1AC Cuban EconomyCuba’s government will collapse in 2013 – ideological weakening and internal liberalization means it’s inevitableSánchez 13 (Yoani Sánchez is the Havana-based author of the blog Generation Y and the recently published book Havana Real. This article was translated by Mary Jo Porter. January 02, 2013, “Midnight in Havana: Will the Cuban government fall in 2013?”, http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2013/01/midnight_in_havana_will_the_cu.html

It's increasingly obvious that the biological clock of the Cuban government -a slow and agonizing journey of the hands that has lasted 54 years - is closing in on midnight. Every minute that passes brings obsolescence a little nearer . The existence of a political system should not be so closely

linked to the youth or decrepitude of its leaders, but in the case of our island, both ages have come to be the same thing. Like a creature made in the image and likeness of a man -who believes himself to be God -Cuba's current political model will not outlive its creators. Every decision made over the past five decades , every step

taken in one direction or another, has been marked by the personalities and decisions of a handful of human beings -two of them in particular. One, Fidel Castro, 86, has been convalescing for six long years in a place few Cubans could find on a map.

Although in the last five years Fidel's brother Raúl, 81, has installed some younger faces in the administrative and governmental apparatus, the most important decisions remain concentrated in the hands of octogenarians. (Raúl's successor, Jose Ramon Machado, is 82.) Like a voracious Saturn devouring his children, the principal leaders of the revolution have not allowed any favored sons to overshadow them. The last to be ousted due to the paranoia of the Castro brothers were Vice President Carlos Lage, a figure who enjoyed popular sympathy, and the foreign minister Felipe Perez Roque. Both might have made promising successors, but were accused by Fidel Castro himself as having been

"addicted to the honey of power" and removed from their positions in 2009. Their own selfishness has left Cuban leaders without a plan for succession and time has run out to develop it, at least one not sincerely committed to continuing along the path set by old men dressed in olive green. For Raúl, the picture is worrisome, and he has declared that "time is short" to ready the generation that will replace him

and his comrades. In 2013, he will be forced to accelerate this process, and his obvious desperation about the future is contributing to the ideological weakening and the loss of whatever popular support the Castro regime still enjoys. Meanwhile,

Castro's tentative economic reforms are also contributing to the loss of control over the population. Together, the expansion of the private sector, the imposition of taxes, the distribution of land leases to farmers, and the authorization of cooperatives in businesses other than agriculture, are gradually reducing the state's influence in the daily life of Cubans. Raúl may see these as a desperation move to jumpstart the Cuban economy, but one consequence will be the diminished ideological commitment of the people to a government that provides fewer and fewer subsidies and benefits. Every step the authorities take in the direction of greater flexibility is like pointing a loaded gun at their own temples. A system based on keeping every tiny aspect of our national life under tight control cannot maintain itself when some of these bonds are loosened. Reform is the death of the status quo and maneuvers to guarantee financial survival by opening the system to private capital are a death sentence written in advance. The year 2013 will be a decisive one in Cuba's move from economic centralism to the fragmentation of production, from absolute verticality to its dismantling. Those who cease to receive their salaries from a state institution and come to support their families through self-employment will undoubtedly gain more political autonomy. Despite the best efforts of the political police, the opposition today is more energized than it has been since the so-called Black Spring of 2003 -when 75 regime opponents were rounded up, most sentenced to long prison terms. Although 2012 closed with the unfortunate loss of Oswaldo Paya, the leading figure of the Christian Liberation

Movement, other faces are beginning to gain prominence. The number of activists is increasing -and they are bringing fresh, modern ideas to the struggle. An emerging community of alternative bloggers and performance artists is blending social criticism into its creations, and increasingly bold musicians are using the lyrics of hip hop and reggaeton to narrate a reality far removed from the official discourse. Meanwhile, alternative information networks, including Twitter and other social networks via mobile phones, are helping to break the state's monopoly on opinion and to communicate the truth about what is happening on our island to the rest of the world. The aging of the nomenklatura, the growing opposition, and the expansion of the private sector are not the only influences that will weaken the system in 2013. The worsening health of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez is a catalyst for collapse. In the absence of his great

patron -and provider of subsidized petroleum -in Caracas, Raúl will have to speed up economic reforms even more quickly to spur growth, further weakening the Communist Party's authority. The emergence of their Venezuelan acolyte was a godsend to the Castros, who lost their original benefactor with the collapse of Soviet communism. But there doesn't appear to be another country on the horizon willing to shoulder the burden of 42,000 square miles and its 11 million inhabitants. U.S. President Barack

Obama will also have a part to play. If the United States finally lifts -or softens - its decades-long embargo , it may give the government a temporary financial respite. But on the other hand, such a move would also take away the Castro regime's favorite political excuse for its economic failures. The country's sad state could no longer be blamed on our neighbor to the north. It would be a hard ideological blow. Given all these factors, it's difficult to see how The System can survive the coming year, much less ensure its long-term viability . But it's worth noting that the regime in Havana has long demonstrated its skill in surviving even the most unfavorable predictions. After all, the Cuban economy has been in a state of crisis for the last 20 years. One could even say that our leaders find tension soothing and perform better under emergency conditions than under prosperity. Material needs can also serve to paralyze people who must spend hours waiting for a bus or standing on line to buy a couple of pounds of chicken instead of organizing.

