contracts with the

military for behind-the-lines services suchas transport and warehousing are provid-ing experience it hopes to apply in otherunderdeveloped nations.'

Start ing with a smal l contract to supplyroadbui lders, Phi lco-Ford bui l t up a$32mi1l ion a year contract involvement,which included 'conducting a vehic'lemaintenance service for the whole DaNang combat command, suPPlYing andoperating an Army vehicles parts supplyl ine and warehousing system, stretchingfrom Tacoma, Washington, to Saigon, andkeeping the dockside handl ing equipmentin running condit ion in Vict Nam' (Tr i-cont inental News Service. American Re-por t , December 1Oth , I 971 ) .

Ex-Ford man Robert McNanrara was agreat proponent of the electronic batt le-field when he was Defence Secretary, andPhi lco-Ford was a major suppl ier ofsensing and communicat iL-rns systems inSouth East Asia in the 60s. The firstelectr t-rnic sensing netwurk set up ulSouth East Asia was cal led the 'McNamara

Wal l ' . Ph i l co had a l ready bu i l t a i r c ra i twarning and control systems for theShah of I ran. an ' lntegrated Joint Com-municat ions System' for Japan, Taiwanand the Phi l ippines, a nat ionwide tele-communicat ions network for the USAirforce in South Korea, and a global'secure voice network' for the Pentagon.At the end of 1968 Phi lco comPletedinstal lat ion in Thai land of a $ l00mil l ioncommunicat ions system specif ical ly de-signed to meet Thai mi l i tary demands.I ts maior use was to perform secret ser-vices ior the American military, and tofunct ion as part of the Pentagon's world-wide defence communicat ions system.run by a combinat ion of special ly trained

ath

army men and Phi lco-Ford technicians.

The vice-president of Phi lco-Ford's Com-municat ions and Electronics divis ion, inan interview in Elecftonic ly'ews, waxedeloquent on the future business prospectsafforded by expected ' fundamental chan-ges in geopol i t ics and America's 5trategiciol ic iei ' . i le sirw the evolut ion of newsuper systems of massive troop transportsserviced by a new generation of fastsupply ships. And busincss prospects forPhi lco-Ford were rosy. 'For t l iose of us inmil i tary telecommunicat ion s this develop-ment means that the tradit ional l ines be-tween strategic and tact ical equipmentwi l l b lur ' , said the vice-president. 'We cansee the need for f ixed, strategic trunkingnetworks, which t ie our bases together,will diminish. And in their place we willdevelop tran sportable telecommunic at ionsequ ipment tha t may be taken anywhere .dnyt irne, and set up immediately f t -r r highcapacity comrnunicat ion. via satel l i tes,back to the States. '

As wel l as electronic warning and 'com-

municat ions' systems, including a numberof 'defense' satel l i tes, Phi lco-Ford wasalready working on missiles, among whichwere the Shillelagh anti-tank missile andthe Army's Chaparral air defence missi lesystem. Consol idated defence and spacesales in 1967 by the Company and thePhi lco-Ford subsidiary total led $429-mil l ion. up | 4% on the I 966 total . Ford' fractor Operat ions received governmentorders for over 38,000 M 151 quarter-tonmil i tary trucks during 1967, worth$l I I mi l l ion. A further order in early1968 for product ion of the Army's M-6565-ton cargo truck was worth $27mil l ion,and was designed by the company'sSpecial Military Vehicles Operations.

Merchan

4 l

Philco-Ford's Educational and TechnicalServices Division furnished, logist icalsupport' to the US Narry's activiiies atDa Nang in South Vietnim at a price of$ I gmil l ion.

All in all, the Vietnam war proved to bea very profitable enterprise for the FordMotor Company - so much so that theyfelt it worth while supplying 5,00i)civilian tech nical advisers.Ford's Defence and Space Sales havegrown throughout the 1970s:

$mtllk,n

197 ) 2931973 369t974 2611975 3891976 431

ln 1974 Ford received a gg6mil l ioncontract to bui ld the worldwide networkof ground terminals for the US Depart-ment of Defence's second generat iondefence satel l i te comniunicat ions systenl.ln 1975 Aeronutronic Ford announcedthat i t was developing a new guidanceSystem employing laser bcams for airdefence systems. as wel l as cont inuingto produce guidance and control systemsfor Sidewinder air to air nt issi les.

By now Ford was the biggest producerol communicat ions salel l i tes in the world.In 1976 i t announced that i t had nowbui l t a total of 39 Earth satel l i tes, hadinstal led 54 rnajor satel l i te earth stat ions.and over 800 ground comnlunlcatronsterminals worldwide. The strategic advan.tages of these shouid not be ovir lookecl.]en years earl ier the vice-president ofPh i lco-Ford's Communicat ions and Elec-tronics Division had said that he viewedearth terrninals for satel l i tes as .br idgc_heads for development of modern te ' ie_communicat ions in more backward sec-t ions of the world ' .

The 1976 Report and Accounts spel ledout the increasing importance of theoverseas arms market: 'The subsidiarvalso produces certain defence productsfor the United States and othei sovern-menls. The products include iact icaland. air-d_efence missi le systems. Someo l the sa les a re made d i rec t l y ro the USgovernment which, in turn sells some of

the products to foreign governments.Ford's military sales madJ directly toforeign governmenls are controlled bylicenses from the US Department ofS ta te. '

ln 1976 i t became possible to obtaininformation publicly

-for the first time

about companies applying for l icensesunt ler the Foreign Mil i tary Sales Act.There are 22 categories on the US Muni-l ions l is l . and companies apply lorI lcenses by category. Companies may.but do not necessari ly in any given year.export i tems in those cateqories. ln 1975Ford f i led i ts appl icar ion Tor a f ive-yearregistrat ion. The appl icat ion included al ist of Ford's munit ions l ist manufacturesan d/or exports:Category I Firearms' and ComponentsCategory II Guns over Caliber .50Category III - Ammunition Componenrs

and PartsCategory lV Launch Vehicles, Guided

Missi les, Bal l ist ic Missi les andRockets and Components for above

Category VI - Gun-and Gun SightMoun ts and Missi le Systems for

Vessels of War and Other SpecialNaval Equipmen t

Category VII - Tanks and MllirarvVehicles and Specif ical ly Designed

ComponentsCategory VIII - Aircraft, Spacecraft

and Associated EquipmentCategory IX - Military Training Equip-

men tCategoryCategory

Category

X - Mi l i tary Body ArmourXl - Mi l i tary and Space Elec-

l t o n i c sXII - Fire Control , RangeFinder, Guidance an d Control

category Xrrr Auxiliary r"t,t"?i'Eil"1llment, Including Space Carneras,Speech Scramblers and Crypto-

graphic Devices and Components.and Armour Plate

Category XVIII Technical Data

The Council on Economic priorities. anAmerican organisation which publishesdetai led information on the pract ices ofUS co rpora r ions . p r in red a l i s i o f rhe USDefence Department 's top 100 contrac-lo rs rn t t s Augus t lQ77 news le t te r .

Ford Arms Sales to US Govemment

)'ear Rank Contracts % of sales(in top 100) (mil fi)

1972 281973 261974 321975 271976 27

196.5 1 .0213.9 0.9174.8 0.7259.7 I . 1285.4 1 .0'As the Carter Administration takes

office on January 20, the Pentagon'sweapons buyers will be setting out ont leir_biggest shopping spree in-nearly adecade. Their pockets are jingting withmore cash than they have seen since1970 . ! (Business tteek t0.1.77)'One reason for this 'very good news forthe nat ion's defence industry ' BusinessIt leek reporred. is rhat Delence Depart-menl uul lays for prtrcurement a.e r is ingb , , l h i n cons tan r do l i a rs and in pe rcen ltage o l s ru \5 n r t i ona l p roduc t and c rnbe e: ipected to cont inue r is inq ;nto thelqROr . {no the r reas . rn i s rha l newPentagon procurement pol ic ies are reduc-lng the nsk lor coniractors and improvingprot ' i ts br al lo* ing companies to- chargdthe sovernment tor the cost of monevu-ie d tu bur , ' r lease pfunt and equiprneni 'l \at ional Act ion Research on th; Mi l i tarvIndus t r r r i C . 'mo lex t .The Ford \totor Company makes largeamounts of monel' from armaments andat the same time strenethens that inter-dependence betueen

-corporation and

state \4 hich is a gron'ing feature of multi-national delelopnrent. The scope forp r ( ) l l t ec : l ng :n the : r rns t r rde i s enormous ,especial l r * :rh ihe * i l l ing partnership ofthe Penragon, *hich is eager to sel lCongress bigger rnd berter weaponss) stems. \o. tne seents to quest ion thehuge p r i . ' e -h rkes *h i ch leeornpany th i st ra de. The Sideri inder m isst le, for in stance.has increased rn pr ice by 99Vo between1975 and 1976 . f rom S :3 .375 ro $46 .450 .None of rhe market considerat ions andprrce constraints that bxist in the autotrade have an1' relevance in the weaponsl radc . Nr r n ta rke t capac i t y . 1o impor tth rea ts . no s ty l i ng headaches , no emiss ioncontrols. no energy pol icy constraints -and a truly captive market. The taxpayerkeeps trn paying. And besr of al l , i f iheproduct kills someone - the contract isprobablv increased.

4 2

The Gost of DyingEver wonder what your life is worth in dollars? Ford has it all worked out: $200,000

"Nobody's making a consumer buyanything. He buys of his own free will.Now, if we build a lousy car. he is gettingscrcwed. And we build lots of lousy cars,no question about it; can't deny that."(Henry Ford, Aprr l 17,1971)

In 1955, Robert McNamara, head of theFord Division, devised a sales strategybased on safety features introduced intothat year's models. General Motors didn'tlike that at all. The Ford advertisementsconveyed the undiluted message thatwhen their cars were involved in crashes,the new safety features would diminishthe owners' iniuries and would do somore effectiveiy than their competitors'cars.

Safety Doesn't Sell'At GM, cars were promoted as dreamboats in order to sell more cars for shorterholding periods. Ford was taking theromance out of cars, injecting collisionsand casualties and other unpleasantnessinto the motorists' decision about whichcar to purchase. Should this continue,GM saw the joy going out of owning anautomobile, with the fear of crashesreplacing the hope of psychosexual grati-fication which their ads projected.'. . . CM executives flipped and camedown hard on McNamara. He not onlywas promoting safety to bolster thesagging sales of a model year that hadlittle else to offer, he appeared to begenuinely interested ir1 safety.

"The number-one auto giant was notwithout friends at high Ford MotorCompany levels. Ford's chairman of theboard, Emest Breech, was formerlyGM's chief financial officer; Dale Harder,Ford's head of manufacturing, had hada similar position in General Motors; andLouis Crusoe, executive vice presidentof the car division, was formerly with theCadillac division of General Motors.These gentlemen understood the marketpower of General Motors. The onlyslightly exaggerated saying at Ford atthat time was that Chevy (Chevroletdivision) could drop its price $25 tobankrupt Chrysler and $50 to bankruptFord. GM said stop and Ford literallyscreeched to a halt. with the aforemen-

tioned ex-GM Ford executives gettingMcNamara to switch gears to an adver-tising campaign.that emphasized stylingand performance rather than safety.

". . . The auto industry's most effectivemyth began to grow. 'Ford sold safetywhile Chevy sold cars,' cracked theDetroit iron masters during the nextdecade when safety advocates urged theauto manufacturen towards more crash-worthy vehicles." (Nader, Unsafe atAny Speed, Second edition).

In September 197'1 , Mother Jones, anAmerican consumer magazine, exposedthe horrific example of the irreconcilableconflict between profits and human life."Although this particular story is aboutthe Pinto, the way in which Ford madeits decision is typical of the US autoindustry generally. There are plenty ofsimilar stories about other cars made byother companies."

Here we reprint a slightly shortenedversion:"By conservative estimates Pinto crasheshave caused 500 burn deaths to peoplewho would not have been seriouslyinjured if the car had not burst into flames.The figure could be as high as 900.Buming Pintos have become such anembarrassment to Ford that its advertis-ing agency, J. Walter Thompson, droppeda line from the end of a radio spot thatread "Pinto leaves you with that warmfeeling."

FiretrapFord knows the Pinto is a firetrap, yet ithad paid out millions to settle damagesuits out of court, and it is prepared tospend millions more lobbying againstsafety standards. With a half million carsrolling off the assembly lines each year,Pinto is the biggest-selling subcompact inAmerica, and the company's operatingprofit on the car is fantastic. Finally, in197'7, new Pinto models have incorpor-ated a few minor alterations necessary tomeet that federal standard Ford managedto hold off for eight years. Why did thecompany delay so long in making theseminimal, inexpensive improvements?

Ford waited eight years because its inter-

nal "cost-benefit analysis", which placesa dollar value on human life, said it wasn'tprofitable to make the changes sooner.

Mother Jones has studied hundreds ofreDorts and documents on rear-endcollisions involving Pintos. These reportsconclusively reveal that if you ran into aPinto you were following at over 30 milesoer hour. the rear end of the car would6uckle like an accordion, right up to theback seat. The tube leading to the gas-tankcap would be ripped away from the tankitself, and gas would immediately beginsloshing onto the road around the car.The buckled gas tank would be jammedup against the differential housing (thatbig bulge in rhe middle of your rear axJe).which contains four sharp, protrudingbolts likely to gash holes in the tank andspill still more gas. Now all you need isa spark fiom a cigarette, ignition, orscraping metal, and both cars would beengulfed in flames. If you gave thatPinto a really good whack - say at40mph - chances are excellent that itsdoors would jam and you would have tostand by and watch its trapped passengersburn to death.

LiesThis scenario is no news to Ford. Intemalcompany documents in our possessionshow that Ford has crash-tested the Pintoat a top-secret site more than 40 timesand that every test made at over 25mphwithout special structural alteration ofthe car has resulted in a ruptured fueltank. Despite this, Ford officials deniedunder oath having crash-tested the Pinto.

Eleven of these tests, averaging a 31mphimpact speed, came before Pintos startedrolling out of the factories. Only threecars passed the test with unbroken fueltank. In one of them an inexpensivelight-weight plastic baffle was

-placed

between the front of the gas tank andthe differential housing, so those fourbolts would not perforate the tank. Inanother successful test, a piece of steelwas placed between the tank and thebumper. In the third test car the gas tankwas lined with a rubber bladder. But noneof these protective alterations was used inthe mass-oroduced Pinto.

4 3

Why was a car known to bc a ser ious f l rehazard del iberate ly re leased to productronin August of 1970?

Like the Mustang. the Pi r r to bccameknown in thc company as "Lee's car" .Lec Iacocca warted that l i t t le car i r r thcs h o w r o o l l l s o f A m e r i c a w i t h t h e l 9 7 ln r o d e l s . S o h e o r r l e r e d l t i s e n g i n c e r i n gvice pres ident , Bob Alcxant lcr . to oversecwhat was probably t l le shor test produc-t ion p lanning per iod in modern automo-t ive h is tory. The normal t inrc span f ror lconcept ion to product ion 0f a new carrnodel is about 4- l months. Thc p intoschedulc was set at just undet 2_5.

Design, s ty l ing, product p lanning, advancecngincer ing and qual i ty assurance a l l havef l e x i b l c t i r n e f r r m e s . a n d e n g i n e c r s c a npret ty ntuch carry these on s in lu l ta-neously . Tool ing, on the othcr hand. hasa f ixed t ime f rame o1 about l8 months.N u r m a l l y . a n J U l i l e r r 6 p s n t , j , , a r n ' ,b e g i n t o o l i n g u n t i l t h c ( ) l h e r p t u e e s s e sare almost over. But lacocca's speed-upmeant Pinto tooling went on at thesame time as product development. Sowhen crash tests revealed a serious defectin the gas tank, i t was too la te. The tool -ing was wel l under way.

