Cyprus1955-1973By Tom CooperCrown Colony

Under Turkish sovereignty since 1570 and until 1867, Cyprus was ceded to Britain in exchange for guarantees that Britain would use the island as a base to protect the Ottoman Empire against possible Russian aggression. The British had been offered Cyprus three times (in 1833, 1841, and 1845), before accepting it, in 1878. The island was finally annexed by Britain, in 1914, and became a colony, in 1925.

By the 1950s, Cyprus had a population of about 520.000 of whom between 75 and 80% were Greeks. Through it had never been part of modern Greece, the Greek government claimed the island as its own, and the main political aspiration of Greek Cypriots was for "Enosis" - a union with Greece. This request took hold among ethnic Greeks living in the Ionian and Aegean Sea islands already since Greece had won its independence from the Ottoman Empire, in 1821, and especially after Britain ceded the Ionian islands to Greece, in 1864.

While a single political entity, Cyprus was nevertheless an ethnically divided community: about 18% of the population were Turkish. They looked to Turkey, the legal owner of the island until 1923, as their homeland.

The British had no political, but plenty of military aims in Cyprus. They wished to retain the island as a base for operations in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East: the crown colony of Cyprus possessed a strategic importance that led the British government to announce that it could never expect to secure independence. Outbreak of Trouble

The Cyprus Emergency resulted from the Greek Cypriot attempt to secure Enosis by force of arms, after they recognized the difficulty of getting the British to concede such an important base. The leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Arch-bishop Makarios III, had been the driving force behind the Enosis movement and had set about creating mass support organisations needed to sustain the campaign. In 1951 he contacted a known right-wing extremist, George Grivas, a Cypriot-born colonel in the Greek Army (and a former leader of a successful but banned resistance group during WWII), to organise the military wing of the movement. This became known as EOKA, or National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters. The new organisation was supplied with light weapons and explosives smuggled by sea from Greece.

Trouble began to develop in late 1954, with the arrival of British forces - including the HQ Middle East Command - evacuated from Egypt (thereby turning a "colonial backwater" into a major military strategic base for a foreign power), a British ministerial statement that Cyprus would never be granted independence, and the refusal of the United Nations to consider the Cyprus question. Fierce anti-British riots erupted in March 1955, during the court hearings into a ship caught smuggling arms from Greece to Cyprus. On 1 April 1955 a bombing campaign started with attacks on government buildings at Larnaca, Limassol and Nicosia. After further attacks in the autumn, in which policemen and servicemen were killed, Field Marshal Sir John Harding arrived as Governor, declaring a state of emergency, on 27 November 1955. At that time EOKA sought to gain control over the Greek Cyprus community, harness world opinion and wear down the

British until they tired of the struggle. The methods which EOKA used to achieve these aims were a skilful blend of propaganda and military action. On the civil front there were riots, disturbances, boycotts, civil disobedience and strikes. On the military side EOKA fought both an urban and a rural campaign, starting with no more than 100 fighters.

The overall strategy employed by the EOKA insurgents was less strictly military than political: they aimed to mobilise domestic opinion and organise it in a manner that would make government impossible. At the same time they applied gradually increasing pressure through selective paramilitary action. The main weapon of EOKA insurgents became bombs: the Governor, Lord Harding, survived an attempt on his life when his servant, an EOKA agent, placed a bomb in his bed: it was one of 2.976 bombs placed by Cypriot Greeks that either failed to explode or were discovered and rendered ineffective by the security forces. Further 1.782 bombs did explode and accounted for damage to the value of GBP 10 million.

EOKA never expected to achieve a military victory over the British: it sought to neutralise the administration and police and eliminate the Special Branch, thereby depriving the British of vitally needed intelligence. But, the main EOKA method had to be by gun and bomb, the chief targets being British servicemen and installations. Aside from the British, the insurgents were also aiming to eliminate political opponents and manipulate the local population for economic and physical confrontations with the authorities. Violence - mainly in form of sniping and street murder, arson, sabotage and bombings, as well as hit-and-run attacks on isolated police stations and patrols - was the critical element in presenting the insurgent case to the outside world. British Military on Cyprus

There was already a large British military presence on Cyprus since the times of the WWI. This increased during the WWII, and again following the departure in 1954 from Egypt. Still, after the declaration of state of emergency, the number of British troops was again considerably increased during 1955, and several new units formed. Reinforcements were airlifted by Shackletons from No.42 Squadron RAF, while No.208 Squadron's Meteor FR.9s flew patrols from Akrotiri and photo-reconnaissance over the Troodos Mountains. The British Army operated Auster AOP.6s of 1910 Flight from Nicosia, Lakatamia and Kermia at the time, while in May 1954, the Search and Rescue (SAR) Flight equipped with Sycamore HC.14 helicopters was formed by RAF in Nicosia. An additional unit, a Flight of the Internal Security force (ISF) was formed in July 1955, and also equipped with Sycamore HR.14s. Helicopters were used to limited extension in autumn 1955, when the British launched operations "Foxhunter", "Pepperpot", and "Lucky Alphonse", with aim of locating Grivas and his supporters. While many of Colonel's most trusted associates were captured, together with several arms dumps, all these proved vain attempts. Worst yet: the British suffered their worst losses of the whole conflict in a series of "friendly fire" accidents and in a forest fire that swept through the Paphost Forest at a high speed during the later operation.

By 1956, when Arch-bishop Makarios had been deported (only to be released to Athens, in 1957), the British flying services further increased their presence, foremost through addition of light aircraft, helicopters and even some fighter-bombers. The EOKA hit back, perhaps out of protest, and on 3 March a chartered Hermes

transport was destroyed while parked in Larnaca. On 12 April 1956, the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) started operations from Nicosia with three Gannet AS.1 AEW aircraft from 847 Naval Air Squadron (NAS), to prevent the smuggling of arms by sea and from the air - the air supply being carried out during hours of darkness. Gannets proved useful in directing RAF fighters in interceptions of many smuggling aircraft, but British fighter-pilots never received a permission to open fire. At least one RAF Venom was lost - due to engine failure - during such intercept operations, the pilot barely surviving ejection into the cold sea by night. In addition, on 27 April 1956, the EOKA hit back for the second time, blowing up a Dakota aircraft parked at Nicosia International.

In June 1956 the British mounted another major operation against insurgents in the Troodos Mountains, but only netted a handful of EOKA members. Quite on the contrary, the terrorists kept up the pressure by extending their campaign to additional towns around the island and attacking also families of British servicemen. Given the small number of British troops involved - no more than 17.000 at this time - and the multitude of defensive duties they had to perform, there were never sufficient troops on the ground to gain thorough control of the island. The security forces never had the numbers to control the countryside, and they never had the amount or quality of intelligence that was needed to get to grips with terrorist groups in the towns. Consequently, most counter-insurgency activity took place in the towns, where the EOKA used terrorism, intimidation and infiltration to keep the issue in the headlines. A good example of actions at the time was the "Battle of Nicosia Hospital", which broke out when the security forced had taken Polykarpos Yorgadjis, a prominent and quite fanatic EOKA-member, to Nicosia General Hospital for X-ray. Four gang members attempted to rescue him, in the process clashing with a British police unit. Two terrorists were killed in exchange for one British constable.

In light of such EOKA activity the demand for light aircraft increased, so that the 1915 Flight of British Army, equipped with Auster AOP.6s was also transferred to Nicosia, with the task of general reconnaissance and liaison work.

Cyprus and Suez Crisis

In September and October 1956, Cyprus saw an immense influx of troops as well as British and French aircraft prior to the Suez expedition. By 29 October, all main airfields on the island were overcrowded by aircraft.

Although the Egyptian government attempted to establish some contacts to the EOKA, the Greeks failed to launch any kind of significant operations against relatively vulnerable British bases during the expedition to Egypt. On the contrary, in October 1956 the British Army launched another counterinsurgency operation and Sycamore helicopters - now consolidated within the 284 Squadron RAF - were for the first time used to transport troops. This unit was reinforced by a number of Whirlwind HAR.2s from November 1956: it was only then that the EOKA took advantage of the lull to stage no less but 416 attacks.

In response, as soon as troops deployed in Egypt returned, the British Army attempted - with some success - to round up the known EOKA cells. Grivas was forced into hiding and, in January 1957, two

EOKA leaders, Drakos and Afxentiou, were killed in clashes with British forces. Their gangs were broken up as well. Strategy and Tactics

During Cyprus Emergency, the security forces - increased to 40.000 by late 1957 - came to win a large measure of control over the military situation, particularly in rural areas. There the EOKA sought to survive rather than fight, although they did carry out ambushes and laid mines. The rules governing the use of weapons by British forces were much more relaxed in rural areas. A system of identification checks was enforced, but there was no ruthless system of accountability by villages, households and streets that the French adopted with great success in Algiers. On the contrary: British troops were initially bound by the provisions of minimum force and common law. It was only because of the never-ending stream of false allegations made about British troops on searches they were freed from legal accountability for their actions during an operation.

In response to their problems the British used experience and techniques that had proved effective in Malaya and Kenya. In Cyprus it was quite easy to produce an integrated administration-police-army organisation on the Malaya pattern in order to combat EOKA. Intelligence services were quickly formed into a single integrated organisation, but in the absence of widespread support amongst the population and sound information on which to work, the security forces had to rely on patrolling, setting up check points and manning observation posts to gain intelligence and contact the insurgents.

In the mountains, cordons and searches of brigade size were not uncommon. In such operations it was quite common for small patrols to take up advanced reconnaissance positions during the night in order to pass on information to units as they took part in formation-sized operations. Correspondingly, Cyprus was the first major campaign where the British used helicopters on a large scale. In fact, the British helicopter force came into its own during this conflict. Despite the fact that Sycamores had a very limited payload, they were able to place troops quickly in inaccessible parts of the mountainous countryside, thus keeping EOKA units constantly under pressure.

The success of the helicopter was to have far-reaching results. One of these emerged from resulting problems - of political nature: at the time Cyprus Emergency erupted, the RAF was required to support Army, and had to buy and operate helicopters for this purpose. This was a source of general dissatisfaction for both services. Relief was provided only when the Minister of Defence directed that the Army was to man and operate its own aircraft, under provision that these would not weigh more than 1.814kg and would remain unarmed. A new corps, the Army Air Corps (AAC), was formed on 1 September 1957, taking command over all the light-aircraft and helicopter assets of the RAF that formerly operated under a nominal Army command. Although RAF retained the manning and operation of the large transport helicopters, through the following years both constraints for size and type of aircraft and helicopters operated by the AAC were quietly ignored.

Conventional fighter aircraft were of little value under such circumstances: although the RAF had a number of Venom FB.Mk.4 units on Cyprus in 1956, only very few of fast aircraft were retained subsequently. These included a flight of Meteor NF.13s of No.39 Squadron at Nicosia, used for reconnaissance but also occasional strikes against mountain strongholds. This unit was transferred to

Malta already in March 1957, however: exactly at the time the EOKA was involved in making its main effort. Other RAF aircraft based on Cyprus at the time were Hunter F.Mk.6s of No.1 Squadron, and Valetta transports. A Fighting Retreat

In early 1958, intercommunal strife became severe for the first time, tension mounting between the governments of Greece and Turkey as well. Grivas attempted to enforce an island-wide boycott of British goods and increased the level of sabotage attacks. In March 1958 the RAF established a Tactical Air Control Centre in Nicosia, responsible for control of all light fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Together with several signal units, this proved instrumental in supporting different units during the emergency. By November 1958 the light aircraft presence was increased by addition of No.230 Squadron's Pioneer CC.1s, also based on Nicosia. They supplemented the Austers, which had re-formed as No.653 Squadron Army Aviation Corps.

The only known use of British fighters during the Cyprus Emergency was the deployment of Sea Venom FAW.21s of 809 NAS, based onboard aircraft carrier HMS Albion, in August 1958. The fighters attacked several hideouts in the Troodos Mountains, using unguided rockets. In response, most of EOKA attacks remained directed against British government property. The best known insurgent operation was the bombing of the British NAAFI at Nicosia, in October 1958. Two people were killed and the 3.800 Greek Cypriots employed by the British authorities were subsequently dismissed. In December, five Chipmunk T.Mk.10s of No.114 Squadron flew counterinsurgency patrols. The type proved unsuccessful and unsuitable and this unit was disbanded already on 14 March 1959.

In January 1959 the Army/RAF Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit (JEHU) was deployed in Cyprus. JEHU was to conduct additional trials into the uses of helicopters in the field. Until 31 December 1959, when it was disbanded, this squadron experimented with different tactical and technical procedures. The work of the JEHU was steady and unspectacular, but highly successful, and resulted in procedures that were put to good use in later years by Royal Navy Commando and RAF Support Helicopter Squadrons. Meanwhile, RAF Sycamores continued supporting ground troops. By the time the emergency ended, in December 1959, the No.284 Squadron had been renumbered No.103 Squadron. In all, this unit flew a total of 9.792 hours in 19.375 sorties during this conflict, dropping 4.000 troops and 120 tons of supplies, while lifting 268 casualties.

