d igital f orensics cs4398 g uest l ecture jan kallberg, phd 11/28/2011

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DIGITAL FORENSICS CS4398 GUEST LECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

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Page 1: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

DIGITAL FORENSICS CS4398

GUEST LECTUREJan Kallberg, PhD11/28/2011

Page 2: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

• A perspective on security• Systems and today’s challenges• Digital forensics’ role in security• Humans as security risks• New risks: reputation, business risks,

regulatory risks

Topics

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Page 3: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

A perspective on security

•Ensure implementation of decisions•Accountability•Functionality •Institutional control•Maintain trust, authority, and confidence•In government - legitimacy

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Page 4: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

The Ladder of Abstraction

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Page 5: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Four Steps

TheoryMethodologyToolsImplementation

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Page 6: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

SECURITY CHARACTERISTICSINTANGIBLENOTIONPERCEPTION

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Page 7: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

HOW DO YOU MEASURE SECURITY?

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Page 8: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

GENERAL MISTAKES IN IT-SECURITY

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Page 9: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

CITY WALL

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Weakness:1.Once given access there are no effective control of actual activity. 2.All of the security processing occur at the point of entrance.

Page 10: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

CAPTURE ALL (STASI)

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Weakness:1.Too much data is captured that no one has enough resources/time to analyze.

2.Security management is overwhelmed by indicators and suffer information overflow.

Example: Pilots in an emergency

Page 11: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

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REFUSAL TO IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS

Weakness:1.All information assets are protected equally leading to what really matters does not get relevant attention.

2.Under time pressure and with the risk that the crime is still perpetrated it is essential to understand what is important to protect and respond to.

Remedy: Business Impact Analysis (BIA).

Page 12: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Systems and today’s challenges

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Page 13: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

ISO 27000

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Page 14: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

The Basic Model

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Page 15: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

The Challenges to ISMS 1(2)• Where does the system begin and end?• Shared resources – responsibility?• Identify resources – cloud, servers, back

locations, devices?• Flat organizations / independent work groups• Remote work – working from home

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Page 16: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

The Challenges to ISMS 2(2)• People • Big plans, mediocre implementation, entropy

over time (Bob retired…)• Stamina in upholding IT-sec policies (Hospital)• Unsafe behavior among executives and mgmt

(laptop DEA)

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Page 17: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Digital forensics role in IT-security

•Accountability•Regulatory compliance•Audit trail•Monitoring•Policy enforcement•Deterrent

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Page 18: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Regulatory and Policy Enforcement

• SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission)• SOX audit trail• Internal and external audits• Federal and state law compliance• Agency, corporate or university policies

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Page 19: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Routine Security Check•Captures all staff/mgmt•You don’t need an excuse to do it•Don’t trigger any concerns•Intermittent pattern

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Page 20: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Deterrence

• Perpetrators are more focused on the risk of being caught than the repercussions

• Insider information theft are premeditated (Example: sales manager leaving company steals a copy of the customer data base)

• Deterrence only works towards rational actors

• Visible forensic and monitoring abilities deters

• Forensic ability or monitoring structure can not be shared in detail – risk of anti-forensics

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Page 21: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

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Digital Forensics as a Part of Risk Analysis

Page 22: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Monitoring – Forensics – Incident Reports (feedback loop)

Adaptive “healing” systems

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Page 23: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Presenting Complex Technical Evidence

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Page 24: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Humans as risks

•Greed•Jealousy•Vanity•Revanchist•Ideological risks•Addiction (all flavors)

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Page 25: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Humans vs.

Machines

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A person works approx 2,000 hrs / year – Google report equals ≈144 years

Page 26: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

SECURITY – WORK FLOW

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Security rules, processes, and policies that are obstacles to work flow tend to be trespassed or ignored.

Office culture prevails.

Page 27: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Collegial bonds are strong

•Don’t disclose to mgmt that something is not right•Often signs are clearly visible•Protecting each other•A + B + C = the complete story

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Page 28: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

• Reputational risks / leaks• Enterprise cloud computing • Facebook• Social media• Google Docs • Unauthorized information

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Other considerations

Page 29: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

• A perspective on security• Systems and today’s challenges• Digital forensics role in security• Humans as security risks• New risks: reputation, online

clout, business risks, regulatory risks

Topics

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Page 30: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

Discussion

How would you handle the following?

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Page 31: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

1. HOW DO YOU MOTIVATE A BUSINESS LEADER THAT THEIR COMPANY NEEDS IN-HOUSE DIGITAL FORENSIC ABILITY?

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Page 32: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

2. HOW CAN WE LIMIT THE DAMAGE OF CHARACTER FAILURE (UNAUTHORIZED ACTIONS) IN AN ORGANIZATION?

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Page 33: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

3. HOW CAN A SECURITY AWARENESS CAMPAIGN IN A COMPANY PRESENT FORENSICS AS AN INDIVIDUAL DETERRENT?

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Page 34: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

4. TAKING IN ACCOUNT THE ADVANCES IN FORENSICS AND MONITORING. DO YOU THINK IT-SECURITY IS BECOMING EASIER OR HARDER TO EXECUTE?

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Page 35: D IGITAL F ORENSICS CS4398 G UEST L ECTURE Jan Kallberg, PhD 11/28/2011

QUESTIONS?

THANK YOU!

[email protected]

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