Whe n i t was discovered the gas tan k wasunsafe. did anyone go to lacocca andtel l him? "Hel l no," repl ied an engineerwho worked on the Pinto, a high com-pany official for many years, who, unlikeseveral others at Ford, maintains anecessarily clandestine concern for safety."That person would have been fired.Safety wasn't a popular subject aroundFord in those days. With lee it wastaboo . "

Heightening the ant i-safety pressure onPinto engineers was an important goalset by lacocca known as "the l imits of2O00". The Pinto was not to weigh anounce ovcr 2,000 pounds and not tocost a cent over $2,000. "lacocca enfcrrcedthese l i rni ts with an iron hand," recal lsthe engineer quoted carl ier. So, evenwhen a crash test showed that that one-pound, onedol lar piece of plast ic stoppedthe puncture of the gas tank, it wasthrown out as extra cost and extra weight.

As Lee lacocca was fond of saying,

"Sal 'e ty doesn' t se l l . "

B l r r n c f r r r a l l t h e i . n j u r i e r r n d d c e r l l s i lP i n t u s s i n c c l q 7 0 d o e s n o l t e s t u n t l l r 'shoulders of Lee Iacocca a lone. For .whi le he and h is associates fcrught the i rbat t le against a safer Pinto in Diarborn.a larger war against saf 'er cars raged inW a s h i n g t o n .

One skirnt ish in that war involved Ford'ssuccesslirl eight-year lobbying e ffortagainst Federal Mtxor Vehicle Saf-e1S lan t l r r J J0 l . t he rea r -end p rov is ions o twhich would have forced Ford to redesignthe Pin to.

Bulldog HenryDuring the early 1960s. auto safety legis-lation becanre the b€:te-ruire of Antericanbig business. The auto industry was thelast great unregulated business, and i f l rcouldn' t reverse the t ide of governmentregulat ion, the reasouing went. no onecou ld .

Pcople who know him cannot rememberHenry Ford I I taking a stronger standthan the one he took against the regulat ionof safety design.

By 1965, most pundits and lobbyists sawthe handwri t ing on thc wal l and preparedto acccpt government "meddl ing" in thelg_st_ bastion of free enterprise. Not Henry.With bul ldog tenacity, he held out fordefeat of thc lcgislation to the very end,loyal to his grandfather 's invent ion and tothe company that rnakes i t . But the SafetyAct passed the House of Senate unani-mously, and was signed into law byLyndon Johnson in 1966.

While lobbying for and against legislationls pretty much a process of high-levelback-slapping, press-confe ren cing andspeech-making, fighting a regulatoryagency is a much subtler matter. Henryhcldct l home to l ick his wountls in GrossiPr-r inte. Michigan. and a planeltrad ,r f theFtrrd Motor Company's best brains f lewto Washington to start the "educat ion"of the new federal auto safety bureaucrats.

neu , o i t lc ia ls regulat ing auto safety .Br ie i r sumnrar ized, that ideology stat isthat Jut ( ) lcc idents are caused nut bv( . . r , . . . b r r h r l t p c o p l e a n t l 2 ) h i g h w a yc o n d i t i ! ) n i .

Bct i , re rh. ' F! \ rd ! ' rper ts Ie f t Washingtont( ) rerum r , i r t l ' t lng tables in Dearbomt l rer J i i ! )ne ( rher th ing. They managedto in torr ' tJ l l \ rcrch an agreement wi ththe n l t iur subl i i sc ' rvants who would benra lung :ur . , s l ie tv decis ions. This agree-nte l ] l \ \as ih : l " ; t rs t -benc1l t " would bern aeceptabie ntoJe of analys is by Detro i tand i ts ne* regulators. And. as we shal lsee. .osr-be: le t l t enal rs is quick ly becanrethe b:srs or ' Ford ' i argunrent againsts a t e r ; l r , l e s t g n

Evc.r r i , tn ier * h . l l r our l i fe is wor th ind o l l a r s ' P e : n r p ' S l 0 m i l l i o n ? F o r d h a s a- b e t t e r r J . ' r S : 0 0 . 0 0 0 .

R e m e n b e : . F . r ; h e d g o t t e n t h e f e d e r a lreguldt . , rs i ! , r i ree to ta lk auto Safety i l lternrs , r : . , rs i ,Oenef i t analys is . But inorder t t r : : , : le to argue that var iouss a t e t \ . . \ ! l ! \ \ . ; e g r e a t e r t h a n t h e i r b e n e -t l ts . For . : reeie i ro have a dol lar va luef igure t , , r lh . henet l t " . Rather than beso un.oui l ' , JS lo come up wi th such aprrce I ig i tse l : . the auto industry pres-sured the \ r r ionr i l l ighway Traf f icSatet \ AdntLnisrra l ion to do so. And in al97l repLrr r rhe asencv decided a humanl i fe *as \ {o: rh S100.725. In f la t ionaryiorces have re.enr l \ pushed the f igure upto S1i6.000

implant the officialin the minds ol the

$11 Too DearFurnished uirh rhis useful tool , Fordimmediatel l \ \ 'enr to $ork using i t toprove rvhr rar ious satet l improvementswere Ioo exp€nsr! 'e to make.

Nowhere did the company argue harderthat i t should make no changes than inthe area of rupture-prone fuel tanks.Not lons after the government arr ivedat the Sl00.7l5.perJi fe f igure, i t sur-faced. rounded olT to a cleaner $200,000,in an internal Ford memorandum. Thiscost-benef i t analysis argued that Fordshould not ntake an $l I -per-car improve-ment that would prevent 180 f iery dcathsa year.

Ali Ford had to do was convince men like

Price of a LifeTheir job was toindustry ideokrgy

44

)

\ ! ; ' t u '

'qe$ .l"iis

; - ! . - .

: -;5- .t -rl:_

John Volpe, Claude Brinegar and WilliamColeman (successive Secretaries of Trans-portation during the Nixon-Ford years)that certain safety standards would addso much to the price of cars that fewerpeople would buy them. This coulddamage the auto industry, which was stillbelieved to be the bulwark of the Ameri-can economy. "Compliance to thesestandards," Henry Ford II prophesied atmore tlan one press conference, "willshut down the industry."

So when J.C. Echold, Director of Auto-motive Safety (which means chief anti-safety lobbyist) for Ford wrote to theDepartment ofTransportation whichhe still does frequently, at great length -he felt secure attaching a memorandumthat in effect says it is acceptable to kill180 people and bum another 180 everyyear, even though we have the technologythat could save their lives for $11 a car.

There are several main techniques in theart of combating a governrnent safetystandard: a) make your arguments insuccession, so the feds can be working ondisproving only one at a time; b) claimthat the real problem is not X bur Y (wealready saw one instance of this in "theproblem is not cars but people"); c) nomatter how ridiculous each argument is,accompany it with thousands of pagesof highly technical assertions it will takethe govemment months or, preferably,years to test. Ford's large and activeWashington office brought these tech-niques to new heights and became theenvy of the lobbyists' trade.

Fiery DeathThe Ford people started arguing against

Standard 301 way back in 1968 with astrong attack of technique b). Fire, theysaid, was not the real problem. Sure, carscatch fire and people bum occasionally.But statistically a.uto fires are such aminor problem that NHTSA should reallyconcern itself with other matters.

Strange as it may seem, the Departmentof Transportation (NHTSA's parentagency) didn't know whether or not thiswas true. So it contracted with severalindependent research groups to studyauto fires. The studies took months.which was just what Ford wanted.

The completed studies, however, showedauto fires to be more of a problem thanTransportation officiais ever dreamed of.Robert Nathan and Associates, a Washing-ton research firm, found that 400,000cars were buming up every year, bumingmore than 3,000 people to death. Fur-thermore, auto fires were increasing fivetimes as fast as building fires. Anotherstudy showed that 35 per cent of all firedeaths in the US occurred in automobiles.

Another study was done by the HighwayTraffic Research Institute in Ann Arbor,Michigan, a safety think-tank fundedprimarily by the auto industry (the give-away there is the words "highway traffic"rather than "automobile" in the group'sname). f t concluded that 40% of the liveslost in fuel-fed fires could be saved ifthe manufacturers complied with pro-posed Standard 301. Finally, a thirdreport was prepared for NHTSA by con-sultant Eugene Trisko entitled "A NationalSurvey of Motor Vehicle Fires". Hisreport indicates that the Ford MotorCompanv makes 24% of the cars on the

American road, yet these cars account for42% of the collision-ruptured fuel tanla.

Ford lobbyists then used technique a)bringing up a new argument. Their linethen became; yes, perhaps burn accidentsdo happen, but rear-end collisions arerelatively rare (note the echo of techniqueb) here as well). Thus Standard 301 wasnot needed. This set the NHTSA off on anew round of analyzing accident reports.The government's findings finally werethat rear-end collisions were seven and ahalf times more likely to result in fuelsoills than were front-end collissions. Somuch for that argument.

Thousands BumBy now rt was 1972; NHTSA had beenresearching and analyzing for four yearsto answer Ford's objections. During thattime, nearly 9,000 people bumed todeath in flaming wrecks. Tens of thousandsmore were badly burned and scarred forlife. And the'four-year delay meant thatwell over l0million new unsafe vehicleswent on the road, vehicles that will becrashing, leaking fuel and incineratingpeople well into the 1980s.

Ford now had to enter its third round ofbattling the new regulations. On the"the problem is not X but Y" principle,the company had to look around forsomething new to get itself off the hook.One might have thought that, faced withall the latest statistics on the horrifyingnumber of deaths in flaming accidents,Ford would find the task difficult. Butthe company's rhetoric was brilliant.The problem was not bums, butimpact ! Most of the people killed in thesefiery accidents, claimed Ford, would have

45

FoThebePtttx} t

died whether the car bumed or not. Theywere killed by the kinetic force of theimpact, not the fire.

And so once again, as in some giantunderwater tennis game, the ball bouncedinto the government's court and theabsurdly pro-industry NHTSA begananother slow-motion response. Onceagain it began a time-consuming round oftest crashes and embarked on a study ofaccidents. The latter, however, revealedthat a large and growing number ofcoroses taken from bumed cars involvedin

-rear-end crashes contained no cuts.

bruises or broken bones. They clearlywould have survtved the accident un-harmed if the cars had not caught fire.This pattern was confirmed in carefulrear-end crash tests performed by theInsurance Institute for Highway Safety.A University of Miami study found aninordinate number of Pintos burning onrear-end impact and concluded that thisdemonstrated "a clear and present hazardto al l Pinto owners".

DelaysPressure on NHTSA from Ralph Naderand consumer groups began mounting.The industry-agency col lusion was soobvious that Senator Joseph Montoya(D-NM) introduced legislation aboutStandard 301 . NHTSA waffled some moreand again announced its intentions topromulgate a rear-end collision standard.

Waiting, as it normally does, until thelast day allowed for response, Ford filedwith NHTSA a gargantuan batch ofletters, studies and charts now arguingthat the federal testing criteria wereunfair. Ford also argued that designchanges required to meet the standardwould take 43 months, which seemed l ikea rather long time in light of the fact thatthe entire Pinto was designed in abouttwo years.

Some of these complaints were accepted,others rejected. But they all requiredexamination and testing by a weak-kneedNHTSA, meaning more of those I 8-month studies the industry loves so much.So the complaints served their real pur-pose delay;al l told, an eight-year delay,while Ford manufactured more than

: . l i \ r . l l t n r r 1 1 r r r r t ' '

1 ' : - t ,

] 9 l l i ; . . . t " t '

three million profitable, dangerouslyincendiary Pintos. To justify this delay,Henry Ford II called nlore press con-ferences to predict the demise of Americancivilization. "lf we can't meet the stan-dards when they are published," hewarned, '\ve will have to close down.And if we have to close down some oro-duct ion because we don't meet standardswe're in for real trouble in this country."

Out of CourtWhen the Pinto liability suits began, Fordstrategy was to go to a jury. Confident itcould hide the Pinto crash tests. Fordthought that juries of solid Americanregistered voters would buy the industrydoctrine that drivers, not cars, causeaccidents. I t didn' t work. I t seems thatiuries are much ouicker to see the truth

F0RD "lir*rrir.'l'

than bureau.racies. a fact that gives oneconf iden.e Ln democracy. Jur ies beganruling agatnst the company, grantingmillion-lollar a,* ards to plaintiffs.

"We'li never go Io a jury again," says AlSlechter iri Ford's Washington office."Not n a I l re case. Jur ies are just toosentimental. Thel see those charredremains and torget the evidence. No sir ,we ' l l se t t l e . "

Settlemenr invohes less cash, smaller legalfees and less publ ic i t l , but i t is an indica-t ion of the seakness of their case. Never-theless. Ford has been sett l ing when i t isclear that the company can't pin theblame on the dr iver of the other car.

Unt i l recent ly, i t was clear that, what-ever the cost of these settlements, it wasnot enough to seriously cut into the

Pinto's enormous profits. The cost of re-tooling Pinto assembly lines and of:quipping each car with a safety gadgetl ike that $5.08 Goodyear bladder was,JOmpany accounts calculated, greaterrhan that of paying out millions tosurvivors like Robbie Carlton or towidows and widowers of victims likeSandra Gillespie. The bottorn line ruled,and inflammable Pintos kept rolling outof the factories.

ln 1977, however, an incredibly sluggishgovernment had at last instituted Standard301. Now Pintos will have to have rupture-proof gas tanks. Or will they?

To everyone's surprise, the 1977 Pinto

The Airbag FixAirbags, which inflate instanta-neously inside a car if that car hitsanything are potentially the greatestlife saver yet devised.

However, according to Ford, airbagswill add anywhere frorn $100 to;H00 to the cost of every auto. Thecompany arg.res, probably co rrectly,that the auto buyers would preferto pay less and take their chances.But the vehemently anti-airbagFord wasn't willing to take itschances with the Department ofTransportation even when it wasloaded with pro-auto Republicans.So Ford introduced a cral ty l i t t lesystem called the ignition interlock.The ignition interlock will notallow a driver to start the car untilthe front seat passengers are buckledup. The ignition interlock was asensible compromise. The rat ionalewas that if drivers were forcedto use seat belts there would be noneed for airbags. which is trueenough. In late 1970, Henry FordII sold Chrysler president LynnTownsend on the idea and convincedhim they could sell it togetherin Washington.

A Nixon aide set up a meetingbetween Ford, Chrysler's Townsendand Nixon to discuss "mattersrelated to the automotive industry".

recently passed a rear-end crash test inPhoenix. Arizona. for NHTSA. Theagency was so corryinced the Pinto wouldfail that it was the llrst car tested. Amaz-ingly, it did not burst into flame.

"We have had so many Ford failures inthe past," explained agency engineer TomGrubbs, "l felt sure the Pinto would fail."

How Did it FassRemember that onedollar, one-poundplastic baffle that was on one of the threemodified Pintos that passed the pre-production crash tests nearly ten yearsago? Well, it is a standard feature on the1977 Pinto. In the Phoenix test i t protec-

A few days after the meeting,John Ehrlichman called a meetingwith Transportation Secretary JohnVolpe. After the meeting Volpe washeard to remark "The airbag's introuble." Soon after, Henry Ford I Icontributed nearly $50,000 towardsNixon's re-elect io n campaign.

After mury of the delays thatauto-makers love, on August i 5,l9 73, Department o f Transportat ionofficials finally issued a new regu-lat ion requir ing igni t ion inter lockson al l new cars. There was now noneed for airbags, so they droppedl rom the p i c tu re . Dur ing t l l i stwo-year delay, however. Congressmember Louis Wyman (R-NH) waspreparing an amendnlent to theMotor Vehicle and School BusSafety Act ol 197 4 . which said,"Federal saf 'ety standards maynot require that any vehicles beequipped with a safety belt inter-lock system." Sonre [{i]1 stal'lers sayFord actually wrote the amend-ment. With a well-timed push fromauto lobbyists, the amendmentpassed. The airbag and the ignitioninter lock were now both dead,victims of one of the most brilliantlyexecuted double fixes in the historyof lobbying.

Now that airbags are back on theagenda again, keep your eye onFord.

ted the gas tank from being perforatedby those four bolts on the differentialhousing.

