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Cultural Origins of Cooperation: The Role ofCollectivism and Individualism
Simon Gachter1, Jonathan F. Schulz1, Christian Thoni2
1University of Nottingham, 2University of LausanneERC-Grant COOPERATION
Social Norms and Institutions, AsconaMay 13, 2015
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 1 / 18
Overview
Cooperation
Cooperation of unrelated individuals is essential for well-functioning ofmodern societies
Research QuestionsI Are there societal differences in cooperation when institutions are held
constant? YESI What may explain cross-societal variation in cooperation among
unrelated individuals?
Hypothesis: Permeability of social networks plays a major role
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 2 / 18
Overview
Cooperation
Cooperation of unrelated individuals is essential for well-functioning ofmodern societies
Research QuestionsI Are there societal differences in cooperation when institutions are held
constant?
YESI What may explain cross-societal variation in cooperation among
unrelated individuals?
Hypothesis: Permeability of social networks plays a major role
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 2 / 18
Overview
Cooperation
Cooperation of unrelated individuals is essential for well-functioning ofmodern societies
Research QuestionsI Are there societal differences in cooperation when institutions are held
constant? YES
I What may explain cross-societal variation in cooperation amongunrelated individuals?
Hypothesis: Permeability of social networks plays a major role
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 2 / 18
Overview
Cooperation
Cooperation of unrelated individuals is essential for well-functioning ofmodern societies
Research QuestionsI Are there societal differences in cooperation when institutions are held
constant? YESI What may explain cross-societal variation in cooperation among
unrelated individuals?
Hypothesis: Permeability of social networks plays a major role
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 2 / 18
Overview
Cooperation
Cooperation of unrelated individuals is essential for well-functioning ofmodern societies
Research QuestionsI Are there societal differences in cooperation when institutions are held
constant? YESI What may explain cross-societal variation in cooperation among
unrelated individuals?
Hypothesis: Permeability of social networks plays a major role
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 2 / 18
Overview Factors explaining societal differences
Importance of permeability of social networks for morality
Confucius (551 - 479 BCE) argued that one has the moral obligation toprotect kin, even one who broke the law and harmed others. Greif andTabellini (2015)
Banfield (1958) ’Amoral Familism’
Yamagishi (1998): ”Intense group ties (...) prevent trust fromdeveloping beyond group boundaries”
Tabellini (2008) ’Limited vs. generalized morality’
Alesina and Giuliano (2014) ’Family ties’
Greif and Tabellini (2015) ’The clan vs. the coperation’
→ in societies with tight group boundaries morality is limited towards thein-group
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 3 / 18
Overview Factors explaining societal differences
Importance of permeability of social networks for morality
Confucius (551 - 479 BCE) argued that one has the moral obligation toprotect kin, even one who broke the law and harmed others. Greif andTabellini (2015)
Banfield (1958) ’Amoral Familism’
Yamagishi (1998): ”Intense group ties (...) prevent trust fromdeveloping beyond group boundaries”
Tabellini (2008) ’Limited vs. generalized morality’
Alesina and Giuliano (2014) ’Family ties’
Greif and Tabellini (2015) ’The clan vs. the coperation’
→ in societies with tight group boundaries morality is limited towards thein-group
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 3 / 18
Overview Factors explaining societal differences
Importance of permeability of social networks for morality
Confucius (551 - 479 BCE) argued that one has the moral obligation toprotect kin, even one who broke the law and harmed others. Greif andTabellini (2015)
Banfield (1958) ’Amoral Familism’
Yamagishi (1998): ”Intense group ties (...) prevent trust fromdeveloping beyond group boundaries”
Tabellini (2008) ’Limited vs. generalized morality’
Alesina and Giuliano (2014) ’Family ties’
Greif and Tabellini (2015) ’The clan vs. the coperation’
→ in societies with tight group boundaries morality is limited towards thein-group
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 3 / 18
Overview Factors explaining societal differences
Importance of permeability of social networks for morality
Confucius (551 - 479 BCE) argued that one has the moral obligation toprotect kin, even one who broke the law and harmed others. Greif andTabellini (2015)
