david newbery, dae cambridge
TRANSCRIPT
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David Newbery, DAE Cambridge
CEPR/ESRC I-O WorkshopThe Political Economy of Regulation
www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/research/regulate.htm
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• universal service obligation in exchange for franchise monopoly
• vertically integrated• final prices controlled: ‘just and reasonable’
� regulation or state ownership• both under cost-of-service regulation
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• US: evolved cost-of-service regulation• deregulation, not privatisation• default is regulation• UK: privatisation for many motives• recognise need for price control• designed to avoid US inefficiency• default is reference to MMC/CC
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• Federal Power Act 1935 requires prices that are ‘just and reasonable’
• Selling at market-related prices requires:– utility and affiliates do not have market power– competitive prices are just and reasonable– can withdraw right if there is market power– can re-impose cost-based prices caps
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• liberalisation creates tensions– unsustainable cross subsidies (AT&T)– access problems motivate unbundling• easy at privatisation, harder if private– US gas, BG, painfully dismembered– CEGB unbundled at privatisation
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• Licenses define rights and powers• Needed for regulatory credibility
– for sale, to ensure private investment• competition not privatisation for efficiency• RPI-X as transition from incumbency� incentive regulation of natural monopoly
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• UK (and Norway) considered successes• Single market requires unbundling• Electricity markets seen as unproblematic• Reasons for institutional solutions ignored• Little guidance given to member states• Two years to enact Electricity Directive
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Politically acceptable liberalisation requires:
• A regulator who can credibly ensure :– sustainable competitive outcomes– absence of abusive market manipulation– efficient free entry and investment
These challenges remain unmet in EU
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• England+Wales unbundled, Scotland not– social benefits: 6% p.a. E+W; 0 in Scotland= 100% return on CEGB sales value– consumers lose, generators win� regulatory pressure to increase competition– tough price controls to pass through cost fall
� E+W model for EU Electricity Directive
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Productivity of CEGB and successor companiescompared to UK manufacturing industry
10
79/80 81/82 83/84 85/86 87/88 89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96
Financial years April-March
Inde
x nu
mbe
rs 1
989/
90=1
00 (l
og s
cale
)
Industry CEGB NP PG NE NGC
100
150
200
300
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Generation in England and Wales by fuel type
TWh
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 20000
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Nuclear
Coal
other steam
CCGT
hydro+other
imports
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Generation in England and Wales
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
89/90 90/1 91/2 92/3 93/4 94/5 95/6 96/7 97/8 98/9 99/00 00/01f'cast
TWh
PSB /MissionPGNP Mis'n AES EasternIPPImportNE Magnox
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• Scotland: vertical integration – small gains offset by costs– little competition, lower price fall
• N Ireland: Single buyer model– large efficiency gains: 3 times CEGB– hard to transfer to consumers because of PPAs– UK Govt. subsidises electricity prices
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Electricity prices by town3,300 kWh at 2000 prices excl VAT
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 19997
8
9
10
11
12
Edinburgh London Belfast
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Lars Bergman,Geert Brunekreeft,Chris Doyle, David Newbery,
Michael Pollitt, Pierre Regibeau,Nils von der Fehr
www.cepr.org Published London:CEPR,1999
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• authorisation preferable to tendering• access is key to creating single market
– press for rTPA– require transparency– charge depend only on connection point
• require ownership separation of G & T/D• strong sector-specific regulation needed
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• Lisbon 2000 European Council asks CEC to work to complete single ESI market
• CEC reaches same conclusion as CEPR• Stockholm 2001 CEC presents
– analysis: working papers– Press Release: ‘California not a problem’– proposed amendments to Gas+Elec Directives
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• for electricity and gas• only rTPA, tariffs published ex ante• sector-specific regulator• legal (but not ownership) unbundling G&T• no SBM, no tendering (except reserve)• 1.1.2005 all gas + elec markets fully open
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• CEC claims reforms will avoid California problems caused by “inadequate legal framework and .. capacity”
• France opposes new Directive: not convinced of liberalisation
• Germany opposes need for regulator– also has nTPA and vertical integration
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1996: cost of new power < regulated price– buy out stranded generation assets• Price cap until then, expect price fall, but• average 2000 wholesale price 3 x 1999• Jan-Apr 2001 prices 10 x 1999• distribution companies bankrupted• State steps in at huge cost
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• Under-investment + cheap hydro from NW• high demand growth in WSCC• Huge swing in hydro supply (=12 nukes)• Gas price rise, NOx permits double cost,• Regulatory disapproval of contracts• Price caps imposed with perverse effects– High Western prices � bankruptcy
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• Inelastic demand + tight market � large market power
• Unbundling � price risks - need hedging• discouraging contracts � market power• Capacity- public good in federal system• Local intervention in interconnected system
problematic
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• Supply Function Equilibria– Green and Newbery (1992) JPE
• Cournot (by hour of day)• Auctions: pay-bid vs Pool• Commercial software
– captures non-convexities
Agree on general form of equilibrium
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GW
œ/MWh
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 4500
20
40
60
80
100
Marginal Cost Maximum Demand
2-firm range 5-firm range
Feasible Supply FunctionsDuopoly and Quintopoly
Calibrated for England 1990
A
B
C
D
X
demandvariation
Cournot line
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• Spare capacity � Bertrand competition• Tight capacity � Cournot competition• Spot competition for uncontracted output• Entry determines average price• Peak price depends on capacity• Capacity depends on p-c for least-run plant
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• Number of competitive generators• Short-run elasticity of demand• Capacity• Contract coverage• Entry conditions• Demand uncertainty
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• peak price increases as 1/{(n+1)�}• peak price decreases with contract cover• demand elasticity � very low• transmission constraints fragment market– reduce effective number of generators, n• generators can exploit constraints
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• desirable to reduce concentration– trend is in other direction
• encourage contracting• desirable to increase spare generation
– hard to sustain in liberalised market• desirable to maximise extent of market
– regulate for “excess” transmission - but how?• Should TO’s take account of market power?