We asked Grubbs if he noticed any othcrsubstantial alterations in the rear-endstructure of the car. "No," he repl ied,"the Iplastic baffle] seems to be the onlynot iceable change ovcr the 1976 model."

But was i t? What Tom Grubbs and theDepartrnent of Transportat ion didn' tknow when they tested the car was thati t was manufactured in St Thomas,Ontar io. Ontar io? The signif icance of thatbecomes clear when you learn that Canadahas for years had extremely strict rear-end collision standards.

Whether the new American Pinto fails orpasses the test, Standard 30i wi l l neverforce the company to test or recall themore than two mil l ion pre-1977 Pintosstill on the highway. Seventy or morepeople will bum to death in those carsevery ycar for many years to come."

A tiny itenr in Automotive /y'ews onAugust 22nd 1977 reported that FordMotor is recal l ing 642 1977 Pinto modelsfor inspect ion of two nuts in the rearburnper assembly. " lncorrect nuts mayhave been used. Because oftheir mountingposit ion, they could cut the fuel tank ina rear-end col l is ion, Ford said."

A fortnight later the same paper featuredFord's "refutation" of the Mother Jonesarticle. The n'rain item appears to beFord's declarat ion that " there is no proofto substantiate these claims", althougltthere are also rnasses ofstat ist ics designedto show "that the'Pinto is free of thesafety-related defects ascr ibed to i t byMother Jones". No specific evidence isgiven to counter the art ic le.

Since the passage of the Motor VehicleSafety Act in 1966. there have been morethan 50 million cars recalled in almost2000 recall campaigns. Ford itself re-called l.3million vehicles in 42 separatecampaigns in the United States, and657.000 vehicles in 23 campaigns in

Europe - al l in the one year 1976. Givenhow hard the company fights to avoidrecalls, the true extent of profitable butlethal car-building remains hidden.

47

Ford and theThird WbrldFord's intervention in the Third World, far from transforming economies by utilising potential for

development, exploits and reinforces existing situations for its own profit.

Ford, l ike other mult inat ional companies,has to continually seek new marketsand develop old ones. By the mid-sixties,the American market was no longer agrowth area for motor manufact i rers,and the US motor industry turned i tsattent ion to the development of marketsin Europe and the Third World.

Ford has operat ions in numerous countr iesof South East Asia: South Korea ; Taiwan ;Thai land; Malaysia; Singapore ; Indonesia;and the Philippines. These operations arecontrolled from Ford in Australia. andare closely tied in with the supply ofcomponents to the Austral ian and NewZealand factor ies. In Lat in America, thecompany has manufacturing capacity inMexico, Brazi l , Venezuela, Uruguay, andArgent ina.Ford was already established in theseareas, having manufactured in LatinAmerica, for instance, since the 1920s.However, in the 1960s it was facing in-creasing competition from relatively newJapanese competi tors, and the expandingEuropean mult inat ionals. Ford needed todevelop i ts product ion in the Third World,and take maximum economic advantaseo I ve ry sma l l na t iona l n ra rke rs . ThePhi l ippines, for example, when Fordopened a plant in 1967, accounted forjust 0.24 per cent of the world market.

The key to Ford's strategy is complemen-tat ion. This is a plan for each country in aregion to special ise in the product ion ofpart icular components, and then by ex-changing them assemble a complete car invarious countr ies. These imports wouldbe treated as local products, and thetheory is that each country exports asmuch as i t i rnports. "To those of us atFord, it is a fancy word for inter-regionalfree trade in motor vehicles and com-ponents." (Henry Ford [ I) The companygains by avoiding dupl icat ion of tool ingcosts, and achieving lower unit costs viahighcr volumc prodr. lct ion.

Ford faced. however. other ploblemsbesides the smal l s ize and diverse natureof the car markets in the Third World.Dur ing the 1950s and ea r l y 1960s , mos tThird World countr ies were attemptingto bui ld industr ies that would producegoods for the domestic market and lessen

imports, helping to solve the chronicdef ic i t in their balance of payments.Though the detai ls.var ied from counlryto country, in general the developingnations tried to create these importsubst i tut ion industr ies, protect ing thembehind high tariff barriers, and strictlycontrolling the use of foreign exchange.

The First National City Bank of Maniladescribes the effects of typical measuresin the Philippines between 1950 and1962. 'The exchange control system setin motion a radical alteration of thecountry's economic structure. Stimulatedby an effective barrier against foreignproducts and by preferential access toforeign exchange . an entire spectrumof new.or expanded local industries camelnto extstence.

IMF Rules OK?The rnultinational companies could getround the tariff barriers by establishingmanufacturing or assembly plants withinthe country, but they could not getaround the government control of foreignexchange. The expansion of their oper-at ions was l imited to a certain extent.and more impor{ant ly, their abi l i ty torepatriate profits was severely curtailed.Also, the tariffs prevented the multi-nat ionals from expanding product ion andrat ional is ing i t for a larger regional mar-ket. thus gaining economies of scale. Forthe mult inat ionals to organise the ThirdWorld countr ies into product ion bases.and integrate individual countr ies intoregional markets for their output, therestr ict ions on free trade had to becleared away.

This did not take long. The pol ic ies ofi lnport subst i tut ion, though developinglocal induslry, could not solve the balanceol payments problem. The expansion ofindustry scrved to increase imports ofindustr ial mate r ials and semi-f inishcdproducts to be fed into local industr ies.and eventual ly inrports began to exceedthe value saved by domestic product ion.In the rnid-1960s a wave of grorving tradedef ic i ts spread around the Third World.

At this t ime. a number of internat ionalagencies began the process of remouldingthe Third World's trade pol ic ies. The

International Monetary Fund, the lastresort of Third Wortd governments need-ing loans to finance trade deficits, opposedexchange controls and restrictions on theflow of capital with increasing firmness.Loans were made conditional on the dis-mantling of tariffs and foreign exchangeregulat ions.

Cuaderno. govemor of the PhilippinesCentral Bank, describes an applicationfor a loan made in 1958, needed to meeta deficit in the balance of payments. Aspart of rhe stabilisation plan he put beforethe IMF. a 25% tax on the sale of foreigncurrenc) was proposed. The IMF how-ever \r'as determined that the loan wouldbe conditional on the removal of alllbreign erchange controls, and a de-valuation of the Peso. Cuaderno com-ments: 'We had a feeling that this was

- what the US govemment ofhcials wouldlike us to do.' On that occasion thepressure *as resisted, but later on thisu'as not possible.

As * ell as pressure from the IMF on.urrenc\ controls, organisat ions l ike theWorld Bank. the Inter American Deve-lopment Bank and the Agency for Inter-nal ional Development were busy promot-ing r.'gional trade areas based on theEuropean Common Market. In 1960 theLat in American Free Trade Associat ion$as iounded. and in 1966 the Associat ionoi South East Asran Nations was formed.The theory behrnd such trade areas wasthat as rar i i fs were abol ished. largerm3rke ts i , , r rndus r r ia l p roduc ls wou ld -becreated. I t r ias argued for example, thatthe .reir ion of the L-at in American FreeTrade Area u rruld halve the amount ofiorergn er;hange needed for investment,i i industrres could be planned for theennre reg lon .

Repatriating ProfitsRatl ier than irrport subst i tut ion, thedrive was now on fbr 'export or ientedr n d u s t r i a l i s a t i u n . T h e e r ) u n l r i e s c o n -cerned were supposed to aid the processof in dust r ial isat ion by promoting freetrade and concentrat ing cm industr ialproduct ion ofgoods for the world market,br inging in foieign exchange. lmpl ic i tin this is thc need to encourage foreigninvestment to provide the factor ies capable

48

]1.;, i competing economical ly on the worldnarkets. So Third World governments'oegan

to legislate for the protection ofioreign investment and its right to repat-r iate prof i ts.

A year after the creation of the Asso-. : iat ion of South East Asian Nationst ASEAN) in 1966, Ford opened i tsassembly plant in the Phi l ippines, and in1969 the f i rst of the Investment Incent iveActs was passed in the Phi l ippines. Underthe joint pressures of the IMF and thevarious internat ional aid agencies, theThird World was gradually being trans-formed for the benefit of multinationals.

Ford was well prepared to take advantageof these changes, and the way they havetrperated within ASEAN shows howrnult inat ionals have used the new oppor"Iunit ies offered. In 1971. Henry Ford hadtalks with government leaders frorr nineAsia Paci l lc countr ies. He rnade i t qui teciear that 'complerrrentat ion holds farmore promise for the region than ad-herence to old style purchasing, assemblyand manufactur ing methods. ' (Ford; AGlobal Corporat ion Ford publ ic-a t i on , 1 973)

Asian CarsAttempts had been made in the past toireate an integrated car industry inSouth East Asia. ei ther within ASEANor an enlarged area including Japan,Austral ia and New Zealand. Li t t le hadbeen done to implement this howeve r,and the Phi l ippines decided to push aheaclalone - in fact to pre-empt any suchmoves. In May l97l they announcedtheir Progressive Car Manufactur ing Pro-gram.me. This is a scheme to encouragecar manufacturers to produce in thePhi l ippines by threatening exclusion fromthe market of those companies thatwould not comply with governmentcr i ter ia on local content and so on. Carassemblers had to submit their plansby January 1912, and despite the factthat this scheme did not yet have ASEANapproval, al l the car companies in therrea submitted plans fcr r approval.

At first the Philippines government saidthat there was only room for the part ic i-

Ferdinand and Imeldo Marcos, Philippint,st! ran$

pat ion of ' three motor companies, andthe unsuccessful companies would haveto leave the Phi l ippines. There wereseveral cr i ter ia for deciding who wouldeventual ly be al lowed to part ic ipate inthe Progressive Car Manufacturing Pro-gramme. These included the contr ibut ionthe companies would make to ASEANcar product ion, to the expansion ofmanufactur ing in the Phi l ippines, and tothe transfer of technology to Fi l ip inoengineering. Most important of al l wasthe proport ion of the f inal assembledvehicles sold in the Philippines that would

Popperloto

be domestical ly rnanuf 'actured. The Phi l ip-pines government was looking for aminimum domestic content rat io of35% by the third and f inal year of theProgramme.IFord's plan was the. establ ishment of abody stamping plant at Mariveles in theplanned Free Trade Zone. Free TradeZones are industr ial estates where land,factor ies, electr ic i ty and other servicesare furnished by the host government,and cornplete freedom is granted fromtari f f restr ict ions or import dut ies. Directincent ives l ike tax concessions andinvestment grants are also offered by the

49

host governments, and make Free TradeZones highly attractive to foreign invest-ment.

Free Trade Zones, l ike free trade areas,are being heavi ly promoted by an inter-nat ional agency, this t ime the UnitedNations Industr ial Development Organis-at ion (UNIDO). Founded in 1967 topromote the indust r ial isat ion of develop-ing countr ies, UNIDO provides assistancein the establ ishment of Free Trade Zonesin the form of prel iminary surveys,feasabi l i ty studies, and many otherservices short of actual ly operat ing theZone. UNIDO is assisted by the ShannonFree Airport Developmen t Co Ltd and bythe ubiquitous World Bank. Free TradeZones are supposed to aid the promotionof exports, the creat ion of job opportu-ni t ies, and the transfer of technology tothe Third World. According to UNIDOthere are current ly over 30 developingnat ions with plans for Free Trade Zonesin their te rr i to r ies.

Philippines PlantFord's commitment to the Free TradeZone at Mariveles in the Phi i lppines wasIarge, and i ts investment of 244 mil l ionPesos, l l Smil l ion, was important inencouraging other manufacturers to par-t ic ipate in the Zone. This promisedinvestment was instrumental in buyingFord's way into the Car Manufactur ingPrograrnme. When the various plans wereassessed, Ford only came fourth in thescori l lg systern, and should havc beenexcluded along with Renrult and Nissan.Howevcr . thc govc ln l ren t dec ided toinclrr t le Ford nonetheless. Thc twL)reasons given wefe t l )e Marivales invcst-n ren t and t l l e l ac t tha t F t l rd had ca rnedt n ( , . . 1 p ' ) i t ' t j l , , r i t ' e o n t r i h u l l ( ) n I r , J nin teg r ; r ted ASLAN ca l i ndus t ry . th rnks toe r i s t i n { r F -o rd p ian ts i n o thc r ASLANcoun t r ies . The ou tcomc wes the open ingo1 ' t l re Ford body s tan tp ing p lan t rn Feb ,rua ry I976 by In re lda Marcos . r v i l e o fthe President of the Phi l ippines.

Th is p la i l t . i i l l ac t . con l r i hu les l i t t l e tothe Phi l ippincs ee()nomy. Even at i tsruraxiurum outpul o1 70.000 bodies a yeari t e r r rp l t r l s t rn l l 700 w , ) t ke rs i n I tUun-try with an unemploynrcnt rate of around

5O%. As for an integrated ASEAN carindust ry. the stamping plant is integratedonly ai far as Ford's"own operauons areconcerned. Although the Car Manufactur-ing Programme's guidelines recommendthe production of components that canbe used by more than one manufacturer,car bodies are of course restr icted in useto the rnanufacturers' part icular models.The Ford stamping plant does supply toother Ford factor ies within ASEAN, butalso sends Cort ina bodies to Austral ia andother Asian countr ies outside of ASEAN,as well as body panels to Dagenham inthe UK. A body plant makes very l i t t lecontr ibut ion to the growth of technologyand unlike an engine plant, for example,cannot be ut i l ised in the develooment ofother industr ies- .

Final ly i t should be remembered thatc omplementat ion, as i t was so ener-getically sold by Henry Ford, was sup-posed to help accumulate foreign exchangeby replacing imports with domesticproducts. In reality the Progressive CarManufacturing Plan spends the region'sscarce fbreign exchange on the carindustry, which is given preferentialforeign exchange guarantees, withoutaccumulating any surplus foreign ex-change in return. Ford's intervention inthe Philippines, far from transformingthe economy by utilising its potential fordevelopment, exploits and reinforces theexisting situation for its own profit. Fordhas to make cars to make monev. andh ls l o r r r l ke thcm somcwhere . Theinlerests of thc local workl i t rcc or thehost econonty do not er ' t ter this decision.Ford's plans rn [-at in Arnerica give amplecndcnce o f tha t .

The WreckersT h e t o L r n d i n g m e e t i n g o f t h e L a t i nA r n e r i c a n F r e c T r a d e A r e a ( L A F T A )c o n s i s t e d o f A r g e n t i n a , B r a z i l . M e x i c o .Bol iv ia . Chi lc . Colunrb ia. Ecuador, Par .a-gual ' . Peru. Uruguay and Venczuela. Att h e t i m e . F o r d h l d f a c t o r i e s i n M e x i c o ,( 'h i le , Braz i l . Argent ina. Venezueia andPeru. The p lan rvas to creale a f lec t radca r c a b y 1 9 7 3 , b u t a c o n f l i c t o i i n t e r e s t senlcrged between the nat ions conccrnedbccrusc of thc d i f ferences in thei r s izesand degrces o l industr ia l isat ion. In 1969,

a sub-group of LAFTA was set up, calledthe Andean Pact, which excluded thebig three: Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.

The Andean Pact countries adopted amuch f i rmer posit ion on the quest ion offoreign investment. calling tbr a gradualtransit ion to local ownership. and impos-ing limits on the amoun t of profit thatcou ld be repa t r i a ted by io re ign compan ies .Peru had the most str ingent regulat ions,demanding an immediate 507 stake in al iforeign investments. Ford. which hasalways tried to insist on 100% ownershipof its subsidiaries, withdrerv from Peruby 1970 .

In Chi le, Ford responded to the 1970elect ion of Al lende's Popular Unitygovernment by embarking rrn a programmeof economic dest ab i l isat iern. More than60% of the countrl"s pubLtc transportsystem ran on Ford rehi; les. and Fordalso had about 35% of the ;ar market. Al lthese vehicles. part icul3r l) the publ ictransport buses. depended on spareparts suppl ied by Ford. Beiore Al lende'select ion, Ford imporrei appoximately$156 ,000 wor th o i spa re D3r l s i n to Ch i leeach month. Immedrateir : i ter the elec-t i on , th i s supp ly was . :u r i . l us t 315 .000worth a month. Credi i r . , ; i r dealers wasalso slashe d.