In the end, the Cyprus Emergency ended in an irony similar to that in Algeria. Despite sound and innovative performance of the British military, the well-proven British methods did not yield results - mainly because the nationalist organisation was extremely resilient and the security forces were unable to counter widespread public support for the insurgents. Faced with a population that could never be reconciled to British rule and could never be induced to inform on insurgents, the attempt to find a military solution in Cyprus was doomed to failure.

The insurgent movement, while never anywhere near being able to outright challenge British military, was nevertheless able to obtain a grip on the community through persuasion and intimidation that the British found impossible to break. The End of one - and Begin of another Conflict

Violent sectarian strife erupted already in mid-1958, when 109 were killed. It was this development that prompted Archbishop Makarios, Greece and Turkey to accept reality and agree on the solution of independence. In reaction, British prime minister Harold Macmillan proposed a seven-year partnership scheme of separate communal legislative bodies and separate municipalities, in June 1958. This "Macmillan Plan" was not accepted, but led to discussions of the Cyprus problem between representatives of Greece and Turkey.

During a conference in Zurich, in September 1958, and in London, in September 1958, Makarios announced his abandonment of support for Enosis. The outcome of the Cyprus Emergency was in fact decided when Makarios endorsed a Greek-Turkish plan to make Cyprus an independent state - under international guarantee within the Commonwealth. He was permitted to return to Cyprus, in February 1959, and from that moment all involved parties foremost emphasised attempts to find a political solution. This search became increasingly complicated and urgent as Turkish Cypriots became ever more fearful of seeming British "weakness" in the face of Greek demands. The political issues eventually became important for the British: although Greece had been an ally during the WWII, it not only rejected a NATO mediation in the case of Cyprus, but Turkey - which demanded the return of Cyprus by Britain, or partition - meanwhile proved also a more important strategic partner in NATO, and had the ear of Britain and the United States.

The reasons for such British politics were actually logical. The world of the 1960s was a very dangerous and volatile place: the Cold War was at its highest and could turn "hot" at almost any minute, beginning from the "U-2 Crisis", in 1960, via the Cuban Missile Crisis, of 1962, the crisis in Congo and Vietnam, etc. Aside from this there were numerous emergencies - especially in British, French and Portuguese colonies - in Africa, but also in into almost all of these hot spots, and the "Communist danger" was omni-present.

To the West, the "Makarios regime" - which was receiving arms shipments from the Communist block - thus appeared not only leftist, but outright "red". The Cuban experience with a communist enclave at the underbelly of the USA, was alarming: the Enosis movement on Cyprus could eventually be accepted if it was not for the fact that the Greek government was also increasingly turning "leftist", and seen as a instable.

The situation in Turkey was not much better. The country was bankrupt by 1960, and the military intervened, arresting the government. This was not a planned coup d'etat, but rather an uprising of younger officers, who were in turn expelled by a more senior military committee, which only reluctantly gave power away, over a year later. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted and the Soviet Union threatened with war against the USA if Jupiter surface-to-surface missiles, operated by the US Army from Turkey, would not be removed from the Turkish soil.

Soviet reconnaissance aircraft were penetrating the Turkish airspace, while US U-2s and C-130s were shot down over the USSR: all the available Turkish forces had to be concentrated on the borders in eastern Anatolia, and on the border to Bulgaria. At the same time the Iraqis were at war with Kurdish separatists and numerous violations of border took place. The situation boiled to a point where two Iraqi Ilushin Il-28 bombers were shot down by THK fighters. Finally, the

border towards Syria, which claimed the province of Hatay, was constantly infringed upon by so-called "smugglers". Turkey was therefore surrounded by Communist enemies, or Soviet clients, and under permanent threat. Worse yet: the whole eastern Mediterranean area could turn hostile at any moment. Latin America. The situation in the Middle East was boiling with daily clashes between Arabs and the Israelis. War lingered also between Malaysia and Indonesia, and India took possession of Goa, while increasing amounts of Soviet-made weapons were streaming

After much negotiating, a compromise agreement supporting independence was reached and foundations laid for the Republic of Cyprus. The new nation was to have a parliament and government services with 70:30 Greek-Turkish representation, and a proscription on union with Greece - or any other state. Following this agreement, Cyprus was granted independence from Great Britain, on 16 August 1960.

Despite so many precautions, there was little prospect of a lasting peace, then from 1962 both, Greeks and Turkish Cypriot factions began stockpiling weapons. The political settlement could not last for long as EOKA-B still campaigned underground for enosis, and terrorised the Turkish population, while its government members - like Polykarpos Yorgadjis, were issuing statements like, "There is no place in Cyprus for anyone who is not Greek". Numerous Cypriot Greek attempts to amend the constitution were seen as a threat to Turkish minority rights as well. In early 1963 armed violence broke out, resulting in several hundred killed.

Although by the time there was a total of 990 Greek and 650 Turkish troops based on the island (while the British were granted the right to retain two sovereign base areas, at Dhekelia, in the east, and Akrotiri/Episkopi, in the west), these could not put the situation under control. Consequently, on 27 March 1963 a UN peacekeeping force was established as United Nations Force In Cyprus (UNFICYP). The HQ of this contingent, comprising at its peak 7.000 troops with air support provided by No. 19 Liaison Flight and No.21 Recce Flight of No.651 Squadron Army (operating Sioux helicopters and Auster AOP.9s), was the Blue Beret Camp, on the edge of Nicosia International Airport. The UNFICYP included contingents from Austria, Canada Denmark, Great Britain, and Sweden. From 1972 also the Whirlwind HAR.10s of B Flight No.84 Squadron RAF were committed in its support. Old Opponents with New Weapons

During the late 1960s tensions between Greek and Turkish ethnicities on Cyprus slowly increased. The situation further destabilised because of strong antagonism between Greece and Turkey. Since both, Greece and Turkey joined NATO, in 1952, their air forces were completely re-built with US support. Nevertheless, as of the early 1960s, both countries were still in no position to exercise strong military presence on Cyprus.

The Royal Hellenic Air Force received some 200 second-hand Republic F-84G Thunderjets from different sources, during the early 1950s. These were reinforced by addition of 104 North American F-86 Sabres by 1956. In the same year also the first of 50 Republic F-84F Thunderstreaks and RF-84F Thunderflashes arrived, the later of which remained in service until 1991, when they were definitely the last examples of this series in world-wide use.

Deliveries of MiG-21F-13s to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, in 1961, conditioned an upgrade of the RHAF, in the early 1960s, and by 1968 a total of more than 50 Lockheed F-104 Starfighters and 70 Northrop F-5A Freedom Fighters, as well as some 40 Convair F-102A/B Delta Dart interceptors were acquired from the USA. The first two types were to build the main strength of the RHAF well into the 1980s, and were reinforced in the early 1970s by additional Starfighters "cascaded" from different NATO countries (mainly Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands), as well as some F-5As purchased from Iran.

In the late 1960s, Greece came under a military rule, and the relationship to the NATO calmed to the point that the country was not considered as a part of the pact, in turn causing a stop of arms deliveries from the USA.

The Turkish Air Force (Turk Havva Kuvvetleri = THK) - one of the oldest air forces of the world (established as a separate arm already in 1911), was reinforced through significant numbers of F-86 Sabre and F-84 Thunderjet fighters, in the early 1950s. Given that until this time the THK was still flying vintage Supermarine Spitfires, Republic P-47D Thunderbolts, DeHavilland Mosquitoes and Douglas B-26 Invaders, purchased during or shortly after the WWII, as well as that most of the newly acquired jet-fighters were "cascaded down" from other NATO air forces and in a pretty poor condition, initially there were considerable problems with the training and maintenance, which were not completely solved until the early 1960s. Nevertheless, in the late 1950s, USA, France, Belgium, and Netherlands delivered additional F-84s and then also first North American F-100 Super Sabres, and by 1966 the THK was also reinforced by over 160 additional F-84Q Thunderstreaks (a more powerful, swept-wing version of the F-85 Thunderjet), so that its fleet of fighter-bombers was well standardized.

Despite many similar deliveries for the Turkish Army and Navy, and the Turkish armed forces looking formidable on the paper, Turkey was ill-prepared and deployed for troubles on Cyprus. For reasons described above, the Turkish military was in fact seriously overstretched, and the Air Force and Navy badly in need of modernisation. With all contingencies on its borders, any action on Cyprus required an absolute maximum effort the Turkish military could exercise at the time. Without surprise, there was actually no plan for a Turkish invasion of the island in the early 1960s: Turkey was in no position to launch such an operation.

In the early 1960s, the southern coast of Anatolia was seriously under-developed. There was no modern road along the coast from Silifke to Antalya (this was constructed only in the 1970s), and no road between Antalya and Izmir (constructed only in the 1980s). In fact, the whole Turkish coast opposite to Cyprus was devoid of any military installations between Izmir in the west and Mersin in the east: there were no air bases, but only the civilian airport at Adana. The closest airfield in the area was the US-controlled Incirlik: this had only installations for F-100s, and could not be used by Turkish forces. The THK operated only from Diyarbakir - which was also the only Turkish military airfield in the east of the country. The other airfield in the area, Konya, was at the time still a secondary installation: it was not before the late 1960s that Konya was fully developed as an air base. Finally, the Erhac AB, near Malatya, was too far away, housing only a single F-100 squadron, available for use by the then 3rd Air Force THK. Until arrival of a

single squadron of Lockheed F-104 Starfighters, in late 1963, the THK in fact had only three squadrons (reduced in size) of fighters that could be considered "modern" - F-100Ds. The rest of the force consisted of very old and troublesome F-84Gs, few somewhat newer F-84Fs handed down from the French Air Force, and a fleet of vintage F-86Es that was in a very poor condition. The air transport capability consisted of only three C-47-units, and a handful of helicopters. The Army aviation component consisted of some 150 L-18/L-21 Piper Cubs, and the Navy did not operate any aircraft or helicopters until the 1970s. The THK also had not a single radar station between Izmir and Mersin.

The Turkish Navy was in no better position. Construction of the port of Mersin was completed only in 1963, and initially there were no military installations there either. The sole other harbour in the area, the one at Iskenderun, was hopelessly old and there were only plans for its modernisation at the time. Turkey was therefore caught by the onset of a new crisis on Cyprus with a military in no situation to take part.

The First Cyprus Crisis

Aware of Turkish problems and not content with independence, Greek Cypriots - lead by George Grivas - still sought Enosis, and tensions remained high. In the night from 20 to 21 December 1963, a car carrying weapons for Turkish Cypriots in the Omorfita, a district of Nicosia - where armed resistance was organized - was halted on a police roadblock. After a few minutes a large crowd, mainly consisting of Turkish Cypriots, assembled nearby and the situation heated up, resulting in exchange of fire in which one policeman and two Turks were killed. This mini-uprising of Turkish Cypriots ended by Christmas of the same year, but there more skirmishes followed, as since that time Turkey began systematically organising and arming students and men younger than 30 into small units, equipped with personal weapons, bazookas and mortars. Several loads of food and ammunition were shipped from Turkey to Cyprus during the following winter, mainly by small boats and by night, which were landing in the Kokkina area.

It was the developments on Cyprus - together with the sorrow state of the Turkish military - that resulted in acquisition of significant reinforcements for the THK, in 1963. During the emergency in 1963, the THK was able to deploy only a single squadron (161. Filo) of F-84Gs to Adana. These were tasked with "skip-bombing", which was a form of low-level anti-ship operations of the time. Certainly, this "demonstration" did not impress anybody. Late in that year the THK received its first squadron of F-104Gs and TF-104Gs arrived. These were the first out of 55 F-104Gs and eight TF-104Gs: additional Starfighter deliveries from different NATO countries (foremost Italy) were to follow, bringing the number of F-104s in THK to almost 90 by the early 1970s. Simultaneously, however, the complement of the F-100s was reduced to two active squadrons, due to the lack of flyable airframes.

The THK was therefore in no better position when the next emergency followed. On 7 March 1964, Turkish Cypriot insurgents opened fire into a crowd of unsuspecting civilians in the busy street of Pafos, killing seven and injuring 34. Over 200 Greeks were subsequently arrested by Turkish Cypriot authorities. In attempt to restore order, the Greek Cypriot National Guard (CNG) deployed a battalion from Nicosia to Pafos. Following several incidents of similar scale,

Athens decided to deploy experienced combat veteran officers as commanders of the - still inexperienced - CNG to Cyprus. The Greek officers were mainly to concentrate on operations in rural areas. Also, in April 1964, George Grivas was posted as commander of the CNG.

