Data for Development in Africa

How does civil society use open budget data to advocate for improved public services within

the Ugandan political context?

Name: Elma Jenkins

E-mail: elma.jenkins@googlemail.com

Course: MSc International development studies, University of Amsterdam

Cover photo: Budget champion volunteers receiving training from the Advocates Coalition in Kampala (observation 2).

1

Acknowledgements

Thank you to the wonderful people I have had the honour of speaking with

while undertaking this research, including but not limited to; ACODE, their

budget champions and staff who were kind enough to let me travel with

them and introducing me to some truly wonderful people; CUWEDA for

your excellent planning, hospitality and dedication; Development Initiative,

for setting me on the journey; Development Research and Training for the

insightful discussion giving me new angles for questioning; Bugisu NGO

Forum for helping me connect to the youth and patiently translating; All

the African Centre for Media Excellence journalists for being an inspiration,

asking tough questions and setting the curve; Overseas Development

Initiative for giving me insights into your project and to all the individuals

working on promoting truth patriotically and standing up for what they

believe in.

2

Inhoud Acknowledgements ........................................................................................ 1

List of figures .................................................................................................. 3

Abbreviations ................................................................................................. 4

Summary ........................................................................................................ 5

Policy recommendations ........................................................................... 5

1. Introduction ........................................................................................... 7

2. Theoretical framework .............................................................................. 8

2.1 Open budget data ................................................................................ 8

2.2 Civil society advocacy ........................................................................... 9

2.4 Surveillance .......................................................................................... 9

2.5 Governments and transparency ........................................................ 10

3 Research Methodology ............................................................................. 11

3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 11

3.2 Research questions ............................................................................ 11

3.3 Sampling ............................................................................................. 11

3.4 Methods ............................................................................................. 11

3.4.1 primary data ................................................................................ 11

3.4.2 Secondary data ...................................................................... 12

4. Country context ....................................................................................... 13

4.1 Historical context ............................................................................... 13

4.2 Economic and social context.............................................................. 13

4.3 Political context .................................................................................. 14

4.4 Civil society......................................................................................... 14

4.5 Open data........................................................................................... 14

4.5 Participatory budget structure .......................................................... 15

5 Transparency in Uganda ........................................................................... 16

5.1 The landscape of data use ................................................................. 16

5.1.1 Responses to digitisation ............................................................ 16

5.1.2 Dissemination and engagement ................................................. 18

5.1.3 Processes and products of advocacy .......................................... 20

5.2 How transparent is Uganda’s budget? .............................................. 22

What data do CSOs want? ................................................................... 23

5.3 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 25

6. Social-political impacts of open data ....................................................... 26

6.1 Open data impacts on public services ............................................... 26

6.1.1 Impacts at the national level ...................................................... 26

6.1.2 Sub-national level impacts ......................................................... 27

6.1.3 Empowerment impacts .............................................................. 29

6.2 Political context of Uganda ................................................................ 30

6.2.1 The legal framework in Uganda.................................................. 30

6.2.2 Safety using budget data ............................................................ 31

6.2.3 Citizens self-censorship .............................................................. 32

6.3 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 33

7. Conclusion................................................................................................ 34

Bibliography ................................................................................................. 35

Annex one – Overview of respondents ....................................................... 40

3

List of figures Figure 1 World Bank development indicators, 2016 13

Figure 2 - Governance structure of Uganda 15

Figure 3 - National print data in Ugandan Newspaper 16

Figure 4 - DI budget data visualization 17

Figure 5- Tally of digital comments 2015 18

Figure 6 - Hard copy display of local budget information 19

Figure 7 - Main types of budget information used or analysis (Renzio&Simson, 2013) 21

Figure 8 - Data gaps identified by CSOs 23

Figure 9 - Davies (2015) 5 stars of data engagement 24

Figure 10 - Participatory timeline, Nebbi 29

Figure 11 - Citizen at Mbale Ekimeza 33

4

Abbreviations

ATI: Access to Information

ACODE: Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment

ACME: African Centre for Media Excellence

BM: Black Monday

CBO: Community Based Organisation

CSOs: Civil Society Organisations

DI: Development Initiative

DRT Development Research and Training

HDI: Human Development Index

IO: International Organisations

M&E: Monitoring and evaluation

MoF: ministry of Finance

NGO: Non-Governmental organisation

NRM: National Resistance Movement

OECD: Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development

ODI: Overseas Development Initiative

RCT: Randomised Control Trials

UDN: Uganda Debt Network

5

Summary

The debate on whether open data can be used for effective advocacy has

many conflicting viewpoints. Different scholars see both an empowering

effect through the increase of social accountability with evidence-based

advocacy or the breakdown of trust in society as ICT-mediated information

increases anonymity and creates passive transparency. This research adds

to this debate by assessing how civil society groups use, disseminate and

apply a recently launched transparency initiative for open budget data in

Uganda. The analysis further explores the landscape of budget data use;

how transparent budget data is; how open data impacts on government

accountability to public services and what impact the political context has

on advocacy. Based on fieldwork that was carried out over 10 weeks in two

urban centres and one rural area of Uganda.

Overall, it is argued that civil society uses open data to increase bottom-up

transparency through improved monitoring and evaluation work.

However, impacts are currently only visible at the sub-national level and

do not always lead to hard accountability. The initiative does improve the

ability of CSO to use evidence based advocacy but it is further limited by

the digital divide and a weak legal framework. Worryingly, neutral civil

society groups have also been branded as opposition in the pre-election

climate while the initiative can distance national government from local

service delivery issues. The thesis concludes, while that are strong

theoretical links between transparency and advocacy, it has been shown

through comparisons with international standards that the open budget

initiative in Uganda displays an opaque level of transparency and

consequently a weak level of advocacy. It is suggested that the best way

for civil society in Uganda to use digital data is by building local

government capacity and awareness of open data requirements, especially

to improve local hard copy displays in order to re-affirm local

governments’ responsibility to provide public services and to increase data

journalism in the national media. The research also emphasises the

important role infomediaries will play as ICT-mediated open data

increases.

Policy recommendations

For the open data web portal:

1. Build a data request section into the web portal.

2. Increase offline dissemination and engagement through the media.

3. Add a map to the web portal to help visualise and improve

administration of district boundaries.

4. Improve responsiveness to comments through closer collaboration

with local governments helping build their capacity to understand

budget processes.

5. Actively engage media house to encourage debate about the

budget and open data in Uganda at the national level, including

those from a wide range of political views.

6. Include a help link to explain how data can be searched.

7. Include tools to aid data analysis on the website I.E an Excel

template outlining typical data comparisons.

8. Match data inputs with outputs. For example, matching funding

inputs with service improvement (outputs).

9. To introduce a wider range of languages on the toll free call line

especially with more representation from the North of the country.

For broader open data practices in Uganda:

10. To include qualitative data which contextualises budget information

6

11. Create more feedback loops between CSOs and governments which

builds confidence in political structures.

12. Encourage local governments to hold consultations with CSOs on

their data needs.

13. Make steps to implement a process of further opening data beyond

the district budgets in order to meet the data gaps as outlined here.

14. Encourage NGOs and CBOs to share stories with the media to

generate debate, particularly at the national level.

15. Provide deliberate mechanism of empowering the local citizens

through creating stronger and cluster advocacy interest groups such

as budget champions and interpreters of budget information for the

ordinary citizens.

16. Monitor budget implementation through setting up budget

monitoring committee at different levels.

17. Encourage the use of data at the participatory budget planning

meetings.

18. To encourage CSOs to increase monitoring at the sub-national level

in urban centres.

7

1. Introduction

Un-equal growth is a major hindrance to inclusive development and

corruption is one cause of this inequality. Uganda has the highest levels of

corruption in East Africa scoring 26/100 in the Transparency International

rankings with 86% of people admitting to paying a bribe (TI, 2014). While

the country has seen GDP growth in recent years (Alexis Rwabizambuga,

2015) it measures poorly (164) on the Human Development Index (HDI)

while growth in consumption is consistently low for the poorest income

levels in society, demonstrating a rising income inequality gap (HDI, 2014,

p. 39). The development of public services has also not matched the

economic growth of the country as the World Bank estimates of 40-60% of

urban accommodation are slum dwellings.

Opening government data is being explored as a way to increase

transparency and fight corruption (Renzio & Masud, 2011). In a report

published by the UN entitled “A world that counts” (2014) president Ban-

Ki-Moon called for a data revolution in the post-2015 development agenda

which has led to new funding streams for open data initiatives to hold

governments accountable (UN, 2014: 3). Comparative studies show how

open budget data are related to transparency and accountability and how

ICT will play an increasingly important part in the future by increasing the

scope and reach of transparency (Harrison & Sayogo, 2014). Particularly

interesting is the growing focus on micro data, seen in the IMFs 2015

Enhanced General Data Dissemination Systems (E-GDDS) (IMF, 2015).The

amount of data in the world is increasing (estimates say 90% of today’s

data has been created in the last two years) but it will take some time for

civil society, governments and academic groups to adapt to these new

knowledge flows (UN-IEAG, 2014, p. 5).

This has led some to suggest that the practice of open data is racing ahead

of empirical or theoretical thinking (Fox, 2015, p. 346). Furthermore, critics

have argued that open data can cause more harm than good by increasing

anonymity and reducing trust between governments and citizens. (Meijer,

2009), (Dawes, n.d).

Globally there has been an increase of interest in open budget websites

(Making budgets, 2011). The world bank launched ‘Boost’ in 2010, a

budget tool which “collects and compiles detailed data on public

expenditures from national treasury systems and presents it in a simple

user-friendly format” (Kheyfets, Mastruzzi, Merotto, & Sondergaa, 2011, p.

1) while many individual country budget websites soon followed such as

the U.S, UK and Kenya. This cutting and pasting of open data policies

across countries has led some to call for open data to be subsumed in

information justice issues (Johnson, 2014 ).

The Government of Uganda recently launched their own web portal

making budget data more transparent, consequently this is the first time

sub-national budget data is available in a widely accessible form (MoF,

2015). By looking at how civil society groups in Uganda are using digital

budget data this research can fill a knowledge gap on how useful a data

revolution is in a country like Uganda. This research aims to contribute to

the debate on how data, which has been described as a tool for positive

change in the world (Taylor, 2014), can be used for development purposes

by focussing on its use for social accountability.

