darwall - two kinds of respect

7/30/2019 Darwall - Two Kinds of Respect

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Two Kinds of Respect*

StephenL. DarwallUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

IAnappeal o respectas something o which all persons re entitledmarksmuchrecent hought nmoral opics.Theappeals commonboth nwritingson generalmoraltheoryand in workon particularmoralproblems.Forexample, uch writersas JohnRawls,BernardWilliams,David Gauthier,R. S. Downie, and ElizabethTelfer refer to the respectwhich is due allpersons, ither n arguing ororin articulating ariousmoralprinciples.'The idea is not particularly ew, sinceone of the keystones f Kant's thicsis the view that respect or the moral aw entails reatingpersons oneselfincluded) lwaysas ends nthemselves ndnever implyasmeans.PreciselywhatKantmeant,orshouldhavemeant,bythis s a matterof somecontro-versy,but it is generally hought hatthesameclaim sexpressednsayingthatonemustrespectpersons s such.2Theappealto respectalso figures n much recentdiscussion f morespecificmoralproblems uchasracismorsexism.Forexample,t isarguedthat variouswaysof regarding nd behaving owardothers,and socialar-rangementswhichencouragehoseways,are inconsistentwiththerespectto whichall persons reentitled.

* I am indebted to severalof my colleagues at Chapel Hill, to Lawrence CrockerandStephen Hudson, and to the editor of Ethics for help with this essay.1. John Rawls,A Theory of Justice (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity Press,1971); Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," in Moral Concepts, ed. Joel Feinberg(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 158-61; David Gauthier, Practical Reasoning(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 119-20; R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer,Respect for Persons (London:Allen &Unwin, 1969).2. Kant,Foundations of the Metaphysicsof Morals,trans.L. W. Beck(Indianapolis:Bobbs-MerrillCo., 1959), hereinafter FMM. See especially p. 46 (Ak. p. 428), where Kantclaims that "rationalbeings are designated persons because their nature indicates that theyare ends in themselves."See also The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, trans.JamesEl-lington (Indianapolis:Bobbs-MerrillCo., 1964), pp. 96-98, 112-14, 130-33. It is interestingto observe in this connection the ratherdifferent use that various writers have made of theKantian principle. Both Rawls and Robert Nozick invoke it in support of quite differentsubstantive onceptionsof justice; ee Rawls,passim;and Nozick,Anarchy,State, and Utopia(New York:BasicBooks,1974), p. 32.

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37 Two Kinds of RespectThe claim that all personsareentitled to respect just by virtue of beingpersonsmay not seem wholly unproblematic,however. How could respectbe something which is due to all persons?Do we not also think that persons

can either deserve or fail to deserve ourrespect?Is the moralistwho claimsthat all personsare entitled to respect advocating that we give up this idea?Questionsof this sort should call into question justwhat respect itself is.Other questionsabout respect appear as soon as one starts to press.Isrespect a single kind of attitude? Is it primarily,or even solely, a moral at-titude? Are persons the only sort of thing to which respect is appropriate?Everyone at leastunderstandshe coach who saysthat his team mustrespectthe reboundingstrengthof the opposingteam's front line. No moral attitudeis involved here. Nor may personsbe respected only aspersons.Frankmaybe highly respected as a weaver, Sarahas a doctor.II

Severalwriters have in fact given explicitattention to what constitutesrespect for persons. On most such accounts it is a willingness to take intoconsideration ne or anotheraspectof personswhen one'sactionsaffect them.Candidatesfor the relevantaspectsof personswhich are owed our consid-eration are their wants,3their point of view on a particular situation,4andthe like. These accountsarenotintendedasgeneralaccountsof respect.Theyareonly meant to give some more specific content to what it is that personsare entitled to by virtueof being persons.One notable exception to such accounts is a recent attempt by CarlCranorto give a general account of respect.5Cranor holds respect to be acomplex relationshipwhich obtainsbetween two persons(the respecterandthe respected), ome characteristicthebasisof respect),and some evaluativepointof view (fromwhich the person s respected).Thisrelationship onsists,roughly, n the respecter's udgingthat the person'shavingthe characteristicis a good thing (from the relevantpoint of view), hisappreciating why it isa good thing,and hisbeing disposedto do what is appropriate o the person'shaving that characteristic.III

One problemthat infects each of the accounts mentioned as a generaltheoryof respect is that each fails to distinguishtwo rather different waysin which persons may be the objectof respect. Or, as I am inclined to say,two ratherdifferentkindsof attitudewhich are bothreferredtoby the term

3. Gauthier, p. 119; and Downie and Telfer, p. 29.4. Williams, p. 159;and Rawls, p. 337.5. CarlCranor,"Towarda Theory of Respect for Persons,"AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly 12 (October 1975): 303-19.



