culture and charisma: outline of a theory by philip smith

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DOI: 10.1177/000169930004300201

2000 43: 101Acta SociologicaPhilip Smith

Culture and Charisma: Outline of a Theory

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Culture and Charisma: Outline of a Theory

Philip Smith

Department ofAnthropology and Sociology, University of Queensland,Australia

ABSTRACT

From the work of Weber onwards charisma has beenprimarily explained

in terms of its

relationship to underlying social structural and psychological environments. The paperredresses this imbalance and examines the cultural structures that operate as

preconditions for the attribution of charisma to political and religious leaders. Drawingon Weberian, Durkheimian and semiotic theory the paper argues that charisma arisesin conjunction with salvation narratives. The internal structure of these narratives

requires binary oppositions contrasting good and evil. The model is exemplified withreference to case studies of Hitter, Churchill and Martin Luther King.

Philip Smith, Department ofAnthropology and Sociology, University of Queensland, St. Lucia,

Queensland4072,Australia

Scandinavian SociologicalAssociation 2000

1. Theories of charisma: a cultural critique

Two fault lines have run through the landscapeof charisma theory in the 20th century. The firstof these is social structural and psychologicalreductionism. Dominant trends in charisma

theory have no place for what has becomeknown as the autonomy of culture (Kane1991). That is to say, they fail to acknowledgeculture as an independent level of analysis andas a crucial factor in the construction of

charismatic authority. The second flaw is

conceptual triviality. By applying the conceptof charisma indiscriminately to things and

people that are attractive and/or powerful, the

specificityof charismatic power in Webers

theory has been lost. Although analyticallyseparate, the two issues are intimately related.

Consequently, resolving the former requiresattention to the latter. Drawing on recent workin semiotic and narrative theory this paperproposes a simple model of the cultural formsthat underpin charisma. In so doing it calls for arelocation of charisma theory around leaders,the sacred and salvation.

Webers writings on charisma are typically

Weberian. They are suggestive, elusive, brilliantand fragmentary.Although Weber hints at thepossibilities of a multidimensional understand-

ing of charisma, his successors have elected toread him in a reductionist way. Webers argu-ments, to

quoteShils, have been taken to

testifyto the irrepressibility of the need to attributecharismatic properties to individuals undercertain conditions, and to the probability thatcertain kinds of personality - expansive and

dominating and with strong and fundamentalconvictions - will emerge, under conditions of

stress, in specific decision making, powerexercising roles (Shils 1975 a: 257). Weberssuccessors and critics have grounded theirdebates with the master on this theoretical

terrain. Rather than exploring the relative

powers of social structure and culture, the

issue at stake has been the form that social

structures can take in supporting a psychologi-cally defined charisma.

Evcn Edward Shils, a noted cultural advo-

cate, has shared this discursive horizon. Instead

of arguing for the primacy and autonomy of

symbolic structures. Shils restricted his innova-tions to insisting that charisma was equally

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fundamental to a routinized, hierarchical social

order. Such an approach converts charisma intoa seemingly automatic appendage of office orstatus, and tends to conflate the exercise of

routine political power with a world ordering

symbolic power (Shils 1975a:263, also 1975b,1975c). Much the same comments can be madeabout the work of Wolfgang Schluchter (1989)and Schmuel Eisenstadt (1968) and their

attempts to theorize office charisma and institu-tional charisma. Whilst the intention is to

provide a more hermeneutic understanding ofthe contemporary state, the mode of theorizingis one which privileges social, not culturalstructures. If Shils, Schluchter and Eisenstadt

have been unable to offera

strongly culturalmodel, it comes as no surprise that other, lesscultural, theorists of stable organizations have

shared in reductionist theorizing. In this tradi-tion, charisma has been variously accounted foras the product of hierarchical systems, groupdynamics, and the instrumental manipulationsassociated with money and power (Etzioni1961; Blau & Scott 1962: Friedland 1964;Bell 1986 ; Bensman & Givant 1986; Glassman

1986a).In seeking to bolster Webers claims regard-ing the association of charismatic leadershipwith instability rather than stability, moreorthodox thinkers have opposed the Shilsian

hypothesis, but are equally reductionist.

Through linking charisma with situations likethe developmental cycles of social movements

(Hopper 1950; Smelser 1963: Gusfield 1966).or the emergence of new nation-states (Apter1963;

Lipset1963 ; Dow 1968 ; Gonzalez 1974),

Webers apologists have, once again, boundcharisma so tightly to the social structure thatcultural autonomy has been squeezed out of the

analytic frame. When mythology and symbo-lism are discussed, they are framed as an

imaginative response to objective social rela-

tionships, such as inequality or social disloca-tion. Even theorists concerned with the

relationship of charisma to the personalitysystem neglect the influence of cultural forceson private meanings. By pinning the psychicneeds and structures of the individual to the

familial, material or social conditions which

shape them, scholars such as Loewenberg(1971) and Lasswell (1933. 1948 ), perhapsunwittingly, allocate primacy to the socialstructure.