Cuba’s economy is also collapsing – the government can’t use material needs to keep the population in checkMorris 11 (Emily, London Metropolitan University UK, FORECASTING CUBA’S ECONOMY: 2, 5, AND 20 YEARS, Presented at the international symposium “Cuba Futures: Past and Present,” organized by The Cuba Project Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies at The Graduate Center/CUNY, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/cuba/cubaforecasting.pdf)

Risks in the short term Political risks arise from the process of transferring leadership from the old guard to a new generation. Evidently conscious of the hazards, the old guard are seeking to closely manage the generational handover, but their control will diminish. So far signs of dissent within the government have been rare and weak, but in 2011 the situation will begin to change radically. At the special conference of the PCC that will take place after the sixth PCC congress in April 2011, it seems likely that a new set of leaders will take up their posts. None of them will have the authority of the Castro brothers, and so for the first time for fifty years there is a possibility of the emergence of factionalism. In the TABLE 5. Two year forecast 2010 2011 2012 Real GDP (% growth) 2.1 3.5 4.2 Inflation (year-end, %)a a. This inflation figure is based on an estimated average household cost of living index that takes into account a reduction in the amount of basic goods available at heavily subsidised prices on the ration. The impact of the shift from subsidised consumption to market prices will vary widely between households, with the percentage rise in the cost of living being greater for those at the lower end of the income scale, who spend a higher proportion of their income on basic goods. 6.3 7.2 5.5 Average labour productivity (% growth) 4.2 5.9 4.5 Government spending/GDP ratio (%) 66.5 63.8 60.4 Investment/GDP ratio (%) 10.5

11.1 12.5Forecasting Cuba’s Economy: 2, 5, and 20 Years 13 context of the rapid changes taking place in the economic sphere, 2012 is likely to be a testing year. Despite its efforts to dampen expectations, there is a sense among the Cuban public that they should see material benefits from the economic reforms. If these hopes are dashed, the government could face a serious crisis of public confidence. In the economic sphere, there are many hazards arising from the process of transformation. There are risks that monetary growth will outstrip that of supply so that inflationary pressures could build, at a time when the government is losing its power to directly control prices. The extent to which the government will be able to manage the fiscal challenge it has set itself—to achieve sufficient savings and raise

sufficient tax revenue to maintain welfare provision whilst phasing out the existing apparatus of social protection—will depend on its ability to respond quickly to difficulties as they arise. A major fiscal crisis would jeopardise the reform process, and hamper the government's ability to respond to social pressures

created by the extensive realignment of relative incomes that will result from the changes. External risks are heightened by Cuba’s lack of access to emergency financing in the case of unanticipated shocks. The largest single risk comes from Cuba’s high degree of dependency on Venezuela, and in particular on earnings from the export of professional services. Hugo Chávez, on whom the relationship rests, does not face re-election until 2012 but if anything were to befall him before then, the Cuban economy would suffer. The high degree of uncertainty about the global economy also presents risks, with the recovery in OECD countries fragile and signs of strain within the economies of the growth leaders, China and India. 14 C

Squo reforms are not enough – only lifting the embargo promotes a stable transitionPiccone 13 (Joseph, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy, Opening to Havana, 1/17/13, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/opening-to-havana)

Under Raul Castro, the Cuban government has continued to undertake a number of important reforms to modernize its economy, lessen its dependence on Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, and allow citizens to make their own decisions about their economic futures.

The process of reform, however, is gradual, highly controlled and short on yielding game-changing results that would ignite the economy. Failure to tap new offshore oil and gas fields and agricultural damage from Hurricane Sandy dealt further setbacks.

Independent civil society remains confined, repressed and harassed, and strict media and internet controls severely restrict the flow of information. The Castro generation is slowly handing power over to the next generation of party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process. These trends suggest that an inflection point is approaching and that now is the time to try a new paradigm for de-icing the frozen conflict. The embargo — the most complex and strictest embargo against any country in the world — has handcuffed the U nited S tates and has

prevented it from having any positive influence on the island’s developments. It will serve American interests better to learn how to work with the emerging Cuban

leaders while simultaneously ramping up direct U.S. outreach to the Cuban people. I recommend that your administration, led by a special envoy appointed by you and reporting to the secretary of state and the national security

advisor, open a discreet dialogue with Havana on a wide range of issues, without preconditions. The aim of the direct bilateral talks would be to resolve outstanding

issues around migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, the environment, and trade and investment that are important to protecting U.S. national interests. Outcomes of these talks could include provisions that normalize migration flows, strengthen border security, break

down the walls of communication that hinder U.S. ability to understand how Cuba is changing, and help U.S. businesses create new jobs. In the context of such talks your special envoy would be authorized to signal your administration’s willingness to remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, pointing to its assistance

to the Colombian peace talks as fresh evidence for the decision. This would remove a major irritant in U.S.-Cuba relations, allow a greater share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce, and free up resources to tackle serious threats to the homeland from other sources like Iran. We should also consider authorizing payments for exports to Cuba through financing issued by U.S. banks and granting a general license to allow vessels that have entered Cuban ports to enter U.S. ports without having to wait six months. You can also facilitate technical assistance on market-oriented reforms from international financial institutions by signaling your intent to drop outright

opposition to such moves. Under this chapeau of direct talks, your administration can seek a negotiated solution to the thorny issue of U.S. and Cuban citizens serving long prison sentences, thereby catalyzing progress toward removing a major obstacle to improving bilateral relations. You should, in parallel, also take unilateral steps to expand direct contacts with the Cuban people by: • authorizing financial and technical assistance to the burgeoning class of small businesses and cooperatives and permitting Americans to donate and trade in goods and services with those that are certified as independent entrepreneurs, artists, farmers,

professionals and craftspeople; • adding new categories for general licensed travel to Cuba for Americans engaged in services to

the independent economic sector, e.g., law, real estate, insurance, accounting, financial services; • granting general licenses for other travelers currently authorized

only under specific licenses, such as freelance journalists, professional researchers, athletes, and representatives of humanitarian organizations and private foundations; • increasing or eliminating the cap on cash and gifts that non- Cuban Americans can send to individuals, independent businesses and families in Cuba; • eliminating the daily expenditure cap for U.S. citizens visiting Cuba and removing the prohibition on the use of U.S. credit and bank cards in Cuba; • authorizing the reestablishment of ferry services to Cuba; • expanding the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including items like school and art supplies, athletic equipment, water and