The result was that the rut l ic l ransportsystem was thro\r 'n in1., lotal chaos.The Ford factoq' * :s taken over, butwithout components t : , ,nr other Fordfactor ies i t was piacr icalh useless. TheChi lean economy . r i hi . 'h Ford helpedto wreck. is in pieces. Frar. str l l operat-inq there. has seen i is ntonthly salesdecl ine from 1000 c:rs J month to 100.

That ief i Ford operatrne onlv in VenezuelaJnrongs l the Andern P , - t . , , un t f i es .There i t manufactured F:r lctrn and Farr-lane nrodels i rom furer ica. and theTaunus from German\ ' .

The Andean Pact cont inued to discuss theviabi l i ty of an integraled car product ionplan. but wrth the Pacr countr ies support-ing l . { plants producing 1,10 models for amarket no larger than Flor ida's, achievingagreement on such a plan was not easy.Many of the factor ies would have to closeand many of the models phase out, and

5 0

t \ 't . _ -

older in Aryentina

competi t ion between the states to protecttheir own interests was intense. However,eventually a plan was worked out, whlchdoes not depend on component manufac-ture at all. It allocates the manufactureof vehicles of different engine size cate-gories to different countries, and thisarrangement was finally agreed and signedin September 1977.The allocation of carsabove 1500cc goes to Venezuela theonly country in the Andean pact whereFord produces cars, all of which are inthis range. It seems an incredible coin,cidence that Henry Ford was in Caracasat the time of the signing, and he an-nounced big expansion plans for theVenezuelan factories, worth S84million.The big three US- manufacturers haveeach submitted plans for an 8 cylinderengine plant in Venezuela, in a bid toparticipate in the Andean Pact plans, anddoubtless Ford's announced investmentplans depends on i ts bid being accepted.

Ford publicity claims that 'for hostcountries multinational companies area powerful engine for growth, especiallyin developing nations as foreign govern-ment aid tapers off. Multinational com-panies invest capital, createjobs, introducetechnological improvements . . . in short. . . they are a positive force for economicprogress. ' (Ford: A Global Corporat ion)

Ke y stone

The country most often cited to demon-strate this 'progress' is Brazil, which hasgrown remarkably rapidly in recent years.Between 1968 and 1974. Gross NationalProduct grew at an annual rate of l0%.For Ford, Brazi l became the most impor-tant market outside North America afterGermany and Bri tain. In 1967, totalFord factory sales in Brazil were 32,000.By the peak year of 1974, they hadreached 177.700. and in 1976 stood at169,000 cars and trucks.

The Brazilian boom depended quitelargely on the motor industry. Thedemand for components, steel, glass andother inputs, and the concomitantgrowth of roads, shopping centres andcement production, as well as the rapidgrowth of the petrochemical industry, allcontr ibuted to the economic exoansion.The backdrop to this 'miracle'has been achange of policy concerning trade barriersand exchange controls simi lar to that ofother Third World countries. The laststage of an attempt to reach a nat ional istsolut ion to the problems of dependancywas the Goulart regime, which embarkedon a massive programme of land re-distr ibut ion, nat ional isat ion and so on.This came to an ab rupt end in I 964 witha miiitary coup, headed by GeneralBranco.

He rapidly real igned Brazi l ian economicpol icy in the interests of internat ionalcapitalism. The foreign exchange system

was simplified, laws governing the repat-riation of profits were revoked, tradeunions were declared illegal, and thetorture of political and trade unionactivists became commonplace.

But the growth of the Brazilian economyhas been entirely dependant on foreigncapital, and the more dependant theeconomy becomes on multinational in-vestment and finance, the more profitsand interest are repatriated. The Brazilianmotor industry is over 90% owned bymultinationals like Volkswagen, Ford andGeneral Motors. The more successfulthese subsidiaries become, the moreprofits are remitted back to the parentcountry - in hard currency. Volkswagen,for example, is the largest car manufac-turer in Brazil, and the largest exporterfrom Brazi l . In the ten years from 1965to 1975, i t invested a total of $l 19.5-million . and $72.Smillion were reinvestedout of profits generated. But in the sameten years, $Tomillion were remitteddirectly back to Germany, and no lessthan $208.5million were paid to theparent company for licences and tech-nology. In al l , a total of $279. lmi l l ionwere sent back to Germany a net out-flow of ffi6.8million.

The Brazilian government allows all plantand machinery to be included in thecapital valuation ior the purpose of profitremittance - in reality the machineryVolkswagen installed in Brazil wasobsolete plant shipped from Germany.

The General Mbtors subsidiary in Brazilhas an investment valued at $38million,and an enormous debt back into the USof $200million some one per cent ofthe entire foreign debt at the time it wasincurred.

Ford has a long term debt of $84.6mil l ion,which must be repaid at between 6/zand 1tA per cent, irrespective of remit-tances of prof i ts or payments for l icencesand technology. However much themotor companies increase their output,or their Brazilian exports, the profits willeventually be repatriated to the US, orEurope or Japan. All these debts aredenominated in dollars, so they areinsured against the devaluations of theBrazilian currency brought about by

5 l

Brazil's ragingdrain Brazil's

inflation, and continue toforeign exchange earnings.

The vicious circle ofbalance ofpavmentsdef ic i ts leading to foreign loans. andloreign interest payments aggravating thebalance of payments deficits, continues.Brazil is in no better a position to pay offits massive foreign debt - $:0biitionthan it was before it embarked on itsrapid growth. In I 969 i ts debt was oneand a half times its annual export earninss.This rat io is expected to 6e about oieand three quarters t imes export earningsin 1977, but only at the expense of acrippling squeeze on the economy in anattempt to reduce imports. The interestalonc on the foreign debt this year comesto ffi. I billion, or over half Brazil's exportearnings.

Social Costsln 1972 the Brazilian government in-stituted a programme of massive taxconcessions to car manufacturers i f thevboosted exports and helpet l al leviate lhebalance of payments problem. Ford tookfull advantage of this, and created anexport programme worth some $1000-million over a period of five years. Theysupplied the 4-cylinder engines for theUS Pinto from the factory in Taubate,and reduced product ion in Detroi t . Dieselenglnes are exported to Japan, wherethey are fitted into trucks which arethen exported to the US. Other carmakers simi lar ly tumed their Brazi l iansubsidiar ies into export bases. Yet threeyears later, Brazi l st i l l had a pavmentsqap . i nc lud ing debr repaymenrs , o f$ l07 .8n r i l l i on in the au ro sec ro r . t xpo r rswere worth $268.5mil l ion, but imports.i n f l a te t l by i nves tmen t cap i la l o f $R3 .4 -mil l ion and loans of $228.4mil l ion.total led $476mil l ion.

The truth is that the large mult inat ionalcar firms, while reaping profits fromgovernnlent concessions and investmentgrants. have contr ibuted nothing to thestabi l i ty of the Brazi l ian econonry, andtheir ef fect on social condit ions in Brazi lhas been disast rous.

The Brazi l ian working class has bornthe brunt of the 'Brazi l ian miracle' andthe super-prof i ts of the rnul t inat ionals.

ln 1976. 3.900 Brazi l ian workers paidwith their l ives in industr ial accidents -the highest rate of industrial fatalities inthe world. lt is commonplace that formost of the population bf Brazil, the'miracle' has brought about a worseningof the conditions of intense povertv andmisery.

Malnutrition causes seven out of tendeaths among children under five, accord-ing to the World Health Organisation.Infant mortality rates in 1970 were 105per 1000 live births - the comparativef igure for Bri tain is 19. Real wages haveconsistently fallen as inflation rages, andthe Union of Metallurgical Workers claimsthat the cost of livins index has beendeliberately rigged by the governmentever since 1973, to hide thc real rise inprices. The top five per cent of the popu-lation increased their share of the totalurban income ftom 28% in 1960 t"o 35%in 1970. This fact has been hypocriticallycriticised by Robert McNamara, presidentof the Worl t l Bank. Yet i t is the WorldBank that must take much of the blamefor the situation and as Minister ofFinance Delfim Netto said. "thev havenever asked us to change anythin! and Iam sure they will continue to loan in thesame way". Destitution and hunger arethe n igh tmares beh ind the d re im o fBrazil's miracle.

Cheating the PoorThe motor industry, based in the suburbsaround Sao Paulo, has added i ts ownburden to the l ives of car workers.G,overnment regulations provide thatatter six months of cont inuous emolov-men t , a worke r becomes en l i t l ed to nav -mcnts from a srrre organised lay-oi i fundto which employers have to contribute

the Fundo Garant ia Tempo Servico. lnorder to avoid this, about a third of thework force of the motor manufacturers islaid off every six rnonths. I f they arelucky, these workers wi l l be re-employedby another manufacturer for anothersix months. They work in the industrylor years, without ever achieving anysecuri ty of tenure or lay-off pay. Themotor industry has created i ts ownmigrant labour force, with a third of thelabour lbrce constant ly on the movc,

forming an arm) oi relarively skilled butcasual laboui.

Ford has its o*n srorl to tell about theFundo Garantia Tempo Servico. ln 1973it sacked thousands of * orliers from itsSao Paulo factories. Thev had been work-ing for Ford since I96-.and*ereent i t ledto substantial pavments from the Fundo.However, Ford had nor put any moneyaside for this purpose. and refused to payup. The workers. assisted bl the labourtribunal sued the Ford \{otor Company,and eventualll' $on their case, but thevreceived no mone\ unri l l9-7.

ln 1977, car sales i:. B::zrl t-ell sharply,as government ar:e::) ; : - i : . \ hal t importsand boost expons:. . : :e: up the pr ice ofpetrol , restncted :r : : : : . and squeezedthe domestic marke: F rr rhe first sixmonths of the 1e.: : . ' - '1es were 12%lower than thel 'ha; :e: : . in 1976. Fordrecent ly opened a rr : : : - : t lant in Brazi l ,and the tractor m3;^e:. : . , , r . rs showinssome decl ine.

In i ts attempt to :e--3:: .Jre i ts marketshare in Brazi l . Fo: i : : :1: ! \Juced a newmodel, the Corcel le ! I : :sed on the newEuropean Cort ina. H::r Ford himselfvisited Brazil tbr th: ..r'lnch. and metwith the Presidenr. He : ,aimed that thecompany was losine Sl50 on every carsold in Brazil becau- .,i the sovem-ment 's pnce regulat i , n ' . :nJ p.ror inarketconditions. Ford ciar:rl. to have lost$1 lmi l l ion during lo-o Ford's solut ionwas that the go!€rnment should give asubsidy to the companl for every car itsold in Brazil. If the profit situation didnot improve, serious thought would haveto be given before anl ne* investmentcould be sanctioned.

At about the same r ime rn Geneva. lceIaccoca was addressrng rhe S* iss AmericanChamber of Commerce . I i only mult i -nat ionals were not hindered by codes ofconduct or governmenr regulat ions, whatbenefits they brouehr ro developingnat ions - what posir ive effects theyhad had on counrr ies l ike Brazi l andTaiwan! The Ford messase is clear: "Thehost country can r* in

- by welcoming

multinational corpomtions and learningal l they have to teach." {Ford: A GlobalCorporat icn )

J L

Hi

Popperfoto

The North American operations of theFord Motor Company are. and alwayshave been, the hub of the Ford empire.Ideas, tactics and processes are developedin the home base and then adapted andexported. And the competitive relation-ship of the major auto companies inNorth America determines to a consider-able extent their overseas strategies.

The introduction of the assembly line andmass production of the Model T gaveFord a domination of the US autoindustry which lasted over twenty years.'When they first attempted to assemblean entire car by the assembly line method,they put a frame on skids and pulled it

from one end of the building to theother with a rope. A group of men walkedalong with it, grabbing parts from pre-placed piles as they went along. Thenext refinement was to station differentmen, or teams, by the equipment, anddrag the chassis past them . As theprocess was refined, the number of manhours per car was cut f rom | 5r,4 to lrA'(Herndon).

Mass ProductionBefore the computerised lines of todaywere ever thought of, the process hadbeen streamlined and the workforce pres-sured to the point where a Model T wascoming off the line every one minute

thirty six seconds. Sales of the 'no frills'Model T burgeoned:

1 9 1 0 2 1 , 0 0 0t 9 l 1 54,000t912 82,000l9 l3 199 .000

By l9l9 monthly product ion was 86,000,and this had risen to over 100,000 permonth by 1921. November of 1922 saw anew monthly record of 240,000.

While Ford concentrated on productionfigures, General Motors concentrated onprofit margins. Henry Ford had an almostpathological distaste for the niceties ofmodern financial management, and ironi-cally enough the financial and sales

5 J

experts who eventually gave GeneralMoton its superiority had moved acrossfrom Ford to its rival in the post WorldWar I period. Norval Hawkins was a salesexpert who went over to GM at thistime, and he opened the way for WilliamH. Knudsen, who had supervised thep lann ing and cons r ruc t io ; o f Fo rdassembly plants both in the States andin Europe. Knudsen it was who led GMinto i ts dominat ion of the car market,or iginal ly as head of Chevrolet, and lateras head of the ent ire company.

Against the advice of his son Edsel. whowas president of the company, HenryFord clung to the Model T through thetwenties. It was, however, increasinglyobvious that Chevrolet. with a car thatwas nlore aesthetically pleasing as wellas having as standard equipment itemswhich were extras on the Model T, waseat ing into Ford sales. Styl ing as anelement of competi t ion was winning i tsf i rst big batt le.

In 1916 Ford product ion dropped bymore than a quarter of a mi l l ion units.CM now had 28% of the US market.Ford tr ied a few cosmetic touches on thcaging Model T but i t was no use. WlienHenry Ford evenlual ly gave in, the stepsI re l t rok t t r imn len ren l the res t ruc tu re o fp ruduc t ion d i spe l led rny i l l us iop5 pepu-lar ly held about his humanitar ianism. Theplant was run f lat out for the f i rst part ofI e l T i n o r d e r t o s r r r c k p i l e e n , r u g h M o d e lTs f i rr future demand. When the last of atotal production of over | 5 million hadrol led off the I ine. lhe plant uas shutdown and 60,000 workers were thrownout of work. The plant was closed forsix months from May | 927. There wasno unemployment pay, and the jettisonedFord workers had to apply for ci ty' re l i e f . Der ru i r l ra , l r re l re r ' b i i l $ tn r i l l i " nhisher th an in 1926.

Hunser MarchMeanwhi le Ford was bui lding a new planton the River Rouge which would ernploya lo t l ess men than had been pu t ou t o fwork . Fo r years De t ro i t was p lagued w i thunempkryment. Only half a nr i l l ion Foldcars were produced in 193 1 a drop o1'one r l i l l i on f ro rn 1919 . In 1932 th ree

thousand unemployed marched to thegates of.the Ford plant where they werefired on by the guns of the DearbomPolice and the Ford Service Department.Four marchen were killed and over ascore injured.

Working condit ions in the new plantwere worse than rhey had been in theold one. Speed-up had been a fact of lifeat least since the introduct ion of the'Five Dol lar Day' in 1914. Henry Fordhad gained a lot of favourable publicitvlrom doubl ing the wage rate and shorten-ing the working day from nine to eighthours. But the workforce had paid aheavy pr ice in rerms of speed-up ai Fordreduced the cost of the Model T to boostsales. Ford had benefited also from adecl ine in labour turnover and absentee-ism. The Five Dollar Day had effecrivelycreated a large pool of unemployed whowaited at the gates of the factory forvacancles.

The $5 DayA week after the new rate had beenannounced, together with a hiring pro-gramme of four or five thousand newmen, there was still a crowd of tenthousand waiting in the snow for jobswhich had already been filled. The Fordmethod of dispersing the surplus was toturn fire hoses on them. In 1916 theFord Sociological Department stated that'looked at from a cold-blooded point ofview of business investmenl ( the FiveDol lar Day) was the very best investment(the Ford Motor Company) has evermade ' .

