dartdart defense adaptive red team micro-foundations of insurgent violence: implications for iraq...

DARTDARTDARTDART

Defense Adaptive Red Team

Micro-Foundations of Insurgent Violence: Implications for Iraq

Mark Smith, Janine Davidson, Peter BrooksCenter for Adaptive Strategies & Threats

Hicks & Associates, Inc.

Prepared for Presentation to theIrregular Warfare Forum

Pentagon, VA5 October 2005

2

DARTDART Agenda

• How Insurgency Works: The micro-dynamics of insurgency – Perspective of the civilian population (C.O.G.)– Insurgent and Government tactics and objectives

• What To Do: A Framework for Commanders– How to analyze the AOR and tailor tactics accordingly

• Implications for Iraq

• Audience: Unit level commanders

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DARTDART Purpose

• The purpose of this briefing is to provide unit-level commanders (Company – Brigade) with:– A deeper understanding of the micro-level

motivations of insurgent and local civilian behavior

– A framework for applying this knowledge to develop a counterinsurgent strategy tailored for their AOR

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DARTDART Brief Based on Wide Array of Scholarship:

• Bosnia• Kosovo• Vietnam• Uganda• Angola• Mozambique• Eritrea• Palestine• Greek Civil War• El Salvador

• Cambodia• Soviet Partisans in

Ukraine during WWII• Greek Partisans during

WWII• Nicaragua• Guatemala• French Revolution• Cyprus• Liberia• Malaya

This brief describes the patterns of violence observed in these other insurgencies, and then applies these lessons to Iraq.

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DARTDART

• Insurgent activity is extremely public at the local level.• Caching weapons, recruiting fighters, punishing

government collaborators, collecting taxes, etc…• Actions are visible to locals -- civilians are the audience.• Insurgencies and counter-insurgencies are fought

through the civilian population.• Most of the violence is against civilians.

– Insurgents punish collaborators– Historically, government forces often engage in reprisals,

although this is not currently the case in Iraq

Insurgent Activity is Public…

Civilians are the eyes and ears of COIN

6

DARTDART … and THIS is What It Looks Like

A man, center, lying down, is punched before being killed, while another man walks to execute a second man, seen on his knees on the right, on Baghdad's Haifa Street, Sunday Dec. 19 2004. About 30 gunmen ambushed a car

Sunday in central Baghdad carrying employees of the Iraqi organization running next month's elections, killing three of the workers while two escaped unhurt, an official from the election body said. Adel al-Lami, a member of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, said the early morning attack took place in downtown Haifa Street, a thoroughfare running through central Baghdad and the scene of repeated clashes between security forces and

insurgents. (AP Photo / Str)

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DARTDART Insurgents use Selective Violence…

• “Silence Was a Weapon”: If they want to survive, insurgents must keep the civilian population from aiding the government security forces.

• Reasons Insurgents Target…– …American troops

• To drive them back into protected bases in order to allow insurgents to continue their public activities without fear of interruption.

– …Indigenous security forces • To allow insurgents to monopolize violence in the neighborhood.

– …Collaborators with those forces• To deter collaboration with security forces, in order to prevent

identification of insurgents and their supporters.

As of March 2005, 24,865 Iraqi civilian deaths were reported., 35.9% due to “criminality,” 12% due to insurgent targeting of govt.

collaborators, and only 7.7% due to terrorist bombings. (IBC 2005)

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DARTDART …Because they Understand “Nagl’s Ninety Percent”

• LTC John Nagl points out that even if 90% of the civilians in Al Anbar support the Americans, they will not help if they are afraid of retaliation.

Insurgents need only for good people to do nothing

I Like the Government

Insurgents can Identify and punish collaborators: I’M NOT SAFE

Government can protect civilians from retaliation: I’M

SAFE

Silence

DenunciationTips Collaboration

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DARTDART Civilian decisions rely primarily on security

• In the civilian’s mind: A marginal benefit to government forces is not worth the sacrifice in personal security it brings with it.– One person’s aid to the government is not going to end the

insurgency. It will make -- at best -- a small difference on behalf of the government.