food preparation systems, retail business machines, and telecommunications equipment (currently allowed only as donations). The steps recommended above would give your

administration the tools to have a constructive dialogue with the Cuban government based on a set of measures that 1) would engage Cuban leaders in high-level, face-to-face negotiations on matters that directly serve U.S. interests in

a secure, stable, prosperous and free Cuba; and 2) allow you to assert executive authority to take unilateral steps that would increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. To take this step, you will have to contend with negative reactions from a vocal, well-organized minority of members of Congress who increasingly are out of step with their constituents on this issue. Your initiative should be presented as a set of concrete measures to assist the Cuban people, which is well within current congressional mandates, and as a way to break the stalemate in

resolving the case of U.S. citizen Alan Gross (his wife is calling for direct negotiations). Those are winnable arguments. But you will need to be prepared for some unhelpful criticism along the way. Conclusion: Current U.S. policy long ago outlived its usefulness and is counterproductive to advancing the goal of helping the Cuban people. Instead it gives Cuban officials the ability to demonize the United States in the eyes of Cubans, other Latin Americans and the rest of the world, which annually condemns the embargo at the United Nations. At this rate, given hardening attitudes in the

region against U.S. policy, the Cuba problem may even torpedo your next presidential Summit of the Americas in Panama in 2015. It is time for a new approach: an initiative to test

the willingness of the Cuban government to engage constructively alongside an effort to empower the Cuban people.

US financing is necessary to avoid hyperinflation and internal violenceMorris ’11 (Emily, London Metropolitan University UK, FORECASTING CUBA’S ECONOMY: 2, 5, AND 20 YEARS, Presented at the international symposium “Cuba Futures: Past and Present,” organized by The Cuba Project Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies at The Graduate Center/CUNY, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/cuba/cubaforecasting.pdf)

Risks in the medium term Five years is a very long time in politics, and with the near certainty of both a generational transition and a deep and disruptive overhaul of the system of economic

management and structure of relative prices, forecasting is particularly hazardous. The one-party political system will be severely tested. If the government were to

collapse, the range of possible scenarios would be huge: the economy might collapse in to chaos and hyperinflation amidst violent conflict, or enjoy a US financed boom , depending on the circumstances. However, It is worth noting that, as ever, the probability of

government collapse remains smaller than is estimated by those hoping for a political transition. If it were not, the exercise of forecasting a survival scenario would perhaps be a futile one. Forecasting Cuba’s Economy: 2, 5, and 20

Years 21 Even in the absence of political collapse, there remain substantial risks of economic instability and weakness. The reform process, which includes the removal of subsidies and extensive realignment of relative prices and incomes, will create inflationary pressures that will be hard to contain. The forecast of a steady rise in average productivity is derived from an expectation that the positive impact of the introduction of market signals and

improvement in incentives will outweigh the disruption costs. The slow rate of average real income growth would imply continued pressure on the government to maintain subsidies for basic goods and extend welfare provision to households struggling to adapt to the new conditions, draining fiscal resources and increasing the temptation to raise taxes on productive activity to levels that discourage innovation and enterprise, or push activity back from the formal economy to the informal sector. If Cuba’s reform wave were to coincide with deteriorating external conditions, rather than the relatively benign scenario presented in the EIU’s global assumptions, the political and economic risks would be greater. The danger of upsets in the global economy remains heightened by concerns about high debt levels and sluggish growth in the EU and Europe, and inflated asset prices among the rapidly-growing economies of the developing world. A deterioration in global conditions might feed through to Cuban economic performance through collapse in the nickel price or surge in oil or food prices, or a sudden contraction in tourist arrivals. The single event that would have the greatest negative impact on Cuba’s economic prospects, however, would be the replacement of Hugo Chávez with a

hostile regime in Venezuela, particularly if this were to coincide with high international oil prices. A similar degree of shock , but on the positive side, would arise from the lifting of the US travel ban, opening of the US market to Cuban exports or removal of restrictions on US and multilateral financial flows to Cuba.

Cuban instability causes Latin American instabilityGorrell 5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war . Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals;

this time the number could be several hundred thousand flee ing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶

Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems.

Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in

1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated . Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency . The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The

only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity , so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China . What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

That causes global conflictManwaring ‘5 – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson(Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism . These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption,

intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy.

At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace

generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is

that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his

Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity .65

Improves Economic Ties

Removing the embargo boosts economic ties – allows long term reformsHinderdael 11 M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment [Klaas Hinderdael, Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, by http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true]