A second, and related, problem withWebers successors is that in many cases theyhave broadened the concept of charisma to such

an extent that it loses its distinctiveness - and

with it its utility (Schlesinger 1960; Ratnam1964; Willner & Willner 1965; Roth

1979:128). A defining strand of Webers

original formulation is that charisma relates to

the sacred qualities of an individual and thesense of mission and duty that defines therelationship between the individual leader andhis or her followers (Shils 1975b; Weber

1978:241-245). Subsequent theorists have

applied the label of charisma to roles, institu-tions, symbols and geographical locations.Whilst they attempt to specify these phenomenausing the concept of charisma, it is far fromclear that there is any real payoff from the use of

the term. On the contrary, the apparentlyuniversal application of a key sociologicalconcept has cheapened and trivialized it.

Appropriating a phrase from Geertz: the broad

conceptualization of charisma has made vividlydisparate matters look drably homogeneous(Geertz 19983: 2 ).

In contrast to these macro theorists, social

psychologists have maintained a focus on theindividual leader and his/her followers at the

centre of theirunderstanding

charisma.They,however, have trivialized charisma in another

direction. As Shils and those in his school

realize, Webers conceptualization charisma istied up with ultimate concerns regardingissues of soteriology, eschatology and theodicy.In reducing the study of charisma to personalitytraits on the one hand (Hoffman & Hoffman

1970; Maranell 19 7U: Bensman & Givant

1975; McClel land 1975) or emotional needsand

group dynamicson the other (Freemesser &

Kaplan 1976; Corsino 1982; Galanter 1982),social psychologists have obscured the specifi-cally cultural facets of Webers complex con-

ceptual edifice, that is to say, the essentiallyreligious qualities of charismatic authority andits links to wider symbolic and narrative fields.

2.A model of culture and charisma ..-

Contemporary studies of charisma, then, aremarked by two problems. On the one hand,there is no widely acknowledged general theoryof the relationship between culture and char-isma. In the effort to explain charisma, socialtheorists have concentrated on explaining it

away in social structural terms. On the other

hand, the concept of charisma lacks a clear

empirical or theoretical referent. It has becomea debased, floating signifier. To begin the process



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of culturalist reconstruction it is necessary first

to attend to this latter issue, and to define

charisma as a moral bond of duty linkingfollowers to leaders (see Lindholm 199U:7).This bond, however, should not be understood

in micro terms as the product of personality andgroup process, but rather in a cultural way as

the product of symbolic structures. It is foundedon the collective sentiment that the fate of

society with regard to ultimate concerns is

dependent upon the actions, powers and moralworth of the leader (Shils 1975b: Bendix

1977: 301 ).Although subjectively located, thismoral bond is sustained by objectively identifi-able culture forms amenable to comparative

social scientific investigation.Recent work in the Durkheimian tradition

provides clues as to the nature of these culturalstructures. It has pointed to the importance of

symbolization and the infiltration of the sacredinto seemingly secular social and political life

(e.g. Hunt 198H;Alexander 1989). Drawing onearlier structuralist scholarship (e.g. Levi-Strauss 1966: Barthes 1972: Sahlins 1976),this Durkheimian body of work indicates the

centrality of binary oppositions in culture.Arelated position argues for the importance ofnarratives in establishing the broader symbolicresonances of specific, worlded practices (e.g.Ricoeur 1984: Walzer 198 5; Wagner-Pacifici1986). Such narratives can be seen as workingin structured ways, mythologizing the con-crete by aligning actors and events with plots.trajectories, destinies and moral codes (Frye197 H; Jacobs 1996). By reading culture as astructure maintained

byinternal

grammarslike

these, such models provide strong grounds for

asserting the analytic autonomy of culture(Kane 1991). Like a language, its systems of

meaning are generated by internal systems ofresemblance and difference between symbolsrather than merely echoing wider social struc-tural forces.Although such an understandingprovides no guarantee that cultural forces willexert a significant causal force in determininga

givensocial outcome (this concrete auton-

omy can be demonstrated only throughdetailed study of particular historical events),it does provide a necessary but insufficientcondition for theorizing cultural autonomy insocial explanation.