– Result: The vast majority of civilians will not put their security at risk to help the government.

• Creates a vicious cycle…• A government’s legitimacy depends on its ability to provide

security.– Throughout history security has been the primary

motivation and purpose for allegiance to a higher authority (E.g. feudal system, organized crime, etc.)

10

DARTDARTEven Mass Killings and Bombings by Insurgents are often selective…

• What may at first appear to be indiscriminate violence is often highly selective.– Suicide car bombs often target police convoys,

recruiting stations, government officials, and security forces.

• Truly indiscriminate violence signals the inability of the insurgency to get good intelligence on who is and is not a government collaborator, and so they often resort to targeting by ethnic group, the only information available to them.

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DARTDARTOne week in Iraq… (1 of 3) 7 July 2005 to 10 July 2005

Date Target Weapon Killed Location

7-Jul-2005Ihab al-Sherif, Egypt's ambassador-to-be in

Iraq gunfire 1kidnapped in

Baghdad

7-Jul-2005 Police Station, Local Govt. HQ mortars 3 Mosul

7-Jul-2005 Shiite cleric Hashium Attiya al-Fahdli gunfire 1 Baghdad

7-Jul-2005 Bodies found decapitated 5b/w Ramadi and

Rawah

7-Jul-2005Ali Ghalib Ibrahim, head of Salahuddinn

provincial council gunfire 1 Tikrit

8-Jul-2005Jumhour Karim Khammas, Sunni Muslim

Basra Univ. professor gunfire 1 Basra

8-Jul-2005 taxi passengers gunfire 4 Mosul

8-Jul-2005 Bodies of 4 men found executed 4 Mosul

8-Jul-2005 policeman gunfire 1 Al-Yarmouk

8-Jul-2005 Ali Shakir, chief of Iraqi karate federation gunfire 1Kut, body found in

river

9-Jul-2005 Translator working for U.S. and his family gunfire 4 Al Ta'mim, Baiji

10-Jul-2005 U.S. military convoysuicide car

bomb 1 near Fallujah

*Data from Iraq Body Count Database as of 28 July 2005

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10-Jul-2005 truck drivers working for U.S. gunfire 3 Near Dujail

10-Jul-2005 security official gunfire 1 Kirkuk

10-Jul-2005 police colonel gunfire 1 Baghdad

10-Jul-2005 convoy of mayorsuicide car bomb 3 Kirkuk

10-Jul-2005 army recruitssuicide bomber 20

Muthanna airfield, Baghdad

10-Jul-2005 Sunni Arabs from northern Baghdadtortured, shot 12

Sadr City, Baghdad

10-Jul-2005 employees of Iraqna telecom co. gunfire 2 SW Baghdad

10-Jul-2005convoy of police chief Brig. Gen. Salim Salih Meshaal

suicide car bomb 5 near Mosul

10-Jul-2005 customs official2 suicide car bombs 7

Walid crossing, Syrian border

11-Jul-2005 Shiite family gunfire 8Baladiyat, Baghdad


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12-Jul-2005Office of International Org. for Human Rights gunfire 4

Jamaa, western Baghdad

12-Jul-2005 industrial area car bomb 3 Kirkuk

12-Jul-2005Lt. Col. Amer Mozar, head of Ministry of Interior CSI gunfire 1

Wahda, southern Baghdad

12-Jul-2005 worshippers at Al-Kebir Sunni mosquesuicide bomber 2

Jalowla, 50 mi. SE of Baquba

13-Jul-2005 US Base mortars 1 al-Siniyah, Bayji

13-Jul-2005 Army checkpoint gunfire 1 Sahrayn, Tuz

13-Jul-2005 US Patrolroadside bomb 1 eastern Baghdad

13-Jul-2005 unknowntortured, gunfire 10

bodies found in eastern Baghdad

14-Jul-2005 checkpoint at entrance to Green Zonesuicide car bomber 1

Green Zone entrance, Baghdad

14-Jul-2005 policeman in car gunfire 3 near Kirkuk


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DARTDART Civilian Micro-decisions…