Speed-up was also standard pract ice int l ie new Rouge Plant. and to the pressureo f t l re l i ne was added rhe sheer bhvs ica ll 'ear engendered by rhe Service Dipart .rnent.'Ford, the onet ime humanist, had publ ic lystated that men worked foFnoney andwere kept in l ine through lear sowhi le Sorenson and his straw bossesdrove the men merci lessly. Bennett 'sarmy of thugs kept them in l ine . . . Thespecdup aged men prernaturely; whenthey could no ionger produce they werediscarded. Bennett 's spies inf i l t rated theplant. The result was t l rc occupauonar

disease known as Forditis. Men had ulcersand the shakes. If rhel talked at all onthe job, i t was out of rhe sides of theirmouths' (Hemdon ).

Bennett was a thug \ iho had ingrat iatedhimself with Ford. and as Ford srewmore seni le. Bennert greu more power-ful in t oth facron and boardroom. Heran the Seruce Deparrmenr of 3,500private pol ice including hundreds ofgoons armed with pisrols and clubs,leasing franchises inside Ford plants tolocal gangsters. and t-ighrrne anY attemptsto unionise with sickenrns brutal i ty. Thejust i f icat ion for rhis brur i l i t l came fromHenry Ford. who hi i sr: ied 'We wi l lnever recognise the United Auto Workersor any other Union. l.abour union organ-isations are the sont thinqs that everstruck the earth'.

Ford also ' refused ro :e ;epressed by thedepression. Again ar:J aEain between1929 and, 1934 he erl l ,,rut sratementsthat shocked those *h. ' h: i uatched theagony in the breaCi:r :e, . He said thedepreSsion was'whrr le,r ! .nie ' . that peoplewould prof i t by rhe ' : l l r . : , : berauie ' iherecovery is prolonged': r : r : t these are thebest t imes we ever ha;. . ' tBur[ngame)

Of course Ford cou.: , i iord to feelremote from the brea,:- t : : . :s. His personalinco tne in l 919 r . r r : . . : . ' : r S l , lm i l l i on ,with Edsel receivins : : ; r iher S8mil l ion.Str ikes cal led bv the UnrieJ Auro Workershad secured conrracr i . l t borh CeneralMotors and Chry sler ' r r

rhe spring of1937, and 'Ford nexr ' $3s rhe war-cry.In May of the same vear the city ofDearborn, prompted br Roosevelt 's NewDeal legislation. gave union organiserspermits to distr ibure leai lers to Fordworkers outside the gares oi rhe Rougeplant. On May 26rh rhe UAW represen-ta t i ves , 60q women. \ \en r l o tha sa tesa t the sh i f t change . ( ' \ ' e r r ime . In l he'Batt le of the Overpass' the overpasswas a pedestr ian br idge over the roadoutside the planr the UAW peoplewere severely beaten up by Bennett 'smen. Thc two senior union represen-t r r i ves , Wa l re r Reurher and I i i ch r rd

Top: F,arly,, asse nbly line

Bot tonl : Queuing for the i r cards. 1946

54

;lPoppetfoto

Keystone

:l

Frankensteen, werebeaten and thrown

particularly badlydown the stairs.

Camera-men and reporters from thenat ional press had their equipmentsmashed, were beaten up and chasedin cars f iom the scene of the batt le. Thisinitiated a press campaign against Ford.In Kansas and Dallas union workersreceived simi lar treatment. Fol lowinsthese evenrs there was a perrod of in--creased violence inside the factories.In a court case the company was foundguilty of several violations of federallaw, and eventual ly, af ter the dischargeof eight workers for union agitation, theworkers struck, picket l ines were set upand barr icades e rected.

Eventually the strikers won, an electionwas held md 7O% of the worken votedfor the union. A contract was drawn up.In exchange for dropping all the casesagainst Ford the union received its mostgenerous contract ever.

Ford's son, Edsel, died in May 1943and Ford hirnsel l , 80 years old andcompletely unf i t ted for the organisat ionaltask necessary, assumed the companypreside ncy.

With company organisat ion in a chaot icstate, the War Product ion Board and theArmed Services fel t thar the product ionof B24 aircrr f l at Ford's Wil low Runplant was under threat. In August 1943Henry Ford I I , the old man's grandson,was released frt-rm the Nar,y an-d sent t.tsort things out.

On Sep tember 2 l s t 1945 Henry Ford I Iwas formal ly elecred president of thecompany after Edsel 's wife had threatenedto sel l her Ford stock i f Henry I did nothand over the reins. Bennett was ousted.and Henry Ford I I found himself in chargeo f an a i l i ng g ian t o f a company los i i gl ! l 0m i l l i on a mon th . Wi thour wr r cun-l rac ts and money s tashed away in va r iousbanks the end would already have come.Now that war product ion was over, thecash reserves were diminishins fast^ andFord was losing $300 ,rn ever-y cal soldin competition with Chevrolet.

Henry Ford IIPractically the first act of the new presi-

dent was to sack 1,000 employees, and inthe course of his first year at the helmno less than 32,000 Ford worken in theUSA lost their jobs.

During the war productivity had fallen34%, and according to workers at theRouge plant 'the place was running wild'.Wildcat strikes were frequent, and withwages having been frozen since the begin-ning of the war, the recent ly recognisedUAW put in a major claim. Henry Ford IIused a tactic to deal with this situationthat has been part of management'sannoury ever since. He bought off theclaim - but got the union to police itsown members. The company agreed toan l8%% rise, while the union 'tookdefinite steps' to control its membenhip,agreeing that its memben could be fired .for instigating or taking part in workstoppages.

The f i rst Henry Ford bui l t , and then al lbut ruined. the Ford Motor Company byautocrat ic rule. The second Henrv Fordmaintained the prerogative of the finaldecision in all major matters. He alsobought in al l the help and ski l l he couldto reorganise the company, get theaccounts in order and replan product ionand market ing.

General Motors was the industrv leaderbecause i t had wedded the product iontechniques of Fordism to the market ingstrategies known as Sloanism after AlfredP. Sloan Jnr. , president and ch ief execut iveoff icer of GM from 1923. To these GMhad also added a system of companystructure and f inancial control . The FordMotor Company had attempted to survivethrough Fordism alone, and as a resulthad lost i ts market supremacy to GM inthe twent ies.

Determined that now was the t ime tocompete with GM on more equal terms,Henry Ford I l l u red ac ross Ernes t B reechfrom GM to teach Ford management theGM system.

Scores of GM men came over with Breech.The Ford Motor Company became de-centralised into divisions, with a strictprofit orientation, research and develop-men t i nves lmen ts , and sc ien t i f i c cos t inq .Managemenl personnel were made com-

petitive with one another, both fordivisional profits and for the rewards ona personal level of financial bonuses andupward mobility in the hierarchy. Agroup of ex-Service officers to be knownas the Ford Whizz Kids were hired.including Robert McNamara, who was robecome a Ford president, US Secretaryof Defence, and president of the WorldBank. But for all the new talent hiredfor the reorganisation Henry Ford IIfirmly retained the ultimate authority.

The Ford family has always insisted onfinancial control of the company, and,given that control, has never been ableto resist the opportunity to wield per-sonal as well as financial power via thetop executive position. The family'sfinancial control was threatened on thedeath of Henry Ford I by the prospectof having to sell large amounts of sharesin order to pay death dut ies, as theRoosevelt New Dealers had jacked upinheri tance tax to 9l% to help pay forthe new social welfare measures beinsintrodrrced.

Ford FoundationBetween them Henry Ford I and his sonEdsel had owned 96.5% of the FordMotor Company stock, with Mrs HenryFord owning the other 3.5%. Edsel, with41.5% had established trust funds forhis four children, thereby circumventingthe inheritance tax laws. Henrv Ford I.however , had res i s ted a l l a t r imprs rob reak up h i s ma jo r i t y ho ld ing .'As matters stood at that crucial iuncture.I hc governmenr waited anxiously in thewings for its whopping 91% of the estate- unless, of course, the experts shouldconjure up an eleventh hour loophole.Thus was bo rn lhe Ford Foundar ion fo rHuman Advancement ' (Demaris).

The Foundation had actual ly been incor-porared in 1936 with a $25,000 grant,and had made small grants in and aroundDetroit, most of which were beneficialto the company. The charter of theFoundation stated, 'The purpose orpurposes of this corporation are as follows:to receive and administer funds forscient i f ic, educat ional and chari table

J O

purposes, all for the public welfare, andfor no other purpose . . .'

After Henry Ford I died in 1947 at theage of 83, 88% of Ford Motor Companyassets in the form of a new issue of con-vertible non-voting stock - Class A shares

were handed over to the Ford Foun-dation. The family retained the non-vot ing stock Class B shares.'On the foundat ion's books this (stock)was given the value. for tax purposes.of $4l6mil l ion. but i ts real value. asmeasured by the earnings of Ford Motors.was at least $2%billion' (Macdonald).

The deaths of Henry Ford I and EdselFord realised a combined inheritance tax(on property other than Ford stock) of$30million. This was on total assets witha market value of over $3billion - i.e. |Vo.Thus financial control stayed in thefamily - and the Ford Foundationembarked on its own growth and sig-nificance.

Beginning in 1956 the administratorsbegan to diversify the portfolio followingthe going public of the Ford MotorCompany. l-arge blocks of stock weresold back to the company, which conver-ted it to voting securities which weregradually put on public sale.'The family retained poss€ssion of 40% ofthe voting rights in the form of 2,700,000Class B shares. In all it held 12.1% of ellFord stock. It was enough to ensurethat Henry Ford II ran the Ford MotorCompany as he liked. The sale alsoprovided the Ford Foundation with aninitial $640,725,445' (Beynon).

By 1969 the Ford Foundation had reducedits holding of Ford's outstanding stock to25%.but i ts other investments were payingdividends, and at the end of fiscal 1971the Ford Foundation had assets of$3.2billion. It has turned into a multi-national operation of great politicalinfluence, dispensing large sums of money,particularly overseas. It has far moreoverseas staff than home staff, and hasextended the influence of Ford moneyand ideology with a strong emphasis onthose Third World countries consideredto be 'politically sensitive'. For example,

River Rouge stikers winning the long and bl6unionisation. 1941The penalty for attempting to organise at Ford

Ke ystonewinning the long and bloody battle for

) /

between January 1965 and November1967 the Foundation made direct $USgrants to at least 25 foreign governmentsor regions, including UAR, Jordan,Lebanon, Zambia, Nigeria. Paktstan,India. Ivory Coast, Syr ia, I raq, Tan-zania, Mexico, Kenya, Tunisia, Ant igua,Cameroon. West Bengal, Chi lc, Brazi land Nepal. The strategies of company andfoundat ion have not always coincided.In the early 1970s the Foundation gave a$99.700 grant to help establ ish a schoolin Tanzania for Mozambiquan refugeesfrom the then Portuguese colonial power.The Portuguese Foreign minister attackedthe Foundation for allegedly financingthe Liberat ion Front of Mozanbioue.Pressure was brought to hear on the FordMotor Company's assembly plant inLisbon. The grant was terminated, andthe,Vew York Times reported that 'TheFord Foundation is reported to haveassured the Government of PremierSalazar that i t would be consulted beforeany f'uture grants are given to Africanareas of part icular interest to Portugal. . . '

The Director of the American committeeon Afr ica sent a telesram to the FordFoundation President, complaining that' the Ford Foundation is being used forpol i t ical purposes by the Ford MotorCornpany and tax status should be opento exarninat ion by the Bureau of lnternalRevenue. The fact that a grant for educa-t ional aid to Mozambique ref ugee studentswas recent ly terminated by the FordFoundation is intcrpreted as wi l l ingnessof the Foundation to yield to pressures ofthe Motor Cornpany and Portugal. 'Despite the healy capital expendituredemanded by the post-war reorganisat ionand the introduct ion of a brand new postwar model ( instead of an updated I942model), the Ford Motor Company showeda prof i t of $l77mil l ion in 1949. This wasthe beginning of competi t ion on a model-for-model basis. The new Ford was adirect competi tor with GM's Chevrolet,gaining steadi ly on i t as the new annualversions came out, unt i l by 1954 i t wasclose to outsel l ing Chevrolet. Ford, how-ever was using two body shel ls for 97%of i ts product ion at this t ime, whi le GMhad a far wider range, particularly in thelarqer car sector of the market - the

sector whrch provides the greatest profitmargins. In I 95 5 Ford started to plan theextension of its own range in order tochallenge the CM and Chrysler stables ona wider front.

Unl ike thc Europeans, the Americans hadno desire lbr a smal l oar. The importmarket was pract ical ly non-existent,and the small fcrreign cars that foundt l ie ir way into the country were lookedon as curiosi t ies. Yet by 1968 the homeindustry was sitting up and taking noticeof the half million VW sales in the USAin that year.'Snrall cars give Detroit big headache'clainred the lilashington Posl with someaccuracy- VW led the importers by a widemargin. Ford had tr ied to buy up the VWcompany after the war without success.GM however was making Opels in Ger-many, and imports of these came second.On the West Coast in part icular Toyotaand Datsun were making their firstappearan ces.

The American car nrakers grumbled aboutimport penetration, and Henry Ford inparticular complained about the Japaneseon the grounds that competi t ion was al lvery well, but the Japanese unfairly didnot al low American producers into theircountry. However Ford was busily build-ing up i ts overseas operat ions, especial lyin Europe, and activity in the USA wasconfined to the continued competitionwith GM and Chrysler.

Throughout the 60s the American autoindustry spent a large port ion of i ts netprolits on expanding production facilities.GM and Ford relied almost entirely oninternally generated funds, while Chryslerhad a far greater dependence on thrcapital market.

Working from the overseas base originallybui l t up by Henry I . overseas expansion.particularly in Europe, also went ahead ata considerable rate once Ford was backinto profit. Due partly to the originalextent of Ford's overseas base, and partlyto the fact that GMs strength lay in theprofitability of large American cars whilethe European market was concentratedaround smaller model sizes, fiom 1965onwards Ford's operations overseas have

given Ford an advantage over GM in theexternal market.Ford's capital plant and equipmentl ias been increased in value by $4,064.1-mil l ion, or 268%, over the period 1 960-1976 f rom $1 .5 l6m. to $5 .580m.US Plant I-ocationsMotor Vehicle Assembly LinesAt lan ta , ( ;A Wayne, M lChicago, IL San Hose, CADearborn, MI Twin (l i t ics, MNLorain, OH Wixom, MIPico Rivera Oakvil le, OntLos Angcles, CA St Thomas, OntKansas C i ty , MO St Lou is , MOLouisvil le , KY Michigan TruckMahwah, NJ Norfolk, VAN{etuchen, NJ Canada Truck, Ont

Engine Assembly Lines 1976Lima, Otl Fairfax, OHCleveland, OII Livonia, MlWindsor, Ont Sharonvil le, OH

Automotive Component Plants

CastingsShefficld, AL (Alurninium) Dearborn, MIlr lat Rock, MI Cleaveland, OH

Metal StampingsChicago Heights, IL Buffalo, NYWoodhaven, MI Maumee, OHCleveland, OHDearborn, MI (Tools and dies)

ChassisIndianapolis, IN (power train, cold formedpar ts )Dearborn, MI (frames)Sterl ing Heights, Ml (Rear axle, Front endsuspension, drive shafts)Monroe, MI (Wheels, coil springs, bumpers)Canton, OH (forgings)

Industrial engines and turbine plantDearborn, MI

SteelDearborn, MI

GlassDearborn, MITulsa, OHIndus l r ia l and ( 'hem ic i r l p roduc tsMt Clemens, MI (Paint, vinyl products)Utica, MI (Soft tr im)

General PartsPlymouth, MI (Heaters, air cond'ners)Rawsonvil le, MI (Carburetors, powdered metalparts, alternators, srnall rnotors, fuel senders,master brake cylindcrs)Saline, MI (Plastic parts, instruments)Ypsilanti, Ml (Horns, distributors, ignit ioncomponents, shock absorbers, starters, regu-lators, ignit ion coils)Green Island, NY (Radiators, leaf-springs,heater cores)Sandusky, OH (Lamps, starter drives, zinc andaluminium die cast parts, window regulators,air cleancrs, oil frlters)

5 8

The MultinationalThe Direct Investment confers advantages that no importer could enjoy. A company that apparently

provides jobs and export earning is not treated in the same way as an importer of foreign goods.