Extrapolating from this literature, it is

proposed here that charismatic authority is

underpinned by binary cultural codes whichelaborate and oppose sacred and evil grammarsof motivations (Mills 1940 ; Burke 1969), along

with narratives which emplot events within asalvation framework. These cultural structuresserve to mark out charisma from routine

deviance, suggesting that the charismatic isthe bearer of a transcendent, positive essence

(Katz 19 72 ). This position is consistent with thewell-known findings of Davies ( 195~), whodiscovered that rigid categories of good andevil were held by those who attributed charismato political leaders. It is also in accordance withWebers own study of the Hebrew prophets andChinese saints in his religious sociology, and his

argument that charismatic individuals are

exemplary with respect to the quest for salva-tion (Weber 1952). As Edward Tiryakian

(1995) has pointed out, charismatic commu-nities feel themselves to be moral communities

fighting for some kind of transcendence. Finally,the model gives substantive content to some of

Webers casual remarks regarding the im-

portance of rhetoric in allocating charisma:... rhetoric has the same meaning as ... street

parades and festivals: to imbue the masses withthe notion of the partys power and confidencein victory and, above all, to convince them of the

leaders charismatic qualification ( Weber,quoted in Bell 1986:64). Whilst Webers under-

standing of political language was perhapsrather too instrumental, he is correct in under-

standing the pivotal role of discursive frames inthe construction and attribution of charismatic

properties.Because the symbolic logic of charisma

hangs upon binary codings and salvationnarratives, images of evil must be present inthe forest of

symbols surroundingeach charis-

matic leader. There must be something for themto fight against, something from which theirfollowers can be saved. In many cases this evil is

an abstraction such as poverty, capitalism,heresy or injustice. In yet other cases, this evilfinds its embodiment in another individual

actor, a threatening person who can be takenas embodying a powerful negative charisma.Love of the charismatic leader often seems to be

predicatedon hatred of the evil

againstwhich

they fight, and, indeed will be magnified as this

perceived evil intensifies and is incarnated in a

specific folk devil.

Why has this simple observation about therole of evil largely escaped prior attention? Theanswer lies in a theoretical flaw inherent in the

study of culture. The overwhelming trend fromthe work of Marx through that of Weber andDurkheim and Parsons has been to look at

culture and ideology in terms of prescriptive



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(pull) rather than proscriptive (push) constitu-ents. In the tradition of Marx and his followers,

ideologies promote false images of the utopianor else posit an erroneous correlation betweenthe extant and the desirable. The Weberian

lineage centres on the role of positive religiousideals and ethics as determinants of action. Inthe theory of the later Durkheim, social

solidarity is for the most part assured by the

manipulation of symbols that attract membersto the sacred from the mundane rather than

from the presence of evil, negatively chargedsymbols that repel members into sentiments of

communality. For Parsons, values specify ideal

goals towards which structured individual

social action and institutional imperatives aredirected. Failure to attend to the nature of theevil and its relationship to conceptions of the

good, desirable or sacred has prejudiced cultural

analysis to the extent that half of the picture hasbeen overlooked. In charisma theory, this

generic problem has been compounded by theparticular historical and biographical factorsthat led Weber to a vision of charisma as an

ideological good; that is to say, as a romanticantidote to the

impersonal andcoercive

poisonsof a rationalized and deracinated social order

(Mitzman 1970). This combination of universaland particular factors has resulted - insofar asthe issue of meaning has been addressed at all -in a focus on the positive ideals and relation-

ships of mutuality between the charismaticleader and his/her followers. Images of eviland damnation have been left out of the

frame.

If

genericfeatures of social

theory,and

specific qualities of charisma literature, haveworked against recognition of the kind of

understanding developed in this paper, theyhave by no means prevented other scholarsfrom thinking along similar lines. In social

psychology it has long been acknowledged thatlove and hatred, solidarity and exclusion areinterlinked in complex ways. In his discussionsof group psychology Freud 119 Z 2: 5 3 ) indicatedthat ... hatred

againsta

particularperson or

institution might operate in just the sameunifying way, and might call up the same kindof emotional ties as positive attachment. Eric

Hoffer ( 19 51:1 ? ~-12 3also pointed to the roleof suspicion and hatred in generating a com-

munity of fanatical true believers. Within thecharisma literature we can also find scatteredreferences to the religious dimensions of charis-matic authority and of its links to imageries ofsalvation and evil. The anthropologist I. M.

Lewis, for example, has indicated parallelsbetween beliefs about charisma and beliefsabout witchcraft.According to Lewis both areunderpinned by beliefs about mystical, super-natural forces and in a sense presuppose one

another.As Lewis points out. ... the conquestand transformation of malign forces (negativecharisma) empowers the leaders of charismaticcults (1986:vii).

The are also parallels between the

approach taken here and that of CharlesLindholm (1990). Whilst his study is broadlysituated within the tradition of social psychol-ogy rather than cultural sociology, his casestudies draw attention to the pivotal qualities of

transcendent ideals, messianic leaders and evilsto be conquered in charismatic episodes.AnnRuth Willner ( 1984), however, provides perhapsthe most sustained analysis in the spirit of theone proposed here. Through a series of carefullywrought case studies, Willner challenges reduc-tionist understandings and develops a powerfuland hermeneutically rich argument for the roleof cultural frames in sustaining charismatic

leadership. Her vocabulary of myths, saviours,

heroes, apostles andseers

correctly identifies thequasi-religious dimensions of these sustainingnarratives.

