cuban missile crisis d2

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CARIBBEAN

CRISIS

Subtitle


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Berkay Ertugrul

Caribbean Crisis, a missile crisis on October 1962 in

Cuba. The strongest trigger to turn the Cold War into a

Hot War. The little detonator to a world war, possibly a

demolish of humankind for generations. The crisis which

led people into fear, more than ever in history. A fear,

which may become true only in seconds, anytime!

What? When? How? Which? Why? Whoa!?

You have questions? Flip the page.

CARIBBEAN

CRISIS


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The Caribbean Crisis, also known as the October Crisis,

with the most common name of the Cuban Missile Crisis,

referred as the crisis in our book, took place in Cuba by the

placement of nuclear missiles by a nation hostile to the United

States of America (USA), the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-

lics (USSR or the Soviet Union). The crisis created a huge ten-

sion between NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances and the main

belligerents were USA, Italy, Turkey opposed by USSR and

Cuba.

Unlike a traditional crisis, there werent many casualties in this

crisis. 1 U-2 Spy Aircraft was shot down and 1 was damaged.

Even in cold war, where military engagements werent activemuch, there were more casualties in most of the other crisis.

However, unlike all the other crisis during cold war, the Cuban

Missile Crisis held the most danger in it.

CONTENTS

!Introduction to the Crisis -Section I, Page 4

!Background Information -Section II, Page

!Necessary Information; Strategies and doctrines -Section III, Page

!Pre-Crisis; Alteration on USAs Policies and Talks onUSSR Alliance&Access and the Events -SectionIV, Page

! The Crisis; Placing the Missiles -Section V, Page

!During-Crisis; U.S. Executive Committee of NationalSecurity Council -Section VI, Page

!During-Crisis; International Stage -Section VII,Page

! The Agreement, Ending the Crisis, Analyses and theBenefits of USSR -Section VIII, Page

!Post-Crisis; Affects of the crisis to influence of theleaders of USSR, USA and Canada -Section IX,Page

!Post-Crisis; The diplomatic relations between USSR,USA and Canada; including theories and suggestions-Section X, Page

!Post-Crisis; International Stage -Section XI,Page

!Additional Information, Theories -Section XII,Page 1-?

2

Introduction

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Monroe is a foreign policy doctrine written by US President

James Monroe in 1823. The author of the doctrine was the Sec-

retary of State John Quincy Adams.

The doctrine states the standing of the USA against colonialismor any internal affairs intervention from overseas into Americas.

This doctrine has been an official US Foreign policy between

1823 and 2013. Barrack Obamas Secretary of State John Kerry

declared the expiration of the doctrine in November 2013.

-

Johnson, Keith (November 18, 2013). "Kerry Makes It

Official: Era of Monroe Doctrine Is Over". Wall

Street Journal.

This doctrine is being associated with the isolationist policies of

the USA. In order to ensure her security, her neighbours have to

be an ally, in her control, pro-US or at least neutral. An oppos-

ing regime or an hostile or a possible-to-turn-hostile control

shall be prevented in order to ensure complete US Defense and

Security.

SECTION CONTENTS

! 1823 Monroe Doctrine

! Spanish-American War

!Impacts of Imperialism

!

The Cuban Revolution!Revolution and Monroe

! The Bay of Pigs Plan

! Operation Mongoose

! U.S. Nuclear Missiles

3

Background

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the Spanish nation is disposed to sacrifice to the last

peseta of its treasure and to the last drop of blood of the last

Spaniard before consenting that anyone snatch from it even onepiece of its territory.

-Spanish Prime Minister Cnovas del Castillo

The Spanish government in late 19th century had a very

strict standing for their colonies and overseas territories.

She also regarded Cuba as one of their provinces, ratherthan a colony. However, he was assassinated in 1897.

Cuba was not a colony of the Spanish Empire, it was an over-

sees territory, meaning that it wasnt a country, it was a prov-

ince, it didnt have an independent army, even garrisons were

under Spanish control and it didnt have any control on its

trade, even the flag was Spanish, not even New Spain. It was

an absolute monarchy with no letting power for the populace.

Even the Government King and the Captain General werent

Cubans, belonged to a Spanish Royal Family and born in

Spain. Before 1607, Cuba had different administration, it be-

longed to another country, not Spain, it belonged to New

Spain. However after 1607, it took a step forward on inde-

pendence and became The Captaincy General of Cuba.

However, this so-called independence led Spain being apart

from a larger and a stronger state New Spain whichd raise

more voice to Spain to a smaller and weaker state. It was

again a colony, the stance didnt change but the name and

the borders did. This led the Cuban people be happy for

awhile for being so-called more independent. In 1812, the

Spanish Constitution declared the territory of Captaincy

General as an internal part of the Spanish Monarchy. The

provincial government had a more limited legislative power

than it had before. After this has happened, the Cuban peo-

ple revolted against Spain in 1868 and fought till 1880 and

failed. They tried one more time in 1895.