Data by Geographic Area 1976 (money in millions of $, employees in 000s)

Sales % Net holit % Investment % Employees %

The International Dvision was formed in1949 to co-ordinate the activities of thecompany's 36 overseas subsidiaries. Todaythere are 55 active overseas subsidiaries,operating in four major groups: Europe;latin America: Asia-Pacific; and Mid-Eastand Afr ica.

In 1916 Internat ional Operat ions accoun-ted for -ll% of the company's sales,44%oi its profits, and,46% of its employment.Given the saturation of the Ame ricancar market, and the squeeze on profitmargins, these shares are likely to grow.

in the three years to 19'79 . In the previousfive years it spent some f,2,300m, in-cluding several major projects such as theValencia plant. No major new constructionprojects are planned.

Sales in Europe accounted, for 20.37o ofFord's total sales in 1976, and a muchlarger 31% of total profits. 'The increasesin earnings outside the United States andCanada during 1975 and 1976 primarilywere attributable to European operations.'(Ann,-ral Report 1976).Ford make five passenger cars in Europe:

machinery market, and this subsidiarymakes earth moving equipment, exca-vators and so on. Although only theCortina/Taunus engines are made in twoplants, all but the small Fiesta enginesare used in at least two different models.The three major centres of engine produc-tion are Cologne (Germany), Dagenham(UK) and Valencia (Spain).

Ford U.K.Ford is now the largest seller of cars inthe UK. It took market leadership froml,eyland in the first six months of 1977 ,more as a result of kyland's weaknessthan of any surging forward of its own.However, the Ford Cortina and Escortwere comfortably ahead in the LK carsales league. and all five of the company'spassenger cars wete in lhe top ren l ist :

Retail Car Sales: UK-January to June I977

I . +Cort ina 70,91 I2. *Escort 54,1343 . Mar ina 35 ,5364 . A l l eg ro 31 .0595 . M i n i 3 1 , 0 3 56 . Cheve t te 30 ,4137 . xF ies ta 23 ,7718. +Capri 22,4089 . Cava l ie r 20 ,810

10 . *Granada 18 ,470

*Fo rd

Ford had a 27. l% share of the I IK carmarket. with 190,000 cars sold in thef irst s ix months of 1977

1976 was a record year for Ford UKit swept to record prof)ts and exports,with a substant ial increase in produc-tivity and a 20% improvement in vehiclesales. The number of Ford workers roseby about 1000 overal l to 68,000, burthey produced 600,000 vehicles. against532,000 the year before. On a crudeproductivity gauge this means that Fordwent up from 7.95 vehicles per worker(including tractors, trucks and cars) to8.83 vehicles per worker in 1976.

The company's prof i ts. r t t | 2 | .6m pre-tax, were almost double the previous highof !65.4m in 19'73. and compare withprof i ts of f ,14.1m in 1975. The value

US & Canada 19858 69Europe 584'7 20lat in America 1783 6All other (mainlyAsia-Pacilic) 1352 5

Totals 28840 r00 983 100

546 56305 3r7 t 7

6 t 6

3 5 11 6 03 3

7

5 5 1

5 3301 l

5

100

64 235.92 9 i 3 3 . 86 49.9

| 24.3

100 443.9

In 1976 Ford's share of the world carmarket outside North America was 9.5%with l .5m cars sold. Ford's major com-pet i t iors outside North Ameriea wereToyota, wilh a 9.8% share of the car.market, Volkswagen with 9.5%, Nissanwith 9%, General Motors with 8.4% andFiat with 83%.Ford trucks sold 348,000units, giv ing a market share of 8.5%.

Ford ErropeThe heart of Ford's international ooera-t ions is Europe. where some t*u thi t , lsofthe company's overseas sales take place.Ford of Europe coordinates the act iv i t iesof l5 separate nat ional companies withI 35.000 employees in a market of some350m people. In 1976, Ford had recordsales of 1.2m cars and trucks. Car sales.up 30% from 1975, total led l . lm ex-ceeding the 19"72 record b-"" 38,000vehicles. The 30% increase in Ford salescompares wilh a 13% rise in total Euro-pean car sales, and brought Ford's marketshare up to 11 .2% f rom 9 .8%. Sales ofFord-bui l t t rucks were 144,000 in 1976,compared with 1 27,000 in 1975 : a marketshare of 1 37o.

Ford plans to spend some f,800m onexpansion and modernisation in Europe

the Capri ; Cort ina (Taunus); Escort ;Granadal and Fiesta. These five cars areassembled at nine centres. and no modelexcept the Granada is dependent on onecentre alone. The Granada is bui l t only atCologne (Germany), the Escort at Cologneand Saarlouis, whi le the Cort ina (Taunus)and the Escort are built in both Germanyand Britain. The Fiesta is built in Spainfor most of Eurupe. in Germany forEurope and export to the US, and in theUK for Britain, Scandinavia and Belgium.Models are assembled in other countriesin Europe. such as Portugal or l reland,but this is for local distr ibut ion only.

Ford vans are bui l t in Genk (Belgium),and Southampton (UK), whi le lorr ies aremanufactured at Langley (UK: A and Dseries) and Amsterdam ( Transcont inental ) .Production of lorries was centralised atlangley to be in a position to assault theEuropean market when Bri tain enteredthe EEC. but this stratesv was notespecially successful.

Tractor oDerations are co-ordinated fromBasildon (UK), and assembly also takesplace in Antwerp (Belgium). The acqui-si t ion in 1971 of Richier S.A. of Francebroueht Ford into the industrial

t

59

of direct.exports ( i .e. ignoring imports)went up almost 49% from 3452.3m in1975 ro f ,631 .8m in 1976 . as Ford tookfull advantage of the falling price ofsler l ing. The actual number of vehiclesexported rose too. however. by 27% to.+06,000. Ford reversed the trend ofthe previous few years toward rapidlyincreased bank borrowings. and reducedits loans by half , f rom 129.2m to [63.4m.It had sales of i l .6b compared to f , l . I bin I 975 .'The Ford results demonstrate just howwell-run companies. especial ly expo rte rs,can have benefitted from recent Govern-ment concessions. Whi le lhe group's wagebi l l , thanks part ly to the Pay Code, roseby l9%. sales jumped by 42% (sl ight lyfaster, in fact, in the home market takenseparately). Only t7m of tax is payable. '(Financial Times 26.3.7 7 ).

Plant Empktyment

Dagenham 29,000Halewood 14,000Leamington 1,400Basi ldon Tractor 3,700Basi ldon Radiator 900Dun ton 3 ,500Belfast i,000Daventry I ,500Enfield I ,300War ley 1 .750Southampton 4,000Swansea 2,000Aveley 900Woolwich 600Croydon 300Treforest 400

Ford GermanyAfter North America and Japan, Germanyis the largest vehicle producer in theworld. l t is the largest producer in Europe,and second largest vehicle exporter in theworld after Japan, ahead of Francc,Canada and the US. Ford-Werke A.G. isFord's biggcst overseas subsidiary.

European

GermanyFrance

car an,.l lruck productiltn lQ76

Great BritainItaly

4 .3m3.4ml . 7 m1 . 6 m

1976 was an excel lent year for Ford-Werke, and the product ion losses sus-tained during the recession years of1974 and 1975 were nrade up. A record812,800 cars and trucks were produced,an increase of 28.1% over 1975, helpedby thc introduct ion of the Fiesta inMay 1976 .

hoduction by plant

1976 1975 %changa

242 , t 17 194 , t42 24 .1244,490 218,993 I I .6326,191 221 ,401 41 .3

8 I 2 ,798 634 ,536 28 .1

The Capri and Granada were assenrbledin Cologne, the Fiesta and Escort inSaarlouis, and the Taunus (Cortina) andTransit in Genk. Although Genk is sitedgeographically in Belgium, the plant isaccounted as part of Ford Werke. Enginesfor the Pinto and Mustang were exportedto the US from Cologne, over 4000 kitslbr Granada assernbly in South Africawere produced, as was product ion mater ialfor Taunus (Cortina) assernbly in Holland.The average daiiy production of vehicleswas about 3.5 00 units.

Domestic sales of Ford vehicles were354,915 units, an increase of 133% over

CologneSaarlouisGenk

Total

60

tu..+&

"i..-q1*"a"

1975. This included 10,500 imports.mainly from Hol land, Bri tain and the US.The rest of Ford-Werke's production.466,723 units. was exported- a r ise of4 1 % .

Ford is the third largest vehicle producerin Gcrmany. afrer Volkswagen and Opel(GM). ln the commercial ve-hicle market.Ford maintained i ts share in a stat icmarket with Transit vans, the A and Nseries (the N series was specificallvdesigned for the German market, base'don the successful D series that had soldin Britain), and the healy ,Transcon-tinental' from Amsterdam.

Ford Werke employed 5 2,900 workersat the end of 1976, of which over 42000were hourly paid manual worken alarge proportion of these were immigrantworken.

Chile's reign of terror begins, backed bythe Ford Motor Companv

CologneGenkSaarlouisWulfrathDuren

Total

3 1 , 3 1 61 l , 2 6 77,852

85011 ,6445 ) q r q

This was an increase of 5O00 over 1975- although 8 58 I workers were laid off in197 4 and 1975. Ford claimed record

prof i ts in 1976 o{ DM627.8m (t l 59.7m),up l2 lVo on 1975 . and pa id DM720m(f, l83m) in dividends.

Ford Latin AmericaAs recently as the beginning of 1975 Fordwas saying 'Latin America - increasedshare of larger market'. In November1974, Ford of latin America was formedto co-ordinate the activities of Ford'ssubsidiaries in Argentina, Brazil Mexico,

6 l

Uruguay and Venezuela, and direct salesoperations in many other l-atin Americancountnes.

At that time Ford had 980 franchiseddealers in the area, and sales of cars andtrucks were 235900 and 120,300.(Compare with Europe's l.2m). Thisrepresented 16.9% of the entire l-atinAmerican car market, and 25 .4% of itstrucks. Unlike the rest of the world, thesemarkets were still growing.

In the first four months of 1977, sales ofvehicles fell to 281,215 vehicles - a fulll0% on the same period in 1976. Fordand General Motors are the worst hit.

Over lfi)O of Ford's 22,0fi) worken inBrazil were laid off between January andMarch 1977, and more have since losttheir jobs. According to l,ee A. Iaccocca,Ford's President, Ford is losing $250 onevery car manufactured in Brazil. Fordmakes medium sized and large passenger

Retail Sales of Ford Cars and Trucks Brazil

&rs127,160122,918I 30,21 5t 05 ,680

197 6197 5197 4197 3

Morket sharet 7 . 017 .31 9 . 0r 7 . 6

Trucks42,3404 9 ) < 14't ,483lq r l5q

Mrket share29.OJ J . J

32 .629.7

Since then, after two years as'a majorbright spot on the world automotivescene', the recession has caught up withlatin America, and far from continuingto grow, vehicle sales have declined. Totalcar sales fell 3% in 197 5 , a further | .2%in 197 6 and more in 197'1 . Truck saleswere static in 1975, and, fell 1% in 1976.During 1976 Ford's car sales dropped 5%to 212,000 cars a 15.6% share of themarket. Truck sales rose from 1 I 5,000to 116O00. a23 .7% marke t share .During the early 1970s, Ford investedheavriy in latin America, adding some360,000 square feet to their facilities inI 973, and 1 .4 million sq ft in 1974.Capital expenditures have fallen since, to$47m in 1975 and $33m in t976.By 1976,6.2% of al l Ford's sales were inlatin America, and this represented 7 .2%of Ford's total prof i ts.

Ford BrazilBrazil is the largest and most importantvehicle market in [:tin America. Forthe ten years till 1975 the Brazilian carmarket grew at an average 20% a year.In 1975 the whole Brazi l ian economysuffered a sharp decline, petrol pricesrose by more than 7 5% and the carmarket grew only 3%. In 1976 it grewjusl 5%, and the signs are that 1971 wlllshow a fal l in the market of 10 to 157o.Ford is the third largest manufacturer inBrazil, after Volkswagen and GeneralMotors.

cars, and petrol and diesel lorries, inBrazil, and has been particularly hard hitby recent Government measures torestrict petrol consumption.

Ford of Brazi l lost Crl53m ($1 1.2m) in1976, afler a net profit of Crl l9 million($8.2m; in 197i. During Apri l 1977,Ford cut its car output by 47% to only3,502. The Sao Paulo based motorindustry had sacked around 5,500 carworkers by Apri l 1977.

Ford had been expanding its investmentin Brazi l before 1975. Product ion offourcylinder engines began in 19'14, followingcompletion of engine and casting plantsat Taubate. During 1974, stamping andassembly capacities were increased. Anew tractor manufacturing and assemblycomplex started product ion in 1976 ,aimed at the healy tractor segment ofthe fourth larsest tractor market in theWest. tn 19'l6- too, Ford of Brazil beganshipping engines to Japan, where ToyoKyogo rnanufactures pick-up trucks thatare then exported to Ford US for salein the United States.

Ford has been operating in Brazil since1920 between 1925 and 1927 threenew assembly plants were bui l t . In 1967,Ford took over Willys Overland do Brazil

the second largest manufacturer of carsand trucks in the country, with morethan 3000 dealers. 9000 workers andthree assemblv olants.

ArgentinaIn 1973, in its Annual Report, Fordwrote 'In a series of attacks durins 1973against several foreign and locally ownedbusinesses in Argentina, terrorists killedtwo employees of Ford in Argentina andwounded three others. Since thesetragic events, the Company has receivedassurances from the Argentine govern-ment that it will provide for the safetyof Ford's employees and facilities,which have been placed under militaryprotection.' A little later Ford moved allits non-Argentinian staff, some twentypeople, mostly American, to neighbouringUruguay.

The sort of military protection Fordreceives from the Argentinian governmenttoday is revealed by items like this: 'More

than 9000 car industry workers defied amilitary Government ban on strikes andyesterday continued stoppages . theGovernment decreed jail terms of one toten years for strikers.' (Financial TimeslO.9 .7 6). The Argentinian regime isperhaps the most systematically repressivcin the whole of Latin America - tortureof prisoners is commonplace, and hun-dreds of trdde unionists languish in jail.

Beset by inflation, and the generaleconomic recession, the Argentine carmarket fel l by 15% in 1975, and a furthermassive 25% in 1976. Ford have justbeen holding their share in this shrinkingmarket . . . but Argentinian Ford workersdid not.

Market ShareCarsUnits soldMarket Share

TrucksUnits soldMarket Share

1972 1976

29,09s 19,76014.8% 15.2%

18,900 13,10429-3% 27.3%

Ford also has an Argentinian subsidiaryTransax, which is the local industry'sprimary source of axles.

VenezuelaVenezuela's population although rela-t ively smal l at | 2.6 mi l l ion is seen asone of the richest markets for car makersin all tatin America.' (Financial Times

6 2

-:, ': .f)

;rl: .:.: : '

'Brightest spot on the South Africanrnotor industry scene'. is how the SouthAfrican newspapet The Cltuen describedFord's Cortina assembl)' plant at PortEl izabeth in August 1977. Ford has beensel l ing cars in South Afr ica since 1928,but in l96l , af ier the Sharpevi l le mas-sacre and the South African withdrawalfrom tlie Comrnonwealth. their invest-nlcnt was stepped up. The Government,in an attempt to insulate South Afr icafrom external economic and politicalpressure, introduced a local contentplan, restricting the impori of cars, pro-viding tariff protection for locally pro-duced parts, and awarding bonus impodpermits to firms using more locally madeparts in their cars.