By June 1964, the Greeks estimated that more than 1.000 of boat-loads of arms, food and ammunition arrived from Turkey. As the condition of Greek military forces was no better than that of the Turkey (in fact, it was probably even worse), Athens could do little, but Makarios acted nevertheless. He abrogated the Treaty of Guarantees, in turn causing more violence. By 9 July, the situation was so tense that the Lorovouno Mountain was occupied by the Turkish Cypriots, who also cut off several Greek villages nearby. Given that Athens saw this move as setting up of a bridgehead for a Turkish invasion, in July, Grivas was re-called to Athens for consultations about actions that were to be taken against the Turkish Cypriot community. Upon his return, on 6 August 1964, the CNG was advised to establish positions on the opposite side, deploying the 12th Tactical Group, including 206th Infantry Battalion, 31st Raider Squadron, and various Scout and artillery units to counterattack on Lorovouno Mountain, as well as against several Turkish villages in the Kokkina area. The CNG counterattack was launched on 8 August; to Ankara it was obvious that Athens was behind this development and major elements of the Turkish armed forces went on alert. THK in Combat

The battle of Kokkina was well underway when, around 17:00hrs, two THK F-100 Super Sabres made two passes over the battlefield. Several minutes later, additional Turkish four-ship formations followed. This time, the Super Sabres attacked. According to Greek sources, the THK F-100s made between 50 and 60 strafing passes, most of which were ineffective. Nevertheless, at 18:40hrs the local CNG units were ordered to stop the offensive and stabilize their lines: their attacks ceased.

According to Turkish accounts, not only F-100Cs and F-100Ds of the 111 and 181 Filos participated in these strikes, but also F-84Gs from 161 Filo.

They not only strafed but also dropped napalm, and several formations also attacked two Cypriot patrol boats near the port of Gemikonagi, on the northern coast of Cyprus. The leader of this attack was Maj. Hüseyin Capaoglu: his and the following section scored numerous hits on both CNG vessels, setting them afire. Because of thick smoke the third formation - led by Capt. Cengiz Topel - approached at a very low level, and was thus exposed to heavy anti-aircraft fire. The leading F-100D - "55-2766" - was hit and shot down, forcing the pilot to eject.

According to contemporary British and Turkish reports Capt. Topel was captured and burned alive by CNG fighters. According to Greek accounts he was badly injured when his aircraft blew up, but landed - still alive - only to be captured by Capt. Kalenterides and 1st Lt. Tsertos. According to Greek reports, Topel died in a hospital. An examination of Topel's body by a Danish specialists and his team on behalf of the UN, and their report, however, are rather damning in their conclusions.

Interestingly, according to Greek sources, in Topel's suit - which was later sent to Athens for examination - the CNG officers should

have found also a tactical pilotage chart, with a plotted course to Souda Bay, on Crete. Before dying, Topel supposedly stated that Souda Bay was his "secondary" target during that mission. What kind of purpose should any such action have had at the time, or how should have THK F-100Ds - assigned to attack Cypriot patrol boats near Cyprus - eventually change their mission to strike Souda Bay AB, not to talk about reaching that place after flying a route via Cyprus, however, was never reasonably explained by any Greek sources.

RHAF Response

In fact, THK attacks ceased only after Makarios requested a ceasefire, however, the Greek Defence Minister Garufalias then ordered the continuation of Grivas' operation by night, in order to secure the area. Simultaneously, the RHAF was ordered in action as well - even if in a clandestine way.

At Tatoi AB, in Greece, five RHAF North American T-6 Harvards under Maj. K. Vasilakis, were ordered to deploy to Cyprus, to provide close air support to CNG. Because of the RAF interceptors and Turkish air superiority over Cyprus, they were to fly via Rhodes and by night. All five pilots were night-qualified, and consequently they could deploy by the morning of 9 August. Although their aircraft already had CNG markings applied (these consisted of the standard Greek roundel, in blue-white-blue, but also the Cypriot national flag instead of the fin flash - and codes C-1 thru C-10), and were armed with 2.75in unguided rockets and refuelled, they were ordered to return upon reaching Rhodes. Instead flying back to Tatoi, however, they were then ordered to Kastelli, where they were held in readiness for the following month.

The second RHAF Harvard flight, including aircraft flown by Capt. V. Kottas (with 2nd Lt. P. Lymperopoulos as navigator), Capt. G. Roussos, 1st Lt. K. Avgerinidis (with Warr.Off. P. Vountidis in the rear), 2nd Lt. E. Mponzos, 2nd Lt. G. Kakaris and 2nd. Lt. G. Katsigiannis (with Warr.Off. Kapsomenakos in the rear), reached Rhodes, nevertheless. They set off for Cyprus at 21:30hrs, and proceeded at a very low level. Avegerinidis almost hit the coast while approaching Cyprus, and made a hard landing. After burning their aircraft, he and Vountidis walked for three hours to Lakatamia airfield - surprising the rest of their flight, who considered them dead. No specific details about eventual operations of the surviving four Texans in support of the CNG are known yet.

On the morning of 9 August, the 338 Mira from Souda Bay AB, was ordered to scramble four F-84Fs - flown by Capt. T. Louloudakis, 1st. Lt. D. Termoulis, 1st Lt. K. Theodoropopulos, and 1st Lt. D. Klitorakis, and send them over Cyprus. In order for Thunderjets to reach that far, technicians first had to dismount all the 5in rockets from them. Climbing to 28.000ft at an economic speed of 400kts, they approached Cyprus without any reaction from the THK - or even the RAF. Then the formation split, with one pair turning towards Nicosia and the other to Mansoura, to make two low-level and high-speed passes each. Without knowing this, Louloudakis and Tremoulis were fired upon by CNG troops, which failed to recognize them as Greek. In addition, Louloudakis experienced problems with one of drop tanks, which did not transfer fuel properly, and had to abort to Kasteli. The other three F-84Fs returned to Souda with almost completely empty tanks.

RAF Intervention

The THK launched new air raids on the morning of 9 August, hitting CNG positions with napalm and machine-gun fire to cover a ship dispatched to evacuate the injured Turkish Cypriots.

After additional - but inconclusive - fighting, on 11 August 1964 the UN ordered a ceasefire. This was not broken, even if THK F-100s continued flying over Cyprus, and four Turkish Navy destroyers arrived off the coast, to evacuate casualties and unload food and ammunition.

Despite the ceasefire, both air forces continued operating over Cyprus. In late August, six RHAF RF-84Fs were deployed to Souda, and then ordered to undertake reconnaissance missions over different parts of the island. The flight leader was XO 348 Mira, Maj. E. Roulias, while other members of his flight were 1st Lt. T. Dimopoulos, N. Papadopoulos, S. Dranias, I. Printzios, and S. Papasis. Approaching Cyprus at 28.000ft, and separated by between three and five minutes, they descended to photograph their targets from a level of 10.000ft with vertical cameras.

Papadopoulos aborted due to a problem with drop tank, while other members of the formation continued. Approaching his target in the Morfou area at 10.000ft, 1st. Lt. Printzios observed two fighters approaching. Assuming they were THK interceptors, he jettisoned both drop tanks and turned for Souda at low altitude. Seconds later, Maj. Roulias was intercepted by two RAF Lightnings, which approached in a close formation, taking position on both of his sides. Using hand signals the British pilots instructed him to leave the area, however, the Greek flight-leader refused and continued on the course towards his target. Therefore, the RAF pilots went in front of him, causing his RF-84F to shudder under their jetstream: the severe turbulence made all the photographs Roulias made useless.

1st Lt. Dranias was underway behind Maj. Roulias. Upon hearing about the interception of his leader, he jettisoned his drop tanks and continued towards his target area. However, underway there he was also intercepted by two Lightnings and then decided to return to Souda.

The last two Thunderflashes followed a few minutes later. Dimopoulos was intercepted as first: after forcing him to turn away, the Lightnings then jumped on 1st. Lt. Papasis, using their jetstream to prevent him from taking useful reconnaissance photographs. Turning around, the young Greek pilot set a course for a second pass over St. Hilarion, before continuing for Souda Bay. The two Lightnings were still with him, but this time Papasis had a surprise for them: he deployed airbrakes, forcing both RAF interceptors to overshoot. Thanks to this manoeuvre he was able to take photographs as required, even if the two British fighters subsequently "escorted" him for 15 minutes.

Claims and Counter-Claims

Although most Greek reports state that the CNG suffered minimal losses during the battle of Kokkina, or in Turkish air attacks, at least 53 Greek fighters were killed. The number of Turkish Cypriot casualties remains unknown, but Greek reports about the THK suffering a loss of at least four fighter-bombers over Cyprus, in 1964, are known.

This figure should include the RF-84F "52-8871", supposedly shot down over Cyprus already on 5 June 1964, as well as a Lockheed T-33A serialled "4059", downed at an unknown date. The THK admitted the loss of one RF-84F on 5 June, but stated that the plane crashed near Finike while on return from a reconnaissance mission, and that there are no reports of it being actually shoot down. Also lost in 1964, was the T-33A "4050", but in a crash during flight from Ankara to Diyarbakir, already on 15 May. If this accident stood in any connection with the situation on Cyprus is at best arguable, then while this aircraft was underway on a courier duty from Ankara to Diyarbakir, with orders related to Cyprus, its route was well away from the island. Therefore, except for the F-100D shot down while flown by Capt. Topel, no other THK losses over Cyprus were ever confirmed.

The exact reasons why were the RAF Lightnings intercepting RHAF RF-84s, but none of THK fighter-bombers active over Cyprus remain unknown, but are likely related to the history of the Cyprus Emergency. Bitter over this, however, the Greek government ordered the Army to secretly deploy a whole infantry division to Cyprus. Using regular ferries, in the following weeks no less but 8.000 soldiers wearing civilian clothes and disguised as "tourists" or "students" arrived to from the "Cyprus Division". To remind the Greeks about their command of the air over Cyprus, Turkish F-100s again flew low over Nicosia, on Christmas Day, in 1964. Eventually, the Greek situation was even poorer than that of Turkey: under the strong Turkish threat of an invasion, the CNG pulled back from frontal confrontation with Turkish Cypriots, and the fighting died down for some years.

Although eastern Turkey experienced a devastating earthquake that seriously drained the fragile economy and used up all available medical facilities, in August 1966, with over 2.400 dead, the THK remained active over Cyprus. On 25 November 1967, an RF-84F crashed near Incirlik due to technical malfunction, after returning from a reconnaissance sortie over the island. The Greek "Cyprus Division" remained on Cyprus until autumn 1967, when during the next crisis the CNG claimed to have shot down a THK TF-84F.

Eventually, tensions were lessened through international mediation. The Turkish politicians and military were at least satisfied by shows of force and shipments of armament to para-military forces on Cyprus. However, much more than token presence was not possible at the time. Therefore, Turkey began a significant modernisation of its military, in the late 1960s. While the Army started receiving transport helicopters, between 1965 and 1968 the THK received 75 Northrop F-5As and 13 F-5B Freedom Fighters - including ten examples purchased from Libya, after the USA cancelled their alliance with that country in the wake of the coup against the King Idriz, in 1968, and simultaneously also a number of Republic F-102A/B Delta Dart interceptors was purchased from the USA.

Cyprus, 1974Although tensions between Turkey and Greece over the issue of Cyprus subdued during the late 1960s and in the early 1970s, the situation was soon to change. In November 1973, a coup d'état in Athens brought a military junta, led by Brig.Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides, on power. Ioannides was one of Greek officers that served on Cyprus in the 1960s: rigidly anti-communist, he considered that Makarios should be removed from his office and immediately established connection to EOKA B, to plan a coup. His intentions became known to Cypriot

intelligence, in spring of 1974: Makarios had no other choice but to ban EOKA B, and demand the remaining 650 Greek Army officers assigned to the Cypriot National Guard (CNG) to be withdrawn. His demands were published in a letter to the Greek president, on 2 July 1974. A reply came 13 days later - in the form of an order from Athens the CNG to overthrow its commander in chief.

Narrowly escaping the death in CNG attack, on 15 July 1974, Makarios was evacuated by a British helicopter to RAF Akrotiri, from where he went to London and, few days later, to New York, to address the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, on 17 July, the notorious EOKA terrorist Nicos Sampson was declared provisional president of the new government.

To Turkey, it was once again obvious that Athens was behind the coup, as well as that there was an imminent threat for the security of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. The Turkish Prime Minisster Bülent Ecevit, flew to London to elicit British aid in a joint effort on Cyprus, as ascertained by the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, but the British were neither willing nor ready to take action. The USA were not interested in bolstering Makarios government because of his connections to communist countries in eastern Europe: nevertheless, Washington attempted to stave off the impeding Turkish invasion by sending an envoy to Ankara. The Turkish demands were clear: Nicos Sampson had to be removed and the Greek Army officers had to leave, while Cyprus was to remain independent. The American envoy managed only to get a Greek agreement for the 650 Greek officers to be reassigned.

While negotiations were still going on, the Turkish military was mobilized and preparations for a military intervention began. This time the Turks were ready and equipped sufficiently enough to intervene. The Opposing Air Forces

By 1974, the Turkish military was in a considerably better position to operate on Cyprus than during the 1960s. Especially the air force, which was to play the dominant role in the following intervention, was equipped sufficiently enough to transport and support an invading force. By the spring of 1974, the THK boasted 17 squadrons of fighter-bombers, having acquired its original complement of Northrop F-5A/Bs and F-104G Starfighters, and including a new large batch of North American F-100C Super Sabres, acquired in the early 1970s. The THK was also short of launching the next modernisation phase, which was to include the purchase of 40 McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom IIs, the deliveries of which went under the Project "Peace Diamond III".