This time, in order to avoid a failure, U.S. engaged in. In late

19th century, there were lots of pro-Imperialist people in the

US however in order to lower the opposing presence from

anti-Imperialist people, U.S. used the yellow journalism strat-

egy.

4

Additional Information: Official records state that MicheleAngiolillo assassinated him and the shown reason is that hesan anarchist, however there are theories that the reason for theassassination was overthrowing the strong imperialist govern-ment and replace with a weaker one with unstable politics. So

Michele might be a spy, probably a US Spy.

Additional Information: Theres a theory that U.S. mighthave provoked the revolution, possibly both of the times.

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Official records state that the Spanish shot down a U.S. fleet

and U.S. declared war in order to respond and also liberate

the Cuban people.

Within about a year after the assassination of the previous

Spanish prime minister, the new Spanish government

reached a peace agreement with the U.S., a protocol to the

Peace Treaty of Paris 1898 stated the agreement of relin-

quishment for all sovereignty and title over Cuba. Less than amonth later, on August 12, by the ratification of the Treaty

of Paris, Cuban independence has been recognized.

Because it has been an overseas territory instead of a col-

ony, it even had less independence, it wasnt even a country

and belonged to Spain, directly. Therefore, being a protector-

ate would be a huge step forward for them. A protectorate

within only the Cuban borders. The U.S. claimed Cuba as a

client state, not even by negotiating with the Cuban govern-

ment or inviting to talks with Spain.

For over 50 years, U.S. held Cuba as a client state. U.S. con-

trolled its foreign policies and limited the legislative power

too and of course, U.S. had the right to intervene militarily.

The U.S. also intervened in internal affairs. She ensured

theres no opposition in her client. 1906 invasion and occupa-tion for 4 years after President Palmas regime would be an

example, following with 1912 and 1916 interventions. How-

ever, U.S. didnt want to lose Cuba completely, therefore they

didnt prevent them getting slightly more autonomy in 1933

for legislative powers.

In 1940, Fulgencio Batista came into power as an elected

president. He served until 1944. He managed to have lots of

influence in the government and the army. After awhile, in1952 he came into power again but not by getting elected, by

seizing power in a military coup and canceling 1952 elec-

tions. He was dictatorial and indifferent to many popular con-

cerns.

5

Additional Information: There are theories stating that U.S.shot its own fleet to blame the Spanish. This way, they canavoid being seem as imperialist in the international stage and

protect it s diplomatic relations and prestige. Also, within thecountry.

Additional Information: Theres a theory stating that theU.S. did not intervene against this military coup because Ba-

tista was pro-American and even though it was an unlawfulact, theres no problem to the U.S.

Additional Information: Theres a theory stating that the mili-tary coup by Batista was supported underground by the SovietUnion (might even be without the knowledge of Batista) inorder to prepare ground for further cases.

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Because of the dictatorship of Batista and the ongoing loss

of trust and support for U.S. Imperialism, the public gained

opposition to the Batista government. From 1953 to 1959, Fi-

del Castro militarily revolted against the government to over-

throw it. Castro strongly supported complete independence.

Naturally, because Batista was strongly anti-Communist in

his second term, his biggest opposition Castro was commu-

nist.

Castro was finally successful with his attempt to overthrow

the Batista government after a couple tries and hard times in

prison. He won against Barista, even though Barista had U.S.

support.

The U.S. government immediately took action by trade em-

bargoes. U.S.-Cuban relations were changed significantly.

Cuba was no longer a client state of U.S. and was hostile to

U.S.. Right after the embargo, Cuba faced a strong economic

threat and immediately made a trade agreement with USSR,

sugar export for oil import from USSR.

Castro made lots of significant reforms and improvements.

From declaring officially that Cuba is a Socialist Republic to

not doing discrimination against blacks to declaring the state

as officially Atheist.

The Cuban Revolution led to a communist state occur in

Americas. Just like in Asia, a fear that the domino theory

would work in South America too and damage U.S. - South

American States relations and also lose allies and gain ene-

mies. In addition, even within U.S. the public would start to

support Communism and this might lead to uprisings, riots

and even revolts.

This was violating the Monroe Doctrine, this wasnt even a

small threat, it was an hostile threat which would spread if

not stopped. It was spreading to the American continent.According to the official foreign policy, Monroe Doctrine,

this shall not be allowed and an immediate action should be

taken against the hostile nation. The sphere of influence was

in danger of instability.

6

Additional Information: Theres a theory stating that Batistachanged his stance on Communism in his second term in or-der to avoid getting opposition from the U.S. after the coup. Inhis first term, he wasnt very anti-Communist.

Additional Information: Theres a theory stating that Castrowas being supported by the Soviet Union while in his attemptto overthrow Batista.

Additional Information: The reasons U.S. didnt engage mili-tarily but only sent aid would be as following; not to lose in-

fluence from its public, not to damage diplomatic reputation,underrating the enemy.