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38 Ethicsrespect.'6 The two different ways in which a person may be respectedprovide but one instanceof a more generaldifference between twoattitudeswhich are both termed respect. Crudely put the difference is this.There is a kind of respect which can have any of a numberof different

sortsof things asitsobjectand which consists,most generally, n a dispositionto weigh appropriatelyin one's deliberationssome feature of the thing inquestion and to act accordingly. The law, someone's feelings, andsocial in-stitutionswith theirpositionsand roles areexamplesof thingswhich can bethe object of this sortof respect. Since thiskind of respect consists n givingappropriateconsiderationor recognition to some feature of its object indeliberating about what to do, I shall call it recognition respect.Personscan be the objectof recognition respect. Indeed, it is just thissort of respectwhich is saidto be owed to all persons.To say that personsassuchare entitledto respect s to say thatthey are entitled to have otherpersonstake seriouslyand weigh appropriatelythe fact that they are persons n de-liberating about what to do.'Such respect is recognition respect;but whatit requiresas appropriate s not a matter of general agreement, for this is justthe questionof what our moralobligationsor duties to otherpersonsconsistin. The crucial point is that to conceive of all persons as entitled to respectis to have some conception of what sort of considerationthe fact of being aperson requires.A person may not only be the objectof recognition respectas a person.As Erving Goffman has shown in great detail, human beings play variousroles,or presentvarious"selves,"both in their interactionswith others andin private before imagined audiences.7 Others may or may not respondappropriately o the presentedself. To fail to takeseriously he personas thepresented self in one's responsesto the person is to fail to give the personrecognition espectasthatpresented elf orin that role.It is thissortof respectto which RodneyDangerfieldreferswhen he bemoans the fact that neitherhis son nor his wife takes him seriouslyas a father or a husband with the

complaint, "I can't get no respect."There is another attitude which differs importantly from recognitionrespectbut which we likewise refer to by the term 'respect.'Unlike recog-nition respect,its exclusiveobjectsare personsor features which are held tomanifest their excellence as personsor asengaged in some specific pursuit.For example, one may have such respect for someone's integrity, forsomeone'sgood qualitieson the whole, or for someoneas a musician. Suchrespect, hen, consistsn an attitudeof positiveappraisalof thatpersoneitheras a personor as engaged in some particularpursuit. Accordingly the ap-propriategroundforsuchrespectis that the personhas manifested charac-

6. Though I prefer to put the point in this way, nothing crucial hangson it. I couldas well speak throughout of two different ways in which persons may be the object of re-spect.7. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in EverydayLife (GardenCity, N.Y.:Doubleday &Co., 1959).



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39 Two Kinds of Respectteristics which make him deserving of such positive appraisal. I shall laterargue that the appropriatecharacteristicsare thosewhich are, or are basedon, features of a person which we attribute to his character.Because this sort of respect consists n a positiveappraisalof a person,or his qualities, I shall call it appraisal respect. Unlike recognition respect,one may have appraisalrespectfor someonewithout having any particularconception of just what behaviorfrom oneself would be required or madeappropriate by that person's having the features meriting such respect.Appraisalrespect is the positive appraisalitself. It is like esteem or a highregard for someone, although,as I shall argue later,the appropriategroundsfor appraisal respect are not so broadly based as those of these latter atti-tudes.

Typically, when we speak of someone asmeriting or deserving our re-spect, it is appraisalrespectthat we have in mind. We mean that the personis such as to merit our positiveappraisalon the appropriategrounds.It is truethat in order to indicate or express such respect, certain behavior from uswill be appropriate. But unlike recognition respect,appraisal respect doesnot itself consist in that behavior or in the judgment that is appropriate.Rather, it consists n the appraisal tself.In giving this characterizationof appraisalrespect, it would seem thatI am giving no role to feelings of respect. Justas one may be said to havefeelingsof admiration o onemaybe said to feel respect oranother.AlthoughI won't pursue this point further, I suggest that such feelings may be un-derstoodas feelings which a personwould explainby referringto his or herpositive appraisal of their object. Just as we understandthe feeling of fearto be that which is explained by one's belief in the presenceof danger,so thefeeling of respectfora person is the one which is occasionedby the positiveappraisalwhich constitutesappraisal respect for that person.8My project n this paperis to developthe initial distinctionwhichI havedrawnbetween recognition and appraisalrespect into a more detailed andspecific accountof each. These accounts will not merely be of intrinsicin-terest. Ultimately I will use them to illuminate the puzzles with which thispaper began and to understandthe idea of self-respect.IV

