[david walsh] the military balance in the cold org

The Military Balance in theCold War

This book examines the impact of American perceptions of the militarybalance between the United States and the Soviet Union during the keyperiod of 1976–85. That decade witnessed the decline of the US–SovietDetente and the resurgence of superpower confrontation, often calledthe ‘‘Second Cold War.’’ Among the factors contributing to this shift wasthe American view of the military balance—that is, whether the UnitedStates had been or was being overtaken by the Soviet Union in terms ofmilitary capability. Since then, the military balance has been viewedwithin the overall context of issues impacting superpower relationsduring this era. However, American attitudes of the time were basedheavily on the military balance, and perceptions of it came to have adecisive impact on US policy. Dr Walsh examines the full range ofissues—strategic and European-based forces, power-projection cap-abilities, and military spending—and their role in shaping perceptions,not just of the military balance but also in such key areas of internationalrelations as arms control, trans-Atlantic diplomacy and Third Worldconflict. In doing so, the author shows how the perceptions of the 1970scontributed to key policy decisions in the 1980s, which themselvesplayed a significant role in bringing the Cold War to an end.

This book will be of interest to advanced students of Cold War history,Strategic Studies, US foreign policy and IR in general.

David M. Walsh has a PhD in International History from the LondonSchool of Economics.

Cold War history seriesSeries Editors: Odd Arne Westad and Michael CoxISSN: 1471-3829

In the new history of the Cold War that has been forming since 1989, many ofthe established truths about the international conflict that shaped the latter halfof the twentieth century have come up for revision. The present series is anattempt to make available interpretations and materials that will help further thedevelopment of this new history, and it will concentrate in particular on pub-lishing expositions of key historical issues and critical surveys of newly availablesources.

1. Reviewing the Cold WarApproaches, interpretations, and theoryOdd Arne Westad (ed.)

2. Rethinking Theory and History in theCold WarRichard Saull

3. British and American Anticommunismbefore the Cold WarMarrku Ruotsila

4. Europe, Cold War and Co-existence,1953–1965Wilfred Loth (ed.)

5. The Last Decade of the Cold WarFrom conflict escalation to conflict trans-formationOlav Njølstad (ed.)

6. Reinterpreting the End of the Cold WarIssues, interpretations, periodizationsSilvio Pons and Federico Romero (eds)

7. Across the BlocsCold War cultural and social historyRana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds)

8. US Paramilitary Assistance to SouthVietnamInsurgency, subversion and public orderWilliam Rosenau

9. The European Community and theCrises of the 1960sNegotiating the Gaullist challengeN. Piers Ludlow

10. Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Roleof China 1949–64Changing alliancesMari Olsen

11. The Third Indochina WarConflict between China, Vietnam andCambodia, 1972–79Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (eds)

12. Greece and the Cold WarFront line state, 1952–1967Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

13. Economic Statecraft during the Cold WarEuropean responses to the US trade embargoFrank Cain

14. Macmillan, Khrushchev and theBerlin Crisis, 1958–1960Kitty Newman

15. The Emergence of Detente in EuropeBrandt, Kennedy and the formation ofOstpolitikArne Hofmann

16. European Integration and the Cold WarOstpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965–1973N. Piers Ludlow

17. Britain, Germany and the Cold WarThe search for a European detente 1949–1967R. Gerald Hughes

18. The Military Balance in the Cold WarUS perceptions and policy, 1976–85David M. Walsh

The Military Balancein the Cold WarUS perceptions and policy, 1976–85

David M. Walsh

First published 2008by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informabusiness

# 2008 David M. Walsh

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted orreproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,including photocopying and recording, or in any informationstorage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from thepublishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataWalsh, David, Ph. D.The military balance in the Cold War :US perceptions and policy,1976-85 / by David Walsh.p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-0-415-42619-0 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. United States--Defenses. 2. United States--Armed Forces. 3. Cold war. 4. Balanceof power. 5. Soviet Union--Defenses. 6. Soviet Union--ArmedForces. I. Title.

UA23.W315 20073530.03327309047--dc222007003129

ISBN10: 0–415–42619–7 (hbk)ISBN10: 0–203–94631–6 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978–0–415–42619–0 (hbk)ISBN13: 978–0–203–94631–2 (ebk)

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’scollection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

ISBN 0- 203- 94631- 6 Master e-book ISBN

Contents

Preface viii

Acknowledgements ix

List of abbreviations x

Introduction 1

PART I

Strategic forces 13

1 The counterforce doctrine 15

The development of ‘‘Limited Nuclear Options,’’ 1974–77 15The Carter years—PRM 10 to PD 59, 1977–80 22Counterforce and Soviet strategy: The role of perception 31

The Nixon–Ford years 31The Carter years 35

Conclusion 39

2 Protracted nuclear war 42

Strategy 44Weapons 50The Soviet threat 54Conclusion 59

3 Of shelters and Star Wars 63

Introduction 63Civil defense 63Soviet civil defense—The view in the 1970s 66Soviet civil defense—The view in the 1980s 72US civil defense—Programs and plans 74The Strategic Defense Initiative, 1983–85 79

The Soviet challenge 83Conclusion 86

PART II

The balance in Europe 89

4 The nuclear balance 91

The ‘‘neutron bomb’’ and alliance cohesion, 1977–78 92The LRTNF debate, 1979–83 97US perceptions and the Soviet threat 105Conclusion 107

5 Conventional forces 109

Prelude to the LTDP, 1974–77 111The three percent decision and the LTDP 114The balance in the Central Region 117Continued efforts, similar results, 1981–85 124Conclusion 127

PART III

Power projection 129

6 The naval balance 131

The shifting balance of power at sea 132The 1970s: Of missions and dollars 135The naval balance: Lists and capabilities 139The 600-ship navy and the balance of sea power in the 1980s 144Conclusion 150

7 Forces for rapid deployment 153

Carter and the RDF, 1977–81 155Reagan and the Central Command, 1981–85 164US and Soviet power projection capabilities compared 169Conclusion 171

PART IV

Defense spending 173

8 The expenditure debate 175

The balance of military spending in the mid-1970s 176Team B 180

vi Contents

The Carter years 183The Reagan increases, 1981–85 188Conclusion 193

Conclusion 195

Notes 208

Bibliography 250

Index 267

Contents vii

Preface

The years 1976–85 witnessed the decline of the US–Soviet Detenteestablished during the early 1970s and the resurgence of superpowerconfrontation, known as the ‘‘Second Cold War.’’ A significant con-tributing factor was the American view of the military balance. Putsimply, debate rested on whether the United States had been, or wasbeing, overtaken by the Soviet Union in terms of military capability.

Since that time, the military balance has been viewed in the overallcontext of issues impacting superpower relations during this era. How-ever, American attitudes toward the Soviet Union were based heavily onperceptions of it. These came to have a major impact on US policy during1976–85. As much documentation has only recently become available, adetailed analysis of this subject has as yet not been forthcoming.

This book examines the issues involved in the debates for each cate-gory of importance in the military arena, as well as the positions of theparticipants, both official and public. As a historical analysis, it stayswithin the parameters of what was known to the participants and reliesheavily on documents and sources from that period. The impact that thedecisions had on future events is also analyzed and discussed.

Acknowledgements

My deepest personal thanks to Dr Odd Arne Westad of the LondonSchool of Economics, who supervised the dissertation on which this bookis based and provided important suggestions in direction and for revi-sion; to Professor Ibrahim Karawan at the University of Utah, whooffered continual support and encouragement; and to my parents, whoprovided unquestioned love and support throughout the process ofresearch and writing.

Abbreviations

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament AgencyALCM Air-Launched Cruise MissileAIMS Alternative Integrated Military StrategiesC3I Command, Control, Communications and IntelligenceCDI Center for Defense Information/Conventional Defense

InitiativeCENTCOM Central CommandCPD Committee on the Present DangerDCI Director of Central IntelligenceDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDPC Defense Planning Committee (NATO)ERW Enhanced Radiation WeaponGLCM Ground-Launched Cruise MissileGSFG Group of Soviet Forces, GermanyIRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic MissileJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffINF Intermediate Range Nuclear ForcesLNO Limited Nuclear OptionLRINF Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear ForcesLRTNF Long-Range Theater Nuclear ForcesLSO Limited Strategic OptionLTDP Long Term Defense ProgramMAB Marine Amphibious BrigadeMAD Mutually Assured DestructionMAF Marine Amphibious ForceMAU Marine Amphibious UnitMIRV Multiple, Independently-Targetable Re-Entry VehicleMPS Multiple Protective Shelters/Maritime Prepositioning ShipsNCA National Command AuthorityNSC National Security CouncilNSDM National Security Decision MemorandumNSSM National Security Study MemorandumNSDD National Security Decision Directive

NTPS Near-Term Prepositioning ShipsNUWEP Nuclear Weapons Employment PolicyPD Presidential DirectivePFIAB President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory BoardPRM Presidential Review MemorandumRDF Rapid Deployment ForceRDJTF Rapid Deployment Joint Task ForceSACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, EuropeSCC Special Coordinating CommitteeSDI Strategic Defense InitiativeSIOP Single Integrated Operational PlanSLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic MissileSSBN Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile SubmarineTNF Theater Nuclear Forces

Abbreviations xi

Introduction

The period from 1976 to 1985 saw a considerable deterioration inrelations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two distinctperiods can be identified for this timeframe: the decline and fall of Detentebetween 1976 and 1980 and the ‘‘Second Cold War’’ of 1980 to 1985. Thereasons for this turn of events were numerous. The differing concepts ofDetente held by the United States and the Soviet Union played a con-siderable role in leading to a deterioration in relations. Soviet actions inAngola, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan, appeared, in American eyes,to violate the spirit of Detente. Another cause was that the superpowerDetente was a global process, in which numerous interests came into play,many of which exacerbated conflict rather than alleviated it.

One aspect that received considerable attention during this time wasthat of the military balance between the two powers. During 1976–80,critics of Detente came to see the military balance as shifting danger-ously in favor of the Soviet Union. These critics saw a link between thelarge-scale Soviet military buildup and the greater willingness on Mos-cow’s part to use force, both directly and indirectly, in the Third World.They saw this increased military capability as a means for the SovietUnion to achieve global hegemony, at the expense of the United States.

These critics did not go unanswered. Analysts and commentators bothwithin and outside of government challenged the view that the SovietUnion was overtaking the United States in terms of military power.However, the critics, who included such prominent individuals as PaulNitze, who had more than 25 years experience in official nationalsecurity positions, were able to convince both elite and public opinion ofan increasing Soviet threat.

It was this debate, on the perception of the superpower military bal-ance, that came to be so prominent during this time. The period 1980–85, which saw a resurgence of US–Soviet confrontation, witnessed theimplementation of many of the hawks’ arguments in American foreignand defense policy.

The historiography of this period makes considerable mention of theimportance the military balance—or the perception of it—had on the

shaping of events. Generally, the historiography can be divided into twocategories: the work of analysts writing during the period and that ofhistorians writing since the end of the Cold War. In the first categoryare those like Fred Halliday, who devoted a chapter of his book onsuperpower relations in the 1970s and 1980s to what he termed ‘‘TheDecline of US Military Superiority.’’1 Halliday viewed the military aspectas implicitly linked to other developments during the 1970s:

[T]he US military programmes of the Second Cold War periodreflect the combination of three interrelated considerations: anattempt to lengthen once again the quantitative gap between US andSoviet capabilities; a desire to take advantage of the opportunitiesfor greater superiority opened up by new technological develop-ments to develop a war-winning capacity; and anxiety at the manner inwhich the erosion of the US military superiority had led to the emergence ofchallenges to US policy in the world at large. (My italics)2

Halliday went on to note that ‘‘on its own the arms race would not haveprecipitated the Second Cold War: that developed only out of the com-bination of the shift in the military balance with other developments thatcompounded US alarm at the change in the military sphere.’’3

For political scientist John G. Stoessinger, the perceptions of indivi-dual leaders also played an important role in the shift in superpowerrelations. This was particularly true of Ronald Reagan, who came to thePresidency with a view of the Soviet Union not only as an ‘‘evil empire’’but as posing an immediate danger to the United States and its alliesacross the globe. The result, according to Stoessinger, was that ‘‘Underthe first term of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the Soviet–American rela-tionship deteriorated to a level not seen since the days of the Cubanmissile crisis of 1962.’’4 The military programs pursued by the UnitedStates during this time—particularly the deployment of Pershing andCruise missiles in Europe, the MX ICBM, and the Strategic DefenseInitiative (SDI)—were reflective of this climate of mutual distrust andhostility.5 Writing in 1988, very soon after the events of the period inquestion, John Newhouse saw the resurgence of the Right in Americandomestic politics and the Carter Administration’s inconsistencies,including its sidelining of prominent hawks like Nitze, as leading to arejection of the Detente process.6

For the post–Cold War historians, there is some similarity to the ana-lyses of those writing in the 1980s, although with a broader examinationof the debates that took place. Richard Crockatt points out that the veryreal increases in Soviet military capabilities led to a debate betweenalarmists who saw such advances as being part of an expansioniststrategy on the part of the Soviet Union and those who saw such cap-abilities as more defensive in nature. As Crockatt states, ‘‘Soviet policy

2 Introduction

may have been reactive, though none the less threatening to Westernobservers for that, since the Soviet Union’s capacity to react effectively wasgreatly enhanced.’’7 As Odd Arne Westad notes regarding American per-ceptions of arms control and Soviet policy during the Carter years:

. . . the main issue was an increasing suspicion that SALT served as asmokescreen for Soviet expansion in Asia and Africa . . . It was thesoothing part of a global strategy, in which the Soviet Union was outto replace the United States as the dominant world power. TheAmerican response was to set up a more powerful form of contain-ment and more effective global competition for influence.8

However, some interpretations during the 1990s have questioned thenature of developments in US–Soviet relations in the 1970s and 1980s.Olav Njolstad argues that the Carter Administration’s approach to armscontrol, and its view of the SALT process as being the sine qua non ofDetente, helped lead to its collapse, as it excluded other issues, particu-larly US–Soviet competition in the Third World.9 According to Njolstad,‘‘in spite of a decade of arms control, the ideological-political and geo-political competition between the superpowers had become moreintense. This perception, which seems even more accurate in retrospect,was like a suicide pill for detente.’’10

Although these and other histories of the period take into account therole of the military balance, their broad subject matter (the Cold War,US–Soviet relations) prevents them from making a more in-depth ana-lysis of the subject. Many analyses of the military balance tend to reflectcapabilities, rather than perceptions of intentions that would accruefrom the possession of such capabilities, held by the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States.

Although American perceptions of the military balance were by nomeans the only explanation for the shift in superpower relations in the1970s and 1980s, they played a significant role in effecting this shift.From 1976, the debate over US–Soviet relations increasingly came to beseen in terms of the military balance between the two countries. Theincreasing emphasis on the geopolitical balance and arms controlreflected back into this debate. Soviet ‘‘gains’’ in the Horn of Africa andthe debate over SALT II involved considerable analyses of Soviet mili-tary effectiveness, and the danger it posed, to the United States.

The importance of this debate was evidenced by the rise of numerousgroups in the United States dedicated to shaping both elite and publicopinion on their view of the Soviet threat. The Committee on the Pre-sent Danger (CPD), founded in November 1976, was the best knownand most active of these. Increasingly, these organizations took centerstage in debates on American foreign policy, with which of coursedefense policy was closely linked. Their central message was that the

Introduction 3

Soviet Union was in the process of overtaking the United States in termsof overall military capability and that it could, within a few years, achieveits geopolitical goals at the expense of the United States. The onlycounter was a major American buildup. Arms control, a linchpin ofsuperpower Detente, was seen as unsatisfactory or even dangerous forthe United States to pursue at the time. Much of this held true for theReagan Administration between 1981 and 1985, as many of its top offi-cials were drawn from groups like the Committee on the PresentDanger (CPD).

There had, of course, been earlier eras in which the public mood hadbeen affected by such calls for increased preparedness, but the 1970sdiffered from these in a very important way. At the time of the ‘‘First’’Cold War in the late 1940s, Soviet ideology was seen as the primarydanger, backed up by military might. The devastation of the SecondWorld War, and the role of Communist parties in the resistance to Nazioccupation in many West European countries, meant that the SovietUnion had potential ideological allies who could subvert Western gov-ernments from within. American military power was seen as containingSoviet military power in Eastern Europe while helping maintain stabilityin the West.

In the 1970s, on the contrary, Soviet ideological appeal was ebbing.The rise of ‘‘Eurocommunism’’ meant that the significantly weakenedand divided Western Communist parties became even less affiliated withMoscow. Even in the Third World, it was challenged by Chinese Com-munism and even by Cuba, which conducted several interventions inAfrica during this time. The main danger from the Soviet Union lay, itappeared, in its military capacity, as well as the reductions in US defensespending and force posture in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Forproponents of the Soviet threat, the danger was that Moscow might betempted to risk war if it believed it could succeed in achieving its aims.The lack of other fields of competition, most notably economic andideological, meant that the danger of a Soviet resort to military meanswas heightened.

From the Americans’ point of view, the Soviet military buildup was tai-lored to such a policy. Four key areas of concern presented themselves.First, the Soviet strategic buildup, which had been underway since the1960s, began to bear fruit. Soviet nuclear forces, it now appeared, wereable to carry out operations against US strategic forces that could enablethe USSR to prevail in a nuclear exchange. As strategic forces were thecenterpiece of the military balance, such a radical shift was seen as dan-gerously destabilizing. Second, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allieshad vastly increased the capabilities of their conventional forces in Europe,where the USSR had deployed the SS-20 ballistic missile, representing avast improvement to Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces. Thesedevelopments appeared to herald a shift in the European balance, causing

4 Introduction

unfavorable geopolitical changes for the United States. Third, the vastincrease in the size and capability of the Soviet Navy and other powerprojection forces was seen as an example of Soviet efforts to extend influ-ence in the Third World. Finally, Soviet military spending had been vastlyincreased from the 1960s on, whereas that of the United States had beenconsiderably reduced by the mid-1970s.

Taken individually, any one of these developments would have beenworrisome. As these took place simultaneously, they were a cause forconsiderable alarm. This was exacerbated by the fact that US militarypower had declined considerably since the early 1970s. The war inVietnam and subsequent budget cuts had considerably reduced fundingfor strategic and European-based forces. Moreover, the NATO allies hadalso been reducing defense spending, in part due to the 1973 oil crisis.US power projection forces also shrank, with major reductions in navalship levels. Soviet interventions—along with those of proxies likeCuba—in Angola and the Horn of Africa, followed by the invasion ofAfghanistan in 1979, were attributed by many in the United States to thegrowing imbalance of military power and a resultant willingness of theSoviet leadership to use force.

These perceptions were shaped by what was known—and notknown—about Soviet military power as well as the political and eco-nomic systems that shaped it. Interestingly, much was known about theUSSR’s armed forces. The performance of weapon systems, for exam-ple, was often gleaned by NATO observers, particularly those monitor-ing Soviet exercises under the Conference on Security and Cooperationin Europe (CSCE) agreements.11 Soviet naval exercises also yieldedmuch useful information to Western nations, whose forces monitoredthese maneuvers. Soviet weapons captured by the Israelis were carefullyexamined by US intelligence. A sophisticated network of US listeningstations was able to determine the characteristics of Soviet ballistic mis-siles during tests. The US intelligence community annually submitteddetailed reports on numerous facets of the Soviet military effort,including strategic forces, forces in Central Europe, and naval deploy-ments. Even military expenditures, perhaps the most difficult aspect ofthe military balance to ascertain, were scrupulously examined, with suchminutiae as inflation and pricing in the Soviet Union included. Nor wassuch knowledge limited to a small, elite circle of decision makers.Numerous publications, from official reports to books by military ana-lysts, were readily available to the American public. The Department ofDefense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff published detailed annualreports to Congress. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, numerousvolumes examining the superpower military balance were also pub-lished, in a variety of formats and with sometimes widely differingviews.12 This applied to Soviet strategic and tactical precepts. To no

Introduction 5

small degree, such analyses were based on Soviet military writings andjournals, which provided much useful information on military doctrine.

Although much was known about Soviet military capabilities andstrategy, there were some significant points of disagreement betweenanalysts on this subject—disagreements that helped to underpin muchof the debate on the military balance during the 1970s and 1980s. Theability of the Soviet armed forces to achieve what many alarmistsfeared—a coordinated strategic strike against the United States, a blitzk-rieg into NATO Europe, a successful thrust into the Persian Gulf, or asustained naval conflict with the United States—was a source of conten-tion. Non-alarmists like Andrew Cockburn noted many facets of theSoviet military system hindering such capabilities: an officer class farmore interested in intrigue and personal gain than professionalism; aconscript military rife with drunkenness and ethnic tensions; rigid tac-tical precepts that ensured inflexibility in operations; unrealistic train-ing; and the design of Soviet weapons, which led to unreliability andoften outright inferiority to their Western counterparts. Those on theother side of the debate, like Edward Luttwak, noted the ability of theSoviet forces to carry out world-wide operations in peacetime as well asthe success of daring Soviet operations in Afghanistan in 1979 and thenumerical superiority enjoyed by the USSR in areas of vital interest tothe United States, particularly Central Europe.13 As for incompetenceand disaffection, Luttwak noted similar problems in all military forces,particularly regarding errors in maintenance and the incompetence ofpersonnel, not to mention the experience the USSR had in maintaininglarge, ethnically diverse armed forces.14 Luttwak also noted theimprovements in Soviet weaponry, and the fact that these were beingproduced in much greater numbers than their Western counterparts.15

A more important source of contention was over what the Sovietsintended to use their armed forces for. In other words, was the Sovietleadership acquiring what appeared to be a vastly increased militarycapability for defensive purposes to counter the threat from the UnitedStates and its NATO allies in the West and from China in the East? Orwas it doing so in order to achieve geopolitical hegemony, at theexpense of the United States, whose own military capabilities appearedto have declined between 1968 and 1975? This debate began in earnestlate in 1976, when, in response to criticisms of the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities, a panel of outsideanalysts, known as ‘‘Team B,’’ carried out a study of the estimate pro-cess. ‘‘Team B’’ was critical of the CIA’s efforts on the grounds that theydid not take into account Soviet ideological and strategic objectives. Themembers of ‘‘Team B’’ included those like Richard Pipes, former direc-tor of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, and Paul Nitze, who hadserved as a member of the US SALT delegation in the early 1970s.They, and their colleagues, saw the Soviet buildup from the mid-1960s

6 Introduction

on as an indication of an effort by the Soviet Union to achieve globalhegemony by establishing military superiority over the United Statesand its allies. This was noted prominently in their report:

Team ‘‘B’’ agreed that all the evidence points to an undeviatingSoviet commitment to what is euphemistically called ‘‘the worldwidetriumph of socialism’’ but in fact connotes global Soviet hegemony . . .‘‘Peaceful coexistence’’ (better known in the West as detente) is agrand strategy adapted to the age of nuclear weapons. It entails atwin thrust: (1) stress on all sorts of political, economic, ideological,and other non-military instrumentalities to penetrate and weaken the‘‘capitalist’’ zone . . . and (2) an intense military buildup in nuclear aswell as conventional forces of all sorts, not moderated either by theWest’s self-imposed restraints or by SALT.16

In specifically military terms, the authors noted,

Team ‘‘B’’ feels the USSR strives for effective strategic superiority in all thebranches of the military, nuclear forces included. For historic reasons, aswell as for reasons inherent in the Soviet system, the Soviet leader-ship places unusual reliance on coercion as a regular instrument ofpolicy . . . It likes to have a great deal of coercive capability at its dis-posal at all times, and it likes for it to come in a rich mix so that itcan be optimally structured for any contingency that may arise.(Italics in original.)17

The ‘‘Team B’’ report was leaked to the press soon after it was issued inNovember 1976, the same month that the CPD was formed. Its mem-bers included Pipes, Nitze, and others who had been on ‘‘Team B,’’ andtheir public papers strongly resembled their views of Soviet militarypower and geopolitical ambitions as stated in the ‘‘Team B’’ report. Intheir initial paper, ‘‘Common Sense and the Common Danger,’’ pub-lished in November 1976, the CPD unambiguously described what itsaw as the threat posed by the Soviet Union:

The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the causeof human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon anunparalleled military buildup . . .For more than a decade, the SovietUnion has been enlarging and improving both its strategic and itsconventional military forces far more rapidly than the United Statesand its allies. Soviet military power and its rate of growth cannot beexplained or justified by considerations of self-defense. The SovietUnion is consciously seeking what its spokesmen call ‘‘visible pre-ponderance’’ for the Soviet sphere. Such preponderance, they

Introduction 7

explain, will permit the Soviet Union ‘‘to transform the conditions ofworld politics’’ and determine the direction of its development.18

These themes would set the tone for the argument of the alarmist campover the next decade. The crises of the late 1970s, including those in theHorn of Africa and Afghanistan, intensified the concerns of alarmists.Writing in 1980, Edward Luttwak saw the combination of several factors asheightening the possibility of superpower conflict during the next fewyears: the fact that Western nations, led by the United States, would closethe gap in military power by the mid-1980s (based on the 3 percentincrease in defense spending by NATO from 1978); the worsening state ofthe Soviet economy, which could lead Soviet leaders to make hard choicesbetween reductions in military spending and the use of their militarypower to achieve geopolitical goals in a narrowing period of opportunity;and the growing operational confidence in Soviet military capacity by theleadership, which could make it less averse to risking war.19

On the other side of the debate were the non-alarmists, who empha-sized a sense of insecurity on the part of the Soviet leadership as beingthe key element in the Soviet buildup. The Center for Defense Infor-mation (CDI), a liberal research center, noted in a May 1976 report that‘‘It is the Soviet Union, particularly since the Sino-Soviet split, that hasfound itself in a ‘Fortress Russia’ position. Soviet geographic vulner-abilities are striking and contribute to what [former Director of CentralIntelligence] William Colby has called ‘a national historical fixation onthe problem of invasion.’ ’’20 The same report also cited the Soviets’perception of the buildup of forces in Europe and Asia:

NATO has improved also. Undoubtedly a number of factors areinvolved, including instabilities in Eastern Europe. The perceivedthreat from China probably has created a generalized heightenedSoviet sense of insecurity. The Soviet build-up in the east and in thewest may be related, rather than separate as described by theDefense Department.21

Writing in 1983, Andrew Cockburn noted similar difficulties for theSoviets. ‘‘The Soviet leadership is all to conscious of the fact thatthe United States and its allies face only one threat—the USSR—whilethe Soviet Union, on the other hand, must consider a series ofthreats.’’22 He then gave a detailed description of this situation whileemphasizing the threat of US and Allied nuclear forces:

On their immediate western national border, a number of sub-servient states are nominally under their control but wracked byinternal dissent. Outside these states lies the ring of unfriendlypowers armed with nuclear weapons. Not only do the British,

8 Introduction

French and Chinese maintain bombers and missiles that can reachthe territory of the USSR, but there are also American-made nuclearweapons under the partial control of Belgian, Dutch, West German,Italian, Greek and Turkish forces.

Beyond this threat to the homeland from bordering states, theRussian contemplate four American fleets: one in the North Atlantic,one in the Mediterranean, and two in the Pacific. Each fleet hasaircraft carriers with nuclear bombers on board . . .They see anAmerican buildup in the Indian Ocean. The island of Diego Garciais prepared for a squadron of B-52 nuclear bombers, and already anAmerican carrier task force with nuclear bombers capable of reach-ing the southern Soviet Union is permanently based in the IndianOcean.23

Cockburn also noted the far smaller gross national product (GNP) of theSoviet Union (reckoned to be just two- thirds that of the United States atthe time) and ‘‘the Soviets’ sense of competing on unequal terms withthe United States . . . as a backward society against the world’s mostadvanced economies’’ in his assessment of the balance of military powerand perceptions of it.24

Some critics also took issue with the alarmists’ view of Soviet strategicprecepts, which were alleged to betoken an emphasis on victory in a warinvolving strategic nuclear forces. Fred Kaplan, who served as defensepolicy adviser to US Representative Les Aspin, wrote in 1980 that ‘‘TheSoviets have obviously been influenced by Clausewitz; but this meansonly that they see the nature and intensity of war as being determinedby political factors, and since nobody has figured out any political goalfor which the Soviets might be willing to risk a nuclear holocaust, theClausewitz connection can hardly be seen as horrifying or as inimical tothe prospects of deterrence.’’25 In his conclusion, Kaplan noted that

while the USSR is modernizing its military capabilities—and doingsome things earlier and more quickly than the U.S. had anticipated afew years ago—this build-up does not and will not, for the foreseeablefuture, jeopardize the United States’ ability to respond flexiblyand selectively, or all-out, to Soviet nuclear strikes. Nor is there anycredible evidence that the USSR could . . .utilize the nuclear arsenal incampaigns of political intimidation or coercion—no more so now, orin the near future, than either side has been able to do since the early1960s. (Italics in original.)26

Beyond the perceptions of the differing camps, which were based onwhat was known—or believed—about the military balance at the time, isthe fact that, despite the wealth of information that was to be had on

Introduction 9

Soviet weapons and strategy, there was nonetheless a good deal that wasnot known about Soviet capabilities. Precisely how much equipment wasbeing produced, for example, was at times a guessing game. The actualnumber of Soviet ICBMs produced each year was difficult to verify.Therefore, analysts counted ICBM silos, as these weapons needed silosfor deployment, and thus a relatively accurate estimate of deployedICBMs could be made.27 Similarly, as the debate over Soviet strategicobjectives between alarmists and non- alarmists indicates, the purposebehind the Soviet buildup often depended upon whose sources onebelieved. Although Soviet strategists planned for offensive action in theevent of war and the Soviet armed forces were vastly increased, Sovietleaders openly stated that war—particularly nuclear war—had to beavoided. Not surprisingly, each camp in the debate had its own inter-pretations of these contradictory facets of the Soviet leadership.

An analysis of American perceptions of the superpower military bal-ance is a major part of understanding the history of this era of the ColdWar. The course of the struggle between the United States and theSoviet Union came to be shaped, to a significant degree, by this issue,not only to 1985 but beyond. The massive US military buildup of the1980s was shaped by the debates of the 1970s on the military balance.This buildup played a significant role in forcing the Soviet Union, from1985 onward, to reorient its foreign and defense policies away fromconfrontation and an emphasis on offensive action to one of co-operationand a defensive military posture. The costs of renewed confrontation alsohelped force the USSR into a decline that ended with its collapse in 1991.The Soviet economy, under growing strain since the mid-1970s, wasunable to sustain the effort needed to match the vastly expanded Amer-ican defense buildup.

The key areas of concern in the debates were strategic nuclear forces,the balance in Europe, naval power and power projection, and defensespending. This study will examine each of these issues, including thesub-issues within them, to present a detailed view of this subject. Thefocus will be on the debates that took place regarding these issues andon how they came to shape events. It will avoid the use of hindsight—unavailable to those engaged in debates and decision-making at thetime—so as to replicate a feel for the tenor of the times. Developmentsduring the period will be analyzed in relation to the debates takingplace, so as to show how perceptions were shaped by events, and viceversa. In discussing military terminology and weapon systems, explana-tions of capabilities will be included, and technical terms will likewise bedefined.

Additionally, the various points of view will be defined in terms of thecapacity of those holding them. That is to say, the official views ofSecretaries of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be discussedseparately from the views of members of the CPD as private citizens.

10 Introduction

Furthermore, the positions of alarmists, or ‘‘hawks,’’ as opposed to non-alarmists or ‘‘doves,’’ will be analyzed independently of each other, inorder for the reader to gain a firm understanding of the positions heldby these groups. Comparisons, however, will be made when necessary,as when specific arguments by one camp were matched by the other.

Introduction 11

Part I

Strategic forces

1 The counterforce doctrine

The 1970s witnessed two important shifts in American nuclear strategy.First, whereas earlier doctrines—most notably ‘‘Massive Retaliation’’ inthe 1950s and the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) of the1960s—stressed an all-out response by US nuclear forces against theSoviet Union if nuclear war erupted, the strategies of the 1970s stressedthe need for a more limited use of nuclear weapons, tailored to theparticular scenario at hand. Second, the emphasis on which targets toattack also shifted. The MAD theory of the 1960s had emphasizedinflicting considerable damage on Soviet population and industry as thecornerstone of American deterrent policy, with considerably lessemphasis on Soviet political and military targets per se. This emphasis oncountervalue (targeting an enemy’s means of economic and societalcohesion) shifted to counterforce (targeting an enemy’s armed forces,with considerable emphasis on his nuclear forces).

There were several reasons for this shift. The technological develop-ments of the 1960s, most particularly the multiple, independently tar-getable re-entry vehicle (MIRV), combined with vastly improvedguidance for ballistic missiles, began to make themselves felt during the1970s. These developments gave strategists and statesmen the ability toadapt more flexible nuclear postures, which could be critical during asuperpower crisis. The massive build-up of Soviet strategic forces from1965 meant that the credibility of MAD was questionable in the face ofSoviet nuclear forces that were now more numerous, sophisticated, andflexible. A strategy aimed at reducing this threat in the event of hosti-lities, and of limiting damage to the United States while maintaining thecredibility of the US nuclear deterrent for its allies abroad, appeared tobe in order.

The development of ‘‘Limited Nuclear Options,’’ 1974–77

The idea of using nuclear forces to reduce an enemy’s military cap-abilities had existed prior to the 1970s. During the Kennedy Adminis-tration, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had explored

counterforce ideas in American nuclear planning. In his review of theUS nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP,adopted in 1960), he made a considerable effort to establish a moreselective approach to nuclear war. The new SIOP, approved in January1962, incorporated such features as the ability to selectively attack Sovietnuclear forces, maintain a reserve of nuclear weapons for later use, andthe ability to strike or withhold attacks on Soviet command-and-controlcenters.1 In June of that year, McNamara spoke at the University ofMichigan in Ann Arbor, where he declared that ‘‘nuclear war should beapproached in much the same way that more conventional militaryoperations have been regarded in the past.’’ McNamara soon shiftednuclear planning away from this, most notably due to the need for farhigher numbers of missiles and bombers to carry out such a strategy(above what McNamara had planned for the US strategic forces).2

Although some flexibility would remain in US nuclear war plans, theprimary emphasis shifted to a countervalue posture.

The developments of the 1960s discussed earlier, and the achieve-ment of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union in the latter part of thedecade, led to a reassessment of American nuclear strategy. The NixonAdministration, upon taking office in 1969, publicly emphasized a policyof ‘‘sufficiency’’ regarding the strategic balance. The US ‘‘triad’’ ofnuclear delivery systems (land-based ICBMs, ballistic-missile sub-marines, and long-range bombers) was, in quantity at least, enough toensure deterrence of the Soviet Union at this level. However, theincreasing numbers of Soviet missiles, together with improved rangeand accuracy, appeared to undermine the essence of MAD. After all, theSoviets could have the capability, as the 1970s wore on, of exercisingcounterforce options that could threaten US deterrent forces and couldalso ‘‘decouple’’ such areas of vital American interest as Europe throughthe threat—actual or implied—to use such forces if the United Stateswas to use nuclear weapons to defend its allies. Furthermore, if anuclear war were to break out, the options for the United States mightbe very narrow. President Nixon summed up the difficulty of MAD—and the need for flexibility—in 1970:

In its broader political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance offorces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced.Thus the relationship between our strategic forces and those of theSoviet Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect ourvital security interests will not be underestimated. I must not be-andmy successors must not be-limited to the indiscriminate destructionof enemy civilians as the sole response to challenges . . . It would beinconsistent with the political meaning of sufficiency to base ourforce planning solely on some finite-and theoretical-capacity toinflict casualties presumed to be unacceptable to the other side.3

16 Strategic forces

Nixon’s concerns led to action regarding nuclear planning. In April1971, the National Security Council initiated a ‘‘Strategic ObjectivesStudy’’; the following year, an interdepartmental group was established,led by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, that studied a numberof limited nuclear options. These included warnings using small num-bers of weapons, limited strikes, and the threat of a Soviet counterforceattack on US ICBMs.4

These efforts resulted in National Security Study Memorandum(NSSM) 169, issued on February 13, 1973. It called for a review of USnuclear policy, which would ‘‘embrace all U.S. nuclear forces, includingstrategic, theatre, and tactical.’’5 The review that emerged from NSSM169 was National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242, issuedon January 17, 1974. It was this document that would become the basisfor US strategic planning for the next 6 years. In approving NSDM 242,President Nixon emphasized the continuity in US strategy, echoing thecounterforce emphasis of McNamara more than a decade earlier.‘‘These decisions do not constitute a major new departure in U.S.nuclear strategy; rather, they are an elaboration of existing policy. Thedecisions reflect both existing political and military realities and mydesire for a more flexible nuclear posture.’’6

While stating that deterrence remained the priority of US nuclearforces, NSDM 242 stated that, should deterrence fail, the primaryobjective would be ‘‘to seek early war termination, on terms acceptableto the United States and its allies, at the lowest level of conflict possible.This objective requires planning a whole range of limited nuclearemployment options which could be used in conjunction with support-ing political and military measures (including conventional forces) tocontrol escalation.’’7

Most important as far as strategic planning was concerned, NSDM 242called for plans:

in which the level, scope, and duration of violence is limited in amanner which can be clearly and credibly communicated to theenemy. The options should (a) hold some vital enemy targets hos-tage to subsequent destruction by survivable nuclear forces, and (b)permit control over the timing and place of attack execution, inorder to provide the enemy opportunities to reconsider his actions.8

It is in this passage that the shift can be seen from the prevalent MADstrategy of the 1960s. Holding ‘‘vital enemy targets hostage’’ couldinclude major cities, even Moscow, which most certainly would havebeen hit by US forces operating under an assured destruction posture.Moreover, MAD was meant to communicate American intentions in theevent of nuclear war simply through its execution, in that utter devas-tation would befall the Soviet Union if it decided to wage a general

The counterforce doctrine 17

nuclear war with the United States. With the flexible options described byNSDM 242, actions taken during a nuclear war could send a signal to theSoviet leadership regarding the cost of their actions and whether theyshould be pursued. This idea, known as intra-war deterrence, either couldcause the Soviets to terminate hostilities or, failing that, would provideforces available to attack a set of Soviet targets withheld from earlier strikes.

To facilitate the identification of such targets to be attacked or with-held in these options, NSDM 242 directed the Defense Department toestablish the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP). Autho-rized by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger on April 4, 1974, thispolicy, known as NUWEP-1, provided the operational basis for NSDM242.9 A key objective of NUWEP-1 was the ability of US strategic forcesto destroy some 70 percent of Soviet industry that would be needed forpostwar recovery.10 This would satisfy NSDM 242’s guidelines about‘‘holding enemy targets hostage,’’ as attacks on Soviet economic assetswould seriously and adversely affect the USSR’s ability to maintaincohesion in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange.

In a question-and-answer session with members of the press at theOverseas Writers luncheon, Schlesinger noted a link between the pro-curement of advanced strategic systems to support the strategy andprogress in the SALT negotiations, which would limit the future size ofUS strategic forces. ‘‘If they [the Soviets] insist on racing,’’ referring tothe improvements in the USSR’s strategic capabilities, ‘‘we are preparedto match them.’’11

In Congressional testimony, Schlesinger noted the purpose of the newstrategy; to deter the Soviets from the use of nuclear forces in a coun-terforce role. ‘‘We have no desire to develop a unilateral counterforcecapability against the Soviet Union . . .What we wish to avoid is theSoviet Union having a counterforce capability against the United Stateswithout our being able to have a comparable capability’’ (My italics).12

Schlesinger later defined the new strategy in terms that would remainits basis for the rest of the decade. ‘‘What we are trying to do is to placeourselves in a position where we are able to respond to every level ofattack, not necessarily by going into a major counterforce strike.’’13

In examining Soviet capabilities, Schlesinger warned that from 1975the USSR would probably begin to add MIRVed warheads to around200 ICBMs per year. This would mean that, by 1981–82, the Sovietswould have deployed some 7,000 MIRVs.14 Such a force would give theSoviet Union a counterforce capability against US strategic forces.