This paper moves beyond Willners book intwo important ways. First, her work offers a

discursively oriented exploration of the varietyof forms that charismatic stories and frames can

take. Here it is proposed that the concept of thesalvation narrative provides a unifying and

distinctively Weberian theme with which wecan work towards the construction of

theoryat

a higher level of generality. Some subtlety andnuance might be lost in this shift from discursiveto propositional theory, but the benefit is not

only the construction of a more parsimoniousexplanatory model, but also the possibility of

recognizing the explanation as a model. In otherwords, by shifting the emphasis in explanationaway from the qualities of individual cases andtowards their generic attributes we can begin toconstruct cultural theories, which are more

likely to be understood and used as valid socialscientific tools by a wider (possibly hostile)discipline. Secondly, Willners decoding of char-ismatic belief systems largely neglects the

importance of negative symbolism. There isconsiderable attention given to the ideals thatthe leader embodies, but rather less to the evilsthat they confront. The resulting narrativeforeclosure precludes from her case studiesconsideration of the ways in which negative



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imagery might influence the rise and fall of thecharismatic leader.As the following empiricalstudies will suggest, this can be a matter of some

significance.The model proposed here, then, builds

upon and formalizes previous scholarship inattempting to avoid the pitfalls that have besetWebers followers and revisionists. In restoringthe individual leader to definitional centrality,Webers original focus on interpersonal and

group relationships is reaffirmed. In arguingthat charisma is linked to the quest for salvationand issues of purity, sacrality, profanity and

pollution, the nascent cultural dimensions ofWebers original argument are maintained and

given content. By specifying the presence ofcodes and narratives with formal and internallyconsistent systems of signification, the modelendows the cultural system with a relative

autonomy from the social and psychologicalsystems. Finally, while arguing for the impor-tance of the individual as leader, the model also

maintains a strongly cultural and, therefore,collectivist, rather than psychological andindividualist, understanding of charismas

social origins.

3. Case studies

The utility of a theory can be seen in its ability toilluminate data. Consequently, this section aimsto demonstrate the plausibility of the model

proposed via three case studies. Ihese involve

political leaders who are widely held to havebeen

amongthe most charismatic

personsof the

20th century: Martin I,uther King jr.. AdolfHitler and Winston Churchill. The theoretical

discussion above provides guidelines for analys-ing these cases. They suggest that historicalevents and the charismatic leader will be framed

within a salvation narrative where strong

binary themes contrast images of evil withthose of the good.As a general rule of thLllllb.charismatic authority will attain its greatestforce when

imagesof evil are at their most

threatening. In each case charismatic authoritycan arise only when these cultural frames areestablished.

Hitler

Consistent with the dominant contours of

charisma theory, Hitlers charisma has been

variously attributed to his personality, to Ger-man social dislocation and to an efficient party

propaganda apparatus. Whilst these are all of

obvious importance, evidence from Hitlers

early life suggests that personality alone wasnot the decisive factor.At the Realsc1wle in Linz

his grades were frequently unsatisfactory andthe other boys considered him an outsider.

During his adolescent life and later in Viennaand Munich he was a loner rather than a leader

(Fest 19 7 31. Even during his period of militaryservice in World War I, there is no indicationthat anyone found him remarkable. One of his

officers described him as a quiet, rather

unmilitary looking man who appeared to differin no way from his fellows; he had been rejectedfor promotion because we could discover no

leadership qualities in him (quoted in Fest

197 3:h8, 69).Hitlers charismatic appeal arose only from

the year 1920 onwards, when he was able to

translate the brooding resentment of his youthinto a mature and more or less coherent world

view. In his early speeches and writings, Hitlerdrew on widespread popular sentiments ofmalaise associated with Germanys postwarsocial crises and funnelled these into a simplisticbut powerful apocalyptic narrative. Using super-

latives and hyperbolehe

elevatedroutine

troubles into world historical struggles (Fest1 9 74: 9ff>. Hitlers discourses spoke of the needfor national salvation from disgrace and offereda spiritual haven in a hostile world (Carr1978 :7). For the mass populace this salvationwas from poverty and unemployment, fromnational ignominy, from perceived foreigndomination, from chaos, anomie and conspi-

racy (Bullock 1952; Carr 1978). Symbolicenemies

figured stronglyin the

binarydis-

courses of National Socialism. Bolsheviks,

Slavs, intellectuals, dithering and decadent

parliamentary systems and nebulous conspira-cies provided the foils against which Hitler could

promote himself as a salvation figure. It was the

Jew, however, who took centre stage in the

moral drama Hitler began to spin (Bullock19 ~?; Lindholm 1990:101). Described as

base, licentious, secretive, deformed and cor-

rupt. the Jew provided a pervasive image of evilwhich only strong leadership could overcome