The most general characterizationwhich I have given of recognitionrespectis that it is a dispositionto weigh appropriatelysome feature or factin one'sdeliberations.Strictly speaking,the objectof recognition respectisa fact. And recognition respectfor that fact consistsin giving it the properweightin deliberation.Thusto haverecognitionrespectforpersons s to giveproper weight to the fact that they are persons.One can have recognition respect for someone'sfeelings, for the law,forthe judge (ina legal proceeding),fornature,and soon. In each casesuch

8. For a similaraccount of the moral sentiments see Rawls,pp. 481-82.



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40 Ethicsrespect consistsin giving the appropriaterecognitionto a fact in one'sde-liberationsabout how to act. It is to considerappropriately,respectively, thefact thata personfeels a certainway, thatsuch and such is the law, that thepersonone isaddressings the judge,that the objectone is confronting s partof nature, and so forth. To respect somethingin this way is justto regarditas somethingto be reckoned with (in the appropriate way) and to act ac-cordingly.On this very general notion of recognition respect, any fact which issomething that one ought to take into account in deliberationis an appro-priate object.Asit stands,then, the notionhassomewhat wider applicationthan what we would ordinarilyunderstand srespect,even of the recognitionsort.

One rathernarrowernotion of recognition respect conceives of it asessentially a moral attitude. That is, some fact or feature is an appropriateobjectof respect if inappropriateconsiderationor weighing of that fact orfeature would result n behavior hatis morallywrong. To respectsomethingis thus to regard it as requiring restrictionson the moral acceptability ofactions connected with it. And crucially, it is to regardsuch a restrictionasnot incidental,but asarising becauseof the feature or fact itself. One is notfree, from a moral point of view, to act as one pleases in matters whichconcernsomething which is an appropriateobjectof moralrecognitionre-spect. To have such respectfor the law, say, is to be disposed to regardthefact that something is the law as restrictingthe class of actions that wouldbe morally permissible. t is plainlythisnotion which we have in mind whenwe speakof respectfor personsas a moralrequirement.Accordingly,whenI speak of recognitionrespectbelow,I shall be referringspecificallyto moralrecognitionrespect.There are attitudes similarto moral recognitionrespect, and referredto as respect, but which differ importantly.A boxer talks of having respectfor his opponent'sleft hook and an adventurer of respecting the rapidsofthe Colorado.Neither regardsthe range of morally permissible actions asrestrictedby the thingsin question.Rathereach refers to somethingwhichhe fails to ,considerappropriatelyat his peril. What is restricted here is theclass of prudentactions. Thusa careful crookwho hasno moralrecognitionrespect for the law per se may stillbe said to have this sort of respect for thepower that the law can wield. Here again we have the idea that the objectof respect (orsome feature or fact regarding it) is such that the class of "eli-gible"actionsis restricted.But in this case the restriction s not a moral buta prudential one. Some people hesitate to use the word 'respect' whenspeakingof such cases.That makesno difference.All that matters s thatweunderstandwhat the attitude comes to and thus how it is like and unlikemoralrecognitionrespect.Aswe are understandingrecognitionrespect it includes a componentof regard.To have recognitionrespect for something is to regardthat factas itself placing restrictionson what it is permissible for one to do. It is ofcoursetrue that one can "be respectful"of somethingwithout having any



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41 Two Kinds of Respectrespect or it (even of a recognitional ort).This will be the case if one behavesas one who does have respect would have behaved,but out of motivesotherthanrespect. For example, a personparticipating n a legal proceeding whoin fact has no respect for the judge (i.e., for the position he occupies) maytake great pains to be respectful in order to avoid a citation for contempt.Such a personwill restricthis behavior owardthe judgein ways appropriateto the role that he plays. But his reason for so doing is not that the mere factof being the judgeis itselfdeservingof consideration,but that the possibilityof a contempt citation calls for caution.Importantly,he sortof regard nvolved n recognition espect sa regardfor a fact or feature as having some weight in deliberations about how oneis to act. This is ratherdifferent from the sort of regard nvolvedin appraisalrespect.V