In a letter to Senator Edward Brooke, President Ford reiteratedSchlesinger’s views of the new strategy as a means of strengtheningdeterrence:

As improved command and control and newer systems permit, weare increasing the flexibility of our forces to be more fully prepared

18 Strategic forces

for all possible contingencies. Because flexible options will increasethe credibility of our deterrent, they will help to decrease the chanceof a conflict starting in the first place.15

The idea of extended deterrence—of using American nuclear forces tosupport conventional forces in defense of allied states and areas of vitalinterest—also received emphasis. By coupling the strategic deterrent totheatre and conventional forces, NSDM 242 reaffirmed NATO strategyregarding first use of nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet conventionalassault in Europe. MC 14/3, approved by the Alliance in December1967, specifically called for ‘‘deliberate escalation,’’ ‘‘to defeat aggressionby . . .where possible controlling, the scope and intensity of combat,making the cost and the risk disproportionate to the aggressor’s objec-tives and the threat of nuclear response progressively more immi-nent.’’16 Thus, extended deterrence reaffirmed the US commitment tothe defense of Europe.17

This did not, however, mark a return to the pre–McNamara era of‘‘Massive Retaliation,’’ in which nuclear weapons would be a weapon offirst resort. In her study of American counterforce planning in the1970s, Lynn Etheridge Davis noted,

American analysts did not believe that the limited first use of nuclearweapons could or should take the place of a defence based initiallyon a conventional response: in the long term the United Stateswould seek to deploy conventional forces to deter enemy conven-tional attacks . . .Nuclear weapons would only be used following theoutbreak of hostilities.18

This did not, however, mean that the United States would be deterredfrom the first use of nuclear weapons outside the NATO area. As Davispoints out, the counterforce strategy set out by NSDM 242 ‘‘left openthe possibility that the United States would plan for the limited firstuse of nuclear weapons throughout the world’’ and that ‘‘The enemycould never be confident that the United States would not respondwith nuclear weapons to the use of military force anywhere in the world.’’(My Italics)19

Experts on the subject of strategic nuclear forces came to view theshift from MAD to this more refined approach as representing aresponse to the shift in the strategic balance during this time. As Davispoints out,

American analysts held a general assumption: if the Soviet Union hadthe capability for limited use of nuclear weapons, the United Statesneeded it too. Flexibility could force the enemy to abandon actionsthat assumed an American response of ‘nothing’ rather than ‘all.’20


Colin S. Gray, a consultant at the Hudson Institute, noted that nuclearstrategy was shaped to a considerable extent by the existence of weaponsthat had been developed earlier but lacked a clear strategic rationale atthe time of deployment. He also noted ‘‘that strategic doctrine doesinfluence the selection of weapon systems, the way in which the armsrace is conducted and the determination of arms control policies.’’21 Inthe context of the 1970s, the development of new strategic systems likeMIRV, improvements in missile guidance, and other technologicaladvancements helped to shape US nuclear strategy.

Although NSSM 169 and NSDM 242 were created by the NationalSecurity Council, the responsibility for the further refinement andimplementation of the counterforce strategies outlined in these docu-ments rested with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. The adaptation ofLimited Nuclear Options (LNO) would be a key feature of his tenure atthe Pentagon (1973–75). Indeed, the cumulative countervailing strategyadopted between 1974 and 1977 came to be known as the ‘‘SchlesingerDoctrine.’’

In his annual report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1975, Schlesingerpointed out that earlier US counterforce strategies had ‘‘all involved largenumbers of weapons,’’22 which did not appear to be in tune with thedevelopment of LNOs and selective use of weapons for such purposes asdemonstration effect. Schlesinger continued his analysis by stating

What we need is a series of measured responses to aggression whichbear some relation to the provocation, have prospects of terminatinghostilities before general nuclear war breaks out, and leave somepossibility for restoring deterrence . . .

In other words, to be credible, and hence effective over the range ofpossible contingencies, deterrence must rest on many options andon a spectrum of capabilities . . . to support these options.23

In summing up the need for flexible options for the US strategic forces,Schlesinger pointed out what he sought to avoid through a strategyincorporating such options:

We do not propose to let an opponent threaten a major componentof our forces without our being able to pose a comparable threat.We do not propose to let an enemy put us in a position where weare left with no more than a capability to hold his cities hostage afterthe first phase of a nuclear conflict. And certainly we do not proposeto see an enemy threaten one or more of our allies with his nuclearcapabilities in the expectation that we would lack the flexibility andresolve to strike back at his assets . . . in such a way as to make hiseffort both high in cost and ultimately unsuccessful.24

20 Strategic forces

The following year, Schlesinger addressed critics of the new emphasison ‘‘warfighting rather than deterrence,’’ as he put it:

Our objective remains deterrence, but modern deterrence across thespectrum of the nuclear threat. And that requires us to be preparedwith credible responses to a variety of contingencies. Considering allthe risks associated with the use of nuclear weapons, this kind ofpreparation does not in any way imply an effort to substitute limitednuclear response options for other instruments of military power.25

John B. Walsh, Deputy Director for Strategic and Space systems in theOffice of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, testifiedbefore the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1976 that

In attempting to retaliate for an attempted disarming first strike,one possibility, of course, is that of wiping out the Soviet Union.However, I think that a better way of responding is to wipe out whatforces he holds back—his remaining blackmail capability—and,hence leave him in a position where he is worse off having executedthe strike then not having executed it. If he is worse off doing it, heis not likely to do it.26

To make US strategic forces more capable of carrying out these mis-sions, Schlesinger asked Congress to help fund programs that would beof vital importance for carrying out counterforce missions. Most impor-tant of these were hard-target kill capabilities27—meaning the ability toattack and destroy hardened Soviet ICBM silos and command-and-control centers—including improved warhead yield and accuracy andcommand-and-control.28

Documents classified at the time concur with Schlesinger’s views.A RAND Corporation report from October 1975 noted the importanceof ICBMs in carrying out such strategies: ‘‘We believe that ICBMs pos-sess and promise more of the desired attributes for LSOs than any otherstrategic force element. If LSOs are a special role for ICBMs, the prin-cipal concerns will be to ensure effective and flexible targeting withminimum collateral damage.’’29

Schlesinger’s successor, Donald Rumsfeld, continued LNO develop-ment. In his first report to Congress, Rumsfeld described the need forflexible targeting options and the dangers of relying on assureddestruction:

Although many people suppose that a massive surprise attackagainst our cities and forces is the only way in which a strategicnuclear exchange might begin, it is only one of a number of possi-bilities . . .we cannot count on others to refrain from inventing ways


to attack a limited but vital set of targets, and we would be foolishindeed not to think of countermeasures that opponents and friendscan recognize as plausible and credible. Deterrence is not weakened byflexibility; it is strengthened.30 (My italics)

Rumsfeld also described in greater detail just what military targetswould be covered by LNOs and why:

Nor should we rule out coverage of some enemy silos, airfields, orsubmarine bases on a second strike. Contrary to a popular view,many of these targets would remain of interest after an enemy hadstruck . . . because some of the launch points—bomber bases andcertain ICBM silos, for example—could be used to reload . . .offensive forces.31

On January 20, 1977, Ford authorized NSDM 348, ‘‘U.S. Defense Policyand Military Posture.’’ In calling for a strategic balance to be maintainedwith the Soviet Union, the section addressing strategic forces stated that

A range of credible options is thus critical to maintaining deterrence,as well as to escalation control, satisfactory war termination, andpostwar recovery. Therefore, the nuclear employment policy direc-ted by NSDM 242 is reaffirmed, as amplified below . . .

Our strategic nuclear forces should be capable of meeting targetingrequirements against political, economic, and military targets relatedto postwar recovery: permit flexible response options: and provide astrategic reserve.32

By 1977, LNOs were central to US strategy. As will be seen, Sovietnuclear doctrine, and its own counterforce emphasis, would become ameans of both justification of US strategy and as a source of peril for themaintenance of a viable US strategic deterrent.

The Carter years—PRM 10 to PD 59, 1977–80

Upon taking office in 1977, Jimmy Carter decided to examine existingstrategy. In February, Carter authorized the National Security Council(NSC) to undertake a comprehensive study of US foreign and defensepolicy, including military strategy. The first of two parts of the study,known as Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10, would be acomprehensive review of US military strategy. Among the topics to beaddressed were ‘‘deterrence at reciprocally lowered strategic levels’’ andthe ‘‘viability and desirability of the ‘triad’ posture.’’33 The report, issuedin June, posited a series of questions regarding US military posture and

22 Strategic forces

strategy. Question six, ‘‘What constitutes an adequate strategic forceposture?’’34 addressed nuclear strategy directly. Four major objectiveswere outlined by PRM 10 regarding the role of US strategic nuclearforces:

Deter nuclear attack on the US, our forces, our allies, and otherswhose security is important to the US.

In conjunction with general purpose and theatre nuclear forces,enhance deterrence on non-nuclear aggression, particularly againstNATO and our Asian allies.

Should deterrence fail and nuclear conflict occur, control escalation,limit damage to the degree possible, and terminate the conflictquickly on acceptable terms. If escalation cannot be controlled,obtain the best possible outcome for the US and its allies.

Insure that the US, our allies, and others whose security is impor-tant to the US can act without intimidation stemming from percep-tions that the strategic balance favored or was increasingly favoringthe USSR.35

As with previous administrations, deterrence remained at the top of thelist of priorities for the strategic forces. Objectives two and three, how-ever, clearly show the inheritance of the Schlesinger Doctrine: the stra-tegic forces would be coupled to US theatre and conventional forcesand, implicitly, to US allies; and the need for options less than all-outretaliation. This clearly pointed to the need for a continued refinementof counterforce strategy, given also that weapon developments werecontinually improving.

The authors of PRM 10 were hardly stressing that a limited nuclearexchange would be beneficial to either side, however. In Section II, theynoted ‘‘Whichever side initiates a limited nuclear attack against theICBM forces of the other side will not find itself better off in terms ofthe residual number of ICBMs, ICBM RVs, and throwweight.’’36 Theidea behind counterforce was not to prepare to fight a nuclear war toachieve a geopolitical goal but rather to deter the Soviets from attempt-ing to do the same.

PRM 10 led to the issues regarding strategic forces being addressedclosely by Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown. In June 1977,Brown authorized a review, based on PRM 10’s findings, to be preparedto more fully determine what forces and strategies were needed for theoptions outlined. In a subsection, ‘‘US Military Strategy for StrategicForces’’, five questions were listed. Two of these addressed counterforceissues: ‘‘To what extent should the US acquire an efficient hard-target-killcapability and for what purposes?’’ and ‘‘Should the US acquire forces


for a Strategic Reserve Force, i.e., forces in excess of other require-ments . . . in a strategic nuclear war.’’37

Such attention indicated that counterforce strategies were central tothe administration’s strategic planning. Two key reasons for this aregiven by Desmond Ball. ‘‘The arguments for a wide range of nuclearoptions were now accepted throughout the Pentagon.’’38 An even moreimportant reason was that

many of the strategic force requirements of a strategy of controlled,limited, counterforce operations, together with the necessary com-mand and control arrangements, were already emplaced; unless onewere persuaded of their counterproductive arms control impact,there would have been little point in dismantling them and denyingoneself the potential options and flexibility they allowed.39

PRM 10 led to the drafting of Presidential Directive (PD) 18, issued inAugust 1977. A key goal of American national security policy was to‘‘Counterbalance . . . Soviet military power and adverse influence in keyareas, particularly Europe, the Middle East and East Asia.’’40 Soon after,a report was issued covering topics of nuclear strategy in relation to PD18. It showed a broadening of interest with regard to nuclear forces, asthe authors made clear in the introduction:

. . . in evaluating employment policy we are concerned not only withthe objectives of policy as stated in PD-18 and NSDM-242, but alsowith the guidance that has been developed to implement policy, andthe capabilities . . . that support these plans. It is the interactionbetween these elements that we will evaluate . . .with particularemphasis on the responsiveness of plans to stated objectives and theirfeasibility in light of projected capabilities.41 (My italics)

During Harold Brown’s tenure, these issues would become interwovenwith the overall US strategic posture.

PRM 10, PD 18, and associated documents were of course classified,circulated to a relatively small number of people in the upper echelons ofthe Carter Administration. In more open and available sources, however,these concerns were also apparent. In his first report to Congress in 1978,Secretary Brown stated what should be expected of the strategic forces:

Assured destruction cannot be the only response available to thePresident. We are quite uncertain as to how an adversary withincreasingly sophisticated strategic nuclear forces might consideremploying them in the event of a deep and desperate crisis . . .Asa consequence, we must have the flexibility to respond at a levelappropriate to the type and scale of his attack.

24 Strategic forces

As part of that flexibility, we must be able to launch controlledcounterattacks against a wide range of targets—including theatre nuclearand conventional forces, lines of communication, war-supportingindustry, and targets of increasing hardness: from aircraft runwaysand nuclear storage sites to command bunkers and ICBM silos. Itshould be added that a great many of these facilities—including air-fields and ICBM silos—could remain priority targets for a second strike.(My italics)42

Brown went further in discussing just what was needed to ensure this.Under the heading ‘‘Capabilities’’, he listed five key areas needed for acredible nuclear posture. Among these were ‘‘a survivable command,control, and communications (C3) system to select and direct the neces-sary action.’’43 Also, reserves were needed ‘‘so that we can hold a portionof them in reserve for an indefinite period of time.’’44

The following year, Brown reiterated these themes. ‘‘We must haveforces in sufficient numbers and quality so that they can: (1) survive awell-executed surprise attack; (2) react with the timing needed, both as topromptness and endurance, to assure the deliberation and controldeemed necessary by the National Command Authorities (NCA); (3)penetrate any enemy defenses; and (4) destroy their designatedtargets.’’45

Brown also set out what would become the term used to define theCarter Administration’s policy for strategic forces, the ‘‘CountervailingStrategy.’’ In the 1980 report, the Secretary clearly defined just whatwas meant in terms of US strategic planning and what would be neces-sary for this to be feasible:

We must also have the redundancy and diversity built into theseforces to ensure against the failure of any one component of thecapability, to permit the cross-targeting of key enemy facilities, andto complicate the enemy’s defenses as well as his attack . . .

To have a true countervailing strategy, our forces must be capable ofcovering, and being withheld from, a substantial list of targets . . .The necessary forces should be included in whatever requirementswe set for a strategic nuclear reserve following initial exchanges.46

The carrying out of these strategies would rest with the US military, andthe views of uniformed strategists supported the policies put forwardduring these years. General George Brown, Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff (JCS) from 1974 to 1978, stated his view clearly. ‘‘Strategicnuclear offensive forces are a critical element in the US deterrent strategy.They must have and be perceived to have the selectivity and flexibility torespond immediately to any level of aggression. They must be flexible


enough to ensure conflict termination at the lowest feasible level on termsacceptable to the United States, should deterrence fail.’’47 General Brownreiterated this in his Posture Statement the following year: ‘‘Inherent in thisstrategy is the need for weapons in sufficient numbers, and of appropriatecharacteristics, to maintain a stable strategic balance in the face of Soviettechnological advances.’’48

The Countervailing Strategy was not simply seen as a means of strikingat Soviet forces. From early in the Administration, an emphasis wasplaced on attacking the means of central political control, as well as theeconomic production base, of the Soviet Union.49 Some, most notablyNational Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, emphasized a strategy thatwould see the heaviest casualties inflicted upon the Great Russian popu-lation, as opposed to other national groups (Ukrainians, Latvians, etc.) toeliminate the effective functioning of the Soviet state.50 In other words, ifdeterrence failed, the United States would be able to shatter the SovietUnion’s highly centralized system of political and economic control.

The Carter Administration concentrated on several key areas to makethe Countervailing Strategy more effective. To maintain the UnitedStates as a functioning society in the event of a general nuclear war, C3capabilities were emphasized. PD 53, issued in November 1979, statedthat ‘‘It is essential to the security of the United States to have tele-communications facilities adequate to satisfy the needs of the nationduring and after any national emergency.’’51 At the top of the list ofpriorities for telecommunications in such circumstances was listed‘‘Connectivity between the National Command Authority and strategicand other appropriate forces to support flexible execution of retaliatorystrikes during and after an enemy nuclear attack.’’52

This linked strongly to the issue of economic mobilization.53 PD 57,issued in March 1980, stated ‘‘It is of fundamental importance to thenational security that the United States maintain the capability to mobilizeits national resources in a timely and efficient manner in order to respondeffectively to crises that might arise.’’54 The Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) was directed to ‘‘ensure that all existing and pend-ing Executive Orders pertaining to mobilization are made consistent withthis directive.’’55 This was followed in June 1980 by PD 58, meant topreserve the continuity of government in the event of nuclear war. Itsparticular emphasis was on the National Command Authority (NCA).56

These decisions indicate how detailed counterforce planning hadbecome. Whereas the Schlesinger Doctrine had placed primary empha-sis on limited options, the Countervailing Strategy envisioned a fullrange of objectives for US strategic forces. In his FY 1981 report toCongress, Secretary Brown defined this strategy:

These plans should include options to attack the targets that comprisethe Soviet military force structure and political power structure, and

26 Strategic forces

to hold back a significant reserve. In other words, we must be able todeter Soviet attacks by making it clear to the Kremlin that, after suchan attack, we would not be forced to the stark choice of either makingno effective military response or totally destroying the Soviet Union.We could instead attack, in a selective and measured way, a range of military,industrial, and political control targets, while retaining an assureddestruction capacity in reserve.57 (My italics)

All these elements were to be found in the Carter Administration’s next,and best known, strategic directive. Issued on July 25, 1980, PD 59directed that US strategic forces be prepared to engage in operationsagainst a wide variety of Soviet targets, both military and political, par-ticularly hardened C3 centers. American C3I capabilities would continueto be increased to provide battle damage assessment and more effectivetargeting of warheads. A secure reserve of strategic weapons would alsobe available for long-term operations.58

In an introductory note to PD 59, President Carter described what itwas meant to accomplish. ‘‘[I]f deterrence fails initially, we must be cap-able of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve hiswar aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable . . . ’’59

The President then outlined the importance of PD 59 in pursuingwartime military objectives:

The employment of nuclear forces must be effectively related tooperations of our general purpose forces. Our doctrines for the useof forces in nuclear conflict must insure that we can pursue specific policyobjectives selected by the National Command Authorities at that time, fromgeneral guidelines established in advance. (My italics)60

In his final report to Congress in January 1981, Brown listed five ele-ments of the Countervailing Strategy incorporated into PD 59: flexibility,escalation control, survivability and endurance, targeting objectives, andreserve forces. Under targeting, four categories, listed as follows, werediscussed: strategic nuclear forces, other military forces (theatre and con-ventional), leadership and control, and industrial and economic base.61

In September 1980, Secretary Brown testified in hearings before theUS Senate regarding PD 59. He outlined the importance the strategyhad in dissuading the Soviets from contemplating the use of nuclearweapons:

PD-59 will not enhance Soviet confidence in predicting what theU.S. response to a limited Soviet attack would be. Rather, it shouldincrease Soviet certainty that there will be a U.S. response—aresponse that will clearly dispel any illusion that the Soviets mighthave regarding winning a nuclear war at acceptable, if large, cost.62


Both Brown and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie stressed theenhancement of support of US and Allied forces in NATO Europe63 aswell as the relationship of PD 59 to overall US military strategy.64 Thusthe concept of Extended Deterrence, defined as ‘‘deterrence of attackagainst U.S. friends and allies or peripheral U.S. interests,’’ wasenshrined in PD 59.65

PD 59 was a culmination of counterforce strategy stretching back toNSDM 242. Where it differed from its predecessors was in its emphasis onattacking Soviet leadership targets, as opposed to the earlier emphasis—most notably during Schlesinger’s term at the Pentagon—on economictargeting.66 In this sense, it was a reflection of Brzezinski’s emphasis onethnic targeting. Brown outlined the importance of this in September1980:

Now, clearly, their industry and their population are important tothem, but so are their military forces, so is their political and militarycontrol over the elements of Soviet power.

We need to be able to show them—and in order to be able to showthem we need to have the forces, the doctrine and the commandand control that will enable us to do this—that given a nuclear war,whatever it is that the Soviet leadership counts as most important toit, would be threatened and would in an exchange or a series of exchanges bedestroyed. (My italics)67

Perhaps as important, if not more so, was that PD 59 emphasized atrend that had been taking shape throughout the Carter years: theemphasis on protracted nuclear war. Whereas earlier strategies hadenvisioned at most a few days or weeks regarding the length of a generalnuclear war between the superpowers, PD 59 emphasized that such aconflict could last for several months.68

In order for PD 59 to be implemented, the strategic forces needed tobe properly structured to carry out the tasks assigned to them. Anumber of programs had been underway since the mid-1970s toenhance US counterforce capabilities, and these received considerablygreater funding by 1981. Two key areas received attention: the wea-ponry of the strategic forces and the C3I needed to support them.69

Particular emphasis was placed on upgrading the ICBM force, as itscombination of accuracy and readiness meant that it possessed prompt,hard-target kill capability. In other words, American ICBMs were themost effective means of carrying out rapid attacks on Soviet command-and-control centers, ICBM launch centers, and silos where reserve mis-siles were located. The Minuteman force, most particularly the MIRVedMinuteman IIIs, received considerable attention. Starting in 1980,the Mark 12A warhead was fitted to 300 of these missiles, which

28 Strategic forces

effectively doubled their explosive yield from 170 kilotons to 335–350kilotons.70 Additionally, all 550 Minuteman IIIs were fitted with the NS-20 guidance system, which increased their accuracy to one-tenth of amile.71 Against Soviet ICBM silos hardened to withstand roughly 2,000pounds of overpressure per square inch (psi), this gave the MinutemanIIIs—or at least those fitted with the Mark 12A warhead—a pronouncedsilo-killing capability needed to carry out the counterforce optionsenshrined in PD 59.72 With growing concern over the vulnerability offixed silo ICBMs, development of the mobile MX also continued.

Nor was the ICBM force the only leg to receive attention. Thebomber force was to receive a considerable boost with the conversion ofsome 173 B-52G/H bombers to carry the air-launched cruise missile(ALCM), of which nearly 3,400 were to be procured during the 1980s.73

Additionally, 12 Poseidon submarines, each capable of carrying 16submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), were backfitted with newTrident I missiles, beginning in October 1979.74 Nine new Trident subs,each with 24 missiles, had received funding authorization by FY 1981.75

The mobile MX, ALCM, and Trident would enable US strategic forcesto utilize the flexible targeting packages emphasized by PD 59.76

While strategic delivery systems received considerable attention, USC3I systems were also enhanced. Command-and-control centers werehardened, and mobility was stressed. Furthermore, new reconnaissancesystems, mostly satellites, were developed, to enable the NCA to assessdamage and targets to be attacked.77 Additionally, improvements toexisting warning systems and the addition of a new nuclear detectionsystem, as well as mobile warning stations, were planned.78

Moreover, a fleet of six E-4B command aircraft was the goal set at thistime. These included an airborne alert aircraft, the Airborne NationalCommand Post (ABNCP), and a ground alert aircraft, known as theNational Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP), in which thePresident would most likely be located in the event of nuclear war.79

The characteristics of the various command aircraft were impressive:

Airborne endurance is increased with refuelling, and secure, anti-jam communications are provided. Key communications improve-ments will increase reliability and survivability of communications toMINUTEMAN and TITAN wings, to airborne strategic bombers,and to the TACAMO [Take Charge and Move Out—Navy SSBN C3aircraft] aircraft relaying execution messages to SSBNs. To assurecontinued operations during nuclear war, the E-4B is hardenedagainst nuclear effects, including electromagnetic pulse (EMP).80

A key influence on the development of counterforce doctrine throughoutthis period was the US war plan, the SIOP. By 1974, when NSDM 242was drafted, more than 25,000 targets had been identified.81 By 1980, the


war plan, SIOP-5D, contained a staggering 40,000 targets.82 Clearly, aneed for target prioritization was in order. US strategic planners haddivided the list of targets into four key groups:

(1) Soviet nuclear forces (both strategic and theatre), which includedlaunching centers, nuclear weapon storage sites, bomber and otherbases for nuclear-capable aircraft, and SSBN bases;

(2) conventional forces, including storage depots, tank and vehicleparks, conventional airbases, and marshalling areas;

(3) Soviet political and military leadership posts used for C3I; and(4) economic and industrial targets.83

SIOP-5D further listed target ‘‘sets’’ from these groups, which wereorganized into four general attack options:

Major Attack Options (MAO), corresponding to the MAD theories ofthe 1960s;

Selected Attack Options (SAO) and Limited Attack Options (LAO),which allowed for selective attacks on either military or economictargets;

Regional Nuclear Options (RNO), for use in support of forces inregional contingencies (e.g., defending NATO Europe from aSoviet invasion).84

This mirrored Harold Brown’s definition of targeting priorities in PD59, the basis for the ‘‘Countervailing Strategy.’’ It is important to notethat SIOP-5D predated PD 59 by some nine months and that thetarget list had been increasing steadily. Nor was the SIOP the onlyplan to be affected by the ‘‘Countervailing Strategy.’’ Among theprovisions of PD 59 was the drafting of a revised Nuclear WeaponsEmployment Policy, which became known as NUWEP-2 or NUWEP-80. This marked a significant shift in emphasis from NUWEP-1,which placed primary emphasis on attacking Soviet industry thatcould be used for postwar recovery. NUWEP-2 prioritized Sovietmilitary and political targets. Furthermore, Soviet economic targetswould be included due to their role in supporting the USSR’s wareffort.85

Certainly a purely military strategy existed for the use of the US stra-tegic forces already. What the official adaptation of counterforce strategiesfrom NSDM 242 to the various directives of the Carter Administrationculminating in PD 59 indicate is that it became necessary for militarystrategy to be interwoven with other aspects of US national securitypolicy, which would become the basis for policies regarding foreign affairsand national defense.

30 Strategic forces

‘‘Diplomacy without arms, said Frederick the Great, is like musicwithout instruments,’’ wrote Michael Howard in 1983, ‘‘and thoughmilitary instruments unorchestrated by diplomacy produce only abloody cacophony, their total absence is likely to result in impotentsilence.’’86 Howard’s analysis is quite cogent here. A nuclear war planseparate from a geopolitical strategy combining both foreign anddefense policy would be capable only of the most general deterrence.The awesome growth of American strategic nuclear potential in the1970s meant that such a harmonization of strategy and policy was of theutmost importance.

Between 1974 and 1980, the United States expanded and refined itscounterforce strategy, adding considerably to its strategic forces anddrafting plans for their use in the event of war. These efforts wereaimed at deterring the Soviet Union, with its vastly expanded strategiccapabilities, from utilizing these forces in the event of a crisis to coercethe United States and its allies. Indeed, the need to maintain a flexiblemilitary posture was at the center of American efforts during this time.Perceptions of Soviet strategic capabilities, based on what US policy-makers and analysts believed about Soviet doctrine and forces, are thesubject of the following section.

Counterforce and Soviet strategy: The role of perception

The Nixon–Ford years

The growth of Soviet strategic capabilities from the mid-1960s on wasa worrisome development for US officials during the decade of the 1970s.Schlesinger pointed out the implications of the Soviet buildup in 1974:

Primarily at issue are the answers to two major questions. To whatextent have the Soviets simply responded to and tried to counterU.S. initiatives? And to what extent have they sought (and do theycontinue to seek) something more ambitious than a capability forsecond-strike massive retaliation against the United States?87

Schlesinger went on to describe Soviet programs, including additionalICBM throwweight and development of the Backfire bomber with at leastsome long-range capability. He warned that, while it could not be statedabsolutely, the Soviet leadership might perceive their growing strategiccapabilities as giving them a military edge vis-a-vis the United States.88

Donald Rumsfeld shared his predecessor’s view of the Soviet strategicforce structure:

. . . there is an increasing possibility that major asymmetries willdevelop between U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive forces . . . and


that the Soviet strategic capability will come to be seen as superior tothat of the United States.89

If the Soviet strategic posture is already impressive today—in num-bers, throw-weight, and survivability—it is becoming even more soin terms of qualitative improvements which are part of the currentwave of modernization.90

As for the relationship between Soviet strategy and force deployment,Rumsfeld observed, ‘‘Soviet programs do not reflect an interest indeterrence by massive retaliation alone; their strategic nuclear posture isdeveloping a war-fighting capability.’’91

These views were shared by JCS Chairman General Brown. In 1975,he noted that ‘‘The Soviet Union’s focus is not simply on maintainingthe current advantage in terms of megatonnage and throwweight, but itapplies as well to accuracy, flexibility, survivability and MIRVing inter-continental missiles.’’92 General Brown went further in his report for1978, indicating a clear link between military capacity and geopoliticalobjectives:

Continued improvements in Soviet forces imply that war-fightingand war-winning capabilities are fundamental Soviet military goals. . . should a conflict develop, it appears they intend to have themeans, both conventional and nuclear, to ensure an outcome favor-able to them. As the Soviets approach such capability, they may wellbe inclined to test US resolve . . .

Before moving on to the views of the Carter Administration regardingthe Soviet strategic threat, it is important to examine Soviet strategiccapabilities as they were understood at the time. In 1976, the balanceappeared to be one of ‘‘essential equivalence.’’ The United States pos-sessed 8,530 deliverable strategic warheads compared with the SovietUnion’s 3,250, a clear lead. Not only were US warheads more evenlydivided between ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, but, in terms of SLBMwarheads and bomber weapons, the American lead was pronounced.93

In equivalent megatonnage, the balance was reversed, with 3,735 EMTfor the USSR to the US total of 1,930.94 In terms of throwweight, thebalance was rather even, with the Soviet Union enjoying a substantial leadover the United States in ICBMs (7 million pounds to 2.4 million) and aslighter lead for SLBMs (1.2 million to 900,000). In bomber payload, theUnited States was clearly ahead, with 22.8 million pounds to the USSR’s4.7 million.95

However, it was the ICBM that provided the superpowers with themost effective capacity for launching prompt, counterforce attacks. Itwas here that the Soviet Union appeared to be taking the lead. In 1975,

32 Strategic forces

three new types of ICBM—the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19—were intro-duced. The SS-17 and SS-19 were capable of carrying four and sixMIRVs, respectively, whereas the SS-18 could carry eight. Additionally,these missiles could be configured to carry single warheads withenormous yields. The SS-17s and SS-19s, for example, could carry a5-megaton warhead, whereas the SS-18 was estimated to deploy a15–25-megaton warhead in this configuration.96

This meant that a counterforce attack could be mounted withMIRVed examples of these missiles on US Minuteman and Titan ICBMsilos and launch control centers (LCC) as well as against US bomberbases. At the same time, hardened US C3 installations could be knockedout by the massive single warhead variants of these missiles. The Sovietsalso deployed the SS-N-8 SLBM, with a range of some 4,800 miles, sig-nificantly greater than its US equivalents, the Polaris and Poseidon.97

These new missiles enabled the Soviet SSBN force to hold US cities ascountervalue targets with greater ease.

The combination of these weapons meant that a strong possibilityexisted that the Soviet leadership, in a severe crisis, might be tempted toinitiate a counterforce war with the United States, having enough con-fidence in their strategic forces to view this as feasible.

Intelligence estimates were also worrying. The CIA’s National Intelli-gence Estimates (NIE) painted a worrisome picture of the US–Sovietstrategic balance throughout the 1970s. NIE 11-3/8-76, issued in late1976, warned of the implications of the Soviet strategic buildup:

Soviet forces for intercontinental conflict have political as well as militaryutility. The Soviets see these forces, along with other military capabilities,as serving their long-term aim of achieving a dominant position over theWest. At present, they believe that the growth of their capabilities forintercontinental conflict . . .have helped create a new ‘‘correlation offorces’’ in the world that is more favorable to the USSR . . .

In a confrontation, the Soviets expect their strategic power toenhance the prospect of favorable outcomes. (My underline)98

The role of Soviet military doctrine with regard to strategic nuclearforces was addressed as well:

The available open and classified Soviet literature indicates that theSoviets are committed to improving their capabilities for wagingnuclear war. This commitment reflects a leadership consensus on theneed to assure the survival of the Soviet Union in case of such a warand a military doctrine which holds that a nuclear war could be won . . .(My italics).99


The 1977 NIE reiterated these views:

Soviet military doctrine sets a goal of creating war-winning capabilitiesand then defines this posture as the best deterrent . . . the Soviets seenuclear weapons and the long-range means of delivering them asboth offensive and defensive, in that they can attack the enemy’smilitary forces, thereby reducing his capability to attack the USSR.100

The intelligence community’s alarm over Soviet strategic capabilities wasexemplified by the ‘‘Team B’’ report issued in December 1976. Led byProfessor Richard Pipes of Harvard, and including Professor WilliamVan Cleave as an associate, together with Paul Nitze and Paul Wolfo-witz—a member of ACDA at the time—as part of the advisory panel,‘‘Team B’’ issued a critique of earlier NIE’s, particularly 11-3/8-76.Among the most important issues was Soviet strategy. The integration ofthe armed forces into the political process—the opposite of civil – militaryrelations in the United States—meant that Soviet strategic thought wasaltogether different from its American counterpart.101

The authors forcefully set out what they believed to be Soviet grandstrategy, including strategic nuclear forces:

. . . in the USSR, military weapons in general, and strategic nuclear wea-pons in particular, are treated not as unique instruments to be used as a verylast resort, but as elements of a whole range of mutually supporting means ofpersuasion and coercion available to the state in pursuit of its interests.(Italics in original.)102

In addressing Soviet ICBM development, the authors came to a starkconclusion:

The full sweep of these programs, and in particular the great ICBMthrow weight, the improvement and multiplication of MIRVed war-heads given that throw weight, and the steady modernization of theICBM force—e.g. in accuracy and systems reliability—support aconclusion that the Soviets seek clear superiority in the capabilitiesof these forces, including the maximum feasible counterforce andwarfighting capability.103

The ‘‘Team B’’ report was leaked to the press, and it helped shapethe overall debate on Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions.The incoming Carter Administration would find itself challenged by theshift in the debate generated by ‘‘Team B’’ and would be pushed towarddirections in its national security policy that, in the end, would be similarto ‘‘Team B’’s’ outlook.

34 Strategic forces

The Carter years

Harold Brown raised concerns that were similar to those of his pre-decessors and reflected a link to Soviet military strategy. ‘‘Their currentprograms have breadth, depth, and momentum,’’104 Brown noted in1978. He went on to speculate about the nature of Soviet rationales forsuch programs:

Conceivably they are as interested as we are in the concept of optionsand controlled nuclear campaigns. They probably have the capability,even now, to employ their offensive forces with some flexibility, andwe cannot preclude their being quite selective in their targeting.Much of what they are doing both offensively and defensively coin-cides with the actions that would support a damage-limiting strategy.And it is within the realm of possibility that they are attempting toacquire what have been called ‘‘war winning’’ capabilities.105

The following year, Brown noted that the Soviet Union continued todevelop ‘‘a large ICBM force with an expanding hard-target-kill cap-ability.’’106 What worried Brown about these developments ‘‘is thedegree of emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on a war-winning nuclearcapability, and the extent to which current Soviet programs are relatedto the doctrine.’’107 Brown’s concerns about Soviet warfighting strategyintensified over the remainder of his tenure. In his 1981 report, hestated, ‘‘[T]here are suggestions also that if a nuclear war occurred, thetime-honored military objectives of national survival and dominantmilitary position at the end of the fighting would govern and so mustshape military preparations beforehand.’’108

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Sep-tember 1980, Secretary Brown noted, ‘‘Soviet actions are such that theyhave clearly shown a willingness to use power in whatever way it servestheir interests—Afghanistan is only the latest in a long series of exam-ples.’’109 He linked these actions to a perception of confidence by theSoviet leadership in their strategic forces to secure victory in a generalnuclear war.110

General Brown’s successor, General David Jones, noted his worriesregarding Soviet strategy, particularly in light of their considerable stra-tegic force improvements: ‘‘They have a doctrine which considersnuclear war as thinkable and they are not only building their offensiveforces, but are giving great attention to command and control, civildefense, air defense, and all other elements needed to fight a nuclearwar’’ (My italics).111

As Detente collapsed and the ‘‘Second Cold War’’ began between thetwo superpowers, Jones’ concerns over Soviet strategic capabilities anddoctrine became more strident. In 1980, he warned of the dangers of an


imbalance of nuclear strength between the United States and the SovietUnion favoring the latter:

I anticipate such a disparity would be reflected in a more confidentSoviet leadership, increasingly inclined toward more adventurousbehavior in areas where our interests clash and where US ability torespond by conventional means could be circumscribed. The Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan could well be a ‘‘leading edge’’ eventreflecting precisely such a heightened confidence.112

A . . . likely consequence is that it will affect the Soviet perception ofthe military balance in a way which might embolden them to actwith less restraint in international affairs. It is thus the political con-sequences of the shifting strategic balance which are of greatestimmediate concern. (My italics)113

The CIA continued to warn of Soviet strategic improvements. In an NIEfrom 1978, it was noted that ‘‘Soviet strategic offensive and defensiveprograms have continued to display the broad scope, vigor, and persis-tence to which we have called attention in previous estimates.’’ Further-more, ‘‘the present phase [of Soviet force modernization] stressesoperational flexibility while maintaining highly centralized control.’’114

In examining force improvements for the next decade, the report listedfour ‘‘general objectives’’: improvement of overall counterforce anddamage-limitation capabilities; enhanced perceptions of a strategic bal-ance favoring the USSR; an emphasis on quality, without an unduereduction in numbers, of the Soviet strategic forces; and an improve-ment in C3I to engage in LNOs and in protracted nuclear warfare.115

In the 1980 NIE, geopolitical implications were discussed:

The Soviets probably view their improved strategic position as pro-viding a more favorable backdrop than before to the conduct of anassertive foreign policy and to the projection of Soviet power abroad.They probably do not see the present situation of approximate strate-gic nuclear parity as providing them with the latitude to safely con-front the United States directly in areas where they perceive US vitalinterests to be involved. However, in areas they believe the UnitedStates regards as less central to its interests, particularly in regionswhere the USSR enjoys a preponderance of conventional forces andthe advantage of proximity, such as Afghanistan, the current strategicrelationship probably enhances Soviet confidence that the risk of a USlocal or escalatory military response would be negligible.116

The link between military capability and political objectives was not loston US policymakers during this time. In testimony before the Senate

36 Strategic forces

Foreign Relations Committee in July 1979, Secretary Brown gave asuccinct summary of the relationship between strategic forces and theglobal balance of power:

In addition to their purely military capabilities . . . strategic nuclearforces—like other military forces—have a broader role in the world.Countries . . .make judgements about our strength and that of theSoviets. The behavior of all those countries will be influenced by their judgements.It is in that respect that our second objective—essential equivalence—particularly applies. It requires that our forces overall be, and be recognized as,at least on a par with those of the Soviet Union. Otherwise the Soviet couldgain in the world (and we lose), without war, from changes in perceptionsabout the balance of nuclear power. (My italics)117

A few days later, in a hearing before the same body, former Secretary ofState Henry Kissinger, who had been in office during the developmentof LNOs earlier in the decade, warned of what an imbalance of strategicforces would mean for US foreign policy and global stability:

The deterrent effect of our strategic forces in defense of allies willcontinually decline; our strategic forces will surely lose their abilityto offset the Soviet capacity for regional intervention. And thiscapacity will be reinforced by the growing edge in Soviet theaternuclear forces, a naval and airlift capability which immeasurablyextends the reach and preponderance of Soviet conventionalpower.118

With the development of nuclear strategy during the Carter years, USofficials increasingly pointed to these efforts as having strengthenedefforts at extended deterrence. Secretary of State Muskie declared inSeptember 1980 that

I am confident that the countervailing strategy not only strengthensdeterrence but also establishes a firmer basis for our diplomacy withthe Soviets. It underlies our determination to respond to any chal-lenges to our vital interests, at the same time it confirms that wepose no threat to the legitimate interests of other states. As such, itleaves the Soviets no room for doubt about our will or our peacefulintentions.119

All this reflected official views of US Government agencies and the mili-tary. For analysts outside of government, these views, while valid, had tobe tempered with other factors, including the reverse of what has beendiscussed here: namely, Soviet perceptions of American strategy. DavidHolloway, citing Soviet writers on the subject, noted ‘‘the growth of


Soviet strategic power has restricted the United States’ ability to use itsstrategic forces in support of its foreign policy.’’120 However, he con-tinued that other writers ‘‘have argued that American plans for moreselective use of strategic weapons—as envisaged . . . by the Schlesingerdoctrine of 1974 and Presidential Directive 59 of 1980—show that theUnited States is trying to escape from the restrictions of parity and torestore political utility to its strategic forces.’’121

Richard Burt, on the contrary, emphasized the links between militarypower and political objectives in Soviet strategy. ‘‘Like super-powerstrategic arms competition, nuclear conflict is understood as a continua-tion of the ideological struggle. In Clausewitzian terms, war—eveninvolving super-power strategic exchanges—is a ‘supremely political act’in which the Soviet Union can and, indeed, must prevail.’’122 BenjaminS. Lambeth viewed Soviet doctrine as one geared toward warfightingand victory. He discerned five key themes in Soviet doctrine: A coun-terforce strategy was the best means of enhancing deterrence; if a gen-eral nuclear war did occur, victory was possible; a first strike wasnecessary to ensure victory; restraint was dangerous; and quantity wouldalso play an important role in any such conflict.123

Most strident on his views of a Soviet war-winning nuclear strategy,and well versed on Soviet military writings on this subject, was RichardPipes, who made two key points regarding Soviet strategy:

Because of Soviet adherence to the Clausewitzian principle thatwarfare is always an extension of politics—i.e. subordinate to overallpolitical objectives . . . Soviet military planning is carried out underthe close supervision of the country’s highest political body, thePolitburo. Thus, military policy is regarded as an intrinsic element of‘‘grand strategy,’’ whose arsenal includes a variety of non-militaryinstruments. (My italics)124

In Pipes’s view, Soviet strategy had developed throughout the Cold Warin a consistent manner, based on the dictum of Clausewitz linking poli-tics and war, and therefore emphasized the idea of using all elements ofmilitary power, including strategic nuclear forces, to achieve Soviet geo-political goals. Furthermore, in accordance with what was written in the‘‘Team B’’ report, Pipes cited Soviet history and ideology as playing apivotal role in the intellectual shaping of Soviet strategy: ‘‘The Sovietruling elite regards conflict and violence as natural regulators of allhuman affairs: wars between nations, in its view, represent only a variantof wars between classes, recourse to one or the other being dependenton circumstances.’’125

These analysts viewed the strategic balance in a manner generally simi-lar to the officials responsible for making policy. For example, the role ofpolitical decision-making in the formulation of strategy in the Soviet Union

38 Strategic forces

was emphasized, albeit to different degrees by such writers as Burt andPipes. Open Soviet sources regarding nuclear war corroborated these—and official—views of Soviet strategy as having a war-winning emphasis.This found its way into official US war planning, particularly during theCarter years. The drafting of US nuclear strategy during that time tendedto be based on a more thorough study of Soviet literature on the subject,and this led to a greater emphasis on targeting Soviet military and politicaltargets, as opposed to the importance of economic and population centersstressed in earlier strategies.126

The most public impact of these shifts in nuclear strategy was to be seenin the drafting of the SALT II agreement. Widely criticized by con-servatives as locking the United States into a position of strategic infer-iority, it in fact allowed both the United States and the Soviet Union tomaintain nearly intact their strategic programs for the next several years.For example, the Soviets were allowed to retain their 308 SS-18 heavyICBMs, with their enormous counterforce capability, whereas the UnitedStates was able to develop its 10-warhead MX ICBM. Furthermore, aftera two-year protocol, the United States would be able to deploy cruisemissiles on its B-52 bombers, which themselves represented an importantaddition to US counterforce capabilities. Although the total number ofMIRVed missiles and missile-equipped bombers was limited to 1,200 (andMIRVed ICBMs to 820) for each side, such forces were well within whatwas needed to carry out counterforce operations.127 Although unratified,both countries adhered to its limitations, an indication (at least in part)that it was sound regarding strategic doctrine.