“Government can protect me and I like the government”

– Denounce known insurgents

– Collaborate with govt.– Provide Tips– Join Security Forces

“Government will arrest or kill me if I help the insurgents, but I still like the insurgency”

– Silence

“Government cannot protect me, but I still like the government”

– Silence

“Government cannot touch me and I like the insurgency”

– Join insurgency– Provide sanctuary– Provide materiel

Lev

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Attitude toward Government (Hearts & Minds)

I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY

Support Oppose

Se

cure

Inse

cure

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DARTDART Secure Environment, Support for Govt…

“Government can protect me and I like the government”

– Denounce known insurgents

– Collaborate with govt.– Provide Tips– Join Security Forces

Lev

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rity

(G

ovt

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I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT

Support Oppose

Se

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Inse

cure

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DARTDART Secure Environment, Oppose the Govt…L

evel

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Sec

uri

ty

(Go

vt.

Co

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I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY

Support Oppose

Se

cure

Inse

cure

“Government will arrest or kill me, but I still don’t like the government”

– Silence

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DARTDART Insecure Environment, Support for Govt…L

evel

of

Sec

uri

ty

(Go

vt.

Co

ntr

ol)


I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT

Support Oppose

Se

cure

Inse

cure

“Government cannot protect me, but I still like the government”

– Silence

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DARTDART Insecure Environment, Oppose the Govt…L

evel

of

Sec

uri

ty

(Go

vt.

Co

ntr

ol)


I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY

Support Oppose

Se

cure

Inse

cure

“Government cannot touch me and I like the insurgency”

– Join insurgency– Provide sanctuary– Provide materiel

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DARTDART Control Precedes Collaboration…

• Control precedes collaboration, not the other way around: – “Once local security was achieved, if only partially, real flow of

intelligence began. This is the second point to stress, for, without intelligence, the security forces are blind and cannot possibly pursue the selective tactics demanded by this type of warfare.” (Asprey 571)

• Professor Stathis Kalyvas identifies the mechanisms:– Control deters coercion and intimidation.– Recruitment generates cascades of support because families of

fighters tend to support the side their family member is on.– Control affects people’s belief in the ultimate outcome.– Control makes it easier to monitor the population.

…But control everywhere requires a huge military commitment.

Is this “mission impossible”?

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DARTDARTHow to Do More With Less: Amplifying COIN Force Presence

• Counter-insurgents can use techniques that multiply their effect:– Manipulate civilian perceptions

• Change expectations about who will win.• Psychological operations (eagle-tagging)• Multiply presence by publicizing patrols and raids.

– Selectively target insurgents and their infrastructure

• Demonstrate an ability to discriminately target insurgents.

• Publicize selective captures of insurgents, as it demonstrates a high level of control and convinces people it is safe to collaborate.

– Build political-security-economic-social institutions simultaneously (“oil-spot” approach)

• Prior to moving to the next fight, counter-insurgents need to build civil administration and domestic capacity, which greatly reduces the military requirements of control.

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DARTDART Selective Targeting Requires Civilian Tips…

• Tips and denunciations are how COIN operators know who the insurgents are.. – Anonymous denunciations

protect collaborators, but make it impossible to judge the quality of the tip.

– Public denunciations are more

dangerous, but more credible.

Local tips are the key to COIN identification of insurgents and

their infrastructure.

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DARTDARTSolving the Conundrum:Tips are Essential; but Usually False

• Many denunciations are false – Usually motivated by personal or clan feuds and vendettas.

