czech foreign policy since 1990 from the euro-atlantic consensus to a deep identity crisis? david...
TRANSCRIPT
Czech Foreign Policy since 1990
From the Euro-Atlantic consensus to a deep identity crisis?
David Král, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
Budapest, May 2010
The two phases of the Czech foreign policy after 1990
Phase 1: The Euro-Atlantic consensus
Accession to NATO and the EU primary (and probably the only) foreign policy objectives
In fact it was consensus -1: the Communist party always disputed integration to EU and NATO, but ultimately more opposed to NATO
Right (ODS) preferred NATO, while Left (CSSD) the EU- this structural cleavage intensified after 2004
Relations with neighbours arguably more important than today
Phase 2: We are in, what’s next?
Post accession fatigue/inertia/indifference:
Lack of vision on part of political representation, polarisation across political spectrum
Desperate search for “added value”, “niche”
Lack of a strategic concept (foreign policy priorities only for 2003-2006, national security strategy not amended since 2003)
The only “boost” of foreign policy thinking: the Czech EU presidency
Characteristics of the Czech foreign policy today
Lack of salience
Lack of consensus among stakeholders
Lack of coherence
Lack of strategic concept
Exploitation of foreign policy issues for domestic purposes
Lack of salience
FP only a secondary issue
Fostered by a relative indifference of public opinion (shifting perception of security threats)
Lack of expertise among the politicians and political parties’ ranks
Linking foreign policy issues to domestic ones (debate on the Czech missions and healthcare fees, shooting down the government during the EU presidency…)
Lack of consensus
No inter-party debate nor expert nor public debate on the foreign policy priorities
Diverging views on important issues:Transatlantic relationsRussiaChina Security arrangements (radar, role of NATO vs. EU,
participation in missions abroad, NATO strategic concept)
Middle East
Areas where there is relative consensus
EU Enlargement:All political parties support in principleAll political parties except KDU-CSL support Turkish
accessionWestern Balkans considered an overarching priority
Eastern partnership: in principle, but lack of vision on the contents and possible involvement of Russia
Reality always does not match rhetoric (Czech EU presidency, visa issues)
Lack of coherence
Multitude of stakeholders: Political parties Government (often a coalition) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, line ministries Parliament President Businesses and NGOs (third sector)
Often sending different or even contradictory messages (strike against Yugoslavia 1999, Iraq, Kosovo, Russian-Georgian conflict…)
This results in a relative lack of credibility vis-à-vis the main partners (EU and NATO), limits the negotiating weight
Stakeholders – political parties
Left – right cleavage clearly visible
Diverging attitudes to international relations at large:Atlanticists (ODS, largely also TOP 09)Europeanists (CSSD) Internationalists (KDU-CSL, Greens) Isolationists (Communist Party)
Stakeholders – government and parliament
Governments are often coalitions
This results in accepting the “lowest denominator” position (Iraq, ESDP)
Foreign policy issues are often not consensual even within the government (Iraq, Kosovo)
Stances often reactive than pro-active (resulting from the lack of strategy)
Parliament: generally very apathetic, doesn’t discuss foreign policy, except for visible issues (missions)
Stakeholders - president
Much more important role than one would constitutionally assume
Havel: high international reputation, close links especially to Clinton administration – “Euro-Atlanticist” president
Klaus: autonomous foreign policy discourse, often goes against the official governmental position (“sovereignist president”)
Government – President co-habitation in foreign policy extremely complex – creates negative precedents
Stakeholders – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The bearer of continuity in foreign policy
Strong expertise but not sufficient political backing
Open to co-operation with NGO sector, even cross-fertilisation (legacy of dissidents)
Diplomatic representation still relatively big compared to the size of the country – legacy of active Czechoslovak diplomacy?
NGOs and businesses
NGOs: humanitarian and human rights NGOs relatively big influence on the MFA and political representation – more reflected during Right-wing governments
Businesses: important stakeholders especially in energy sector and industry economic diplomacy relatively strong, supported by CzechTrade and CzechInvest – the two go often against each other, not clear which one prevails
So which issues are important in terms of Czech FP?
Difficult to determine due to the lack of consensus and lack of strategic debate after EU accession
Selected on an ad-hoc basis, without broader political consultations among different actors
External relations priorities of the Czech presidency could serve as a guidance, but picture might look different if there was Left-wing government
Transatlantic relations
More important for Right wing parties
Paradoxically, the change of US administration aggravated relations with the Czech Republic:Withdrawal from missile defence shieldDifferent ideas of tackling economic crisis (“road to
hell”)Reluctance to accept Guantanamo prisonersDiverging attitudes towards climate change (Obama
more open) Feeling of “loss of interest” in Central Europe, Czech
Republic not considered a crucial ally anymore
EU enlargement
More rhetoric than reality
Bombastic plans of the Czech presidency did not materialize (Thessaloniki II in Hluboká nad Vltavou, no breakthrough on Croatia and Turkey, visa liberalisation only during II/2009)
But: initiation of the “Friends of the Enlargement” group within the Council
Visa policy: Czech Republic supports visa liberalisation, but in reality one of the main troublemakers
The only visible success: Czechs got the EU enlargement/ENP commissioner
Eastern Partnership
Czechs consider it to be “their baby”
Not clear about how it should work in practice
Rather unsuccessful in pushing it in the first phase: turned into the flagship during the EU presidency
The issue of the role and desirable involvement of Russia still highly controversial
Pragmatic approach: economic integration, good governance, democracy, energy – but where are the carrots? (not so much interested in visas)
The long-term goal of EU accession on the table, but not spoken of openly
Democracy and transformation assistance
Flagship of Czech foreign policy after 2004
Very well marketed, but in reality?
Level of financial support relatively small
Advantage: clear separation and different programming from the
general development aidFocuses exclusively on civil society support
Recently more pragmatic approach prevailing (trade off of Cuba for Eastern partnership)
Who are the Czech allies?
Visegrad countries: high degree of alignment in foreign policy, natural forum for discussion
Other new member states, like-minded countries
Germany (on level of administration – politically not very spoken of)
United States
Otherwise no concept of strategic partnership building, very pragmatic approach, ad-hoc coalitions, explicable by reactivity of foreign policy after 2004
Conclusions
The Czech foreign policy after 2004 has created a more positive image than reflects reality
This is largely due to the EU Presidency and good marketing
However, this is not underpinned by brought domestic consensus and truly strategic thinking among political actors
MFA remains the main driver, but does not have sufficient political backing
Thank you! Any questions and
comments welcome!