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The Bay of Pigs plan is a CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)

plan authorized by U.S. President Eisenhower. However, he

loses the next election and JFK (John F. Kennedy) gets

elected. JFK faces with a tremendous decision when he takes

office in 1961, January, whether or not to go with the Bay ofPigs. Under pressure, he decides hes doing it.

The Bay of Pigs was a plan to overthrow the Castro govern-

ment by using the Cuban exiles.

The plan was more of an intervention, not an invasion.

Therefore, the army didnt gather large forces to attack.

There were 1500 elite CIA ground forces and 8 B-26 bomb-

ers, the Cubans had 25.000 soldiers and 9.000 armed police

force, in addition to

200.000 militia. The cu-

bans had about 5000

losses; killed, wounded or

missing. However the

U.S. forces got caught

and captured, all of

them; killed or captured.

The plan has failed.

After the Bay of Pigs disaster, president JFK created a com-

mittee called Special Group Augmented (SGA) charged

with overthrowing Castros government. The committee was

chaired by president JFKs brother Robert F. Kennedy, the At-

torney General of the U.S..The committee came up with Operation Mongoose, also

known as The Cuban Project. The operation was to assassi-

nate Castro. JFK authorized the operation.

The number of assassination attempts to Castro

is unknown.

-CIA, Library, Center for the Study of Intelligence,

CSI Publica-tions, Studies in Intelligence, Studies, vol49no4, The Castro Obsession,

By Don Bohning, Washington, DC, Potomac Books, 2005, Reviewedby Brian Latell

All the attempts failed. Castro survived.

7

Additional Information:The Bay of Pigs Memo-rial, Miami, Florida.

Additional Information: All the attempts from the inter ven-tion by the Bay of Pigs to the assassination attempts by theCuban Project to overthrow the Castro government has abso-lutely known by both Cuba and the Soviet Union. This mighttrigger a counter response against U.S. aggression.

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In April 1959, details for the

continuing NATO Nuclear

Missile Share Programme

was signed by Italy and in

October 1959, by Turkey.The agreement was to ex-

pand the sharing to missiles

capable of longer ranges,

which can shoot Moscow.

They were called Jupiter

Missiles. The deployment

occurred in 1961. Those

werent secret agreements,those were officially known

in the international stage.

The NATO member shar-

ing these missiles was the

U.S..

8

Additional Information:More than 100 missilescapable of hitting Moscowdeployed in Italy and Tur-key. This might triggerUSSR to take further ac-tion.

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Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), is a military doctrine for

preventing a nuclear war, or a conventional war to turn into a

nuclear war.

When one side has a nuclear weapon and the other doesnt, theside which has the weapon takes a huge advantage to win a war,

militarily. (Politically talking, there are so many aspects) So tech-

nically, the side with greater power would have the opportunity

to remain aggressive and expand their imperial goals. Even dip-

lomatically, having a greater military power which is unstoppa-

ble for most cases by the weak, would give the greater power a

lot of advantage. Diplomatic treaties would be for her favour

and international organizations would remain in her domi-nance. Nuclear use or threat to use, conventional use, domi-

nance in international stage and unfair favour in treaties would

not be prevented tolerably.

When two opposing sides both have nuclear weapons and when

they are both capable of hitting each other in a distance that

would cause complete annihilation of each other, Mutually As-

SECTION CONTENTS

!Mutual Assured Destruction

! Second Strike Capability

!First Strike

!Arms Race

!Massive Retaliation

9

Necessaries

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sured Destruction applies. Sides wouldnt use nuclear weap-

ons, wouldnt get into occupational conventional war*,

wouldnt have unfair favour in treaties and wouldnt domi-

nate the international stage; however those only apply

against each other, the states without the MAD situation,

meaning that without being in the situation of capability of

causing a complete or almost complete annihilation of both

sides, would have a different situation which would cause a

different type of war, proxy warand side gaining.

The minor powers which do not have a moderate armed

force and any nuclear power would be used for imperialist in-

terests. They would be unlikely to survive without serving to

a superpower, either diplomatically, economically or militar-

ily. Therefore, theyd get invaded or be diplomatically highlyurged or threatened or theyd get into internal conspiring

situations. The result is obvious, theyd be serving one of the

sides and the other side would try to make the minor switch

sides, either by force, conspiracy or diplomatically. This proc-

ess is the process of proxy wars. Two powers, rivaling

through proxies because they can not rival against each other

completely, otherwise both sides will be annihilated.