Economic ImplicationsIn 2008, the UN general Assembly, voting 185 to 3, rejected the US economic embargo on Cuba; it has done so every year since 1992.31 the United States is isolated in its approach to Cuba policy. As the island rapidly expands its economic and diplomatic ties with other countries, America increasingly sacrifices the potential economic benefits of trading with Cuba. Worse yet, its economic policies with regard to Cuba appear impractical in light of its policies toward other Communist governments.By signing bilateral trade agreements with China and Vietnam, in 1999 and 2001 respectively, the United States has indicated a willingness to actively build economic ties with countries that, while Communist, have enacted economic reforms and largely reintegrated themselves into the international community. In the wake of Raúl’s reform agenda, the island has diplomatic relations with over 160 nations and has significantly increased foreign investment.32 As such, it is generally speculated that Raúl Castro favors continued adoption of Chinese political and economic models, which would allow Cuba to maintain elements of its socialist system.33The economic benefits stemming from even limited trade with Cuba are unmistakable . After Bill Clinton signed into law the Trade Sanctions Reform Act (TSRA) in early 2000, exports to Cuba jumped from $4 million in 2001 to $392 million in 2004, and $710 million in 2008.34 Despite importing only food and medical products, Cuba has ranked as high as twenty-fifth among importers of American products.35 these economic benefits have further diversified the political debate, amplifying the influence of Midwestern congressmen, many of whose constituencies profit significantly from the sale of corn, poultry, wheat, and soybeans to Cuba.36Business groups, politicians, and economists are also illuminating the benefits of ending the embargo . Kenneth Lippner, a university of Miami economist, estimates that the embargo costs the Florida economy between $750 million and $1 billion per year.37 far short of ending the Cuban embargo, the Department of transportation found that simply ending unrestricted travel to Cuba for all Americans would generate up to $1.6 billion annually, and somewhere between 17,000 and 23,000 jobs.38 With such economic and political gains to be made, it is no surprise that the legislatures of California, Texas, and many others have already passed resolutions for improving and opening economic relations with Cuba.Early in the nineteenth century, Cuba and the United States became inseparable as trade relations and the slave trade grew; big American businesses continued to prosper in the country until Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution. Despite having blocked itself off from trade with Cuba ever since, geographic proximity, as well as Cuba’s need for cheap agricultural goods, provide a strong basis for future trade. At the moment, Cuba is already buying more food from the United States than any other country, and Raúl has indicated that it would purchase much more with eased restrictions.39Ending the embargo would also help Cubans, lowering the cost of consumer goods and raising the standards of living, while simultaneously challenging Raúl’s assertions of American imperialism. In realizing that the embargo is too insignificant to have a fatal impact on the Cuban government, and that the usage of sanctions and practice of isolation are no way to be seen as a credible advocate of democratic reform, American policymakers should realize that the economic embargo only diminishes the United States’ ability to influence change in Cuba. Furthermore, over time, increased economic ties can provide the leverage needed to push for political reforms. As a result, with regard to economic and political return, there is little reason to keep the economic embargo in place. Its repeal should be easy to sell to the American people given popular domestic support, recent Cuban internal reforms, and the precedent set with Vietnam and China. It would also provide the United States with a more united front when confronting key Cuban issues by not drawing the ire of the UN for its policies toward the island. Most importantly, repealing the embargo could guide the two countries toward improved relations by employing economic policies that are mutually beneficial.

Plan helps Cuban Businesses

Lifting the embargo will help Cuban businesses and investors - opportunitiesSpadoni & Sagebien 13 a. assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Augusta State b. associate professor at the School of Business Administration and an adjunct professor in the International Development Studies program in the College of Sustainability at Dalhousie University, Canada [Paolo Spadoni & Julia Sagebien, Will They Still Love Us Tomorrow? Canada-Cuba Business Relations and the End of the US Embargo, Thunderbird International Business Review, Volume 55, Issue 1, pages 77–93, January/February 2013, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/tie.21524/full]

Long Term: Greater Liberalization in Cuba and the End of the EmbargoMajor liberalizing changes on the island and a movement toward the elimination of all US trade, investment, and financial restrictions with respect to Cuba should gather pace once Fidel Castro passes away and Raúl is replaced by a new generation of younger leaders. This new scenario will dramatically increase pressure on Canada's market share in Cuba because of US competition and, at the same time, stimulate competition among Canadian firms.Canadian investors should suffer less than traders from a complete lifting of the US embargo (Ritter, 2010a). After all, they have been active in Cuba for years and gained very good direct market knowledge. Considering the latest trends, and whether or not it was ever truly important, Havana's appreciation for Canada's long-time investment presence on the island does not seem to carry as much weight as it used to. And there is little reason to assume that it will matter at some point in the future. Institutionalized knowledge along with quality and efficiency will be key factors to success. In a postembargo Cuba that relies heavily on free-market mechanisms and practices, there should be opportunities for Canadian companies to expand their investment activities, establish new enterprises, and work on joint projects with firms from Canada and other countries. Canadian hotel groups, no longer worried about their exposure to the US market, could participate more vigorously in the Cuban tourism industry. Canadian banks should benefit for the same reason. The Bank of Nova Scotia, which had major deposits in Cuba before the revolution along with the Royal Bank, backed away from providing loans to Canadians wishing to invest in Cuba during the 1990s largely out of fear of running afoul the Helms-Burton law and jeopardizing its investments in the United States (Kirk & McKenna, 1997, p. 16; McKenna & Kirk, 1998). Even in the telecommunications sector, where the United States would naturally become the primary supplier of services to Cuba, there could be room for Canadian firms to participate with other investors and service companies.

Dollar Access Denied

Embargo keeps Cuba from operating with the dollar – impedes investmentGordon 12 Professor of Philosophy at Fairfield University, and Senior Fellow at the Global Justice Program, MacMillan Center for Area and International Studies, Yale [Joy Gordon, The U.S. Embargo against Cuba and the Diplomatic Challenges to Extraterritoriality, VOL. 36:1 WINTER 2012, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs]

IMPACTS OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURESInternational bankingThe U.S. embargo measures interfere in Cuba's access to international banks in several ways, even when they are not U.S. financial institutions. The United States prohibits Cuba from engaging in any transactions in U.S. dollars, and likewise prohibits any bank—including foreign banks— from facilitating commercial transactions by Cuba in U.S. dollars. In recent years, particularly under the Bush administration, the United States has enforced the banking provisions aggressively. The United States fined the Swiss bank UBS $100 million for engaging in U.S. dollar transactions with Cuba, and also imposed smaller fines on Italian and Spanish banks. In 2006, the United States blacklisted the Dutch bank, UNG, which had done business in Cuba for over a decade; the following year UNG terminated its banking operations in Cuba." In 2009, the Treasury Department imposed a fine of $5.75 million on the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Ltd., for financial transactions involving Cuba and Sudan, and also fined Credit Suisse Bank almost half a billion dollars for financial transactions involving Cuba and other countries subject to U.S. embargoes.'^By 2007, in spite of their own national legislation prohibiting compliance with the U.S. embargo, a number of major Canadian and European banks stopped doing business with Cuba including Barclays, the Bank of Nova Scotia, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, and HSBC'' These measures impede Cuba's commerce in a number of ways. For many transactions, there are additional costs in using currencies other than the dollar. Because so many major international banks no longer provide banking services to Cuba out of fear of U.S. retaliation, Cuba has had to turn to other banks, which charge higher rates for their services. For 1998, a State Department official maintained that, because of U.S. measu res, interest rates for financing Cuban development projects reached 22 percent.'* In 2009, Cuba estimated that the losses related to financing costs attributable to the embargo came to $164 million."