Conclusion

The development of US nuclear strategy during the 1970s, which sawan increasing emphasis on counterforce operations and nuclear war-fighting, was influenced by a variety of factors. The Detente process wascritical in shaping much thinking on how US strategic forces would beused, and the rise, decline, and fall of detente influenced the process ofstrategic planning considerably.

It has been well said that Detente came about, in no small part, due tothe realization that the Soviet Union had achieved parity with the UnitedStates. Although the overall military balance might raise questions aboutthe totality of this statement, it is certainly appropriate in terms of strate-gic forces. For Presidents Nixon and Ford, and for President Carter up toabout 1979, the challenge was to maintain this equilibrium of strategicpower—or ‘‘essential equivalence’’—to sustain strategic parity and con-vince Americans, many of whom were suspicious of or hostile towardDetente, that this was a sound policy. The growth in Soviet strategicpower meant that MAD simply could not be sustained. If the Soviets wereplanning to approach nuclear war as a winnable prospect, then the policies


supporting deterrence had to take this into account. NSDM 242, with itsemphasis on limited strikes and flexibility, was, in part, a response to thisshift in strategy. So were the Carter Administration’s early policiesregarding nuclear strategy, as enunciated in PRM 10 and PD 18. Inother words, a robust American nuclear strategy would enable theUnited States to maintain a credible strategic posture vis-a-vis its primarygeopolitical adversary. This extended to arms control, as importantweapon systems, like the MX ICBM and cruise missiles, were secured inSALT II, thus allowing US force planners to match arms with strategy.

During the late 1970s, relations between the superpowers becamestrained, leading to growing opposition in the United States to Detente.US nuclear strategy began to take on another role, that of shoring upthe Carter Administration in the face of critics of its foreign and defensepolicies. From 1978 onward, US strategic policy took on an ever morecomprehensive approach to the waging of a general nuclear war withthe Soviet Union. Civil defense, C3I, and targeting packages all cametogether to form what became known as the ‘‘Countervailing Strategy.’’

With the onset of the Second Cold War in 1979–80, the political pur-pose of American strategic policy became one supporting a more robustgeopolitical effort, in conjunction with the enunciation of the CarterDoctrine in January 1980 (stating US willingness to defend the PersianGulf), the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force in support of this,and the decision on Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF)deployment by the United States and its NATO allies.

At its core, US nuclear strategy, as it developed from 1974 to 1980,became ever more focused on a counterforce doctrine. From the ratherlimited plans outlined by NSDM 242 to the comprehensive, ‘‘Countervailing’’approach of PD 59, this strategy was evolutionary.128 In a key address madein August 1980 at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island,Harold Brown emphasized this phenomenon regarding PD 59:

At the outset, let me emphasize that P.D. 59 is not a new strategic doc-trine; is not a radical departure from U.S. strategic policy over the pastdecade or so. It is, in fact, a refinement, a codification of previousstatements of our strategic policy. P.D. 59 takes the same essential stra-tegic doctrine, and restates it more clearly, more cogently, in the light ofcurrent conditions and current capabilities. (Italics in original.)129

Other US officials reiterated Brown’s statements. ‘‘As such, the counter-vailing strategy is not a radical departure from previous policy,’’ Secretaryof State Muskie declared in September 1980. ‘‘It is rather the result of agradual evolution of our doctrine over a period of years in response tochanging conditions and new knowledge.’’130 Senator Frank Church, in astatement issued about PD 59, declared ‘‘As for the substance of PD-59itself, I am satisfied . . . that it is not a fundamental change in U.S. strategic

40 Strategic forces

policy. It is clear that the United States has not relied solely on the threatof massive retaliation on Soviet cities for deterrence for many years, ifever . . .This has been the case since at least the mid-1960s.’’131

A considerable amount of strategic weaponry, most notably theimproved Minuteman IIIs, the Trident SLBM, the ALCM, and new C3Isystems, was already entering service when Carter left office in 1981.The Reagan Administration would take a more consistent public standin its first term regarding a counterforce strategic policy and wouldaccelerate enhancements to the strategic forces, including a new versionof the B-1 bomber and the D-5 variant of Trident. This policy, however,would be an inheritance stretching back nearly a decade and would, inmany ways, continue along what was now becoming a well-worn path.


2 Protracted nuclear war

By 1981, the international situation had changed markedly. Whereasmost of the 1970s had witnessed Detente between the United States andthe Soviet Union, by the beginning of the 1980s, the two superpowersfound themselves in a state of renewed confrontation or what has beentermed the ‘‘Second Cold War.’’ Among the concerns at this time, as ithad been increasingly during the late 1970s, was that of the US–Sovietmilitary balance, particularly in terms of strategic nuclear forces.

Although the concerns were similar, the dynamic, at least at the offi-cial level, had changed. Whereas Presidents Ford and Carter hadattempted to confront the military situation within the overall bounds ofDetente, President Reagan, at least rhetorically, rejected the frameworkof this policy as it had evolved in the 1970s. Reagan viewed Detente ashaving dangerously eroded American military strength while allowingthe Soviet Union to match or even in some cases exceed the UnitedStates in many areas of comparison. This required a considerableexpansion of US military capabilities, to restore a favorable balanceof power and thus a less confrontational relationship with Moscow.1

Reagan’s views had become more prominent during the late 1970s, as anumber of organizations emerged warning Americans of their country’smilitary imbalance vis a vis the USSR. Most prominent of these (and ofwhich Ronald Reagan was a member) was the Committee on the PresentDanger. When Reagan took office in 1981, its members were appointedto Executive positions in considerable numbers. Among those betterknown were Richard Pipes (Director of Soviet Affairs for the NationalSecurity Council), Richard Perle (Assistant Secretary of Defense forInternational Security Policy), and Paul Nitze (Chief Negotiator to theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks and, later, Special Repre-sentative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations).2

Among those who served in government during this time was Colin S.Gray, who had argued for the adaptation by the United States of a ‘‘war-winning’’ nuclear strategy.3 In an article published by International Securityin 1979, Gray argued for such an approach to strategic planning. ‘‘One ofthe essential tasks of the American defense community is to help ensure that in

moments of acute crisis the Soviet general staff cannot brief the Politburo with aplausible theory of military victory.’’ (Emphasis in original.)4 Gray called fora strategy that would target the structure of the Soviet state:

We resist the external military pressure of the Soviet Union, andeffect carefully selected kinds of damage against the capacity of theSoviet state to function with authority at home . . . a war plan direc-ted at the destruction of Soviet power would have inherent plausi-bility in Soviet estimation [of the risks of war]. (Emphasis inoriginal.)5

The following year, Gray co-authored an article titled ‘‘Victory is Possi-ble’’ in the journal Foreign Policy. The subject was, of course, generalnuclear war. ‘‘Recognition that war at any level can be won or lost, andthat the distinction between winning and losing would not be trivial, isessential for intelligent defense planning . . .U.S. strategic targeting doc-trine must have a unity of political purpose from the first to the laststrikes.’’6 These ideas would come to play an important role in USnuclear strategy during the 1980s.

Given the background of the new President and much of his nationalsecurity team, it is not surprising that a more thrusting nuclear strategywas developed from that which had gone before. Scenarios for wagingnuclear war were soon leaked, indicating the new administration’s view ofa conflict continuing for an extended period of time, in some cases up tofive years. These scenarios incorporated conventional concepts such asmilitary recovery and indicated a war in which both sides would launchselected attacks to secure a greater advantage.7 A war game called IvyLeague, carried out in March 1982, was publicly announced beforehand,and its substance promptly leaked. This exercise simulated a Soviet stra-tegic attack on the United States and dealt with the continuity of govern-ment after such an occurrence, with a strong emphasis on the ability tocontinue to wage war.8 This, together with statements by Reagan and top-level cabinet members indicating the feasibility of victory, gave a strongimpression of a qualitative shift in US nuclear strategy.9

Although this was certainly a valid assessment of the situation held atthe time by the American public (as well as by many in Western Europeand by the Soviet leadership), this view was not entirely accurate, for tworeasons. First, although the Reagan Administration’s approach to nuclearstrategy had changed from that held by its predecessors, it also repre-sented an evolution from what had been established in the 1970s. Itsantecedents can be traced back, in a strongly linear fashion, to NSDM242, the framework for the so-called ‘‘Schlesinger Doctrine.’’ Morerecently, the many Presidential Directives of the Carter years, culminatingin PD 59, provided a solid base for the new administration to formulateits approach to nuclear strategy.

Protracted nuclear war 43

Second, although the Reagan Administration devoted considerablefunding for strategic forces, many of the weapons and systems werealready in service, programmed to enter service, or being developed by1981. As will be seen, few new systems were introduced during the early1980s. These weapons did, however, make the shift to a strategy of‘‘prevailing’’ in a general nuclear war appear to be more feasible andthus served to reinforce the Reagan Administration’s strategic policies.

This chapter will therefore examine these two key areas of nuclearstrategy during the early 1980s—its evolution from what existed beforeand the importance of weapons development in its formulation. Thesimilarities and differences regarding the new strategy as opposed tothat developed through the 1970s will of course be scrutinized. As ever,the influence of official perceptions of Soviet capabilities will be inclu-ded, as will the influence on public perceptions of the official rhetoricemanating from Washington at this time.

Strategy

The Reagan Administration moved quickly to establish a set of criteriafor strategic nuclear policy. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)12, issued October 1, 1981, described the basis for the modernization ofUS strategic forces:

The Modernization program outlined by this directive will guide thelong-term development of our strategic forces. It will help redressthe deteriorated strategic balance with the Soviet Union. The resultwill be a deterrent that is far more secure and stable than our pre-sent nuclear forces.10

At a press conference the following day, President Reagan noted threekey objectives of the strategic forces program:

‘‘– It will act as a deterrent against any Soviet actions directed againstthe American people or our allies;

‘‘– It will provide us with the capability to respond at reasonable costand within adequate time to any further growth in Soviet forces;

‘‘– It will signal our resolve to maintain the strategic balance, and this is thekeystone to any genuine arms reduction agreement with the Soviets.’’11

The President then listed five ‘‘main features’’ of this effort: (1) Thedeployment of 100 B-1 strategic bombers and cruise missiles—togetherwith the development of a ‘‘stealth’’ bomber—to strengthen the strategicbomber force; (2) Continued deployment of Trident missiles and sub-marines as well as the development of an improved Trident missile anddeployment of nuclear cruise missiles on subs; (3) An interim deployment

44 Strategic forces

of MX ICBMs in existing silos, with a new deployment system to bedecided upon by 1984; (4) Improvements to C3 systems; and (5) Abuildup of strategic defense capabilities, including both air and civildefense.12 Nearly all these efforts were a continuation of programs initi-ated during the Carter years.

In December 1981, the Reagan Administration issued its blueprint fornuclear strategy, NSDD 13. Although only a fraction of this documenthas been declassified, it essentially reaffirmed the approach of the CarterAdministration as set out in PD 59 regarding the role of US strategicforces while officially superceding PD 59.13 These two key directiveswould be augmented as time went on, as the Administration spelled outin more concrete terms the nature of its specific strategic programs.NSDD 91, issued on April 19, 1983, amended the provisions of NSDD12. It listed seven key areas for strategic forces development (oneremains classified): strategic communications; the strategic bomberforce; submarine-launched ballistic missiles; strategic defense; ICBMdeployment; and the development of a new, ‘‘small’’ ICBM.14

Perhaps the most detailed discussion of the role of the US strategicforces during this time was to be found in NSDD 32. Issued in April1982, it provided a detailed analysis of US national security strategy. Inits discussion of nuclear forces, NSDD 32 listed a fundamental tenet ofUS strategy: ‘‘the United States and its allies must prevail and in theprocess be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination ofhostilities at the lowest possible level of violence and on terms favorableto the United States.’’15 The earlier NSDDs on nuclear strategy werethen integrated with these objectives:

U.S. nuclear employment planning supports this strategy by ensur-ing the availability of the greatest amount of targeting flexibility tothe NCA, strengthening the linkage between nuclear and conven-tional forces, limiting collateral damage, and maximizing the Sovietuncertainty regarding their ability to successfully execute a nuclearattack.16

Another area where the initiatives of the Carter years were expandedand refined was C3I. NSDD 97 of August 3, 1983, stated that ‘‘A survi-vable telecommunications infrastructure able to support national secur-ity leadership is a crucial element of U.S deterrence.’’17 The authors ofthis report described the importance of improved telecommunications:

It must be manifestly apparent to a potential enemy that the U.S.ability to maintain continuity of command and control of all militaryforces, and conduct other essential national leadership functionscannot be eliminated by a nuclear attack. If deterrence fails, thenational telecommunications infrastructure must possess the functional


characteristics . . .necessary to provide a range of telecommunicationsservices to support . . . essential national leadership requirements.18

Two of the key requirements outlined in NSDD 97 were ‘‘ensuringcontinuity of command and control of military forces’’ and ‘‘providingfor continuity of government and essential functions thereof.’’19 Thiswas a refinement of the Carter Administration’s PD 53 on this subject, asNSDD 12 had been.20 NSDD 97 expanded on another Carter directive,PD 57, regarding mobilization of US forces, as it listed ‘‘support of mili-tary mobilization as directed by the President’’21 to be one of the objec-tives of US national security telecommunication policy.

The most comprehensive directive on this area came on September17, 1984 with NSDD 145. Its objective

Provides initial objectives, policies, and an organizational structureto guide the conduct of national activities directed toward safe-guarding systems which process or communicate sensitive informa-tion from hostile exploitation; establishes a mechanism for policydevelopment; and assigns responsibilities for implementation. It isintended to assure full participation and cooperation among thevarious existing centers of technical expertise throughout theExecutive Branch, to promote a coherent and coordinated defenseagainst the hostile intelligence threat to these systems, and to fosteran appropriate partnership between government and the privatesector in attaining these goals.22

Whereas earlier directives like NSDD 97 set forth the overall objectivesof the Reagan Administration’s policy in this area, NSDD 145 establisheda high-level steering group, including the Secretaries of State, Defenseand the Treasury, the Director of Central Intelligence, the AttorneyGeneral, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Directors of the FBI and theNational Security Agency (NSA) and of the Federal Emergency Man-agement Agency (FEMA), responsible for civil defense. NSDD 145exhaustively outlined the roles and scope of their activities, which wouldbe wide-ranging. The goal set out by the directive was to streamlineinteraction between the government and all existing telecommunicationnetworks in the event of war.

Although these efforts clearly show a continuation of US nuclear doc-trine from the 1970s, the Reagan policies did emphasize a differentobjective to that of earlier strategies. The ‘‘Schlesinger Doctrine’’ out-lined by NSDM 242 had outlined limited nuclear options for Americanstrategic forces, and PD 59 and other directives of the Carter years hademphasized the denial of victory to the Soviet Union in a nuclear war.The Reagan strategies, like those outlined in NSDD 13, laid a far greateremphasis on the idea of prevailing in such a conflict.

46 Strategic forces

The document that most directly spelled out the new Americanapproach was the Fiscal Year 1984–1988 Defense Guidance, which waspromptly leaked to the press. The goal for the United States in a generalnuclear war would be to ‘‘prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union toseek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the UnitedStates’’ (My italics).23 The authors of the document went on to outlinehow such an objective would be attained:

The United States must have plans that assure US strategic nuclearforces can render ineffective the total Soviet military and politicalpower structure . . . throughout a protracted conflict period andafterward, the capability to inflict very high levels of damage againstthe industrial/economic base of the Soviet Union . . . so that they havea strong incentive to seek conflict termination short of an all-outattack on our cities and economic assets.24

US strategic forces would also be ‘‘capable, under all conditions of warinitiation, of attacking a wide range of targets, even when retaliating to amassive strike received without strategic warning.’’ Thus, these forceswere to be ‘‘capable of supporting controlled nuclear counterattacks overa protracted period while maintaining a reserve of nuclear forces.’’25

Additionally, the Defense Guidance called for ‘‘decapitation’’ strikesagainst the Soviet Union’s ‘‘political and military leadership and com-munications lines.’’26 Although some of this had been present in earlierstrategies, it had largely been seen as an attempt to prevent the USSRfrom coordinating its nuclear forces in a conflict. Here, it appeared toconcur with a strategy of winning a nuclear war.27

The Defense Guidance envisaged a major increase in the size of the USstrategic nuclear forces. In 1982, these forces deployed 32 ballistic mis-sile submarines, 376 strategic bombers, and 1,053 ICBMs. By 1991,these totals would be 44 submarines, 483 bombers, and 1,254 ICBMs.28

Given that the unratified SALT II Agreement would have expired,and with arms control at an impasse at this time, such force levels werefeasible.

A front-page article in the Chicago Tribune the following Januarysummarized the document as follows:

It represents a subtle but significant shift in the thinking about anextended nuclear war, from the . . .Carter concept of ensuring thatthe Soviets do not win to the Reagan view of outlasting them byretaining enough offensive nuclear capability to prevent a U.S. lossand guarantee victory.

Nowhere does the document bluntly state that a nuclear war couldbe won. But Reagan appears to go a step farther than Carter by


implying victory is possible if enough weapons survive the openingand subsequent onslaughts to ensure a final strike.29

Most important in formulating the new US nuclear strategy was Secre-tary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. He presided over the drafting ofthe Defense Guidance, and in his reports to Congress, he reiterated manyof the themes regarding nuclear strategy. Weinberger, together withAssistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, was strongly opposed tothe SALT II limits that the superpowers had been adhering to since1979, believing that they had left the United States vulnerable to super-ior Soviet forces.

When in late 1981 President Reagan announced a new arms controleffort—the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)—Perle called for aceiling on missile throwweights. As the Soviet Union was far ahead in thisarea, this would have meant a reduction of the Soviet strategic forces bysome 60 percent, without affecting US force levels.30 Moreover, the initialSTART proposal clearly reflected existing plans to modernize the USstrategic forces while sharply reducing those of the USSR. Under Rea-gan’s START proposal, announced on May 9, 1982, the Soviet Unionwould have to eliminate most of the modern ICBMs deployed during the1970s—the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19. The United States, by contrast,would be able to carry out nearly all its strategic modernization plans,including the deployment of MX and cruise missiles.31

Weinberger’s and Perle’s attitudes had led to conflict with the StateDepartment, particularly after George Shultz became Secretary of Statein June 1982. One of Shultz’s subordinates was Richard Burt, whoserved as Assistant. Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs andwas active in shaping his department’s approach to arms control. BothPerle and Burt were highly knowledgeable on strategic issues, and theywould clash frequently and often over the substance of the STARTefforts.32 Burt, for example, challenged Perle’s ceiling on throwweightand proposed ceilings of 5,000 strategic warheads on ICBMs.

Nor was the State Department alone in opposing Weinberger’s andPerle’s plans. One of the most vocal critics was JCS Chairman GeneralJones. From their first official meeting on January 15, 1981 (a tradi-tional orientation meeting between the Defense Secretary and the JCSmeant to set policy for the coming administration), relations betweenJones and Weinberger were strained.33 Whereas the JCS preferred asteady but sustainable military buildup that would match forces to strat-egy, Weinberger’s enormous budget requests were seen as destabilizing,as they would lead to short-term gains at the expense of the long-termavailability of funds for defense.34

These disagreements extended into nuclear strategy. Jones and theJCS as a whole were alarmed by the large number of ‘‘time urgenttargets,’’ like Soviet C3I centers, that would have to be struck early in

48 Strategic forces

a strategic exchange. Such capabilities were beyond the means of USstrategic forces at the time and would remain so for the foreseeablefuture.35 For this reason, the JCS proposed a START level of 850 stra-tegic missile launchers, as this would allow for a more reasonablenumber of time-urgent targets to be included in planning.36

Soon after he retired in June 1982, Jones, in a Washington Post inter-view, warned that the strategies outlined by Weinberger were simply notattainable. ‘‘I don’t see much of a chance of a nuclear war being limitedor protracted,’’ Jones noted. ‘‘If you really put a lot of emphasis on it[preparing for such a conflict], you’ve got a bottomless pit in terms ofdollars.’’37

The view that the United States had to be prepared to achieve victoryover the Soviet Union in a general nuclear war was stated by Weinber-ger in his annual reports to Congress. In his 1983 report, Weinbergerstated that ‘‘U.S. forces will be capable under all conditions of warinitiation to survive a Soviet first strike and retaliate in a way that per-mits the United States to achieve its objectives’’ (My italics). There would bean ‘‘emphasis on enduring survivability’’ for these forces.38

Interestingly, Weinberger, in later reports, emphasized the continuityof American nuclear strategy through the present administration. In1984, for example, he outlined a key principle of US military strategy—combat operations, including nuclear operations—as follows:

. . . should deterrence fail, our strategy is to restore peace on favor-able terms. In responding to an enemy attack, we must defeat theattack and achieve our national objectives while limiting—to theextent possible and practicable—the scope of the conflict. We wouldseek to deny the enemy his political and military goals and to coun-terattack with sufficient strength to terminate hostilities at the lowestpossible level of damage to the United States and its allies. (Under-lining in original)39

As can be seen, the idea of ‘‘denial’’ bears a strong resemblance to HaroldBrown’s Countervailing Strategy. This is seen even more directly inSecretary Weinberger’s discussion of nuclear strategy later in the report:

We must make sure that the Soviet leadership, in calculating therisks of aggression, recognizes that because of our retaliatory cap-ability, there can be no circumstances in which it could benefit bybeginning a nuclear war at any level or of any duration. If theSoviets recognize that our forces can and will deny them theirobjectives at whatever level of nuclear conflict they contemplate and,in addition, that such a conflict could lead to the destruction of thosepolitical, military, and economic assets that they value most highly,then deterrence is effective and the risk of war eliminated.40


The following year, Weinberger cited the endurance of flexible nuclearoptions in US defense planning: ‘‘Of course, this concept of seeking toenhance deterrence and to limit the level of destruction by having flex-ible and enduring forces is not new. It has been squarely in the mainstreamof American strategic thinking for over two decades’’ (My italics).41

Weinberger also emphasized this approach in his meetings with thepress. In an October 1982 interview with the editors of the Frenchjournal Valeurs Actuelles, Weinberger reiterated the primary goal of theUS strategic forces as ‘‘to deter nuclear war.’’ He went on to note that

. . . our deterrent posture must be based on what deters the Soviets,because it is their perception, not ours, on which we must form thebasis of our deterrent posture. To this end, it has been our beliefthat deterrence is best served by the possession of forces and plansfor their use, which make Soviet assessments of possible war out-comes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous as tocreate strong disincentives for initiating attack or aggression againstus or our Allies. (Underlining in original)42

One key reason, it would appear, for Weinberger’s emphasis on thecontinuity of American nuclear strategy, in regard to counterforce, wasthat the Reagan Administration’s strategy had been an evolution fromwhat had gone before. This was not simply to allay public fears over thisapproach to nuclear war—which had risen sharply between 1981 and1984—or to be disingenuous. Although the strategy of the ReaganAdministration reflected its own strongly held ideological and strategicbeliefs, it would not have been possible to simply establish a strategy of‘‘prevailing’’ at the level of general nuclear war with the Soviet Unionhad not the groundwork already been established. James Schlesingerand Harold Brown had provided the foundation for American nuclearstrategy for nearly a decade, and this had included extensive planningwith numerous detailed options for the use of US strategic forces. Theevolution of this strategy, from limited options to ‘‘countervailing,’’ madethe jump to ‘‘prevailing’’ relatively straightforward.

Weapons

In order for a strategy to be implemented effectively, the necessaryweapon systems must be available. The strategic weapons slated to enterthe US arsenal in the early and mid-1980s were well-suited to a strategyof ‘‘victory’’ in a general nuclear war, as they provided the necessaryaccuracy and warhead numbers for it to be carried out. What was oftenoverlooked in public debate at the time, and is still not fully appreciated,was that the numerous strategic systems advanced by the ReaganAdministration had, in nearly all cases, either been in development for

50 Strategic forces

several years or been slated for deployment in the 1980s. Developed forthe evolving counterforce strategy during the 1970s, they were easilyadapted to the strategic developments of the 1980s.

In terms of offensive weapons, the most important systems advancedbetween 1981 and 1985 were the MX ICBM (termed Peacekeeper bythe Reagan Administration); development of a ‘‘small’’ ICBM; the Tri-dent I and II missiles and submarines to launch them; the B-1B long-range bomber; the Advanced Technology Bomber (which evolved intothe B-2 stealth bomber); and cruise missiles, most notably air- and sea-launched.43 Yet nearly all these weapons had their origins from earlieradministrations, some going back as far as the Nixon years. This wastrue of the Trident I missile and submarine.44 Research and develop-ment of the B-1 had begun in the 1960s and continued up to the 1980sdespite cancellation by the Carter Administration.45 The MX and cruisemissiles were all developments of the Nixon–Ford years, with muchresearch and development (and, in the case of cruise missiles, planneddeployment) undertaken by the Carter Administration.46 The stealthbomber began development during the Carter years as well. Some of theexisting weapons, like the Trident I, were already in service, whereasothers like the ALCM were deployed in accordance with Carter Admin-istration plans.47

What made these weapons adaptable to the latest counterforce strate-gies was their accuracy. The need to destroy hardened Soviet command-and-control centers, as well as the capability to knock out hardenedICBM silos, was pressing to carry out the scenarios envisioned by USstrategic planners in the early 1980s. Some weapons were already on-line for such operations. The Reagan Administration continued theCarter program of upgrading 300 Minuteman III ICBMs with Mark12A warheads, which was completed in 1983.48 This gave the US stra-tegic forces 900 or so highly accurate warheads with prompt, hard-target kill capability. The accuracy and range of the ALCM meant thatSoviet conventional force targets, like ammunition dumps, vehicle parks,barracks, and airfields, could be hit with far more certainty of destruc-tion. This would release ICBM and SLBM warheads for use on othertargets and also restore the long-range bomber force to prominencewithin the US strategic Triad. The Trident I had greater range andaccuracy than the Poseidon missile, which had entered service in theearly 1970s. Equipping 12 older SSBNs and the new Ohio-class sub-marines that began entering service in 1982, these missiles enabled USforces to more effectively carry out countervalue missions against theSoviet heartland.

The Reagan Administration did find itself thrust into a major area ofcontention with the MX ICBM, due mainly to the debate during the1970s regarding ICBM vulnerability. NSDD 35, of May 17, 1982, haltedthe Carter program for Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS) deployment


of the MX. NSDD 73, issued January 3, 1983, directed a new study onfeasibility of the ‘‘Dense Pack’’ system, as well as other approaches, toovercome Congressional opposition. As with earlier directives, NSDD 73stipulated an initial operational capability (IOC) of 1986, with fulldeployment by 1989.49 After much debate, the MX was deployed in 1986,although only 50, rather than the planned 100, were put into service.

As indicated by the MX deployment, the programs most important tothe Reagan Administration—MX, Trident II, and the B-1B—were allslated for deployment in the second half of the 1980s, in what becamethe Administration’s second term. According to Secretary Weinberger’sreports to Congress in 1984, Peacekeeper ICBMs would account for lessthan 10 percent of the US ICBM force by 1988 but would providenearly 25 percent of ICBM warheads by this time.50 The B-1B, a variantof the existing B-1 bomber developed in the early 1980s as directed bythe Reagan Administration, would account for nearly 25 percent of theUS strategic bomber force by 1988 and carry some 37 percent of itsweapons.51 The Trident II would provide the US SSBN force with thecapability of launching prompt counterforce strikes against hardenedSoviet targets, which until this time had only been available to the ICBMforce.52 The new Trident SLBMs, together with the new Midgetman‘‘small’’ ICBM, would complete the nuclear modernization program bythe end of the decade.53

All this indicated that the Reagan Administration would have to rely,at least in part, on the Countervailing Strategy. As the systems mostimportant for the newer strategy of ‘‘Prevailing’’ were still some yearsaway, the 1980s could be called, from the standpoint of weapons devel-opment and acquisition, a transitional era in nuclear strategy, in whichthe newer ideas of the Reagan defense establishment gradually replacedthe heretofore existing ideas of the Carter Administration. At the sametime, the influence of these earlier strategies, harking back to NSDM242, remained in terms of their evolutionary nature, most particularly inthat they had enabled the weapon systems needed for the nuclear stra-tegies of the early 1980s to be developed and deployed.

A key area of investment for the Reagan Administration, as it hadbeen for Carter, was in C3I. Not only were more rapid communicationslinks needed (to communicate more quickly with the strategic forces),but these also needed to be more survivable to prevent the Soviets fromknocking out such centers and thus rendering US forces ineffective. TheAir Force Satellite Communication System (AFSATCOM) had enteredservice, enabling greater command-and-control of US strategic forces.54

Another satellite system, perhaps more important, was Milstar, which,operating at extremely high frequencies (EHF), provided secure, two-way communications between all US nuclear forces, both strategic andtactical.55 This would make the execution of nearly any option under theSIOP feasible, which had not been possible to this extent before.

52 Strategic forces

Improved communication with SSBNs was also a priority, with the useof extremely low frequency (ELF) equipped communication centers andaircraft being announced in October 1981.56 The procurement of E-4Bcommand aircraft, which gave the President, his advisors, and all neces-sary military commanders an airborne platform for waging a generalnuclear war, continued during this time.57

As noted earlier, weapons must be matched to strategy to form asymbiotic relationship that establishes policy regarding the strategicnuclear forces. The various NSDDs and the Defense Guidance provided alook at how this policy was formulated and implemented. By 1983,however, the need for a full discussion of such matters had become evi-dent. The growing anti-nuclear movement in the United States, togetherwith the heated Congressional debate over MX deployment, led theReagan Administration to appoint a committee, led by former NationalSecurity Adviser Brent Scowcroft, to conduct a review of the US strategicforce posture. Known as ‘‘The Report of the President’s Commission onStrategic Forces,’’ or the Scowcroft Report, it was issued in April 1983.

The authors described the overall strategic situation, including thelarge-scale Soviet strategic buildup of the past decade, and then set outrecommendations for the modernization of the US strategic forces. Thereport called for the continuation of efforts to improve C3 capabilities aswell as the bomber and submarine forces. The deployment of Tridentsubmarines and the development and deployment of D-5 missiles werestressed, due to survivability and the fact that the D-5’s ‘‘greater accuracywill also enable it to be used to put some portion of Soviet hard-targetsat risk.’’58

As for the ICBM force, the authors called for a multi-faceted plan tomaintain the viability of this leg of the Triad. First, the Midgetman mis-sile, a small (15 ton, as opposed to the 100-ton MX) ICBM with a singlewarhead, would be deployed in various basing modes. Second, 100 MXICBMs would be deployed in Minuteman ICBM silos as a replacementfor earlier variants of this missile and for obsolescent Titan II ICBMs.Third, MX basing options, like multiple aimpoints, would continue to bestudied.59

Turning to relations with the Soviet Union as affected by the strategicbalance, the authors stressed efforts on arms control. ‘‘It is a legitimate,ambitious, and realistic objective of arms control agreements to channelthe modernization of strategic forces, over the long term, in more stabledirections than would be the case without such agreements.’’60 Theimportance of both a robust US strategic deterrent and arms controlefforts was also cited. ‘‘The strategic modernization program recom-mended herein and the arms control considerations contained in thisreport are consistent with an important aspect of such stability.’’61

The Scowcroft Commission’s report was, as noted earlier, motivatedgreatly by political factors, and it gave the various players in the strategic


forces debate much of what they wanted. The immediate deployment ofMX, as well as of the future addition of Midgetman, satisfied those inCongress who wanted the administration to follow through with itspromise to enhance US counterforce capabilities in the near-term. Thus,the overall US strategic modernization effort was unhampered, withCongress now satisfied that it was a sound approach. Moreover, thereport had put a significant emphasis on arms control. This helped shiftpublic perceptions of the Reagan Administration, which now appearedto be committed more to arms control and less to unrestrained compe-tition.62

The policies laid out by the Scowcroft Commission would become thebasis of US strategic policy for the remainder of the decade, and up tothe end of the Cold War.63 This fact is ironic: given the investment inthe US strategic forces and the priorities assigned to them in the early1980s, these efforts bore fruit just as the rationale for their deploymentwas rapidly changing. As it turned out, the ideological and strategicconditions that helped push the Reagan Administration toward thismore aggressive strategy had shifted significantly by the end of thedecade. It was at this point that such strategies, matched to weapons,became feasible.

In this regard, the weapons themselves were significant. Althoughmuch debate was caused by the revelations made in the Defense Guidanceregarding strategy, systems like the MX, B-1B, and Trident were con-crete manifestations of such planning. The emphasis placed on theircapabilities gave an impression that the Reagan Administration was ser-ious in pursuing its nuclear strategy, to a greater extent than had pre-vious administrations. Here, perception was key. Although widespreadimprovements had taken place regarding US strategic weaponrybetween 1974 and 1980, more emphasis had been placed on strategy.During 1981–85, however, the push to deploy such armaments createda perception that the Reagan Administration might intend to use orthreaten their use in the event of a crisis with the USSR. Such beliefsthus played a key role in shaping the nuclear debate during this time.

The Soviet threat

All this took place during a resurgence in confrontation between theUnited States and the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration’sexpansion of US strategic forces was driven by the perception thatthe USSR had gained a decisive edge in this category. The DefenseDepartment during these years continued the tradition of warningof the growing Soviet strategic threat. It issued a special publication,Soviet Military Power, describing the danger presented by the USSR’smilitary buildup. Although first issued in 1981, it was published annuallyfrom 1983.

54 Strategic forces

The tone was set in the 1981 edition:

In developing and deploying their strategic nuclear forces, theSoviets have subscribed neither to Western notions of strategic suf-ficiency nor to the concept of assured destruction. Instead, whilethey believe that nuclear war and its debilitating results must beavoided, they see the development of superior capabilities weddedto a strategy designed to achieve military victory and a dominantpostwar position as the only rational approach to nuclear forces.64

The 1983 edition spelled out the long-term peacetime and wartimeobjectives of the Soviet strategic forces:

Soviet leaders since Khrushchev’s time have followed a consistentpolicy for nuclear development. Their main objective is to capitalize,in peacetime, on the coercive leverage inherent in powerful nuclearforces, to induce paralysis and create disarray in the free societies. Inwartime, they regard employment of those forces as the key to theirsurvival and winning.65 (My italics)

The authors went on to note that

Soviet intercontinental forces are designed to fulfill their missionsunder the best and worst of circumstances. In the Soviet view, themost favorable circumstance is a first or preemptive strike; the leastfavorable is a follow-on strike after nuclear weapons have hit theUSSR . . .

. . . the Soviets appear to believe that nuclear war might last for weeks,even months, and have factored this into their force development.66

The role of the Reagan Administration’s strategic program was alsoemphasized. Weapons like the MX, Trident II, B-1B bomber, andnuclear-tipped cruise missiles were described and compared with theirSoviet counterparts. On the whole, Soviet Military Power helped to createa public impression of a militarily expanding USSR being matched by areinvigorated US defense capability and of the need to maintain thehigh momentum of American efforts to ensure a stable strategic rela-tionship.