However, at the same time, the major powers would find

themselves in a critical situation. The major powers with no

Mutually Assured Destruction situation (even though they

have nuclear weapons) but a moderately withstanding or

stronger armed forces are capable of protecting themselves

against an invasion for the most part; by economic, diplo-

matic and martial occasions. Thus, superpowers wouldnt be

able to threaten them and use them for their imperial inter-ests. Those major powers were; Great Britain, France and

China for the most part. The superpowers would like to take

those major powers into their side, however they wouldnt eas-

ily do this by threatening, using diplomatic pressure by the im-

balance of powers, invading or by any other rival paths. At

the same time, those major powers would also be seeking

good relations for their mutual interest so that they can share

the income and oppose a mutual enemy,

stop the spreading of a mutually opposed

regime and seek collective security. There-

fore theyd look into new alliances. Such as

NATO and Warsaw Pact. Also, not joining

one of them or not having close ties with

them as a major power would damage your

relationships with the superpower.

10

Additional Information: Occupational Conventional War* isthe war type where one side occupies the others land or sover-eignty by conventional methods. Traditional Warfare, no Nu-clear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction involvedin the conflict.

Additional Information: Sides wouldnt get into an Occupa-tional Conventional War* because in times of war which arethreatening the sovereignty or integrity of one another, com-monly accepted or internationally mandated war laws arelikely to be broken.

Additional Infor -mation: Super-

powers wouldtry to conspire

you internally.e.g. China. (T he-ory)

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By the time, the minor powers even in Europe gets involved

in the proxy war. e.g. Hungary, West & East Germany, Bal-

kan Countries and other minor nations such as Poland.

Those minor nations are faced with armed invasion, strong

internal or external conspiracy, high diplomatic pressure and

threats and therefore forced to join a side and also switch

sides. There are not many nations survived without joining a

side, especially the ones which are in borders.

However, some nations get lucky enough because of their geo-

graphical locations and close ties with NATOs superpower,

USA. Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Turkey and Italy gets

lucky enough to maintain a strong deterrent as minor na-

tions, Nuclear Weapons, more importantly, MAD status.

Technically, theyre not allowed to arm the missiles with the

nuclear weapons without the permission of USA, due to

USA owns the missiles and the nuclear heads. However in re-

ality, when their integrity and sovereignty gets physically

threatened and only if necessary (Allies dont respond and

conventional fighting is in bad situation and theres no sign

for any kind of peace treaty for any cost) that nation in the

share programme can break the laws of war and disregard di-

plomacy and use the nuclear missiles. Therefore, the deter-

rence strategy MAD also works for the sharing nations. For

instance, on October 23 after the U.S. Ambassador George

Balls notification, officials reported that the Turkish govern-

ment would deeply resent any removal. An example proving

that the sharing nations wouldnt like to give up their shares.

Second strike capability is the states capability of striking the

opposing state with a succession of complete or almost com-plete annihilation of the other side after the complete or al-

most complete annihilation of one side. Striking in the sec-

ond place. This is commonly used in the No First Use pol-

icy. In order to ensure a second strike capability, number of

nuclear arsenals and locations should be high, due to the fact

that the nuclear missiles can get shot by anti-ballistic missiles

(abm) which are faster. If both sides dont have detectors, sec-

ond strike capability is probably ensured. However this is im-possible. Or, if one side is able to sabotage or shoot the other

sides detectors or abms, which its possibility isnt too high.

In order to ensure a complete Mutually Assured Destruction

condition, second strike capability should be ensured too.

Otherwise, one side would not be able to respond back if the

other one is able to demolish its capability of shooting down

all of the opposing sides nuclear bases. Before 1960s, missiles

werent intercontinental. The first intercontinental missileswere invented in 1960 but the best ones were capable of go-

ing 10.000 km, the very best one (Atlas) had a range of

14.000 km. However, those missiles were very heavy and not

too fast. Therefore the interceptor missiles were very effective

against them and they were not a great danger, in addition in-

accuracy was a very big issue, even cities were barely tar-

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geted. The greater dangers were theater ballistic missiles (In-

termediate, Medium and Short range missiles). Therefore, na-

tions chose to produce both kinds. They maintained missiles

in submarines, planes, ghost planes, navies, ground bases, in

shared locations and mobile ground vehicles. Also, they over-

produced arsenals and missiles; in many bases, in many meth-

ods, some mobile and some not, in many locations even out-

side of their countries and always with a better performance.

Ensuring the second strike capability in order to ensure the

mutually assured destruction doctrine, completely, requires

too many deployments of military equipments so that one

side doesnt get the advancement to prevent a second strike

as a response after her first strike. This requires lots of deploy-

ment in very expensive military equipment and also lots of

expense for space research and deployment. Having just afew isnt enough because one side shouldnt outnumber the

other to ensure the strategy is working and in order to keep

that balance, the one which has less keeps producing and be-

cause the one which has less keeps producing, the other one

also does to keep its advance. This causes an arms race.

MAD strategy doesnt become so

reliable due to mutually caused eco-

nomic factors (to both sides), inter-nal affairs issues (so much fear and

opposition to governments, causing

chaos in both sides) and insecurity

(causes Massive Retaliation). All of

these cons for no outcome.

The Eisenhower administration declared Massive Retaliation

as an official policy and publicly announced through his Sec-

retary of State, John Foster Dulles. The indicated reason for

the policy was collective security.