The lattersortof respectis a positive appraisalof a personor his char-acter-related eatures. As such it does not essentially nvolve any conceptionof how one's behavior towardthat personis appropriatelyrestricted.I have distinguished ppraisal espect or persons udged as persons romappraisal espectforpersonsassessedn morespecific pursuits.As I shall aterarguein moredetail,those excellences of personswhich are the appropriategrounds or appraisalrespectfor a personas such are those which we delimitasconstitutingcharacter.I shall also have something more specific to say byway of a rudimentaryaccount of character.Appraisalrespect for a person as such is perhaps a paradigm of whatpeoplehavein mind when they speakof moralattitudes.On the otherhand,appraisalrespect for persons udgedin more particularpursuitsneed not be.The particularvirtuesor excellences of a particular pursuit may either beirrelevantor even bear negativelyon an overallappraisal f the person udgedas a person.To be highly respectedasa tennisplayer,forexample,one mustdemonstrateexcellence in tennisplaying which is not primarilyexcellenceof character.At the very least one must be a goodtennisplayerand thatwillinvolve,having abilities which are in themselves irrelevant to an appraisalof the tennis player as a person.Even in such cases, however, respect for aperson assessedin a particular pursuitseems to depend on features of hischaracter(orhis excellence as a person)in at least two ways.To begin with, somebody may be an excellent tennis player withoutbeinga highly respectedone. He may be widelyacclaimed asone of the bestplayers n the world and not be widely respectedby hisfellows-though theymay (in theextendedrecognition ense)respecthis returnof serve,hisviciousbackhand,and so on. Human pursuitswithin which a person may earn re-spectseem to involve some set of standardsorappropriate ndinappropriatebehaviorwithin that pursuit.In some professionsthis may be expresslyar-ticulated in a "code of ethics." In others it will be a more or less informalunderstanding,uch as that of "honoramongthieves."To earnrespectwithinsucha pursuit t is not enoughto exercisethe skillswhich define the pursuit.



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42 EthicsOne must also demonstrate some commitment to the (evolving) standardsof the profession or pursuit.Even in a game like tennis one can lose the respect of otherplayers bypaying no attention to such standards of behavior. If a player constantlyheckles his opponent, disputes every close call to throw off his opponent'sconcentration, r laughswhen his opponentmissesshots, hen even if his skillis such that he would be capableof beating everyoneelse withoutsuch tactics,he is not likely to be respected as a tennis player. Thus, insofaras respectwithin such a pursuit will depend on an appraisalof the participant fromthe perspective of whatever standardsare held to be appropriateto thepursuit,such respect will depend on a judgment to which excellences ofcharacterarethoughtrelevant.Note thatexactlywhataspectof the person'scharacter s thought to be relevantin this instance is hisrecognition respect(or lack of it) for the standardsof the pursuit.Second,even when we attend to those featuresof a personwhich arethe appropriateexcellences of a particular pursuitand involve no explicitreferenceto featuresof character, he excellencesmust be thought to dependin some way or other on features of character.The point here is that purely"natural" capacities and behavior manifesting them are not appropriateobjectsof appraisalrespect, although perhapsof recognition respect, evenin the context of a fairly narrowly defined human pursuit.9If someone iscapableof somefeat (which may be widely admired)solely by virtueof, say,his height, then neither this feat nor the person's ability to perform it areappropriate bjectsof respect-just as one cannotrespectan ant for itsabilityto carry comparatively arge objects ong distances o the anthill,though onemay be appropriatelyamazed.This is becauseit is almost never the case that humanaccomplishmentsare a resultof simple natural ability. Talentsand capacitiesof varioussortsareprerequisites or variousaccomplishments,but almostinvariablytalentsmust be developed,disciplined,andexercised n the face of variousobstacles,and this will call into play featuresof personswhich we identify as partoftheir character.Which features of persons are properly regarded as features of theircharactersand hence as appropriate groundsfor appraisal respect? Beingresoluteand being honest are charactertraits.Being prone to sneeze in thepresenceof pepper is not. But there are difficult cases as well. How aboutbeing irascible? Or being good natured?Or prudent? Discerning? Sensi-tive?

The notionof character(whetherof personsor other things)seems toinvolve the idea of relatively long-term dispositions.But not all long-termdispositionsof personsare held to be parts of their characters.The questionthen becomes, which such dispositionsconstitute character?I have suggested that those features of personswhich we delimit asconstitutingcharacterarethosewhich we thinkrelevantin appraising hem9. On this point see Cranor,p. 312.