THK in 19741. Taktik Havva Kuvveti (1st Tactical Air Force)

1 AJÜ, Eskisehir- 111. Filo: F-100D/F - 112. Filo: F-4E (in training)- 113. Filo: RF-84F

3 AJÜ, Konya - 131. Filo: F-100F/C- 132. Filo: F-100C/D

4 AJÜ, Mürted- 141. Filo: F-104G, temporarily deployed to Balikesir

- 142. Filo: F-102A, temporarily deployed to Balikesir

6 AJÜ, Bandirma- 161. Filo: F-5A - 162. Filo: RF-5A/F-5A

9 AJÜ, Balikesir- 191. Filo: F-104G, temporarily deployed to Cumaovassi- 192. Filo: F-104S

2. Taktik Havva Kuvveti (2nd Tactical Air Force)5 AJÜ, Merzifon - 151. Filo: F-5A/B, temporarily deployed to Cumaovassi - 152. Filo: F-5A/B

7 AJÜ, Erhac- 171. Filo: F-100D - 172. Filo: F-100D

8 AJÜ, Diyarbakir- 182. Filo: F-102A - 184. Filo: RF-5A

Havva Ulattyrma Komutanlygy (Tactical Transport Command)12 AJÜ - 221. Filo: C.160D - 222. Filo: C-130E - 223. Filo: C-47- 224. Filo: Viscount

Havva Egitim Komutanligi (Training Command) 2 AJÜ- 121. Filo: T-33A - 122. Filo: T-37C - 123. Filo: T-41D/T-34A, based at Gaziemir - 124. Filo: T-33A

Most important development in THK's capability when compared to the times of earlier tensions around Cyprus, was the fact that by 1974 it could lift up to 5.000 armed troops at once. The helicopter fleet of the Turkish Army could lift additional 1.000 men, together with their equipment and supplies. Finally, the Turkish Navy obtained capability to handle 5.000 troops with heavy equipment and supplies. The THK had also massively improved its capability to provide close-air-support to ground forces. It was obvious that the Turkish chiefs of staff were learning from earlier contingencies.

Order of battle for Turkish Army and Navy units involved in the coming operation was as follows:

6. Kolordu Komutanligi (6th Army, C-in-C Lt.Gen. Ersin)* 2nd Ordu Hava Alayi (2nd Army Aviation Regiment, with a total of about 70 AB.204s, AB.205s, and UH-1s)

* Hava Indirme Tugayi (Airborne Brigade, Brig.Gen. Everen), including - 1 Parasut Taburu (1st Parachute Battalion)- 2. Parasut Taburu (2nd Parachute Battalion)- 3. Parasut Taburu (3rd Parachute Battalion)- 4. Parasut Taburu (4th Parachute Battalion)

*Komando Tugayi (Commando Brigade, Brig.Gen. Demirbag)- Brigade HQ Company- 1. Komando Taburu (1st Commando Battalion)- 2. Komando Taburu (2nd Commando Battalion)- 3. Komando Taburu (3rd Commando Battalion)- 230 Piyade Alayi/1. Taburu (230th Infantry Regiment/1st Battalion Air-mobile)- Jendarma Komando Taburu (Special Police Comando Battalion)

* Cakmak Özel Görev Kuvveti - Cikarma Tugayi (Special Strike Force Landing Brigade, Brig.Gen. Tuncer)- 6. Deniz Piyade Alayi (6th Amphibious Infantry Regiment, Lt.Cdr. Ikiz), with three marine battalions- 50. Piyade Alayi (50th Infantry Regiment, Col. Karaoglanoglu, from the 39th Infantry Division)- 39. Bölügü (39th Divisional Tank Battalion/Reinforced Company, from 39th Infantry Division)

* 39. Piyade Tümeni (39th Infantry Division, Maj.Gen. Demirel)- 14. Piyade Alayi (14th Infantry Regiment)- 39. Tank Taburu (39th Divisional Tank Battalion)- 39. Kesif Bölügü (39th Divisional Reconnaissance Company)- 39. Tocu Alayi (39th Divisional Artillery Regiment)- 39. Istihk. Taburu (39th Divisional Engineer Battalion)

* 28. Piyade Tümeni (28th Infantry Division, Maj.Gen. Polat)- 230. Piyade Alayi (230th Mechanized Infantry Regiment, minus one battalion)- 61. Piyade Alayi (61st Infantry Regiment)- 28. Tank Taburu (28th Divisional Tank Battalion, minus one company)- 28. Kesif Bölügü (28th Divisional Reconnaissance Company)- 28. Topcu Alayi (28th Divisional Artillery Regiment, with one battalion 105mm How, and one Battalion 75mm How)- 28. Istihk. Taburu (28th Divisional Engineer Battalion)- 28 Tanksavar Bölügü (28th Divisional Anti-Tank Company, with 15 jeep-mounted Cobra ATGMs)

Aside from regular Turkish military units, the Turks also organized the "Kibris Türk Alayi" (Cyprus Turkish Forces Regiment), which was actually a battalion of 650 troops, organized as follows:

* Gönyeli Grubu (Gönyeli Group), based in the town of Kioneli, some four kilometres NW of Nicosia, with: - 2. Piyade Bolugu (2nd Infantry Company)- 3. Piyade Bolugu (3rd Infantry Company)- Agir Silah Bolugu (Heavy Weapons Company)

* Ortakoy Grubu (Ortakoy Group), based in the town of Ortakiol, some two kilometres NW of Nicosia, with: - 1. Piyade Bolugu (1st Infantry Company)- 4. Piyade Bolugu (4th Infantry Company)- Alay Kh. Srv. Bolugu (Regimental HQ Company)

Another armed Turkish organization was "TMT" - standing for "Turk Mukavement Teskilati", or "Turkish Resistance Organisation. The TMT was organized in ten districts (or "Sancaklar"), each of which had one armed unit, varying in size from company to battalion. Every battalion was led by an officer from mainland Turkey, while smaller units were led by local Turks. Total TMT strength was some 9.000 men, with 9.000 in reserve. TMT had four battalions in Lefkose, three in

Bogaz and three in Serdarli, as well as (probably) one each in Mogosa, Larnaka, Limassol, Baf, Lefke, Erenkoy, and Yesilirmak.

The Turkish Navy deployed one amphibious group, with over 30 landing craft, and a Task Force consisting of destroyers:- Adatepe, D-353 (former USS Forrest Royal, DD-872, transferred to Turkey on 27 March 1970)- Cakmak- Kocatepe, D-354 (former USS ? DD-861)- Tinaztepe, D-355 (former USS Keppler, of the Gearing FRAM-2 class)

(E)PA in 1974While under a military rule, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Greek relationship to the NATO calmed to the point that the country was not considered as a member of the pact. This resulted with a stop of arms deliveries from the USA. It was not before 1971 that the relationship between Athens and Washington improved: the Greeks were then swift to order 36 F-4E Phantom IIs, which were planned to become the main interceptor and fighter-bomber asset of the air force.

Relationship to the USA remained insecure, however, especially after the coup in 1973. Therefore, in April 1974 the (E)PA issued an order for 40 Dassault Mirage F.1CG interceptors from France. Most of these new fighters could not arrive in time to be of use when the Greeks needed them badly: only six Phantoms were delivered by June 1974. Therefore, at the time of the Turkish invasion on Cyprus, the (E)PA was still depending on F-5As, F-84Fs and F-102s delivered in the late 1960s.

(E)PAC-in-C: Gen. Papanicolau

110 Pterix Mahis- 347 Mira: F-84F- 348 Mira: RF-84F, based at Larisa- 349 Mira: RF-5A, based at Larisa- 370 Mira: T-33A Mk.III

111 Pterix Mahis- 337 Mira: F-5A/Bs (to be replaced by F-4Es in 1974)- 341 Mira: F-5A/Bs- 343 Mira: F-5A/B

113 Pterix Mahis - 343 Mira: F-5A (deployed there after 20 July 1974)

114 Pterix Mahis - 335 Mira: F-104G- 342 Mira: F/TF-102A

115 Pterix Mahis, Souda Bay- 340 Mira: F-84F- 340/II F-84F (forward deployed at Kastelli)

116 Pterix Mahis- 336 Mira: F-104G

117 Pterix Mahis- 338 Mira: F-4E/F-84F- 339 Mira: F-4E and F-84F (deployed at Souda)

In addition to EPA assets in Greece, the Cypriot National Guard (CNG) was a relatively well-developed force, certainly far better equipped and stronger than the TMT, and reinforced by elements of the Greek Army based in Cyprus (ELDYK). Its order of battle in 1974 was as follows:

* ELDYK (Greek Forces Cyprus) -- ELDYK I (1st Infantry Battalion) -- ELDYK replacements (return to Paphos on Greek Landing Ship "Lesbos" 20 Jul 1974) -- A' Monada Katadromon (MK - A' Raider Battalion: arrives at Nicosia IAP 22 Jul 1974) -- 573 TP (on Greek Landing Ship "Rethymnos", diverted to Rhodes)

* GEEF (General HQ, Greek Cypriot National Guard) -- SA (Military Police Coy.) -- 241 Tagma Pezikou (TP - 241st Infantry Battalion) -- 301 TP (301st Infantry Battalion) -- 286 MTP (286th Mechanized Infantry Battalion) -- Tagma Mihaniko (Engineer Battalion) -- 23 EMA (23rd Tank Battalion) -- 21 EAN (21st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion) -- 120 LBO (120th Heavy Mortar Battery) -- Pantazi TP (Pantazi Infantry Battalion)

* DPB HQ (Artillery Command? HQ) -- 183 MP (183rd Artillery Battalion) -- 195 MEAAP (195th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion) -- 198 POP (198th Infantry Gun Battery) -- 191 POP (191st Infantry Gun Battery) -- 190 MATP (190th Anti-Tank Battalion) -- 184 PPP (184th Artillery Battery) -- 189 MP (189th Artillery Battalion) -- 187 MP (187th Artillery Battalion) -- 182 MP (182nd Artillery Battalion) -- 185 MP (185th Artillery Battalion)

* I ATD HQ (?) - Amochostos -- 201 TP (201st Infantry Battalion) -- 291 TP (291st Infantry Battalion) -- 398 TP (398th Infantry Battalion) -- 399 TP (399th Infantry Battalion) -- 341 Tagma Efedrias (TE - 341st Reserve Battalion) -- 386 TE (386th Reserve Battalion) -- 336 TE (336th Reserve Battalion) -- 376 TE (376th Reserve Battalion) -- 199 PPP (199th Artillery Battery) -- 181 MP (181st Artillery Battalion) -- 173 MATP (173rd Anti-Tank Battalion)

* II ATD HQ - Morphou -- 256 TP (256th Infantry Battalion) -- 281 TP (281st Infantry Battalion) -- 276 TP (276th Infantry Battalion) -- 261 TE (261st Reserve Battalion) -- 316 TE (316th Reserve Battalion) -- 321 TE (321st Reserve Battalion)

* III ATD HQ - Lefkosia -- 211 TP (211th Infantry Battalion) -- 231 TP (231st Infantry Battalion)

-- 331 TE (331st Reserve Battalion)

* II TS / III ATD HQ - Kyrenia -- 361 TP (361st Infantry Battalion) -- 251 TP (251st Infantry Battalion) -- 306 TE (306th Reserve Battalion) -- 326 TE (326th Reserve Battalion)

* IV ATD HQ - Limassol -- 226 TP (226th Infantry Battalion) -- 216 TP (216th Infantry Battalion) -- 346 TE (346th Reserve Battalion) -- 203 TE (203rd Reserve Battalion)

* V ATD HQ - Paphos -- 356 TP (356th Infantry Battalion) -- 304 TE (304th Reserve Battalion) -- 397 TE (397th Reserve Battalion)

* DKD (Raiders Command) -- 31 Monada Katadromon (MK - 31st Raider Battalion) -- 32 MK (32nd Raider Battalion) -- 33 MK (33rd Raider Battalion) -- 34 MK (34th Raider Battalion)

In total, this force had some 20.000 troops, 32 tanks, 50 armoured vehicles, 463 guns and howitzers, and 382 anti-tank weapons. Furthermore, the CNG included the "Home Guard" force, consisting of 25 battalions.Cypriot Coup and Turkish Plans

On 15 July 1974, elements of the CNG staged a coup against the President Makarios. Two days later the leader of the pro-Enosis movement, EOKA-B, Sampson. At the time in prison, and usually described as a "rather naïve person of limited political ability…that happened to be in the right place at the right time" by Greek sources, Sampson was known as fierce Greek nationalist full of hatred for Turks.

Without surprise, the Turks saw this development as a threat for their minority living on Cyprus, and - on 16 July - the Turkish military was put to alert for an invasion of the island. The THK, the Army and the Navy required only three days for completing their preparations: isolated and under massive international pressure, the Greek military regime was very slow to respond and could not make up its mind about what to do. Even if the EPA and the Greek navy were to become ready within two days as well, they were never clearly ordered into the battle, while CNG fortifications at the Salamis beach (north of Famagusta), Lapta and beaches west of Güzelyurt were in the wrong place.