In the policy of massive retaliation, whether its a conven-tional or nuclear attack, the attacked state would massively

retaliate by using a force disproportionate to the size of the

attack in order to defend the integrity and sovereignty of the

state and to ensure a collective security. This policy is com-

monly used with the policy of No First Use.

This policy is caused by MAD. In theory, Mutually Assured

Destruction indicates that both sides has to have a second

strike capability for the strategy to work. In theory, a statewould strike once its struck. However in reality a state with

losing status or a risk of losing would disregard any theory or

commonly accepted laws or declared laws or proposes, this is

called the Massive Retaliation policy. Therefore in reality a

state wouldnt aggress to another MAD status state.

The purpose of responding disproportionate to the size of

the attack is that to ensure eliminating or damaging the suc-

cess possibility of a further massive counterforce strike attack

from the opposing state by doing the counterforce first strike

in the first place and crippling the attacking states retaliatory

capacity.

This strategy is the strategy of using all power at all capacity

and at the quickest time in order to have a chance of victory.

12

Additional Informa-

tion: Too many consfor no solid outcome,is one of the reasons

for further cooperativemelioration for mu-tual outcomes.

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MAD didnt give any chance of victory because both sides

were annihilating each other and both sides were losing. The

strategy of massive retaliation gives one side a low possibility

of survival with no complete annihilation, even though the

cost will be too high, by disregarding diplomacy and all the

commonly accepted rules and regulations. This may actually

cause one side to use nu-

clear weapons at a huge

level. Conventional wars

are not easy to prevent,

even this policy would

not prevent conventional

wars between those

states, however would

turn conventional warsinto nuclear wars instead

of acting diplomatically.

Additionally, the reason for conventional wars arent easy to

prevent is that because of imperial interests, tensions happen.

Those tensions can very easily turn into armed conflicts.

MAD strategy wouldnt work if diplomacy also doesnt work.

Diplomacy usually works but there might be times it just loses

all its power. So tensions would not be solved by diplomacyand conventional armed conflicts would expand into bigger

conventional wars and

states would fear that

MAD may fail and take a

huge risk by breaking

MAD at first, just be-

cause being stroke first would damage the second strike capa-

bility significantly, in the manner that the responses would be

even not enough to reach the level first attack by the aggres-

sor.

13

Additional Information: Thiswill create more fear for the trig-

gering nuclear use and will alsocreate opposition to the govern-ment for officially declared ag-

gression polic ies. This public an-nouncement would be a major

fact in the failure of Eisenhowerand his government in the elec-tions.

Additional Information: Eisen-howers SIOP Plan was an ex-ample of massive retaliation.(Will be explained later)

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Letter to Castro from Khrushchev, Professor Anatoli Glinkin -Director, Latin American Institute - Russian Academy of Sci-

ence, Reports.

By declassification, proving that the request was on purpose, it

was the plan of the USSR.

SECTION CONTENTS

! The Letter

!Bargaining Power Enhancement

!Khrushchevs Prestige

!Alteration on U.S. Policies - 1961

! Conversations with Cuba for USSRs Operation

14

Pre-Crisis Events

We were together with the Minister of Defense, Marshal Ma-linovsky, in Varna, Bulgaria. And we were walking on thebeach of the Black Sea and Marshal Malinovsky told me,

Look, over on the other side of the Black Sea, in Turkey,there are American nuclear missiles which can destroy in sixminutes all cities in the south of the Soviet Union... [andthen Khrushchev asked Malinovsky], Why cant we do thesame as the United States? Why couldnt we place arms, forexample, on Cuba?... Malinovsky answered that maybe itwas a good idea.

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General Anatoli Gribkov, Served on the Red Army General

Staff in Moscow reports that the U.S. had about 5.000 war-

heads, the Soviet Union 300 and those only two or three

dozen that could hit the U.S.

Rear Admiral Georgi Kostev reports that unfortunately forKhrushchev, the Soviet Union was surrounded by American

military bases. But America was free of that encirclement.

Khrushchev had to find a bright spot to balance the situation

with U.S. and have an equal bargaining power so that he can

be able to demand things. At the time, economy of the Soviet

Union wasnt close to the U.S., an arms race would not be ac-

complished, also itd take too long and at the same time,

U.S.A would build up more too. The bright spot was exactlythe same as what U.S. did to USSR, very recently. Less than

three months ago when USSR sent a delegation to Cuba on

August, on May, the U.S. Jupiter missiles were operational,

the missiles which have been agreed to start placing in 1959.

The USSR wasnt happy about the interventions and inva-

sions of USA to Cuba, so by the bargaining power, USSR

can win one more proxy war, which is right beside U.S. bor-

der, easy way to implement the domino strategy and also cre-ate problems within the U.S. and the Latin American states.