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43 Two Kinds of Respectas persons.Furthermore,those features of personswhich form the basisofappraisalrespect seem to be those which belong to them as moralagents.This much Kantianism s, I think, at the core of the conceptionof the personwhich we generally hold to be relevant to appraisalrespect. If this is true,then theremay be otherfeaturesof human beings,forexample theircapacityforaffective sympathy,which are not encapsulated n the conceptionof thepersonwhich is relevant o appraisal espect.As Kantwrote,"Rationalbeingsare designated 'persons'because their nature indicates that they are endsin themselves."''0Thosefeatures of personswhich areappropriategroundsfor appraisal espectaretheirfeaturesas agents-as beingscapable of actingon maxims,and hence, forreasons. Thus,theremaywell be characteristicsof human beings which are regardedas human excellences but which arenot appropriategrounds orappraisal espect. Forexample, warmth in one'sdealings with otherhumanbeingsis regardedasan excellenceof humanity,but may be irrelevant n the appraisalof personswhich constitutesappraisalrespect. Compare lack of warmth or being stiff in one's relationsto othersto deliberate cruelty as a ground for failing to have appraisalrespect forsomeone. Of course, lackof personalwarmth is an appropriategroundforfailing to have appraisalrespectforsomeone to the extent that we conceivesuch a lack to be the resultof insufficient effort on the person'spart. Butinsofaras we soconceive it, we regard it asa lack in the person'sagency: anunwillingnessto do what is necessaryto treat otherswarmly.If the appropriate onceptionof the personwhich isrelevant oappraisalrespectis that of a moralagent, then one would expect ournotion of char-acter to be likewise tied to such a conception.I think that this is indeed thecase. Thosedispositionswhich constitute character(at least as it is relevantto appraisalrespect) are dispositions o act for certainreasons, hatis, to act,and in acting to have certain reasonsfor acting. For example, honesty is adispositiono do whatone takestobe honestat leastpartlyfor the reason hatit is what honestyrequires. Aristotle's heoryof virtue and Kant'stheoryofthe moral worthof actions both stress hat what is appropriateto the assess-ment of persons s notmerelywhatthey do, butasimportantly, heirreasonsfor doing it.12As it stands he conceptionof characteras constitutedby ourdispositionsto act for particular reasons s inadequate. This account capturessuchpar-

10. FMM, p. 46.11. ThusKant:"Onlya rationalbeinghasthe capacityof actingaccordingo theconception f laws, .e.,accordingoprinciples"FMM,p.29).12. Aristotlergueshatcharactersconstitutedy ourdispositionsochoose,wherethenotionof choice sheldtoinvolve heideaof pickinganalternative nsomegrounds rothersee, .g.,Nicomacheanthics,1112a15, ndBookVI,chaps. 2-13).Especiallyelevanthere sAristotle'sistinctionetweena "naturalisposition"ovirtuous ualities ndvirtue"inthestrict ense"which nvolves self-reflective abitof actingon the"right ule" Ni-comachean thics,1144bl-28).Kant'samous iscussionf thegoodwilland hemoralworthof actionsasgroundedn the"principle f thewill," .e., theagent's eason oracting, s inthefirstsectionof FMM.



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44 Ethicsticular character raitsas honesty, fairness,kindness,and the like. But thereareotherdispositionsof personswhich we hold to be partof theircharacter,and thus relevantto appraisalrespect,but which are not best thoughtof asdispositionsto act for particularreasons.For example, we may fail to haveappraisalrespect for someone because we regard him to be weak of will ornot sufficiently resolute. What is referred to here is not a dispositionto actfor any particular reason,but ratherthe higher-level dispositionto act onwhat one takes to be the best reasonswhateverthey may be. Thus,the con-ception of characterwhich is relevant to appraisal respect includes bothrathermore specific dispositions o act for certainreasonsand the higher-leveldispositionto do that which one takes to be supported by the best reasons.Two final points need to be made about appraisal respect. First, notevery positive attitude towarda personon the groundof his or hercharacteramountsto appraisalrespect for that person.If I want to pull a bank heistandam lookingforpartners, may lookfor someone who hasno reservationsaboutstealing (at least from banks)and who can be counted on to threatenviolentaction and, if need be, carryit out. Thus,I may have a favorable at-titude toward such a person on the ground that he has those particularcharacter raits.But my havingthat attitude toward such a person s not thesame thing as my having appraisal respect for him for having those traits.This attitude fails of being appraisalrespectin that my having it toward theperson is conditionalon those traitsbeing such asto make him serve a par-ticular purpose that I happen to have-heisting the bank. In order for theattitude toward the trait, or towardthe personfor having it, to constituteappraisalrespectit must notbe thusconditionalon such an interest or pur-pose. We may employ some Kantianterminologyhere and say that it mustbe a categoricalttitude,onewhichis unconditional n the fact that the traitsin question happen to serve some particular purpose or interest ofmine.13