International Institution Access

Embargo keeps Cuba from working with International Financial Institutions like the IMF and World BankGordon 12 Professor of Philosophy at Fairfield University, and Senior Fellow at the Global Justice Program, MacMillan Center for Area and International Studies, Yale [Joy Gordon, The U.S. Embargo against Cuba and the Diplomatic Challenges to Extraterritoriality, VOL. 36:1 WINTER 2012, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs]

Global effectsIn some regards, because of the extraordinary power held by the United States in many domains, the U.S. unilateral embargo functions as a global embargo. The Helms-Burton Act effectively blocks Cuba's access to global financial institutions—including the International Monetary the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank—by requiring the U.S. representatives on their boards to vote against granting Cuba member- ship or access to loans or development funds. Because voting is weighted, it is nearly impossible for any of these orga-nizations to admit Cuba or provide loans or development aid. In the IMF, the United States holds almost 17 percent of the votes; only three other countries—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—hold more than 4 percent of the votes. By contrast, over 90 countries hold 0.1 percent of the vote or less.^'^ The World Bank has roughly the same structure.^^ In the unlikely event that the U.S. vote is not sufficient to deny Cuba access to financing from the organization, the Helms-Burton Act would then impose punitive measures: if the institution were to somehow extend loans or aid to Cuba, the United States will reduce its contribution to that institution by the same amount."Cuba's lack of access to major global financial institutions has been particularly damaging in the context of Cuba's economic crisis, "increasing the difficulties of negotiating debt settlements and credit with public and commercial creditors, including Paris Club creditors."^' The UN coordinator of aid activities in Cuba notes that, while it is difficult to quantify the effect of this exclusion, "Cuba is one of the few countries in the world facing a deep restructuring of its economy without assistance from international financial institutions."'"There are also other ways in which the U.S. embargo effectively excludes Cuba from global financial networks. For example, international monetary transfers between banks take place through a network called the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system Without access to this system, it is not possible to wire money or deposit a check sent from another country. The SWIFT system has released new software which will be the only means of accessing the system starting in March 2012. The SWIFT network has informed Cuba that it will not provide Cuba with this software, "because it contains United States technologies and components subject to the restrictions of the economic embargo.""

Cuba Failed State

Solves risk of a Cuban failed statePerez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Aside from the strategic importance of this issue, addressing these concerns might also prevent more serious problems in the future. Although the chances of a post-Castro Cuba becoming a failed state are slim, the threat is nevertheless real . If the state were to collapse, the island could plunge into civil war, face a humanitarian crisis, become a major drug trafficking center, experience a massive migration to Florida, or endure a combination of each. However, a new and comprehensive policy toward Cuba can help prevent these nightmare scenarios from materializing.

Disease & Biomed Research

Boosts disease & biomedical researchIglesias 12 Commander of the US Navy – Army War College Publication [Carlos Iglesias, United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba, 10 March 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408]

*GOC = Government of Cuba

Another major market where U.S.-Cuban cooperation promises mutual benefits are biomedical and pharmaceutical industries. With similar rates of major diseases (e.g. cancer and diabetes) the common benefits would be more than just economic. Long proud of its “first world” medical research and training, the GOC has touted an advanced medical capacity. While Cuban Democracy Act restrictions on medicines have impeded cooperation historically, there have been some recent instances of innovation partnering. A notable example was the U.S. Treasury’s 2004 permission for CancerVax, a California biotechnology company, to conduct clinical trials and license a group of experimental cancer drugs that originated in Cuba. 85

Oil Drilling – Embargo Key

Lifting the embargo necessary for cooperative oil drillingREUTERS 08 [Cuban oil production could be a catalyst for a change in relations with U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-cubaoil.4.13670441.html]

Sometime next year, Cuba plans to begin drilling a major oil field off its northern coast that might do what little else has done - bring change to U.S-Cuba relations.In a rare confluence of circumstances - including a new leader in Havana and a new one coming to the United States, as well as record-high crude oil prices - a new petroleum source could grease the wheels for the two longtime foes to reunite out of mutual need, experts say.Getting there would require a sea change in U.S. policy, namely altering the U.S. trade embargo imposed against Cuba in 1962 to try to topple Fidel Castro's Communist government.If the embargo remains as is, a nearby source of oil will be off limits to the United States, and the American oil industry will miss out on billions of dollars of business.Opponents of the embargo rule out any change until President George W. Bush, who has toughened the embargo, leaves office next year.