Like the Pentagon, the JCS raised concerns over the strategic balancethroughout the period. Its 1983 report stated ‘‘The Soviets have steadilyincreased the capability of these forces [strategic offensive] until theynow exceed U.S. forces in several measures of capability . . .The US nolonger enjoys strategic nuclear superiority, and the overall effectivenessof our retaliatory capability has become increasingly uncertain.’’67 In


many ways, the JCS reports of the early 1980s mirrored those of thehalf-decade before, in terms of what had led to this state of affairs andwhat constituted the threat:

The increased uncertainty in the effectiveness of the US strategicdeterrent has resulted from Soviet strategic force modernization anddelays and deferrals of US modernization programs . . . Soviet doc-trinal writings . . . assign little importance to the concept of deter-rence and comparisons of balance as are common in the West.Soviet doctrine talks instead of sufficiency to achieve objectives bythe possession of credible warfighting capabilities.68

In the 1984 report, factors of expenditure, history, and the relationshipbetween strategic and other forces were added in explaining the strate-gic balance:

Over the past two decades, the balance of strategic nuclear powerhas shifted steadily toward the Soviet Union. Since the Cuban mis-sile crisis and the attendant Soviet political humiliation, the USSRbegan a massive program of strategic force modernization . . .TheSoviet Union, having broadly enhanced its ability to engage in andendure a nuclear conflict, now enjoys significant advantages in certainmeasures of nuclear forces. (My italics)69

Another concern shared by the JCS during this time was the Sovietadvantage in hard-target—and particularly prompt, hard-target—killpotential. In all but one (FY 1984) of its Military Posture reports between1982 and 1985, the Soviets were shown to be enjoying a superiority intime-urgent hard-target kill potential (the ability to destroy US ICBMsin their silos and to knock out hardened C3I centers swiftly) from about1979 and gaining an advantage in overall hard-target kill potential fromabout 1983.70

The organization most involved in estimating the Soviet threat was, ofcourse, the CIA. A series of NIEs produced during this period showedthe Soviet Union as being driven by both a willingness to avoid the useof their strategic forces in conflict and with the need to ensure that ifwar should come the USSR had to be prepared to wage it. In the ‘‘KeyJudgements’’ section of an NIE produced in February 1983, the authorssuccinctly describe these key Soviet concerns:

The Soviets believe that in the present US-Soviet strategic relation-ship each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities that coulddevastate the other after absorbing an attack. They seek superiorcapabilities to fight and win a nuclear war with the United States,and have been working to improve their chances of prevailing in

56 Strategic forces

such a conflict. A tenet in their strategic thinking holds that thebetter prepared the USSR is to fight in various contingencies, themore likely it is that potential enemies will be deterred from initiat-ing attacks on the Soviet Union and its allies and will be hesitant tocounter Soviet political and military actions.71

Another aspect of Soviet strategic policy was that ideology affected doc-trine. ‘‘Soviet leaders view strategic arms policy in the context of a persis-tent, long-term struggle between two world systems of socialism andcapitalism . . .From their viewpoint, progress in this struggle is measuredby favorable shifts in the overall ‘correlation of forces’—political, ideolo-gical, economic, social, and military. They seek through strategic andother military programs to continue shifting the military component ofthe correlation of forces in favor of the USSR and its allies.’’72

Although this reflected the position of the CIA on Soviet strategic forceprograms that had existed during the 1970s, the stronger ideological toneof the new administration was felt in some of the Agency’s reports. Someof this went back to the mid-1970, when debate over Soviet strategiccapabilities took place in the US intelligence community. This had led tothe ‘‘Team B’’ report in 1976 and had helped to shift the focus of theCIA’s estimates on Soviet strategic forces toward a ‘‘worst case’’ approach.George H. W. Bush, Reagan’s Vice President, had served as Director ofCentral Intelligence (DCI) in 1976–77. It was Bush who directed the‘‘competitive analysis’’ of the NIE process, which had led to the ‘‘Team B’’report.73 Many of the views held by the CPD were carried over into gov-ernment by its members at this time: William Casey, Reagan’s DCI from1981 to 1987, had been a member of the CPD.74

A March 1982 NIE is representative of the prevailing view of theReagan Administration:

Soviet leaders view strategic arms policy in the context of a persis-tent, long-term struggle expansion of Soviet influence and theCommunist system. They recognize that military power is necessaryto sustain the Communist regime and expand its influence in theworld. It is the USSR’s principal asset for competition in the globalarena. The Soviets’ ultimate objective is global political and militarydomination. They view the United States as the principal strategic threat,the greatest obstacle to their political-military activities and the achievementof their goals. US military power will continue to be the major externalinfluence on Soviet weapons development and acquisition and on Sovietplanning for strategic nuclear operations.75 (My italics)

Beyond the positions taken by the CIA on matters of Soviet policy andideological objectives regarding their strategic forces, these reports citedthe continued improvements to Soviet forces, particularly in areas


necessary to wage war. NIE 11-3/8-81, for example, noted that, by 1991,the USSR would have between 9,000 and 15,000 ‘‘hard-target missile re-entry vehicles’’ [warheads].76

The authors of the next year’s NIE were somewhat less strident intheir appraisal of Soviet strategic force modernization. A detailed studyon Soviet forces included how they would be affected by US arms con-trol proposals, most notably START. The authors noted that withoutSTART, Soviet deployed ICBMs and SLBMs could increase between 13and 25 percent by 1992, whereas START would see a reduction by 64percent over the same time frame.77

In both reports, however, the conclusions are similar—the need toprevail in a general nuclear war. ‘‘The Soviets are attempting to preparetheir leaders and military forces for the possibility of having to fight anuclear war,’’ wrote the authors of NIE 11-3/8-81, ‘‘and are training tobe able to maintain control over increasingly complex conflict situa-tions.’’78 This was echoed by the following year’s NIE:

Soviet perceptions of the growing complexity of warfare have led togreater efforts to plan forces and operations against a backdrop ofmore varied contingencies and to achieve greater realism in combattraining. The Soviets’ principal aims have been to enhance theiroperational flexibility and force sustainability and to increase theprobability of maintaining continuity of control in a nuclear conflict.79

Nor was it simply in the area of estimation of Soviet strategic capabilitiesthat CIA analysts discussed their importance in US–Soviet relations. Inan August 1982 NIE analyzing the security relationship between the twosuperpowers, the authors noted that

The balance of strategic nuclear forces is a critical index for Moscow’sassessment of relative military power between the United States andthe USSR. In 1981 the USSR further improved the striking powerand survivability of its strategic intercontinental and intermediate-range nuclear offensive forces, made progress in overcoming some ofthe weaknesses of its strategic defenses, and improved its supportingcommand, control, and communications systems.80

This view of Soviet strategic capabilities was of steady improvement aswell as of a coherent strategy that would enable them to be used by theSoviet leadership if all other options were perceived to have beenexhausted. The Pentagon, the JCS, and the CIA shared these views ofSoviet capabilities. These complemented and reinforced the ReaganAdministration’s approach to strategic force planning, as a means ofmatching the Soviet Union in the ability to wage a general nuclear war,and thus achieve the best form of deterrence believed to be possible.

58 Strategic forces

Although these views of Soviet strategic capabilities were generallyheld by the Reagan Administration as a whole, there was a difference inthe level of intensity among certain of its members. Caspar Weinbergerand William Casey were perhaps the most alarmist in their view of theSoviet threat and its implications, whereas George Shultz was morepragmatic about Soviet capabilities, stressing arms control as part of anoverall approach to the USSR and as a means of channeling Soviet forceimprovements in a manageable way. By 1984, a broader consensusexisted regarding the role of arms control and strategic stability, as hadbeen outlined in the Scowcroft Report.81

The minutes of a National Security Council meeting held on Septem-ber 18, 1984, provide a good example of how this sort of thinkingexpressed itself at the top levels of government. In arguing for arenewal of START efforts, Shultz pointed out that ‘‘unconstrained mili-tary growth by the Soviet Union is not to our advantage. We have moredifficulty with the politics of modernization than they do. Reductions areto our advantage.’’82 Later in the discussion, Weinberger argued that‘‘It’s important that you [President Reagan] let them see your desire forreducing but also that we are not going to permit them to maintain anadvantage.’’83

Shultz, however, was generally on the defensive during this time,despite the fact that Reagan agreed with many of his ideas about aresumption of US–Soviet arms control efforts, due in no small part tothe lack of coordination in the administration and Reagan’s unwilling-ness to act decisively to establish cohesive positions on such issues.84

Only after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985 and sig-naled a strong desire for a resumption in negotiations did the ReaganAdministration move forward in this area.

Conclusion

As discussed earlier, the Reagan Administration’s policy toward nuclearstrategy was a combination of its own ideas and an inheritance fromwhat had been laid down in the decade before. Most of the majordeployments and R & D programs of the first Reagan term wereunderway during the Carter years, and some even earlier. The strategyadopted by Reagan and Weinberger could trace its origins directly backto NSDM 242.

A confirmation of this comes, ironically, from a member of the CarterAdministration who had helped to shape US strategic planning duringits tenure. In 1984, Leon Sloss—a former State Department strategicarms analyst who had also directed the Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency and the nuclear policy targeting study that formed the basis ofPD 5985—co-authored an article on this subject with an eye to critiquesof the Reagan Administration’s strategic concepts. Going back to NSDM


242, the authors listed three key elements that formed the basis of USnuclear strategy from that time: escalation control, a secure force ofstrategic weapons held in reserve, and the targeting of US forces so as toimpede the Soviet postwar recovery.86 Continuing their discussion intothe Carter years, the authors noted,

The PD-18 studies also prompted defense policymakers to focus onthe possibilities of protracted nuclear war . . .Given the sizes of forceson both sides and the increasing emphasis in both U.S. and Sovietdoctrines on strategic reserves, it seemed highly plausible that sub-stantial nuclear and conventional forces would remain even after alarge-scale nuclear exchange. The actions and interactions of theseforces would have to be taken into account in the development ofour strategic war plans. (My italics)87

These ideas, of course, were central to US strategy in the early 1980s.Indeed, one can find such concepts in the text of NSDD 32 and theDefense Guidance.

Such developments, the authors believed, would have a beneficialeffect for strategic stability. ‘‘Soviet perceptions that the United Statescould engage in protracted war would reinforce our ability to deterSoviet aggression.’’88 Again, the Reagan Administration voiced the samerationale for its strategic planning.

Turning to the Reagan Administration, the authors noted,

In essence, the Reagan Administration, for its part, has accepted PD-59 and turned its attention to the implementation of the strategy,particularly with respect to procuring the forces and C3I required tosupport it. While the terminology of current declaratory policy dif-fers somewhat from its predecessor, the strategic logic adopted by theReagan Administration denotes essentially a continuation of the policy evo-lution described above. (My italics)89

The relationship between strategy and the weapons necessary to imple-ment it cannot be overlooked. By 1985, the United States had relativelyfew forces in being with which to carry out the more ambitious war plansoutlined by the Reagan Administration, let alone PD 59. John M. Collins,a military expert and a highly respected analyst for the CongressionalResearch Service during this time, summed up the situation in themid-1980s:

High-confidence U.S. abilities to destroy very hard, time-sensitivetargets await 100 MX ICBMs (half the quantity President Carterintended to procure) and Trident II SLBMs. Endurance duringprotracted nuclear war depends on survivable systems not available

60 Strategic forces

now. Deterrence predicated on war-fighting capacities withoutforces for homeland defense is questionable. Protection for theAmerican people and production base presently is contingent onsuccessful counterforce second strikes, escalation control, and aquick cease-fire, none of which holds much promise at this point.Attendant deficiencies, in turn, reduce the deterrent value of threatsto retaliate against the Soviet Union if they attack U.S. allies, becausethis nation is naked to reciprocal assaults.90

Collins’s analysis neatly describes the problems that US strategic forceswould continue to face for some years yet. Although some systems likethe E-4B command aircraft and the Mark 12A-equipped Minuteman IIIICBMs were in place, the full range of systems needed for the executionof protracted war strategies would not be available until the early 1990s,by which time the international situation had completely changed fromthat of a decade before. During the Reagan Administration’s first term, anumber of weapon systems were withdrawn from service: 29 Titan IIICBMs, each equipped with a nine-megaton warhead, the largest in theUS inventory, were withdrawn by 1985;91 five squadrons of B-52Ds,some 75 aircraft,92 by 1983; and the Polaris submarine force (eight sub-marines with 128 missiles93) by 1982. Many of these systems wereageing, and their weapons were certainly less accurate than those of thesystems replacing them. However, the overall megatonnage able to bedelivered fell as a result. During 1984–85, it fell by 99 megatons, due tothe withdrawal of 11 Titan IIs.94

The Reagan Administration’s approach to nuclear strategy at this timewas therefore one of often bellicose rhetoric, matched by generally morebalanced military preparation. It was often the nature of this rhetoric thatcaused public alarm and shaped a perception of the US Administration aswarlike. Many of Reagan’s statements regarding the Soviet Union havebecome well known. In his 1981 West Point commencement speech,Reagan identified the USSR as an ‘‘evil force.’’ In March 1983, Reaganwould make his most famous assessment of the Soviet Union, calling it‘‘the focus of evil in the modern world . . . an evil empire.’’95 These state-ments, combined with the public leaks of the Administration’s strategicplanning like the Defense Guidance, created a perception among theAmerican public, the United States’ allies (particularly in NATO Europe),and the USSR that the Reagan Administration believed a general nuclearwar might be a viable option.

It is now known that Reagan became alarmed about the prospect ofsuch a conflict during this time, something that shaped his policies in theyears to come. Thomas C. Reed, who served as Reagan’s appointmentssecretary and on the NSC staff at this time, describes the profound effectthat Reagan’s briefing on the SIOP (in February 1982) had on him andhow it helped lead to the decision to initiate the Strategic Defense


Initiative (SDI)96 to eliminate the threat of nuclear attack. Certainly acase can be made that his subsequent arms control proposals, includingthat made to Gorbachev at Reykjavik in October 1986, were guided bywhat he learned of nuclear warfighting.

Furthermore, Reagan was generally cautious in dealing with theSoviet Union in his first term and avoided threatening the use of nuclearforces vis a vis the Soviet Union during confrontations like those overPoland in 1981–82, Central America, or the KAL 007 shootdown. Bycontrast, both Presidents Nixon (in October 1973 regarding threatenedSoviet intervention in support of Egypt against Israel) and Carter (inJanuary 1980 regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) had invokednuclear weapons directly or indirectly as a warning to the USSR.97

By contrast, Reagan sought to project a tougher American image bothat home and at abroad, in response to the multiple crises of the 1970s,which had led to doubts about American power and will. The con-frontational era in US–Soviet relations was inherited from the CarterAdministration, which had adopted tougher policies as a result of theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan. For Reagan, this provided an opportu-nity to boost American pride and to identify the Soviet Union clearly as adangerous adversary. There can be no doubt that American militarycapacity needed to be improved and to a more significant degree thanhad been the case during the Carter years. However, this combined withthe perception of an increasing Soviet threat—and even possible‘‘superiority’’ in the area of strategic forces—to create the impression ofan extraordinarily activist approach by the United States.

The strategy and forces that emerged between 1981 and 1985 werethe result of long-standing and evolving approaches to the waging ofnuclear war. These developments took place at a time of heightenedsuperpower tension and hostile rhetoric. The perception was that theReagan Administration intended to utilize these strategies and forcesbased on its well-known perceptions of the Soviet threat. As eventsproved, the intentions and perceptions of the administration—likethe intentions and capabilities of the United States to wage such a war—differed considerably.

62 Strategic forces

3 Of shelters and Star Wars

Introduction

In the area of strategic defense against nuclear attack—manifested both inactive forces of interceptors and anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and in pas-sive measures such as civil defense—US efforts waxed and waned duringthe 1950s and 1960s. A major air and civil defense program was insti-tuted, as were efforts to develop an ABM system. However, by the late1960s, these went into decline. The growth in Soviet ICBM and SLBMlaunchers meant that any ABM system would be in danger of beingoverwhelmed by sheer numbers of warheads. Furthermore, any attemptby either the United States or the Soviet Union to match increasing war-head levels—made all the more difficult by MIRVing efforts—would leadto an arms race that could easily escape their control. Accordingly, bothnations agreed to a significant curtailment of their ABM efforts in 1972.On the American side, the lack of a large, effective Soviet strategicbomber force led to a rundown of US air defense forces, whereas theenormous numbers of rapidly deliverable Soviet strategic warheads meantthat efforts to protect the US population in the event of nuclear war weregenerally seen as futile, meriting little attention.

As concerns about the Soviet military buildup emerged in the mid-1970s, strategic defense became an issue in the United States. TheSoviets, unlike the Americans, placed a high priority on strategicdefense. As the US Strategic Air Command possessed a far more for-midable bomber force than the USSR, a commitment to a large airdefense system made sense. As for civil defense, the Soviet Union’s verysignificant efforts in this area indicated, to many American defense ana-lysts, a dangerous effort aimed at supporting a strategy of victory in anuclear war.

Civil defense

Among the first to sound the alarm over Soviet civil defense was RichardPipes, who was instrumental in setting the tone for the debate over the

military balance at this time. In 1977, Pipes defined what he saw as thedanger posed by Soviet civil defense:

Its [civil defense in the Soviet Union] chief function seems to be toprotect what in Russia are known as the ‘‘cadres,’’ that is, the poli-tical and military laders as well as industrial managers and skilledworkers-those who could re-establish the political and economicsystem once the war was over. Judging by Soviet definitions, civildefense has as much to do with the proper functioning of thecountry during and immediately after the war as with holding downcasualties.1

In the view of Pipes and other analysts, Soviet civil defense was structuredto allow for rapid political, social, and economic recovery after a nuclearwar. This approach was seen as being in opposition to, and even negat-ing, the American theory of MAD, which was posited on an ability to kill alarge percentage of the Soviet population and destroy much of theUSSR’s economic capacity. As the US civil defense effort was minimal, theactual MAD theory applied to the United States, rather than the SovietUnion which viewed civil defense as a vital element of strategic planning.

Even with an extensive civil defense network, however, the USSRcould expect enormous casualties in the event of a nuclear war with theUnited States. For analysts like Pipes, history appeared to indicate thateven such dreadful loss of life could be absorbed by the Soviet Unionand still be acceptable:

In World War II, the Soviet Union lost 20 million inhabitants out ofa population of 170 million—i.e. 12 per cent; yet the country notonly survived but emerged stronger politically and militarily than ithad ever been. Allowing for the population growth which hasoccurred since then, this experience suggests that as of today theUSSR could absorb the loss of 30 million of its people and be noworse off, in terms of human casualties, than it had been at theconclusion of World War II.2

It is important to note that Pipes was writing in the capacity of a publiccommentator in the above discussion of Soviet civil defense policy. Ayear earlier, he played a major role in shaping official attitudes on thistheme as head of ‘‘Team B.’’ Civil defense was given significant attentionby the authors of the report, and Pipes’s public views of the followingyear can clearly be seen in the classified analysis:

The great importance attached by the USSR to its civil defense effortprovides an unmistakable clue to Soviet overall doctrine with regardto general nuclear war . . .When viewed in combination with active

64 Strategic forces

strategic defenses and strategic attack forces the civil defense effortunderscores the frankly stated Soviet adherence to the Clausewitzianconcept of war as an extension of politics—even under nuclear condi-tions. These efforts contradict the assumptions that the Soviets viewnuclear exchange as tantamount to destruction of their society andsystem or that they perceive strategic nuclear capabilities primarily as adeterrent. Rather these efforts point to the structuring of both defense and offensefor war-fighting, with deterrence being a derivative function. (My italics)3

Pipes’s views were shared by the CPD, which was established at aboutthe same time as the Team B report was issued. In October 1978, theCPD stated that ‘‘the potential effect of such a war-survival programon our deterrent could be so great as to nearly nullify it—some calcula-tions indicate that Soviet civil defense and industrial dispersal programswould reduce Soviet casualties during a full nuclear exchange to one-tenth those of the United States.’’ (Emphasis in original.)4 ‘‘[T]hey [theSoviets] might well perceive circumstances in which such losses wouldbe risked, especially if they judged that our perception of the imbal-ance of risks would be such as to create opportunities for self-servingdiplomacy.’’5

By the late 1970s, the issue of civil defense had become a topic ofimportance in the overall discussion of the US–Soviet military balance.For hawks, the Soviet civil defense system would provide it with theoption of engaging in a general nuclear war with the United States if itdeemed such a conflict was necessary. In testimony given before theSenate Foreign Relations Committee in 1977, General Daniel Graham,who had served as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, put Pipes’sviews of the role of Soviet civil defense into a definable scenario. ‘‘TheSoviets evacuate their cities and hunker down. Then they move againstNATO or Yugoslavia or China or the Middle East with superior con-ventional forces. The United States is faced with the demand to stay outor risk a nuclear exchange in which 100 million Americans would die asopposed to 10 million Russians.’’6

These views were criticized by doves, who argued that the scenariosenvisioned were implausible, containing too many uncertainties to berealistic. Fred Kaplan, argued that hawks based much of their analysison manuals published by the Soviet civil defense bureaucracy. Thesepublications, Kaplan argued, often presented a brighter picture of theefforts undertaken than really existed.7 The CDI argued that therenewed interest in civil defense in the United States was in fact a mirrorimage of what was alleged of the USSR: an effort to make US counter-force strategies more feasible by limiting American casualties in a strate-gic exchange.8

During the late 1970s, however, the hawks’ views were ascendant inthe debate over strategic forces issues, including civil defense. When the

Of shelters and Star Wars 65

Reagan Administration came to office in 1981, civil defense becamecentral to US strategic policy. Already, the Carter Administration hadmade civil defense a greater priority by the time it left office, as part ofits ‘‘Countervailing Strategy.’’ During the early 1980s, however, theReagan Administration would emphasize civil defense, which helpedfuel controversy over what was intended by such an enhanced Americanprogram.

To understand these debates, it is necessary to examine what wasknown about Soviet civil defense, both publicly and within the US intel-ligence community, and to examine the state of the US civil defenseprogram, and how it was shaped by developments during this time.

Soviet civil defense—The view in the 1970s

From 1976, Soviet civil defense attracted the attention of a wide varietyof defense analysts and journals. The International Institute for Strate-gic Studies (IISS) addressed the issue in its Strategic Survey that year. Itestimated that the Soviet civil defense apparatus, headed by GeneralAlexandr T. Altunin, had a staff of 50 generals and another 70,000 offi-cials across the USSR.9 The article described the extensive constructionof fallout shelters for senior civil and military officials, construction offallout shelters in apartment complexes, and plans for evacuation over a72-hour period.10 However, the IISS pointed out that ‘‘many of theassertions about Soviet civil defense are drawn from statements con-tained in civil defense manuals, and it is difficult to determine whetherthese are expressions of what the Soviet Union would like to achieve orof what she has already achieved.’’11

In relation to Soviet strategy, the IISS stated,

A reading of Soviet strategic doctrine indicates that war survivabilityis a central element of Soviet strategy. However the significance ofSoviet strategic writings is assessed, it seems clear from both wordsand deeds that Soviet leadership endorses the concept of damagelimitation-the ability to minimize the damage to the nation shouldwar occur.12

In conclusion, the IISS emphasized the importance of perception for theUnited States in this area of the strategic balance:

the existence of a widespread Soviet civil defence effort at least tosome extent weakens American confidence in the capability of theUS deterrent force and strengthens American suspicions about Sovietmotivations. This does not augur well either for strategic arms controlor for the maintenance of a stable Soviet-American strategic rela-tionship. (My italics)13

66 Strategic forces

Whatever one’s views on the effectiveness of civil defense, what wasbeyond doubt was its vast size and, according to Soviet military organi-zation, its role as a part of the country’s military effort. From 1961, civildefense had been overseen by the Ministry of Defense, with a majoremphasis on its role from 1972, when General Altunin became head ofthe organization.14 Some 100,000 people were involved in civil defenseby 1983,15 of whom some 50,000 were regular troops backed up bysome 65,000 reservists.16 In addition to the 50,000 active civil defensetroops, some 50,000 personnel from other branches of the military wereassigned civil defense duties as well.17

Nor was this an auxiliary force. Upon his appointment to commandthe Civil Defense troops, General Altunin had been named a DeputyMinister of Defense, placing him within the overall Soviet militaryestablishment.18

At the top was the central headquarters for civil defense. At theregional level, chairmen had a military staff, who coordinated civildefense efforts with the regional military command.19 This structure wasmeant to ensure that, in the event of war, civil defense efforts would becomplementary to military operations.

Although hawks and doves agreed that the Soviet civil defense estab-lishment was considerable, they disagreed on how effective this vastorganization was in practice. Many were skeptical of what the Sovietscould achieve in the face of an overwhelming attack by thousands of USstrategic warheads over a relatively short time. Protection of the Sovietpopulation, for example, rested upon mass evacuation of the cities, inwhich columns of 500–1,000 people would depart for the countryside,where they would build shelters, gather food, and hunker down untilfurther notice.20 Essential workers would be housed in fallout shelterseither in the cities or in the countryside and, in theory, would return towork once the worst had passed. Efforts to harden industry against theeffects of nuclear blast, such as hardening of machinery and the removalof flammable materials, would likewise occur.21

Although such plans appeared sound on paper, they were fraughtwith severe difficulty if applied to actual conditions existing in the USSR.Andrew Cockburn points out that, in the entire Soviet Union, just 2million cars, 2 million trucks, and 200,000 buses existed for the evacua-tion of the urban population to the countryside—a severe problem, tosay the least, as Soviet civil defense plans relied heavily on motor trans-port for urban evacuation.22 Furthermore, the columns of between 500and 1,000 moving by foot could realistically move no more than aboutone-and-a-half miles per hour, or 30 miles per day, well within the blastand fallout radii of nuclear warheads.23 Weather also would have playeda part, as the brutally cold winter and rainy autumn would have playedhavoc with transport and shelter construction, whereas the destruction


of much of the USSR’s transport system would have made any move-ment much more difficult.24

Even before a nuclear attack, the inadequacies of Soviet society wouldhave played a major role in hampering efforts at effective civil defense.Cockburn points out that civil defense plans called for the population tostock up on enough food to last for two weeks. As it took queues ofseveral hours just to buy a daily ration of bread or meat, the idea that asudden mass attempt to get hold of such supplies could be dealt withaccordingly was far-fetched, to say the least.25

Cockburn’s analysis succinctly sums up the case of the doves in thedebate. Despite its size, funding, and extensive organization, Soviet civildefense, if confronted by the realities of a nuclear war, could providelittle in terms of protection for the citizens of the USSR. That suchefforts could support a Soviet war-winning nuclear strategy—as Pipesand Graham had argued—appeared impossible.

Writing in 1980, Fred Kaplan cited a study by the US Arms Controland Disarmament Agency, which estimated that just 150 plants held 50percent of the USSR’s production capacity for chemicals, primarymetals, power generators and other vital equipment: 400 plants pro-duced 75 percent of the total output.26 Kaplan also noted that, accord-ing to a study by the US Office of Technology Assessment, just 10American missiles—three triple warhead Minuteman III ICBMs andseven Poseidon SLBMs equipped with nine warheads apiece—werecapable of destroying 73 percent of the industrial refining capacity ofthe USSR.27 Kaplan summarized the situation faced by Soviet civildefense planners regarding industrial protection:

Virtually every sector of the Soviet economy is highly centralized,and the great bulk of its productive capacity lies in the large urbancenters. In short, it wouldn’t take very many warheads to do devas-tating damage to the Soviet industrial structure. The Soviet econ-omy—deliberately concentrated to make most efficient use of aheavily bottlenecked and centralized planning system—is not at allconducive to a civil defense program designed to survive an all-outretaliatory attack by the United States.28

Marshall Shulman, a Deputy National Security Adviser in the CarterAdministration, echoed this view. ‘‘The civil defense program . . . is by nomeans of an order that would give the Soviet leadership confidence thatthey could substantially reduce their casualties . . .They’d be out of theirminds to think it would do that.’’29

The official literature of the US Government tended to have a mixedview of how effective Soviet civil defense measures were in affecting thestrategic balance. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger’s annual reports forFYs 1975 and 1976 mentioned nothing about Soviet civil defense in

68 Strategic forces

discussing the USSR’s strategic forces. Only ABM and air defenses wereanalyzed. Donald Rumsfeld did address the Soviet civil defense capability,beginning in his FY 1977 report. The greater Soviet investment in thisarea, Rumsfeld warned, ‘‘bears directly on our strategic relationship withthe Soviets and on the credibility of our deterrent posture.’’30 However,the report gave civil defense a mere paragraph of discussion, expressing aconcern on this subject. Rumsfeld’s FY 1978 report likewise discussedSoviet civil defense, but generally listed its priorities (continuity ofCommunist Party control, economic viability, and protection of the popu-lation), while reiterating the emphasis the USSR placed on this area.31

Harold Brown gave a general description of Soviet civil defense(including the figure for 100,000 military and civilian personnelinvolved) in his FY 1979 report.32 The following year, Brown did supplymore concrete evidence of the capabilities of Soviet civil defense, albeitwith qualifications. Discussing blast shelter construction, Brown stated‘‘If this results in a pace of construction matching what has happenedsince 1968, by 1988 the number of people who could be sheltered(which is not the same thing as surviving) in urban areas could increaseto some 30 million—about 17 per cent of what we project the Sovieturban population to be at that time.’’33 Brown went into greater detailthe following year, although he emphasized the difficulties facing Sovietplanners:

The Soviets could probably shelter about 6–12 percent of the totalwork force at key industrial installations . . .Nationwide, the Sovietshave probably constructed at lest 20,000 blast-resistant shelters,more than half of which are intended for key industrial workers . . .they can protect approximately 13 million people, or roughly 10percent of the total residents in cities of 25,000 people or more.

However, the vast majority of the urban population would have tobe evacuated from cities in order to receive some degree of protec-tion . . .There is no evidence that evacuation exercises have beenconducted involving the movement of large numbers of people.34

The JCS sounded a more alarmist view during the late 1970s. GeneralBrown described the close link between civil defense and military stra-tegy in the USSR:

The Soviet Union includes civil defense as an integral part of itsstrategic defense and damage limiting programs. Their rationaleasserts that credible civil defense contributes to deterrence, to stra-tegic stability, and to the ability of the state to survive . . .The shelterprogram for urban areas appears to be designed for the protectionof people deemed essential rather than for the general populace.35


General Brown admitted that ‘‘While these various activities are occur-ring, their extent and effectiveness are unknown to our intelligencecommunity at this time.’’36

General Brown’s successor, General Jones, was also concerned aboutSoviet civil defense efforts. In his final report as Chairman, GeneralJones stated:

Soviet civil defense is a nationwide program under military control.It is viewed by the Soviet leadership as part of the USSR’s overallmilitary strategy. Its objectives are to protect people—especially theleadership and the essential work force—to facilitate the continuityof economic activity in wartime, and to enhance the capability forrecovery from the effects of war.37

Perhaps the most authoritative and widely available publication of theUS Government during this time was The Effects of Nuclear War, a reportissued in 1980 by the US Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment.The report was drafted by authors from various backgrounds and withdiffering political views.38 The report analyzed the effects of a nuclearattack in four cases: a single or multiple warhead attack on Detroit,Michigan, and Leningrad, similar in both size and population; an attackon oil refineries, in which each side used 10 missiles; a counterforceattack on ICBM silos; and a large-scale attack on numerous civilian andmilitary targets.39 The report was quite wide-ranging and detailed. In achapter on civil defense, the authors cited hawks like T. K. Jones inassessing the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense. However, they alsocited a December 1978 report by ACDA, indicating that

blast shelters might reduce fatalities to 80 percent of those in anunsheltered case, but this could be offset by targeting additionalweapons (e.g. those on bombers and submarines that would bealerted during a crisis) against cities. Evacuation might reduce fatal-ities to a range of 25 million to 35 million, but if the United Stateswere to target the evacuated population, some 50 million might bekilled. Furthermore, civil defense could do little to protect the Sovieteconomy, so many evacuees and millions of injured could not besupported after the attack ended.40

In assessing the effects of a nuclear attack on Leningrad, the casualty fig-ures listed in the report did not appear to give the Soviets grounds forcomplacency. A one-megaton airburst detonation (equivalent to that of aUS Minuteman II ICBM warhead) would have caused some 890,000fatalities and 1,260,000 injuries. For a 9-megaton airburst (equivalent to aUS Titan II ICBM warhead), the casualties would have been 2,460,000killed and 1,100,000 injured, whereas 10 40-kiloton airbursts (the explosive

70 Strategic forces

power of a US Poseidon C-3 SLBM) would have caused 1,020,000 deathsand 1,000,000 injuries.41 To be sure, these results postulated that thepopulation received no warning of attack and that the attacks occurred atnight, with most people at home.42 As the authors noted, however, inLeningrad ‘‘People live close to where they work. In general, there is nocross-city movement.’’43 In a real attack, there would most certainly havebeen at least minimal warning, meaning that workers—who in Leningradwould include many essential workers—would have had at least some timeto try and reach blast shelters. Moreover, Leningrad, the authors noted,had advantages over Detroit, including the greater spacing of apartmentbuildings, the fact that buildings were, on the whole, less likely to burn, andtransportation, particularly the metro system, was excellent, expeditingevacuation from the city.44 Still, the high casualty rates, even if one makesallowance for some efforts at evacuation and shelter, show that the SovietUnion, if it came under a full-scale nuclear attack, would suffer unprece-dented devastation over a very brief time.

Although most of the CIA’s analyses of Soviet strategic forces wereclassified during this time, one report—and the only one specificallydedicated to the subject by the Agency at this time—was made publicupon release. In July 1978, the CIA issued a report, titled ‘‘Soviet CivilDefense.’’ It described the USSR’s civil defense efforts and their goalsand then discussed just how effective they would be in actually protect-ing the population. The authors stated that ‘‘Under the most favorableconditions for the USSR, including a week or more to complete urbanevacuation and then to protect the evacuated population, Soviet civildefenses could reduce casualties to the low tens of millions.’’45 At thevery worst, ‘‘with only a few hours or less to make final preparations,Soviet casualties would be well over 100 million but a large percentageof the leadership would probably survive.’’46 This gibed with theSoviets’ emphasis on protecting the leadership cadres of the CommunistParty and armed forces, who would certainly have had pre-plannedevacuation routes to hardened command posts available to facilitatetheir safety.

In summarizing the current (1978) situation, the authors wrote,

The Soviets almost certainly believe their present civil defenses willimprove their ability to conduct military operations and will enhancethe USSR’s chances for survival following a nuclear exchange. Theycannot have confidence, however, in the degree of protection theircivil defense would afford them, given the many uncertaintiesattendant to a nuclear exchange.47

The CIA’s classified reports from this period echoed the findings of the1978 report. NIE 11-3/8-76, the estimate ‘‘countered’’ by ‘‘Team B,’’gave this view of the program:


It is our tentative judgement that, under optimum conditions whichincluded an adequate period of warning and evacuation, Soviet civildefenses would assure survival of a large percentage of the leader-ship, would reduce prompt casualties among the urban populationto a small percentage, and would give the Soviets a good chance ofbeing able to sustain the population with medical supplies. Withminimal warning, some key leaders would probably survive, but theurban population would suffer very high casualties and the chancesof adequately supplying survivors would be poor. (My italics)48

This was reiterated in the 1978 NIE: ‘‘The effectiveness of civil defensein reducing casualties and in coping with the postattack period woulddepend primarily on the time available to make final preparationsbefore an attack.’’49

Postulating a situation in which 2,200 US warheads struck the SovietUnion in a single-wave attack, the authors gave the lowest casualtyfigure (optimum warning time and preparation) as 20 million and thehighest (under a worst-case scenario) of some 120 million.50 The authorsconcluded that ‘‘While a large percentage of essential personnel shel-tered at economic facilities would probably survive a US attack, theSoviets could not prevent massive industrial and economic damage.’’51

These reports by Congress and the CIA show how both argumentsabout Soviet civil defense shaped a picture of the program. The USSRcertainly took its efforts in this area seriously but that did not mean thata majority of its citizens would have been protected in the event ofnuclear war or that the civil defense efforts, even if effective under best-case circumstances, could allow the Soviet leadership to pursue anaggressive global strategy vis-a-vis the United States.

Both sides in the debate found ammunition for their arguments inthese findings. Doves argued that Soviet civil defense capabilities wouldnot allow for the Kremlin to engage in risky geopolitical actions, as hadbeen argued by the hawks. Massive casualties and collateral damagewould preclude such efforts. The hawks, on the contrary, saw the Sovietefforts to protect leadership cadres as being central to enabling them toengage in such actions. As Pipes argued, the survival of these cadres, aswell as of enough skilled personnel to rebuild and manage the economyand the functions of the state, was enough to ensure victory.

Soviet civil defense—The view in the 1980s

Interestingly, although many of those who later attained prominentnational security posts in the Reagan Administration had warnedstrenuously about the growth of Soviet civil defense capabilities in the1970s, relatively little was discussed in official reports. In his first annualreport, Secretary Weinberger noted these efforts only in passing. ‘‘The

72 Strategic forces

Soviets,’’ he wrote, ‘‘have . . . continued development of and paid increas-ing attention to civil defense and a wide variety of measures, designed toenhance the prospect of survival of key elements of their society after theoutbreak of a nuclear war.’’52 In the publication Soviet Military Power,meant to show the scope of the USSR’s military buildup, the entry on civildefense provided a mixed view of these efforts. Although the authorsnoted that ‘‘Given a war-crisis warning of only a few hours, the survivaland effective functioning of the 110,000 government and other officialsnecessary to lead the Soviet Union may be possible,’’53 they also noted

A civil defense problem of vital concern to the Soviets is their con-tinuing inability to provide physical protection for their industrialinstallations. Although there have been numerous references inSoviet civil defense literature to the desirability of dispersal of keyindustries for protection purposes, little has been done to achieve thisgoal. (My italics)54

The next three annual reports did not even address Soviet civil defense,a departure from the reports of both Rumsfeld and Brown in the 1970s.The JCS, chaired at this time by General John W. Vessey, devoted justfour sentences to the subject in their FY 1983 Military Posture statement,and in these merely listing Soviet shelter and evacuation programs andthe figure of 11 percent of the population that would be protected.55

The next three annual statements provided a mere paragraph or so onthis subject and tended to reiterate what had come before.56

Nor did the CIA have much additional comment on Soviet civildefense. In its two NIE’s analyzing Soviet strategic nuclear forces duringthis period, the Agency gave nearly identical statements on this subject.The first NIE, released in March 1982, said the following about Sovietcivil defense capabilities:

We believe that, with as little as a few hours’ warning, a large per-centage of Soviet civilian leaders—party, government, and eco-nomic—would probably survive a large-scale US nuclear strike. Alarge-scale retaliatory nuclear attack directed against Soviet economicinstallations would cause severe damage to the plant and equipmentat the vast majority of these facilities. Timely implementation of shel-tering and dispersal plans would provide effective protection for alarge percentage of the essential work force at key facilities. Sovietpopulation casualties would vary greatly, depending on the extent towhich civil defense measures had been implemented.57

As can be seen from this statement—repeated nearly verbatim in thefollowing year’s NIE on the same subject58—the CIA believed thatSoviet industry would suffer heavily in a nuclear war, as would the


general population. It was broadly accepted that, as would most majorpowers, the USSR would prioritize the protection of its top leadership inthe event of nuclear war. However, the view that enough of the coun-try’s population and industry could be protected and be counted on toform the nucleus of a rebuilding effort was not one that appeared toenjoy widespread support, even in the Reagan Administration.

Nor did General Altunin appear to have an omnipotent view of theorganization he commanded. Cockburn quotes a ‘‘state of the program’’message given in 1976, in which Altunin remarked ‘‘Many peopleassembled for such sessions [i.e. civil defense training] and were leadthrough the various points of a demonstration exercise, but the traineesdid not receive what was most necessary. The practical portion waspoorly organized and . . . stereotyped.’’59 Given the mixed view of Sovietcivil defense preparedness held by the Pentagon and the CIA in theearly 1980s, these statements appeared to have been applicable to thisperiod of time as well.