As a response, Ford announced plans tobuild a new engine assembly and machineplant, costing $1 I .2million. The complexat Port Elizabeth currently produces carsand trucks, and Ford is now the iargestmotor manufacturer in South Africa. Ithas a market share of about 20%, and its1976 sales, which were not especiallyhigh, totalled $2S8million.

Ford is very sensitive about its presencein South Africa, and makes a great playof i ts 'progressive' labour pol ic ies. In Mayof 1977, together with other US com-panies in South Africa, it signed a 'Mani-

festo' on black employment practices.The Manifesto calls for non-segregation ofeating and work facilities, equal and fairemployment practices, equal pay andan increase in the number of Blacks inmanagement and supervisory positions.

In an interview in The llorld before itwas banned, Ford's publ ic relat ionsmanager said that the principles werenothing new to Ford, and "as far brck asl97l our company introduced equalcompensation and fringe benefits for all."

This is true as far as it goes. The figuresdo show an increased number of Blacks

in the higher grades between 1972 and1971 . Yet the majority of black Ford-workers are paid only 50% above thePoverty Datum Line absolute bareminimum for survival. This works out atabout !20 a week for a family of five.In 1976 a white family of four living onf,74 a week got headl ines and the'house-wife of the year'award from the Johan'nesburg Srar. Subsequently, doctors re-commended additions to the family'sdiet as i t was 'def ic ient ' .

CollaborationThe real reason for Ford's 'progressive'

labour practices is revealed in its AnnualReoort for 1972. 'The demand for ski l ledwoikers and technicians of all kinds isgrowing faster than the supply. Sincewhites are fully employed the colouredand African DoDulation must be in-creasingly depended upon to fill suchposit ions. ' This is why Ford pet i t ionedthe Minister of Labour to have the ouotafur the prupurl ion oi black woikersallowed in Port EliZabeth raised from55% to 76% for Ford factor ies.

In 1973 Ford just i f ied i ts col laborat ionwith apartheid by saying that industrial-isation in South Africa could bring socialchanges that would benefit all racialgroups. After the massacres in Sowetoand the other Af;ican and Colouredtownships, this position is increasinglyuntenable. Nevertheless, in June 1977,shareholders at Ford's general meetingrejected a call for Ford to shut down itsSouth African operations, and ceasebuttressing the apartheid government.The proposal to sever links with SouthAfrica, sponsored by several church andreligious groups. was countered with theold argument that Ford could do morefor race relations in South Africa byremaining there.

Other US companies have in fact pulledout - Polaroid being the most notableexample. But Fo rd is determined to stayas long as i t is prof i table to do so. Thealacrity with which it pulled out of Chile,lndia and Peru when condit ions didn' tsuit it shows how fast it can move if itwants t0.

2.11 .7 6). The Venezuelan economy,cushioned by large oil exports, has notbeen immune from the fluctuations ofthe world economy, but it has pulled outof recession faster than the rest of theconi lnent.In 1975 the Venezuelan motor industrylost around $28m, and in 1976 nearly$50m. Str ict government prrce regulat ions.plus credit restrictions on the purchase ofnew passenger cars are hitting the bigthree US motor manufacturers, whobetween them account for some 85% ofall cars assembled in Venezuela. Fordclaimed a loss of $10.7m in 1975.The Venezuelan government is trying toimpose increases in the locally-manu-factured content of vehicles, from 58%in 1977 to 90% by 1985. I ts detai leddevelopment plan calls for outlays ofabout $465m, largely by the car firms,and the creation of about 20.000 newjobs in the industry. The US companiesare claiming they cannot possibly affordthis investment unless price restrictionsare lifted - but the Venezuelan sovern-ln( 'nl bel ieves that parent codpaniesare earning money on Venezuelan saleswhile local affiliates accumulate book-keeping losses.By 1977, Venezuela's economic fortuneshad recovered, and the car market wasshowing a rise of more than 12%. Withtwo major aluminium projects under way,the country is set to be one of the largestproducers in the world. ln a personalvisi t , Henry Ford I l said that Ford wasinterested in the possibi l i ty of usingVenezuelan made aluminium for liehterveh ic les to be manu faeru red in rh ; USin the years to come. He announced an$l8m investment in expansion of Fordfaci l i t ies in 197U.ln 1975 Ford had retai l car sales of25.500 up l iom 1974s 23,200 whichwas 29% of the nrarket. Truck sales in1974 were 12 ,100 o r 31 .8%' o f themarke t . Sa les rose to 16 .100 in 1975 .ln 1976 total sales were 3l , l 78.

I\dexicoIn 1965 Ford began manufacturing carsand trucks in Mexico, under a governmentapproved programme. At this time , theMexican government was r.lffering enor-

mous investment incentives. By 1975Ford was selling 34,700 cars, a 14.9%share of the market. The next year theMexican car market fell some l4tA%. andFord car sales fell to 22,800 bringingits share down to 11 .4%. Trucks, howevercontinued to grow - from 23,166 in1975 to 24,360 in 1976. This despite thefact that the truck market fell 10%. Ford'smarket share rose from 19.8% to 23.2%.

Ford fuia-Pacific'Asia-Pacific automotive operations is thesmallest component of Fond's inter-national car and truck grcup. Howeverthe region's vast size, growing populationand significant reserves of natural resour-ces provide the potential for rapid eco-nomic growth and substantially improvedvehicles sales.' (Annual Report 1974).

With a third of the world 's populat ion,but only 2% of rts cars, the Asia Pacificregion seemed ripe for exploitation b1,Ford in the late 1960s and early 1970s.The area offered a vastly underemployedpopulation, very low wage rates. andgovdinments such as those tn SouthKorea. the Phi l io innes and Taiwan whowould use miliiary force to ensure adocile work force.

Ford Asia-Pacif ic. organised in 1970,coordinated subsidiar ies in Austral ia.Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand. thePhilippines. Thailand, Singapore, Taiwanand dealer assemblers in Korea. Indonesiaand Malaysia.

ln 1912 Ford Phi l iooines introduced theFiera the Ford veislon of the 4 ovlinder

1300cc 'asian car ' . Based on a simplecab-andchassis format. and available ina wide variety of body configurations.Fiera components are produced by morethan 150 suppliers in the Asia-Pacificregion. Body parts are made in thePhi l ippines. engines in Korea and Taiwan,and axles and transnrissions in Indonesia.

The al locat ion of component product ionis control led solel l bi Ford. When a localplant begins manufactur ing ralher thanimport ing a component. the pr ice of thatpart is deleted fronr the pr ice of thecomplete ki t needed to assemble thevehicle. The deleted price is far lowerthan the price of the part when it isimported. A part nray cost $200 toimport but the assenrbly packagewithout tliat part nral be only $60cheaper than the complete ki t . Assumingthat the imported price reasonablyref lects the cost of the part , then thedifference of $140 is transferred as profitto the parent compan! although there isno ac lua l exchange o f s , ' 0d r

Ford Philippines was establishe d in 1967 ,and Ensite Philippines in l97l . The maintask of this compan)' was to raise fundsfor the stamping plant at Mariveles in thePhilippines. This factory. which has acapacity of 70,000 vehicles a year,employs only 700 workers. i r an areawhere unemployment is virtually 50%. Itstarted product ion in late 1974, and usessheet metal imported from Japan to makebodies, including Cortina bodies. During1976, 15,000 sets of Cort ina doors wereexported to England. Body parts arealso exported to Austral ia, New Zealand.Taiwan and Singapore.

In Taiwan, Ford bought a 70% interest inthe Uo Ho Motor Company from Toyotain 19'72. as Jaoan withdrew from Taiwanas Sino-Japaneie relat ions inrproved.

Between 1968 and 1974 Ford's sales inthe Asia-Pacific region had increased150%, and in 1974 they rose a furtherl1%. ln 1974 Ford predicted a 36%increase in the auto market (excludingJapan) between 1975 and 1980. However,i975 saw a decl ine in the car market(excluding Japan) of 2%. and Ford carsales down by 8%. 1976 was even worse,and Ford sales fell by $4 m.

64

Ford AustraliaAustralia is Ford's principal marketingand manufacturing centre in the region,and the management of most of thesubsidiaries in the area is Australian.It was in 1925 that Ford of Canadaestablished an assembly plant at Ceelongin Victoria, and even today the ownershipof many of the Ford companies in thearea is via Ford of Canada and EnsiteLtd. of Canada - both of course ownedfinally by Ford.

Retail Sales in Australia: Ford cars andtrucks

Cars % Trucl<s %1976 103,936 22.4 26,360 r9.1t975 101 AOO 21.'.l 24,'100 20.31974 108,700 23.0 22,300 19.s

By August 1977,Ford, had gained marketleadership, for the first time since the1950s .

In 1975 Ford employed 1 2p00 workersin Australia in the following plants:Homebush, Sydney (assembly); Geelong,Victoria (foundry); Ballorat, Victoria;Broadmeadows, Victoria (assembly); andEagle Farm, Queensland (assembly).Homebush assembled the Escort. andEagle Farm the Falcon. Ford also sel lsthe Fairlane, Cortina and LTD models.

Expansionln 1975, Ford Australia produced itstwo mil l ionth car. The iast ing plantat Geelong completed a modernisationprogramme, and the Homebush assemblyplant was expanded. Sales of the newEscort assembled from kits importedlrom Halewood, UK, were a notablesuccess.

ln 1976, Ford announced a three vear$77m programme for product deveiop-ment, towards 'an all-Australian car' - areplacement for the Falcon. ln May 1977a new A$82m assembly plant outsideSydney to assemble Falcons and Fairlaneswas announced. Its initial caoacitv willbe 30,000 unirs a year. with possibleexpansion to 100,000 a year.

The Australian market has been in-creasingly penetrated by imports

especially from Japan, and an attempt toincrease local production by imposinglocal-content strictures and import tariffsis under way. Previous such attempts havebeen notably unsuccessful.

Ready built imports as % of newregistations

1 9 7 4 3 1 . 81973 14.31972 8.5

ln 1976 Ford of Australia reDorted a netprof i t of A$22.5m, a record, and almostA$4m higher than in 1975. Since 1970sales had risen by $397m to $776m.

Ford Japan" . . . what burns me up is that I can't gointo Japan. We can't build, we can't sell,we can't service, we can't do a damnthing over there." (Henry Ford II)

Japan is the only major western carmarket that Ford has not yet penetratedto any significant extent, but since 1973it has been taking steps to try and alterth^is. In 1974 it set up a subsidiary Fordof Japan, capital ised-at Y250m io takecare of Ford sales, and the unused plantat Yokohama was refurbished as a 'hbmo-logation' centre, to monitor Japaneseregulat ions on emissron control . , andensure that imported vehicles concurred.ln 1974 the retail sales of Ford built carswere 6,800, compared to 6000 the yearbefore. Clearly these numbers are [iny,in terms of Ford's volumes of production- but compared to the total numberof foreign cars imported into Japan.less than 40,000 a year. they are norinsignificant.

In 1975 Ford signed a sales agreementwith Hisco, a subsidiary of Honda,Japan's fourth largest car maker. kr 1977this agreement was brought into action,with the import of Cortina Ghias fromthe UK, and 1.6 litre Fiestas from Ger-many. The cars wi l l be distr ibuted by 100of Honda's sub-dealers throughout japan.This is not the full Honda dealer network.but nevertheless will give the two cars abigger nat ionwide coverage rhan anyother imported cars except those bougl i tby Yanase, which special ises in impolrs

and has several competing makes at once.

Sales targets are 1750 Fiestas a year, and700 to 1000 Cortinas a year, plus anincrease in the 2000 or so Mustangs,Bobcats and Monarchs from the USthal Hisco have been sel l ing.

Ford is the only American major whichhas no direct capital stake in a Japanesemotor company. General Motors has aminority interest in Isuzu, Chrysler aholding in Mitsubishi Motor Company.In the late 1960s Ford had merser talkswith Toyo Kyogo. but these brole downover the size of the Ford shareholdinsunder the merger. Toyo Kyogo standlmidway between the two top Japanesecar makers, Toyota and Nissan, whichare too powerful to admit foreign capitalparticipation, and the smaller weakercompanies which are increasingly movinginto the orbit of the American motorindustry.

The links with Toyo Kyogo were notcompletely severed, and the companymanufactures the Courier lisht truck forFord. which is imported into the US,in a 1 .8 litre version manufactured entirelvin Japan, and a 2.3 l i t re model. usingengines exported from Ford Brazil.

The microcomputers that control fuelemission, re-cycling ratio, ignition timingand other functions in Ford's 1978models are manufactured in Japan bvToshiba.

Ford Mddle Fast and Africaln 197 5 a new subsidiary was formed,Ford Mid-East and Africa, Inc, 'to developmarkets that have a common productinterest and a capabi l i ty of t rading witheach other.'The most important marketscovered by the group are Morocco,Pakistan, Turkey, Senegal and Ghana,several of which have dealer-assemblv.and there are subsidiar ies in Egypt andSouth Africa.

The South African companv accounts foralmost half the sales in ihis-group Fordof South Africa is discussed elser,vhere inthis report. The further development ofFord ' s M id .Eas t pene t ra r ion 'dependsabove all on political developments in theare a.

6 5

Amsterdam (Netherlands)

Assembly Taunus and Transcontinental Truckranges.

Antwerp (Belgium)

Ford Tractor, rear axle and transmission pro-duction. Final assembly Tractors.

Basildon (England)

[iord Tractor cngine production, hydraulicheavy equipment. Ir inal assembly Tractors.

Basildon (England)

Frocesses enginc parts, front covcrs, valverockers, carn followers, water pump assemb-lies tbr Kent, Essex, O.H.C. and F iestaengine ranges. Similar parts lbr Dorsct and\ o rk eommcrc i r l veh ie lc cng in r . rangcs .

Radiator assemblies for Escort, Ir iesta, Cortina,Capri, Granada, Transit, A/D/N Scries Truckranges.

Suspension and rear axle components fbrEscort, Cortina, ( apri, Granada A/D/NSeries Truck rangcs.

Belfast (Northern lreland)

Carburettor and distributor production for allEuropean Ford petrol engines. Units usedin Escort, Fiesta, Cortina, Taunus, Capri,G ranada, T runs i t and A-Ser ic \ .

Bordeaux (France)

C3 Automatic Transmissions tbr [ iscort, Cortina,Taunus, Capri, Granada and Transit. C3Automatics also shipped to USA for instal-lation in Pinto and Mustang ranges.

Transaxle Plant produces transmissions for allFiestas.

Cologne Mest Germany)Final assembly of Capri and Granada models.Trim for Capri, Cranada, Escort and Taunus.F'uel tanks for Granada.Chrome plating of bumpers fbr I ')scort, lr iesta,

Capri, Taunus, Granada and'l 'ransit.Plastic parts for Escort, Fiesta, Clapri, ( 'ort ina,

Taunus, Granada and Transit. Lngineproduction for Taunus, Cortina, Capri,Granada and Transit.

Engine parts fbr Fiesta.Engines also supplied to USA for Pinto and

Mustang.Suspcnsion transmission and brake componcnts

for Escort, Taunus, Capri, Granada andTransit.

Forgings firr brake and transmission com-ponents for l.scort, Taunus, Capri, Granadaand Trans i t .

Gear components for Fiesta.Aluminium die castings for cngines installcd in

l lscort, Taunus, Capri, Granada and Transit.Die cast transaxle casings for Fiesta.

Cork (lreland)

Irinal assembly I-scort, Cortina.

Dagenham (England)

Irinal assembly Cortina and lr icsta models, Trimproduction for Lscort, Cortina, Transit,A/D/N Series truck rangcs, Fuel tanks tbrCor t ina and Granada.

Stamping plant produccs body panels tbrEscor t , F ies ta , Cor t ina , Taunus , Capr i ,Granada, A/D/N Series Truck rangcs. Wheelproduction fo: Escort, Capri, Cortina,Granada and Transit.

L-nginc production fbr Fiscort, ( 'ort ina, Taunus,! i cs ta , Capr i , Granada, T rans i t , A /D/NSeries truck ranges.