8

2. Theoretical framework This chapter will unpack some of the literature debates behind the main

concepts of open budget data, civil society advocacy and government

transparency.

2.1 Open budget data In 1914 American lawyer Brandeis famously said “sunlight is the most

powerful of all disinfectants” (Brandais and the history of transparency,

2009). Today this translates into open data which is defined as “accessible,

machine-readable (i.e. in a form where you can manipulate it with digital

tools), and licensed to permit re-use, rather than restricted by copyright or

intellectual property rights” (Davies T. , n.d, p. 20). Making budget data

open and freely available is one of the key aims of the open data

movement (Heald, 2012) because it is seen as a mechanism to increase

citizen’s participation and government accountability to public service

(Gray, 2015).

Of course transparency levels need to be taken into consideration. Fox

(2007) has theorised that openness, as a form of transparency, can be

placed on a scale between clear and opaque, either hiding or revealing the

true nature of an institution. (Fox, 2007, p. 666). These scales of difference

are due to the malleable nature of the term transparency, which explains

why open data does not always lead to accountability.

Closing low accountability gaps has further been theorised with the use of

a ‘virtuous circle’ of accountability which can be initiated through a

sandwich strategy of state and society working together (Fox, 2015, p.

347). This solution emphasises the importance of feedback loops

encouraging communication between data users and data producers.

Davies (2012) draws on this in his 5 steps for open data engagement which

“generate social and economic benefits to hold state institutions to

account” (Davies T. , 2012, p. 1). In an increasingly ICT driven world, open

data is being promoted as a modern equivalent to Brandais’ disinfectant.

Yet there are still many challenges to overcome especially around

government transparency and especially in the African continent public

accessibility (Renzio & Masud, Measuring and Promoting Budget

Transparency:, 2011). Open data initiatives tend to be top down which

requires critical assessment within a given social-political context,

especially where unequal social privilege and vast differences in the

capabilities of data users exist (Johnson, 2014 ). Critics have further noted

that quantitative data needs to be properly contextualised otherwise it

loses meaning and increases the likely hood of anonymity in data leading

to decreasing trust in governance institutions. Citizens also can face

challenges analysing the data, all of which creates further engagement

problems (Meijer, 2009). This aligns with Janssen et. al thinking that the

benefits of data openness are more complex than often credited (Janssen,

Charalabidis, & Zuiderv, 2012).

A prominent development approach which can help evaluate the degree of

development with open data is Sen’s (1999) ground-breaking capabilities

approach which theorises development as freedom and emphasises the

importance of subjectivity. Sen argues that individual freedoms are crucial

for inclusive development, capturing aspects of individual agency in

poverty eradication and differences in resource access and use. The focus

here is on citizen’s freedoms regarding “transparency guarantees.” In the

context of open data, one way to view Sen’s approach is to view

development as accountability (AccountAbility, n.d) giving citizens more

power to advocate for themselves.

9

2.2 Civil society advocacy Civil society is often seen as an engine for social change with normative

assumptions that civil society will always promote a democratic agenda

(Pearce & Howell, 2001, p. 59). The term struggles to recognise issues of

CSOs co-option and bribery by the state it is therefore important not to

treat civil society as a homogeneous unit (Kew & Oshikoya, 2014). The

problem is further transported onto conceptions of civil society advocacy.

For example, the Open Budget Survey (OBS) has defined Budget Advocacy

as “a strategic approach to influence governments’ budget choices, aimed

at achieving clear and specific outcomes e.g., healthier people, less

poverty, or improved governance (IBP, Orientation to budget advocacy,

n.d) which assumes that budget advocacy will strengthen good

governance. Civil society campaigners often couple the concepts of

accountability and transparency together by, “incorporating the right to

know into both their strategies and their tactics, with the hope that

transparency will empower efforts to change the behaviour of powerful

institutions” (Fox, 2015, p. 663). As such, accountability is emerging as a

key strategy for development by rooting advocacy in knowledge and

information (Houtzager, 2012). This builds on the above definition of

advocacy to include social accountability as an advocacy approach.

Along with scales of transparency Fox also theorised scales of hard and soft

accountability (Fox, 2007). Soft accountability with open data often

focusses on strengthening data transparency over accountability at the

national level while hard accountability involves naming and shaming as

well as institutional sanctions. There is a higher prevalence of soft

accountability as shown in a survey Gray (2015) conducted using digital

methods which found data visualization (65%) to be the most common

data use. Joshi & Houtzager (2012) argue that current trends in

accountability have come to focus on “widgets” such as web portals. These

they argue do very little to tackle low data engagement rates (Houtzager,

2012, p. 153). Furthermore, literature assessing open data is often

focussed on benchmarking and evaluating a data set which leaves a gap in

knowledge around end user practices (Susha, Zuiderwijk, & Janssen, 2015).

In order to avoid a homogeneous view of civil society and to ground

understanding of how social accountability is working in practice, a new

concept alongside the concept of social accountability is necessary.

Renzio and Simson (2013) have compiled a list drawn from African NGO

publications showing their main uses of budget data. This list will be used

in the data analysis to explain how data is used in Uganda. It highlights a

growing strategy by civil society in developing countries: independent

monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of government programmes (Gildemyn,

2014). For example, Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) conducted Random

Control Trials (RCTs) of community M&E on primary health care centres in

two Uganda villages and found that behaviour of health care staff at the

local level changed with increased engagement of citizens in their local

health centres.

2.4 Surveillance M&E can be measured through levels of citizens’ surveillance to see how

open data is being used as a tool for social accountability. Surveillance is

defined as a “focused, systematic and routine attention to personal detail

for the purpose of influence, management, protection or direction” (Lyon,

2007, p. 14). There is a tendency to view surveillance negatively in our

growing digital age, but this does not always have to be the case. As Lyon

points out, surveillance contains elements of care and control. An example

is the crowdsourcing website in India which allows citizens to report

10

bribery and corruption online (Janaagraha, 2015). As a community activity

M&E helps ensure inclusive development by involving citizens in the

decisions which affect their lives. However, Gildemyn (2014) argues that

M&E is limited in its ability to tackle unequal power relations between

CSOs and service providers because it is confined to the sub-national level.

The UN also recognises the risk of a data gap between the “data haves and

the data have-nots” (UN-IEAG, 2014, p. 6). Others have described this as a

‘digital divide’ linking it not only to lack of internet access but also a lack of

usage and benefit from data (Fuchs & Horak, 2008).

Heald (2012) argues that we need to be realistic about what open data can

achieve and the importance of studying the format and function of open

data carefully. For example, a country may score highly on an open data

index and but this may not always result in accountability because of low

uptake in civil society in this way weakening transparency initiatives.

Therefore, open data cannot provide answers “to profound ideological and

practical questions concerning the scope of the state” (2012: 47) but it can

increase evidence based citizen’s advocacy.

2.5 Governments and transparency Governments, as the largest providers of data often adopt a simplistic

approach to data sharing, viewing open data as an ends rather than a

means to development. Janssen et al (2012) identify several open data

myths commonly held by governments such as: disclosure will

automatically benefit society, all data is required to be open and open data

automatically results in open governments (Janssen, Charalabidis, &

Zuiderv, 2012). In actuality, much government open data is voluntary

making it important to study how data is made available as this can

communicate a message about the motivations and objectives behind

government open data policies. These could be to do with investments in

democratic accountability, public policy influence and equity or social

control rather than real structural change which Sen theorises as necessary

for development (Susha, Zuiderwijk, Janssen, & Gronlund, Benchmarks for

Evaluating the, 2015). Political leaders in Africa typically exert control

through the use of state resources to create patronage structures as a way

of retaining power (Tangri & Mwenda, 2005). This is expressed in Uganda

through the control of data as well. How Ugandan authoritarian leadership

react to increased evidence based accountability with data will be analysed

here by studying the format and uses of open data.

11

3 Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction This chapter will introduce the sub-questions (3.2). It will then describe

how sampling was conducted and the units of analysis (3.3). The methods

will be outlined under sub-sections of primary and secondary data (3.4).

3.2 Research questions The main research question is divided into four sub-questions for further

conceptual development.

Sub question 1: What is the landscape of open budget data use in Uganda?

Sub question 2: How transparent is budget data?

Sub question 3: How has open budget data impacted government

accountability to public services?

Sub Question 4: How does the political context affect the advocacy

practices of civil society groups?

3.3 Sampling My initial sample were selectively chosen, known as purposive sampling

(Bryman, 2008: 458) followed by a snowballing approach1. Samples were

selectively chosen to locate respondents who had come into contact with

or previously used the web portal. Civil society was operationalised as

NGOs, CBOs and the media in order to research a wide variety of civil

society actors who drive advocacy work. NGOs were further narrowed

1 See Annex one for a description of respondents

down to those who work on improving public services. With the media this

was improbable (journalists inform on a large range of subjects) so media

were selected based on familiarity with data journalism training.

Respondents from three geographical areas (Kampala, Nebbi and Mbale)

were chosen to ensure the findings were not limited to one geographical

area. The research used an inductive approach to locate a range of target

samples.

3.4 Methods

3.4.1 primary data

Semi-structured Interviews: A total of 23 in depth interviews using

semi-structure questions were conducted. Each interview was transcribed

for analysis. Discretion was used when making direct approaches to

organisations. For instance, NGOs were directly approached but

government ministries, without formal correspondence, were not.

The research aim was always introduced and respondents were assured

verbally that their anonymity would be guaranteed.

Observations: Observations allow behaviours to be directly observed

rather than inferred from secondary data (Bryman, 2008:254). A

participant observer approach was used (2008:257) for four observation

opportunities which made note keeping and requesting translations easier.

Observation can provide contextual knowledge to the research while non-

structured conversations can assist in networking for more respondents.

Participatory method: The research includes a participatory method in

order to explore the central themes of the research question from the

perspective of a CBO working at sub-national level (Bryman: 2008, 473). A

12

participatory time line was selected in order to map experiences of using

budget data on the ground.

3.4.2 Secondary data

Secondary data collected from the field includes government

correspondence, photos and media coverage as well as online comments

extracted from the web portal. Secondary data was especially important

for data on the media component who have a greater online presence. The

data collected includes:

1. Online comment from the Budget.go.ug website.

2. Online and in print budget coverage of the last two years (blogs and

news articles).