US civil defense—Programs and plans

Compared with the vast Soviet civil defense effort, that of the UnitedStates appeared miniscule. The US civil defense system consisted of just10,000 civilian employees, backed up by another 20,000 part-timevolunteers, organized in a civilian agency, the Office of Civil Defense,administered by the Secretary of the Army.60 Whereas the Soviet civildefense structure was part of the armed forces, in the United States theonly military personnel involved in civil defense were the 3,782 com-missioned and non-commissioned officers, all reservists, who were notassigned to specific reserve units and part of civil defense through theMobilization Designee (MOBDES) program.61

Gradually, as the 1970s wore on, the United States began to examineits civil defense capabilities. In part—and, ironically, a mirror image ofthe reasons alleged for a strong Soviet civil defense effort—this stemmedfrom the adaptation of LNOs. Schlesinger, in his 1976 annual report,noted that

Our civil defense program is, and has always been, an essential ele-ment of our overall strategic deterrence posture. Hence, one wouldexpect that the recent shift in emphasis towards a more flexible strategicresponse policy . . .would be reflected in our Civil Defense Program.That is indeed the case. We are seeking to reflect in our civil defenseplanning the wider range of response options that we are nowintroducing into our military planning. (My italics)62

Schlesinger’s 1975 annual report cited several areas for attention,including the designation of areas at high risk to the effects of nuclear

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attack; development of relocation plans, and for a ‘‘shelter survey,’’ todetermine how best to implement a fallout shelter program.63 Schle-singer’s request, however, was rather modest: $86.3 million, of whichjust $9 million would go for the shelter survey and another $40.3 millionwould go to state and local governments in order for them to play a partin civil defense efforts. The remaining $37 million would go to maintainthe program’s overall functions.64

The following year, Schlesinger requested $108 million for civildefense—$88 million for FY 1976 and $20 million for the Transitionbudget into FY 1977. This would see modest increases for state and localgovernments and for the shelter survey.65 Among the efforts under-taken were studies of ‘‘high-risk’’ areas like the Atlantic seaboard, wheredense urban concentrations would have seen heavy casualties in anuclear attack and in coordination between the national, state, and localgovernments in civil defense efforts.66

These efforts were complemented by those of the Ford Administrationto improve civil defense. NSSM 244, issued on July 24, 1976, directedthat the authors ‘‘should take into account the current status of US andSoviet civil defense programs, their potential impact on the strategicnuclear balance, and their implications for our flexible nuclear optionsstrategy (NSDM 242).’’67

The Carter Administration also began to take an interest in improvingcivil defense. In September 1977, President Carter ordered a study,known as PRM 32, in which ‘‘the Policy Review Committee undertake areview of issues related to civil defense in the United States and theSoviet Union . . . to analyze the strategic implications of civil defenseprograms to the United States and the Soviet Union, and to determinewhat changes, if any, should be made in current US policies related tocivil defense questions.’’68 This study provided a comparison of the USand Soviet civil defense establishments as well as ‘‘the capabilities andeffectiveness of these programs during, immediately after, and for up tosix months after an attack.’’69 It further examined the policy for civildefense, particularly in relation to developments in the strategic balanceoverall, its strategic usefulness, and the implications such programswould have for Soviet civil defense efforts and US strategic doctrine.70

The PRM 32 study led to PD 41, issued in September 1978. Thisclearly described the link between an enhanced US civil defense postureand the refinement of flexible nuclear strategy during this time. Theobjectives of US civil defense would be to

Enhance deterrence and stability in conjunction with our strategicoffensive and other strategic defensive forces . . .

Reduce the possibility that the U.S. could be coerced in time ofcrisis.


Provide some increase in the number of surviving population andfor greater continuity of government, should deterrence and esca-lation control fail, in order to provide an improved basis for dealingwith the crisis and carrying out eventual national recovery.71

Although the authors stressed that such efforts did not ‘‘suggest anychange in continuing US reliance on strategic offensive nuclear forces asthe preponderant factor in maintaining deterrence,’’ they pointed outthat ‘‘Civil defense, as an element of the strategic balance, should assist inmaintaining perceptions of that balance favorable to the U.S.’’ (My italics)72

On July 15, 1979, the renewed emphasis on civil defense was exem-plified by Executive Order 12148, which transferred responsibility forcivil defense from the Pentagon to the FEMA.73 This order definedFEMA’’s brief as being to ‘‘enhance deterrence and stability in conjunc-tion with our strategic offensive and defensive forces.’’74 The Pentagonhad already placed evacuation as the main effort of civil defense, akin toplanning in the USSR. The goals of the US civil defense program werelisted in Harold Brown’s FY 1979 report as

development of crisis relocation plans, surveys of fallout shelterspaces in existing structures in potential target areas and crisis relo-cation host areas, maintenance of radiological defense systems andcapabilities, development of State and local government emergencyoperating capabilities, maintenance of a national CD warningsystem, and peacetime training and exercising for those who wouldplay key roles in actually implementing the program in time ofcrisis.75

As with Schlesinger, Brown linked civil defense efforts to the moreflexible nuclear strategy adopted and refined by the United Statesduring this time. In his 1981 report, Brown gave a clear link betweenthe two. ‘‘Civil defense planning will continue to be fully compatible withoverall US strategic policy and . . .maintain an effective link between strategicnuclear planning and nuclear attack preparedness planning’’ (My italics).76

Despite the transfer of the civil defense responsibility to FEMA, both theNational Security Council and the Pentagon would oversee the devel-opment of civil defense planning.77

During the Carter years (FY 1979–82), the United States spent some$406 million on civil defense, up from $254 million from FY 1975 to1977.78 These figures indicate a major investment in civil defenseduring the Carter years, greatly influenced by the evolution of USnuclear strategy toward a ‘‘Countervailing’’ posture. This strategy,emphasized by Secretary Brown and PD 41, required an enhanced civildefense capability to prevent the USSR from ‘‘prevailing’’ in a nuclearconflict. Ironically, such efforts tended to validate the position of the

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hawks, by creating a ‘‘mirror image’’—albeit on a smaller scale—ofSoviet civil defense efforts during this time.79

The incoming Reagan Administration viewed a widespread civildefense program as a distinct possibility, and its national security direc-tives bear this out. NSDD 12 outlined the administration’s plan forimproving the US strategic force posture. Strategic defense was includedamong the priorities, including civil defense: ‘‘An expanded, cost effec-tive civil defense program will be developed.’’80 NSDD 23, issued onFebruary 3, 1982, called for ‘‘survival of the US population in the eventof nuclear attack preceded by strategic warning, and for continuity ofgovernment, should deterrence and escalation control fail.’’81 One of theprovisions of NSDD 23 was a study to ‘‘allow a funding decision to bemade on a program to protect key defense and population relocationsupport industries. These preparations will allow for initial deploymentof an industrial protection system in 1985 and full deployment by1987.’’82 This would fit into the overall goal of US civil defense, whichwas to ‘‘provide an improved basis for dealing with crisis and carryingout eventual national recovery.’’83

NSDD 26, issued on February 25, 1982, reiterated the commitment toeffective civil defense efforts and stated bluntly what the role of civildefense in US strategic planning was to be:

Civil Defense, along with an effective Continuity of Governmentprogram, emergency mobilization, and secure and reconstitutabletelecommunications systems, is an essential ingredient of our nucleardeterrent forces. It is a matter of national priority that the US have a CivilDefense program which provides for the survival of the US population. (Myitalics)84

These goals were incorporated in NSDD 47, issued on July 22, 1982.This directive dealt with preparation for mobilization involving a widerange of contingencies. As for civil defense, the directive stated ‘‘it is thepolicy of the United States that all Federal agencies shall participate in,and support, the civil defense program for population protection, com-munications and warning, training and education, and industrial pro-tection.’’85

Based on these directives, the US Congress authorized a civil defenseprogram in 1982 that provided FEMA with some $4 billion in fundingduring the early 1980s.86 This reflected a massive effort to improve UScivil defense capabilities, which was linked, as in the Ford and Carteradministrations, to the development of US nuclear strategy. The ReaganAdministration emphasized a strategy of ‘‘prevailing’’ in a protractednuclear conflict. A civil defense program meant not only to protect thepolitical and military leadership of the United States but a large per-centage of the population was therefore necessary.


Whether the US civil defense program would have been any moreeffective in the event of a nuclear war than that of the Soviet Unionremained uncertain. As US–Soviet tensions resumed during the early1980s, this issue remained a source of debate, very much along the linesof the previous decade.

Many of the official estimates regarding the effectiveness of US civildefense efforts tended to mirror the optimistic views of their Sovietcounterparts. The Pentagon estimated in the mid-1970s that, withproper civil defense measures, just 800,000 Americans would be killedin a Soviet counterforce strike on US strategic forces. However, a Con-gressional report projected that such an attack would instead killbetween 3.2 and 16.3 million Americans, whereas an attack on USICBM bases in Missouri alone would kill some 10.3 million.87 Estimatesin the early 1980s by FEMA that the population of Manhattan could beevacuated in 48 hours appeared to be based largely on wishful think-ing.88 Clearly the emphasis on evacuation from urban to rural areaswould have presented the US civil defense system with numerous diffi-culties, as David Miller points out:

Whether the gasoline would have been available for such a massmovement, whether the huge numbers of travellers would havebeen amenable to control, and whether the rural areas could haveaccepted and sustained the numbers involved was never put to thetest.89

The views of certain US officials regarding civil defense90 indicated theirconsiderable lack of understanding of their area of responsibility. Civildefense efforts in the United States during the early 1980s faltered, dueto public apathy and a general loss of interest by the US Government.91

The American view of Soviet civil defense, and the US civil defenseefforts meant to create something of a similar capability, reflected per-ceptions of the character of the Soviet state. Hawks held the view—notentirely inaccurate, of course—of the Soviet Union as a regimented,totalitarian society in which the population was disciplined and wherethe basis for societal organization was highly militaristic. For doves, theinefficiency of Soviet bureaucracy was emphasized, including such fac-tors as the ability of Soviet citizens to avoid unpleasant tasks like civildefense exercises and potential for mismanagement and poor trainingby civil defense officials. Furthermore, the difficulty these officials wouldhave had in overcoming the very real geographic and economic chal-lenges stemming from attempts to protect the population from theeffects of a nuclear war was also important in the doves’ case.

From the late 1970s, the hawks’ case gained pre-eminence in US civildefense policy. When the Reagan Administration came to office in 1981,many of those who had argued for an enhanced US civil defense

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program found themselves in important positions. However, they hadoverlooked many of the problems faced by their Soviet counterparts,particularly in the details of planning. Therefore, they came face to facewith such difficulties when they attempted to establish a similar cap-ability for the United States. Thus, the Americans found themselves witha civil defense policy combining high expectations with very little prac-tical ability to fulfil them, just as their Soviet counterparts did.

The Strategic Defense Initiative, 1983–85

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan made a nationally televised address.Its subject was familiar—the need for the United States to strengthen itsdefenses in the face of the Soviet military buildup. At its conclusion, however,Reagan proposed an idea that would be among themost radical in the historyof postwar American national security policy. The President stated it thus:

Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It isthat we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missilethreat with measures that are defensive . . .what if free people couldlive secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon thethreat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that we couldintercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our ownsoil or that of our allies? . . .

My fellow Americans, tonight we are launching an effort whichholds the promise of changing the course of human history. Therewill be risks, and results take time. But with your support, I believewe can do it.92 (My italics)

What differentiated Reagan’s vision from other, earlier efforts at strategicdefense was that defense could supplant offense in the strategic relation-ship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This speech, soondubbed the ‘‘Star Wars speech,’’ led directly to one of the most con-troversial and intriguing American military initiatives of the era: theStrategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Although Reagan’s idea was a radical one, the idea of active strategicdefense was hardly unknown. It had, in fact, been analyzed and, to alimited extent, implemented over the past 20 years. As mentioned ear-lier, the development of ABMs had proceeded apace during the 1960sand had resulted in deployment by both superpowers in the 1970s.However, the development of MIRVed ballistic missiles led to the reali-zation that any comprehensive ABM system was likely to be over-whelmed and that limited protection of important sites was the onlypossible use for active strategic defenses. The ABM Treaty of 1972enshrined limited active defenses, and its 1974 amendment limited the


superpowers to one ABM site apiece. The US Safeguard system,deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota, was deactivated in 1975,almost immediately after achieving operational capability. The Sovietsbuilt a site outside Moscow, consisting of 32 ABM-1 Galosh missiles,providing the capital and its environs with minimum ABM defense.

Reagan’s idea, however, went beyond the deployment merely ofground-based missiles. It extended to laser and particle beam (or‘‘directed-energy’’) weapons, including those that could be deployed inspace. Again, these were not necessarily radical concepts in and ofthemselves. Both superpowers had conducted research programs ondirected-energy weaponry for several years prior to the initiation of SDI.However, the complexity of the technology, as well as questions abouteffectiveness, limited these efforts,93 although the Soviet Union wasbelieved to have carried out seven tests of interceptor (‘‘killer’’) satellitesin 1976.94

Given the low level of interest in space-based weapon systems, Rea-gan’s proposed SDI was indeed amazing. It was also daunting. To createa defense that would aim for almost full protection of the West (it wasalso intended to protect the NATO allies in Western Europe) wouldrequire the development and deployment of a vast array of systems thathad never before been tested as well as a means of synchronizationensuring nearly 100 percent reliability.

Before discussing the progress of SDI and the views held inWashington regarding its impact on US–Soviet relations, it is necessaryto examine the origins of SDI. Reagan’s views were influenced byEdward Teller, among the most senior of America’s scientists who hadplayed a pivotal role in the development of thermonuclear weapons. In1966, Reagan, the then Governor-elect of California, had visited theLawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where tests of ABM technol-ogy were being conducted. Teller described the technology to Reagan,who came to view such defensive weaponry as being a necessity for thesecurity of the United States.95

During the late 1970s, the debate over ICBM vulnerability, and thedevelopment of the MX missile, led to calls by Republicans, includingReagan, to provide for an ABM system to protect MX.96 This view washeld by some of Reagan’s defense advisors during his campaign.Another more ideological group held that the ABM Treaty was keepingthe United States in a position of inferiority, as it could not adequatelydefend itself against Soviet strategic attack. This group, which includedRichard Allen, Reagan’s first National Security Adviser, wrote theRepublican Party’s defense plank during the 1980 campaign.97 Regard-ing strategic defense, it called for ‘‘a vigorous research and developmentof an effective anti-ballistic missile system, such as . . . in the Soviet Union,as well as more modern ABM technologies.’’98 At the start of his Pre-sidency, Reagan was urged to develop an ABM system utilizing such

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technologies as the ‘‘X-Ray laser,’’ which had been tested at LawrenceLivermore in 1980.99

Some of the arguments for space-based defense began to enter thepublic arena. In 1981, for example, David Baker, who had worked forNASA and had played an important role in the development of theSpace Shuttle, wrote a book on the subject, The Shape of Wars to Come. Init, Baker argued that particle beam weapons could be used as an ABMsystem. Moreover, he argued that the Soviet Union was well ahead ofthe United States in this area and that it could develop a capability in thenot so distant future. After describing how such weapons would work,Baker warned of the consequences of an ABM system utilizing suchtechnology:

The most effective application of the beam weapon would be in theABM role, neutralizing incoming warheads before they reachedtheir targets and effectively screening the home country from bal-listic missile attack. This would have the most profound significancefor the concept of mutually assured destruction, giving one countrythe power to blackmail all others.100

The Reagan Administration began to outline plans for the developmentof weapons to be used in space. NSDD 12 emphasized strategic defense.‘‘Strategic defenses will be modernized, including air and space defenses.A vigorous research and development program will be conducted onballistic missile defense systems.’’101

A White House fact sheet on US space policy, issued in July 1982,outlined the purpose of US military space policy:

The United States will proceed with development of an anti-satellite(ASAT) capability, with operational deployment as a goal. The pri-mary purposes of a United States ASAT capability are to deterthreats to space systems of the United States and its Allies and,within such limits imposed by international law, to deny any adversarythe use of space-based systems that provide support to hostile military forces.(My italics)102

The concluding remarks show that the United States was concerned withthe possibility of Soviet space-based systems. Although these includedcommunications and reconnaissance satellites, which had been present formore than 20 years, the danger of Soviet space-based weapon systems, likethe sophisticated weaponry described by Baker, was certainly a concern.

Among the most important events in shaping Reagan’s decision todeploy a space-based defensive system was a letter written to him onJuly 23, 1982, by Edward Teller. In it, Teller described the scientificefforts being made to develop such systems, and their potential.


‘‘Operating . . . against distant targets in space, the effects of some ofthese techniques [i.e. particle beam] are expected to be spectacularlydestructive; however, it is enemy warheads, rockets and satellites, notlives, which will be destroyed.’’103 Teller then warned of the danger ofthe USSR taking the lead in such technologies:

There are reasons to believe that the Soviet Union might be a fewyears ahead of us in each of these areas of development [of space-based weapons technology]; . . .Because of their extraordinarypotential, it seems likely that the Soviets would seek an earlyopportunity to employ such means to negate our offensive strategiccapabilities, the more so as a ‘‘bloodless’’ victory would be in pro-spect.104

He concluded by urging the deployment of such systems by the UnitedStates, by noting the stakes involved:

If the Soviets should be the first to develop and deploy thesedefensive nuclear weapons, the Free World is in the deepest possibletrouble. However, if we act in this matter promptly and with the fullvigor of which we are capable, we may end the Mutual AssuredDestruction era and commence a period of assured survival on terms favor-able to the Western Alliance.105 (My italics)

It was the last half of the final sentence in this paragraph that would bemost attractive for Ronald Reagan, who came to the decision to deploySDI and emphasized it as being a means to overcome the threat ofnuclear war.

Much of this view came from Reagan’s visit to the North AmericanAerospace Defense Command (NORAD) headquarters in 1979, wherehe was appalled to learn that the United States had no effective defenseagainst incoming nuclear warheads.106 As a candidate, Reagan hadexpressed his concerns over a lack of US strategic defenses: ‘‘With allthis great technology of ours, we . . . cannot stop any of the weapons thatare coming at us. I don’t think there’s been a time in history when therewasn’t a defense against some kind of thrust . . . ’’107 So too did Reagan’sbriefing on the SIOP, which helped give Reagan the impetus he neededto initiate SDI.108

One other area that should be noted is the popular climate in theUnited States at the time. By 1982, Reagan’s strong rhetoric, as well theemphasis on ‘‘prevailing’’ in a nuclear war against the USSR, had led tothe emergence of a popular movement calling for a ‘‘freeze’’ on thedeployment of nuclear weaponry by the superpowers. Such views wereheld by many in Congress, particularly in the Democrat-controlledHouse of Representatives, where, on August 6, 1982, a resolution calling

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for an immediate freeze was defeated by just 204 votes to 202.109 In hisletter to Reagan, Teller argued that a space-based ABM program ‘‘mayalso constitute a uniquely effective reply to those advocating the dan-gerous inferiority implied by a ‘nuclear freeze.’ ’’110

Through SDI, Reagan was attempting to initiate a radical solution tothe arms race—disarmament through effective defense.111 Whereashawks like Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle saw SDI as a means ofenabling the United States to develop a ‘‘war-winning’’ strategic nuclearcapability,112 Reagan adhered to his idealistic vision of SDI throughouthis presidency. The question of whether SDI was feasible, and how itwould affect US–Soviet relations, remained to be seen.

The Soviet challenge

Not surprisingly, the news that the United States was seeking to developand deploy a strategic defense system that would protect the West fromballistic missiles was treated with alarm by the Soviet Union. As JohnNewhouse describes it, ‘‘The Soviets may have felt as if they were con-demned to an endless and exhausting game of catch-up with a powerholding higher cards.’’113 The Soviet economy was in dire straits, suf-fering from both poor management and the effects of more than 15years of heavy defense expenditures. The Soviets knew that an effort ontheir part to match SDI could lead to ruin.

The Soviet reaction was anticipated by the Americans. In September1983, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issued a jointreport on Soviet reactions to SDI. The authors summarized the expec-ted Soviet approach to undermining SDI:

In the near term, we expect the Soviets to rely principally on a concertedpolitical and diplomatic effort first to force the United States to drop its bal-listic missile defense (BMD) plans or, failing that, to negotiate themaway. There are also certain . . .military steps that the Soviets couldtake . . . for the purpose of improving their bargaining position and forpreparing them for initial US deployment should it occur. (My italics)114

The authors noted that in the long term, the Soviets ‘‘will look foreffective countermeasures’’115 to SDI:

. . . ICBMs and . . . SLBMs can be upgraded with new boosters,decoys, penetration aids, and multiple warheads. The signatures ofthese systems can be reduced and new launch techniques and basingschemes . . .devised which make them less vulnerable to US missilewarning and defensive weapon systems. These systems can also behardened or modified to reduce their vulnerability to directedenergy weapons.


The Soviets can employ other offensive systems, particularlymanned bombers and long-range cruise missiles with improvedpenetration aids and stealth technologies, to assume a greaterburden of the strategic offensive strike role and to exploit theweaknesses in US air defense capabilities.116

The Soviet effort at developing directed energy weapons was also citedas being able to ‘‘provide antisatellite capabilities which could be usedagainst some space-based elements of a US BMD system.’’117

The authors summarized the overall reaction by the USSR to SDI asfollows:

We believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will undertake a‘‘crash’’ program in reaction to US BMD developments, but ratherwill seek to counter them by steadily paced efforts over the decades theUnited States will need to develop and deploy its overall defense.They will look for solutions that are least disruptive to their way of doingbusiness and involve the least possible change to their planned pro-grams. The Soviets are not likely to embrace a fundamental shift inthe strategic environment entailing reliance on strategic defenses byboth sides. (My italics)118

The US intelligence community, however, did note that the SovietUnion had been pursuing directed energy technologies and wasattempting to utilize them for its own BMD efforts. The authors of theCIA–DIA report of September 1983 believed that ‘‘In most of thedirected energy weapons technologies, the Soviets are now on a parwith, or lead, the United States. They are likely to pursue these effortsregardless of whether the United States sustains its strategic defense initiative’’(My italics).119 Eighteen months later, in March 1985, the CIA, in areport on Soviet directed energy weapons, broadened this view of theUSSR’s capabilities in this field:

The Soviet Union is believed to be interested in the development ofdirected energy weapons (lasers, particle beams, and microwaves)for ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite (ASAT) applications . . .The resources the Soviets have applied to these efforts are believedto be greater than those which the United States has applied.(Underlining in original)120

Laser technology was an area of concern for the authors, since itappeared that the Soviets had already deployed usable laser weapons:

. . . the Soviets have begun to develop and test laser weapons. TheSoviets already have a ground-based laser capable of damaging

84 Strategic forces

some US satellites and which may be used to investigate the feasi-bility of lasers for ballistic missile defense applicatons. (Underliningin original)121

With a view toward US–Soviet relations on this issue, the authors noted

Hostile Soviet reactions to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)and lobbying against the SDI by high-level Soviet scientists must betempered by the fact that the Soviet Union has not admitted to itsown long-standing counterpart research and the most vocal Sovietscientists have themselves been heavily involved in that weaponsresearch.122

As an interpretation of actual Soviet behavior, the 1983 report, with itsview that Moscow would take the ‘‘least disruptive’’ approach to coun-tering SDI, proved to be the most accurate. Raymond Garthoff notesthat the Soviets studied means of countering SDI but that ‘‘studies bySoviet scientists had . . . led to the conclusion not to attempt to emulatethe SDI program beyond the existing research effort.’’123

Not surprisingly, SDI became an important issue in arms controlnegotiations when they resumed in 1985. NSDD 153, issued on January1, 1985, gave considerable attention to both the Soviet and the Americanpositions on SDI:

The Soviet Union fully recognizes that the SDI program . . . offersthe prospect of permitting the U.S . . . to flank years of Soviet defen-sive investment and to shift the ‘‘state-of-the-art’’ in defenses intoareas of comparative U.S. advantage. This is one of the reasons thatthe primary Soviet focus has not been on attacking the idea of theincreased contribution of defenses to deterrence, which lies at theheart of the SDI program, but rather, on ‘‘preventing the militar-ization of space.’’124

In stating the US position, care is taken to distinguish the time frame fordeployment with respect to the ABM Treaty:

In the near term, the SDI program directly responds to the ongoingand extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, which includes allthe actual deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. It pro-vides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to rapidly expandits ballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABMTreaty.125

The NSC was not alone in recognizing the impact SDI would have onarms control. In a 1983 memo to George Keyworth, President Reagan’s


scientific adviser, Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle included a list ofpoints regarding SDI. Regarding arms control, SDI was seen as playingan important role in strategic arms talks. ‘‘If the Soviets are convincedthat they cannot prevent a US ballistic missile defense program throughpolitical and propaganda means they may become more willing toengage in genuine negotiations for offensive force reductions.’’126 Onthe same subject, it was stated that ‘‘In the long run, ballistic missiledefenses may open new incentives and opportunities for combiningarms agreements and unilateral measures to achieve stability at lowerlevels of offensive forces.’’127

Conclusion

At the outset of this section, SDI was described as being a truly radicalapproach, indeed unique in American national security policy. This wasbecause SDI, in its concept and intention, reflected the view of one man:Ronald Reagan. Whereas earlier strategic efforts had been influenced bysuch factors as bureaucratic politics and threat perception, SDI boreReagan’s unique world view. Development of space-based weapons wasnot new, but this had slowed due to such factors as cost, practicability,and views of arms race instability. Yet Reagan was suggesting somethingthat no other US President during the Cold War had even thought fea-sible—the absolute, total defense of the United States and thus the endof the danger of nuclear war.

Any analysis of Ronald Reagan’s personality and worldview is lengthyand complex and beyond the scope of what is being discussed here. It isimportant, however, to analyze some elements to gain a better under-standing of SDI and why it came to have the impact it did during the1980s. John Newhouse saw two important sides of Reagan: the fantasist,who viewed the world through the lens of Hollywood screenplays (whichcame to influence many of his speeches), and the hard-headed realist,shaped by his experiences as President of the Screen Actors Guild and asGovernor of California, capable of pragmatic action and tough negotia-tion.128 It would appear that SDI emerged from Reagan’s fantasist side.Indeed, historians have argued with cinematic evidence that there aredirect links between Reagan’s views and the screenplays of certainfilms.129

Yet an affinity for Hollywood films does not in and of itself explainReagan’s unshakeable faith in SDI, even as the obstacles to its successfuldeployment mounted. Reagan saw SDI as an example of America’sdesire for peace, using its scientific and technological capabilities todevelop a system that would end the state of nuclear threat and bring alasting peace to the world.

Given his deeply rooted beliefs, together with his abhorrence ofnuclear weapons, Reagan saw SDI almost as the sole means of achieving

86 Strategic forces

world peace and ridding the world of these armaments, as opposed tothe process of arms control that had been pursued by his predecessors.However, at the height of a renewed Cold War, SDI, regardless ofRonald Reagan’s vision for it, seemed an example of a new stage in thearms race, made possible by technology and the ideological climate ofthe time.

The American approach to strategic defense over the decade from1976 to 1985 reflects two key chronological themes. First, the develop-ment of an enhanced US civil defense capability paralleled the develop-ment of a more flexible nuclear strategy. As with the need to haveflexible strategies for the use of strategic offensive forces, the need toutilize civil defense to mitigate the effects of a Soviet attack was seen ascomplementary. An improved civil defense capability would, itappeared, prevent the Soviet Union from achieving what it might havebelieved would be ‘‘victory’’ in a nuclear conflict. Such thinking was, ofcourse, based on perceptions of Soviet nuclear strategy.

By 1982, it was becoming clear that an enhanced civil defense posturewas not enough to provide the United States with an effective strategicdefense against the USSR’s vast strategic capabilities. This leads into thesecond key theme of this subject: the initiation and development of SDI.The fact that Ronald Reagan was present at the apex of US nationalsecurity policy at this time was the key factor precipitating this turn ofevents. A different president might have maintained civil defense atpresent levels and initiated a limited ABM effort, thus improving the USstrategic defense posture. Reagan’s unshakable belief in total defense ledto SDI. Granted, there had been warnings from hawks about the possi-bility of a Soviet space-based weapons capability: that had helped spurEdward Teller’s letter to Reagan in July 1982. However, the overallvision for SDI stemmed from Reagan himself.

For Reagan, the development of such a system would force the SovietUnion to abandon the arms race and join the United States in a mean-ingful nuclear disarmament effort, thus ending both the balance ofterror and the Cold War. His speech on US–Soviet relations in January1984 was evidence of such an approach, which culminated at Reykjavikin 1986, where Reagan and Gorbachev proposed a three-stage, 15-yearplan for the elimination of offensive strategic weapons. Although itfoundered, ironically, on the question of SDI, it is indicative of Reagan’sbelief that such a goal was feasible, even if the method of achieving it—SDI—was unrealistic.


Part II

The balance in Europe

4 The nuclear balance

The cornerstone of US strategic policy during the Cold War was indubi-tably Western Europe, which had, in the twentieth century, come to pro-minence as an area of vital American interests as a result of the two worldwars and their aftermath. The projection of Soviet power and influenceinto Central Europe after 1945, and the conflict this had helped spawnbetween the superpowers, had led the United States to bind itself institu-tionally, through the NATO alliance, to the defense of Western Europefrom Soviet designs. From the early 1950s, this commitment had necessi-tated a large-scale US military deployment in the region, which becamethe consistent primary focus of American military strategy.

For American strategic planners, this required a nuclear commitmentto Europe’s defense. Although sizable US conventional forces were sta-tioned in several European NATO states and the European conventionalforces were also considerable, the imbalance with the USSR and itsWarsaw Pact satellites (both real and perceived) in this area necessitatedthe deployment of US nuclear weapons to Europe to provide a linkbetween conventional defense and the US strategic arsenal. If, as widelybelieved, a Soviet offensive overran NATO conventional forces, theatreand tactical nuclear weapons would be used, opening the way for the useof US strategic forces if the Soviets did not halt their aggression forthwith.This link between NATO conventional and European-based nuclearforces and the US strategic deterrent, known as ‘‘coupling,’’ would remainthe centrepiece of NATO strategy throughout the Cold War. Theatrenuclear forces were especially important. JCS Chairman General Jonesnoted this in the introduction to his 1980 posture statement:

NATO has long viewed theater nuclear weapons as both an essentialleg of the ‘‘NATO Triad’’ (conventional, theater nuclear, and strate-gic nuclear forces) and a key element in assuring the credibility ofthe escalation option within NATO’s flexible response strategy.1

This approach had been effective during the 1950s and 1960s. However,as the Soviets increased and improved their strategic arsenal, perceptions

about the US nuclear guarantee to NATO Europe began to shift. TheSoviet buildup had, by the mid-1970s, begun to encompass theatre forcesas well. In 1976, the Soviets began to deploy a new intermediate-rangeballistic missile (IRBM), the SS-20, to replace older systems targeted onWestern Europe. In addition, Soviet conventional forces deployed inCentral and Eastern Europe were improved both quantitatively and qua-litatively. By 1977, these combined improvements in Soviet forces hadbegun to raise alarm in the West.

The issue of Soviet force improvements received considerable publicattention as a result of a speech given by West German ChancellorHelmut Schmidt at the International Institute for Strategic Studies inOctober 1977. In it, he outlined a variety of Allied concerns over USdefense and foreign policy in relation to the military balance in Europe.Citing the SALT II negotiations then under way, Schmidt called forparity in both strategic systems (covered in the SALT negotiations) andtheatre systems deployed in Europe. As theatre weapons would mostlikely be used in a European war (and would remain predominant,even if strategic forces did take part), Schmidt was enunciating aconcern shared by many in Western Europe. In their eyes, such forceswere strategic, and as most NATO (except for the British and Frenchindependent deterrents) and all Warsaw Pact theatre weapons wereultimately under the control of the superpowers, they had to be inclu-ded in the overall nuclear equation.2 ‘‘Strategic arms limitations con-fined to the United States and the Soviet Union,’’ Schmidt declared,‘‘will inevitably impair the security of the West European members ofthe Alliance vis-a vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do notsucceed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallelto the SALT negotiations.’’3

The ‘‘neutron bomb’’ and alliance cohesion, 1977–78

These concerns helped push the United States toward exploring optionsfor deploying improved theatre and tactical systems in Europe. Newnuclear artillery shells were in development for 155-mm and 8-inchhowitzers, whereas a new US short-range missile, the Lance, beganentering service. Along with these improvements, the United States hadalso developed a new type of nuclear warhead, known as the EnhancedRadiation Warhead (ERW). This weapon relied on using a fusion reac-tion to produce an explosion that would reduce blast effect. This wouldconcentrate the force of the blast within a relatively small area, withradioactive fallout being similarly concentrated for maximum lethaleffect.4 Against massed Soviet tank formations, the ERW would causeenormous casualties while minimizing the physical damage in the areawhere it was used. In practical terms, this would enable NATO forces tomatch improved Soviet tactical missiles and artillery and, theoretically,

92 The balance in Europe

would allay West German fears regarding the use of nuclear weapons ontheir soil.5 Indeed, the damage limitation features of ERW were centralto the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe, as they were implicitly linkedto supporting NATO conventional forces in the event of a Warsaw Pactinvasion. It was these very features that would shape the debate overERW deployment, a debate that would have far-reaching consequencesfor the Atlantic Alliance in the decade ahead.

By the mid-1970s, US defense planners had begun to take intoaccount damage-limitation options in planning for a possible nuclearconflict in Europe. In his FY1976 report, Schlesinger spelled out theseefforts:

. . .we should continue to develop selective, carefully controlledoptions that will permit us: (a) to enhance our ability to deal withmajor penetrations of an allied sector and achieve a quick, decisivereversal of the tactical situation; and (b) to engage . . . in a highlydiscriminating interdiction campaign against enemy lines of com-munication. Both . . . options are designed so as to minimize theincentives for the enemy to reply . . . or to respond with uncontrolledattacks. As I indicated earlier, changes in the size and composition ofour deployed nuclear stockpiles and systems will improve our abilityto accomplish these ends.6

Rumsfeld reiterated this view in his Fiscal Year 1978 report. ‘‘Theobjective,’’ he wrote, ‘‘has been and remains to increase kill probabilities,reduce collateral damage, and economize in the use of scarce nuclearmaterials.’’7 Thus, as concerns were raised by the European NATOmembers about the perceived imbalance of nuclear forces on the Con-tinent, the United States had available technologies enabling thedeployment of weapons to redress this inadequacy. President Fordauthorized development of the ERW in 1976,8 although a decision ondeployment was not yet made by the time he left office.

The Carter Administration found itself embroiled in the ERW issuesome six months after taking office. In June and July 1977, WalterPincus of the Washington Post wrote several articles describing the ERWand its capabilities. This quickly led to an uproar among anti-nucleargroups in Europe, with a strong element of anti-American sentimentpresent in the debate. The USSR directed a strong propaganda effortagainst the ERW, calling it a ‘‘capitalist bomb’’ that would kill people butleave property intact.9 This led the ERW to be termed the ‘‘neutronbomb.’’

Within a short time, the ERW became an important issue in transat-lantic relations. Questions were raised about what its addition to theNATO arsenal would mean for crisis stability and the use of nuclearweapons in a European war. Would the ERW enhance deterrence by

The nuclear balance 93

virtue of its flexibility, as its proponents claimed, by limiting collateraldamage and concentrating its destructive effects on invading Sovietforces? Or, as opponents argued, would it lead to a temptation byNATO to resort to nuclear weapons early in a conflict, initiating unin-tended consequences and widespread destruction as a result?

With arguments for and against deployment, President Carter com-promised, asking Congress to provide funding for production, in July1977, which was done four months later. However, no decision on ERWdeployment was made at the time.10 This reflected the predicamentfaced by both the United States and NATO Europe over ERW deploy-ment. The Allies, particularly the West Germans, who supporteddeployment wanted the Americans to come to a decision on this issue,due to widespread public opposition. The Americans, stung by criticismover ERW, wanted the onus to be on the Europeans, as they hadrequested an improvement in NATO theatre and tactical forces. TheEuropeans, in other words, had to decide on where and how to baseERW, as the priority for its deployment would be the defense of NATOEurope. A lack of consensus on this issue in Europe created a perceptionof indecision for American policymakers, who viewed the Europeans asbeing half-hearted on important matters pertaining to their defense.

Throughout this period, US officials went out of their way to empha-size that the ERW was considered to be a nuclear weapon rather than a‘‘grey area’’ weapon that might be considered conventional and thushave a lower threshold of use than other nuclear warheads. HaroldBrown made this clear in his FY1979 report:

These weapons [ERW] would not lower the nuclear threshold: theconsequences of using any nuclear weapons is so uncertain that thedecision to release enhanced radiation weapons would be no easier than anyother nuclear decision. They would make our constraints policy ofminimizing collateral damage easier to achieve, and improve some-what the chances that a tactical use of nuclear weapons cold be keptunder some degree of control . . .But they are neither a panacea nor aspecial cause for alarm. (My italics)11

Although such statements provided comfort to proponents of deploy-ment in Europe, Carter’s vacillation meant that the debate dragged on,leading to an ever more emotional argument over ERW. An Americanoffer to include ERW in negotiations on arms control in Europe inreturn for a reduction in the number of SS-20s by Moscow wentnowhere.12 Much of the pressure emanating from the ERW debate wasfelt by Helmut Schmidt, whose Social Democratic Party (SPD) was ser-iously divided over the need for ERW deployment, the bulk of which (ifnot all) would be in West Germany. In a telephone conversation withCarter, Schmidt raised the issue of ‘‘singularity,’’ or the basing of ERW


in West Germany alone. Schmidt insisted that other NATO states, mostnotably Belgium and the Netherlands, accept some ERW warheads ontheir soil, to deflect public criticism and ‘‘share the burden’’ of deploy-ment among the Allies.13

By early 1978, Schmidt—who had expended considerable political capi-tal in his efforts regarding ERW—had reached a compromise wherebyERW deployment would be contingent on success in arms control nego-tiations over forces in Europe. After two years, if such talks were not suc-cessful, ERW would be deployed.14 Carter, however, who had deep moralreservations over ERW and saw little practical gain in deployment, tookaction that led to the unravelling of this formula. In March 1978, Cartercancelled a NATO ministerial meeting on ERW, sending Assistant Secre-tary of State Warren Christopher to Bonn to inform Schmidt of Carter’sviews about cancellation. This alarmed the West Germans, who had goneto great lengths to accept the framework for deployment in response toAmerican pressure on this issue. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, West Germany’sforeign minister, stated that Schmidt supported production and possibledeployment. On April 4, a leak to the press indicated that Carter would notproduce the ERW, and over the next two days came indications that thePresident was ‘‘reviewing’’ the issue. On April 7, Carter announced that hewas ‘‘deferring’’ a production decision, just two days after West Germanypublicly announced support for ERW production.15

Although Carter sweetened the blow somewhat with the announcementthat Lance missiles and 155-mm and 8-inch artillery would undergonuclear modernization with the possibility of ERW capability,16 the effectof this episode on Trans Atlantic relations in the Alliance was extremelydetrimental. Relations between Carter and Schmidt, which were at bestcorrect before the issue came to a head in 1978, declined sharply.Schmidt believed that Carter had callously (or even intentionally) under-mined his position, as he had expended considerable political capital towin support from the divided and skeptical SPD.17 Carter, for his part,was seen as an untrustworthy and ineffective leader, a man incapable ofmaking important decisions and sticking to them. Such weaknesses wereseen by Allied leaders as dangerous shortcomings for an American pre-sident, who might conceivably make life-or-death decisions in a crisis.Carter, for his part, saw ERW as a response to a European concern overthe nuclear balance and believed that the responsibility for deploymenttherefore rested with the Europeans, particularly the West Germans.Without agreement on this issue, production of ERW by the United Stateswould serve no purpose.18

Although ERW would adversely affect US relations with the Europeanallies as a whole, the most serious strains were with West Germany.During the Spring of 1977, a special task force directed the study ofEurope as part of PRM 10. West Germany was central to America’sEuropean policy, as the PRM 10 drafters noted:


The FRG remains the United States’ prime European asset, with eco-nomic strength and a basic domestic consensus on foreign policy goals . . .American influence, among other factors, means that changes in theparty in power . . .will have little effect on Bonn’s foreign policy. Onbalance, the new German self-confidence can serve U.S. interests if therelationship is carefully managed. (My italics; underlining in original)19

Given the mishandling of the ERW issue by Carter, it appeared that akey tenet of his national security strategy had been discarded. Ratherthan a relationship that was ‘‘carefully managed,’’ it appeared that rela-tions between the United States and West Germany, heretofore basedon a strong commitment to NATO unity and cohesion, were now subjectto the whim of President Carter, who had based his decision to a sig-nificant extent on his own personal views of the issue at hand.