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Capacity constraints but no contracts
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• Merge (c.f. Germany)• Reduce spare capacity (Germany)Contract cover demand driven � expensive � reduces cover � market power
� Critical to minimise barriers to entry– ownership unbundling of G & T
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Supply function equilibriumvarying number of generators
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18price
quan
tity
Q n=2D maxD minQ n=3Q n=5Q n=8
With contracts to deter contestable entry
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• Contracts reduce av. price to deter entry• More competitors � less volatility
� Expect actions to impede entry, e.g.- pay-bid, opaque markets, vertical
integration (NETA?)
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• rTPA + ownership unbundling: CEC �• adequate and secure supply: CEC �
– network adequate and reliable– production capacity adequate– security of supply of primary fuel
• power to regulate competition: CEC �
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“competition where possible, regulate where not”• Leave markets to competition legislation?
– Ex post, penalties � legalistic, slow– dominance ~ 40+% of market– information collected only for case
� need ex ante regulatory powers
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• 2000: Market Abuse Licence Condition– refers to bidding in Pool– not accepted by AES, British Energy� referred to Competition Commission� not “against public interest” if unmodified• Pool to be replaced by NETA 2001
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• generator licence restrains market behaviour• can be modified after reference to CC• market power possible with HHI < 1800
– electricity cannot be stored– transmission constraints fragment market– supply must be matched to demand by second– demand inelastic in short run
� volatile prices: £11-1100/MWh over 24 hrs
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• US has long history of price regulation• markets may achieve better outcome– if not, fall back on regulation• EU assumes market will be better– no fall-back option
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• Dec 15, 2000 FERC – deems prices ‘unjust and unreasonable’– imposes soft price-caps on spot prices
� perverse effects, ‘MW laundering’• June 2001 FERC order extended to WSCC
– must offer to spot market• contrast with CA MSC mitigation plan
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• IOUs sell at cost• consumers can buy 85% at 2000 price• right to market pricing only if
– sell 75% capacity as 2-year contracts at ‘competitive price’ ($54/MWh)
– file annual outage plan, must bid otherwise– no cap on spot, AS markets– otherwise face cost-based price regulation
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• both attack capacity withdrawal• FERC caps spot prices of whole region� to avoid market power contagion• CA MSC operates on contract price� leaves spot price to signal scarcity� rights to regulated contracts prices� avoids costly long-term lock-in
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• market power falls as contract cover rises• confine price regulation to contracts
– leaves spot price to signal scarcity– ‘dual pricing’ prevents large rent transfers– sustained by legacy contracts in short-run– long run requires franchise?
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• no prior legislated cost-based regulation• no concept of ‘just and reasonable’ prices• little power to control wholesale prices• often limited power to get information � weak market surveillance– competitive tests derive from other markets
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• dominant incumbents (Fr, Be, It)• merger wave (EdF, E-on, RWE)• inadequate interconnect transmission• illiquid or absent wholesale markets• under-staffed or no regulator• access to information patchy• lack of regulatory enforcement power
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APX and LPX Weekday prices May-July 2001
0
100
200
300
400
500
30-Apr7-M
ay14-M
ay21-M
ay28-M
ay4-Ju
n11-Ju
n18-Ju
n25-Ju
n2-Ju
l9-Ju
l16-Ju
l23-Ju
l30-Ju
l6-Aug
Euro
/MW
h
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
ratio
APX
:LPX
APX 9-18 LPX 9-18 ratio APX:LPX
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Arbitrage profit weekdays May - July 2001
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1001 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
hours
Euro
s/M
Wh
Average Av - 1 SE Av+1 SE
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• vertical integration � recover fixed costs via access charges to grid?
� low spot prices, entry deterrence, mergere.g Germany (Brunekreeft)
• Electrabel: 95% of Be, 30% of NL– vertically integrated in Be, no spot market– low cost but interconnector zero price
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• lack of markets + domestic franchise �contracts necessary– reduces short-run market power, hedges spikes– yardstick regulation of PPAs countervails
• opaque markets & asym info deter entry� horizontal, vertical integration �old German-style equilibrium: safe but costly?
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• new Directive ends franchise� generators integrate into supply• remove counterparties to entry contracts� reduce spare capacity• limited interconnector � market power in
national markets• ESI now 400 bn euros, high prices costly
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• increase interconnect capacity rapidly– ‘excess’ T is public good– dilutes market power in short run� reduces need for regulation
� long run EU-wide shortages?• Maximise contracts, also for capacity
– G capacity is public good• � keep franchise as counterparty?