(Fest 1974:101I. In the Book ofApocalypse theBible speaks of the end of the world. Usingstrikingly similar imagery. Hitler spoke of theawesome and irreversible powers of Jewish evil:If with the help of his Marxist creed, the Jew isvictorious over the other peoples of the world.his crown will be the funeral wreath of

humanity and this planet will, as it did millionsof years ago, move through the ether devoid of



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men (quoted in Fest 1974:102).At other timesHitler predicted anArmageddon-like strugglefor the future of the planet: What is beginningtoday will be greater than the World War. It willbe fought out on German soil for the entire

world. There are only two possibilities:we

willbe the sacrificial lamb or victors (quoted in Fest

1974:151).Within this broader pseudo-religious

framework, Hitler was positioned as a prophet-like figure.As Joachim Fest (1974 :154ff, 755)points out in his monumental biography, Hitlersometimes saw himself in a John the Baptistrole, at others as the heir to Jesus, rather than ashis precursor. For the Nazi leader Christ had

been the greatest early fighterin the battle

against the world enemy, the Jew and he

consequently proclaimed that the work thatChrist started but could not finish, I -Adolf

Hitler - will conclude (quoted in Toland

1976:302). These kinds of self-identificationsfound currency with the German people.Accounts exist, for example, of spectators atthe Oberammergau Passion Play confusingJesus on the cross with Hitler (Toland1976:491).

Within the three years between 1920 and19233 the oddball outsider was converted into a

charismatic leader with a mass following.A

spell in Landsberg prison provided him theopportunity to write Mein Kanipf. This is less a

political tract than a visionary text in thetradition of St. John of Patmos and the OldTestament seers. Following a quasi-mythologi-cal, semi-autobiographical account explaininghow he had seen the

lighton the road to his

own personal Damascus, there come a series of

cataclysmic visions of the rise and fall ofcivilizations engaged in a cosmic struggleregulated only by an eschatological Darwinism.Hitlers own role in this grim but heroic tale wasto promote the cause of theAryan race. This

group alone could bring about salvation

through the attainment of a millennial Thou-sand Year Reich under his leadership. Theseframes were enhanced in subsequent years bythe rallies and rituals through which the Nazi

regime generated mass hysteria. Whilst thesehave often been invoked as examples of thesecularization of ritual process, the obverse is

perhaps more accurate. The code underlyingNazi political rituals was the spiritualization ofthe secular processes of political life. Conse-

quently Goebbels called these activities thedivine services of our political work. Thosewho attended perceived Hitler not as the states-

man or politician who inhabits the deflatedworld of Realpolitik. but rather as a Christ-likefigure in a mythological scenario - as a helper,rescuer, redeemer from overwhelming need(quoted in Fest 1974:328; see also Lindholm

1990:100ff). For this reason, Hitlers publicappearances have been properly likened toElmer Gnntr~-style religious revival meetingswhere his messianic politics of sacrifice andsalvation struck an appropriate emotionalchord (Carr 1978 : 5).

Churchill

Webers original theory emphasized the chal-

lenge that charismatic authority posed to theestablished order.

Charismais said to

derive,in

part, from confronting legal-rational authorityand institutionalized norms. One of the most

significant developments in post-Weberiancharismatic theory has been the assertion thatthis form of power can be conservative in

orientation rather than radical. Edward Shils

( 19 7 5 a, b, c) argues that charisma is a propertyof cultural and political centres as well as

peripheries. In detailed comparative and histor-ical work

BarrySchwartz

(e.g. 1983)has

documented this theme, showing that figureslike George Washington derived charismatic

authority by conforming to orthodox norms ofvirtue rather than by establishing oppositionalvalue systems.

The case of Winston Churchill allows for an

application of the model proposed in this paperto such conservative charisma. His early life wasa mediocre as Hitlers. Neither showed anyevidence of nascent charismatic

appeal.As a

schoolboy and army cadet Churchill wasunremarkable and scarcely gave promise ofwhat was to come (Lockhart 1973:12). He wasbad at sports, unpopular and often at thebottom of his class (Mayer 1967). His fellowofficers in the cavalry considered him bump-tious. As a young politician Churchill was

widely considered to be talented, but also

impulsive, presumptuous and self-serving(Wright 19 7 3 ). For much of the 19 30s Church-ill was a wilderness figure, excluded from office.He was an outcast in British politics, prognos-ticating from the back benches, and ridiculed for

his bombastic and ornate literary style (Berlin1949). The former Tory party heavyweight wasviewed as reactionary, unreliable, a figure of the

past who was out of touch with the times

(Rhodes James 1970). His persistent warningsthroughout the decade about Hitler and Ger-man re-armament, such as the Deepening and



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107

Darkening Danger speech of May 31, 1935(Churchill 1974:5624) were seen as warmon-

gering. Churchill was widely viewed as a

political adventurer and swashbuckler of themost dangerous sort and was written off byPrime Minister Stanley Baldwin as part of theflotsam and jetsam of political life thrown up onthe beach (Gardner 1970:2, 6).