The secondpoint is that appraisalrespectis somethingwhich one mayhaveor fail to haveforsomeone,andit isan attitudewhichadmitsof degree.Onemay respectsomeonemorethansomeoneelse.Whenwe speakof havingor not having respectfor someone what is implied is an appraisalof him assatisfactorywith respect to the appropriategrounds. Many attitudes havethis sort of structure.We speak alternativelyof liking and not liking thingsas well as of liking something more than something else.To sum up: Appraisal respect is an attitude of positive appraisalof apersoneitherjudgedas a personoras engagedin some morespecific pursuit.In the first case, the appropriategroundsare features of the person'schar-

13. See Kant'sdistinctionbetween hypothetical and categorical mperatives n FMM,sec. 2. This idea of unconditionalityon one's interests (i.e., on the fact that they are one'sin-terests) is involved in Hume's notion of "moral sense"and Butler'snotion of the "principleof reflection." David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1967), p. 472; JosephButler,Sermons (New York:Liberal ArtsPress,1950), p. 27.



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45 Two Kinds of Respectacter: dispositionsto act for particularreasonsor a higher-level dispositionto act for the best reasons.In the second case, though featuresof characterdo not exhaust the appropriate grounds for appraisal respect, some suchcharacter traits will be relevant (recognitionrespect for the standardsof aparticularpursuit).Also,the other featureswhich constitutethe appropriateexcellences of the pursuitmust be related to traits of characterin the wayspecified. In both cases, the positiveappraisalof the person,and of his traits,must be categorical.It cannot depend on the fact that the person, becauseof his traits,servesan interest or purposeof one's own.Appraisalrespect brings into focus the idea of virtue. Much of recentmoral philosophy has been exclusively concerned with the assessment ofactionsor social nstitutions.However,an accountof the appropriate roundsfor appraising persons,the virtues,is also a proper concern of moral philo-sophers.VI

Sinceappraisalrespectand recognitionrespect may both have persons,conceived of as such, as their objects,it is important to distinguishthem asattitudes.To have recognition respect for someone as a personis to give appro-priateweight to the fact that he or sheis a personby being willingto constrainone's behavior n ways requiredby that fact. Thus,it is to recognitionrespectfor personsthat Kantrefers when he writes,"Such a being is thus an objectof respectand, so far, restrictsall (arbitrary) hoice."14 Recognitionrespectfor persons, then, is identical with recognition respect for the moral re-quirementsthat are placed on one by the existence of other persons.This is ratherdifferentfromhavingan attitudeof appraisalrespectforsomeone as a person.The latteris a positiveappraisalof an individual madewith regardto those features which are excellences of persons.As such, itis not owed to everyone, for it may or may not be merited. When it is, whatis merited is justthe positive appraisal tself.To bringout the difference between recognitionrespectand appraisalrespect for personsas such, consider the different ways in which the twoattitudesmay be said to admit of degree.When one person s said to be morehighly respectedas a personthan someoneelse, the attitude involved is ap-

14. FMM, p. 428, emphasisadded. Cranor s by no means alone in confusing recog-nition respectwith appraisalrespect.HardyJonesfaults Kant's dentificationof respectforpersonswith being disposedto treat personsas ends in themselveson the groundsthat:"Torespecta judgeor a parent snot merelyto behavein specificdeferential andthus 'respectful')ways. It is also to have a certain attitude toward them and to regardthem in certain ways.'To respect a person'is often properlyused to mean 'to think well of him' " (HardyJones,Kant's Principle of Personality [Madison:University of Wisconsin Press, 1971], p. 75). Ifwe interpret Kant as identifying recognitionrespect for personsas such with a willingnessto treat personsas ends in themselvesno such problem arises. See also Downie and Telfer,p. 18, for anotherinstanceof this confusion.