Cuba Economy Advantage

Collapse Now / Plan Solves***High risk for Cuban economic collapse – now is the key time, only the plan solvesMorris ’11 (Emily, London Metropolitan University UK, FORECASTING CUBA’S ECONOMY: 2, 5, AND 20 YEARS, Presented at the international symposium “Cuba Futures: Past and Present,” organized by The Cuba Project Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies at The Graduate Center/CUNY, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/cuba/cubaforecasting.pdf)

Risks in the medium termFive years is a very long time in politics, and with the near certainty of both a generational transition and a deep and disruptive overhaul of the system of economic management and structure of relative prices, forecasting is particularly hazardous. The one-party political system will be severely tested. If the government were to collapse, the range of possible scenarios would be huge: the economy might collapse in to chaos and hyperinflation amidst violent conflict, or enjoy a US financed boom , depending on the circumstances. However, It is worth noting that, as ever, the probability of government collapse remains smaller than is estimated by those hoping for a political transition. If it were not, the exercise of forecasting a survival scenario would perhaps be a futile one. Forecasting Cuba’s Economy: 2, 5, and 20 Years 21 Even in the absence of political collapse, there remain substantial risks of economic instability and weakness. The reform process, which includes the removal of subsidies and extensive realignment of relative prices and incomes, will create inflationary pressures that will be hard to contain. The forecast of a steady rise in average productivity is derived from an expectation that the positive impact of the introduction of market signals and improvement in incentives will outweigh the disruption costs. The slow rate of average real income growth would imply continued pressure on the government to maintain subsidies for basic goods and extend welfare provision to households struggling to adapt to the new conditions, draining fiscal resources and increasing the temptation to raise taxes on productive activity to levels that discourage innovation and enterprise, or push activity back from the formal economy to the informal sector. If Cuba’s reform wave were to coincide with deteriorating external conditions, rather than the relatively benign scenario presented in the EIU’s global assumptions, the political and economic risks would be greater. The danger of upsets in the global economy remains heightened by concerns about high debt levels and sluggish growth in the EU and Europe, and inflated asset prices among the rapidly-growing economies of the developing world. A deterioration in global conditions might feed through to Cuban economic performance through collapse in the nickel price or surge in oil or food prices, or a sudden contraction in tourist arrivals. The single event that would have the greatest negative impact on Cuba’s economic prospects, however, would be the replacement of Hugo Chávez with a hostile regime in Venezuela, particularly if this were to coincide with high international oil prices. A similar degree of shock , but on the positive side, would arise from the lifting of the US travel ban, opening of the US market to Cuban exports or removal of restrictions on US and multilateral financial flows to Cuba.

Plan K2 Cuban ReformsIncreasing US ties by removing the embargo is critical to Cuba’s transition CSG ’13 (Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba February 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032)

Repealing Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions that limit the Executive Branch’s authority over Cuba policy.Over time, U.S. policies toward Communist countries with poor human rights records and histories of adversarial relations—such as China and Vietnam—have evolved toward diplomatic normalization and economic engagement. Policymakers in both parties have rightly judged that engagement, rather than isolation, better serves U.S. national interests and lends greater credibility to calls for political and economic reform. The Cuba Study Group believes the most effective way to break the deadlock of “all-or-nothing” conditionality and remedy the ineffectiveness of current U.S. policy is by de-codifying the embargo against Cuba through the repeal of Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions that limit the Executive Branch’s authority over Cuban policy.xviii Repealing Helm-Burton and related statutory provisions would shift the primary focus of U.S. Cuba policy away from the regime and toward empowering Cuban people. It would also enhance the leverage of the United States to promote a multilateral approach toward Cuba, as well as embolden reformers, democracy advocates and private entrepreneurs inside the island to press their government for greater change. www.CubaStudyGroup.org 8 De-codifying the embargo would allow the Executive Branch the flexibility to use the entire range of foreign policy tools at its disposal—diplomatic, economic, political, legal and cultural—to incentivize change in Cuba. The President would be free to adopt more efficient, targeted policies necessary for pressuring the Cuban leadership to respect human rights and implement political reforms, while simultaneously empowering all other sectors of society to pursue their economic wellbeing and become the authors of their own futures.xix Repealing Helms-Burton would also free civil society development and assistance programs to be implemented outside of a contentious sanctions framework. Repealing the extraterritorial provisions of Helms-Burton would allow the United States greater leverage in persuading the international community, especially key regional partners, to adopt a multilateral and targeted approach toward focusing on the advancement of human rights in Cuba. This would fundamentally transform the international dynamic that has long helped the Cuban government stifle dissent, since its efforts to isolate critics at home would increasingly lead to its own isolation from the international community. While it is difficult to prove a direct causal connection between economic reforms and an open society, modern history has taught us that it is increasingly difficult for dictatorial governments to maintain political control the more prosperity their people enjoy.xx Repealing Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions would allow the U.S. the ability to efficiently promote and provide direct support to Cuba’s private sector. Such support would empower a greater plurality within Cuban society, including government reformers, democracy advocates, Cuban entrepreneurs and society as a whole by increasing their access to the resources and expertise of the world’s most prosperous private sector (and largest Cuban diaspora), located a mere 90 miles from Cuba’s shores. In turn, this would enhance the relative power of Cuban society to that of the state, while stripping the latter of its preferred scapegoat for its oppressive practices and economic blunders. U.S. policy should also seek to incentivize the Cuban government to end state monopolies on economic activities and allow greater private participation in the economy. The Cuba Study Group believes that any forthcoming congressional review of current legislation relating to Cuba, such as a review of the Cuban Adjustment Act, must require a review of the totality of the legislative framework codified in HelmsBurton and related statutory provisions so that the United States may finally develop a coherent policy toward the Island. The U.S. should pursue this course of action independent of actions taken by the Cuban government so as not to place the reigns of U.S. policy in the hands of Cuban proponents of the status quo.