A proxy war was won on the enemy continent. In addition,

lots of dangerous nuclear missiles were removed from two

countries which are very close to USSR. All, because of the

bargaining power gained by USSR.

Within the Soviet Union, the leader has gained a very good

prestige by bravely challenging the U.S. In an era where pub-

lic was in great fear in USSR, the fear was also spread to

USA, even more. Every military action Khrushchev takes

would create patriotism to Soviet Union for the public andwould gather support for him. In addition, itd give the Soviet

Union more prestige. The more prestige the Soviet Union

has, the more its allies will see her as the leading role and

will also trust in her power and will be more loyal. In addi-

tion, the prestige USSR gains will keep the union as a union,

therell be less attempts of separation by the governmental

bodies. Lastly, itll give more voice to USSR in the interna-

tional stage and more reputation to Khrushchev over the

Globe.

Other than its advantages for USSR, it also provides disad-

vantages for the U.S.. Other than the fact that the nuclear

missiles placed in Cuba creating a great fear over the U.S.,

the Soviet attempts also create fear, which is a longer-term

fear. First of all, U.S.A. officially agreed for a non-aggression

mandate to Cuba. It was not a simple non-aggression pact, it

was an acceptance of a demand by an hostile nation, it wasmandated. The second demand however, was kept as a secret

and therefore it didnt damage U.S. prestige. The first de-

mand damaged the prestige of U.S. and caused the public to

trust less to the country and the government. In addition, not

preventing all of these to occur also damaged the prestige of

the U.S. and caused loss of trust. Lastly, Khrushchevs and

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It was decided to send a delegation to Cuba to discuss the

idea of placing nuclear missiles into Cuba, with Cubans. Gen-

eral Anatoli Gribkov reports that Fidel didnt give an immedi-

ate answer and wanted some time to think.Additional Information: Itd be safer for Cuba if USSR came witha large army, not nuclear weapons. Yes, nuclear weapons are a deter-rent factor however theyre also triggering an attack. Theyre trigger-ing an attack because U.S. would like to get rid of them and theyredeterrent because theyd be used against U.S. if U.S. tried to get ridof them and failed. However, a Soviet army is never a triggering

fact. Its just for defending Cuba. And U.S.A. wouldnt attack Cubaif theres enough presence against her. No huge losses for small inter-ests. However, same for USSR, no huge expense for small interests.

Fidel knew that if he didnt accept, he wouldnt get much help, nu-clear missiles were also an advantage for USSR, not only for Cuba.

-On October 26, Kennedy told his advisors it appearedthat only a U.S. attack on Cuba would remove the mis-

siles, but he insisted on giving the diplomatic channel alittle more time. The crisis had reached a virtual stale

mate.

-history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis

(U.S. Government Official Sources)

Cuban officials of course didnt reported this military access

of nuclear weapons as a We had to agreement.

In order to show solidarity to socialist countries

-Jose Ramon Fernandez, Vice President, Council

of Ministers - Cuba, reports.

However, another speech proves that it was a We had to

agreement. The following speech shows the dependency of

the neo-colony, Cuba.

We, politely referred to as "underdeveloped", in truth,

are

colonial, semi-colonial or dependent countries. We are countrieswhose

economies

have been distorted by

imperialism, which has ab-

normally developed those branches of industry or agriculture needed

to complement its complex economy. "Underdevelopment", or dis-

torted development, brings a dangerous specialization in raw materi-

als, inherent in which is the threat of hunger for all our peoples.

We, the "underdeveloped", are also those with the single crop, thesingle product, the single market. A single product whose uncertain

sale depends on a single market imposing and fixing conditions.

That is the great formula for imperialist economic domination.

- Ch Guevara, 9 April 1961

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19/28

The largest sea-born operation in Soviet History. After the con-

versations in May with Castro and after his consent, the Soviets

have just 4 months to organize, transport and install 16 nuclear

intermediate range and medium range missiles, jet aircraft and

40.000 men on an island nearly 8000 miles away and it all has

to be done in secret, with the name of a Serbian city (Anadyr).

The Soviets decide to use Cargo ships.

At the Black Sea Port (Crimea) of the Soviets, 85 ships are pre-

pared for departure on July 1962, to an unknown destination.

Even the ship captains didnt know where theyre headed. Also,

soldiers had arctic clothing.

Before we sailed, we were given three sealed packets; num-bered 1, 2 and 3. The first was to be opened after leaving the territo-

rial waters of the Soviet Union. As the ships pass through the Bospho-

rus strait in Istanbul, the second envelope is opened. It contains the or-

der to stay beyond the straits of Gibraltar and into the Atlantic Ocean

SECTION CONTENTS

! Operation Anadyr

! U.S. Spying Operations

! OPLAN

18

The Crisis

3 3


20/28

In the third package the order was to go to Havana, Cuba and eve-

rything became clear.

-M.G. Kuzevanov, Soviet Missile Commander

He also reports the followings:

It was not easy, temperatures reach to 110 and 115 degrees.