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46 Ethicspraisalrespect. One's appraisalof a person, considered as a person, may behigherthan of someoneelse.Consider he instruction o ordera list of personsaccordingto one'srespect for them. The natural way to respond would beto rank the personsin the light of one's appraisalof them as persons.

What sense can be given, however, to degrees of recognition respect?For example, a person might think that we should have more respect forpeople'sfeelings than for social conventions.Presumablywhat such a personthinks is that we ought to weigh other people's feelings more heavily thanwe do considerationsof social convention. Insofar as we can give a sensetohaving more recognition respect for one thing than another it involves adispositionto take certain considerations as more weighty than others indeciding how to act. There is, of course,a kind of appraisalinvolved here.Butit is not an appraisalof a personas such,but of the weight that some factor feature ought to have in one's deliberations about what to do, and if allpersons as such should be treated equally, there can be no degrees of rec-ognition respectfor them, althoughone may be a greater or lesserrespecterof persons.The confusion between appraisal respect and recognition respect forpersonsas such infects the account of respect for persons given by Cranor.He intendshisaccountto capturethe sortof respectthatit is claimed personsare entitled toby virtue of being persons.Partof his account is the claim thatfor one personto have respectforanotherthere must be some characteristicthat the respected person is believed to have, and the possessionof whichis held to be a good thing from some point of view. Cranor fleshes this outwith the followingremarks: Inrespectinga personwe aregivinghim creditfor having some trait or characteristic . . . the believed characteristic invirtue of which one respectsa personmustbe believed to be a good-makingcharacteristic of persons or contingently connected to a good-makingcharacteristicof them."15These remarksapply only to appraisalrespect for persons.When oneis appraisingan individualasa person,those features which merit a positiveappraisalaregood-makingcharacteristics f persons.Or to use the languageof Cranor's therremark, heyareto hiscredit as a person.Onthe otherhand,to haverecognitionrespectfora personas such is not necessarily o give himcredit for anything in particular,for in having recognition respect for apersonas suchwe are not appraisinghim orher asa personat all. Ratherweare judgingthat the fact that he or she is a person places moral constraintson our behavior.The distinctionbetween appraisalrespectand recognition respectforpersonsenables us to see that there is no puzzle at all in thinkingboth thatall personsare entitled to respect just by virtue of their being personsandthatpersonsaredeservingof more or lessrespect by virtueof theirpersonalcharacteristics.Though t is important o distinguishbetween these two kindsof respect,

15. Cranor, p. 312.



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47 Two Kinds of Respectthere are connectionsbetween them. I will mention two in particular.First,there will be connections between the groundsof one's appraisalrespect,or lack of it, for particularpersons and the considerationswhich one takesas appropriateobjectsof recognitionrespect.Forexample,if one judges thatsomeone is not worthy of (appraisal)respectbecause he is dishonest, one iscommittedto recognitionrespectfor considerations f honesty.Our appraisalof personsdependson whetherthey show theappropriate ecognitionrespectfor considerationswhich merit it. The account of characterbrings this out.Second,the only beings whoare appropriateobjectsof appraisalrespect arethose who arecapable of actingfor reasonsand hence capableof conceivingof variousfactsas meritingmore or less consideration n deliberation.Onceagain, so much is entailed by the account of character.Becauseof the par-ticular sortsof reasonswhich are relevant to our assessmentof character,wemay say thatthe only beingswho are appropriate bjectsof appraisal espectare those who are themselvescapableof recognitionrespect,that is, of actingdeliberately.VII

Both recognition respect for personsas such and appraisalrespect foran individual as a personare attitudes which one can bear to oneself. Ac-cordingly, these two kinds of self-respectmust be distinguished.Considerthe following remark of VirginiaHeld's: "Forpersonsto ac-quiesce in the avoidable denial of their own rightsis to lack self-respect."''6What 'self-respect' efersto here is recognitionrespect or oneselfas a person.The passageis obviously false when we take it to refer to appraisalrespectfor oneself as a person. To acquiesce in the avoidabledenial of one's rightsis to fail to respect one's rights as a person.Exactly what such self-respectrequiresdependson what moral requirementsareplacedon one by the factthat one is a person.It is recognition elf-respect o which we appealin suchphrasesas "haveyou no self-respect?"hoping therebyto guide behavior.This is not a matterof self-appraisal ut a call to recognizethe rightsandresponsibilitiesf beinga person.As a personcapableof recognitionrespect,one is liable to reflectiveappraisalof one's own behavior,and as such has a stake in it-that stakebeing appraisal self-respector self-contempt.One'sbehaviorcan expressa lack of recognition elf-respectn differentways. It may have a negative effect on one'sability to continue to functionasa person.Such behavioris self-destructive,and therefore manifestsa lack

of appropriate egardforoneselfas a person.If notactuallyself-destructive,behaviormay be degradingin expressinga conceptionof oneself as some-thing lessthan a person,a being with a certainmoralstatus ordignity. Sub-mittingto indignities,playingthe fool, not caringabout whetherone is taken