Removes the biggest “crutch” of Cuban economic dependency CSG ’13 (Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba February 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032)

The primary consequences of Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions have been to isolate the United States from Cuba and to serve as a political scapegoat for the Cuban government’s many failures. It has become a “Great Crutch” to all sides of the Cuba debate. First, for ordinary Cubans, their struggle has fallen hostage to an international dispute between their government and the United States, which they see themselves as powerless to affect. For the Cuban leadership, it has become easier to blame the embargo than to adopt the difficult reforms needed to fix their economy. Lastly, for defenders of the status-quo within the Cuban-American community, it has become easier to wait for the United States to solve our national problem rather than engage in the difficult and necessary processes of reconciliation and reunification. Helms-Burton indiscriminately impacts all sectors of Cuban society, including democracy advocates and private entrepreneurs, causing disproportionate economic damage to the most vulnerable segments of the population. Conditioning our policy of resource denial on sweeping political reforms has only served to strengthen the Cuban government. The scarce resources available in an authoritarian Cuba have been and continue to be allocated primarily based on political priorities, thereby increasing the state’s relative power and its ability to control its citizens. The majority of American voters, Cuban-Americans and Cuban democracy advocates in the Island have rejected isolation as an element of U.S. policy toward Cuba and have called on the U.S. government to implement a policy of greater contact and exchange with Cuban society.ii As Cuba undergoes a slow and uncertain process of reforms, the continued existence of blanket U.S. sanctions only hinders the types of political reforms that Helms-Burton demands. Instead of maintaining a rigid policy that ties our hands and obsesses over hurting the Cuban leadership, U.S. policymakers should adopt a results-oriented policy that focuses primarily on empowering the Cuban people while simultaneously pressing the Cuban government to cease its repressive practices and respect fundamental human www.CubaStudyGroup.org 3 rights. Repealing Helms-Burton would also free civil society development and assistance programs to be implemented outside of a contentious sanctions framework. Furthermore, the Cuba Study Group believes that any forthcoming congressional review of current legislation relating to Cuba, such as a review of the Cuban Adjustment Act, must require a review of the totality of the legislative framework codified in Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions so that the United States may finally develop a coherent policy toward the Island.

Remittances InternalRemittances are key – removing the embargo solvesJorge 2k (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000).Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers.Paper 28. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)

In fact, the only reason why the Cuban economy has not utterly collapsed is because of the hefty remittances it continues to receive from various sources. The two main ones originate from Cuban exiles and non-governmental organizations in the United States. Annual income flows from the former on the order of US$800 million in-kind and cash, on top of other aid by philanthropic organizations worth a few hundred million dollars, should serve to dispose of the purely humanitarian objections to the embargo. Additionally, Cuba has succeeded in persuading some European and Latin American countries, as well as Japan and Canada, to finance its cumulative level of external indebtedness, mainly in the form of short-term commercial credit. These credits have allowed Cuba to run exceptionally high and growing deficits in its commercial balance during the 1990s. This situation, however, seems to be coming to an end, as non-performing loans keep on accumulating and as Cuba proves unable to repay principal or interest on them.

Trade Deficit InternalPlan boosts trade to CubaCopeland ’11 (Cassandra, Division of Economics and Business Administration, Oglethorpe University, The History and Potential of Trade between Cuba and the US, Journal of Economics and Business, 2011, http://www.auburn.edu/~thomph1/cubahistory.pdf)

Relaxed travel and financial restrictions would increase trade. Florida has advanced in trade negotiations and operations but the product trade mix may favor other states. Positive effects on manufacturing are possible for major US exports including transport equipment and chemicals. There will be limited import competition in manufacturing until investment in Cuba improves infrastructure, machinery, and equipment to take advantage of cheaper labor. The Castro regime has emphasized social services including education, the 95% literacy rate suggesting potential for 13 quick growth. Any competition would be in labor intensive products. The US has already adjusted to such imports from Mexico in NAFTA and from Asia in the WTO. Trade with Cuba provides the opportunity for increased demand for US business services including engineering, construction, shipping, transport, banking, finance, insurance, and consulting. Tourism is expected to become a major industry, with Cuba already claiming interest in promoting multi-destination Caribbean tourism. Increased political pressure to liberalize trade can be expected as more US firms and workers become aware of the potential gains. Most Cubans in Miami now favor diplomatic relations with Cuba as well as limited trade according to the Institute for Public Opinion Research (2007). The US International Trade Commission conservatively estimates the embargo costs the US $1.2 billion annually in lost export revenue, not a huge amount but focused on particular industries and regions. The embargo costs the Southeastern US in particular. There remains little rationale for the embargo as it failed to reach any political objective and strengthened Castro. The Helms-Burton Act is also inconsistent with US policy that maintained relations with former communist adversaries. The Act pushes the limits of international agreements and procedures of the WTO as pointed out by Lisio (1996). Figure 12 shows the US was Cuba’s major trading partner before the embargo, a historical pattern poised to return with a lifted embargo. * Figure 12 * 4. Conclusion Cuba is poised to integrate into the regional economy including the US Southeast and the Caribbean. Except for protectionism, Cuba would have been a US state and the economic history of the region would have taken a different track. The embargo of the last half century is an economic tragedy that has suppressed development in the region encompassing the US Southeast. The 14 present look at history suggests trade and investment between the US and Cuba will return to substantial levels with a lifted embargo.

Trade deficit is key to Cuba’s economyJorge 2k (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000).Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers.Paper 28. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)

A telling indication of the lack of competitiveness of the Cuban economy is the fact that the magnitude of the steadily escalating annual deficits in foreign trade (nearly US$2 billion at the close of the 1990s) comes close to the total value of commodities exported by the country. At the same time, a sustained increase in the level of imported goods without a corresponding growth in the GSP point to the internal inefficiency of the economy. Otherwise, the disastrous performance of Cuba’s economy has been abundantly documented and does not bear detailed repetition. Enormous subsidies to both manufacturing and agricultural enterprises — including, in the case of the latter, over two-thirds of the non-sugar cane

growing, so-called basic units of agricultural production (BUAP/UBPC) and practically all those dedicated to the cultivation of sugar cane — constitute unexceptionable testimony to the overall insolvency of the economy. 14