Turkish plans for a contingency of this kind were relatively simple. The military authority for Cyprus, 6th Army Command, was within the shortest period of time assigned needed units and equipment. It planned to drop airborne commandos behind the enemy lines, and then support them by heliborne-special forces. The task of these units was to advance towards the northern coast of Cyprus and strike from the rear any CNG or ELDYK units they might encounter underway. Meanwhile, the "Strike Special Operation Landing Force" (SSOLF), consisting of a battalion of Marines, reinforced by elements from Army's 28th and

39th Divisions, would deliver an amphibious landing on the northern coast.

The beaches the SSOLF was to use were small, but they were kilometres away from the point at which the CNG-Command expected a possible Turkish landing: Famagusta. Nevertheless, in order to keep the Greek-Cypriots convinced that the landing was to happen in the later area, the Turkish Navy dispatched six large bulk-carriers towards this port. Both beaches were also blocked by high cliffs, and then Besparmak mountains, and the Greeks probably did not expect anybody to use them for a landing of a larger amphibious force. Invasion

After a long and dangerous flight, at the dawn of 20 July 1974, the first UH-1 and AB.204 helicopters landed troops of the 1st and 2nd Commando Brigades near Kyrenia. While Turkish commandos were underway through the streets of the city, the first wave of F-100s of the 111, 132, and 181 Filo, as well as some F-104Gs flew a series of strikes against the CNG barracks in Nicosia, the concentration of CNG units near Famagusta, and the Nicosia international airport (IAP), where they destroyed an empty Hawker-Siddeley HS-121 Trident 1E airliner (5B-DAE), and one Trident 2E (5B-DAB) of the Cyprus Airways. Only minutes later, the C.160 Transall and C-47 transports of the 221 and 231. Filo arrived over Nicosia to drop parasucu-commando battalions (paratroopers) of the 1st and 2nd Turkish Commando Brigades.

In general, the Turkish landing operations went on without major problems. Well supported from the air, the paras operated in well-integrated battle groups, supported by jeep-mounted recoilless guns, then some artillery and even armour - and always in close cooperation with the THK. The coordination was not perfect: a company of paras landed in the middle of the CNG's advance from Nicosia to Kyrenia, and was swiftly neutralized. The paras also failed to build a coherent bridgehead or secure Turkish-Cypriot enclaves in the north and became capable of launching offensive operations. Nevertheless, overall, Turkish losses during the landing were minimal: the CNG was not only taken by surprise by Turkish selection of landing sites on the northern coast, and caught with its best units concentrated in the Famagust area - where they were exposed to merciless air strikes by Turkish fighter-bombers - but also very much suffered from infighting between different fractions following the coup in Nicosia.

Two and a half hours after the landing of paras, the third Turkish battle group, the SSOLF, arrived over the sea. Under command of Gen. Suleyman Tuncer, and led by special forces, the amphibious force hit the beach at two points on the northern coast of Cyprus - "Pladini" and "Karaoglanoglu" - some ten kilometres apart. Both beaches were only some 200m deep, and blocked by Besparmak cliffs. Facing no major resistance, the naval landing operation was completed within only three hours: the sole point of CNG resistance were two jeeps mounting recoilless rifles calibre 106mm, spotted and destroyed barely one hour after the landing began. By the noon the Turks considered their bridgehead secure and began moving towards south, encountering only sporadic resistance from few scattered CNG artillery and armoured units. These were tackled with help of fierce THK air strikes. Around the noon, when the Greek-Cypriot mechanized units moved along the road to Girne and Pontemili, they were fiercely pounded by Turkish fighter-bombers, which marked the beginning of the fiercest fighting. Experiencing the same fate like German armoured divisions rushed to

counter Allied landings in Normandy, 30 years before: without air cover, the Greeks lost a better part of their Armoured Battalion, as well a most of their Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion to rolling Turkish air strikes.

By the afternoon, the road from Girne to Lefkosia was secured, but not without several Turkish losses. During the strikes against different targets in Cyprus on that day, the THK lost three fighters - all to anti-aircraft fire put up by the CNG: an F-100D of the 171. Filo, an F-100C of the 132. Filo (both pilots ejected), and an RF-84F of the 184 Filo (pilot KIA).

Disputed Air-to-Air Battle

Although both sides made many exaggerated claims regarding the fighting on the ground during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, n 1974, probably there is no more controversy in the history of the clashes between the Turks and the Greeks on Cyprus then about what exactly happened when Turkish and Greek fighters started to meet in the air. Both sides, namely, claimed to have shot down at least one enemy fighter, and ever since, fierce discussions to this topic rage on the internet and even in the media. A careful research of currently available accounts, however, shows that there not only one, or two - but several - engagements between the THK and (E)PA interceptors occurred between 21 and 28 July 1974, and that apparently both sides are likely to have the right to make some claims, even if officially nothing happened at all.

Despite obvious interests in the affair, the Greek government was slow to respond to the Turkish action, even if the military forces were immediately placed on alert and readied for action. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus came as a complete surprise not only for the Greek government, but also almost all the members of the armed forces - many of which were on a summer leave. Therefore, quite some time was lost after the general mobilization was declared, around noon of 20 July. Initially, this was not very important: on the morning of 20 July no THK aircraft flew over the Aegean Sea, and therefore the (E)PA was not alerted, while there was obviously no threat of a Turkish invasion of Greek Macedonia, or any of the islands in the Aegean Sea. Besides, at the time there were no such continuous stand-offs between Greece and Turkey as there are now, and the relationship between the two countries was actually pretty good.

Besides, the US government also exercised heavy pressure upon Athens: a task force of the US 6th Fleet - centred on the USS Forrestal - operated in the area, and on 20 July two of USN F-4J Phantoms supposedly engaged two (E)PA F-5As over the Milos Island. The USN records for the cruise of the USS Forrestal in the Mediterranean Sea in 1974 show no reports about this engagement, while according to Greek sources the Phantoms threatened the F-5s (one of them was an RF-5A), and then the Greek pilots - one of which was Lt. Pantelis Mitsenas (later CO of the 349 Mira) gained favorable position behind the Americans, albeit, neither side had a permission to fire.

By the morning of 21 July, however, the situation changed and now the (E)PA was put on air defense alert, while the rest of the military was trying to concentrate and mobilize. Right from the dawn of that day there were - according to Greek reports - intensive operations of the THK, which fighters patrolled deep into the Athens F.I.R., and also inside the Greek airspace over the Aegean Sea. A number of (E)PA

interceptors were scrambled to escort the Turks away, but no weapons were fired. Finally, around 1130hrs, two F-5As of the 111PM, based at Nea Anchialos AB - flown by Flt. Lt. Giannis Dinopoulos and Flg. Off. Thomas Skamparthonis - were advised to start immediately. The following account about their engagement with Turkish interceptors was compiled on the basis of the few reports published in the Greek media so far, none of which was ever confirmed by the official Greek authorities.

Dinopoulos was to lead, but during the roll to take-off his radio failed, so he signaled Skamparthonis to take over. While climbing towards the north Aegean, lead by the ground control (call-sign "Joker") Skamparthonis was followed by Dinopoulos at some distance: the two pilots had no means of communication with each other, but hand signals. For this, however, they would have to fly in a very tight formation, which was not a very sound idea. Instead, Dinopoulos followed Skamparthonis at a distance of more than a mile, offering him a better protection.

Once at a level of 20.000ft the pair of F-5s was vectored towards their first target: before closing enough to identify it, they were sent into a new direction and started a new intercept - albeit at a different level. Two more times Skamparthonis - followed by Dinopoulos from a distance - has got a new vector and flight level for interception of unidentified aircraft that penetrated Athens F.I.R., before finally - while reaching the area between the islands Aghios Efstratios and Limnos at a speed of 300kts, and climbing through 18.000ft towards 20.000ft - he was advised by the "Joker" that bogeys should now be some 20° right. Skamparthonis looked around and - to his surprise - saw two THK F-102A Delta Darts flying parallel and level with him only 200m away to his left side. Acting instinctively, the Greek pilot broke into the opponents, which followed him in his turn. Due to his low speed and despite the opening throttles, through the turn Skamparthonis started to slowly descend: he actually wanted to get behind the Turkish Darts, but making four full turns in a tight descending spirale he dropped to 10.000ft before losing the sight of his opponents....

Meanwhlie, Flt. Lt. Dinopoulos was tensely monitoring the development of the engagement in front of him. He flew higher and far behind Skamparthonis and was by the time not detected by the Turkish pilots, but now positioned well behind them, in a perfect position for an attack. His master-arm switch was off - as ordered during the briefing before the flight. But then, he noticed one of the Turkish fighters opening its weapons bay while flying behind Skamparthonis, and recognized this as a sign of an imminent attack (some Greek sources explain outright that one of the Turkish fighters launched an AIM-4D against Skamparthonis). There was no time to waste: Dinopoulos switched his master-arm on, selected the first AIM-9B Sidewinder and fired from a range of around 800m. Due to insufficient time left for the missile to fully power up after it was activated, the Sidewinder flew straight and passed by the target without any reaction. Selecting the second AIM-9B, Flt.Lt. Dinopoulos waited few moments to hear the characteristic sound in his earphones, and then fired again. This time the missile immediately connected and flew right up the tailpipe of one of Turkish Delta Darts: the plane exploded in a brilliant ball of flame - forcing Dinopoulos to break hard right in order to evade debris - and then crashed into the sea bellow.

Finally, Flt. Lt. Skamparthonis has got an order from Joker to disengage: he has not witnessed Dinopoulos firing Sidewinders, but

only saw a large splash in the water and oily debris on the sea surface. Only after the landing in Nea Anchialos AB did he notice that Dinopoulos' F-5A came back without both Sidewinders....Later in the day, the two (E)PA pilots were to learn that the other Turkish F-102A was also lost: as reported to them, it crashed out of fuel after the pilot got disoriented and then used too much afterburner in order to get away...

Ever since the story about this engagement became known in the public, the Greek sources boast that their F-5As have shot down one, and caused the loss of another THK F-102A. Probably their strongest argument was the interview with - now Brigadier - Skamparthonis in the Greek magazine "Cockpit", published in May 2001, which offered details of the account, mentioning names, ranks, dates, and times. There are some discrepancies with the Turkish and NATO/USAF reports, however, which do not mention any engagements on 21 July. Furthermore, the Greeks report the involved THK F-102As to have been the "55-3413", flown by Lt.Col. Vasif Sayin, and "54-1403", flown by Maj. Ibrahim Cinar, for either of which there is no firm confirmation to have been lost on the given day. Simultaneously, Greek sources frequently indicate the F-5A flown by Dinopoulos to have been the 22550 - which is actually an example acquired from Iran via Jordan, only in 1975! This mistake was caused by a Greek "Modelling" magazine, which brought illustrations of this F-5A with two kill markings. Actually the publication in question failed to mention that while carrying the kill markings for other reasons, this plane definitely could not have been involved in this incident, and thus created a confusion, which leads many people to believe this was the case until today.

In fact, Greek claims are stubbornly denied by the Turks, even if these admit to have lost one F-102A at around this time in July 1974: a plane flown by Maj. Ibrahim Cinar crashed during take-off from the Balikesir AB, on the morning of 23 July 1974. The strong points in the Greek version are definitely the details, foremost about at least one of the pilots involved. The weak points are that the Greek sources claim the leader of their section to have acted in an especially irresponsible manner, and continued the mission despite the failure of his radio. Even if in the case of a war certain rules can often be ignored, it is interesting to note that according to the account by Brig. Skamparthonis he and Dinopoulos were put under an official inquiry after landing and an inquiry against them opened, "obviously" for Dinopoulos not reporting his radio to have failed and thus putting his wingman and himself at great risk, and then shooting down fighters of an - at least in theory - allied nation. Furthermore, so the story, this mission was supposedly even removed from the log-books of Dinopoulos and Skamparthonis, and neither of them ever credited with a kill.

Consequently, it might be problematic to confirm the Greek version on the basis of official documents; on the contrary, both the available Turkish and NATO/US documents do not mention anything about any engagement on 21 July 1974, and describe a completely different air-to-air battle to have developed on the following day. More about this later.

False Air-to-Sea Clash

On the same day, 21 July 1974, also a catastrophic case of fratricide fire happened to the Turks. The THK was informed - according to Greeks this was a disinformation purposedly spread by the Greek Army Signals 2nd Directorate (Greek Army Intelligence) - about the Greek Navy LST Lesvos L-172 (former USN 511-1152/LST-class, initially called USS Boone Country, LST-389, and transferred to the Greek Navy in June 1960) was underway somewhere around Cyprus. Lesvos was known to have brought replacement contingent for "ELDYK" - a Greek Army Battalion stationed at Cyprus - day before the invasion, and was now underway back towards Greece with the replaced contingent of troops aboard. Also, there was a report about a convoy of Greek warships moving from Rhodes towards Cyprus, but the THK lost the contact with this formation, and then also lost the trace of Lesvos.