3. Official correspondence from Ministries.

13

4. Country context This chapter will begin with an overview of the historical context (4.1)

followed by Uganda’s economic & social contexts (4.2). 4.3 will look at the

political context followed by a brief overview of civil society in Uganda

(4.4). 4.5 will describe Uganda’s open data context and 4.6 will cover

historical changes to the budget and the participatory budge structure.

4.1 Historical context Uganda gained independence in 1962 however, democracy has alluded the

country as two dictators have held power for over 17 years, between 1963

until the general elections in 1980. Colonial administrative structures were

not altered in this time continuing a system of closed records and data in

Uganda. These political structures were not challenged until the National

Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni demanded a return

to democratic elections (Mutibwa, 1992).

Museveni has held on to power since 1980 and has over-seen economic

and political reforms which included transparency, openness and

accountability (Kuteesa, Magona, Maris, & Wokadala, 2006). However, the

need to retain power by the ruling party has seen the corrosion of these

reforms as spending priorities are re-directed and selective transparency is

implemented. In the last election (2011) it was estimated the NRM spent

Shs350 billion maintaining power and is set to spend more in the coming

election (Matsiko, 2014).

4.2 Economic and social context Uganda is a land locked country with a population of 37.58 Million (WB,

World Development Indicators, 2016). Figure 1 shows Uganda’s macro-

economic stability with a GDP growth of 5.9% driven by the agriculture and

telecoms industries ( Alexis Rwabizambuga, 2015, p. 4). Government debt,

however, remains consistently high reflecting the reliance on international

aid (WB, World Development Indicators, 2016).

Figure 1 World Bank development indicators, 2016

Uganda has been rapidly urbanizing due to a lack of opportunities in the

rural areas. However, currently only 18% of the population live in urban

areas (Sengendo, Lwasa, & Mukwaya, 2010, p. 268). This has led to recent

changes in the district administration as governance areas re-adjust to the

influx of people by demanding new district boundaries (25 more districts

created, 2012). The majority of the countries revenue is made and

collected in the only registered city, Kampala, though there are several

14

urban centres in the running to be given city status in the coming years

(Jinja, Mbale, Arua, Mbarara and Gulu) which will rival the economic

strength of Kampala in the future.

4.3 Political context There is political tension with the upcoming 2016 elections. President

Museveni has been accused of a sham democracy and has been linked

with a number of human rights abuses (Izamo & Wilkerson, 2011, p. 65).

He recently passed laws limiting freedom of speech and increasing ICT

control which suggests political control through violence. The continuation

of corruption within the current regime is especially apparent in the kick-

backs for public service contracts (WB, April 2004). Some argue that

President Museveni’s power is weakening due to corruption charges, for

instance parliament recently passed amendments to the anti-corruption

bill in order to bring political leaders in line with the law (Parliament,

2015). There have been some Internal attempts from the ministry to stamp

out corruption, the move to decentralisation in 1997 was designed so

citizens can hold their local officials to account (OECD, 2004). Despite this,

some entities in Kampala are still dealt with directly through the central

government office making them effectively personal entities of President

Museveni, another sign of his strong grip on the country. Most recently the

government introduced the Leadership Code of 2002 (WB, April 2004) in

an attempt to regain control.

Andrew Mwenda a Ugandan journalist reports on corruption and how

elite officials continue to go uncharged (Mwenda, 2014). The strong

leadership of President Museveni was, arguably, necessary after the Amin

years but now criticism is starting to emerge about Uganda’s slow

democratic reforms. There is also decreasing trust in government bodies

which are viewed as corrupt, particularly the Presidency, Parliament and

the Police (AfroBarometer, 2015).

4.4 Civil society Civil society in Uganda find themselves working in an increasingly

regulated society where they previously had a strong say in policy

decisions (Robinson & Friedman, 2007). For example, the passage of the

recent NGO regulation bill allows more scrutiny of NGO work. Increasingly

Ugandan CSOs have been taking part in international discussions which has

led President Yoweri Museveni to be distrustful of CSOs with large or

external funding (Monitor, 2012).

4.5 Open data Global indexes show that the state of open budget data is low, especially in

Africa (Renzio & Simson, 2013). However, Uganda now excels in open

budget data scoring the highest in East Africa in the Open Budget Index

(OBI, 2015). The web portal launched in 2013 provides open data access to

national and sub-national budget data with the aim of eventually building

capacity so each district can upload their own data.

Uganda has a history of reforming open budget data, for example, the

1992 Mid-Term Expenditure reforms (MTER) led to newspapers regularly

publishing national government releases and introduced participatory

budget reforms (Kuteesa, Magona, Maris, & Wokadala, 2006). However,

government concepts of open data were outdated which many CSOs

complained about ( Nandyona, 2014). Furthermore, requesting

information was a long process with low success rates (Anderson, 2015)

and for those who did not have internal contacts, gaining access was

problematic (ibid). The move to ICT for open data is a bold but historically

founded in government reform.

15

ICT uptake in Uganda is low, only 2,2% of all households have a working

laptop in their homes with large differences between rural and urban areas

(UCC, 2015). Literacy rates are at 66.8% and skewed toward men (CIA

World Fact Book: 2009). Together these statistics demonstrates that a

digital and gender divide in Uganda. Developments in fibre optic cable

access and higher speed internet may impact these figures in the future,

matching trends across Africa to connect the continent (ItNews, 2015).

4.5 Participatory budget structure The Local Government Act of 1997 also set out requirements for a

participatory budget process in order to improve services (IFPRI, 2011).

Local meetings in the smallest administrative unit, the village are feed into

the larger units to create an inclusive budget. Figure 2 shows Uganda’s

governance structure around budget decisions. There have been

complaints however that power is concentrated at the sub-county and that

the participatory process is merely consultative (Kiwanuka, 2012).

Most of Uganda’s 111 districts are reliant on the central government

grants for money which adds to the challenge of making local voices count

in the participatory structure. Furthermore, the central government only

spend a total of 15% of the national budget on district grants (DI, 2015)

leading to low capacity among local leaders and poorly planned local

services (IFPRI, 2011).

Figure 2 - Governance structure of Uganda

16

5 Transparency in Uganda Chapter five will begin describing the landscape of budget data and the

local/global responses to it. Section 5.1 will describe how citizens are

engaging with budget data both online and offline and what advocacy

products and processes have emerged at the national and sub-national

level. Section 5.2 will study how transparent the budget website is and will

conclude with a comparison to international standards.

5.1 The landscape of data use

5.1.1 Responses to digitisation

In 2013 the Ugandan Ministry of Finance (MoF) paired up with the

Overseas Development Initiative (ODI) a UK think tank. Together they built

Uganda's first open budget web portal in 20132. The website includes a

search function down do the parish level listing budget planning figures

and quarterly release dates. It includes a feedback section and a toll free

call line available in five languages. The website represents the first time

sub-national level data is freely available in Uganda.

Responses to national open data

National budget data have been printed every quarter in major national

newspapers for the past few years in Uganda. Figure 3 shows the level of

print detail. It includes central government budgeting figures split into

sectors.

2 Budget.go.ug

Figure 3 - National print data in Ugandan Newspaper

BUGISU NGO forum, an NGO which works to strengthen democracy

through participation, view the data as a way to create accountability

around public funds,

“each time they release money, they publish it in the paper so that

everyone knows that money has come [laughs] there should not be

any excuse for not implementing”.

Interview 16

17

Figure 4 - DI budget data visualization

However, it is important to bear in mind that national budget data in

Uganda represents only 15% of the total country budget (DI, 2015)

reminding us of the voluntary nature of open data in Uganda. There is low

transparency in the rest of the budget, most prominently the defence and

state house spending. This is demonstrated by low response rates to

Access to Information (ATI) requests. Between the 2008 and 2011 a total

of only 10/33 requests were granted (AFOIC, 2012). Furthermore, online

open data creates a digital divide limiting its use to the educated and

economically well off while the previous availability of national budget

data in newspaper and the low trust in government institutions lessens any

impact of digitising the national budget.

Responses to sub-national digital data

Prior to the web portal it was difficult, although not impossible, to access

sub-national level data from local gatekeepers. But access was often

entirely reliant on connections, as one NGO employee describes,

“So for those who are persistent like us if we wanted the

information, now they know us and they know we are working in

that area, we would get it. But any citizen, if you went to the

district you probably wouldn't get that information.

Interview 16

The biggest response from the Civil society community to sub-national

data has been in data visualisation, typified by the Development Initiative's

(DI) new web tool (Figure 4) in the hope that it will improve citizens

understanding of public finance.

Overall many who have been working with government data are excited to

see the web portal as one NGO worker explains,

“we are quite happy; may I say probably even excited that actually

you can with a click on the computer you can download some of

these things”

Interview 4

Improving ICT in society means CSOs are increasingly able to access open

data. However, these responses are still limited by a digital divide. To

understand it’s full reach offline engagement needs to be studied.

18

5.1.2 Dissemination and engagement

The prevalence of a colonial closed data mentality in Uganda is difficult to

measure. Some indication might come from the amount of data uptake in

Community Based Organisations (CBOs). Open data is impacting on older

forms of information sharing including hard copy displays, CBO training

and debate and dissemination through the media.

Digital comments

Despite the low uptake of ICT across Uganda there were just under 200 (as

of 09/15) online comments on the new web portal. They offer a unique

opportunity to analyse a new avenue for communication and engagement

between civil society and government. Figure 5 shows the types of

comments and their frequency.

Category Type of feedback # % of total

Negative comments

Work not done 55

27.92%

Money not received 28

14.21%

Shoddy work 19

9.64%

Ghost services 12

6.09%

Extortion for public services 7 3.55% Services not running 6 3.05% Money returned complaints 3 1.52% over spending complaint 2 1.02% procurement delay complaints 1 0.51% no feedback on spending 1 0.51% Community meetings not held 1 0.51%

Positive comments

Positive comment on work 9 4.57%

positive comment on website 3 1.52% Money received 1 0.51% Requests for change

Request for work 7 3.55%

suggestions for site improvements 1 0.51% more participation 1 0.51% Incorrect information/ information

requests 40

20.30%

Figure 5- Tally of digital comments 2015

The top two complaints concern incomplete work and incorrect

administrative boundaries. The majority are negative signifying an overall

dissatisfaction with the implementation of the budget at sub-national level

which match Uganda’s low HDI score. They do demonstrate a high level of

interest in citizen local service monitoring but also show the challenges of

locating the responsible authority for social services due to confusion with

district boundaries, highlighting an area CSOs need to be aware of, as one

NGO worker explained,

“Today KCC [Kampala city council] is a district, then the next day it's

a city then some budget is going through this level then at some

point they are going direct to the service delivery units. Then you

have projects, special projects that have different modalities, you

know, so by all means the information cannot be complete.”