The ERW imbroglio raised questions about how Carter would shapepolicy toward Europe. After all, this was the centrepiece of Americanforeign policy since 1945. Whereas other regions like Southeast Asia andthe Middle East had waxed and waned in importance for Washingtonover the years, Western Europe had consistently maintained its vitalimportance throughout the entire post-war era. Carter’s hesitation onERW led to serious concerns over the credibility of the United States, asit represented the most sophisticated tactical nuclear weapon in the USarsenal, tailor-made for use on European battlefields. If the Americanleadership could not, in reasonable time, make a decision in support ofits closest allies, how could the United States, clearly the leading Westernpower and the indispensable engine of the Atlantic Alliance, be trustedto make decisions that might determine Western Europe’s future fordecades to come?

At the heart of the debate over ERW was a perceptual differencebetween the Allies. For the Americans, ERW was seen as a weaponneeded by the Europeans to allay fears of the Soviet threat. Given thepresence of thousands of US and Allied warheads in Europe, and theflexibility of their delivery systems, the improved Soviet theatre posturewas not in and of itself seen as overly dangerous. The primary impor-tance of ERW, therefore, was seen as maintaining European confidencein the US commitment to their security. For the Europeans, on thecontrary, ERW was seen as central to their defense. Given the state ofstrategic parity between the superpowers, any Soviet advantage in thea-tre forces was seen as dangerously undermining the balance of militarypower in Europe. Deploying ERW was therefore seen as vital to main-taining the perception of military stability.

These perceptions figured prominently in the decisions made during1978 regarding deployment. Because the Europeans had raised theissue of improving theatre nuclear forces, the Americans believed thatthey had to take the lead in deciding when and where ERW would be


deployed. For their part, the Europeans, and particularly HelmutSchmidt, wanted the Americans to show leadership on this issue andmake this decision. These perceptions, however, were conflicting, andlittle effort was made to bridge this gap, resulting in serious transatlanticstrains over this issue. To a great extent, the ERW imbroglio helped leadto another contentious debate over the deployment of US nuclearweapons in Europe, this time regarding long-range theatre nuclearmissiles. The need for Allied solidarity would be the main legacy of theERW debate and would be prominent in the theatre missile deploymentnegotiations. In examining ERW, a valid case could be made that ithelped create the long and not always harmonious debate over theatrenuclear forces that emerged during 1979.

The LRTNF debate, 1979–83

The alarm over the balance of forces in Europe during the 1970s came,in no small part, from the improvements to Soviet Long-Range TheatreNuclear Forces (LRTNF), particularly the deployment of the SS-20.Although designed to replace older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, the SS-20was, in comparison with its predecessors, a quantum leap in terms ofcapability. Whereas the SS-4s and SS-5s were deployed at fixed sites orin silos and had one warhead, the SS-20 was fully mobile and carriedthree warheads, each independently targetable. It also had greaterrange (4,400–5,000 km) than the SS-4 (2,000 km) and SS-5(4,100 km).20

Taken in combination with the development of new Soviet battlefieldnuclear weapons and the deployment of the Backfire bomber in thewestern USSR, the SS-20 appeared to herald an attempt by the SovietUnion to establish regional nuclear superiority in Europe. This wouldcancel out NATO’s ability to use its nuclear forces to deter a Sovietconventional attack against Western Europe, which many analysts andcommentators saw as a prelude to a worrying trend. Termed ‘‘Finlandi-zation’’ in reference to what was seen as the USSR’s ability to influence,through its preponderance of power, Finnish foreign and even domesticpolicies, this theory held that the Soviet Union, with its conventional andnuclear superiority vis-a-vis NATO Europe, would be able to intimidatethe European members of the Alliance into acceding to Soviet desires.These would enable the USSR to increase its influence throughoutWestern Europe, at the expense of the United States, and thus tip theglobal balance of power radically in its favor.21

The response to this perceived imbalance of power came, at first, fromthe European NATO members. Helmut Schmidt’s October 1977 speechin London had sounded the alarm and forced Washington to examinethe situation. The Carter Administration had also begun to worry aboutthe nuclear balance in Europe. The European Task Force that drafted


PRM 10’s assessment of the region described the situation in May 1977:‘‘There is strategic parity and a rough standoff in theater nuclear forcesdespite greater NATO numbers’’ (Underlining in original).22 Percep-tions of the US nuclear commitment to Europe, among both the NATOallies and the Warsaw Pact, were then summarized:

NATO European allies believe the credibility of the triad [of strate-gic, theater, and conventional forces defending NATO Europe]hinges on the U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces. While apalpable risk of a nuclear strike on the Soviet homeland is seen asthe key to deterrence, theatre nuclear weapons are also critical inoffsetting Pact conventional advantages and in their role as part ofoverall NATO strategy.

Warsaw Pact views are, in many respects, the mirror image. TheU.S. will to use nuclear weapons on Europe’s behalf is key to theEast’s vision of NATO . . . the Soviets attempt to de-couple U.S.nuclear weapons from NATO through SALT or regional controls onthe use of nuclear weapons. (Underlining in original)23

A meeting of the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) of the NSCheld on July 7, 1977, gave a stark description of the LRTNF situa-tion. Addressing PRM 10’s assessment of the European balance, theparticipants noted that ‘‘Soviet theater nuclear capabilities in Europeare improving significantly, and only concerted Western efforts to fulfilpresent improvement programs would halt (but not reverse) currenttrends in their favor in the military balance on the Central Front’’(My italics).24

With such concerns in mind, the United States began to quietly mod-ernize its nuclear forces committed to NATO. By 1977, five Polaris sub-marines, equipped with a total of 80 single warhead missiles, had beenreplaced by two Poseidon submarines, equipped with 32 missiles andover 400 warheads. These were assigned to the Supreme Allied Com-mander, Europe (SACEUR) for use in the event of a European nuclearwar and represented a quantum leap in the West’s strategic capabilityin this area.25 The number of F-111 dual-capable strike aircraft basedin the United Kingdom grew from 80 to 164 during this time.26 All told,NATO fielded some 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe, whereas morethan 3,000 aircraft, missiles, and artillery pieces were designated asnuclear capable.27

During 1977 and early 1978, the Carter Administration found itselfpressured to pay more attention to the issue of LRTNF. Two reasonsexisted for this. First, the diplomatic fiasco over ERW had led to seriousquestions about American credibility regarding NATO. Second, theSALT II negotiations had begun to address certain weapons that could


be deployed in Europe as theatre systems. From the Europeans’perspective, the issue of both range and numbers deployed for cruisemissiles was a key concern. These weapons—small, cheap and highlyaccurate—were seen as being an effective deterrent to the Sovietbuildup, particularly the SS-20s. In 1977, the Carter Administrationdispatched a briefing team to NATO to describe all aspects of cruisemissiles and possible deployment. Although even-handed in their brief-ings, the team attempted to shift European attitudes toward support forAmerican efforts through SALT to negotiate limitations on cruise missilecapabilities. This, of course, meant that the Cruise Missile’s potential wasplayed down by the briefers.28

However, from mid-1978 and the ERW fiasco, LRTNF had to belooked at afresh. In June 1978, the NSC drafted PRM 38, meant to‘‘focus on identifying and assessing the major political and military issuesbearing on long-range theatre nuclear capability in Europe and armscontrol.’’29 Already, in November 1977, a High-Level Group (HLG) hadbeen formed, and, in a meeting at Los Alamos, New Mexico in February1978, the European delegates called for NATO to deploy a new theatreweapon system.30 By October, the HLG was able to begin studies onpossible LRTNF forces.31 At the same time, National Security AdviserBrzezinski made a secret trip to Europe to meet the key Allied heads ofstate: British Prime Minister James Callaghan, French President Giscardd’Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt.

As a result, a four-power meeting was set for January 1979 at Guade-loupe.32 The Americans needed European support for SALT II andthus needed to determine a framework for LRTNF deployment. TheBritish sought to purchase Trident missiles to replace their Polaris force,whereas the French wanted continued American support for their ownnuclear weapon program. Furthermore, such weapons as cruise and SS-20 (seen as ‘‘grey area’’ weapons due to both their theatre and theirstrategic potential) needed to be addressed in the SALT negotiations.33

At Guadeloupe, the four leaders decided to deploy US LRTNFweapons in Western Europe. Schmidt had accepted this so long as ‘‘sin-gularity’’ was avoided and other states accepted deployment of theweapons on their soil as well.34 He had also secured agreement thatnegotiations on theatre weapons would occur parallel to planning fordeployment of LRTNF.35 Thus was born the ‘‘two-tier’’ or ‘‘two-track’’approach regarding this issue.36

Three months later, NATO created the so-called Special Group of theHLG,37 which would examine important political issues, including theimpact of arms control on LRTNF improvements.38 Throughout 1979,these groups met and determined both the military and the politicalapproaches to be taken regarding LRTNF deployment. By year’s end,NATO was ready to reach a public decision on this issue. At a meeting ofthe Nuclear Planning Group in The Hague on November 13–14, 1979,


Ministers noted that the modernization of theatre nuclear systemswould, by adding highly accurate and survivable, long-range systemsbased in NATO Europe, enhance NATO’s deterrent and strengthenthe linkage between NATO’s conventional forces and United Statesintercontinental strategic systems; and by augmenting NATO longrange theatre nuclear forces, close a gap in the spectrum of escala-tion and provide increased options for restrained and controlledresponses.39

Here exists the rationale for the deployment of LRTNF, both tostrengthen the NATO deterrent and to maintain the ‘‘coupling’’ of USstrategic forces. Indeed, many of the arguments made for ERW deploy-ment two years earlier can be seen, namely, the link between the USnuclear commitment and maintaining a balance with the USSR in thea-tre forces. Whereas American and European perceptions of the role ofERW in the military balance had been very different in 1978, by late1979 they were very similar regarding LRTNF.

On December 12, following a meeting of the Defense Planning Com-mittee, a special meeting of the Alliance’s foreign and defense ministerscame to a decision on LRTNF deployment. In accordance with what hadbeen decided during the HLG’s meetings, a total of 572 missiles—108Pershing II and 464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM)—wouldbe deployed in Europe. To avoid the appearance of increased relianceon nuclear weapons for deterrence, some 1,000 US nuclear warheadswould be withdrawn from Europe.40 Furthermore, as part of the ‘‘dual-track’’ approach, the ministers emphasized the need for arms controlagreements that would create equal ceilings on US and Soviet theatresystems.41

It was in the area of strategic arms control that the issue of LRTNFwas brought up. The Soviets had, since the talks leading to the SALT Iagreement in 1972, expressed concern over the presence of AmericanForward Based Systems (FBS)—nuclear missiles and nuclear-capableaircraft based in Europe and Asia or on aircraft carriers in nearbywaters—that could, along with the US strategic forces Triad, be con-sidered a part of the US strategic nuclear posture. In 1979, these forcesin Europe included 108 Pershing IA missiles (based in West Germany),over 150 F-111’s based in Great Britain, some 250 F-4 fighter-bombers,20 A-6 and 40 A-7 attack aircraft, stationed on European bases and air-craft carriers in the Mediterranean.42

The Americans had excluded these systems from SALT, maintainingthat they were tied to regional defense and were not therefore strategic. ACIA report issued in May 1977 took note of the Soviet emphasis on FBS:

The Soviets believe they have a strong case—and one that could beparticularly effective in influencing foreign public opinion—that US


forward-based systems are a strategic asymmetry in US favor andare a proper subject for bilateral limitations on strategic arms.43

One option noted by the authors was for a limitation on cruise missilesas a means of deflecting Soviet insistence on FBS inclusion. A major USeffort toward strategic reductions—like that seen in March 1977—couldhave led to Soviet insistence on a freeze on new FBS before 1985,although the Soviet demand for FBS reduction ‘‘is one they probablywill not ultimately insist on.’’44

By 1978, however, the idea of including some concessions on theseforces, in response to a Soviet reduction in LRTNF (i.e., the SS-20s) wasseen as meriting consideration. In February of that year, an SCC meet-ing addressed these issues in relation to a planned SALT III agreement:

We will include the following formula in a unilateral statement: ‘‘Anyfurther limitation on U.S. systems principally designed for theatremissions should be accompanied by appropriate limits on Soviettheatre systems.’’ We will present this approach in the February 24NAC [North Atlantic Council] consultations, while maintaining ourflexibility on the specific language of a statement.45

As it happened, the issue of FBS was not included in the final SALT IIagreement, signed in June 1979. However, the idea of such a formulawas considered for a possible SALT III agreement, which it was believedwould be negotiated in the early 1980s.

The issue of LRTNF, therefore, had been decided upon by both theUnited States and its European allies. Although there would be difficulties—that is, Dutch and Belgian reluctance, due to domestic opposition, tocome to an immediate decision over basing—the framework of deploymentand arms control had been agreed to. The mix of the two systems—thePershing II with its prompt, hard-target kill capability, the GLCM with itsgreater range but longer flight time—helped to allay fears that these newsystems represented a forward-based US first-strike capability.46 The factthat more than three-quarters of the missiles were GLCMs strengthenedthis view.

However, whereas the efforts leading to the December 1979 decisionhad been initiated by the Europeans to strengthen the American nuclearlink to the Allies, by this time, LRTNF deployment was also beingchampioned by Americans increasingly disillusioned with Detente.In September 1979, Henry Kissinger gave a speech in Brussels titled‘‘The Future of NATO.’’ Addressing the issue of theatre nuclear forces,Kissinger warned

If there is no theater nuclear establishment on the continent ofEurope, we are writing the script for selective blackmail in which


our allies will be threatened, and in which we will be forced into adecision whereby we can respond only with a strategy that has nomilitary purpose but only the aim of destruction of populations.47

Kissinger further argued that ‘‘either the Soviet nuclear threat in theaternuclear forces against Europe be eliminated (which I do not see is pos-sible), or . . . an immediate effort be made to build up our theater nuclearforces.’’48

Although influential Americans began to call for a stronger effort atLRTNF modernization, events began to shift this debate onto a differentplane. Within two weeks of the NATO ministers’ decision on Pershing IIand GLCM deployment, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, provid-ing a spark for a renewed Cold War between the superpowers. Ratherthan a means of ensuring Detente through effective deterrence, LRTNFnow appeared to serve as a symbol of American resolve in a new era ofconfrontation with the USSR.

In other words, what was seen as a strengthening of the existing stateof East–West relations—something which the Europeans had desired—now appeared to suit a more bellicose approach from Washington,which the Europeans, having more at stake in the Detente developedduring the 1970s, did not tend to endorse. This was made plainly evi-dent when, as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carterwithdrew the SALT II treaty from US Senate consideration at thebeginning of 1980. The hope that a SALT III treaty would then benegotiated, and in which equal LRTNF levels would be established,appeared dashed. Now, deployment, rather than deployment andnegotiations, appeared to be the only conceivable outcome.49

The difference of opinion regarding deployment became more visibleafter Ronald Reagan took office in 1981. Carter had seen the renewedconfrontation as a period in which the Soviet Union would, afteraccepting American resolve, return to a more businesslike approach insuperpower relations. Reagan saw this situation as succeeding Detente,in which the United States was now engaged in a struggle for the survi-val of freedom across the globe, in direct competition with Moscow.However, in May 1981, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council inRome, the United States announced that it would open talks on limitingLRTNF (now termed Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF). Thiswas welcomed by the European NATO members, who saw the issue asbeing one that could cause a serious rift in Trans Atlantic relations.50 InNovember 1981, Reagan proposed the so-called ‘‘Zero Option,’’ bywhich all Soviet LRTNF missiles would be dismantled in return for theUnited States not deploying Pershing IIs and GLCMs.51

This approach had a strong appeal for President Reagan, as indicatedin a November 1981 memorandum for discussion with the chief US INFnegotiator, Paul Nitze. ‘‘We are offering a very bold and constructive


proposal on limiting the major missile threat in Europe,’’ the Presidentpointed out, before describing in greater detail its importance:

I want to emphasize that the zero level proposal I made public onNovember 18 is a serious proposal and that we will be negotiating itin good faith. Our Allies support it strongly as well. You shouldemphasize that any levels of intermediate range above zero threateningEurope will be because the Soviets will not accept that limit. (My italics)52

However, it faced several practical problems. The Soviets would have todismantle several hundred missiles, including their most modern SS-20s, in return for an American promise not to deploy weapons that werenot yet in place. Moreover, some of the NATO states in which the mis-siles might be deployed, most notably Belgium and the Netherlands,had not made a final decision on deployment; thus, some of the new USmissiles might not be stationed in Europe anyway, meaning that Moscowhad even less incentive for accepting the ‘‘Zero Option.’’ 53 Anotherfactor mitigating against this approach was the fact that the British andFrench nuclear deterrents would remain unaffected.54 These forces,while small compared the massive US and Soviet arsenals, were hardlyinsignificant. Britain deployed four ballistic missile submarines with atotal of 64 missiles, whereas France deployed five missile submarineswith 80 missiles, about 30 strategic bombers, and 18 IRBMs.55 Thesewould remain a formidable striking force in the European theatre, evenif (as was the case of the French arsenal) they were under respectivenational, rather than NATO, control.

Nonetheless, the official US position remained the ‘‘Zero Option,’’ andthe superpowers conducted a series of negotiations on INF in Genevafrom November 1981 through November 1983.56 On the whole, neitherside was able to make headway in the negotiations. The terms of the USposition were unacceptable to the Soviets, who were unable to offer anacceptable alternative. The only real sign of progress came in June 1982.During an informal meeting, later termed the ‘‘Walk in the Woods,’’Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky, his Soviet counterpart, agreed to a for-mula for INF. The Soviets would reduce their force to just 75 SS-20sfacing Europe while eliminating some 380 older SS-4s and SS-5s. TheAmericans would be allowed to deploy just 75 GLCMs in return.57

However, both Washington and Moscow rejected this proposal. On theAmerican side, there was a lack of coordination as well as the opposition ofmore hawkish members of the Reagan Administration (most notably Wein-berger and Assistant Secretary Perle), who worried that giving up PershingIIs would have harmed deterrence in Europe.58 Also, it was seen as destabi-lizing relations with the European NATO allies, especially West Germany’sHelmut Schmidt, who would have been outraged that a weapon system hehad agreed to had been sharply curtailed in deployment, as had been the


case with ERW.59 The Soviets too rejected this proposal, as it would have leftBritish and French forces intact and forced a massive reduction in their ownINF arsenal with little American reciprocity.60

In terms of relations with the European NATO allies, the ‘‘Walk in theWoods’’ brought about criticism on two counts. First, although Nitze hadbeen acting on his own, it was feared that Reagan could have put hisposition and prestige as President behind the offer. This revived theEuropean fear of the superpowers ‘‘doing a deal’’ over the heads ofEuropean leaders, a concern shared by American hawks like Weinbergerand Perle. Second, the fact that the deal had been rejected by the UnitedStates was also condemned, as it was seen as a missed opportunity both togain a substantial Soviet INF reduction while improving NATO cap-abilities in this area. It was also seen as a missed opportunity to reducetensions between the two superpowers, which had led to fears of war inWestern Europe and a massive anti-nuclear movement that, by 1982, hadcome to exert considerable pressure in several European countries.

Nonetheless, the ‘‘Walk in the Woods’’ did lead to some flexibility inAmerican INF proposals. NSDD 104, issued on September 21, 1983,described this approach:

While actively keeping our proposal to eliminate all land-basedLRINF missiles on the table, the United States formally notified theSoviet Union that the United States is prepared to enter into aninterim agreement under which the United States would accept alimit at some finite, agreed number of warheads on LRINF land-based missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number ofwarheads on its LRINF land-based missile force to an equal level ona global basis.61

Despite this modification, the INF negotiations broke down in Novem-ber 1983, as the first Pershings and GLCMs were due to be deployed.The Soviets, on learning of the impending deployments, walked out ofthe talks in Geneva. The lion’s share of the blame for the failure of thenegotiations therefore fell upon the Soviet Union.62 In December 1983,the first nine Pershing IIs were deployed to West Germany, withGLCMs arriving in the United Kingdom at the same time. By December1985, all 108 Pershing IIs had been deployed in West Germany,whereas a total of 464 GLCMs had been stationed in the United King-dom, West Germany, Italy, and Belgium by March 1986.63 As theNetherlands had demurred on deployment, extra GLCMs were sta-tioned in West Germany.

The deployment of improved LRTNF was necessitated by the ERWdebate and was shaped by many of the same perceptions. The need tomaintain a European nuclear balance with the Soviet Union was central inthe decision to deploy LRTNF as well as maintain transatlantic solidarity.


However, differing sets of perceptions were at work during these years.During 1978–79, LRTNF deployment was seen as helping to maintainDetente in Europe, as a stable military balance would facilitate Europeanarms control and further the process of cooperation between East andWest. From December 1979, when the decision on deployment wasmade, this began to change. The emergence of a renewed Cold War sawLRTNF representing a more robust Western security policy vis-a-vis theUSSR. Although the European NATO allies certainly recognized this shiftin perceptions, it was most pronounced in the United States, the Alliance’smost powerful member and the nation that would produce and deploythese weapons to defend its allies.

US perceptions and the Soviet threat

From the American perspective, the overall Soviet military threat toEurope was central in the nuclear issue. Naturally, this played a key rolein determining the US response. Secretary Brown observed SovietLRTNF capabilities in his FY1980 report:

Judgements about the adequacy of our theater nuclear forces will beaffected strongly by the role given to them in deterring Sovietnuclear or conventional attacks. These judgements, in turn, areaffected by the counterpart capabilities of the Soviet Union. . . .mostof their peripheral attack forces appear to be oriented toward Wes-tern Europe. NATO, by contrast, has few theater nuclear systemsthat can reach these Soviet forces. Coverage of the Soviet peripheralattack forces would have to come primarily from the U.S. strategiccapabilities, as NATO recognized some time ago.64

From both a political and a military standpoint, the new LRTNF weaponsprovided a sound means to rectify a perceived imbalance of power in anarea crucial to American security. In his 1984 report, Weinberger noted,

By virtue of their high accuracy, both Pershing II and GLCM will pro-vide an effective capability to attack hard targets while limiting collateraldamage. In addition, each system has distinctive characteristics thatcomplement those of the other. Pershing II offers a high assurance ofpenetrating future Soviet defenses, [and] has the capability to striketime-urgent targets . . .GLCM’s longer range will allow it to attackdeeper targets and to be based farther rearward, thereby increasing itspre-launch survivability and offering an opportunity for broader parti-cipation among the allies by hosting U.S. deployments on their soil.65

The JCS cited the importance of LRTNF to both European and USsecurity. In his 1981 posture statement, General Jones emphasized the


necessity of deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM in support ofNATO:

Continued modernization and strengthening of Soviet theaternuclear and conventional forces have highlighted the need forNATO TNF modernization, particularly in longer-range systemswhere the greatest deficiency lies. Modernization is not designed tomatch the Warsaw Pact system-by-system, but to provide significantlong-range capability enhancing the range of possible responses toaggression. US theater nuclear systems . . . are intended to compli-ment allied capabilities in meeting the projected threat.66

The State Department, dealing with the likely diplomatic and politicalmoves to be made by the Soviet Union, saw the issue of LRTNF as beingripe for exploitation by Moscow. In an August 1979 report, the Depart-ment’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research noted that the Sovietswould try ‘‘to protect deployment programs of the new Soviet systems,especially the SS-20’’ while attempting ‘‘to seize the political/propagandahigh ground’’ on the LRTNF issue. Such moves would serve ‘‘to impedethe development of an added NATO long-range theater nuclear cap-ability.’’67

During the first two years of the Reagan Administration, the Bureaualso warned of Soviet efforts to take advantage of LRTNF negotiationsin Geneva. The Bureau warned in a November 1982 report of concretemilitary steps that could be taken by the USSR in addition to a variety ofnegotiating positions and propaganda efforts:

Moscow may also take certain military steps to gain leverage in INF talksand to increase Soviet military capabilities. Moscow could, for example,deploy SS-20s well beyond their current numbers. The Soviets might beable to deploy long-range . . .GLCMs by the mid 1980s.68

In examining American perceptions during this time, it is important tonote the differences in opinion between the Carter and Reagan adminis-trations as to their definitions of the military balance. The Carter Admin-istration viewed it as one of rough parity—‘‘essential equivalence,’’ to useits terminology. This meant that US and Allied military programs wereshaped to maintain this balance of power, and to prevent the Soviets fromgaining an undue advantage. The Reagan Administration, on the con-trary, saw an imbalance of military power, favoring the Soviet Union, ashaving emerged by 1981. The priority for the United States was thereforeto establish military superiority over the Soviet Union across the militaryspectrum to forestall Soviet expansionism.

One area where this became apparent was in INF negotiations.Whereas the Carter Administration saw negotiations on these forces as


being in line with the SALT process (in which an essential equivalencewould be maintained), Reagan and his advisers saw these efforts ascomplementing efforts to restore American superiority, by eliminatingSoviet advantages. The ‘‘Zero Option’’ would have fully eliminated theSoviet INF threat to Europe while merely halting US efforts on similarweapons. The ‘‘Walk in the Woods’’ would have had a similar effect. Bylimiting superpower INF missiles to 75 apiece, this would have placedthe burden of disarmament on the USSR. It would also have allowed theUnited States to show NATO that it had accomplished a major reductionin the Soviet threat, in return for minimal US INF deployment. Thedifferences in opinion existing between the two presidents were mir-rored by those existing between the United States and its Europeanallies.

Conclusion

The official US view during this time saw improvements to SovietLRTNF as creating multiple threats—military, political, and diplo-matic—for NATO. The deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs wasseen in a similar manner and underlines the essential nature of thisissue: that it was a matter of perception on many levels, with repercus-sions to be felt at each of them if this deployment was not undertaken.From a European perspective, the issue tended to swing between twoextremes: on the one hand, doubts about the US nuclear commitment toEurope, which had existed to some extent since the early 1960s; on theother, the view that the United States might be too eager to use theseforces in a European war to limit nuclear use to the Continent, awayfrom the United States itself.

These concerns arose first during the ERW episode. A weapon offeredby the United States to allay European concerns regarding the perceivedimbalance of theatre weapons vis-a-vis the Soviet Union became anobject of heated debate over whether it would serve as a deterrent or ausable weapon. These issues had not been resolved when the debateregarding LRTNF emerged, meaning that much of the same sort ofrhetoric was heard. Thus, the issue of what would best serve the AtlanticAlliance in terms of military security tended to become lost among aplethora of arguments.

Like the Americans with the strategic balance, the Europeans placedgreat emphasis on the perception of the balance of theatre forces regard-ing their role in NATO’s security.69 On this issue, the Europeans’ con-cerns tended to correlate with those of more hawkish Americans. Thesewere reinforced by European concerns that, due to what appeared to beSoviet LRTNF superiority, the American commitment was in jeopardy.This, in turn, led to yet another offer by the United States to providenew weapons to maintain the balance.


Yet it was not only differing views of the nature of such weapons thatled to friction between the United States and the European NATO allies.The international political climate also had a part to play. During thedebate over ERW and LRTNF deployment, Detente, although underserious pressure, persisted. From 1980, the emergence of the SecondCold War changed the nature of debates over many issues of the East–West balance. Whereas LRTNF had been seen as a means of preservingdeterrence within a framework of Detente, during the early 1980s, theycame to symbolize a new American assertiveness vis-a-vis the USSR,leading to European fears that manifested themselves in massive publicprotests. Many NATO governments, including those of the Netherlands(which ultimately did not deploy GLCM) and Belgium (which delayedconsiderably its decision to deploy) had to take these into account informulating policy.

These concerns led to the ‘‘Dual-Track’’ formula for deployment,linking it to progress in arms control in this area. However, theapproach taken by the Americans from 1981 through the ‘‘Zero Option’’meant that for numerous reasons (including Soviet intransigence),negotiations tended to fall by the wayside. The European NATO coun-tries were therefore faced with the need to make good on their promiseto deploy Pershing II and GLCM, as to delay or refuse would under-mine Allied credibility. With widespread public protest by 1983, how-ever, the political costs appeared significantly higher than had been thecase 4 years earlier.

The issue of the European nuclear balance is an example of how Alli-ance politics, and the perceptions on which they were based, came toshape decision-making. Here, not only did such factors as domesticpublic opinion and interagency views play a role, but also two often dif-fering views of the same situation, which had to be harmonized in orderfor a workable decision to be agreed to. This lay at the heart of theLRTNF debate and, as shall be seen, that over the conventional balanceas well.


5 Conventional forces1

At the same time that the USSR’s deployment of SS-20s began to drawattention to the military situation in Europe, the issue of the conven-tional forces balance—particularly in the area known to NATO as theCentral Region2—began to attract greater scrutiny in the West. Theshaping of this aspect of the balance went back nearly a decade andinvolved several important developments in defensive strategies, diplo-macy, and military posture.

First, and most important, was a decision made in December 1967regarding NATO’s defense strategy. Known as Military Committeedocument 14/3 (MC 14/3), this strategy saw NATO responding to mili-tary actions by the Warsaw Pact at the same level using the same means(at least initially.) Thus, small-scale actions (such as probing assaultsacross the inter-German border) would be met by similar-sized forces.3

This extended the doctrine of ‘‘Flexible Response’’ adapted by theUnited States during the Kennedy Administration to NATO as a whole.As the term ‘‘Flexible Response’’ indicates, NATO would meet WarsawPact aggression on the level at which it was initiated, only resorting toincreased levels of force (i.e., theatre and strategic nuclear weapons) asnecessitated by the military situation. This shift in strategy, which hadbeen debated by NATO for several years, was necessitated by the mas-sive buildup of Soviet strategic forces, vitiating the earlier Americanstrategy of ‘‘massive retaliation,’’ which saw NATO conventional forcesas a tripwire for the use of theatre and strategic weapons against theUSSR and the Warsaw Pact in the event of a European war.

As with any significant decision by an alliance such as NATO, MC 14/3had a strong political context, which would play an important role adecade later as efforts toward strengthening the Alliance’s conventionalforces began to be made. This strategy was complimentary to the con-current decision by the Alliance, made at the North Atlantic Council’smeeting in Brussels. Known popularly as the Harmel Report, this deci-sion, titled ‘‘The Future Tasks of the Alliance,’’ outlined two key goals.First, regarding defense, ‘‘the Alliance will maintain, as necessary, a sui-

table military capability to assure the balance of forces [between NATOand the Warsaw Pact], thereby creating a climate of stability, securityand confidence.’’4 This enabled NATO to carry out its second goal:

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, topursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship inwhich the underlying political issues can be solved. Military securityand a policy of detente are not contradictory but complimentary. It is thenecessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxationof tensions. (My italics)5

By embracing the realities of the military balance and adopting NATOstrategy to them, MC 14/3 thus provided the nucleus for NATO’s firstgoal, which of course made the second possible.

However, at the time that MC 14/3 and Harmel were issued, theability of the United States, the Atlantic Alliance’s most powerfulmember, to provide a strengthened conventional role was under severestrain. By 1968, the United States had deployed some 543,000 militarypersonnel in Southeast Asia, with an enormous logistical effort involvingits forces around the globe. As early as 1966, 15,000 US ‘‘specialist’’personnel had been withdrawn from Europe and deployed to Vietnam.6

In 1968, another 28,000 US troops—two-thirds of a mechanized divi-sion, an armored cavalry regiment and support personnel—were with-drawn from West Germany to the United States. Although theyremained committed to a role in the defense of NATO, the need forexperienced troops for deployment to Vietnam was one of the reasonsfor this action.7 This sapping of military resources, as well as seriousdisciplinary and morale problems and major reductions in funding forUS conventional forces in the aftermath of the war, meant that theAmerican contribution to NATO in this area could not be seen with thesame confidence as was the case a decade earlier.

The political situation had also stabilized. From 1967, and especially1969, East–West relations improved markedly. West German ChancellorWilly Brandt’s Ostpolitik helped pave the way for a settlement of manyoutstanding issues causing tensions in Europe. This coincided with theemerging US–Soviet Detente, which intersected with European Detentein such efforts as the Quadripartite Agreement over Berlin in 1971 andthe Helsinki Accords of 1975, the high point of these efforts in Europe.Major improvements in NATO’s conventional military capabilities weretherefore not of vital concern, as the political climate did not appear todemand such efforts.


Prelude to the LTDP, 1974–77

Beginning in 1974, however, a shift in perceptions began in the UnitedStates. With Vietnam now past, American policymakers began to lookanew at the military situation in Europe and at the composition of USforces there, with an eye to strengthen their capabilities. In 1974, Sena-tor Sam Nunn proposed an amendment to the defense authorization billcalling for a reduction of 18,000 US support troops in Europe. Thesecould, however, be replaced by combat troops, enhancing the fightingability of the forces stationed there. The Ford Administration gave itssupport to this measure.8 The need for such improvements was echoedby Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in his report to Congress in 1974:

To stress that we and our NATO allies have the ground and tacticalair forces to mount a stalwart defense against the ‘‘designated’’ (orexpected) Pact threat does not mean that we can view the situationin Europe with complacency. As I have indicated, NATO has some-what fewer forces than the Pact, and if more pessimistic assumptionsare made about several key variables (such as Pact mobilization anddeployment time, warning and allied responses), the NATO positionbegins to look more precarious and the nuclear threshold becomeslower. It is also the case that while a rough balance of forces isessential to deterrence, it by no means guarantees an acceptableoutcome for NATO if deterrence should fail. Even as we preservethe equilibrium, there remain a number of quantitative and qualita-tive weaknesses in our collective posture that must be removed.9

Thanks to the Nunn Amendment, the Ford Administration moved tostrengthen US forces deployed in NATO Europe. Two brigades and otherground combat elements were slated for deployment in 1975, and addi-tional Air Force units were also scheduled to be sent at the same time.10

As a result of these efforts, the 1970s witnessed a rebuilding of USconventional forces in Europe. What became clear, however, was that anAlliance-wide, long-term conventional buildup was needed in order toredress the imbalance of military power in the Central Region. A newAmerican Administration would take the lead in formulating such apolicy, so as to ensure that NATO would achieve the goals set out by MC14/3 nearly a decade earlier.

By January 1977, the United States had begun to improve its con-ventional military capabilities in the Central Region. In accordance withthe Nunn Amendment of 1974, some 13,909 combat personnel hadbeen deployed to Europe during FYs 1975 and 1976 in place of the18,000 support troops to be withdrawn.11 Another program that hadbeen initiated during the mid-1970s was known as Pre- Positioning OfMateriel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS). US Army formations

Conventional forces 111

based in the continental United States and earmarked for reinforcementto NATO Europe had sets of equipment deployed in Europe. Whenordered to deploy, these troops would be airlifted there to ‘‘marry up’’with their equipment, thus accelerating the reinforcement processconsiderably. Considerable planning and refinement of the POMCUSprogram was underway by 1977.12 However, increased airlift capabilitiesdid not receive the funding that POMCUS had, meaning that a shortfallin available air transport assets was emerging.13

The incoming Carter Administration began to focus its efforts towardstrengthening the Atlantic Alliance and US–West European cooperationoverall. In February 1977, the administration issued PRM 9, titled‘‘Comprehensive Review of European Issues.’’ Its aim was to ‘‘Examinebroad trends in US relations with Western Europe, the European Com-munity, and other major institutions . . . and the relative utility of avail-able frameworks in which the US and Western Europe deal with eachother.’’14 Not surprisingly, NATO received considerable attention:

The review should identify major issues confronting NATO, includ-ing steps the US might take to invigorate the Alliance politically.Taking into account the improvements in Warsaw Pact and NATOcapabilities . . . there should also be a general examination of NATO’sbasic military posture and overall force structure and current strategyand tactics, including the question of warning time of an unreinforcedsurprise attack. The review should consider: the issue of warningtime, questions of Allied defense investment, procurement proce-dures, standardization, and interoperability of weapons systems; andwhether a basic NATO review of important aspects of the Alliance’sstrategy and doctrine would be appropriate.15

The military situation in NATO’s Central Region came to occupy a sig-nificant place in PRM 10. A European Task Force on Comprehensive NetAssessment was established as part of the PRM 10 effort. Its authors weredirected in March 1977 to ‘‘describe in summary form projected trends inthe NATO/Warsaw Pact balance,’’ as well as ‘‘the impact of Soviet doctrineand objectives on the European military balance; likely trends in (andimplications for the military balance of) the force posture of individualWarsaw Pact states; and any internal factors in the Warsaw Pact that affectits military posture.’’16 This emphasis on Soviet doctrine was commonthroughout PRM 10, and here it reflected concerns about shifts in Sovietmilitary planning that could threaten the balance in Europe. As for NATO,the Task Force would ‘‘Examine trends in defense relations among theNATO Allies.’’ This would include joint planning, standardization ofweaponry and equipment, greater defense cooperation among the Eur-opean NATO states, and ‘‘the political and military requirements for majorUS force deployments in the European theater over the long- term.’’17


By May 1977, the Task Force had completed a summary of Europeanissues, including the military balance. Its discussion of trends in this areawas rather bleak. Overall, the balance was termed ‘‘adverse,’’ due to‘‘improvements in Pact forces over the last decade . . .The Pact would . . .havea significant initial advantage in an unreinforced Soviet initiated attack.’’18 Italso noted the importance of Soviet doctrine in shaping the conduct of aEuropean war and the existing force posture of the Warsaw Pact:

Soviet strategy for war in Europe places a premium on force super-iority at the outset, on neutralizing NATO airpower and on securingkey objectives within two to three weeks—thereby hoping to disruptor prevent NATO reinforcement. The Pact’s greatest advantage liesin a short, non-nuclear war. (Underlining in original)19

The summary gave mixed reviews to NATO. ‘‘NATO has made sig-nificant, though limited, advances in a number of areas: standardization,interoperability of weapons systems, and joint planning.’’ However,‘‘Because of economic factors, European NATO members have not sig-nificantly increased their defense budgets, and some reductions in effec-tiveness are likely, particularly in British, Italian and Belgian forces.’’20

The technological balance was also emphasized. ‘‘NATO possesses anadvantage, if a diminishing one, over the Warsaw Pact in general tech-nology and in the ability to apply it; the latter remains the key Sovietweakness . . .Despite NATO’s advantage, a significant advance by either sidecould affect the military balance’’ (My italics; underlining in original).21

Many of these concerns found their way into the final draft of PRM 10,issued in June 1977. ‘‘The Pact’s large, modern ground forces in EasternEurope and the Western USSR pose the major threat to NATO.’’ It wenton to note: ‘‘The major imbalances from NATO’s perspective are thePact’s potential for quickly building up its combat forces in East Europeand NATO’s low inventory of combat consumables . . .The assessmentconcludes that the chance of NATO stopping an attack with minimal lossof territory and then achieving its full objective of recovering that landwhich had been lost appears remote at the present time.’’22

The efforts to rebuild US conventional strength in Europe had, by1977, become central to American defense planning. Beginning with theNunn Amendment of 1974, a gradual increase in US troop strength hadbeen underway, with an emphasis on the deployment of combat forma-tions and the stationing of equipment for US reinforcements in Europe.PRM 10 addressed the key issues of the military balance in the CentralRegion, and thus provided a framework for the efforts that would takeplace during the Carter years. These efforts would come to form thebasis of NATO defense policy into the next decade.