The Turkish Navy's Task Force in the Cypriot waters, consisting of the destroyers Adatepe, Kocatepe, and Tinaztepe was underway towards the point where Greek Navy vessels were expected, but the THK seems not to have been informed about this fact, nor were any identification signals agreed between the THK and the Turkish Navy: as NATO-members, both navies were supplied by numerous destroyers of the Gearing FRAM 1 and FRAM 2 classes, and identification of these from the air was extremely problematic - even if the Turkish Navy ships were ordered to wave large Turkish flags This proved a very dangerous failure, especially as the destroyers of the Turkish and Greek Navy were all of US origin and looked very similar, and - even more so - there was also a Task Force of the USN in the area, in which several USN destroyers of the same class were underway!

In the end, an order was issued for the THK to find and destroy the Greek ships: however, as the Greek convoy from Rhodes pulled away from Cyprus, and Lesvos escaped as well, the only ships remaining in the area were three Turkish destroyers. When the appearance of three destroyers near the Cypriot port of Paphos was reported to the THK, nobody in the High Command realized the mistake and a strike package consisting of F-104Gs and F-100Ds was dispatched to attack.

The fighters had no particular problem finding their targets, and attacked immediately. Obviously not noticing large Turkish flags on the ships, THK pilots delivered a tremendous attack, hitting all three Turkish destroyers with bombs calibre 454kg, and damaging them heavily. While the crews of the other two ships managed to save their ships, the Kocatepe was hit by a bomb into the ammunition magazine and exploded: 80 crewmembers were killed immediately, and from the rest of the crew that went overboard only 42 were later rescued by an Israeli merchant, which brought them to Haifa.

There are reports, that the defensive fire from Turkish warships also brought down one of the attacking THK F-104Gs, but such rumours were never confirmed, even if the THK did report a loss of a single Starfighter - but on 22 July. The sunken Turkish destroyer was afterwards replaced by another former USN destroyer, the USS Norris, and so a new Kocatepe, D-354, came into existence, which remained in service well into the 1980s.

Despite this tragic mistake, the THK fighters did found several smaller Greek ships near the coast of Cyprus on this day, and attacked them - albeit with unknown results.

The Spoiled "Victory"

While the (E)PA and THK fighters were engaging - at least in mock air battles - over the Aegean Sea, and the THK was attacking warships of the Turkish Navy, by the evening of 21 July the Greek government finally make up its mind about what to do regarding Cyprus. A decision was taken to deploy the 1st Commando Battalion to the island, in order to reinforce the CNG, which lacked the firepower and training to stop the Turkish onslaught.

The plan for deployment of commandos to Cyprus - code-named "Operation Niki" (Victory), was relatively simple: they were to be loaded into 20 Noratlas and ten C-47 Dakotas of the 354th TTS "Pegasus"/112th PM, and then flown out to Nicosia International Airport by night and in total radio-silence. Top cover was to be provided by F-102 Delta Darts, operating out of Heraklion AB. Due to the need to keep the operation secret, the take-offs were to commence at 22.30 hrs of July 21, with single aircraft starting at intervals of five minutes, and all being airborne by midnight. This would assure that all would arrive in Nicosia under the cover of darkness.

The take-off plan was kept by the first five Noratlas', but then several delays occurred, and by the time the tenth aircraft finally started it was already so late that the order was issued for the remaining five Noratlas and all the Dakotas to stay on the ground. The final plane that came away was "Niki 15", carrying the heavy equipment and ammunition of the 1st Commando Battalion: even this Noratlas was already badly behind the schedule, but the crew ignored the order to abort: apparently, they too off with their radio out of order.

Following a flight to the point 34°N and 27°E at an average level between 300 and 500ft (100-160m), the aircraft turned one by one in direction of Cyprus, knowing that the area ahead was monitored by Turkish radars, and there was a distinct danger of interception by THK fighters while the transports were slow and had no protection at all. Approaching Cyprus without any navigational reference points, flying at hardly more than 40 to 50ft (12-15m) in total darkness, the crews performed brilliantly, with only one aircraft, Niki 13, losing the course and having to divert to Rhodes. Flying at such low levels by night was not without some other dangers either: the crew of another Noratlas later reported that it passed very close to an US Navy aircraft carrier. The 6th US Fleet was already in the area and very active, preparing to support an evacuation of foreign nationals from Cyprus. Several (E)PA Noratlas' also passed low over the British air base Akrotiri, which was already at alert, and the commander of which immediately warned the Greek officials that any additional aircraft would be intercepted by the British forces.

Then came the last phase of the flight: the landing in Nicosia. The airfield was defended by several anti-aircraft guns, manned by nervous CNG gunners, but there were also numerous armed civilians in the area. These all were to hold back the fire, but in the end such order was obviously not issued in the confusion, and as the first aircraft approached it flew straight into a hail of fire from several directions. The Niki 1, 2, and 3 somehow managed to land and unload commandos and equipment, but Niki 4 received several direct hits and crashed two miles short of the runway. Except for one passenger, everybody onboard was killed. The Niki 7 then got hit in both engines, and had two commandos killed and eleven injured, but managed to make an emergency landing. In a desperate effort to make clear those on the ground who is arriving, several crews turned all their

lights on, with the effect that these Noratlas' were "only" damaged, but not shot down. By the time the last transport – Niki 15 - landed, two were shot down and 33 killed. The last aircraft arriving did not land: Niki 14 arrived only after the first light and was ordered to return back to Souda Bay.

With a "ceasefire" agreed between the (E)PA crews and the CNG, and after unloading, all the Noratlas' took off for the return flight - except the badly damaged Niki 7, and Niki 12 (the later was found to lack fuel for the return trip). Both aircraft were destroyed by the CNG in order to erase traces of direct Greek involvement in the fighting: as always, nothing should reveal that Greece and Turkey were at war. Besides, early in the morning, the THK fighter-bombers returned to bomb the Nicosia IAP, so the two transports would probably be destroyed any way. The surviving commandos of the 1st Battalion then took positions along the defence perimeter of the airfield, and were to fight several pitched battles against the Turks in the following days. Their efforts were in vain, however: eventually the Greeks were forced to leave this airfield under the control of the UN.

The Operation "Niki" was obviously to be supported by the EPA fighter-bombers. Namely, already two days before, the EPA was on alert and preparing itself for fighting. All the available F-84F airframes were serviced and by 21 June the air force reported to have brought 96 of them into flying status. Most were soon underway to bases closer to Cyprus, including Souda Bay and Kasteli.

A detachment of the 338 Mira, equipped with 26 F-84Fs and under command of Sqn.Ldr. Athanassios Mpourolias, was deployed to Kastelli AB, and ordered to ready for flying strikes against Turkish Army positions on the island. For this purpose, each F-84Fs was armed with two rocket launchers calibre 2.5in, two M-64 bombs calibre 500lbs (250kg), full load of 20mm ammunition for guns, and equipped with four JATO rockets for assisted take-off. Their objective was to become the Turkish bridgehead near Pentemili. Reportedly, there was a secret treaty between Greece and Lebanon according to which these planes would be permitted to land in Lebanon after flying a strike against Turks on Cyprus, then re-arm and re-fuel and fly another strike while returning to Greece.

At 05:10hrs of 22 July, the crews of the II/340M were sitting in their cockpits and the green flare - a signal for take-off - was shot into the skies. The first aircraft rolled to the runway, followed by the others. The final permission for take off was never issued, however: barely five minutes later, a red flare was fired cancelling the strike against Pentemili.

Additional "Mysterious" Engagements

We have already discussed the Greek claims for (E)PA F-5As shooting down one and causing the loss of a second THK F-102, for 21 July 1974. As we move towards describing what happened on 22 July 1974, it's about the time to discuss the Turkish version of the same - or, more likely - a completely different engagement that happened on this day. According to Turkish sources (and these include official THK records), no F-102As were lost on 21 July 1974, although one was damaged in non-combat related accident. During the fighting on Cyprus, again three THK fighters were shot down by CNG anti-aircraft fire, including an F-100D of the 171. Filo, and an F-100D of the 172. Filo (both pilots ejected), as well as an F-104G of the 191. Filo

("64-17783", the pilot of which ejected as well). But, two THK F-102As of the 142. Filo should have been involved in a successful air combat with EPA THK fighters. The heavy loss definitely illustrates the intensity of the THK commitment and the ferocity of the Greek anti-aircraft defences: it was the THK which made the difference and enable the Turks to continue their advance in the face of the fierce resistance over a very problematic terrain.

The 142. Filo was at the time forward deployed at Balikesir AB, and flew air-defence missions over the northern Aegean. At 1355hrs on this day, so the Turkish version, two F-102As - serialled 55-3401 and 55-3413) were scrambled to intercept an unidentified aircraft that was jamming the radar site at Canakkale. Upon reaching the designated area the pilots of the THK fighters - Lt. Col. Vasif Sayin and Capt. Sitki Onur - found an (E)PA Albatross amphibious aircraft. Only moments later, however, they were advised to leave the Albatross and turn into two EPA F-5As, which were closing from the West. The visibility on that day was pretty poor, and while approaching towards the Greek fighters, the two Turkish pilots noticed the F-5s passing by; they turned around and positioned themselves behind the two Greeks. What happened afterwards is the only point where there is inconsistence between different Turkish accounts: according to one version, while passing by one of the Greek fighters fired an air-to-air missile - and missed. The Greeks counter this by pointing at the fact that at the time their pilots were strictly ordered to leave the "master arm" switch in "off" position, and that it is therefore very unlikely for any of their pilots to open fire if not ordered to do so. According to the same Turkish version, after reporting that he was under fire, Capt. Onur was granted permission to fire: he acquired one of the F-5s with his AIM-4Ds and launched a single air-to-air missile, scoring a hit which resulted in a brilliant ball of flame and the ejection of the Greek pilot. The brilliant explosion and ejection of the Greek pilot were confirmed visually by Lt. Col. Sayin as well, which meanwhile started to pursuit the other F-5A. However, he lost the contact and then suffered the failure of his gyro compass, losing orientation in the process and flying towards Athens. Only after some consultations with the ground station could Sayin take a course back towards Turkey, but then he ran out of fuel and was finally forced to make an emergency landing on a highway near Soke after an engine flame-out. His aircraft was excessively damaged in the process, but was subsequently repaired.

As indicated already while discussing the Greek claim from 21 July, until today fierce argument between the Greeks and the Turks continues, with both sides claiming to have shot down at least one enemy aircraft - but the Greeks stating this happened on 21 July, while the Turkish documents all show this engagement to have happened on 22 July.

The main problem with the Turkish version of what should have happened on 22 July is that there is no report for a loss of any other Greek F-5A during this period of time except for 343MAH/114PM's serial "64-13361", flown by 2nd Lt. Hatziantoniou Dimitrios. According to most of the Greek reports, this aircraft indeed crashed on 22 July 1974. While this accident should have happened due to fuel starvation after an engagement with several Turkish fighters, the plane reportedly crashed during attempted emergency landing at Tanagra AB. The 26 years old Hatziantoniou was killed and his F-5A written off in the crash.

Theoretically, both the (E)PA and the THK have to report any accidents involving their aircraft to the NATO. This is an obligation, and the failure to do so could result in certain negative consequences. Yet, the NATO depends on the two air forces for such reports being correctly done, and containing proper information. Consequently, little - if any - indications of actual air battles can be found in official documents, and the only available sources that could be considered as authoritative should be the pilots involved.

Understanding the - meanwhile obvious - predilection of both the Greece and Turkey to either completely ignore or try to cover-up engagements in the air over the Aegean, or declare wrong dates and reasons not only for losses suffered during mutual engagements (a fact confirmed by several officers from both the (E)PA and THK on condition of anonymity), but also in the case of certain kind of mishaps, it should not be surprising if both sides have lied - or left only parts of the full story to be published - so far, and that there were indeed two different engagements ending with some of the participants going down in flames.

If nothing else, the completely different accounts offered by the two sides about what should have been a single engagement indicate that there were indeed two different battles. After all, it is easily possible that the Greeks have indeed hit one THK F-102A on 21 July, and that this was the plane, which then crash-landed near Soke, but that the incident was put into the records as having happened on 22 July - and due to fuel starvation. Equally, it is possible that the Greek F-5A, which - interestingly - also crashed due to "fuel starvation" on 22 July, was actually damaged in an air combat with THK F-102A.

Namely, after intensive research to this topic the authors are sure that there were more engagements in which something happened than only one (either on 21 or 22 July), as usually claimed by the Greeks and the Turks. For example, while going through different NATO records, a report from the NATO radar station at Cigli was found, which described an engagement that happened on 28 July 1974.

At the height of the Cyprus crisis, the F-5As from the 5th AJÜ, Merzifon AB, were also forward deployed - to Cumaovassi AB, for duty as clear-weather interceptors. This task was important, as at the time most of the Turkish air defence weapons consisted from different WWII weapons, and the number of modern SAMs was very limited. At 0900hrs of 28 July the radar station near the Cigli AB detected two unidentified aircraft, moving over a group of very islands claimed by both the Greeks and the Turks. The HQ of the THK immediately ordered two F-5As that stood on alert to be scrambled and identify the two unknown aircraft. The leader of the pair was Capt. Z. Torumtay (flying F-5A "13346"), and both aircraft were armed only with their two fixed 20mm cannons. On the take-off, however, Torumtay's wingman reported he could not retract his left landing gear, and had to abort the mission.