Interview 2

The comments are to be flagged with the duty bearers in the districts to

encourage follow up (interview 21) in effect creating a digital feedback

loop as Fox (2015) Suggested.

19

Offline dissemination, debate & discussion

In Uganda community workers, radio hosts or journalists can make data

locally meaningful which increases their importance. Development

Research and training (DRT) an NGO working to reduce inequality with

data explained,

“so to use this (open data) of course you have to know how to use

a computer. So that's why these infomediaries are coming into

play. Actually that's another fancy word that this revolution is

creating so the infomediaries are people who stand between the

analysts and the consumers of this information.”

Interview 4

NGO’s in Uganda often recruit district volunteers to disseminate

information. The Advocates Coalition (ACODE) a national level NGO who

aim to reduce poverty in East Africa use 'budget champions,' volunteers

who act as information brokers and advocate for more informed

community engagement within their district (interview 17). They are

successfully reminding local service providers of their duty to display hard

copies of budget information as demonstrated in Figure 6. This information

is more localized and therefore more accessible for citizens, particularly in

rural areas therefore, it can be argued, budget champions increase

transparency.

Figure 6 - Hard copy display of local budget information

Training was identified as another important tool in making data more

transparent. ACODE open data trainings are in high demand (Observation

2) however many volunteers had trouble keeping up which was evident

from complaints that the training was too technical, demonstrating the

pervasiveness of the digital divide.

Interestingly, data training in Uganda is not limited to civil society. Local

government officials are also targeted by NGOs. Development Research

and Training (DRT) explained that they have at times specifically targeted

government officials,

“Yes we have actually trained parliament, the members of

parliament that sit on the budget committee, because some of

20

these, you know when they are debating the budgets they actually

don't know”

Interview 4

There is clearly a real challenge of overcoming the digital divide and

increasing transparency across all sectors of society in Uganda, not just

civil society. Digital mediums can also be used to dissemination budget

data, which will be considered next.

Radio

The radio is a popular medium to disseminate budget data and is

particularly effective because of its ability to sensitize people to issues due

to strong oral traditions in Uganda (Kalyango, 2009, p. 213). For this

reason, CSOs often pay for radio time to raise budget issues (Interview 5).

During radio debates the public call in for clarification of budget figures

such as the actual amount of a quoted percentage (Observation 4). This

demonstrates a demand for budget information at the sub-national level in

Uganda through interactive ICT platforms beyond the website and shows

how citizens are using local resources to improve transparency freedoms.

Media

Few journalists in Uganda are aware of the web portal (Interview 11). The

African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME) a journalists’ capacity building

organisation which promotes higher news standards estimates that, of

those coming to their data journalism training, only 30% are aware of the

budget website (interview 8). ACME did however note that there had been

an increase of sub-national budget data requests from local news writers:

twenty journalists last year requested their local budgets through ACME

because the costs as still too high for downloading and aggregating the

large PDF files. But data journalists are still concerned about the lack of

data use, as one explained,

“We have a general problem with our people. I mean this

information is available and it would be good for these guys to

build their advocacy campaigns on this information. But still you

find them going on rumors and not following the actual

information”

Interview 14

Sub-national open data has had the largest impact across the country, as

can be seen from the online comments and improved local hard copy

displays. This is because CSOs have identified key indicators which increase

data engagement such as the importance of oral information sharing and

locally meaningful data. However too often info-mediaries are unable to

cope with the high demand for information which presents a problem

which they cannot overcome alone. More needs to be done to promote

sub-natinal data use, particularly in the national media. During the DI map

launch in July 2015 (Observation 2) director Charles Ntale argued that

better data can inform and monitor progress and CSOs should try to

overcome the current disconnection between data and users by

encouraging wider engagement as a way to build citizens capabilities,

however the inequality inherent within open data due to the digital and

literacy divides in Uganda can not be ignored.

5.1.3 Processes and products of advocacy

Advocacy practices often have a division of labour, either working from

within the governing system to influence policy makers or working from

outside to apply pressure. Renzio and Simson (2013: P6) identify nine

21

indicators which cut across both and show which budget data are used for

advocacy in the African continent for analysis (Figure 7).

Figure 7 - Main types of budget information used or analysis (Renzio&Simson, 2013)

1. Fiscal balance (after grants) as a percentage of gross domestic product

(GDP) (actual).

2. Actual versus budgeted expenditure.

3. Actual spending on medicines (and medical supplies) as a share of total

health expenditure.

4. Actual spending on primary education as a share of total expenditure.

5. Ratio of actual primary education expenditure to tertiary education

expenditure

6. Ratio of actual wage and non-wage recurrent expenditure in

agriculture.

7. Total budgeted transfers to subnational governments as a share of

total budget.

8. Actual capital expenditure as a share of total expenditure, and

explanation of the purpose and expected results of different capital

projects.

9. Foreign aid grants actually received as a share of those initially

foreseen

Internal advocacy processes

The Civil Society Budget Advocacy group (CSBAG) which advocates at the

national level is an example of a CSO which openly admits to being co-

opted into government (Interview 6). They are regularly invited along to

internal Ministry of Finance (MoF) meetings to present their budget

priorities and view this as an opportunity to influence decision making

from within. They analyse budgets for actual sector spending as a share of

total expenditure (indicators 3&4 on the list) in order to explore how much

has been spent on key social sectors in comparison to the total budget.

They go on to compare these to their own budget priorities by writing an

annual alternative national budget proposal (CSBAG, 2015). Tracing the

share of public resources in this way invites a critical look at the ruling

parties budget priorities and helps assess the quality and relevance of

public sector spending. Doing so also queries ratios of spending within

sectors; are funds equally spread across all educational levels for instance

(indicators 5&6). Another popular national level analysis is to compare

total budget transfers to sub-national governments as a share of the

national budget (indicator 7). For example, many CSOs in Uganda do not

consider 15% of the national budget to be adequate for all the district

budgets (Interviews 7 + 11). These are popular analytical use of budget

data across Africa and shows how national level data can be useful to raise

the agenda of social services.

External advocacy processes

Sub-national level accountability practices analyse actual versus budgeted

expenditure in the key sectors (indicator 2). This allows CSOs to assess the

credibility and implementation of the government’s budget by following

up on the ground, as one ACODE budget champion described,

“I would say’, we are watchdogs. We are monitoring government

programs. Are they meeting the needs of the people? Are people

satisfied?”

Interview 19

Sub-national level monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of public services

22

with budget data is an example of evidence based advocacy. For example,

citizens are able to name and shame corrupt practices as demonstrated in

the Black Monday newsletters, a movement which formed to challenge

corrupt government practices and which is supported by the INGO Action

Aid,

“Judiciary is reported to have further failed to account for millions

of shillings released for training of Judicial Officers and purchasing

of 15 vehicles for new Judges” (BM, 2014, p. 1)

Edition 21

However, such examples of hard accountability are limited to educated

CSOs, figures show Uganda is failing in adult literacy rates (reporter, 2016),

while their ability to apply sanctions are low. The next section will ask what

new advocacy messages this creates.

New advocacy products and processes

CSOs have created new indicators which build on Renzio & Simons list.

With open data CSOs can improve the timing of their advocacy messages.

One volunteer monitor explains how he is more informed then local

officials,

But now, you find a technical person being surprised by budget

champions saying, “you man, do you know they have released this

money for this quarter?” By the time he goes to check whether the

information is true.

Interview 15

CSOs also think more critically around structural issues, for instance ACODE

have started campaigning for a higher minimum educational level of local

elected officials in order to tackle a lack of financial literacy. They see this

as a roadblock to the proper delivery of public services. These additional

indicators: “cross-checking quarterly release dates with actual dates” and

“measuring ability of elected leaders to manage district budgets”

demonstrate how CSOs have increased agency with their transparency

freedom.

Many new indicators will continue to emerge as citizens engage with

budget data. For instance, the Hub for Investigative Media (HIM), an

independent media outlet advocates for taking legal action against political

frameworks which keep data closed. This begins to tackle a larger problem

with budget data in Uganda, not covered by Renzio & Simson’s list, which

is the issue of unavailable data, to be discussed in the next chapter.

In summary, citizens’ hard accountability is currently limited to CSOs

external to the government and while national level data has many uses,

sub-national data has a higher impact. Currently however the digital divide

is limiting the impact of open data to improving evidence based advocacy.

It is also important to emphasise here Sen’s theory on the

interconnectedness of development freedoms, that without social or

economic freedoms, transparency freedoms are redundant emphasising

the importance of education and ICT access for open data.

5.2 How transparent is Uganda’s budget? This section will show how transparent Uganda’s open budget portal is. It

builds on Fox’s (2007) scale by arguing that data which is not demand

driven is also opaque, that is: data can be analysed by its ability to meet

23

the needs of the individuals who use it. Lastly it will measure the Ugandan

web portal against global open data standards.

What data do CSOs want?

CSOs have identified many budget gaps in addition to the web portal

signifying the varied ways data is used by civil society in Uganda. Figure 8

below is a tally of CSO data gaps extracted from 23 interviews. They show

differences between NGOs and the Media, representing the scales of

government criticism within Ugandan Civil society.

Type Data gaps total

NGO/CBO District data 4

NGO knowledge gap 3

Media/NGO Sensitive data 2

Media/NGO Auditor General Reports 4

Media Output / real time expenditure data 3

NGO/CBO Archived budget data 1

Media/NGO Improve search engine 1

NGO Procurement information 2

Figure 8 - Data gaps identified by CSOs

Sub-national data remains high because the web portal does not always

accurately reflect allocations to each district (Interview 5). For example, in

the south east the Toro road has been on the budget for twenty years yet

there are still quality complaints from local residents (interview 9 & 6).