• Must have a local system for vetting tips that examines motives– Other civilians often know whether tips are credible.– Map and understand existing tribal and clan networks– Enlist cooperation of trusted locals to vet tips– Secret village or tribal committees can evaluate accuracy of

denunciations, as in Vietnam, Greece, and elsewhere…

• Must have system to act on tips– QRF’s, Decentralized decision-making, command and control

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DARTDART …Which has Implications for Intelligence

• Intelligence about insurgency is very local and has a very short half-life

• Captured insurgents must be exploited locally– Rather than arresting insurgents and sending them up to division

headquarters• The number of tips coming in is a good Measure of

Effectiveness because it demonstrates civilian faith in govt.

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DARTDART Good COIN looks like Good Policework.

• The key is the social interaction of police officers with the community.– Permanent presence– Ability to bring in tips– Ability to extract information

from suspects to lead them to new suspects

– The legitimacy that comes with a permanent presence in the community.

• Using tips to make arrests, then using the interviews to generate more tips, to make more arrests, leading to a raid on the ultimate target. …following the chain of clues

– For example, you get a tip about a drug dealer, arrest the drug dealer, turn him to get his distributor, turn the distributor to give up the drug manufacturing house, which you raid with SWAT.

Indigenous forces will be better at these techniques

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DARTDART Micro-Foundations to Macro Strategy…

• Up to this point, we have talked about the nature of insurgent violence at the micro level.

• Now we apply this knowledge to the development of a COIN strategy.

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DARTDART How do unit leaders know where they are?

• Security Indicators: – Low # of Direct Attacks– High # of tips from civilians– High degree of presence– High number of recruits

• Attitude Indicators:– Improved Polls, focus groups – Improved Quality of life measures

• Security Indicators:– High presence/access– Low-Med Direct Attacks– Low-Med # of tips– Low # of Recruits

• Attitude Indicators:– Poor Polls and focus groups

– Poor Quality of Life Measures

• Security Indicators:– Some Direct Attacks, frequent IED attacks– High level of violence that looks like criminality– Low/Sporadic Presence/Access– Low-Med Tips, Mostly Anon

• Attitude Indicators:

– People express support tacitly, but are reluctant

to help openly

• Security Indicators:– Frequent Direct Attacks– Low/Sporadic Presence/Access– Low-No Tips

• Attitude Indicators:– Civs. celebrate insurgent attacks

– Little ability to measure attitude.

Lev

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Support Oppose

Se

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Inse

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Present-day Kurdistan; Most of Baghdad Sadr City, Prior to Chiarelli actions

Nagl’s Al-Anbar; Najaf during Sadr Uprising Fallujah Prior to USMC Assault

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DARTDART How do we win?

Goal: Build Legitimacy

• Tasks:

– Increase Quality of Life

– Build legitimate institutions.

– Create upward trend in economic development

– Transfer to indigenous forces

Goal: Win Hearts and Minds

• Tasks:

– Infrastructure development

– Reward civilians that help

– Work on econ development

– Good policework is key


Goal: Improve Security

• Tasks:

– Combined selective targeting and police work, being careful not to alienate population while establishing security.

– Manipulate perceptions

– Build permanent police presence


• Tasks:

– Security must be reestablished before anything else.

– Kinetic COIN

– Direct action against insurgents

– Heavy patrols and garrisons

Lev

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Support Oppose

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Inse

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DARTDARTEliminate Insurgent Sanctuaries, Gain Control…


• Tasks:

– Security must be reestablished before anything else.

– Kinetic COIN

– Direct action against insurgents

– Heavy patrols and garrisons

Lev

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Support Oppose

Se

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Inse

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Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.

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DARTDARTWin Hearts and Minds and Construct Legitimate Institutions…

Goal: Win Hearts and Minds

• Tasks:

– Infrastructure development

– Reward civilians that help

– Work on econ development

– Good policework


Lev

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(G

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Support Oppose

Se

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Inse

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Secure, Civilians Like Government

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DARTDARTRestore Security without alienating population…


• Tasks:

– Combined selective targeting and police work, being careful not to alienate population while establishing security.