Remaining alone, Capt. Torumtay continued the mission, constantly under the direct control from the HQs of the 1st Hava Kuvvetleri Komutanligi (1st Tactical Air Force THK). After reaching a point some 200km from the base, the Turkish pilot found himself alone and confronted with two (E)PA F-102As. He reported the identity of the two fighters to his command and then took a position behind the two Delta Darts. Over the next ten minutes Capt. Torumtay manoeuvred his fighter three times to maintain a position at six o'clock behind the

Greeks: then one of the F-102As opened the weapons bay while turning towards the lonesome F-5A, which was understood as a hostile gesture. Readying for an eventual air combat, the Turkish pilot reported this to his ground control, but then both Delta Darts did a turn back towards West and left the area at a high speed.

Only moments later, namely, two THK F-100Ds - each armed with four AIM-9 Sidewinders - arrived in the area to reinforce Capt. Torumtay, and assure his safe return back to Cumaovassi AB, where the pilot was surprised to get a hero's-welcome: confronting two (E)PA F-102As and remaining in a favourable position for ten minutes was certainly not a small feat.

It remains unknown why had this engagement been mentioned explicitly in western records: it is almost sure that the THK and EPA fighters meet each other in the skies over the Aegean several times between the 20 and 28 July, apparently without opening fire. If nothing else, it is certain that not only EPA F-102s and F-5s, but also F-4Es flew permanent combat air patrols over the Aegean Sea, and that at least some kind of confrontations with Turkish fighters were unavoidable. Torumtay's engagement was thus no exception but rather the rule - down to the point that in this case a single F-5A engaged and outmanoeuvred two F-102As, and that neither side fired any missiles. Namely, Greek sources cite another similar engagement, this time between one of their F-5A (flown by an unknown Lieutenant-Colonel), and two THK F-102s, in which the Greek fighter fired two Sidewinders and caused some damage to at least one of Turkish fighters - but without scoring any kills. Much additional "digging" will be needed to find out all the details about these air battles, then it is obvious that not only both sides are hiding details about such encounters, but also the NATO and the USA.

Action from Heraklion

Meanwhile, on Cyprus the fierce Turkish air strikes caused a great concern for the safety of foreign nationals caught up in the fighting. The RAF contingent at Nicosia Airport was evacuated to Dheklia, flying out the families of troops living in the east of the Island. The civilians were flown out from King's Field airstrip by RAF Hercules, although 500 US citizens were evacuated by Sixth Fleet CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters to the USS Inchon on the 24th July. Cover for the USMC helicopters was provided by F-4 Phantoms of the VF-11 and VF-74 from USS Forrestal (CV-59). Holidaymakers in the Kyrenia/Nicosia area were transferred to the British carrier HMS Hermes from the beach at Kyrenia, on the 23rd, by Wessex HU-5s of 845 NAS and Sea Kind HAS.1 of 814 NAS, aided by HMS Devonshire's Wessex HAS.3. By the end of the day, 1.630 people had been evacuated. In order to ease the traffic between different bases four Puma HC.1s of the 33 Sqn were flown to Cyprus. When the evacuation was complete - on 8 August 1974 - 13.430 people had been returned in a well-organized operations, especially in respect of reception in England. The aircraft involved included Hercules, Belfasts, Comets, Britannias and VC.10s.

Meanwhile, another EPA unit was short of engaging in the fighting. At the start of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the (E)PA already had a detachment of ten F-5As of the 111PM dispersed to Heraklion AB, on Crete: these arrived since 18 July in a move which was initially not connected with the Turkish operation. On the morning of 21 July, the F-5s were reinforced by the first three F-4Es of the 117PM/338M from

Andravida, and two F-102As from Tanagra. In the same afternoon eight additional F-4Es were to arrive.

The EPA originally deployed 18 crews plus three instructor crews (i.e. a total of 42 pilots) to Homestead AFB, in the USA, to be trained on F-4Es. Two thirds of them were back in Greece in May and June 1974, the final third being recalled to Greece on 20 July 1974. After 80 hours of both air-to-ground and air-air training by USAF pilots with combat experience from Vietnam, all the Greek F-4 crews were declared fully qualified on the F-4E.

Usually, it was reported that there were seven F-4Es delivered to EPA by July 1974. Such reports, however, are wrong. By June of that year actually no less but 23 Phantoms were already delivered to Andravida, and already in service, with the 339 Mira being earmarked as the first to receive Phantoms, and the 338 following shortly. By the time of the Cyprus emergency the 338 Mira had only 50% of the aircraft and crews officially assigned to it. Even if neither unit was officially declared operational, all that was left to be done was the "formal" evaluation of the squadron by EPA Staff officers. Officially, however, the NATO documents were showing both units still equipped with F-84Fs.

The decision to deploy eleven Phantoms to Heraklion and held the remaining 12 aircraft back at Andravida was taken already on 20 July, but the order to do so arrived at the units only in the last moments. In a rush the assigned F-4E-crews were strapped inside their cockpits: the commanders of the 339 and 338 Mira, Lt.Col. Sotirios Kontogiannis and Lt.Col. Harilaos Aggelopoulos, respectively, remained in Andravida, however.

After being prepared with the help of the Mr. Pitioulis, a Greek employee at the McDonnell Douglas, the first section - at the time already forward deployed to Tanagra for air defense duties - consisted of three Phantoms, flown by Maj. Kontomaris S. and 1st Lt. Liagouridis K., Capt. Spiliotopoulos S. and 2nd Lt. Rallis Z., and Capt. Georgoulis C. with an unknown WSO. The aircraft were tasked with the air-to-air role and were to act as cover for the eight bomb-laden Phantoms that were to follow. After refuelling at Tanagra, the Phantoms transferred to Heraklion without any problems.

The second section took off directly from Andravida and consisted of four Phantoms, flown by Lt. Col. Skrekas S. and 1st Lt. Mourelatos D., Maj. Kolovos I. with an unknown WSO, Maj. Koukolas N. and 1st Lt. Manousos P., and Capt. Sampanis E. with 2nd Lt. Garonis G. in the rear cockpit. These aircraft also arrived without any problems at Heraklion, already loaded by Rockeye CBUs and Mk.82s, as well as drop tanks.

The third section also took off from Andravida and flew straight to Heraklion. It consisted again of four Phantoms, all armed with six Mk.82s and carrying three drop tanks, flown by Lt. Col. Mpalles P. and 1st Lt. Vidakis D., Cpt. Skarlatos G. and 1st Lt. Kostakos M., Capt. Poulakos N. and 1st Lt. Shortsinaitis Th., and Maj. Papadopoulos E. with 1st Lt. Papoudis K. Lt.Col. Mpalles later recalled that while on the way to Heraklion, the radio-frequencies he monitored were busy because of the engagement between EPA F-5As and THK F-102s. He also recalled that he knew Flt. Lt. Dinopoulos, who was trained by him years ago, while both were flying Freedom Fighters.

Since the operation was started under such a rush, the technicians at Andravida found no time to remove safety pins from all the bombs carried by these eight Phantoms: in fact, the safety pins were removed only from the bombs carried by the Phantom flow by Capt. Skarlatos. As there was an order to make the bombs safe again before transfer, the technicians returned the safety pins to the weapons under his aircraft, and this caused a postponement of some four or five minutes, so he had to transfer to Heraklion flying alone and far behind his formation. In order to catch up, Skarlatos therefore picked a short-cut route towards Souda and then Heraklion, while the rest of the formation flew via Peloponesos Peninsula. After passing the island of Kythera, the whole formation jettisoned their bombs and two drop tanks each into the sea: the centerline drop-tanks were held under the aircraft, as these were to be empty on arrival at Heraklion and there would be no problems to land aircraft loaded with them.

While approaching to some ten miles from Heraklion, Lt. Col. Mpalles finally sighted Skarlatos' Phantom: at the time Skarlatos was requesting to go around the airport and land after an approach from the east. Mpalles ordered him to land as first and ordered the rest of his section to line-up behind Skarlatos, on the axis 90-270 degrees. While landing, Mpalles noticed that there were strong downwinds, and he had some problems with stopping his Phantom due to his high speed. Papadopoulos, who had not flown any Greek Phantoms - equipped with LES - before, but only the USAF "hard wing" examples at Homestead, followed the "by the book" landing procedures, in turn failing to re-calculate the landing speed - especially under downwind conditions, and landed at a very high speed, bursting one tire in the process. The aircraft veered of the runway and cached fire, causing the crew to eject: the pilot and the WSO both landed safely and without any injuries.

As this drama was developing a radio-message from the tower caused some additional confusion: the tower called, "No. 3, you have smoke…", attempting to warn Papadopoulos about the problems with the burst tire. Skarlatos, who was the actual number 3 of the formation, however, was already on the ground. Consequently, he responded with, "Ok, roger!", and the tower then screamed, "No. 3, you are afire!". Lt. Col. Mpalles, understanding what is actually going on, then interrupted the exchange, calling Skarlatos, "George, hold to the left!" Skarlatos turned his aircraft on the taxyway, clearing the runway for the rest of the formation, and then - just as the tower was screaming, "Fire, fire, fire!" - did an emergency evacuation of the aircraft, together with his WSO!

In fact, this was the moment at which Papadopoulos and Papaoudis ejected.

Noticing the chaos in front of him, Poulakos aborted the landing attempt and diverted to Souda Bay, where his aircraft remained for two hours - until the runway at Heraklion was cleared again.

Despite the mishaps, the Phantoms were designated to fly one strike against Turks on Cyprus on the following morning. The first order for take-off was given at 1107hrs, but recalled only two minutes later. The second order for take off was issued at 1224hrs, and then finally six Phantoms - out of a total of 14 planned to participate (including at least six armed with bombs and four with air-to-air missiles) - started towards Cyprus. Some of the weapons these F-4Es carried were taken from the NATO ammunition dump in Souda Bay.

At noon of 23 July, the seven Phantoms were again ordered to start towards Cyprus, but this time the movement was detected by the USN warships in the area and US immediately intervened in the Athens: the mission was aborted and the F-4s of the 117PM had to return back to Heraklion. While landing there, one of the Phantoms made a heavy landing and the aircraft was subsequently written off (both, this and the example lost day earlier, were replaced by F-4E-60-MCs 74-1618 and 74-1619, delivered to Greece in June 1976, free of charge).

Greek Indecisiveness

By the time, the fate of Cyprus - but also that of the junta in Athens - was sealed. When the Turks began landing their reinforcements - including main bodies of the 28th and 39th Infantry Divisions, supported by some 150 M47 Patton tanks - on 23rd July, Brig.Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides' regime in Athens collapsed. Sampson simultaneously resigned in Nicosia, and was replaced by Clerides. The Greek junta could simply not decide whether or not to become involved on Cyprus: Brig.Gen. Ioannides trusted Kissinger that the USA would prevent a Turkish invasion, and thus failed to alert the armed forces in time. Gen. Bonanos, Chief of the General Staff, could not make up his mind should the Greek forces fight or not; Army Commander Gen. Galatsanos explained that it would take days for Greek forces to get to the border to Turkey, and then it would be too late; Admiral Arapakis, C-in-C Greek Navy would not release any of the two advanced, German-built Type 209 submarines to intercept the Turkish naval forces; while the C-in-C EPA, Papanicolau, ordered the fighter-bombers to be deployed to Crete and Rhodes, but would not order them into combat.

With this the threat of the war between two NATO allies was over, but the Turkish Army was now on Cyprus and tensions were still increasing over the Aegean Sea as well. In fact, while the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish foreign ministers, as well as foreign ministers of the guarantor powers met in Geneva, on 25 July, to discuss the military situation on the island, and Prime Minister Ecevit publicly welcomed the change of government in Greece, Turkish forces continued taking territory and improving their positions. Broken and demoralized, isolated from supply bases in Greece, the CNG retreated: by the end of July, the Turks had most of northern Cyprus in their hands.

The second conference about Cyprus began on 10 August, again in Geneva, and saw participation of Clerides and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktas. The later proposed a federation, with Turks controlling 34% of island. When this proposal, and several other Turkish proposals were rejected, while Clerides asked for between 36 and 48 hours to consult with the government in Nicosia, on 14 August the Turks launched a new offensive. Thus began the second phase of the Turkish intervention, about which quite little is known, except that it was supported by new F-100-strikes, and that within two days it resulted in Turks controlling no less but 37% of Cyprus.

Having brought their forces in favourable positions, the Turks then declared the "Atilla Line", which ran from Morphou Bay in northwest to Famagusta (Gazimagusa) in the east, and then ordered a ceasefire. Cyprus remains partitioned until today and a large Turkish Army contingent is stationed on the island ever since.

The Shooting Down of the Turkish F-102s

By Demetrius Stergiou

In our attempt to get out of the ordinary discussions, we decided to do a small photographic dedication, accompanied by a narrative of an incident that in our opinion is the most important contribution of the F-5 in the modern history of the EPA. This decision fell after dozens of phone-calls and requests by Cockpit readers. And for those that haven't understood yet, or do not know, let us clear that we are talking about the shooting down of a Turkish F-102 by a Greek F-5 on July 21 1974, and the destruction of a second one. The incident which resulted in two Turkish pilots loosing their lives was recalled by one of the two Greek protagonists, then young Pilot Officer and today retired Brigadier General Thomas Skamparthonis.