Furthermore, data availability is reliant on timely and correct data

submission by each division to the MoF who report regular delays in these

submissions (Interview 21). This demonstrates the low transparency of the

site and the necessity to cross check information. Some technical needs

were also identified such as the need to improve the online search engine

to locate budgets per sector and including archived budgets for

comparison.

Media demands included the need for more output/expenditure data so

users can locate missing work quicker as one journalist explained,

“But OK so you have mapped where the money is going, how about

someone goes and maps what it has done and what it hasn't done”

Interview 7

When studying these data gaps, it becomes clear that the budget data on

the website represents a narrow definition of budget data in light of which

it becomes necessary to ask: what is budget data? Government data is

often made available depending on what a government wants to achieve.

In Uganda it has been suggested open data policies are there to full fill

donor expectations (Tangri & Mwenda, 2005, p. 460).

This highlights the issue of low political will which has challenges beyond

opening data. If local leaders do not have the will to lobby central

governments for funds or to pursue good contractors, information access

is only a small part of a bigger problem bringing into question the

theoretical foundations of open data as outlined by Brandais. Instead low

political will implies that transparency alone is not sufficient which is a

starting point Fox takes in his framework for analysing accountability

(2007: 265).

24

How far Uganda’s web portal complies

Demand driven ★

Are choices of data release and structure need driven: Are choices of data structure need driven: Option for data request included: Option for data response included:

Score: 2/4 Yes – sub-national data in high demand No – structure still in PDF* No – No formal request area Yes – Comments section included

Data in context ★★

Is data clearly described, and of high format quality Is data regularly updated frequency, format and quality: Qualitative data included for data history and use clarifications: Links to data analysis (done by self or others) in data:

Score: 1.5/4 1/2 – data online is clearly described 1/2 – complaints of slow updates 1/2 – budget described but not often clarified No – No other links to data analysis

Supporting conversations around data ★★★

Can people network comments on the data: Do you join the conversation: Is interaction with the data owner possible or encouraged: are there offline opportunities for conversations:

Score: 2/4 Yes – Other uses can respond to comments Yes – MoF often checks and responds No – Data owners not included No – few or little available publicly

Building capacity & networks ★★★★

Are there tools provided for people to work with: is there a “how to” link for data analysis for people to learn from: Do you run skill building workshops on skill building on the dataset: Do you sponsor or engage capacity building initiatives:

Score: 1.5/4 No – No tools included No – no help link 1/5 – press releases held, but no workshops Yes – Engaged with ACODE actively

Collaborations on common resource data ★★★★★

Are there feedback loops to improve the data Are there collaborations to create new data sets Do you provide support for people to build tools with the data Are there initiatives to connect to other data sets: *As of August 2016 data has been available in CSV format

Score: 0/4 No – No feedback loops to improve dataset No – No new collaborations No – NGO's building their own No – No only in third sector Total score: 7/20

Figure 9 - Davies (2015) 5 stars of data engagement

25

International open data standards

Davies’ (2012) five stars of open data engagement attempt to define how

data can be used for hard advocacy by moving the discussion beyond

advocating for open data towards data advocacy. He adds stipulations such

as the need for data to be demand driven (point one), the need to include

qualitative information (point two) and feedback loop requirements (point

5) (Davies, 2012: p1) which match closely with the literature on open data

from Fox’s virtuous circle (Chapter 2).

Figure 9 shows the extent to which Uganda's web portal adheres to this

model. It scores low with only 7/10. Its best areas are being demand driven

and supporting conversations around data although these areas still need

work. While work on collaborations (linking to other data sets) and

contextualising data still need initiating.

However, applying this model to the Ugandan context is not without

problems. For instance, the model does not emphasise the importance of

oral tradition, as argued earlier. It also simplifies complex social problem

without recognising the detrimental impacts that open data can have, such

as reducing citizen trust in government. (Dawes, n.d). For open data

standards to be more transparent there needs to be consultation with a

wide range of local actors rather copying and pasting international policies

into a country context. Here it is possible to grasp why Sen avoided

applying universal instrumental indicators for development freedoms as an

open data initiative in America will not build the same capacities as in

Uganda. This further emphasises the need to analyse open data’s

application within a socio-political context.

5.3 Conclusion Sub question one asked what the landscape of budget data use is.

Analysing the empirical evidence has demonstrated, firstly, that civil

society is heterogeneous in its use of budget data, from criticising the

ruling party to increasing hard copy display. Sub-national data has had the

biggest impact, reflected in CSOs interest for data visualization.

Worryingly, there has been no wider national debate around budget data

as reflected in the low uptake of sub-national data in national media.

The digital divide is a huge barrier which CSOs cannot overcome without

improvements to ICT access and educational levels generally.

Though small the data shows a growing interest in citizens to use evidence

based advocacy while offline data dissemination tactics demonstrate the

creative ways CSOs have found to build citizens capabilities. The biggest

use of open data so far has been to improve its visualization – either

through hard copy or online, which matches global trends but which

means that so far data has only been used for soft accountability.

Sub question two asked how transparent the web portal is when

compared to the data needs of civil society. The diversity of answers led to

the conclusion that budget data in Uganda has an opaque level of

transparency as theorised by Fox (2009). Suggestions to improve

transparency would include a consultation between local government and

CSOs on what open budget data should include. The most critical data gap

was the failure of the web portal to match inputs with outputs the result of

which is that the same services appear on the budget year after year. This

shows how, without context data can lose meaning and can create

anonymity around budget planning.

It has further been suggested that the website can be viewed as a

mouthpiece for the government rather than as a tool for public

accountability. Writers such as Mwenda (2005) have drawn this

conclusions, questioning the aim of the open budget initiative. Looking

through the lens of the capabilities approach, it can be asked to what

extent does open data increase citizens’ capabilities in Uganda and does it

26

really make a difference at the national level if there is low political will.

The data shows that political and social freedoms also need to be realised

before the transparency initiative can be used to improve social services.

The next chapter will explore what impact open data has had at the

national and sub-national level. It will also look at how the political context

is impacting open data initiatives in order to measure the effectiveness of

evidence based advocacy.

6. Social-political impacts of open data This chapter will discuss the impacts of the open data initiative with a

specific focus on improvements to public services. It will begin with an

analysis of the empirical data showing to what extent CSOs aims have been

achieved with open data (6.1). It will then consider the political context to

explain how open data mechanisms work in Uganda (6.2).

6.1 Open data impacts on public services This section begins with a study of the national and sub-national level

impacts of open data and will conclude by analysing the participatory

timeline in order to find out how the web portal has been used by a CBO in

Nebbi.

6.1.1 Impacts at the national level

CSOs in Uganda have been calling for a ‘culture change’ in government in

response to high levels of corruption (Observation 1). Open data has been

at the forefront of this change internally and although direct impacts are

difficult to measure, there have been some political and social changes

internally.

Cultural change

In Uganda political changes have largely influenced by the new modus of

open data discussions at the national level because the budget is no longer

a closed document. Partners external to the government have noticed an

increase in the amount of discussion about the budget, as one stakeholder

put it,

“Every government official now, they all continuously talk about

the budget website, they talk about the national call center”

Interview 12

NGOs have also reported a reduction in the amount of trips they have to

make to the ministerial offices therefore breaking the culture of personal

connections in government and challenging patronage structure, as one

NGO worker explains,

“our trips to the ministries everyday are reducing, because even

they are doing it reluctantly, they have to share some of their data

online so our trips to go the ministry to get what we want is

reducing.”

Interview 4

There has also been improved levels of communication and engagement

with the Ministry of Finance and national NGOs which has strengthened

their own advocacy message, as CSBAG explains below,

“I think the thing we are having is presenting more credible budget

information which is where we have official budget data because

when [..] because we have credible budget information [….] we are

27

not just pointing fingers and accusing them we actually have real

data and [..] that is why they feel they can work with us.”

Interview 6

Evidence based advocacy is now essential to influence internal decisions by

reducing factual errors and persuasively influencing policy makers. These

factors can account for a culture change through the weakening of

government officials gatekeeping roles which is breaking down colonial

mind sets. The stronger culture of debate about priorities in budget

spending is creating a more sophisticated political environment and

creating new channels of engagement around public services. In the media

ACME report increased interest in data journalism as writers start to

critically analyse the budget to highlight uneven growth (Asiimwa, 2015).

However, open data’s scope to improve public services at the national

level is questionable as one INGO worker noted,

“but you cannot tell whether their (local officials) attitude towards

service delivery has improved or not at the moment.”

Interview 12

Ultimately these cultural changes have minimal impact as one journalist

reported that the feedback loop on the website for reporting social service

issues is not effective,

“talking to a local government official from Mukono and he says,

“you will find that appropriations they say: we have released this

amount of money to this district Mukono” and he says that when

they actually have not received the money then on the website

there is an option to call in or send an e-mail, but when you call,

you are actually not helped.”

Interview 7

It can be argued that the virtuous circle of accountability is failing in

Uganda which supports the theory that the open data increases passive

transparency while potentially hiding corrupt practices because officials

are further distanced from local problems. The consequence is reduced

trust between citizens and the administration. National level advocates

overcome this by trying not to match inputs against outputs and instead

focussing on the cultural change such as the engagement channels created

through evidence based advocacy. However, with regards to the central

question of this thesis, open data has not resulted in top down

improvements to public services

6.1.2 Sub-national level impacts

There are two areas of impact at the sub-national level in Uganda due to

the web portal: debate and responsiveness which are spurred by an

increase of hard copy displays of budget data at the sub-national level.

However, the argument that local services are not improving is further

strengthened due to low information asymmetry between data owners

and data users.

Improving debate

CSOs have reported that open data approves citizens M&E work to local

government which mean citizens themselves are more willing to engage

with local governments overall improving the communication between

citizens and local leaders. NGOs have noticed this through improved local

radio debates,

28

“Traditionally you will have people getting angry and pointing

fingers so they (leaders) do not show up to the radio talk shows.

But we have seen them (the public) recognise that some of these

issues, sometimes, are not always someone who is directly

responsible, so they are discussing things a little bit more openly”

Interview 5

Evidence based advocacy along with the new spaces for interaction, such

as radio or online comments sections, are resulting in calmer debate and

improved listening. Particularly interesting is that these debates show

increased voluntary contribution from citizens and local government

officials which is sparked by the access to new information.