16. VirginiaHeld, "ReasonableProgressand Self-Respect,"Monist 57 (January1973):22.



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48 Ethicsseriously and being content to be treated as the plaything of others may ormay not be actuallyself-destructivebut neverthelessmanifests lack of self-respect.'7 Exactly what behavior is so regarded depends both on the ap-propriateconception of personsand on what behaviors are taken to expressthis conception or the lack of it. Certainlythe latter is something which canvary with society, convention, and context.One may give adequate recognitionto the fact that one is a person andstill have a rather low opinionof oneself as a person. People appraisethem-selves as persons,and the attitude which resultsfrom a positive appraisal sappraisal self-respect. Like appraisal respect generally, the appropriategroundsfor appraisalself-respectare those excellences of personswhich wedelimit as constituting character.It is important, herefore, o distinguishappraisal elf-respect rom otherattitudesof appraisalwhich one can bearto oneself. One such attitude s thatwhich we normallyrefer to as self-esteem.18Thosefeaturesof a personwhichform the basis for his self-esteem or lack of it are by no means limited tocharacter raits,but include any featuresuch that one is pleasedordowncastby a belief that one hasor lacks it. One'sself-esteem may suffer from a lowopinion of, for example, one'sappearance, temperament, wit, physical ca-pacities,and so forth.One cannotalwaysbe what one would wish to be, andone's opinion of oneself may suffer. Sucha failing by itself doesnot give riseto lack of appraisal self-respect, although it might suffer if one attributedthe failing to a lack of will, an inability obringoneself to do what onewantedmost to do. So farforththe failingwouldbe regardedasarising rom a defectin one's characterand not solely from, for example, a lack of physical abili-ty. The self-appraisalwhich constitutes elf-respect s of oneselfasa person,a being with a will who acts for reasons.The connectionbetweenrespectandagency is striking. Recognition respect consists in being disposed to takecertain considerations eriouslyas reasons oractingor forbearing o act. Onthe otherhand, appraisalrespectconsists n an appraisalof a personon thebasisof featureswhich arepart of, orare basedon, hisor her character.Andwe conceive a person'scharacter to consistin dispositionsto act for certain

17. Kant'swritingson self-respectare especially useful here; see Lectures on Ethics(New York:Harper& Row, 1963), pp. 118-19. The place of respectingone's own autonomyis especially importantin the Kantian dea of self-respect.Forsome illuminatingcommentsaboutservilityand itsrelationto a recognitionof oneselfasa person,see ThomasE. Hill, Jr.,"Servilityand Self-Respect,"Monist 57 (January1973):87-104.18. To somedegree Rawls'sremarkson self-respect n A Theoryof Justice sufferfroma confusionbetweenself-respectandself-esteem. Thispointisdevelopedin LarryL. Thomas,"Moralityand Our Self-Concept,"forthcoming in the Journal of Value Inquiry.) Rawls'sexplicit account of self-respect (p. 440) is very close to my notion of appraisalself-respect.In other places,however, it seems to be the more broadlybasedattitude of self-esteem thathe hasin mind.Thisis especiallyclearin hisremarkson the connectionbetweennatural hameand self-respect (p. 444). It is an interestingquestion to what extent this conflation affectshis accountof self-respectas a primarygood and his argumentfor the proposedprinciplesof justice.



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49 Two Kinds of Respectsortsof reasons ogether with the higher orderdisposition o act for what onetakesto be the weightiest reasons.Thus, the appropriateconception underwhich a person is appraisedas worthy of respect is as a being capable ofrecognition respect for those things which are entitled to it. This is whatconnects he two kindsof respect.The one is the attitudewhich is appropriatefor a personto bear, as an agent, toward those things which deserve his orher consideration n deliberation about what to do. The other is an attitudeof appraisalof that person as just that sort of being, a being capable of ex-pressing such consideration n action.

darwall - two kinds of respect

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