(F) or 43 to 46 C degrees.

The situation was very difficult, there was not enough water.

There were no bathrooms. We had to use buckets. But the worst

part was the heat. We were almost dying from the heat and thestuffiness. But it was forbidden for us to go out and deck. There

was a guard. They only open the hatch at night, so men can go out

and deck and get fresh air.


In order to keep it safe and secret, the Soviets were even al-most torturing their own soldiers.

After the landing to Havana, Cuba, the process is described

by Anatoli Michael Burnov, Technical Officer, SS-4 Missile

Regiment:

We would unload at Mariel, only at night. We had the mis-

siles in a big hangar. And we would only transport them after 3 in

the morning.


They were transporting at night in order to prevent the

American surveillance.

We have to say that it was an open secret, a secret that many

Cubans knew about. For example, there were cases where we

would have to tear down a house in a small village to allow the bigmissile trucks to turn the corner.

-Jorge Risquet, Central Committee Chairman, Oriente

Province, Cuba.

The Soviet soldiers were in civilian clothing and were not al-

lowed to speak Russian. Once the troops arrive to designated

destinations, the living conditions remained difficult.

We didnt have housings, we had to build it up ourselves.

We didnt want to go to bed, we were scared of insects biting us.

-A Soviet Soldier

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21/28

In the beginning of operation Anadyr, it was planned to send

so many ships, in frequent groups. Since the relations be-

tween Castros Cuba and the U.S. was very hostile, any move-

ment in or near Cuba would draw huge attention and suspi-

cion to U.S..

As the ships approach Caribbean borders, they were closely

observed by American aircraft.

When we were two or three days from Cuba, we noticed the

American Reconnaissance Aircraft above us. An american helicop-

ter was hovering above us, almost touching us.


The first photographs taken by the patrol were rushed to

Washington, DC. The photo films were received by an elite

team of photo analysts in the Secretive National Photo-

graphic Interpretation Center (NPIC).

During 1962, there was just one ship after another carrying

supplies to Cuba and we were looking at each one of them. When

the Russian Frasers came out of the Bosphorus (Istanbul), they

were photographed in the Bosphorus and photographed again by

our units in Sicily and Gibraltar. So we had all these photography

coming in.

-Dino Brugioni, CIA Photographic Interpretation Cen-

ter - Founding Member Deputy Director

Dino Brugionis quote proves that the U.S. was already

suspicious of this huge movement from Soviets and were

ready to investigate closely if they come close to their bor-

ders.

The soviets were very good at hiding the nuclear missiles

in the ships. The first photographs didnt contain the ships

cargo. The experts have made conclusions based on what is

visible. The photographs showed crates on the decks of the

ships. However, the experts had a good knowledge of the

crates because they have also observed the previous Soviet

aids in Syria and Egypt. Therefore, they were concluding

that there were aircrafts by precisely measuring the crates

and thinking what would fit in them.

In a sense we would make like a little box and then see what

would fit in them



203 3


22/28

When the soviet ships unload at the port of Mariel in Cuba,

U.S. Surveillance photographs confirm the contents of the

crates. The contents they confirm include; fighter jets, patrol

boats and trucks. These are all clearly arms for Cuba. How-

ever, at the moment, the content in the trucks are unknown

but are estimated as firearms.

Meanwhile the first regiments were settling, they were being

watched 70.000 feet above them. They were being watched

by a U2 High Altitude Spy Plane, cameras loaded with high

resolution film.

The Soviets have planned or were lucky about the weather,

most part of the first settlement was cloudy in August 1962and U2 overflights were put on hold for 3 weeks.

On August 29th, a U2 spy plane gets cleared for an overflight

of Cuba and gets further details with photographic evidence.

NPIC discover the first signs of nuclear missiles. They recog-

nize a pattern which looks like a Star of David. They recog-

nize this pattern from previous reconnaissance photography

of Soviet weapon sites. There has become no doubt that

these objects were SA-2 Missile sites (SAMS)

The first problem was that these missiles were capable of

shooting U2 aircraft. The second problem was about the fact

that Soviets have installed these suffisticated anti-aircraft mis-

siles indicates they are protecting something much larger.

There were no photographic evidence for a nuclear weapon/missile, however this tremendous anti-aircraft missile gave the

sign that it had a good reason to be there.

The missiles were covered in tents, they were 30 meters long,

put into a ditch and covered; so that from above, you could only see

tents.

-Anatoli Michael Burnov, Technical Officer, SS-4 Mis-

sile Regiment

On October 14th in 1962, Major Richard Hayser takes off

from Edwards Air Force Base in California on to next U2

overflight of Cuba.

The Soviets at the time were in days of making their nuclear

missiles operational.

21


23/28

After Haysers 6 hour U2 flight, he lands his plane to McCoy

Air Force Base in Orlando, Florida. The film is rushed to Of-

futt Air Force Base in Nebraska and to the NPIC in Washing-

ton, DC for Analysis.