Improved responsiveness

CSOs disagree on open data’s ability to improve government

responsiveness. For example, the open data website has since its launch

already had an upgrade making it more interactive while there are plans to

change the formatting and to speed up and refine the search engine

(interview 21). These changes demonstrate an increased responsiveness

from policy makers to citizens’ engagement. However, reducing long term

information asymmetry through the website is not assured.

Increased responsiveness can be seen in local official’s attitudes, as one

ACODE volunteer monitor noticed,

“They are no longer the way they used to handle: To Whom It May

Concern ah- ah they are now conscious. Because they know there is

somebody else who knows about the work”

Interview 15

At the sub-national level this had led to some concrete examples of public

service improvements. Uganda Debt Network (UDN) an NGO which builds

advocacy networks has mobilised community groups across the country to

write petitions and hold demonstrations if local services are not of a high

enough quality. During the building of a maternity ward in Mbale for

instance the locals noticed the cement mixing was not adequate,

“The community were really on the look out to see how this was

constructed and they were able always to challenge the contractor,

and you see him improving. Because when he started the

construction, they said no no, no, we can’t allow that, the way you

are mixing they made noise and he had to adjust. They have now

completed the work and its ok.”

Interview 15

Here is an example of bottom up surveillance (Lyon, 2007) but, as

Bjokrman & Svensson (2009) argue it is currently only limited to the local

level.

Data journalists are more critical, in particular they feel that the web portal

should be used to find discrepancies in the data in order to build criticise

and that open data is not being used to its full potential. Here one

Journalist explains,

“my problem with NGO's in Uganda is that they are almost no

different from a government worker. Instead of going out and

looking for stuff (budget discrepancies) that I can write in a story so

29

that people can use. In my view they don't put enough work in this

civil society work”

Interview 7

The critical stance of a CSO towards the ruling party can explain these

contradictory views, while some do not think the website goes far enough,

others view open data as an expression of power by the ruling party; those

who have access to the means of surveillance (in this case the national

government) are encouraging bottom up surveillance to tackle corruption.

But as chapter 5 demonstrated, the responsibility for data dissemination

and engagement is not spread equally across the governance structures

and bottom up surveillance has not increased hard accountability. As a

result, it could be argued that the information asymmetry necessary for

accountability has not yet been fulfilled, yet all CSOs recognise the need

for increased citizens M&E.

6.1.3 Empowerment impacts

Many NGOs use the concept of empowerment to strengthen evidence

based advocacy as a DI report states,

“We also hope that citizens and decision-makers will be better empowered

through free access to key information on what is being spent and where”

(DI, 2015).

Figure 10 charts the main achievements of the CBO Community Uplift and

Welfare Development (CUWEDA)over the last four years. Based in the

Nebbi district CUWEDA engages citizens with budget data to improve local

M&E work.

Prior to the web portal launch in 2013 CUWEDA was already using the

printed data to cross check their local quarterly releases. Early in 2015 the

CBO tried the toll free line but were excluded because their language was

not supported. The most important event for the CBO was the M&E

training they received in late 2012 from CUWEDA. After this point their

activities increased and the CBO formed a women’s rights defenders

group. This demonstrates how data dissemination responsibilities are

being left to the CSOs while the inherent inequality within open data

makes it difficult for sub-national advocacy to transcend unequal power

relations between CSOs and governments, as argued by Gildemyn (2014:

509). The context further shows how ICT quick fixes for accountability are

not sufficient as argued be Houtzager (2012) while ideas of society

moulding to ICT needs are unrealistic (Johnson 2014). The next chapter will

look at what impacts the political context of a country, soon to hold

another election, has on evidence based advocacy practices.

Figure 10 - Participatory timeline, Nebbi

30

6.2 Political context of Uganda This section will outline the legal structures which affect the use of the

budget data in Uganda and consequently if citizens experience any safety

issues using evidence based advocacy. Throughout the importance of

political context with be discussed.

6.2.1 The legal framework in Uganda

It is important to understand a countries legal framework in order to

contextualise advocacy practices. This Involves knowing the legal

structures but also understanding the extent of its implementation. There

are an increasing number of laws in place to control civil society in Uganda

such as the anti-terrorism laws (2002) or the digital communication act

(2010) which aims to curb freedom of speech. These are in addition to the

Secrecy Act which restricts Access to Information (ATI) laws and new NGO

certifications (Mwesigwa, 2015). While there are no laws restricting the

use of budget data directly, the above mentioned laws are in place to keep

data closed and help create a “culture of secrecy” (HURINET, 2010: p7)

described below by one NGO worker,

“The anti-terrorism laws they are so wide that so if the person has a

reasonable belief that ... that information going out might

jeopardize state security, you know the phrasing is ridiculous itself,

but they can do all sorts of things they want,”

Interview 4

One important structure for accountability of public service money is the

anti-corruption bill. In August the bill went through a second amendment.

The articles under discussion were regarding specific definitions of “a

person who commits an offence” (Uganda, House passes anti-corruption

amendement bill, 2015) to include political leaders (ibid). This

demonstrates a willingness make corruption a serious issues and to include

political leadership in the law. The ruling party is aware of delays and

failures in service delivery and are responding (Museveni vows to crush

corruption, n.d) but without tackling the culture of secrecy few local

leaders will connect their obligation to provide budget data with the fight

against corruption bringing into questions how these laws, including the

amendment bill, are enacted on the ground. As one investigative journalist

commented,

“Because our experience has shown us everywhere we have gone,

they (local government) don’t know anything about the law. They

don’t know about their obligation to provide information to the

public. What they know about is their official security act that bars

government officers from disclosing government information.”

Interview 14

In the run up to the elections criticism is being limited. A recent letter

leaked onto social media sight Facebook (TVO, 2015) from the Ugandan

Communication Commission (UCC) a quango body in charge of

communication for the ruling party further illustrates this. It reminds all

media stations in the run up to the election to avoid ‘negative trends’ and

‘unreliable sources of information’ (ibid). In a climate where most CSOs do

not know about official sources of data, warning letters further

discourages criticism and create an environment where freedom of speech

is limited.

31

6.2.2 Safety using budget data

CSOs have genuine concerns using budget data for advocacy as it is

recognized that data can be used to incite people. Many district officials

are threatened by bottom up surveillance of their local services, especially

if they have been using local budgets to bolster patronage structures. One

local volunteer from the Advocates Coalition recounted,

“some of those members at the sub counties are always threatened

by politicians. Yes some of them are. They come to you and say:

now you see [...] you first wait, you don’t take that information

about this, it will make people start asking this and that. - By who? -

Those LC3s”

Interview 15

NGOs overcome this by angling themselves as non-partisan and monitor

only at the sub-national level. They consider this a strength in their

approach because they do not offer their members up as a vote bank and

can work with multiple political parties. Problematically in Uganda,

especially in the run up to the election, non-partisan criticism is often

branded along with the opposition as one local monitor explained,

“Yes there is a lot of risk there because these people don’t want to

be monitored, so they will feel, this person here is trying to make

our work very hard. So they will brand you opposition if they are

politicians they will brand you”.

Interview 15

Furthermore, the external funding many NGOs receive can cause problems

because of President Museveni’s dislike for CSOs external funding

(Monitor, 2012, p. 16:02). One international funded, but nationally written

newsletter wrote that,

“We have been accused of being as corrupt as government, labelled agents

of imperialism, funding the opposition and plotting to overthrow the

government and President Museveni” (BM, 2012).

Not all NGOs are branded opposition, for example, during the ACODE

budget training it was interesting to note that there were many ruling

party (NRM) supporters amongst the volunteers. This was evident from the

shouting and cheering when mentions were made of the ruling party

(Observation 2) which brings into question their ability to impartially

monitor and evaluate services. Some ACODE budget champions argue that

there is no risk because the government is supporting them, as one

explained here,

“How do you for example threaten me? I cannot be threatened

because it is the wish of government. Whatever we are doing is

what the government wants”

Interview 17

Favourable sub-national level monitoring is encouraged by the ruling party

who want to take a tough stance on corruption but who are not

threatened by a favourable NGO. From this we can see it is important not

to treat CSOs homogeneously as there are different degrees of

surveillance, dependent the stance towards the ruling party. One of the

riskiest uses of data is to take legal action. INGO the Hub for Investigative

Media (HIM) take open budget data to its “logical conclusion” (Interview

14) by taking ministries to court over missing information.

32

“you can sue government. You take them to court, and government

they lose most of these cases because they are just playing around.

For me that’s the message I send, if you don’t give me what I want,

I take you to court.”

Interview 14

However, legal action is not a route many CSOs can take because of weak

legal structures which are easily compromised. Most CSOs use subtler

methods such as demanding hard copy information and relying on

community pressure to campaign locally while trying to remain non-

partisan.

6.2.3 Citizens self-censorship

This section will analyse how the political context impacts CSOs self-

censorship. It was found that all CSOs self-censor with no exceptions when

it comes to discussing the two aspects of the budget: defence and military.

Few CSOs in Uganda actively pursue this data because of physical threats

as one journalist explains,

“defence and state house they take a huge chunk of money. State

house is office of the president. So lots of money is channeled

through that and then we cannot see where they spend on....

sometimes we get reports and then you got some information and

it's not easy to just present it. Yeah, for defence you get

threatened.”

Interview 11

The Ugandan ruling party has a selective distinction between budget data

and data which is deemed a security risk. This has created tensions by

encourages some CSOs while silencing others. For example, the Black

Monday movement used hard accountability such as naming and shaming

and monitoring of local services however but since March 2015 many

journalists noticed that there have not been any publications. Members

were allegedly arrested in order to close the publication down (Interview

11). In contrast, the MoF minister was more than willing to provide his

personal contact number to ACODE monitors (Observation 2).

The tensions around advocacy can also be seen in the way ordinary citizens

do not want to hear political criticism. During an interview in a public space

with a radio talk show host a local woman nearby was so offended by the

respondent’s views on state level corruption that this researcher was

accused of being a foreign spy here to stir up opposition resistance

(Interview 20). It would appear that citizens are not only censored by top

down pressure but also from peer pressure too, as one CSO explains,

“Some people are so ignorant, they say those things of government

I don’t want, and they will arrest me. There are some people like

that, some people will fear to use the information definitely”

Interview 14

Fear of speaking the truth for being branded opposition has made people

cowardly and only those supported by external funds are able to take legal

action demonstrating how legal structures are failing national CSOs. The

tension is felt in wider society as well. Popular in Uganda are public

debates or “Ekimezas,” open forums held at district level where the public

gets a chance to question local leaders. During one such forum in Mbale,

33

before the towns-people spoke there was a call from citizens to disperse

the local police presence on the streets for fear of reprimand later showing

a mistrust for authority figures (Observation 3). Figure 11 shows a local

man demanding answers about public service spending during an

Ekimeeza in Mbale.