The three percent decision and the LTDP

By May 1977, the Carter Administration had made considerable pro-gress in formulating its NATO policy. Although PRM 10 was still amonth away, existing studies helped shape efforts. In November 1976,the RAND Corporation had completed a study called Alliance Defensein the Eighties (AD-80), which included many ideas that would shape USpolicy. Among these were the increasing Soviet emphasis on rapid,combined-arms assaults by conventional forces. The amount of warningtime for a Warsaw Pact attack, which had been assumed by NATO to beconsiderable, was seen as being significantly reduced by AD-80. Mostimportant was the fact that its principal author, Robert W. Komer, whobecame the Defense Department’s Special Adviser on NATO Affairs, hadbeen part of Jimmy Carter’s Presidential election campaign, preparingbackground papers on these issues.23 The importance of AD-80 for theCarter Administration’s planning was its emphasis on both long-term,Alliance-wide efforts at defense improvements and the need for high-level cooperation in order for this to be achieved.24 During the firstmonths of the Carter Administration, informal discussions betweenAmerican and European officials brought tacit support for new Amer-ican initiatives regarding conventional force improvements.

At the London Summit, held between May 10 and 11, 1977, Carterpublicly introduced the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) to hisfellow Allied leaders. The LTDP, in the President’s words, would be‘‘a long-term program to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence anddefense in the 1980s,’’25 implicitly linking it to the goals of the HarmelReport nearly a decade before. Whereas US involvement in Vietnamhad diverted attention from NATO at that time, it now appeared thatthe central focus of American strategic planning would be on Europe

Carter’s fellow heads of state received the LTDP most favorably, giving ittheir blessing and instructing their defense ministers to make plans inorder for the program to be ready by the time of the May 1978 NATOsummit.26 Like the Americans, the European NATO members had becomeincreasingly alarmed by the improvements in Warsaw Pact conventionalforces in Eastern Europe. In December 1976, NATO’s Defense PlanningCommittee (DPC) cited the danger of a low-warning attack by the WarsawPact, while citing improvements in NATO forces. These included therestructuring of US and West German forces for greater combat cap-ability.27 The need for efforts to be coordinated by all members of theAlliance was clearly recognized and appreciated by its leaders in 1977.

Meeting a week later in Brussels, the DPC set to work establishing aformal framework for the LTDP. The Committee established a planningguidance for the years 1979–84, which would address such issues asdefense cooperation, planning, and improvements in weapons acquisi-tion and mobilization.28 In the short term, the DPC declared its


immediate effort would focus on ‘‘a program of short-term measures inareas of anti-armor, war reserve munitions, and readiness and reinfor-cement,’’ while simultaneously it would ‘‘prepare a time-phased defenseaction program concentrating on a limited number of areas where col-lective action is urgently required.’’29

The first, and most public, order of business for NATO with regardsto the LTDP was to decide on common levels of increases in defensespending. The DPC had agreed to an increase of three percent per yearto maintain a sustainable growth in expenditures.30 This would alsoallow NATO to match Soviet defense expenditure increases on a per-centage basis, which would be only slightly higher at 5 percent perannum.31 It marked an area of vital importance for improvement byNATO. During the 1970s, most European NATO members had beenforced to reduce spending, thanks to the recession of 1973–75 and theneed to maintain the highly developed social welfare systems that hadbecome the centerpiece of public policy. The United States had only justbegun to move toward increasing defense expenditures, and the fruits ofthese efforts would take several years to reap. The DPC was nonethelessflexible in its implementation of this agreed level, noting that ‘‘someindividual countries’ economic circumstances will affect what can beachieved.’’32

Over the following year, the DPC formulated a coherent plan ofaction for the Alliance based on the LTDP. Ten so-called ‘‘Action Areas’’were identified: air defense; command, control, and communications;electronic warfare; logistics; maritime posture; rationalization; readiness;reinforcement; reserve mobilization; and theatre nuclear moderniza-tion.33 At the DPC’s meeting in Brussels in May 1978, the ministersreaffirmed the three percent decision and went on to declare

. . . that the Long-Term Defence Programme was designed in parti-cular to meet the need for a more comprehensive framework forNATO’s defence planning, incorporating a longer-term approach,and thus enabling the collective needs of the Alliance to be takenmore into account in the development of national plans.34

Eleven days later, at the North Atlantic Council summit in Washington,DC, the leaders of the NATO countries participating in the LTDP for-mally approved it and declared that it necessitated ‘‘vigorous follow-through action to be taken by national authorities and at NATO andinternational military headquarters,’’ and that ‘‘In taking these decisions,these Allied leaders concluded that, in the absence of equitable armscontrol and disarmament agreements, a satisfactory balance in strategic,theatre nuclear and conventional terms could only be assured by greaterefforts to modernize and strengthen the military capacity of the Alli-ance.’’35


Despite these resolute statements, problems soon arose as to how theLTDP’s goals would be achieved. First and foremost, the LTDP left theactual implementation of its ‘‘Action Areas’’ to the states taking part init.36 Because of the LTDP’s importance, the United States was able tokeep it outside of the regular NATO force planning structure.37 Mosttroublesome for LTDP implementation was that updating the LTDP interms of introducing new recommendations to meet deficiencies wasnearly impossible. National governments reported progress in NATODefense Planning Questionnaires, rather than—as Robert Komer hadhoped—through an annual LTDP review.38 John Duffield has identifiedtwo areas where the LTDP came up short. First, it failed to make sub-stantial increases in the size of NATO’s conventional forces in the Cen-tral Region. Rather than the six division equivalents called for by theUnited States, the allies only planned for six reserve brigades to beformed, and then only by the late 1980s. Second, the LTDP was meantto encompass all of NATO in terms of planning, and that meant thattopics like the air defense of Britain and Portugal came into its purview.From the nine ‘‘Action Areas’’ for conventional forces outlined in 1977,these had grown to over 150 by 1981.39 The original goal of increasingNATO’s strength in the area of primary confrontation with the WarsawPact, the Central Region, was thus significantly undermined by thisapproach.

The diffusion of actual implementation to participating countries hada negative impact on meeting the goal of 3 percent defense spendingincreases. Often, creative national bookkeeping was carried out in orderto create the illusion of a continual 3 percent increase. Perhaps the mostextreme was Great Britain. Its 1979–80 defense budget was underspent, as it was an increase of 2.99 percent over that for the previousyear. For 1981–82, Britain announced a 5 percent increase for one year,followed by zero growth for the next.40 The oil price rises of 1979helped trigger a recession that lasted until 1983, again reducing fundsavailable for defense among European NATO members. According tothe Pentagon, real defense spending among the Allies increased by 2percent in 1978, 2.5 percent in 1979, and 1.9 percent in 1980.41

Events in the Persian Gulf also helped dissipate the efforts to improveNATO’s defenses in the Central Region. The Soviet invasion of Afgha-nistan led the United States to establish the Rapid Deployment Force(RDF) for possible military intervention. Substantial US airlift and sealiftassets would go to support the RDF, while both the US Army and AirForce would have to divert forces away from Europe toward the PersianGulf. This was noted in the Pentagon’s 1981 annual report: ‘‘Althoughour Rapid Deployment Forces comprise far fewer forces than thosewhich would be deployed to a NATO war, non-NATO contingenciesmay place more stringent demands on our mobility forces.’’42 With atbest minimal increases in European NATO forces during this time, this


reduction of US capabilities meant the situation in the Central Regionremained detrimental.

From 1981, a new administration and national security team would bemaking policy in Washington. The Reagan Administration was deter-mined to rebuild US military strength across the board, and it continuedlarge-scale improvements to NATO-assigned forces. However, it wouldalso face many of the problems its predecessor had in attempting toachieve a robust, Alliance-wide improvement in conventional capabilitiesin the Central Region. Before these efforts are examined, an analysis ofthe actual military balance during the period is necessary to maintain aproper perspective of developments.

The balance in the Central Region

In 1979, NATO forces deployed in the Central Region were organizedinto 26½ divisions, fielding 6,180 main battle tanks and supported by1,637 combat aircraft. Facing them were 58 Warsaw Pact divisionsequipped with 19,000 main battle tanks and 2,800 combat aircraft.43 Notsurprisingly, these figures tended to have a major impact on publicviews of the balance in the West. However, the real issues—those to beaddressed by the LTDP—were less well understood.

The state of Warsaw Pact forces, as a whole, has been the subject ofnumerous studies and analyses, both at the time and since, and their dis-advantages are well known: recalcitrant East European forces (particularlythe Czech and Polish forces); disparities in equipment between Soviet andEast European contingents; the low readiness of many Warsaw Pact divi-sions; and the often serious difficulties experienced during attempts tomobilize reservists to bring these formations to full strength.44 By the late1970s, however, a shift in Soviet planning, which of course was adoptedby the Pact as its overall strategy, was seen with increasing alarm in theWest. Whereas Soviet doctrine had always emphasized the importance ofthe offensive, the 1970s saw the USSR increasingly shift emphasis tomaintaining large, highly capable forces in Eastern Europe that would beprepared, in relatively little time, to initiate rapid offensive actions againstNATO. Writing in 1981, David Isby, a well-respected defense analyst,described just how these tactics would shape Soviet operations:

Only the offensive will yield victory, and speed, shock and manoeuvreis the decisive component of the offensive. On the nuclear battlefield itmay be the best defense against nuclear targeting. The Soviets insiston maintaining the momentum of the offensive. Even if nuclearweapons are not used to defeat the enemy, surprise, suppressive fire,bypassing or outflanking resistance and a greater emphasis on ‘‘daringthrusts’’ will contribute to the speed, shock and manoeuvre . . .


. . . Surprise is seen as a key ‘‘force multiplier,’’ making the Sovietforces much more effective than they would otherwise be. The Sovietswould apparently be willing to forgo some of their numerical super-iority and logistical preparation to ensure that lengthy mobilisation didnot alert the enemy. (My italics)45

Official publications echoed these concerns. In his military posturestatement for FY 1978, JCS Chairman General Brown described Sovietdoctrine—introduced in 1970—as one

which calls for a blitzkrieg type of offensive using massed armorattacks across a wide front. This doctrine calls for the seizure of deepobjectives within a few days or weeks at most. The Warsaw Pactcurrent force structure capabilities and logistic base reflect thisthinking. In view of this Warsaw Pact capability and the new doc-trine, it is clear that the West must . . . be prepared to repel an attackwith little or no warning.46

These publicly stated views were reinforced by classified documents onthis subject. A CIA report issued in January 1979 mirrors the descrip-tion of Soviet operations described by Isby and General Brown:

Soviet military strategy calls for a massive and rapid ground offen-sive into NATO territory in Central Europe to defeat NATO forces,disrupt mobilization, and seize or destroy ports and airfields to pre-vent reinforcement. Because this strategy envisions a highly fluidbattlefield and high rates of advance, Pact planners hope to overrun,penetrate, or bypass NATO forward defenses rapidly to prevent the WesternAlliance from strengthening its defenses and using the time gained formobilization and reinforcement.

To achieve the force ratios deemed necessary to accomplish itsobjectives, the Pact has evolved mobilization and attack concepts thatare intended to maximize initial combat power, on the assumptionthat a war in Europe would be short, and therefore decided largelyby forces in being or quickly available. (My italics)47

The issue of warning time was becoming important in planning forNATO’s Central Region defense. Overall, this was not thought to be ageneral cause for alarm. In an April 1978 report, the CIA estimated thatthe most effective form of surprise attack—a standing-start attack utiliz-ing some 15 divisions—could be prepared for in under 24 hours. Still,even if such an action was taken under the aegis of an exercise, it wouldhave difficulty remaining undetected. ‘‘The forward movement of anattack force of some 15 divisions,’’ the CIA report noted, ‘‘would provide


many additional indicators to NATO intelligence which routinely moni-tors military activity in East Germany. This massive movement would bedifficult, if not impossible, to mask as an exercise for long.’’48

The more likely options for attack, according to the authors, would involvebetween two and four fronts.49 A two-front attack ‘‘would require about fourdays to prepare for,’’ meaning that ‘‘US and NATO decision-makers wouldalmost certainly have three days or more of warning.’’50 Anything largerwould be exceedingly difficult to conceal. A three-front attack, probablythe smallest the Warsaw Pact could mount with any chance for strategicsuccess, would have required the mobilization of ‘‘some 600,000men, brought some 30 understrength or cadre divisions to full strength,moved . . . 56 divisions to . . . combat positions, prepared them for combat,set up wartime command and control networks, and established logisticslines of communications.’’51

Where the authors did express concern was over the ability of the Pactto carry out a gradual buildup for war.

Although a gradual implementation would provide us more opportu-nities to detect some of the preparations and more time to validate ourinformation, the early preparations would probably be ambiguous andmight be difficult to distinguish from routine force improvements orexercises. Such incremental preparations would provide the Sovietsopportunities for concealment and deception, but the effectiveness ofsuch measures would decrease in proportion to their scale.52

It is important to understand what forces existed to carry out suchoperations, and their capabilities. By far the most powerful Warsaw Pactforces deployed in the Central Region were those of the USSR. By 1977,the Soviets deployed some 500,000 men in this area.53 A total of 27Soviet divisions were stationed in the Central Region, including 2 inPoland and 5 in Czechoslovakia. By far the most effective concentrationof Red Army forces was the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG),which totaled 20 combat divisions (10 tank and 10 motor rifle) organizedinto five armies (three tank and two combined arms.)54 The 16th AirArmy, with 900 combat aircraft, provided air support for the GSFG.55

By 1980, the GSFG numbered 380,000 men, 7,000 tanks, 3,000 infantryfighting vehicles, and 300 helicopters, with the 34th Guards ArtilleryDivision, three times larger than an ordinary unit of its type, providingfire support.56

Much of this increase in the GSFG’s capability was a phenomenon ofthe 1970s, part of the Soviet Union’s overall increase in its militarypower. According to John Erickson, between 1972 and 1977, the GSFGwas estimated to have expanded from 250,000 men to more than370,000.57 Moreover, all Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe were main-tained at Category 1 readiness levels, in other words at full strength in


men and equipment. New equipment, like T-64 and T-72 tanks, Mi-24helicopters, MiG-23/27 fighter-bombers, and Sukhoi Su-24 strike aircraftadded considerably to their combat potential. Furthermore, self-propelled artillery systems, akin to that used by NATO, replaced muchof the Red Army’s older, towed artillery pieces during this time. Logisticscapabilities, particularly engineer units, were also vastly improved.58

All of these improvements to Soviet forces appeared to bear outdefense analyst Sherwood Cordier’s view that ‘‘It is obvious that Russianforces and weapons are tailored to wage an offensive, mechanized andlightning war.’’59

Although, on the whole, the East European forces of the Pact were notas well equipped or combat ready as their Soviet counterparts, they didcome to play an important role in Soviet operational planning. During1977 and 1978, the East German Defense Ministry began to issue planssimilar to those of the Soviets and integrated them into overall planning.The General Officers’ Training Course, for example, included a themecalled ‘‘Preparation and Conduct of Offensive Operations Along theFront With and Without Nuclear Weapons.’’60

Nor did this emphasis remain limited to military staff texts. In 1980, amajor Warsaw Pact exercise, ‘‘Comrades-in-Arms-80,’’ was held in EastGermany. This exercise stressed a major offensive against NATO forces,and, in its initial stage, termed ‘‘Conduct of operations at the outset of awar,’’ Warsaw Pact forces utilized numerical superiority to breakthrough NATO defenses, followed by reserves and with diversionaryairborne and amphibious assaults behind NATO lines.61

In examining these developments in Warsaw Pact forces, NATOplanners had to examine their own forces’ strengths and weaknesses.Although NATO forces enjoyed high levels of technical competence interms of training and fielded, on the whole, better equipment, therewere some serious deficiencies in NATO’s defense planning. Three keyareas stand out among these difficulties. First, the lack of standardizationamong NATO forces caused considerable logistical problems. BecauseNATO’s defense efforts (although coordinated at the ministerial leveland through the various levels of NATO military commands) allowedprocurement of weaponry and equipment to occur at the national level,in many areas there was a lack of commonality. Belgium, for example,used US, French, and West German arms, in addition to its nationallyproduced weapons. Even some of the equipment used by two or moreallies tended to be lagging behind the latest models being introduced atthe time. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the West GermanLeopard 1 main battle tank was replaced in production and in front-lineWest German service by the Leopard 2. However, the Belgian, Cana-dian, and Dutch armies operated the earlier variant of the Leopardthroughout the 1980s. Ammunition was also a problem. Most NATOtroops were issued with automatic rifles calibrated to fire 7.62-mm


rounds. However, the US M-16 fired a 5.56-mm round. Such differ-ences existed across the military spectrum in NATO. It was no accidentthat among the ‘‘Action Areas’’ of the LTDP, Rationalization, Standardi-zation, and Interoperability (RSI) was included prominently.

A second problem had to do with geography. NATO forces deployedin West Germany were organized into two army groups: NorthernArmy Group (NORTHAG) covered West Germany from the Danishborder in Schleswig-Holstein to the area just south of Bonn, whereasCentral Army Group (CENTAG) was responsible for defending fromthis area to the Austrian border. The NORTHAG area of responsibilitywas narrower and offered less defense-in-depth than that of CENTAG.However, given NATO’s emphasis on forward defense (as close to theInter-German Border as possible), in order to limit damage and casual-ties in West Germany, there was a need for a strong reserve inNORTHAG to support the forward-deployed forces. In practice, how-ever, this was not the case. This led to the issue of maldeployment.NORTHAG was composed, north to south, of four corps: I Netherlands,I West German, I British, and I Belgian.62 CENTAG was made up, fromnorth to south, of four corps as well: III West German, V U.S., VII U.S.,and II West German. Behind these formations, the I and II FrenchCorps, although not under NATO military control, were stationed andwere considered part of a defending force in the event of war.63 ACanadian brigade group and a West German parachute division werealso deployed.64

Although the forces assigned to NORTHAG and CENTAG appearedto be roughly equal in strength, in actuality their deployment exposedserious discrepancies. I Netherlands Corps, for example, deployed justone armored brigade, a reconnaissance battalion and supporting ele-ments in West Germany. The remaining forces would be deployed for-ward as reinforcements. It would have taken the Dutch Government 96hours between an order for deployment and the time these troopsreached their assigned positions.65 Similarly, in 1977, a brigade fromeach of the two divisions of I Belgian Corps was withdrawn from WestGermany.66 Given that the equipment of the Dutch and Belgian forceswas not at the same level as that of the British and West German forcesin NORTHAG, these undermanned formations would have had a toughtime holding against a full-scale Warsaw Pact assault, meaning that theleft and right flanks of NORTHAG would have been seriously jeo-pardized.

The two West German and two US corps that composed CENTAGconstituted a strong armored and mechanized force, backed up by thepowerful French corps. Certainly, Warsaw Pact forces would have foundthese formations a tough nut to crack. However, if the forces inNORTHAG were overrun, Warsaw Pact armies, spearheaded by theGSFG, would have been able to roll forward into the Netherlands and


Belgium with little difficulty, and perhaps—as the Germans had in 1914and 1940—swung south into France itself. Needless to say, the defeat ofNORTHAG forces would have been catastrophic in a conventional warin the Central Region and would have necessitated a nuclear decision,with all its attendant risks, much sooner than NATO would have pre-ferred to have been the case.

The issue of force deployment was certainly serious. Yet it was notaddressed in the LTDP, and little was done to rectify it. Among thereasons for this was the enormous cost involved in shifting the morepowerful US and West German CENTAG forces into a position to sup-port NORTHAG. According to the Pentagon’s annual report for FY1979, the costs of shifting a single battalion toward a more forwardposition near the Inter-German Border would have cost at least $30million.67 The United States, however, did attempt to rectify this situa-tion, deploying a brigade to Garlstedt (in the NORTHAG area) during1978.68 Another reason for maldeployment in the Central Region wasthat the stationing of NATO contingents reflected the axis of advance ofthe Allied armies during World War II. This deployment had becomecemented over more than 30 years, and a shift, however desirable,would have had to contend with deep-seated institutional views of thisarrangement.69

The third key problem facing NATO with regard to the CentralRegion was mobilization. Although the Warsaw Pact had made efforts toreduce the amount of warning time given to NATO in the event ofmajor war, the need for large-scale mobilization of reserves and theirdeployment opposite NATO in the Central Region was still necessary toassure success. Because the Warsaw Pact would have the advantage ofchoosing when and where it would launch its offensive, it would havethe advantage of a lead time over NATO mobilization. On the dayNATO would have begun mobilization, it would have had 390,700 menavailable, while the Warsaw Pact deployed 560,400. Just a week later,this balance would be 399,700 for NATO and 660,300 for the WarsawPact. It would have taken NATO 35 days to mobilize 640,000 men, whilethe Warsaw Pact would have mobilized 930,400 men a week before theNATO total.70 Taking into account casualties as a result of combat attri-tion, these totals would of course be reduced. Still, with such a lead intime and numbers, the Warsaw Pact would most certainly enjoy a sig-nificant numerical advantage, which would complicate matters forNATO. Furthermore, US, British, and Canadian reinforcements wouldhave had to deploy from their home countries, and would thus have hadto come considerable distances by sea and air to reach the fighting.

These issues were not well addressed by the LTDP. The mainimprovements in NATO’s defense posture came from actions taken bythe United States and West Germany. US forces in Europe wereincreased by 35,000 during 1977–78.71 Three divisional equipment sets


were planned under POMCUS for the FY 1980–82 time frame.72 Majorefforts were made to improve reinforcement capabilities. The RapidReinforcement Program, initiated in 1980, sought to deploy 200,000–300,000 US troops to Europe in two weeks, with some 1,900 combataircraft to be sent there in just one week.73 Defense Secretary Browndeclared that this would amount to ‘‘a total of US ground firepowergreater than is in the entire [West] German Army and twice the numberof air squadrons that are in the [West German] Luftwaffe.’’74 Theseplans would see the US ground combat contingent in the CentralRegion doubled to 10 divisions in less than two weeks, with the numberof Air Force tactical fighter squadrons concurrently growing from 28 to80.75 For their part, the West Germans had begun, in 1975, to createthree armored brigades, raising the total from 33 to 36. Six all-arms,heavily mechanized Home Defense brigades were also to be formed.76

There were some notable successes at the NATO level. The PeriodicArmaments Planning System, developed by NATO’s Conference ofNational Armament Directors, and NATO Armaments Planning Review,represented an effort at improving RSI.77 A major step in this directionwas the NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979, which became law in theUnited States in August 1980. This helped reduce export controls onthe sale of US military equipment to the European NATO allies.78

Among the successes in member cooperation was the decision by fourNATO countries, including Belgium and the Netherlands, to purchasethe F-16, which would become the standard US Air Force fighter-bomber in the 1980s.

On the whole, the LTDP’s results were mixed. It did lead to someimprovements in NATO’s conventional force capabilities and served tofocus the Alliance as a whole on the efforts to enhance military pre-paredness. However, it suffered from two key flaws. First, as mentionedearlier, the ‘‘Action Areas’’ covered grew to such an extent that it lostfocus on what it was originally intended to do: namely, improve thecombat capabilities of NATO’s Central Region forces. Second, and evenmore important, the implementation of goals was left to the memberstates themselves and not regulated by LTDP planners. This meant thatissues that would have been politically unpopular, particularly forcedeployment, could be ignored, while the actual levels of defense spendingwere often at variance with the spirit of the 3 percent goal set out in 1977.

In the end, such improvements in conventional forces as were madewere carried out by national governments—particularly the United Statesand West Germany—acting on their own. These were, however, curtailedby a lack of action on the part of other NATO members who were unableor unwilling to increase their share of the burden. By 1981, most of thedifficulties that beset NATO’s Central Region posture in 1977 remained.


Continued efforts, similar results, 1981–85

The Reagan Administration took office on a pledge to restore the cred-ibility of the United States’ apparently weakened military posture. A keyarea where this would occur was Europe, central to American geopoli-tical interests and the focus of the United States’ most important alliance.NSDD 32, issued in April 1982, stated clearly US policy toward NATO:

. . . our primary objective is to strengthen NATO’s capability to deteror defeat a Soviet attack. In wartime, the U.S. will support NATOstrategy which requires forward defense with conventional forcessupported by the possibility of nuclear escalation. In peacetime, U.S.objectives are to enhance deterrence through major improvementsin NATO’s conventional capabilities . . . and to obtain increased Allieddefense contributions in Europe.79

Surprisingly, the area where the forces of the two superpowers and theirmost important alliances directly confronted one another—Europe’sCentral Region—would receive relatively less emphasis during theReagan Administration’s first term than from its predecessor. The LTDPgenerally withered away, with its last program report issued in 1983.NATO’s established defense organizations had already assumed most ofthe duties of the LTDP group, which made these efforts more generalwithin the Alliance’s defense planning.80

As in the 1970s, ensuring continued increases in European NATOdefense expenditures continued to face difficulties. At the May 1981 DPCmeeting in Brussels, the ministers declared that ‘‘notwithstanding eco-nomic and financial constraints the standing Allied commitment to the 3percent formula guidance has been confirmed.’’81 This was reiterated bythe DPC in its Brussels meeting the following May.82 In reality, from 1982most of the European NATO members were unable to meet this goal andlagged far behind the United States in this area.83 In 1982, US GeneralBernard Rogers, SACEUR, stated that the European NATO countrieswould need to increase spending by 4 percent per year in order to achievemeaningful force improvements.84 However, with Trans-Atlantic relationsstrained by LRTNF, and with the need to maintain Alliance cohesion onthis issue, the Reagan Administration demurred from placing heavy pres-sure on the European allies to meet such increases.85

A key reason for a lack of major European NATO spending increaseswas the economic recession of 1979. As mentioned earlier, the EuropeanNATO countries were forced to safeguard their elaborate social welfaresystems, meaning that defense spending took a back seat in terms ofnational priorities. According to a NATO study published in 1984, USdefense spending increased, on average, by 6.2 percent between 1979and 1983, meaning that defense spending equalled 6.9 percent of gross


domestic product (GDP). The average for NATO as a whole was just 5.5percent.86 It is important to note that these were the years during whichthe LTDP experienced its high-water mark (1979–81), and before thetruly vast spending increases of the Reagan Administration were fully felt.

The Reagan Administration was forced to address these issues begin-ning in 1982, just as its predecessor had done. Congress examined thedisparities in US and European NATO defense spending, and, given thebuildup of other aspects of US military power—strategic, naval andpower projection forces—began to put pressure on the Europeans to‘‘do more of their fair share.’’ Among the measures Congress passed wasa ceiling on 316,000 US military personnel deployed in Europe in 1982(This was raised to 326,000 two years later, with a sub-limit of 90,000 forthe Air Force.)87 This was in response to an amendment introduced bySenator Sam Nunn, who had helped increase US combat strength inEurope in 1974. It called for a reduction of 90,000 US personnel fromEurope over three years, unless the European NATO membersachieved the 3 percent goal promised in the LTDP.88

Another issue that forced the Reagan Administration to act was thedebate over no first use of nuclear weapons. Although NATO did notabandon its strategy of nuclear deterrence, this debate, combined withthe growth of significant anti-nuclear movements in Europe during thistime, meant that a stronger conventional defense was desirable.89

Accordingly, efforts toward this objective were made beginning in 1984.A Pentagon report to Congress issued that year stressed the need for anew long-term plan for NATO to improve its conventional military pos-ture. This led, in May 1985, to the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI).However, as East–West tensions began to decline, the impetus for theCDI was lessened. Accordingly, its achievements were generally modest.90

On the whole, the Alliance was able to improve its conventional mili-tary capabilities during the early 1980s. New tanks, artillery pieces,helicopters and combat aircraft were deployed, adding to combat effec-tiveness among the various forces. At the same time, actual Alliance-wideefforts remained limited.91 As in the Carter years, efforts by individualstates were more important than those made by NATO in concert. Thus,many of the same problems that had existed before—the varying qualityof national contingents and proper deployment to match the geographyof the Central Region—remained during the 1980s.

Perhaps the most successful national effort was made by the UnitedStates. By 1985, US ground forces were receiving considerable quan-tities of new equipment like the M-1 Abrams main battle tank, Bradleyinfantry fighting vehicle, AH-64 attack and UH-60 transport helicopters,which improved their capabilities significantly. The US Air Force receivedadditional F-15 fighters and large numbers of F-16 fighter-bombers andA-10 ground-attack aircraft. New anti-tank and surface-to-air missileswere also deployed with US forces. The POMCUS program also con-


tinued, with additional sets deployed in the Netherlands and Belgium byFY 1985. This brought the total number of available divisional equip-ment sets prepositioned in NATO Europe to six, enough to guaranteedeployment of a 10-division US ground force.92

In two other ways, US conventional forces underwent majorimprovements during this time. The quality of personnel in the USmilitary improved markedly in the 1980s over where it had been in theprevious decade. At least as important was the shift in US conventionalmilitary strategy that began to take shape during this time. Beginning in1976, the US Army initiated and refined a doctrine known as Air-LandBattle. Officially known as Field Manual (FM) 100–5: Operations ofArmy Forces in the Field, it was shaped by both the US military experi-ence in Vietnam and the combined arms fighting of the 1973 Arab–Israeli War. As a study by the US Army’s Command and General StaffCollege at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas pointed out in 1988, the manualcalled for US Army forces ‘‘to prepare to fight outnumbered and win andto win the first battle;’’ while reiterating that ‘‘the tank was ‘the decisiveweapon’ of ground combat . . . it could not survive on ‘the modern battle-field’ except as part of a ‘combined arms team’ that included all the otherbranches of the Army and tactical air forces.’’93 This strategy was aimed atdefeating a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany, and doing so as closeto the Inter-German Border as possible. As Major Paul H. Herbert,author of the Leavenworth study, wrote,

Its features included deploying all forces forward without retainingreserves; fighting aggressively in a ‘‘covering force area’’ forward ofthe main defensive area to force the enemy to commit his mainattack echelons; detecting the enemy’s main attack; and reinforcingagainst it by moving . . . from other sectors of the battlefield wherethe defender would accept a certain degree of risk. Fighting toretain ground was a special case in the active defense, which focusedon fighting the attacker’s forces wherever they went on a fluid bat-tlefield. By trading some space for enemy combat power and . . .reinforcing against the enemy’s main attack, the defender hoped toachieve a favorable combat ratio at the point of decision.94

Air-Land Battle thus helped to determine what weapons the US Armywould deploy in Europe. The new strategy also began to be dis-seminated among the European NATO allies, whose forces would haveof course operated with the Americans in the event of war.95 It alsosatisfied the goal of ‘‘Forward Defense’’ of West Germany, keeping theinvading Warsaw Pact forces as far to the east as possible, and perhapseven reversing them, without an immediate recourse to nuclear weap-ons.


Conclusion

On the whole, the conventional combat capabilities of NATO’s CentralRegion forces improved between 1978 and 1985. Overall, though, theseimprovements fell short of what had been intended by the LTDP.According to historian John Duffield, NATO’s ground forces capabilitiesincreased by 19 percent by 1984, while the estimated Warsaw Pactimprovements were 18 percent for the same time frame.96

Three key reasons exist for NATO’s inability to make Alliance-wideconventional force improvements during this period. First, as has beennoted, the economic situation reduced defense outlays.

A second issue was LRTNF deployment. European NATO govern-ments expended considerable political capital in order for these weap-ons to be deployed on their soil. A major increase in conventional forces,along lines set by the Americans, could have had a very negative impactamong the public in such countries as Belgium and the Netherlands.Despite the efforts made during the 1980s, and the emphasis in USpolicy on conventional force improvements by the NATO allies, thisobjective was simply too politically detrimental for the Americans topursue.

Third, the LTDP and the efforts of the Reagan Administration hadtheir roots in the Harmel Doctrine and MC 14/3 back in 1967. This hadenshrined the concept of ‘‘Flexible Response’’ in NATO military plan-ning. Thus, greater conventional forces were needed. However, this alsopreserved the link to theatre and strategic nuclear forces in this struc-ture. MC 14/3 had, at heart, been a compromise between the Americans’view of the feasibility of a conventional NATO defense, and the Eur-opean members’ view that the nuclear link had to be maintained.97 Forthe United States, the establishment of strategic parity with the SovietUnion meant that, in the Central Region, it would be wise to establish afavorable conventional balance. The Europeans, however, saw the pre-paration for major conventional war, and the possible avoidance ofusing nuclear weapons, as an indication of partial decoupling by theUnited States.

As for the development of the LTDP, it was plagued by a vast expan-sion of priorities. What began as an effort to enhance NATO’s conven-tional force posture in the Central Region thus became a catch-allenterprise, motivated by national political factors and constituencies,that saw a major diffusion of effort toward other areas of NATO Europe.While some of these issues were deserving of attention, it would prob-ably have been wiser to address them outside of the LTDP. These pro-blems continued into the 1980s. Even in the areas where the LTDP didaddress the Central Region, many important issues were not addressed.Most notably, that of maldeployment of forces, which could have had


fatal consequences for the Alliance in the event of a Warsaw Pact inva-sion.

Even the United States, the driving force behind the LTDP, facedsuch difficulties. The formation of the RDF in 1979–80 meant that someof the forces, as well as considerable airlift and sealift elements necessaryfor European reinforcement, would heretofore be diverted to a PersianGulf contingency. In the event of a global crisis affecting both NATOEurope and the Gulf, this would have forced US planners to make dif-ficult decisions regarding strategic priorities.

In the end, it was the United States that did the most to improve theconventional defense posture of NATO’s Central Region, often throughunilateral efforts. Beginning in 1974, the United States took the lead inthe conventional force buildup in NATO Europe. From the unilateralefforts undertaken during the Ford Administration, this developed intothe LTDP and an Alliance-wide effort. Throughout the Carter years, theAmericans were the driving force behind the LTDP and consistentlyincreased the capabilities of their Central Region forces. Stockpilingequipment and the vast improvement of troop and weapon quality from1978 on were the main examples of this. With the exception of WestGermany and Great Britain, most other NATO members did little toimprove the state of the Alliance’s defense posture in this area.

The story of the LTDP and other efforts during the late 1970s andearly 1980s is an example of how a variety of factors—many of them notin fact of a military nature—came to play a role in shaping the policies ofthe NATO Alliance toward its common adversary. It is a salutary exam-ple of multi-national decision-making, which, of course, does not alwaysachieve what it sets out to do.


Part III

Power projection

6 The naval balance

As with most categories of the US–Soviet military balance during the1970s, comparisons of American and Soviet naval strength reflected twotrends common in assessments of the time: first, the decline in overallnumbers and funding resulting from the war in Vietnam and its after-math, which affected all branches of the US armed forces; second, theconcurrent increase in investment by the Soviet Union in its militaryduring this same period. The results of these developments would shapethe debate on the balance of naval power during the 1970s and play aconsiderable role in shaping policy during the 1980s, when the ReaganAdministration would undertake a massive expansion of naval strength.

Although all branches of the US military had suffered reductions inforce during the 1970s, the US Navy was particularly hard hit. Schle-singer noted in his FY 1975 report to Congress that although the USNavy had some 951 ‘‘commissioned general purpose ships’’ (aircraftcarriers, major surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, andreplenishment vessels) in service in FY 1968, this number had fallen tojust 588 by FY 1973 and would fall again to 522 by FY 1975.1 Indeed,numbers fell even further, down to 476 ships in 1976 and then to 462 in1978.2 This did not, however, reflect a particular desire to erode Amer-ican naval strength for its own sake. Most of the ships decommissionedduring this time were built during World War II, particularly destroy-ers, submarines, and minesweepers.3 These vessels had reached blockobsolescence by the 1970s, having in some cases served in three majorwars (World War II, Korea and Vietnam), as well as in an exactingpeacetime environment. Moreover, they were unable to carry theincreasingly sophisticated electronics, weaponry, and, in the case of thewar-built carriers, aircraft that entered service with the US Navy duringthis time.

What was problematic was that as vast numbers of older ships wereretired, there was not an across-the-board effort to match these reduc-tions with considerable numbers of new vessels. Eleven years elapsed(1964–75) during which no new destroyers were added to the US fleet,4

while only two nuclear-powered cruisers joined the fleet between 1967

and 1976.5 The nuclear-powered carrier Nimitz took a full seven years tobuild and commission.6 There were some major efforts during this time,especially with frigates and attack submarines,7 but on the whole,American naval efforts were inconsistent and did not reflect commit-ment to an overall strategic plan.

The Soviet Navy, by contrast, was undergoing steady development inorder to become a fleet with global presence, capable of projectingSoviet power in many areas where the USSR had not previously enjoyeda military presence. Under the energetic leadership of Admiral of theFleet Sergei Gorshkov, who had assumed this position in 1956, theSoviet Navy had, by the 1970s, shifted its efforts away from counteringUS carrier task forces and ballistic missile submarines in waters near theSoviet Union to building a fleet capable of challenging American navalforces in areas considered to be of importance to Moscow.8 By 1977, theinventory of the Soviet Navy included 32 cruisers, 87 destroyers, and107 escort ships (frigates or frigate-type vessels), as well as over 258general purpose submarines (more than 80 nuclear-powered) and theKiev, the Soviet Union’s first aircraft carrier.9 The Soviet fleet wasreceiving more effective warships, with new anti-ship cruise missiles as amajor offensive element. Soviet naval aviation, although it could notmatch the powerful air wings of the US carrier fleet, was receiving morepotent land-based bombers, like the Tu-22M Backfire, which posed agreater threat than had their less capable predecessors.10

The shifting balance of power at sea

The two trends discussed above led to a growing sense of parity betweenthe superpower navies, a marked change from the first quarter centuryof the Cold War, when the US Navy had reigned supreme. The SovietNavy began to display its capabilities on the high seas. In 1970 the fleetengaged in a major exercise, Okean, in which some 200 surface ships andsubmarines operated in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Anti-carrier andanti-submarine warfare were practiced, as were amphibious landingswith Warsaw Pact forces.11 Another Okean exercise was held in 1975,with similarly sized forces and also in the Atlantic and Pacific. Sig-nificantly, the Soviets made use of overseas bases, with naval aircraftstaging out of Aden (South Yemen), Somalia, and Guinea. Soviet forcesalso practiced convoy escort in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Japan,which appeared to emphasize a role that the Soviet Navy had not paidmuch attention to before.12

Nor were routine exercises the only example of how the USSR dis-played its growing naval strength. A series of crises in the Middle Eastduring this time showed the Soviet Navy’s ability to challenge the USfleet directly. In September 1970, as a result of upheaval in Jordan, bothsuperpowers forward-deployed significant naval forces to the eastern

132 Power projection

Mediterranean. Facing the US Sixth Fleet’s two carrier groups weresome 49 ships of the Fifth Eskadra, the Soviet Mediterranean naval force.This total included 16 surface warships and 10 submarines. Althoughthe crisis soon blew over, the presence of the large Soviet forceunnerved many top US military officers, including members of the JointChiefs of Staff.13 Writing of the incident later, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt,then Chief of Naval Operations, recalled that

They [the Soviets] learned that . . . though the United States wasdeeply concerned with what happened in the Middle East, it wasstretched very thin there in a military sense. The terrible danger ofthat last state of affairs is, of course, that in a major crisis—which theJordanian trouble was not—the alternatives became backing down(abandoning old principles and old friends) or escalation (riskingtotal war).14

Three years later, Admiral Zumwalt’s concerns appeared justified. InOctober 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a full-scale attack on Israel. Asfierce fighting raged between Arab and Israeli forces, both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union undertook resupply efforts to maintain theirallies. As Israel gained the upper hand and threatened to destroy a largeportion of Egypt’s army in the Sinai, the Soviet Union prepared todeploy airborne troops to break the Israeli encirclement. The UnitedStates responded with a Defense Condition 3 alert of its armed forces,leading to a cease-fire and an end to hostilities.

What is most important to understand is that the superpowers’ pri-mary means of influencing the conflict militarily rested with their fleetsin the Mediterranean. On October 6, the day the war began, the FifthEskadra numbered 58 ships, including 15 submarines, 4 cruisers, 6destroyers, 5 frigates, 2 amphibious ships, and 2 minesweepers. Facingthem were the Sixth Fleet’s 48 ships, which included 2 aircraft carriersand the fleet flagship, a cruiser.15 An amphibious task force was alsopresent carrying a US Marine contingent.16 It is important to look at thedisposition of these forces, because the area in question is quite vast.One carrier was visiting Athens, Greece, while the other was cruising offSpain. The amphibious group was near Soudha Bay, Crete, where theyhad taken part in a major exercise.17 Soviet forces were concentrated inthe eastern Mediterranean.