Banfield (1958) ’Amoral Familism’
Yamagishi (1998): ”Intense group ties (...) prevent trust fromdeveloping beyond group boundaries”
Tabellini (2008) ’Limited vs. generalized morality’
Alesina and Giuliano (2014) ’Family ties’
Greif and Tabellini (2015) ’The clan vs. the coperation’
→ in societies with tight group boundaries morality is limited towards thein-group
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 3 / 18
Overview
Approach
Experimental methodology allows to control the institutionalenvironment
Tool: Public Goods Game without (N) and with peer punishment (P)
I 10 periods N then 10 periods P (within subject)I Partner matching, groups of 4, MPCR of 0.4, punishment 1:3 (as
Herrmann, Thoni and Gachter, 2008)
Two measures:
I Initial cooperation N: (Cooperation in first period of N )I Efficiency P: Realized profits relative to Nash eq. profits in Period 6 to
10 of P
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 4 / 18
Overview
Approach
Experimental methodology allows to control the institutionalenvironment
Tool: Public Goods Game without (N) and with peer punishment (P)
I 10 periods N then 10 periods P (within subject)I Partner matching, groups of 4, MPCR of 0.4, punishment 1:3 (as
Herrmann, Thoni and Gachter, 2008)
Two measures:
I Initial cooperation N: (Cooperation in first period of N )
I Efficiency P: Realized profits relative to Nash eq. profits in Period 6 to10 of P
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 4 / 18
Overview
Approach
Experimental methodology allows to control the institutionalenvironment
Tool: Public Goods Game without (N) and with peer punishment (P)
I 10 periods N then 10 periods P (within subject)I Partner matching, groups of 4, MPCR of 0.4, punishment 1:3 (as
Herrmann, Thoni and Gachter, 2008)
Two measures:
I Initial cooperation N: (Cooperation in first period of N )I Efficiency P: Realized profits relative to Nash eq. profits in Period 6 to
10 of P
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 4 / 18
Overview
Procedures
Aim: Minimize variation between subject pools
Student sample - similar according tosocio-economic indicators
Recruiting as in Herrmann et al. (2008)
Divider walls, computerized (z-Tree)
Conducted by local staff
Earnings adjusted to students’ local purchasingpower
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 5 / 18
Overview
Procedures
Aim: Minimize variation between subject pools
Student sample - similar according tosocio-economic indicators
Recruiting as in Herrmann et al. (2008)
Divider walls, computerized (z-Tree)
Conducted by local staff
Earnings adjusted to students’ local purchasingpower
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 5 / 18
Overview Societal differences in cooperation
52 universities; 41 countries; 3936 participants
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 6 / 18
Overview Societal differences in cooperation
Strasbourg Dnipropetrovs'k
Izmir
IasiBratislava
SamaraVilnius
Tbilisi
Minsk
Zurich
Warsaw
Prague
Tel Aviv
Copenhagen
Amsterdam
Athens
Vienna
IstanbulRome
St.Gallen
Nottingham
Bonn
Granada
Lausanne
Groningen
Meknes
Konstanz
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 7 / 18
Results Societal differences in cooperation
Initial Cooperation N
14.2
6.9
05
1015
Initi
al C
oope
ratio
n N
New
Zea
land
Den
mar
kA
ustr
iaU
SA
Bel
arus
Ger
man
yS
witz
erla
ndS
lova
kia
Net
herla
nds
Vie
tnam
Ukr
aine
Chi
naR
ussi
aR
oman
iaLi
thua
nia
Laos UK
Pol
and
Mal
aysi
aT
urke
yIta
lyIs
rael
Cze
ch R
epub
licC
olom
bia
Om
anT
anza
nia
Fra
nce
Spa
inS
outh
Afr
ica
Gua
tem
ala
Sou
th K
orea
Aus
tral
iaG
reec
eT
haila
ndS
audi
Ara
bia
Geo
rgia
Indo
nesi
aK
enya
Japa
nM
exic
oM
oroc
co
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 8 / 18
Results Societal differences in cooperation
Efficiency in P
.79
−.75
−1
−.5
0.5
1E
ffici
ency
in P
(P
erio
d 6
to 1
0)
New
Zea
land
Den
mar
kC
zech
Rep
ublic
Chi
naN
ethe
rland
sP
olan
dU
KG
erm
any
Aus
tral
iaS
witz
erla
ndS
outh
Kor
eaLi
thua
nia
Aus
tria
US
AC
olom
bia
Slo
vaki
aF
ranc
eIs
rael
Japa
nG
uate
mal
aIta
lyS
outh
Afr
ica
Rom
ania
Bel
arus
Vie
tnam
Rus
sia
Ukr
aine
Mex
ico
Spa
inM
oroc
coM
alay
sia
Laos
Tha
iland
Tur
key
Tan
zani
aK
enya
Gre
ece
Geo
rgia
Sau
di A
rabi
aO
man
Indo
nesi
a
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 9 / 18
Factors explaining societal differences
Measure of Permeability of social networks
Hofstede’s Individualism vs Collectivism country level data
Individualistic societies: ’preference for loosely-knit social frameworkin which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves andtheir immediate families’
Collectivistic societies: ’preference for tightly-knit framework insociety in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of aparticular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioningloyalty.’