In the run up to the elections in Uganda is would seem political tensions

are high which is limiting freedom of speech and the scope of surveillance

which civil society can undertake using the budget information as the

ruling party attempts to control the evidence based accountability and

includes surveillance with the purpose of criticising budget management.

The attempts by the BM movement to exact sanctions and their

subsequent silencing limits civil society groups to “soft” accountability for

fear of reprimand in the pre-election climate.

Figure 11 - Citizen at Mbale Ekimeza

6.3 Conclusion

Sub question three asked how open budget data has impacted on

governments accountability to public services. Open data is creating

cultural changes which are both strengthening social accountability at the

local level but also increasing anonymity at the national level but overall

open data has not yet lead to national level improvements to public

services. Instead CSO advocacy needs to be turned into a call for

information justice by matching budget inputs with qualified outcomes in

order to increase awareness of the failures in local planning and create

data which the media can reflect upon.

At the sub-national level, increased debate and local service

responsiveness has improved among citizens and local officials,

demonstrating a local government shift in focus towards citizens’ demands

and creating a more sophisticated political climate. However, with

decentralisation CSOs have to tackle local as well as national level

corruption which they cannot do alone. Contradictions in the data show

that accountability is not evenly spread across the country which

demonstrates poor information asymmetry. This thesis argues that

information alone cannot challenge uneven power relations in Uganda,

demonstrated by the way advocacy impacts are limited to the local level. If

the implications of limiting citizen’s criticisms are not understood by the

ruling party, then responsibility for public services will not be spread

equally across governance structures.

Sub question four asks what impact the political context has on CSO

advocacy practices. The web portal has concurrently made M&E work safer

because of top down government approval while also creating political

divides by simplifying the political debate.

34

With a growing opposition movement in Uganda’s upcoming election civil

society groups have found the ability to demand improved service has

decreased, as can demonstrated by the strength of the secrecy act. Most

CSO have had to take a politically neutral line in order to overcome

political tensions. In addition, the ruling party discourse hinges on the

success of the economy which has had the impact of making any criticism

simultaneously charged as anti-patriotic and anti-growth. Any unwanted

attention on sensitive data has resulted in threats to individuals, creating a

climate of self-censorship and limiting civil society advocacy to data on the

web portal, which has been shown to be limited. Those who are interested

in hard advocacy can only do so with external donor funding due to the

weak legal structures in the country.

7. Conclusion This report shows how civil society groups are using budget data for

advocacy, that is by improving monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices,

however these efforts are limited to the local level. To some extent

surveillance has made government officials more responsive to local

criticism. It has emphasised the importance of social accountability as an

advocacy tool and more specifically how monitoring and evaluation is

reasoned to increase individual agency through bottom up surveillance.

More can be done by increasing the use of budget data in existing

structural institutions while issues of technological determinism need to be

overcome the focus group data demonstrated. While openness is closely

related to concepts of transparency and accountability, data can inherently

exclude certain socio-economic groups and perpetuate unequal growth, a

problem which cannot be overcome with more data. As such, data policies

are never external to the political structures which create them so legal

and political structures are important contexts to open data.

In Uganda CSOs should work with the institutional structures which

respond best to their advocacy aims and the amount of citizen –

government interaction should be increased. The strength of open data

lies in its ability to increase evidence based advocacy and specially to

emphasise growing inequality. In Uganda authoritarian control is

expressed through the control of outcomes, by diverting local government

responsibilities towards the aims of the ruling party instead of increasing

local governments responsibility to citizens. In light of this, NGOs should

use data to break down the structural control with closed data while CBOs

should not forget that the media, and especially data journalism, can help

to improve their outreach.

CSOs in Uganda want to see increased internally reflexivity on party

leaderships behaviour and want to build capacity at the national level

around the use of budget data but because of the digital divide

transparency through open data is not reaching enough new audiences

while open criticism is lacking. Together these explain why transparency

does not lead to accountability while hard accountability has been limited

and the legal system is failing CSOs who want to take open data further.

35

Bibliography Alexis Rwabizambuga. (2015). Uganda. Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from African

Economic Outlook (AEO):

http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/

Nandyona, G. (2014, May 12). Why these spreadsheets are special: a

turning point in transparency for Uganda and Rwanda. Retrieved

11 20, 2015, from Devinit.org:

http://devinit.org/#!/post/spreadsheets-special-turning-point-

transparency-uganda-rwanda

Ranganathan, R., & Foster, V. (2015). East Africa's infrastructure: A

continental perspective. African Region: The World Bank .

AccountAbility. (n.d). Development as Accountability . Retrieved 11 02,

2015, from Accountability21:

http://www.accountability.org/images/content/0/6/066/AccountA

bility%20-%20A21%20Development%20as%20Accountability.pdf

Adieno, D. (2015, April 16). High-Level Conference on the Data Revolution

in Africa: Defining the next steps for data communities. Retrieved

11 20, 2015, from Devinit.org: http://devinit.org/#!/post/high-

level-conference-on-the-data-revolution-in-africa-defining-the-

next-steps-for-data-communities

AFOIC. (2012). The struggle for access: An Assessment of the Capacity of

Public Bodies to Implement Uganda’s Access to Information Act,

2005. Uganda: African Freedom of Information Centre.

AfroBarometer. (2015, September 25). News release. Retrieved 11 20,

2015, from Eroded? Institutional trust suffers as perceived

corruption increases:

http://www.afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/press-

release/Uganda/uga_r6_pr3_accountability_trust.pdf

Amartya, S. (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford press.

Anderson, B. (2015, February 02). Adventures in the data revolution:

Collecting data in Uganda. Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from Markets for

good : http://www.marketsforgood.org/adventures-in-the-data-

revolution-getting-to-grips-with-data-in-uganda

Asiimwa, D. (2015, June). Increased allocation to roads, energy 'good for

economy'. Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from East African News:

http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Increased-allocations-to-

roads--energy--good-for-economy-/-/2558/2750638/-/cbg1gv/-

/index.html

BBC. (2015, July 09). Uganda's Amama Mbabazi and Kizza arrested.

Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from BBC Africa:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-33459274

Björkman, M., & Svensson, J. (2009). Power to the People: Evidence from a

Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in

Uganda. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 124, No. 2, 735-

769.

BM. (2012, December 14). Black monday newsletter: The first black

monday. Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from Action Aid:

http://www.actionaid.org/uganda/publications/black-monday-

movement-newsletter

BM. (2014, September). Black Monday Newsletter edition 21. Retrieved 11

02, 2015, from Action Aid:

http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/21st-edition-black-

monday-newsletter.pdf

Brisset-Foucault, F. (2013). A citizenship of distinction in the open radio

debats of kampala . The Journal of the International African

Institute, Volume 83, 227-250.

Bryman, A. (2008). Social research methods Third edition. Oxford: Oxford

University press.

36

Chapman, J., & Wameyo, A. (2001, January). Monitoring and evaluation

Advocacy: A scoping study. Retrieved 11 17, 2015, from ActionAid:

http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC21800.p

df

CSBAG. (2015). Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group. Retrieved 11 25,

2015, from Citizens Budget: http://csbag.org/publications/citizens-

budget-2015-16/

Davies, T. (2012, June). Supporting open data throgh active engagement.

Position paper.

Davies, T. (n.d). Transparency and open data . ScienceWise: Mapping the

new terrain: public dialogue on science and technology, 19-23.

Davies, Tim. (2010, August). Open data, democracy and public sector

reform. Retrieved 11 03, 2015, from Open data impacts:

http://www.practicalparticipation.co.uk/odi/report/

Dawes, S. (n.d). A Realistic Look at Open Data. Center for Technology in

Government at University at Albany.

Delapalme, N. (2011). African Governance: The Importance of more and

better data . Governance: An International Journal of Policy,

Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 24, No. 1,, 1-3.

Devarajan, S. (2011, July 10). Africa’s statistical tragedy. Retrieved from

World Bank blog: http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/africa-s-

statistical-tragedy

DI. (2015, October). Groundbreaking new tool lets Ugandans see numbers

on resources, poverty, education . Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from

Devlopment Initiative: http://devinit.org/#!/post/groundbreaking-

new-tool-lets-ugandans-see-the-numbers-on-resources-poverty-

education-and-health-at-national-and-district-level

Ding, L., Peristeras, V., & Hausenblas, M. (2012, May/June). Linked open

government data. Retrieved 11 16, 2015, from computer.org:

http://www.computer.org/csdl/mags/ex/2012/03/mex2012030011

.pdf

Fox, J. (2007). The uncertain relationship between transparency and

accountability. Development in Practice 17:4, 663 - 671.

Fox, J. (2015). Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?

World Development Vol. 72, pp 346–361.

Fuchs, C., & Horak, E. (2008). Africa and the Digital divide. Telematics and

Informatics 25, 99–116.

Gildemyn, M. (2014). Understanding the Influence of independent CS

monitoring and evaluation . American Journal of Evaluation Vol.

35(4), 507-524.

Gray, J. (2015). Open budget data: Mapping the landscape. Retrieved 11

02, 2015, from Fiscal Transparency:

http://www.fiscaltransparency.net/resourcesfiles/files/201509021

28.pdf

Harrison, T., & Sayogo, D. (2014). Transparency, Participation and

accountability practices in open government: A comparitive study.

Government information quarterly , (31) 513-525.

HDI. (2014). Human development reports. Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from

UNDP: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data

Heald, D. (2012). Why is transparency about public expenditure so elusive.

International Review of Administrative science 78(1), 30–49.

Hedström, P., & Swedberg, R. (1996). Social Mechanisms. Acta Sociologica

Vol. 39, No. 3, 281-308.

Houtzager, A. J. (2012). Widgets or Watchdogs? Public Management

Review 14:2, 145-162.

HRW. (2011, June). Joint letter to president Museveni from civil society.

Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from Human Rights watch :

37

https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/15/joint-letter-president-

museveni-civil-society

IBP. (n.d). Orientation to budget advocacy. Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from

International budget parternship :

http://internationalbudget.org/budget-advocacy/orientation/

IBP. (n.d). Role of civil society budget work . Retrieved November 02, 2015,

from International Budget Partnerhsip:

[http://internationalbudget.org/why-budget-work/role-of-civil-

society-budget-work/]

IFPRI. (2011). Decentralization and Rural Service Delivery in Uganda. IFPRI

Discussion Paper 01063: International Food Policy Research

Institute.

IMF. (2015). Bundesbank. Retrieved 11 18, 2015, from IMF Statistical

forum: Official statistics to support evidence based policy making :

http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Bundesbank/Research/

Conferences/statsforum.html?startpageId=Startseite-

EN&startpageAreaId=Marginalspalte&startpageLinkName=statsfor

um+347826

Izamo, A., & Wilkerson, M. (2011). Musevenni's triumph and weakness.

Journal of democracy Volume 22, Number 3, 64-78.

Janaagraha, C. f. (2015). I Paid A Bribe. Retrieved 11 18, 2015, from I paid a

bribe: http://ipaidabribe.com/

Janssen, M., Charalabidis, Y., & Zuiderv, A. (2012). Benefits, Adoption

Barriers and Myths of Open. Information Systems Management

29:4, 258-268.

Jetzek, T., Avital, M., & Bjor, N. (2014). Data-Driven Innovation through

Open Government Data. Journal of Theoretical and Applied

Electronic Commerce Research VOL 9 / ISSUE 2, 100-120.

Johnson, J. (2014 ). From open data to information justice. Ethics Inf

Technology , 16:263–274.

Kalyango, Y. (2009). Political news and democratic support. Journal of

Radio & Audio Media 16:2, 200-215.

Kew, D., & Oshikoya, M. (2014). Escape from tyranny: civil society and

democratic struggle sin Africa. In E. Obadare, The Handbook of Civil

Society in Africa (pp. 8-10). New York: Springer.

Kheyfets, I., Mastruzzi, M., Merotto, D., & Sondergaa, L. (2011,

September). New data tool to Boost public spending efficiency.

Retrieved November 02, 2015, from World Bank:

http://www.worldbank.org/eca

Kiwanuka, M. (2012). Decentralisation and good governance in Africa:

Institutional challenges to Uganda's good governance. The Journal

of African & Asian Local Government Studies Vol 1, No 3, 44-59.

Kuteesa, F., Magona, I., Maris, W., & Wokadala, J. (2006). Uganda: A

Decade of Budget Reform and poverty reduction. OECD journal on

budgeting Volume 6: No. 2, 1-25.

Lyon, D. (2007). Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Cambridge : Polity

Press.

Making budgets, p. (2011, October 11). THE DAR ES SALAAM DECLARATION

ON ACCOUNTABLE, PARTICIPATORY AND TRANSPARENT PUBLIC

BUDGETS. Retrieved from IMF.org:

http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/consult/2013/transpol/pdf/da

ressalaam.pdf

Matsiko, H. (2014, November 24). Buying the vote. Retrieved 11 23, 2015,

from The Independent : http://www.independent.co.ug/cover-

story/9516-buying-the-vote

Meijer, A. (2009). Understanding modern transparency. International

review of administrative science Vol 75(2), 255–269.

38

Ministry of Finance, P. (2015). Uganda Budget Information. Retrieved 11

23, 2015, from Know your budget: Feedback:

http://www.budget.go.ug/index.php?p=allcoms

MoF. (2015). know your budget. Retrieved 11 04, 2015, from Uganda

budget information:: http://www.budget.go.ug/

Monitor, D. (2012, December 13). Live Feed: Museveni adressing

parliament . Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from Daily Monitor:

http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/Live+Feed++Museveni+addressi

ng+parliament/-/691252/1643070/-/format/xhtml/-/we3pkm/-

/index.html

Mutibwa, P. (1992). Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled

Hopes. Africa: African world press.

Mwesigwa, A. (2015, June 24). Uganda: NGO bill aims to muzzle civil

society, say activists. Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from The Guardian :

http://www.theguardian.com/global-

development/2015/jun/24/uganda-ngo-bill-aims-muzzle-civil-

society-say-activists

New, V. (2012, July 19). 25 more districts created. Retrieved 11 25, 2015,

from New Vision: Uganda's leading Daily:

http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/633146-25-more-districts-

created.html

Obadare, E. (2011). Civil Society in Sub-Saharan Africa. Oxford: Oxford

Hnadbooks Online.

OBI. (2015). Open budget index rankings. Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from

International budget partnership:

http://internationalbudget.org/opening-budgets/open-budget-

initiative/open-budget-survey/publications-2/rankings-key-

findings/rankings/

OECD. (2004). Decentralisation and povert in developing countries.

Working paper no. 236: OECD.

OECD. (2013). Aid data search. Retrieved from Query wizard for

international development statistics: https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/

Parliament, U. (2015). Houses passes anti-corruption amendement bill.

Retrieved 11 19, 2015, from Parliament of the Republic of Uganda:

http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/about-

parliament/parliamentary-news/637-house-passes-anti-corruption-

bill

Pearce, J., & Howell, J. (2001). Civil society and development. U.S.A: Lynne

Rienner Publishers Inc.

Renzio, P., & Masud, H. (2011). Measuring and Promoting Budget

Transparency:. Governance: An International Journal of Policy,

Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 24, No. 3,, 607–616.

Renzio, P., & Simson, R. (2013, December). Transparency for what: the

usefulness of publicely available budget information in African

countries. Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from Overseas development

initiative (ODI): http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-

assets/publications-opinion-files/8754.pdf

reporter, V. (2016, January 22). Uganda falls short on 2015 adult literacy

target. Retrieved from New Vision:

http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1330222/uganda-

falls-short-2015-adult-literacy-target

reporter, V. (n.d). Museveni vows to crush corruption. Retrieved 11 02,

2015, from New Vision:

http://www.newvision.co.ug/mobile/Detail.aspx?NewsID=628463&

CatID=1

39

Robinson, M., & Friedman, S. (2007). Civil Society, Democratization, and

Foreign Aid: Civic Engagement and Public Policy in South Africa and

Uganda . Democratization, 14:4, , 643-668.

Sen, A. (1981). Poverty and Famine. Oxford: Oxford English press.

Sengendo, H., Lwasa, S., & Mukwaya, P. (2010). Urban Development

transitions and their implications for policy and planning in Uganda.

Urban Forum 21, 267–281.

Sunlight, F. (2009, May 26). Brandais and the history of transparency.

Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from The Sunlight Foundation:

https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2009/05/26/brandeis-and-

the-history-of-transparency/

Susha, I., Zuiderwijk, A., & Janssen, M. (2015). Benchmarks for evaluating

the progress of open data: usage limitations and lessons learned.

Social science computer review, Vol. 33(5) 613-630.

Susha, I., Zuiderwijk, A., Janssen, M., & Gronlund, A. (2015). Benchmarks

for Evaluating the. Social Science Computer Review Vol. 33(5), 613-

630.

Tangri, R., & Mwenda, A. M. (2005). Politics, donors and the

ineffectiveness of anticorruption. The Journal of Modern African

Studies Vol. 44 Issue 01, 101 - 124.

Taylor, L. e. (2014). Big Data and Positive Change in the Developing World.

Policy and internet Vol 6, no 2, 418-444.

TI. (2014). Corruption perceptions index: 2014 results. Retrieved from

Transparency International:

[http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results]

Tumusiime-Mutebile, E. (2010). Uganda's economic reforms . Oxford:

Oxford University press.

TVO. (2015, July 08). UCC - to all broadcasters. Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from

Facebook:

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1120244264656290&

set=pb.100000121802522.-

2207520000.1443363413.&type=3&theater

UBOS. (2014). National population and housing census: provisional results.

Uganda: Uganda Bureau Of Statistics.

UCC. (2015). Accecss and usage of communication services across Uganda .

UCC: Uganda Communication Commission .

Uganda, P. (2015, August). House passes anti-corruption amendement bill.

Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from Parliament of the republic of Uganda:

http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/about-

parliament/parliamentary-news/637-house-passes-anti-corruption-

billf

Uganda, P. (2015, August). Houses passes anti-curruption amendement bill.

Retrieved 11 02, 2015, from Parliament of the republic of Uganda :

http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/about-

parliament/parliamentary-news/637-house-passes-anti-corruption-

billf

UN-IEAG. (2014, November 01). A world that counts. Retrieved from

United Nations Data Revolution Group:

http://www.undatarevolution.org/wp-

content/uploads/2014/11/A-World-That-Counts.pdf

WB. (2016, November). World Development Indicators. Retrieved 11 03,

2011, from World Bank:

http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&coun

try=UGA&series=&period=#

WB. (April 2004). Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of

delivery of Public Services? Evidence from Uganda. The World Bank,

Washington D.C.: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3277.

40

Annex one – Overview of respondents

In-depth semi-structured interviews

interview #

Description Age/Sex Location

1 NGO Middle/Female

Kampala

2 NGO Middle/Male Kampala

3 INGO Middle/Male Kampala

4 NGO Middle/Male Kampala

5 INGO Middle/Female

Kampala

6 NGO Middle/Female

Kampala

7 Media Middle/Female

Kampala

8 Media Middle/Female

Kampala

9 ex-government Old/Male Mbale

10 NGO/CBO Middle/Male Nebbi

11 Media Middle/Male Kampala

12 INGO Middle/Male Kampala

13 NGO/CBO Middle/Male Kampala

14 INGO/media Middle/Male Kampala

15 NGO/CBO Middle/Male Mbale

16 NGO/CBO Young/Male Mbale

17 NGO/CBO Middle/Male Mbale

19 NGO/CBO Middle/Male Mbale

20 Media Middle/Male Mbale

21 Government (MoF)

Old/Male Kampala

23 NGO/CBO Middle/Male Kampala

24 Media Middle/Male Kampala

Observations

Observation #

Description Location

1 DI interactive map website Kampala

launch

2 ACODE budget champion Training

Seta-Mukona

3 Ekimeza/public debate Mbale

4 Radio show Mbale

Participatory method

Participatory method Description Location

Focus group timeline Community Uplift and Welfare Development (CUWEDA)

Nebbi