data competitor analysis behavior gt data: -formerly al qaeda in iraq -20,000 – 32,000 fighters...
TRANSCRIPT
ISIS Hostage Negotiations: The
Irrationality of TerrorismChEcu Mate
Brendan Shanahan, Gali Ross, Will Lynn, Martin Ahrens, Paul Pemberton
BOTTOM UP ANALYSIS
DATA
CompetitorAnalysis
Behavior
GT
DATA:- Formerly Al Qaeda in
Iraq- 20,000 – 32,000
Fighters (CIA estimate)- 2,000 westerners in
ranks (10%)- Control large swathes
of Iraq and Syria- Strong anti-western
sentiments
BOTTOM UP ANALYSIS
DATA
CompetitorAnalysis
Behavior
GT
Competitor Analysis:
Goals: - Establish Caliphate- Eliminate western
influence in middle east
Strategies:- Blitzkrieg warfare- Public executions- Recruit western
operatives
BOTTOM UP ANALYSIS
DATA
CompetitorAnalysis
Behavior
GT
Competitor Analysis:
Capabilities:- 20,000 – 32,000
Fighters- Access to captured
Iraqi and Syrian army weapons
- Control of oil reserves- Captured and privately
funded wealth
BOTTOM UP ANALYSIS
DATA
CompetitorAnalysis
Behavior
GT
Behavioral Analysis:
Rational Model Departure:- Terrorism is innately
irrational from a western perspective
Current Strategy:- Build reputation
through fear- Demonstrate disregard
for life
BOTTOM UP ANALYSIS
DATA
CompetitorAnalysis
Behavior
GT
Game Theory Application:
Analyzing Executions by ISISPlayer 1 (Islamic State):
Player 2 (Western Allies):
BOTTOM UP ANALYSIS
DATA
CompetitorAnalysis
Behavior
GT
Game Theory Application:
Analyzing Executions by ISIS
Existing Parameters of Game: West is Bombing, Hostage TakenPotential Game 1:
IGOUGO Game- Bombing Decision- Execution Decision- Payoffs
- Reputation- Strategic and Financial
Potential Game 2:
Dynamic Game- Similar to a business
competition game- More complicated- Need for more analysis at
this time.
IGOUGO GAMEMove 1: JAMES FOLEY
More Air Strik
es
Cont’d Air Strikes
End Air Strikes
Kill hostage
Kill hostage
Hold hostage
Hold hostage
Hold hostage
Kill hostage
Estimating ISIS PayoffsWhat does the Islamic State value right now?
Reputation Capabilities
Escalation(Air Strikes Increase)
Status Quo(Air Strikes Continue)
West “Blinks”(Air Strikes End)
Increase in recruitment, credibility, media attention
Escalated damage to income sources, strategic military installments
Maintain credibility and recruitment position
Moderate damage to infrastructure and military installments
Decrease in recruiting and fundraising opportunities
Strengthening of income sources, buildup of armaments
Estimating the West’s Payoffs
Reputation Capabilities
Escalation(Air Strikes Increase)
Status Quo(Air Strikes Continue)
West “Blinks”(Air Strikes End)
Strengthened military credibility and show of force, but risk of civilian casualties & failure
Expensive military action, but protect oil reserves from ISIS control
Open to criticism for underestimating ISIS threat
Moderate military action, steady ISIS expansion and threat to oil, stability
Appear weak and vulnerable to future kidnapping/terrorist threats, exposes IRAQ to ISIS advance
Saved military cost but rapid expansion by ISIS, major threat to oil, stability
Conclusions
Rationalities are vastly different› Each side views the other as irrational› Necessary to empathize with other side
Payoffs push both Players to Escalation Multiple factors at play
› Finance› Reputation› Others…?
How does the long term game factor in?
What other players are there?
What other hostages does ISIL have?
Can the West afford to negotiate?
FIND OUT NEXT TIME…