Enginc parts also produced tbr abovc models.I:orgings for I iscort, Cortina, Capri, Granada,

Transit, A/D/N Series truck ranges. Suspen-sion components.

Iroundry production of engine castings forFiscort, Fiesta, Cortina, Taunus, Capri,Granada, Transit, A/D/N Series truck ranges.

Duren (West Germany)Rear axlc production for Escort, Taunus,

Cortina, Capri, ( lranada and Transit. Wheelhubs fbr Escort, Taunus, Capri, Granada andTransit.

Enfield (England)

Instrumcnts, t.uel gauge sender units, watertemperature gauge sender units, enginespark plugs for Escort, Fiesta, Cortina,Taunus, Capri, Granada, Transit, Ai D/NSeries Truck ranges.

Genk (Belgium)

Irinal assembly Taunus and Transit models.Trim production for Escort, Taunus, Transit.lrucl tanks for Taunus.Road wheels for Escort, l" iesta, Capri, Taunus,

Granada, Transit.Stamping plant produces body panels for

Escort, [r iesta, Taunus, Cortina, Capri,Granada, Transit, A/D/N Serics truck ranges.

Halewood (England)F'inal assembly Escort.Trim production for Escort, Cortina, Transit,

A/D/N Series truck ranges.Fuel tanks for Lscort.Stamping plant produces body panels for Escort

Taunus, Cofiina, Capri, Granada, Transit,A/D/N Series Truck ranges.

Transmissions for Escort, Cortina, Taunus,Capri, Granada, Transit, A/D/N SeriesTruck ranses.

Engine gear wheels for Escort, Cortina, Capri,Granada, Transit, A/D/N Series truck ranges.

Suspension components for Escort, Cortina,Capri, Granada, Transit, A/D/N Series Truckranges,

Langley (England)Final assembly A/DiNiR Series commercial

vehicles.Machining axle and suspension components for

Transit, A/D/N/R Series commercial vehicles.

Leamington (England)Foundry production of engine components for

I;iesta, Kent, Essex, O.H.C., Dorset, Yorkengine ranges.

Brake parts ibr Lscort, Cortina, Capri, Granada,Transit, A/D/N Series Truck ranges.

Transmission housings for Escort, Cortina,Capri, Granada, A/D/N Series Truck ranges.

Lisbon (Portugal)li inal assembly of Escort, Cortina, Capd,

Granada, Transit and D-Series truck ranges.

Saarlouis (Western Germany)l ' ina l assembly Escor t . F iesta. Capr i .Trim production for Escort, Iriesta, Capri.F uel tanks for Fscor t . l - iesta, Capr i .Stamping plant produces body panels for

Escort, Fiesta, Taunus, Cortina, Capri,Granada, Transit, A/D/N Seties truck ranges.

Southampton (England)Irinal assembly Transit.Body assembly for A and S-Series Truck

tanges.Stamping plant produces body panels for

Transit, A/D/N Series truck range andCorlina.

Swansea (South Wales)Rear axle production for Escort, Cortina,

Capri, Granada, Transit, A/D/N SeriesTruck ranges.

Brake components for Escort, Cortina, Capri,Granada, Transit, and A-Series commercialvehicles.

Gearbox production for A/D/N Series Truckranges.

Treforest (South Wales)Spark plug insulators for all Ford petrol engines.

Valencia (Spain)Final assembly Fiesta.Trim Droduction for Fiesta.Stamping plant produces body panels for Fiesta.Fiesta engine production.

Woolwich (England)Engine parts for Escort and Cortina models.Transmission parts for Escort, Cortina, Capd,

Transit, A/D/N Series truck ranges.

Wuelrath (Western Germany)Transmission parts for Fiesta.Suspension and steering components for Escort

Fiesta, Taunus, Capri, Granada and Transit.

67

tn j974 the world 's motor manufacturersv, ' : r ' faced with the unthinkable. After:hc previous year's record figures, salesplunlureted, and cars started to pi le upin the parking areas of Detroi t andWoif sburg.

zr. s the recession deepened around theworld, the stockpi les of cars grew, andb"v 1975 practically every car manufac-turer had imposed short t ime working:r id had got r id of large numbers ofworkers. ln l914 Ford shed 50,000workers, Br i t ish Leyland got r id of2u,000 and as the Volkswagen factoriesshut down migrant workers were sentb rek to Morocco and Turkey .

The two years of recession, <ieeperthan any car manufacturer's worstnightmares, were traumatic for thewhl le industry. Even previously suc-cesstul Volkswagen looked over theedgr: of bankruptcy, and Chrysler, smallestof the American big three, was drivendeel:r into the red. For firms like BritishLeyland, i t meant disaster and rescue bylhe state.

l ; , - ' r the stronger motor companies the*orst is apparent ly over. Prof i ts arereaching new records, despite the factihat sales arf str l l below their 1973 peaks,and most manulhcturers are entering the198th with new model ranges. Invest-rnenls are being stepped up. Over $50-

Prospects

billion is to be spent in the USA by1985 to downsize the model ranees oflhe big three car makers. A toial ofnearly iTbillion will be invested bymotor makers in Europe between nowand 1982 .This apparently healthy situation is onlyskin deep, for most of the new invest-ment is not going into new manufactur-ing capacity, but into raising produc-tivity or refining engines and compo-nents to improve fuel economy andexhaust emissions. The fundamentalproblems of overcapacity that emergedduring the recession have still not beensolved. There are too many car nanu-facturers fighting over the world market,and the prospects for real growth in thenear future are far from certain.Unemployment in the OECD area, theleading industrial nations is currentlyat l6.3million and expected to rise.Growth in plant and machinery invest-ment will rise only moderately in mostcountr ies in 1978, and the US economy,saddled with an enormous trade deficitwill grow more slowly in 1978 than itdid in 1977. Forecasters are predict ingthat US car sales will fall by 6% in 1978.Japan's growth is expected to be just1%, Europe's under 3%. 'Only majornew pump priming can prevent Europe,Japan and Canada from slipping to thebrink of recession by the end of theyear,' wrote Business l|eek at the end

"There are too many car manufacturers fighting over the world market."

I i i! s N

f$

Poppetfoto

of 1977. Yet pump priming is the lastthing that most governments, fearfulof renewed inflation. are about to under-take.

What this means for the motor manu-facturers is that any growth in the carmarket from its present levels is highlyspeculative, and that competition isgoing to be more fierce than ever before.

Ford, with itS integrated productionand the related economies of scale,and its aggressive production and market-ing techniques, is in a very" strong com-petitive position. The addition of theFiesta and the luxury Granada meansthat it is competing in Europe over thefull model range threatening not onlythe popular car producers but also theluxury car makers.

It is precisely in periods of depressed orstagnant demand that Ford is mostdangerous to other makers. Their com-petitive edge is such that Ford can sell allthe cars it can produce - when the mar-ket is not growing fast this is at theexpense of other manufacturers. Fordhas the added advantages of access toAmerican capital, its sheer size comparedto its European competitors and the factthat it is not tied to any one Europeancountry.

The companies that have emerged fromthe recession in worse shape than theyentered it are going to be hit even harderin the near future. This must mean furtherclosures and redundancies as the industryis reorganised in the interests of capital.Already rumours are rife that Britishl,eyland plans to axe a quarter of itsworkers. In the short term it will meanconstant pressure by the employers onwage levels, productivity and flexibilityof labour, and workers' organisation. Wecan confidently predict that Ford willbe in the forefront of this employers'offensive.

Ford workers have proved their militancyand organisational ability at plant level inthe past. Only by extending their fight-back on international lines can they resistthe depredations of what has now be-come the most global of global corpor-atlons.

6 8

BIBLIOGRAPHYBe\ non H.Roth sch i ld E .Barne t R . & Mu l le rDemaris O.\ader R .

Herndon B .Burlingame R.Braverman H.Turke l S .$ alker C. & GuestCh inoy E .

Se id le r E .Vau r i ce M.

Automotive Task Force

TGWUA\,lPO Japan-Asia

Quarterly ReviewHU Y.S.

Work ing tb r I o rdParadisc LostG loba l ReachDi r ty Bus inessUnsafe a t An ] Speed

(Second cd i t ion )F o rdHenry I ro rdLabor and Monopol-v' CapitalWorking\{an on thc Asscnrbll LineThe Automob i le \ l o rker and

thc Am er ican DreanrLe t ' s Ca l l i t I ' i es taSh i f t Work : Econonr ic Benc ' l i t s

and Sot ' i a l Cos tsRcv ie \ \ ' o f the Nor th Amcr ican

Motor lndus t r !F ord Wage ClainrI r rec Trade Zones and

Ind us t r ia l i sa t ion o f As ia' fhe Impac t o f U .S . lnvcs tn rcn t

in F-uropc

. '1 l leu Lancl intagc Books.9rntc.ll <t ,Sllttrsrlr NYI I a r 7t L' r s l,lo ga : irt t' Pre ss

Ban tatrt Rooks('assell

Quadran glt'Montlt ly Reyier PressPenguinHarrard

Doubleda.tPa t r iL k S tephet ts

I LO Ger te rcCanadiurt ( )oyentntett t

D(pL. ol IndustrlT(; lt'tPa c i J i c-..1 s ia R t'so u rc t's

Cett trt,, Tokt ct

Praegt,r

t 9 1 3t 9 1 11 9 1 11 9 7 ' 1

1 9 7 31 9 7 01 9 1 01 9 7 61 9 7 - i1 9 s 2

1 9 5 5l 9 l ( ,

1 9 1 4

.\nd l- 'ord .\eu's, Mornirtg Star, Socialist htorker. Socialist Challcngc..\etdint. l .abrryr

| 9 1 1| 9 1 1

1 9 1 7

1 9 1 3

h t e e k h .

,S O L RCI.,S O F F URTHER IN FO RMA TI O A'

Ford Workers Group Dagenham, and Ford Langlev Act ion Group. Roont 165.l l Clerkenwel l Cl lose. London ECI

B r g F l a m e ( F o r d G r o u p ) L i v e r p o o l , l l 7 W a v e r t r e e R o a d , L i v e r p o o lConference of Socia l is t Economists. c io Dept of Economics. Bi rkbeck Col lege,- - 1 5

G r e s s e S t r e e t . L o n d o n W 1C a m p a i g n A g a i n s t t h e A r m s T r a d e . 5 C a l e d o n i a n R o a d , L o n d o n N l 1\ A R M I C ( N a t i o n a l A c t i o n / R e s e a r c h o n t h e M i l i t a r y I n d u s t r i a l C o m p l e x ) . 1 5 0 1

C h e r r y S t r e e t . P h i l a d e l p h i a P a l 9 l 0 l U S A\ l u t h e r J o n e s , 6 0 7 M a r k e t S t r e e t , S a n F r a n c i s c o , q 4 1 0 5 U S AEuropean Metal Workers Federat ion. Brussels .

RL,D NOTES PUBLISHES..

Workers Struggles and the Development of Ford in Br i ta inI l l u s t r a t e d h i s t o r y o f F o r d U K , 1 9 7 6

M o t o r l n d u s t r y C r i s i s i n B r i t a i n 1 9 7 5 - 6i )eta i led analys is of workers ' s t ruggles and ernployers ' response'We are not casual labour ! 'l l lust rated h is tory of thc s t ruggle against lay-of fs . 1978

P l u s

Red Notes Ford Archive an extensive archive of Ford st rugglesthe past ten years

Red Notes Ford Sl ide Show 40 rn inutes fu l l co lour s l ide showegainst lay-of fs

A v a i l a b l e f r o m : R e d N o t e s . B o x 1 5 , l a S t P a u l ' s R o a d . L o n d o n N l

Thanks to:S o l i d a r i t y . 1 2 3 L a t h o m R o a d L o n d o n E 6 , w h o p r o d u c e t h e S o l i d a r i t v M o t o rt s u l l e t i n s e v c r l l t i m e s a y e a r .

Contemporary Archive on Lat in America. I Cambridge Terrace, London NWI

Corporate Data Exchange. 198 Broadway, Roonr 707. New York 10038. USA.

European Metalworkers Federation, Brussells Belgiunt.

NACLA, PO Box 57 , Ca thedra l S ta t ion . New York 10015 . USA.

( r ,py r igh t o ( 'oun tc r In fo rn ra t ion Serv iccs

nat ional ly over

on thc s t ruggle

TNI Publ icat ions

Pamphlet No.1 :Chi le: Economic 'Freedom' and

Political Repression0rlottJ,, Le t t li,'r

Th is in -dcp th ana l l s i s by r i i ) rn le r lead ingo f f i c ia l o f thc A l l cndc covernment o f ( ' h i l cdemonst ra tes thc necessar ! rc la t ionsh ip be-t \ \ cen an econor r r i c deve lopn ten t mode l uh ichbcnc f i t s on ly a r i ch minor i t - v and the po l i t i ca lterror \\,hiL:h has reigned in Chilc sincc thcover th ro \ o f thc A l lende ree ime.

$0.s0Pamphlet No.2:

The lnternational Econornic Order,Part I

Orlarulo Lerelier and Michocl Mo.l.fitt' fhc

par rph lc t t r rc t ' s h is to r i ca l l r thc con f l i c tbe lueen the adv lnccd c lp i ta l i s t coun t r ies andthe Th i rd \ \o r ld over the es tab l i sh rnen t o f r"nc$ in tc rn l r t iona l economic o rdcr " . Spec ia lr t ten t ion i s p l id to thc ro le ( ) l ' thc I N . thcNo n- l l i gncc l rnovr .n ' rcn t . and OPI : ( .

s3.00Pamph le t No .3 :

The Crisis of the Corporat ionRichord J. Barne t

The parnph lc t dcscr ibes the poucr o f th rn lu l t ina t i ( )n l i l co rp ( r ra l i l )ns $h ich domin i ] t c thel - iS ccononr l . Barnc l sho \s ho$ t l l c r . l ro \ \ ' i h ( r l 'r t r t r I I t n r r r , ' n I l . r n ( v i ' J b l ] , . s u l r . i n . l l ( \ r r L l l \ 'concent ra t ion o l cconomie and po l i t i c l l pouerin a l c r r hands . Th t ' r csu l t . accord ing to B l rnc l .i s a c r i s i s fo r den tocracv i t se l l .

$ 1 . s 0

Pamphlet No..1:Multinational llanks in the Third World

Howarcl lll. h'ach telThe p rmph le t docurncn ls anc l anr l l zes thegrou th o l Th i rd \ \ ' o r ld c icb t b t p r i r r te L IS-brsedrnu l l i na t iona l banks and thc in )pac1 o t th is nc \ \fo r ln o l ind .b tcdncss on thc po l i t i cs ande , , ' n u i l ) i ! F , ' l i e i L . , , ' T l r i r . l \ \ , ' r l J r ' , ' u n l r r c \ .

53.00

Special Report:Black South Africa Explodes

Ct ' l t t l ! . r t t t J ) , rn ta t i , ' n .Sr ' r t i r ' c s .Lttntlott

B l rck South A l r i ca l . rp lodc 's i s rhe on l l dc -t r i l cd rccount { ) l cvcn ts in South A f r i c l s incethc upr is ing uh ich begrn in . lunc . 1976. inSou 'c to . Thc rcpor l c \poses thc r ra l i t \ o l ' l i f e inthc A t r i can to$nsh ips . thc in lp : rc t { } i Sou thAf r i ca 's ccononr ic c r i s i s on B lacks . and thc wh i l rreg in ! ' s dcpcndcnce on l :u rope ln and An l r . r i canI ln tn c r .

s2.00Bttlk quattt i t i |s ttt Ll iy ottttt at di lahlt uprti l

r: ' t lu(tt. Plt,as( aclcl S0 )5 postag( arklltatldl inf, lot La(lt i teDt t))d(,tL'd

0rder lrom:' l

ransna t iona l Ins t i tu te , | 901 Q St . NWWashington, D.C. 20009

(202) 234-9382Transnational Institute

20 Paulus Potterstraat, Amsterdam1007 Holland 126 608