Michael Davis (SAC Photo Analyst - Airman 1st Class) findsout a circle in the films after 1 AM in the morning. They scru-

tinize the film for hours and Davis finds a series of long cylin-

drical shapes that look very familiar. NPIC also comes to the

same conclusion.

They find 8 objects which are 65 feet long and 2 objects that

are 100 feet long. The measurements of the objects match

perfectly with Soviet SS4 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles.

We were convinced that what we had was a field deployed

SS4 site.



OPLAN stands for Operation Plan Land, Air and Navy. Two

operational plans were considered during the Cuban Missile

Crisis. Code named 316 and 312. Both of these plans were

for invading Cuba with over 90.000 soldiers, heavy land and

navy equipments and strategical air strikes and naval bom-

bardment.

However, the most critical part was being fast; invading in 7

days. The goal was to accomplish this invasion before the nu-

clear missiles became operational. However, the debates were

long enough to fail deciding and they were also in a lack of

knowledge of Soviet equipment in the island, so a decision of

invasion could have caused a tremendous disaster.

22

Additional Information: With the technolog y of 1960s, evenan unclear photograph with matched measurements of an-other material was enough to convince U.S. government offi-cials that the object was a ballistic missile, deployed in a

field.


24/28

NPIC Chief Art Lando comes in the next morning after they

find 3 nuclear sites in the photos. Then he goes to the white

house to brief President Kennedy and his national security coun-

cil. The group after named as the Executive Committee of Na-

tional Security Council with the presidency of Attorney GeneralRobert Kennedy (Johns brother). (EXCON)

The NPIC Chief and Marshall Carter from CIA introduces the

locations of the missile trailers and the suggestions they came

with. Meaning that they thought the items were ballistic missiles,

according to their measures. (Just length) And this was enough

to convince the United States and take action based on that sim-ple information.

SECTION CONTENTS

!Introduction of Crisis

!First Debates

! The Update

23

Security Council


25/28

During the first debates, Defense Minister Robert McNA-

MARA (Evidence from JFKs De-Classified Secret Tapes),

suggests a plan to invade the specific locations of the missile

sites before the missiles become operational. However, the de-

bates and the planning takes long enough.

Very soon, they receive the information that at least one of

the sites were ready to operate while planning to invade the

island with 90.000 men in 5 days. They debate another op-

tion, at least to navally blockade the further Soviet aid. How-

ever the military still pressures for invasion.

The first decision is an order to increase in U2 surveillance

flights.

However, they still werent aware of the Soviet Short-Range

Battlefield Nuclear missiles which were ready to operate.

These short-range ballistic missiles were capable of desolat-ing an invading army. American troops would be gone at the

moment they land Cuban beaches and the missiles wouldnt

create a huge impact on the rest of Cuba. It would not create

too much radiation which would stay long-term or it would

not create a huge thermal wave which immediately kills too

many people.

There was also one more thing which was unknown. The nu-

clear missile threat in the seas. There were 4 heavily armed

Soviet submarines.

Our submarine was armed with 22 torpedos. One of which

was a nuclear torpedo.

-Nikolai Shumkov, Submarine Commander - Soviet

Navy

As far as I am concerned, having received an order to use my

nuclear torpedo, I would surely have aimed it at an aircraft carrier

and there were plenty of them in the area.

-Aleksey Dubivko, Submarine Commander - Soviet

Navy

However, the biggest update wasnt received yet. Since then,

they have just found medium range ballistic missiles and they

werent aware of the battlefield nuclear missiles and the sub-

24

Additional Information: The statement of the Soviet Subma-rine Commander proves that a Soviet Naval Commanderwould not hesitate using weapons of mass destructions andstay loyal.


26/28

marine nuclear missiles. However, there was one more signifi-

cant thing that they were not aware of. A bigger threat.

The medium range missiles were able to shoot almost all of

the east coast, including Washington, DC. However, they

were not capable of shooting all the counter-ballistic missilebases and ballistic missile bases in the United States. Mean-

ing that, The Second Strike capability and also the capability

of countering the missile attacks still remained according to

the information the U.S. had since then. So since then, MAD

(Mutual Assured Destruction) policy was still avoiding a war.

At NPIC in Washington, analyses the latest U2 film. They

find the structures that they refer to as slash-marks. Whichled them to recognize that these were IRBMs. Intermediate

Range Ballistic Missiles. Their ranges covered all of the U.S.

except the extreme North-West.

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SECTION CONTENTS

!

26

International Stage


28/28

A Berkay Ertugrul Project

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Nec leo enim. Morbi in nunc purus ulla mcorper lacinia. Tinc idunt odio sit amet dolor pharetra dignissim.

xxvii

Credentials

Additional Information: None of the additional informationis taken from elsewhere. They are all Berkay Ertugruls

thoughts and guesses. All his theories and creations, probablymight have been thought by the others too.

3 3

cuban missile crisis d2

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