The Second World War and Hitler pro-vided, of course, the raw materials for Church-

ills overnight symbolic and political redemption(Rees 19 7 3: 211, 217 ) and his elevation to the

status of a colossal figure (ibid.:217). Church-ills anti-German track record was well estab-

lished and enabled him to be symbolically

distanced from tainted appeasers. As newnarratives fell into place the warmonger was

retrospectively interpreted as a kind of prophetwhose warnings of an impendingArmageddonhad gone unheeded.A binary contrast with theevil Hitler was facilitated by the fact that sincethe mid-1930s the German leaders speecheshad frequently denounced Churchill in person(Gardner 1970:24). With defeat at Dunkirk,Britain became vulnerable to invasion and even

stronger salvation narratives emerged. Church-ills hyperbolic and bombastic radio broadcastsreinforced this mood, conjuring up the mena-

cing spectre of Nazi domination and an end tothe civilization of the English speaking peopleswith their great national traditions of democ-

racy. For example, in the Blood, Toil. Tears andSweat speech of May 13. 1940 Churchill

(1974:6220) argued that the war was againsta monstrous tyranny never surpassed in the

dark, lamentable catalogue of human crimeand that without victory there would be ... no

survival for the urge and impulse of the ages,that mankind will move forward towards its

goal. In the subsequent speech, Their FinestHour (Churchill 19 74: 6 2 3 8 ), the binary con-trasts were drawn even more fiercely and in anidiom which fused the search for secular

salvation with the religious imagery of apoc-alyptic struggle: Upon this battle depends the

survival of Christian civilization...

Ifwe

can

stand up to him [Hitler], all Europe may be freeand the life of the world may move forward into

broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then thewhole world ... will sink into the abyss of a newDarkAge ...

Radio broadcasts allowed Churchill to

disseminate these imageries direct to the public.The widespread acceptance of their underlyingManichean dualisms allowed Churchill to

become, in the words of IsaiahBerlin

( 1949:9()), the saviour of his country, a

mythical hero who belongs to legend as muchas to reality .... In other words, Churchillscharisma emerged once he became an effectivemobilizing symbol in an apocalyptic narrative, a

personification of the spirit of national defiance.According to one historian, his tonic effectupon the British people was almost miraculous

(Thompson 1973:72). Robert Rhodes James(1969:109) provides some indication of this

quasi-millennial mass transformation innational mood: One caught Churchills infec-tious spirit that this was a great time to be alive

in; that Destiny had conferred a wonderfulbenefit upon us; and that these were thrilling

days to live through. One indication of thisability to resonate with and construct a national

mood was his immense personal popularity. Hisbroadcasts were listened to by over 60 per centof the adult population and byAugust 1940 he

enjoyed an 88 per cent approval rating (Pelling1974:458).

Following Dunkirk and the Battle ofBritain, Churchills charismatic authority was

assured, and for the period when the outcome of

the war was in doubt he was to enjoyunprecedented public adulation and conse-

quent personal influence.As one commentatornotes: Churchills charisma persuaded the

sceptical military chiefs, the cynical CivilService, the uncertain House of Commons and

the batlled man in the street that he, and he

alone, was capable of extracting the countryfrom disaster ... (Lewin 19 7 3:? 3 ). For the rest

of his life Churchill was to remain a respected

figure, although it is doubtful that his charis-matic authority ever regained the heights of1940 (Rees 1973). By 1945 realist frames sawconcerns about poverty replace concerns for the

survival of civilization, and Churchill was voted

out of office. His administration from 1951-555

was unremarkable and did nothing to boost hischarismatic power (Rees 1973), being mostlyconcerned with economic matters and austerity,which provided a much less easily identifiable

goal than victory over Hitler (Colville1973:138). Notwithstanding Churchills con-siderable oratory, debates about nationalization,

social security and steel production could not

equal the salvation narratives that enhancecharismatic reputation. ;

Martin Luther King Jr.Biographies of King show that he too was notconsidered charismatic

earlyin his life.