– Manipulate perceptions

– Build permanent police presence

Lev

el o

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ecu

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(G

ovt

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Support Oppose

Se

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Inse

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Secure, Civilians Like Government

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DARTDARTBuild legitimate institutions and transfer power…

Goal: Build Legitimacy

• Tasks:

– Increase Quality of Life

– Build legitimate institutions.

– Create upward trend in economic development


Lev

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rity

(G

ovt

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Support Oppose

Se

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Inse

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DARTDART How to Mess it Up - Security

Then…

Insurgents will move in and fill power vacuum because of existing popular base.

Lev

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Support Oppose

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Inse

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Secure, Civilians Like Government Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.

Not Secure, Civilians Like Govt. Not Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.

If…Govt. takes security for granted anddoes not establish permanent policing.

Then…Insurgents will undermine govt. authority with violence against civilians and infrastructure.

If…Govt. minimizes footprint to regain popular support.

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DARTDART How to Mess it up – Hearts and MindsL

evel

of

Sec

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(Go

vt.

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Support Oppose

Se

cure

Inse

cure

Secure, Civilians Like Government Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.

Not Secure, Civilians Like Govt. Not Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.

If…In attempts to restore security, Govt. is too heavy-handed

If…Civilians don’t see continual improvementand there is no transfer to indigenous authorities

If…Tanks roll in to restore security and then leave without establishing a presence.

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DARTDART COIN Forces Need the Capability to…

1. Selectively target insurgents and their supporters.2. Gather, vet, and act on tips.

• Act on them locally.• Teach officers role of tips and their motivations.• Evaluate the quality of tips before and after acting on them

3. Go back and check on number and effectiveness of past tips.• Maintain networked records to get the big picture of the insurgency.• Maintain records even if informant is confidential.• Interoperability• Protecting security of database

4. Exploit captured insurgents locally.• Interrogate locally.• Promise benefits in exchange for information.• Turn a series of local arrests and interrogations into a raid.

5. Acquire, maintain, and demonstrate control.• Rapidly mass troops on a contested area.

6. Establish and maintain presence.• Patrols – Both mounted and dismounted.• Permanent police stations or garrisons in community.• Combined Action Program – type units.

7. Create perception of government effectiveness.• Show of force• Use of media• Guerilla marketing

8. Establish safe places for civilians to give tips, where civilians go to for other reasons.• Supermarkets, schools, sewing circles, etc.. So that you are not asking collaborators to walk into a police

station.

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DARTDART Questions? (and Suggested Readings)

• Mueller, John. 2000. The banality of “ethnic war.” International Security 25, 1:42-70.

• Gates, Scott. 2002. Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, 1:111-130.

• Johnson, Chalmers A. 1962. Civilian loyalties and guerrilla conflict. World Politics 14,4: 646 – 661.

• Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. The Organization of Rebellion in Africa. Unpublished Paper.

• Herrington, Stuart. Stalking the Vietcong: Inside Operation Phoenix.

• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2001. “New” and “Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? World Politics, 54:1, 99-118.

• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2003. Warfare in Civil Wars. Unpublished Paper.

• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2004. The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars. Security Studies 13:3, 1-31.

• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2004. The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War. Journal of Ethnics 8:1, 97-138.

• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1999. Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria. Rationality and Society 11:3, 243-285.

• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Forthcoming. Cambridge University Press.

• Scott, James C. Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. 1976. Yale University.

• Ben-Ze’ev, Efrat. 2002. The Palestinian Village of Ijzim During the 1948 War: Forming an Anthropological History Through Villagers Accounts and ArmyDocuments. History and Anthropology 13, 1:13-30.

• Deininger Claus. 2003. Causes and Consequences of Civil Strife. Microlevel Evidence from Uganda. Unpublished Paper.