EXT – Bioterror ImpactBioterror risk is high and neg takeouts are wrong – qualified experts confirm. Deutch 5 (John Deutch, qualified inside this piece of evidence, is now at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology – Meeting the Bioterrorism Challenge: Testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness -- May 11, 2005 -- http://web.mit.edu/chemistry/deutch/policy/72MeetingBioterroism2005.pdf)I base my views on my experience as Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of Defens e in the first Clinton administration, as a member of President George H.W. Bush’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as chairman of the Commission on the Organization of the Government to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and from the mid-seventies, my service on many Defense Science Board and other government advisory committees, that addressed various aspects of the weapons of mass destruction threat. My views align closely with most who have studied the threat of bioterrorist and our biodefense preparedness. At the World Economic Conference this January I served on a panel with Majority Leader Frist, a member of this subcommittee, that addressed bioterrorism and I believe our views on this important subject are quite similar. My assessment of the threat is as follows: o

Terrorist groups with international reach, such as al Qaeda, have shown interest in bio logical weapons. The technology for producing biological agents and dispersal mechanisms is well known and easily within the capacity of terrorist organizations . Thus the threat is real . o We are fortunate that the U nited States, our allies, and our deployed military forces have not yet been subject to a large-scale biological attack . The l ikelihood of an attack, our vulnerability to an attack, and the need to prevent catastrophic consequences, means that biodefense deserves to be a national priority. o Despite the many warning, and some progress by the various involved government agencies, including Health and Human Services (HHS) and its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and National Institutes of Health, (NIH), and the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), our territory, citizens, agriculture and livestock remain unacceptably vulnerable to a catastrophic biological agent attack. State and local government cannot possibly deal with these events without significant technical and financial help from the federal government. o In the near term, the agents of greatest concern are anthrax and smallpox. In the longer term, it is entirely possible that new classes of pathogens will be developed based on modern molecular biology and biotechnology techniques that will be more virulent and more difficult to detect and to treat. o To my knowledge, no comprehensive multi-year program plan exists that integrates the efforts of the various agencies required to improve our nation’s biodefense posture.

Impact – Korea War

Gorrell says Latin American instability spills over to Korea

Korean war goes nuclearSTRATFOR ‘10 (International Think Tank, “North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on the Peninsula,” http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100526_north_korea_south_korea_military_balance_peninsula, May 26, 2010)So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could precipitate escalation — that would be beyond the control of Pyongyang or Seoul. With both sides on high alert , both adhering to their own national (and contradictory) definitions of where disputed boundaries lie and with rules of engagement loosened, the potential for sudden and rapid escalation is quite real . Indeed, North Korea’s navy, though sizable on paper, is largely a hollow shell of old, laid-up vessels. What remains are small fast attack craft and submarines — mostly Sang-O “Shark” class boats and midget submersibles. These vessels are best employed in the cluttered littoral environment to bring asymmetric tactics to bear — not unlike those Iran has prepared for use in the Strait of Hormuz. These kinds of vessels and tactics — including, especially, the deployment of naval mines — are poorly controlled when dispersed in a crisis and are often impossible to recall. For nearly 40 years, tensions on the Korean Peninsula were managed within the context of the wider Cold War. During that time it was feared that a second Korean War could all too easily escalate into and a thermonuclear World War III , so both Pyongyang and Seoul were being heavily managed from their respective corners. In fact, USFK was long designed to ensure that South Korea could not independently provoke that war and drag the Americans into it, which for much of the Cold War period was of far greater concern to Washington than North Korea attacking southward. Today, those constraints no longer exist. There are certainly still constraints — neither the United States nor China wants war on the peninsula. But current tensions are quickly escalating to a level unprecedented in the post-Cold War period, and the constraints that do exist have never been tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.

Impact – Africa War

Gorrell says Latin American instability spills over to Africa

Great power warGlick ‘7 - Senior Middle East Fellow – Center for Security Policy (Caroline, “Condi’s African Holiday”, 12-12, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568)

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars , which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars . Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox , which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers . The Horn of Africa includes the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya.

Impact – Caucus War

Gorrell says Latin American instability triggers wars in the caucus

Central Asia war would trigger WWIII F. William Engdhal, Global Research Associate, 10/11/08, “The Caucasus —Washington Risks nuclear war by miscalculation” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9790

So far, each step in the Caucasus drama has put the conflict on a yet higher plane of danger. The next step will no longer be just about the Caucasus, or even Europe. In 1914 it was the "Guns of August" that initiated the Great War. This time the Guns of August 2008 could be the detonator of World War III and a nuclear holocaust of unspeakable horror. Nuclear Primacy: the larger strategic danger Most in the West are unaware how dangerous the conflict over two tiny provinces in a remote part of Eurasia has become. What is left out of most all media coverage is the strategic military security context of the Caucasus dispute. Since the end of the Cold War in the beginning of the 1990’s NATO and most directly Washington have systematically pursued what military strategists call Nuclear Primacy. Put simply, if one of two opposing nuclear powers is able to first develop an operational anti-missile defense, even primitive, that can dramatically weaken a potential counter-strike by the opposing side’s nuclear arsenal, the side with missile defense has "won" the nuclear war. As mad as this sounds, it has been explicit Pentagon policy through the last three Presidents from father Bush in 1990, to Clinton and most aggressively, George W. Bush. This is the issue where Russia has drawn a deep line in the sand, understandably so. The forceful US effort to push Georgia as well as Ukraine into NATO would present Russia with the spectre of NATO literally coming to its doorstep, a military threat that is aggressive in the extreme, and untenable for Russian national security. This is what gives the seemingly obscure fight over two provinces the size of Luxemburg the potential to become the 1914 Sarajevo trigger to a new nuclear war by miscalculation. The trigger for such a war is not Georgia’s right to annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Rather, it is US insistence on pushing NATO and its missile defense right up to Russia’s door.