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108

Accounts of his college years show that he was

perceived as a sharp dresser, a good debater andan earnest but by no means brilliant student

(Lewis 1978). If there was a charismatic

personality, then, it did not manifest itself at

this stage.The situation began to change with the

Rosa Parks initiated bus boycott in MontgomeryAlabama in 19 5 5.As a member of the cityssAfrican-American elite, King found himself

taking on a leadership role in the dispute.Salvation narratives began to structure this

dispute following Kings stirring sermon at theHolt Street Baptist Church. When he asked that

his congregation be saved from that patience

that makes us patient with anything less thanfreedom and justice (quoted in Lewis 1978:58).King was placing a secular struggle for equalitywithin a religious context. This narrative

framing was made possible, in part, throughthe influence of Rauschenbuschs concept of theSocial Gospel on Kings theological develop-ment. It was a motif that remained central to

the narratives King spun in subsequent disputesas the struggle for material and political rights

promoted by the civil rights movement became,simultaneously, a struggle for spiritual salva-tion. In many cases this understanding was

predicated upon the Old Testament doctrine ofthe Promised Land, and in particular the storyof Moses (Smylie 1989). King called the CityCommissioners of Montgomery, for example, the

pharaohs of the South and dreamed that one

day even the State of Mississippi, a desert state

sweating with the heat of injustice and oppres-

sion will be transformed into an oasis of freedomand justice (Smylie 1989:135). Such imageryplayed upon a long-standing, religiouslyinflected dualism inAfrican-American popularculture that extended back to the anti-bellum

period. This depicted the South as unfree and as

Egypt whilst the North was Canaan - thePromised Land to which escaped slaves wishedto flee (Cone 1991 :59). In this framing Kingplayed a role analogous to that of Moses,

operating simultaneouslyas a

temporaland

spiritual leader.At other times King used New Testament

analogies. In his epochal Letter from Birming-ham Jail, King explicitly likened himself to the

Apostle Paul responding to the Macedonian callfor aid. Such tactics were designed to raise

conveniently interred memories about thesacrificial aspects of Christian duty (Lewis1978:188). On occasion King would speak asa

prophetic figure.The

conceptof the dream,

which figured most prominently in his I Have a

Dream speech, identified King as a person in thetradition of the Old Testament prophets whoreceived messages from God and tried to enactthem to redeem a sinful world. It is no accident,

then, that King was to suggest that the Negro isGods instrument to save the soul ofAmerica

(Cone 1991:151).A series of evil and polluted opponents

facilitated Kings rise to charismatic status.Whilst the abstract system of inequalityprovided one source of evil, Kings charismatic

appeal was maximized when he confronted

personal rivals who could be portrayed asviolent, irrational and selfish. The moral

dramas which King - following Gandhissatytigralia teachings - attempted to createdepended on strong narrative polarization.Thus the key mytho-poetic moments of thecivil rights struggle are located in precisely those

places where brutal and stupid establishmentofficials confronted King and his followers -Sheriff Clark and ColonelAl Lingo in Selma,Commissioner Bull Connor in Birmingham,Police Chief Bubba Pritchet in Albany and

Connie Lynch in St.Augustine (Lentz 1990).Confrontations with these figures assisted Kingto exert his maximum influence in the periodbetween the Birmingham demonstrations of1963 and the Selma March of 1965 (Cone1991).

By contrast Kings later campaigns seemedto flounder when he could not locate an

opponent. The Chicago housing initiative, for

example, was consistently thwarted by Mayor

Daleys compliant facade of affability (Lentz1990:220). In the case of Chicago, Kingscharisma was damaged once he was forcedinto compromise by city authorities, rivalAfrican-American organizations and ghettoapathy. The accompanying shift towards realistnarrative frames led to a deflation of salvation

rhetoric. With this movement came a wide-

spread feeling that King was no longer a

prophetic figure, but rather had become justanother

politician (Lewis 1978 :349). Thesethreats to charismatic authority were reinforced

by growing public splits with more radicalAfrican-American leaders, division over the

Vietnam question and inability to deal withurban riots. By 1967 a Gallup Poll showed Kingwas no longer among the ten most admired

persons (Lewis 1978:358), and by 1968

prominent activistAdam Clayton Powell had

publicly dubbed him Martin Loser King.

History,however, has been somewhat kinder



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109

to King.An unintended consequence of hisassassination was that it ensured him an

enduring martyrs status and a posthumouslevel of moral authority that is without equal inthe United States.

4. The limits to cultural autonomy andother qualif cations

Structural models of culture such as the onehere proposed are prone to several flaws. First,

they are said to be culturally deterministic in themanner of a Levi-Straussian myth. Secondly,they are claimed to be static, inflexible and

prone to glossing over situational detail. Thirdly,they are said to make claims that are too broadand universal, ignoring sphere-specific logics. Inorder to place the argument of this paper incontext, it is necessary to consider each of thesein turn.