• Loizos, Peter. 1988. Intercommunal Killing in Cyprus. Man, 23:639-653.

• Lucas, Colin. 1983. Themes in Southern Violence After 9 Thermidor. In Gwynne Lewis and Colin Lucas (eds), Beyond the Terror: Essays in French Regional and Social History, 1794-1815. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 152-194.

• Paul, Benjamin D. and William J. Demarest. 1988. The Operation of a Death Squad in San Pedro la Laguna. In Robert M. Carmack (ed.), Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 119-154.

• Schroeder, Michael J. 1996. Horse Thieves to Rebels to Dogs: Political Gang Violence and the State in the Western Segovias, Nicaragua, in the Time of Sandino, 1926-1934. Journal of Latin American Studies 28, 2:383-434.

• Bax, Mart. 2000. Warlords, Priests and the Politics of Ethnic Cleansing: A Case Study from Rural Bosnia Hercegovina. Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, 1:16-36.

• Aschenbrenner, Stanley. 1987. The Civil War from the Perspective of a Messenian Village. In Lars Baerentzen, J.O. Iatrides, and O.L. Smith (eds.), Studies on the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945-9. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 105-125.

• Asprey, Robert. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. William Morrow & Company. 1994.

36

DARTDART

BACKUP

37

DARTDARTWhat Capabilities do you need for each of these tasks?

DoD in a Supporting Role• Indigenous forces• Police / Law Enforcement• USAID, State, Rest of Inter-

Agency• Civil Affairs

DoD in a Supporting Role• USAID• State• Rest of Inter-Agency• Indigenous forces• Civil Affairs

DoD is primary actor• Indigenous Security Forces• DoD Military Forces• Civil Affairs• Police / Law Enforcement

DoD is primary actor• DoD Military Forces• Indigenous Security ForcesL

evel

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Support Oppose

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38

DARTDART Foreign Involvement in Insurgency

• Historically: Most insurgencies have had significant external support, especially insurgencies during the Cold War.– The COMINTERN brought together insurgent movements and

coordinated them around the globe.

• Islamist insurgencies have attracted strong diaspora support, as did many Communist insurgencies.– Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan during Soviet invasion.– In Afghanistan, the Arab fighters were ineffectual despite getting

most of the money from Pakistani ISI. Local commanders were able to do much more damage to the Soviet occupation

– Afghan commanders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud (the Lion of Panjshir) often derided the quality and effectiveness of the Arab fighters.

39

DARTDART What About Foreign Jihadis in Iraq?

• Most suicide bombers are foreigners, although this is beginning to change.

• These non-Iraqi Arabs require local assistance and knowledge to be effective at all.

– A Saudi in Baghdad is like an American in London: their clothes, their accent, their dialect, and their lack of local knowledge give them away to local Iraqis.

• Local insurgent commanders will use suicidal foreigners like any other weapon. They are especially useful against hard targets, and for situations where it is better to blame the carnage on a foreigner.

• Zarqawi has had time to build a network inside Iraq since before the war, so he is less visible. His alliance to Bin Laden came at the price of putting off his quest to foment a civil war in favor of attacking Americans and their allies.

40

DARTDART and Perceptions Become Reality…

• For the Government: – If civilians see government patrols out in force, they perceive the

government as being able to protect them, and they feel safe to denounce insurgents and provide tips. This allows the government forces to make progress against the insurgents, turning the perception of control into reality.

• Every effort must be taken to multiply presence through psychological and information operations, and the constant publicizing of patrols, raids, captures, and other successes.

• For the Insurgents:– Insurgent activity that creates the perception of a strong

presence can undermine civilians’ faith in the government’s ability to protect them. This reduces cooperation with the government, resulting in greater freedom of action for the insurgents and eventually greater control.

dartdart defense adaptive red team micro-foundations of insurgent violence: implications for iraq...

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