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 10 / 18
Factors explaining societal differences
Measure of Permeability of social networks
Hofstede’s Individualism vs Collectivism country level data
Individualistic societies: ’preference for loosely-knit social frameworkin which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves andtheir immediate families’
Collectivistic societies: ’preference for tightly-knit framework insociety in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of aparticular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioningloyalty.’
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 10 / 18
Factors explaining societal differences
Measure of Permeability of social networks
Hofstede’s Individualism vs Collectivism country level data
Individualistic societies: ’preference for loosely-knit social frameworkin which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves andtheir immediate families’
Collectivistic societies: ’preference for tightly-knit framework insociety in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of aparticular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioningloyalty.’
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 10 / 18
Factors explaining societal differences Societal differences in cooperation
Individualism - Initial Cooperation N
AUS
AUT
CHN
COL CZE
DNK
FRA
DEU
GRCGTM
IDN
ISRITA
JPNKEN
KOR
LTU
MYS
MEX
MAR
OMN
NLD
NZL
POLROM RUS
SVK
VNM
ESP
CHE
THA
TURGBR
USA
68
1012
14C
oope
ratio
n (P
erio
d 1,
N)
0 20 40 60 80 100Individualism
Rho (N=34): 0.47, P=0.0051
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 11 / 18
Factors explaining societal differences Societal differences in cooperation
Individualism - Efficiency in P
AUS
AUT
CHN
COL
CZE DNK
FRA
DEU
GRC
GTM
IDN
ISRITA
JPN
KEN
KORLTU
MYS
MEXMAR
OMN
NLD
NZL
POL
ROMRUS
SVK
VNM
ESP
CHE
THA TUR
GBR
USA−
1−
.50
.51
Effi
cien
cy in
P (
Per
iod
6 to
10)
0 20 40 60 80 100Individualism
Rho (N=34): 0.57, P=0.0004
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 12 / 18
Conclusion
Conclusions
Substantial societal variation in cooperation in PG with and withoutpunishment
Network structures within societes explain variation
I Initial cooperation in PG w/o punishment higher in individualisticsocieties
I Peer Punishment increases/stabilizes cooperation in individualisticsocietes
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 13 / 18
Pronoun-drop
’Deep’ grammatical rule: Pronoun-drop
Language evolves slowly over time→ Language reflects distant cultural traditions (rather than morerecently acquired traits)
Kashima and Kashima (1998): languages that forbid dropping thefirst person pronoun are of cultural traditions that put more emphasison the individualSign. Corr. Pronoun-drop / Individualism (Rho: 0.75, P < 0.0001)
Used as instrument for cultural traits emphasizing individualism byLicht et al. (2008), Tabellini (2008), and Alesina and Giuliano (2007).
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 14 / 18
Pronoun-drop Societal differences in cooperation
Pronoun-Drop0
510
15In
itial
Coo
pera
tion
N
No−Pronoun−Drop Pro−Drop
0.2
.4.6
Effi
cien
cy P
No−Pronoun−Drop Pronoun−Drop
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 15 / 18
Pronoun-drop Societal differences in cooperation
2SLS Regression
(1) (2)Init. Coop. N Efficiency P
Individualism 0.109** 0.020**(0.047) (0.009)
Income 1980-2000 -1.471 -0.195(1.247) (0.228)
Rule of Law, 1996 -0.312 -0.080(0.747) (0.137)
Dummies legal origin Yes Yes
Constant 19.550** 1.339(9.772) (1.791)
R2 0.22 0.42Observations 30 30
2SLS estimates; robust standard errors in parentheses. Instrument for Individualism: pronoun-drop. Dummies for
UK and French legal origin included
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 16 / 18
Conclusions
Conclusions
Substantial societal variation in cooperation in PG with and withoutpunishment
Network structures within societes explain variation
I Initial cooperation in PG w/o punishment higher in individualisticsocieties
I Peer Punishment increases/stabilizes cooperation in individualisticsocietes
Results are robust to ’deep’ linguistic measure for individualism
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 17 / 18
Conclusions
Thank You!
Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 18 / 18