To argue that culture has a significant andautonomous input into the process of generat-ing charismatic individuals is by no means todiscount the importance of social structure or

individual ability and psychic needs. Clearly noteverybody has the same access to world

ordering power as a US President or leader ofa social movement. It is also obvious that in

periods of social crisis and upheaval, actors willseek powerful leaders in response to sentimentsof anomie and vulnerability. Still, social struc-ture and psychic needs alone are not determi-nate. Not every power-wielding leader ischarismatic (e.g. Gerald Ford), nor does every

economic or social crisis give rise toa

messianicfigure (e.g. 1998Asian economic meltdown).Only when these structural conditions are

supported in a combinatorial way by the

availability of appropriate cultural structurescan the charismatic figure arise. Even in thesecases, however, questions relating to the recep-tion of culture need to be considered. Whilst

elites may deploy charisma-generating culturalframes, there is no guarantee that audienceswill endorse this

template. Duringthe 1990s.

for example, US President Clinton made exten-sive use of Biblical imagery and negative imagesof Hussein and Milosevic in order to justifybombings of Iraq and Serbia. Yet there was no

sign of Clinton becoming charismatic simplybecause this discourse existed. Whilst a detailed

explanation of this negative case is beyond the

scope of this paper, it would seem that the

American people continued evaluating events

usingmundane and realist cultural frames.

These genres underpin realpolitik, and generatepragmatic orientations towards political eventsand political leaders (Smith 1994).

The argument that charisma is universallydetermined by historically invariant cultural

structures should not be conflated with anassertion that there is an unchanging semanticcontent within these formal structures. This isconsistent with Webers own work on compara-tive religion, which demonstrated that there are

many local ways of pursuing the universal questfor salvation. Consider the case studies. In all

three we can detect common structural proper-ties to the narratives. In each there is an evil to

be overcome and a way that the leader proposes

it can be conquered, yet in each the specificitiesare highly divergent. Understanding thatHitlers Jews, Kings racists and ChurchillsNazis are structurally analogous does notmean the same thing as claiming they are

semantically identical. Rather, it allows us toconstruct higher-order models of culture

through which to compare and understandthe specificities of each concrete historicalepisode.

Turning briefly to the issue of general-izability, the case studies presented here areintended mainly to validate the model inpolitical and social movement domains. Thereis no necessary reason why charismatic figuresin other areas, such as business or sports,should follow a similar logic. Similarly, all threeexamples were drawn from settings within the

Judeo-Christian tradition where Biblical ima-

gery plays a key role. Whilst it is anticipated that

salvation narratives will bea

universal featureof political charisma, it is likely that they willdraw up local religious traditions in othercultural settings. Willner ( 198-1), for example,points to the way theAyatollah Khomeini madeuse of Islamic mythologies of the heroic Imam.

Interesting questions must also be raised aboutthe possibility of charisma (at least in itsWestern form) arising in societies with anti-dualist cultural idioms. Buddhism, for example,

arguablylacks a

conceptof evil. Can there be a

Buddhist charisma?

5. Conclusion: the routinization of

charisma and paradox ,

In Webers formal treatment of the types of

authority (/!(rrsr/M/f) more attention is devotedto the transformation, routinization, weakeningand eventual disappearance of charisma than to



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110

the phenomenon itself. Webers discussion ofthis process spins around an axis of instru-mental motivations and institutional forces

(Weber 19 78 :246-2 54, 266-2 71). If a culturalmodel of charisma it to be taken seriously, it

must be able to provide a compelling alternativeaccount of this process. The theoretical modeland the studies of King and Churchill suggestedthat charisma attributed to the individual canweaken when binary rhetoric is no longerproduced, and when inflated salvation narra-tives are replaced by frames which substituteeconomistic and piecemeal visions of mundane

political life. Fundamental to this process are the

negative symbolisms against which heroes and

salvation narrativesare

constructed.Because complex symbolic processes, andunder-determined individual and group level

typifications, are involved in the discursivetransformation of the charismatic hero into

the bureaucratic leader, rational manipulativestrategies and social structural changes mayhave a less determinate influence than lvebersfatalistic vision suggests. Certainly this must bethe case when the target of negative symbolismhas sufficient

powerto

performacts whose

interpretations may reinforce or destroy the

authority of the charismatic hero himself.

Strange as it may initially seem, this argumentis in one sense an instance of old wine in newbottles. That the fate of a leaders charisma is

ultimately dependent upon the actions andrepresentations of his or her imagined enemyadds a cultural level of perversity to the

catalogue of paradoxes we find in Webers

originaldiscussion.

First version received July 1998Final version acceptedApril 1999

Acknowledgements

JeffreyAlexander, Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters commentedon early drafts of this paper. Notes by Paul Colomy were of use inconstructing the literature review. Helpful suggestions fromKlaus Makela. Charles Lmdholm and other, anonymous,Acta

Sociologica referees were of assistance in strengthening the finalmanuscript.

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