"...I reported to the Icarus School (Greek Air Force Academy) in October of 1968 and joined the 44th Training Class. The 44th was the first that completed four years in the Academy, since up to that time the years for graduating were three, as was the same in the Army and Navy Academies. The Icari (cadet pilots) of the 43rd Class, been in the transition stage from three to four years, were sworn as Pilot Officers at 3 1/2 years and we were the first to be commissioned at 4 years. So I was sworn in as a Pilot Officer in September of 1972.

The years at the Academy passed relatively fast. In the first year the basic training was conducted, and this included 35 hours on T-6 Texans and Harvards. We soloed at 25 hours, which is considered late by today's standards, as this was attributed the T-6 being pretty difficult for the young cadets. From the next year (1969-1970) things for the cadets at Icarus School changed with the of the T-41D Mescaleros of the 360 MAE (Mira Arhikis Ekpedefsis, Basic Training Squadron). My class, the 44th, was the last to train with the Harvards.

In the second year we continued our training with the T-37. At that time we didn't go to Kalamata for this, but to Elefsis. There, the 361 EMA using the T-37 and the 362 EMA using the T-33A for advanced training were stationed, as wells as the 355MTM. In the second year we concluded our basic training, logging some 70-75 hours, while at the third year, in the advanced stage, we logged 120 hours in the T-33.

Of course at the time my Class was at the advanced stage, Kalamata opened (1970-71), so most T-33 hours were logged there. This change however was not the last for my class. When we reached our fourth year at the Academy, the EPA leadership decided that the Icari should pass another stage of training, called the "operational" and this provided for the conversion on the F-84F and for us to trained in air-to-ground weapons tactics only. We were to use all weapons that the F-84F was capable of using and fire these. At some point the EPA leadership finally decided that this was "risky" - despite our significant flying experience gathered the previous three years, so we logged at Larissa the amount of hours necessary (50-60) using the T-33 again. These were Canadian-built MkIII's, and were used because of their greater weapon carrying capability.

I was sworn in as Pilot Officer in September of 1972 and was transferred to 111 PM (Fighter Wing) at Nea Anchialos. At that time the F-5 was used as an unofficial lead-in-fighter training aircraft ("LIFT") for newly commissioned pilots that would then transfer to other aircraft, foremost F-104Gs and F-84Fs (the F-104G-units also

had two-seaters). I was appointed to 337MAH - a Day Interceptor Squadron, as was the title and the main task of the unit at the time. We had a secondary fighter-bomber role. The operational conversion training for me along with other four of my classmates that were transferred together with me, started immediately, with ground school for the aircraft systems (it was named KEM) and the classes of flight theory, and by the late 1972/early 1973 we started flying the F-5, going solo after seven hours - if I remember correctly.

After 50 hours flown over a span of four to five month, I was declared operational and took part in all the Squadron's activities. This happened in early summer of 1973. Time passed quickly as that year was full of events, but I have to say that absolutely nothing warned us of what was about to follow in the summer of 1974. Our relations with Turkey seemed - and probably were - quite good. No reason for scrambles, interceptions and things like that. Of course as a fighter squadron we always had readiness, but, as far as I can remember in the one year I was operational in the squadron, we did not do one single interception of Turkish aircraft. Significantly, only four months before the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, in April of 1974, we visited the THK air base of Bandirma in a squadron-exchange program within the NATO. We remained there for ten days, returning the visit made to us by the Turkish F-5s a few months back. I repeat that nothing - but really nothing - was indicative of what was about to follow in July and August of 1974.

Even as of July of 1974, with all that happened in Cyprus, we didn't have readiness or alerts, at least not in the Air Force. This I know because the day of the Turkish invasion I was on leave. That morning I went to the balcony to drink my morning coffee when a neighbor informed me that a general mobilization was ordered. Without believing her I opened the television and got the first glimpse of the situation. I packed my things, said "goodbye" to my wife and took my car to the road for Anchialos. This took me many more hours than usual since many parts of the Athens-Lamia freeway were closed, so when I finally arrived at my base it was late in the afternoon.

I was ordered to get into my anti-G suit and done the life-west, and head for the shelter that was assigned to me after a short briefing. The last hours of July 20th (**) passed quietly and from what I am in a position to know there were not any Turkish violations over the Aegean the whole day long.

The next day, however, things would change. From early morning we had massive violations of the Athens F.I.R. by Turkish aircraft. Me and my colleagues were all inside our aircrafts and waited. Our readiness were of five and two minutes, so we were sitting inside the F-5 cockpit with seatbelts on, waiting for the order to scramble. About 1:30 in the afternoon, a scramble was sounded and to my surprise, I was in the first pair to take off. My leader was Flt. Lt. Dinopoulos, senior than me in the squadron, serving as an instructor. Without having time to think I started both engines, went out of the shelter, and waited a while to be called by my No.1. This did not happen so I went on the frequency calling my No.1. I haven't got any answer so I taxied on the taxiway waiting for Dinopoulos to lead me to the holding point.

When he came to the connection point I was in, with a series of hand-signals he explained that he had no radio and could neither transmit

nor receive anything. With another signal he told me to lead as No.1 and he would follow watching my moves and covering me as a wingman. Flt. Lt. Dinopoulos should have aborted and return to his shelter actually. This was what our orders provided for in such cases. He didn't do it however and preferred to take-off without me ever knowing the reason for such a decision. I estimate, without being certain, that weighing the situation he followed the unwritten rule that in times of crisis, even with a malfunction, aircraft always take off one way or another. It was certainly a gutsy decision that showed his level of training and professionalism. I went ahead and did exactly what I used to do in training or regular flights without being anxious about anything.

In our briefings we were specifically ordered to have our weapons switches in the Off position and to do nothing more than a visual ID of the bogeys we would meet. We had no briefing that would indicate that we should be ready for all instances. Of course our unit (111PM) was combat ready with all anti-aircraft guns armed, manned and in position, high security measures etc. So before we took off I knew we would fly a typical interception, a procedure done many timed before in peacetime.

I followed the instructions of the Mt Pelion Radar station (call-sign "Joker") and we started climbing heading for the North Aegean. Dinopoulos followed from a relative long distance flying always higher than me (I don't know exactly how much) in order to be able to watch my movements and the surrounding area. I always followed Joker's instructions that constantly changed my heading and altitude.

You see, our "targets" were many that day. After two or three such changes of level and heading I was ordered by Joker to head for the area between the islands of Aghios Efstratios and Limnos at a lever of 20.000ft. While I was still climbing to about 18.000ft with a 350 knots speed, I was warned by Joker to look for bogeys at 20 degrees right. I turned my attention to that area and almost immediately I saw two Turkish F-102s flying in a tight formation to my left, on a distance no greater than 200 meters. Instinctively and without any delay I stopped climbing, broke hard left and started turning to get behind them. Almost immediately I realized they were doing the same, since I had always visual contact seeing them at my left (8 o'clock). I reported to Joker - and to tell you the truth, when I saw them turning behind me I thought they were going to head back east to their base. This, however, did not happen!

They continued turning in order to get at my 'six and this was evident now. I had full throttle and was on maximum turn rate trying to keep visual contact. In this effort my speed dropped to 300 knots so I gradually started lowering my nose since we met at the same level but they were in a better position, because they were flying level while I broke my climb.

After at least four such turns I reported to Joker that I was engaged and continued turning while descending. At a certain point I lost visual contact but I continued turning and looking out my canopy in order to regain visual. Now I was flying at less than 10.000ft and as I was looking in all directions I saw at the rather wavy sea water tower climbing very high and then turning in a big oil spill. Then I realised what happened and turned my attention to Dinopoulos trying to locate him. I asked Joker where he was but got back no specific answer.

I was ordered to return to Anchialos and a few moments later I was given a vector for a new bogey that was heading also west like me. I followed Joker's instructions but was unable to find him. Visibility was not that good that day. When I landed, Dinopoulos' aircraft passed over the runway. I stopped at the end of the runway and waited for him to join me. I was surprised to see that both his wingtip Sidewinders were missing. Stoping our aircraft at the apron we got out - and before we could say anything to each other we were surrounded by colleagues and technicians asking all kinds of questions. Almost immediately a jeep came and took us away from this pandemonium. We were both questioned separately and returned to our duties. After a while I found out what had happened.

Dinopoulos was following from a distance and being higher was not seen by the two Turkish pilots. He watched all the engagement descending and closing. Before he could do anything he saw the bay of the leader F-102 open and an AIM-4 Phalcon been fired at me. The missile missed since we were both in a tight sustained turn so they were out of parameters. Without been noticed Dinopoulos closed in range. Let me add here that the target was clearly identified visually. As you know the F-5A had no radar. When you had a visual on the target, you turned the weapons switch on, in the "ARM" position, selecting guns or missiles. At that time we had only the early AIM-9Bs on our F-5A. A lock-on on the target was achieved when - after selecting the missile, and after its seeker head was warmed up and establishing a contact with the hot exhaust gas of the target - you heard a screeching sound that was sharper as the seeker head was turning closer to the target. Then you were ready to fire. Distance was calculated visualy also through the gunsight. For example, when the surface of the target was covering all the gunsight, you were 1200 meters away; if the surface was covering half the gunsight, distance was also half etc. If I remember correctly the optimal distance for the AIM-9B was about 800 meters. Having these parameters, Dinopoulos turned the weapon switch "ON" and fired immediately one Sidewinder.

The missile was, however, was not ready yet and - lacking the time to "warm-up" - missed. The second Sidewinder in the meantime was ready to fire and gave a loud sound signal. Dinopoulos fired the second missile without hesitation. The missile hit dead-center and he had to brake hard right in order to avoid being hit by the debris of the F-102 that was burning while crashing into the sea.

The same night we learned that in Turkish television it was reported that two Turkish fighters had shot down two Greek ones. The Greek side did not announce (and did not confirm or deny) anything. Long time after that we learned that the second Turkish pilot (we do not know if he was the No.1 or No.2 of their formation) lost his direction probably due to shock. He was panicked, thought that we were on his tail and made extensive and unnecessary use of his afterburner, thus going "bingo fuel" and finally crash-landing on a highway. His aircraft was destroyed and he died of his injuries later at the hospital.

We also learned that the Turkish pilots were probably high ranking ones and we got word that the leader was a Lieutenant Colonel, and his wingman a Major. After this, nothing happened: there were no news. We returned to normal pace and the Turks did not show up over

the Aegean even at the second phase of the Cyprus invasion in August 1974. What changed that day was that from now on Greek fighters always took off with the weapons switches in the "ON" position and that the Turks did not show up over the Aegean for years. And when I say years, I mean years. From what I am in a position to know, their first hesitant attempts to fly over the area were done in 1976-77.

Many years later I was serving in Naples, at "Air-South" Command, when a Turkish pilot approached me and we started to talk. When he stared to tell me about the capabilities of his country's Air Force, he mentioned that the Turkish F-102's shot down two Greek F-5's. When I asked him if I look like a zombie he changed colour. I have never seen a more embarrassed man in my life..."

Even if some say that the Greek pilots involved in this incident were mistreated by PA General Staff, and were not given the proper promotions, Thomas Skamparthonis denied this strongly. He did not deny however that both he and Dinopoulos were not given any medal or commendation for their combat. From our point of view we believe that not going public and recognizing this incident is not the right way, especially since the Turkish side still claims - foremost through the internet - that their F-102s shot down the Greek F-5's!

That the "other side" has always maintained an affection for propaganda and winning the last impression, is well known, even if some Greeks in key positions cannot or are not willing to understand it. It is almost certain that the same tactic will be continued in the future. Is it not time for PA to end its silence and state the facts? Twenty seven years have passed and we believe this should be done soon!

Note

The AIM-4 carried by the Turkish F-102's were probably of the -D version, fielded in 1963 for use against fighter aircraft. However, we can only be sure that the missile was practically useless in air combat within the visual distances, especially under the specific conditions that the Turkish pilot used it in: sustained turn at maximum degrees and high G's. It is certain that despite the improvements of this version, kinetically it was almost the same missile as the -C version, intended for use against the Soviet bombers, not in manoeuvring combat against enemy fighters.

(*) Ikarus is the name of the cadet in theHellenic Air Force Academy, the "Sholi Ikaron"

(**) The date has been confirmed now as the 22nd by numerous other PA pilots who were in the air that day, especially 339 Mira F-4E pilots, Air Vice Marshalls (Ret.):- Panagiotis Mpalles - Stephen Skrekas, - George Skarlatos- Panagiotis Manousos,- Member of Parliament, Ministerof Defence and Colonel (Ret.) Spilios Spiliotopoulos.

Also we have the report by the then Colonel P. Semertzakis who studied all official PA reports during the invasion of Cyprus and was submitted in December 1974 to the PA General Staff, and which analysed all aspects of the aerial operations.

The Greek MoD George Averoff, member of the civilian Government that lead the Country to free democratic elections in the fall of 1974, during his meeting with State Departments Undersecretary of State Hartman, also mentioned the 22nd July as the date of this engagement