During the course of events, the Soviets built up their naval forcesconsiderably. By October 14, the Fifth Eskadra numbered 69 ships,which grew to 80 by October 24.18 By the end of October the SovietNavy had deployed a total of 96 ships in the Mediterranean, including25 major surface warships and 25 submarines.19

The Sixth Fleet built up to a force of 60 ships—including an addi-tional carrier and 10 attack submarines20—during this time. However,

The naval balance 133

US naval forces were not concentrated, due to delays in decision-makingin Washington and the need to deploy a line of picket ships to cover theUS airlift to Israel. This reflected on the fleets’ role in carrying out theirnations’ resupply policies. However, Soviet air and sea resupply effortsto Egypt and Syria were aided by the concentration of Soviet navalforces.21 Moreover, the outnumbered US submarine force was spreadthin attempting to keep track of its larger Soviet counterpart.22

The events of October 1973 had a considerable impact on how thenaval balance came to be perceived. For the first time since World WarII, the US Navy had faced a serious challenge at sea from a rival fleet.Furthermore, the two fleets were, in terms of capabilities, closely mat-ched. The three US carrier groups between them mustered some 200fighter and attack aircraft, and the surface combatants and submarineswere well-armed. On the other hand, the concentrated Soviet fleet had apowerful arsenal of anti-ship weapons, including 88 surface-to-surfacemissiles and 348 torpedoes.23 When it is remembered just how tensethe situation in the Mediterranean had become by the end of the crisis,the threat of combat was certainly not far off.24 What would happen infuture confrontations between a similarly imposing Soviet fleet and a USNavy whose future strength might be in doubt?

The correlation between a decline in the overall size of the US Navyand the growth of the Soviet Navy was noted at the outset of this chap-ter. It should also be noted that these developments correlated with ashift in the geopolitical situation in the Third World. The establishmentof pro-Soviet regimes in many states in Africa, as well as the collapse ofAmerican-backed governments in Southeast Asia in the mid-1970s, wasperceived as a marked shift in the ‘‘correlation of forces’’ in Moscow’sfavor. The increasing deployment of Soviet naval forces in the SouthAtlantic and Indian Oceans reflected a greater use of this service as aninstrument of Soviet foreign policy, providing a visible sense of militarystrength in these regions. Moreover, the securing of bases by the SovietUnion in many of these countries meant that Moscow now had a con-crete presence in these areas, and, it seemed, a more direct influence inhow regional (and by extension global) affairs would be settled. The useof such bases during the Okean exercise in 1975 appeared to support adirect link between Soviet regional successes and its overall geopoliticalstrategy, which, from an American perspective, came to rely increasinglyon a forward military presence in the Third World.

This highlights an important point about naval power during thistime. Navies, unlike the strategic nuclear forces or the forces deployedin Europe, had a dual use. First, to support these two categories ofmilitary deterrence. The ballistic-missile submarines of the superpowersprovided a potent leg of their strategic nuclear triads, while also playinga key role in any war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The abilityof the US Navy to escort men and material across the Atlantic to stop a


Warsaw Pact invasion of NATO was vital, as was its ability to defeatSoviet naval forces attempting to interfere with this objective. The SovietNavy would of course have had a vital role in disrupting these efforts, aswell as defeating US and NATO naval forces.

The second key role of naval forces, discussed in part above, was as ameans of projecting military power into the Third World. The flexibilityof these forces, in the sense that they could project power from sea toland (air strikes and amphibious landings) meant that they could beused effectively against opposing Third World states, as well as to deterboth these states and the rival superpower from taking similar action.This had proven to be vital for the United States, and, it appeared, ofgrowing importance for the Soviet Union.

Given the importance of the superpower maritime balance, it was onlya matter of time before the United States began to examine the state ofits navy. By the mid-1970s, American policymakers began to take a hardlook at the apparently adverse trends in the balance of power, and par-ticularly in terms of naval forces. The need to rebuild US naval strengthafter the decline of the early 1970s, and to regain a clear-cut edge overthe growing Soviet fleet, became a priority.

The 1970s: Of missions and dollars

The need for a broad-based increase in US naval strength becameapparent during the mid-1970s. Schlesinger, in his FY 1975 report,indicated that this would soon be undertaken, noting that ‘‘Beginning inFY 1977, the trend [of numerical decline] will be markedly reversed asthe number of new ships delivered to the fleet exceeds the numberbeing retired.’’25 The FY 1975 budget included requests for a new ‘‘SeaControl Ship’’ to provide a less costly aircraft carrier to protect amphi-bious groups and convoys,26 new destroyers, nuclear-powered cruisersand attack submarines, and development of the Aegis system for shipdefense and battle management.27 Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) cap-abilities would also be enhanced, with procurement of 12 10-planesquadrons of carrier-based S-3 aircraft.28 The Navy would also receiveother carrier-based aircraft, including F-14 Tomcat fighters,29 alongwith missile systems like the air- and sea-launched Harpoon.30

This program reflected an emphasis on a smaller but more potentfleet built around the sea control mission. Nuclear power was alsoemphasized for ship propulsion, which increased the cost of such ships,as well as limited the numbers that could be built. This was indicated bythe nuclear-powered ship construction programs tentatively laid out bySecretary Schlesinger for FY 1976–80. During that time, it was plannedthat construction would commence for 2 aircraft carriers, a cruiser and12 attack submarines. Seven ballistic missile submarines were included,reducing the overall number of general purpose nuclear vessels to be


delivered.31 During FY 1974–77, the cost of the nuclear-powered shipswould come to some $5 billion.32 This was just a fraction of overallexpenditures for the US Navy, which would require a plethora of otherships, not to mention aircraft, weapons, electronics and items likeammunition, fuel, and stores, to maintain operational capability.

Rumsfeld continued the commitment to a fleet geared toward seacontrol and power projection. His five-year shipbuilding program (FY1977–81) included some 111 ships of all types, including 11 attack sub-marines, 3 carriers (one a sea control ship), 10 guided-missile cruisersand destroyers, 40 guided-missile frigates, and numerous auxiliaryships.33 The following year, in his five-year shipbuilding program for FY1978–82, Rumsfeld listed a total of 178 ships, of which 157 were newconstruction and the remainder to return from overhaul for service lifeextension.34 Additionally, 106 ships had been authorized by Congressbut had not yet been delivered, including 2 carriers, 3 cruisers, 25destroyers, and 30 attack submarines.35 These figures would have seen amajor rejuvenation of the US fleet by the mid-1980s, based on theestablished precepts of US naval power, namely control of the seas forboth power projection missions and the maintenance of naval super-iority vis a vis the Soviet Union.

A day after Secretary Rumsfeld’s FY 1978 report was issued, the FordAdministration issued NSDM 344, which would ‘‘Provide for steadygrowth in active ship force levels to attain and maintain an active force ofabout 600 ships in the mid-1990s.’’36 The force levels were nearly iden-tical to Rumsfeld’s figures and reflected a commitment to ‘‘maintain asuperiority in maritime capability that can deter or defeat the Sovietthreat in a timely manner,’’ as well as to ‘‘maintain maritime forces cap-able of carrying out other U.S. military requirements.’’37

Within days, Jimmy Carter took office. During his campaign in 1976,Carter had been critical of the high cost of defense during the Nixonand Ford Administrations. Among the areas of concern was that of theNavy’s nuclear-powered ships, whose costs had escalated during the1970s. For the FY 1976–79 period, the carrier and cruiser constructionprograms together came to over $3.7 billion, while attack submarineconstruction totaled over $2.8 billion.38

More fundamental than a desire to fulfil campaign promises for thenew administration was a differing view of global strategy. The Nixonand Ford Administrations had budgeted for defense based on a con-tinued requirement for major power projection forces, including, ofcourse, the Navy. The Carter Administration differed somewhat in itsview. While it continued to view a forward-deployed fleet as a necessity,it placed greater emphasis on the defense of NATO Europe, with morelimited contingencies in areas like Japan. PRM 10, issued in June 1977,outlined a variety of military contingencies that the United States mightface in the years ahead. The authors of the study placed considerable


emphasis on a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe andprovided a detailed outline of what the role of the Alliance’s naval forces(including the US Navy) would be: ‘‘NATO maintains major maritimeforces primarily in order to ensure that military and economic resupplycargoes can be moved to Europe to sustain NATO combat capability andpreclude the Pact from considering that it has an option of outlastingNATO.’’39

The authors went on to note the advantages that US naval forceswould have in conflicts outside of NATO Europe, including Korea.However, the increasing focus of the Carter Administration on NATO,particularly through the LTDP, which included naval forces as an‘‘action area,’’ meant that the US Navy would heretofore give greaterprominence to this role, with less emphasis on sea control in watersoutside Europe.

The Carter Administration did make a significant effort to addressnaval matters during its tenure. In March, 1978, the Department of theNavy issued a study, known as Sea Plan 2000, that outlined what the USNavy’s overall strength would be over the next two decades. Three‘‘Options’’ were listed in terms of ship numbers, each corresponding towhat the authors deemed to be the missions of the US fleet. Option 1,described as having ‘‘a low degree of flexibility, with minimal capabilityacross the range of naval tasks,’’ postulated a fleet of 439 active ships,plus 35 reserve and sealift vessels. This corresponded with the NATOfocus of PRM 10. Option 2, a somewhat enhanced version of Option 1,listed 535 active (plus 44 reserve/sealift) vessels. Option 3, designed toprovide ‘‘a high degree of versatility in the form of a wider range ofmilitary and political actions,’’ was closest to planning during the Fordyears. A total of 585 active and 46 reserve/sealift ships was listed in thisoption. In the eyes of the authors, Option 1 was ‘‘high risk,’’ Option 2provided a ‘‘minimum acceptable risk,’’ and Option 3 ‘‘a lower risk.’’40

Sea Plan 2000 would come to play an important role in US naval plan-ning during the coming decade. For the moment, though, it would bethe tenets of PRM 10, as well as world events, that would shape thedevelopment of the US Navy.

Secretary Brown listed four main ‘‘objectives’’ for FY 1979–83: improv-ing ASW forces; improving the Navy’s anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities;improving the anti-ship capabilities of US naval forces (particularlythrough the acquisition of Harpoon and Tomahawk cruise missiles); andimproving the fleet’s combat readiness.41 The FY 1979 budget saw majorreductions in funding for new nuclear cruisers and Aegis destroyers.Greater attention was given to modernizing older AAW destroyers so asto improve this capability at less cost. Development of Vertical/ShortTake-Off and Landing (V/STOL) carriers replaced funding for additionalnuclear carriers in the budget, while acquisition of nuclear attack sub-marines was funded at around $460 million.42 The FY 1979 shipbuilding


program was set at 15 ships, with funds for service life extensions for car-riers and modernization of AAW destroyers.43

The budget for FY 1980 was similar, with a relatively modest five-year shipbuilding program (FY 1980–84) of 67 ships. In types of ships aswell as in numbers, this contrasted sharply with what Rumsfeld hadlisted during his time in office. Only five new attack submarines wouldbe built, down from 11 in Rumsfeld’s FY 1977–81 program. Thedestroyer program remained generally stable, with 10 new ships to bedelivered, along with 10 modified units. A new guided missile frigatewould be procured in considerable numbers (25 by FY 1984), as thesewere valuable AAW escort ships. However, no additional cruisers wereto be procured, while only two carriers would undergo service lifeextensions.44

In shifting its strategic priorities, the Carter Administration began toface opposition to its plans, particularly from Congress. Instead of the V/STOL carrier that the administration had proposed in its FY 1979defense budget, Congress voted funds for a fourth Nimitz-class nuclearcarrier. In response, President Carter vetoed the funding for this vessel.Congress, however, remained undeterred, adding funds in the FY 1980budget, which Carter was forced to accept.45

At least as important as Congressional opposition in shaping theCarter Administration’s naval program was the shift in the internationalarena during its third year in office. The Iranian Revolution and theHostage Crisis, followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, helpedbring about a change in the administration’s view of the US Navy’s rolein its overall global strategy. The ability to rely on regional allies toaugment US forces in the Third World came into question, while thewillingness of the Soviet Union to engage in direct military interventionoutside of the Warsaw Pact appeared to betoken an increasingly directSoviet challenge to American interests. A fleet suited to power projec-tion, including large aircraft carriers and their battle groups, which hadbeen the standard during the Nixon-Ford years, appeared once again tobe necessary.

Brown’s FY 1981 report reflected this renewed power projectionemphasis. The shipbuilding program for FY 1981–85 was increased to97 new ships, an increase of 30 from the year before. This included 16new Aegis missile cruisers, with 2 new destroyer classes and a new classof nuclear attack submarines.46 Another 81 ships had been authorizedbut not yet delivered by the end of FY 1980. This total included twocarriers, one of which had been funded over Carter’s veto in FY 1980.47

Adding to his four objectives for the US Navy listed in his FY 1979report, Brown added two more for FY 1981: ‘‘Maintaining worldwidepresence and crisis management forces’’ and ‘‘Improving fleet balanceand weapons modernization.’’48 Such objectives strongly complementeda strategy emphasizing sea-based power projection. By the time Brown’s


final report was issued to Congress in January 1981, it bore a strongresemblance to the Rumsfeld budgets put forward more than four yearsearlier. The shipbuilding program for FY 1982–86 came to 99 ships, 80of which were to be built new.49 Moreover, whereas it had been plannedthat the carrier force would fall from 15 to 12 ships by FY 1982, thebudget for that year included a 13-carrier force by that time.50

By 1981, the United States had returned to a naval policy emphasiz-ing forward deployment and power projection, as a result of worldevents, which necessitated an emphasis on power projection forces forregions like the Persian Gulf. Concentration on NATO Europe had beensuperseded by a more global approach. The incoming Reagan Admin-istration would make its naval buildup central to its defense effort.However, as in other areas, the groundwork had already been laid overthe past year or so, and even earlier. Before going into the details of thenaval expansion of the 1980s, it is important to discuss the prevailingviews of the US–Soviet naval balance during the decade before, in orderto have a clearer picture of the context in which decisions were made.

The naval balance: Lists and capabilities

Much analysis of the superpower naval balance was guided by simplelists of warships, which in and of themselves were often misleading. Onestudy from 1978, conducted by the Center for Strategic and Interna-tional Studies at Georgetown University, provided a comprehensiveship-by-ship numerical comparison of the two fleets, complete with netchanges between 1970 and 1977. While interesting, these figures needqualification with other factors (which the CSIS study fortunately pro-vides.)51 Factors like crew training, ship endurance, range of weaponsand aircraft, capabilities in AAW and ASW, and, very importantly, geo-graphy must all be examined to attain an understanding of the navalbalance.

At the heart of the debate over the naval balance was the simple factthat the two navies reflected differing ideas of how sea power was to beexercised. ‘‘U.S. and Soviet navies are . . . structured asymmetrically inalmost every respect,’’ John Collins wrote in 1978.52 The US Navyemphasized a central role for aircraft carriers and their air wings, as thecentrepiece of task forces built to defeat an enemy fleet and provide forpower projection. The Soviet Navy sought to utilize its missile-armedsubmarines and ships, as well as land-based aircraft, to destroy hostilenaval forces (including US carrier task forces), thus denying an enemythe ability to use the seas to his advantage.

As with the European balance, so too with the maritime: the UnitedStates, as well as its NATO allies to a certain extent, planned for a pro-tracted naval conflict, as sea control, by definition, requires naval forcesthat can operate for a long time and have a self-sustaining capability.


The Soviet Union, by contrast, planned a naval war that would be briefand intense, as sea denial would not require forces to remain on stationvery long after the action had taken place.

In a paper presented to the IISS in 1975, Johan Jorgen Holst, theDirector of Research for the Norwegian Institute of InternationalAffairs, succinctly defined the differences between the two fleets in termsof surface warship design:

Some of the design differences between Soviet and American surfacecombatants may be explained in terms of the different requirementsof the sea-control and sea-denial missions. The sea-denial missionputs a design emphasis on heavy fire-power and a first-strike cap-ability against the opponent’s forces, rather than on self-sufficiencyfor extended deployments. Thus Soviet ships generally have greaterspeed than their American counterparts, while the latter havegreater endurance, mainly because of their larger size. The Amer-ican underway replenishment capability is much superior to that ofthe Soviet Union . . . Soviet ships generally carry a greater totalweight of ammunition than US ships, but they carry little or noreload for their major missile and torpedo systems.53

As Holst’s analysis shows, the basic philosophy of war-fighting of the USand Soviet navies determined the design and purpose of their forces.Eric Morris noted this trend in examining the Soviet fleet. ‘‘ . . . the majorsurface units . . . are required, it would seem, to counter surprise attackson a concentrated deployment rather than in sustained operations in ahostile environment.’’54 Morris’ analysis had its basis in fact, as the FifthEskadra had deployed its surface warships in such a concentrated fashionagainst the US Sixth Fleet during the October 1973 crisis.

The Soviets’ mass production of small, missile-firing attack craft—whichwere nearly non-existent in the US Navy—were another indication of theimportance of the sea-denial mission. Worth H. Bagley, a retired USNavy admiral, noted in 1977 that ‘‘In any case, the Soviet Navy possessesthe launch platforms and cruise missiles to concentrate about eight stand-off systems against each important American naval target in the openseas. As Soviet patrol boats come into the engagement, the ratio increasesby at least 25 per cent.’’55 This buildup of Soviet naval strength, withpowerful surface and submarine forces providing considerable firepower,appeared to challenge US and Allied fleets.

However, if the US Navy suffered from difficulties with its operationalplanning—namely, the vulnerability of forward-deployed forces—theSoviet Navy too faced problems with its plans for waging war. EricMorris got to the heart of the matter in describing these difficulties:‘‘ . . . the Russians have not constructed a balanced fleet on the Westernpattern . . .There is instead a heavy emphasis on submarines and these,


together with many of the surface ships, are quite rigidly divided intospecific tasks or missions.’’56

Perhaps the greatest deficiency experienced by the Soviet Navy lay inthe quality of its personnel. Several Western naval experts noted thisin their analyses of Soviet naval power during the 1970s. John Moore,a retired Royal Navy captain and a highly respected naval analyst,discussed this phenomenon. ‘‘The manning of the Soviet navypresents that most difficult of all mixtures—a professional officer corpsdirecting a conscript Lower Deck . . . a fact which clearly worries AdmiralGorshkov.’’57

The fact that the Soviet armed forces relied so heavily on conscriptionto fill the enlisted and non-commissioned ranks meant that, in the SovietNavy, there was both a high turnover and rapid advancement for veryyoung personnel, particularly because very few volunteered to stay onafter their required naval service. ‘‘It is hardly surprising,’’ Moore con-tinues, ‘‘that a system such as this throws a very heavy technical burdenon the officers and senior ratings . . . the total of officers and ratings isabout 425,000 whilst the annual intake of trainees is a little over100,000.’’58

This analysis must be balanced against the fact that, during the 1970s,the US Navy also suffered from serious personnel problems. The lin-gering effects of the Vietnam era, most particularly strained race rela-tions and drug abuse, plagued the fleet, while retention rates, althoughnot as serious as in the Soviet Navy, were worrisome. To give oneexample, in FY 1977 the goal for retention of nuclear submarine officerswas 60 percent (154 officers.) The actual figure for that year was just 38percent (98 officers.) Moreover, 1977 saw the US Navy record thehighest desertion rate in its history.59

Although these problems were alleviated somewhat by the end of thedecade, difficulties remained. Although re-enlistments for second-termand above enlisted personnel were high, officer retention was between 30and 40 percent, rather than the Navy’s desired 60 percent level.60 ‘‘Whilethe Navy faces major problems in both the officer and enlisted cate-gories,’’ wrote Norman Polmar in 1981, ‘‘the relative sophistication ofNavy ships and aircraft continues to increase, making still more demandson the quality of personnel required to operate the modern fleet.’’61

Despite these problems in the US Navy, its personnel were, in com-parison to their Soviet counterparts, rated to be better sailors. Speakingin 1977, when the US Navy appeared to be at a sort of nadir in terms ofpersonnel quality, John Moore was able to state:

If we compare the standard of the men of the U.S. Navy with thestandard of the men of the Soviet navy, we find that this country iswinning all along the line. Its men are better educated and bettertrained; they are used to technology. And they are competing with


a conscript group who are nowhere near the same standard. That isa source of some comfort in the overall power equation.62

Having discussed the warfighting capability of the Soviet Navy (as well asthat of the US Navy), we must address another question: what was itsstrategic purpose at this time? The deployment of Soviet warships toports along the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts of Africa, as well as thelarger Soviet naval squadrons that were to be found in distant waters,led to speculation that the Soviet Navy was now serving a political pur-pose not dissimilar to that of Western navies: as an example of a globalistSoviet foreign policy meant to compete with the West in the ThirdWorld. By the late 1970s, the Soviets had gained access to ports inAngola, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Syria, Cuba, and Guinea. Thisincreased the Soviet Navy’s ability to stage sea and air operations in theIndian and Atlantic Oceans with greater ease, as well as deploy forces inthe Caribbean Sea and the Persian Gulf. The success enjoyed by pro-Soviet factions in Angola and Mozambique in 1975 helped strengthenSoviet influence in Africa, and thus to improve the Soviet naval positionhere.

The US Navy, not surprisingly, noted the correlation between Sovietnaval expansion and an enhanced global presence. In the 1975 edition ofUnderstanding Soviet Naval Developments, it was noted ‘‘During the past fewyears there has been evidence that the Soviets will rely more and more onnaval forces for overseas projection . . . the national leadership of theSoviet Union recognizes the significance of sea power in the last quarterof the 20th Century.’’63 In the 1978 edition, the authors wrote ‘‘Today,Soviet naval forces are deployed continuously on several seas . . .Theydemonstrate Soviet military might through port visits . . .demonstratesupport for Soviet clients, and inhibit Western military initiatives.’’64

A DIA report issued in February 1980 on the Soviet naval presence inthe Indian Ocean echoed official American views of this phenomenon.‘‘The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is an example of theSoviet use of seapower to support state interests and implement nationalpolicy. In support of these general aims, the Soviet presence is designedto enhance the image of the USSR as a global military power in the eyesof Indian Ocean littoral states and thereby increase Soviet regional influ-ence at the expense of western and Chinese Communist influence.’’65

However, the USSR did suffer setbacks in its attempt to expand itsnaval presence in the Third World. Although it had deployed a power-ful armada in the eastern Mediterranean in October 1973, it must beremembered that the Soviet Navy was ejected from its considerable baseinfrastructure in Egypt just a year earlier and lost all access to Egyptianfacilities in 1976. The war between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Ogadenin 1977–78 led to a loss of Soviet access to the port and air facilities atBerbera.


In discussing this situation, it should be remembered that there wereconsiderable limitations on the Soviet Union’s ability to use these installa-tions. The authors of the IISS Strategic Survey in 1979, analyzing the use ofthe Soviet Navy as an instrument of foreign policy, noted this. ‘‘Since thelate 1950s the Soviet Union has gained access to shore support in severalthird-world countries. But this access has not been to bases, which theUSSR could use as she pleased, but to facilities, which can be used only atthe discretion of the host nation’’66 (My italics). The limitations placed bythese countries on Soviet usage meant that forward-deployed Soviet navalforces often had to rely on a considerable force of underway replenish-ment ships, particularly in the Indian Ocean.67

This meant that the Soviet Navy had to rely on its bases in the USSRfor most of its overall support and reinforcement. Here the issue ofgeography must be addressed, as it was of prime importance inconsidering the effectiveness of the Soviet fleet, particularly in wartime.The Soviet Navy was divided into four fleets: the Northern, based along theArctic Ocean and having as a primary responsibility operations in the NorthAtlantic; the Baltic, which would have operated against Denmark andWest Germany in the event of war; the Black Sea, which provided theforces for the Fifth Eskadra in the Mediterranean; and the Pacific, whichalso provided units for the Indian Ocean Squadron. The Northern andPacific fleets were the two largest, as they would have had the greatestresponsibilities in wartime.

While the size of the fleets was impressive,68 the geographical odds theyfaced in getting to sea were formidable. The Northern Fleet would have toround the North Cape (dominated by NATO member Norway), then, afteran open run through the Norwegian Sea, would face the Greenland–Iceland–Faeroes–UK Gap, which would place severe restrictions on passage,particularly for submarines. The Baltic Fleet faced an even worse situation,as the Danish Straits are just 40 miles wide. The Black Sea Fleet would facethe Bosporus, 3/4 of a mile at its narrowest, while the Pacific Fleet wouldhave to contend with the various straits adjacent to Japan and Korea to getto the open ocean.69 US, NATO, and other friendly naval forces wouldhave presented a formidable challenge at these bottlenecks early in a war.

This situation was in sharp contrast to the US Navy, which enjoyedwarm water ports on both the long Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, muchfurther from deployed Soviet forces. The US Second Fleet in the Atlan-tic and Third Fleet in the Eastern Pacific were able to deploy from basesat Norfolk, San Diego, and Pearl Harbor. The Sixth Fleet in the Medi-terranean was able to call on bases like Naples. The Seventh Fleet in theWestern Pacific deployed from Yokosuka, Japan, and Subic Bay, Phi-lippines. In the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia had by the end of the 1970sgrown into a significant naval base.70

This state of affairs would have been lopsided enough in war. Inpeace, when the superpower fleets were routinely forward deployed,


this also had an effect. The US Navy could deploy forces for longerperiods of time and with fewer support ships than the Soviet Navy. Inearly 1980, for example, three US carrier battle groups—centered onthe Midway, Kitty Hawk and Nimitz—were deployed in the Indian Ocean.This presented a far more powerful strike force than could be broughtto bear by the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron.71

A good summary for the growth of Soviet naval power during the1970s comes from Breyer and Polmar, who in 1977 offered their opi-nion on what the American contribution to the state of the naval balancehad been during the decade, something taken to heart by the ReaganAdministration four years later: ‘‘. . . the Americans themselves are lar-gely responsible for the closing of the gap . . . in recent years the Amer-icans have not made any technological progress . . . they have lost theirnumerical superiority . . . because they have drastically reduced their shipinventory, and . . . because of the small amount of new construction.’’72

The 600-ship navy and the balance of sea power in the1980s

A key objective of the Reagan Administration’s defense program was theexpansion of the US Navy to a force of 600 general purpose ships. Thishad been the goal set during the Ford Administration but shelvedduring the Carter years.73 Such a fleet was linked to the new adminis-tration’s view of global US interests and the Soviet threat to them.Weinberger, in his first report to Congress in 1982, described thenecessity of naval superiority:

We are determined to restore and maintain maritime superiorityover the Soviets. The question of the use of naval forces by theUnited States or its adversaries to protect or further their interests isclosely related to the more general question of the ability of eachside to project power in various areas of the world. Today, we havecritical interests in many places that are distant from the ContinentalUnited States. These places include . . . the homelands of our Eur-opean and Asian allies and regions—notably the Persian Gulf—onwhich we and our allies critically depend.74

Weinberger’s plans saw a fleet totaling between 610 and 640 operationalships by the early 1990s. This would include auxiliary, sealift andreserve vessels, as well as combat ships.75

The FY 1983–87 shipbuilding program included some 133 new ships,along with 16 conversions and reactivations. Among the ships to be builtwere two additional Nimitz-class nuclear carriers, while the four battle-ships of the Iowa class, built during World War II, were to be reactivatedto lead surface groups to complement carrier battle groups.76 Funding


was also vastly increased, with a request of over $6.8 billion for the car-rier program alone for FY 1983.77

Within three years, the US Navy had made impressive strides in thesize of its deployable battle forces (ships able to be deployed for combator in support of combat forces.) From 479 ships at the start of 1981, thistotal had grown to 491 by the end of that fiscal year, then to 513 by FY1982, falling to 506 in FY 1983 (as a result of retiring older vessels.)78

By FY 1984 this had grown to 52579 and to 542 by FY 1985.80

Equally impressive was the turnaround in the situation regardingnaval personnel. Thanks to major increases in pay and benefits duringthe early 1980s, enlistment and retention rates increased significantly.By 1984, the US Navy met 100 percent of its recruiting goals.81 Whereasthe Navy had a shortage of 22,000 senior petty officers in 1981, that hadbeen reduced to 9,300 by 1983.82 Officer recruiting and retention alsoimproved. From a range of 30–39 percent retention in FY 1980, by FY1983 this had improved to between 45–60 percent.83 Personnel qualitywas also high, some 90 percent of male enlistees being high schoolgraduates.84

While there was considerable Congressional and public support fornaval expansion during the 1980s, the enormous growth in the fundingand scope of the US Navy during this time is due to the efforts of Rea-gan’s Navy Secretary, John F. Lehman. Lehman had championed a 600-ship fleet built around 15 carrier battle groups, 4 battleship groups, and100 attack submarines, as well as greatly expanded amphibious lift cap-abilities.85 During the 1970s, the goal had generally been to maintain aforce of between 12 and 13 carriers. Lehman argued strongly for theneeded funds to build up the fleet and linked this with a broad-basedmaritime strategy. Lehman outlined eight principles of maritime strat-egy: the need to tailor the maritime strategy to US national securitypolicy; ensure that the Navy’s missions clearly emulate the principles ofthe strategy; establish maritime superiority over the Soviet Union;ensure such superiority is carried out within the framework of thestrategy; ensure that it is based on a realistic assessment of the threat;ensure that it is global in scope; integrate US and Allied forces into thestrategy; and ensure that it is a forward strategy.86

It was the idea of a forward strategy that set Lehman’s approach apartfrom much that had gone before. Although elements of it had existed inAmerican strategic thought throughout the Cold War (as with plans touse carrier-based nuclear bombers to strike the Soviet Union in the1950s), Lehman’s maritime strategy was much more comprehensive. InLehman’s words, ‘‘With the global nature of our maritime tasks, thelimited forces available dictate that our strategy must be a forward one, astrategy that identifies and exploits Soviet weaknesses such as inherentlyunfavorable maritime geography. It must force the Soviet Union to useits maritime forces, particularly its attack submarines, to defend its


vulnerabilities rather than allowing the Soviets the initiative to prey onour vulnerabilities.’’87 A powerful force of carrier and battleship groups,together with a large attack submarine fleet, was seen as vitally impor-tant in carrying out these goals.

This naval strategy corresponded to overall US national strategy.NSDD 32 outlined objectives for US conventional forces that the Navywas well suited to carrying out. These included ‘‘Putting . . . Soviet inter-ests at risk, including those in the Soviet homeland.’’88 It also directedthat ‘‘Counteroffensives will be directed at places where the US canaffect the outcome of the war . . .US actions . . .will be designed to protectessential US interests, take advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, and divertSoviet attention and forces from Europe and Southwest Asia.’’89

This was the basis for the Reagan Administration’s strategy of ‘‘hor-izontal escalation,’’ which would allow US forces, in the event of war withthe Soviet Union or its proxies, to attack areas of Soviet vulnerability.For example, a Soviet invasion of Iran or seizure of West Berlin couldbe matched by a US attack against Cuba or North Korea, in order toforce the Soviets to divert forces for their defense.90 As Secretary Wein-berger declared in his Report for FY 1983:

We may be forced to cope with Soviet aggression, or Soviet-backedaggression, on several fronts. But even if the enemy attacked at onlyone place, we might choose not to restrict ourselves to meetingaggression on its own immediate front. We might decide to stretchour capabilities, to engage the enemy in many places, or to con-centrate our forces and military assets in a few of the most criticalarenas. (Underlining in original.)91

As with the rest of the US defense buildup of the early 1980s, the navalincreases were seen as a counter to growing Soviet naval strength. It istherefore necessary to assess the superpower naval balance during this time.

Given the importance in the maritime balance between the super-powers, it is not surprising that the Reagan Administration turned to theintelligence community to produce a comprehensive study of the SovietNavy. In March, 1983, the CIA produced an NIE on this subject. In the‘‘Key Judgements’’ section, the authors noted the improvements inSoviet naval capabilities during the 1970s:

Over the past decade, the role of the Navy within the USSR’snational strategy has continued to evolve, supported by additionaloperational experience and an ambitious naval construction pro-gram. This program, emphasizing larger ships with increasedendurance and technologically advanced weapon and electronicsystems, has enhanced the Navy’s capability for sustained conven-tional combat and distant area deployments.92


However, the authors went on to note that ‘‘Within the Soviets’ overallwartime strategy . . . the primary initial tasks of the Navy remain: Todeploy and provide protection for the ballistic missile submarines inpreparation for and conduct of strategic and theater nuclear strikes’’ and‘‘To defend the USSR and its allies from strikes by enemy ballistic missilesubmarines and aircraft carriers.’’93

Although these missions had been present in Soviet naval planningsince the 1950s, their scope and range had increased greatly by the1980s. The authors noted this in describing the areas of operation forSoviet naval forces assigned these tasks:

Accomplishment of these tasks would entail attempts to . . . conduct seadenial operations . . . to about 2,000 kilometers from Soviet territory.We believe that virtually all of the Northern and Pacific Fleets’ availablemajor surface combatants and combat aircraft and some three-quartersof their available attack submarines would be initially committed to[these] operations . . .Other initial naval wartime tasks are: support ofground force operations in the land theatres of military operations . . .and some interdiction of Western sea lines of communication.94

As for forward deployment, the authors noted that ‘‘In addition to itswartime tasks the Soviet Navy will continue to play important peacetimeroles, ranging from routine show-the-flag port visits to support for dis-tant-area client states during crisis situations and limited wars. Given thelikelihood of continued instability in the Third World, the use of . . .naval diplomacy and power projection techniques probably will increaseduring the 1980s . . . ’’95

Such views were echoed by analysts outside of government. NormanPolmar wrote that Soviet naval development appeared to add the role ofpower projection to that of ASW defense, strategic deterrence throughprotection of ballistic missile submarines, and the ability to engage in con-ventional naval warfare utilizing air, surface, and submarine forces.96 Thisemphasis seemed to be leading to a situation in the 1980s where ‘‘the SovietNavy appears to be moving toward a long-range capability of confrontingWestern or Third World forces at several levels of crisis or combat, includ-ing the ability to fight a conventional as well as a nuclear war at sea.’’97

This analysis was made in 1983, after the death of Brezhnev, a strongsupporter of Admiral Gorshkov, and it was not clear what policy wouldbe under Andropov. However, Polmar noted, ‘‘the momentum for acontinued naval buildup is strong, and the rigidly structured economyof the USSR prevents radical changes in defense programs. Above all,the Soviet leadership certainly understands the importance of Soviet useof the seas for that nation’s political, economic, and military activities.’’98

The Soviet Navy did maintain a large force of combat ships and sub-marines through the early 1980s, but it did not grow sharply in numerical


terms. According to the IISS, in mid-1982, the Soviet Navy possessed 290major surface combatants. This remained the same the following year. In1984, this number grew to 293, then fell slightly to 289. For submarines,traditionally an important element in Soviet naval planning, there wasonly modest growth: 273 attack boats (including those equipped withcruise missiles) in 1982; 276 in 1983; 278 in 1984; and down to 269 in1985.99 This can be compared to the number of American ships in thesecategories. US totals for major surface combatants and attack submarinesin 1982 were, 204 and 90, respectively. In 1983, this fell slightly to 201 forsurface ships and rose to 95 for subs; in 1984, the figures were 206 and95; in 1985, 213 and 95.100

More than simple numbers were the varying capabilities that existedbetween the ships being commissioned by the two fleets. During 1982,each navy added an aircraft carrier to its forces: a Nimitz-class carrierjoined the US Navy, while the Soviet Navy received a Kiev-classvessel.101 The quality of the air wings was heavily lopsided. A typical USNavy carrier air wing in the early 1980s consisted of 89 aircraft andhelicopters organized into 10 squadrons: fighters, light and mediumattack/tanker, early warning, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, anti-submarine aircraft, and helicopter.102 The Soviet carriers operated only12 aircraft and 24 helicopters.103 Moreover, the US Navy deployed 13carriers by late 1982, while the Soviet Navy deployed just 3, one eachwith the Northern, Black Sea, and Pacific Fleets.104

Despite the impressive size of the Soviet Navy, a great many vesselswere obsolescent. The Soviet attack submarine force is a case in point.Of the 490 such boats built by the USSR during the Cold War era (inthis case early 1950s to late 1980s), just 108 were designed and builtfrom the 1970s on.105 Soviet submarines, particularly nuclear boats,were far noisier than their American counterparts, which would havemade them much more vulnerable in wartime.106

Not only was the US Navy growing in numbers and overall capability, butit was also, in accordance with Secretary Lehman’s maritime strategy,establishing a much more visible forward presence. Between August 1 andOctober 16, 1981, the US Atlantic Fleet engaged in exercise Ocean Venture ’81,which involved a total of 14 nations, some 120,000 personnel, 250 ships,and 1,000 aircraft. The US Navy deployed two carrier battle groups, led bythe Dwight D. Eisenhower and Forrestal, to take part. The exercise began inthe South Atlantic, then continued in the Caribbean and off the AtlanticSeaboard with joint US–Canadian maneuvers. This evolved into a majorNATO naval exercise involving operations in the Norwegian Sea, as well asin the Baltic. The American carriers also gave support to a mock conven-tional war in Europe, and practiced convoy escort in the Atlantic. This seriesof exercises were the largest conducted by the US Navy in several years.107

The US Navy carried out similar operations in the Pacific. In April–May 1983, major exercises in the Northwest Pacific, known as FLEETEX


83-1, were conducted, involving 3 US carrier battle groups, centered onthe Midway, Coral Sea and Enterprise, totaling more than 40 ships. Theseincluded vessels of the Canadian Navy and the US Coast Guard.Supported by US Air Force early warning aircraft and B-52 bombers,the fleet conducted simulated attacks on Soviet Pacific bases, whileUS attack subs and ASW aircraft deployed in protected ‘‘bastions’’ ofSoviet ballistic missile boats. The armada of ships actually came to within720 kilometers (450 miles) of the Kamchatka Peninsula, and aircraftfrom the Enterprise and Midway overflew Zelenny Island in the Soviet-controlled Kurils.108

The purpose of these exercises was two-fold. First, to practice the newUS maritime strategy, as noted earlier. The second was more directlyrelated to US–Soviet relations at the time. In March 1981, PresidentReagan had authorized the US Navy to operate near the coasts of theSoviet Union. Their objective was to show Moscow that the UnitedStates and its allies could engage in operations close to Soviet territory instrength, and in such a way as to inflict considerable damage on theSoviet Navy in wartime.109

In displaying American geopolitical will vis a vis the USSR, the USNavy increasingly revealed the weaknesses of its Soviet counterpart. TheSoviet Navy was never able to match the wide-ranging exercises of theAmericans during the 1980s, as its Okean manovers in 1970 and 1975had done. This is not to say that the Soviet Navy was idle. A majoramphibious exercise was undertaken in July 1981 by Soviet and Syrianforces in the Eastern Mediterranean involving over 1,000 Soviet NavalInfantry.110 In September of that year, the Soviet Navy deployed 60ships and landed more than 6,000 Naval Infantry and Army troops aspart of Zapad ’81, a major combined-arms exercise conducted in theBaltic near the Polish border. The size of the exercise (the Soviets offi-cially declared that some 100,000 personnel took part) and its politicalsignificance (it occurred three months before martial law was imposed inPoland as a result of the challenge of the Solidarity movement) meantthat the Navy could still be seen as important to Soviet foreign policy.111

Nonetheless, when it is considered that the US Navy was able to parti-cipate in a plethora of combined-arms exercises that achieved suchimpressive results, Soviet activities are put into proper perspective.

Furthermore, the role of allied navies, alluded to at various times inthis chapter, cannot be ignored. Whereas the Warsaw Pact could offerrelatively little in terms of forces outside the Baltic, NATO naval forcesprovided considerable support to the US Navy in the North Atlantic andin the Norwegian, North, Baltic, and Mediterranean Seas. Excludingballistic missile submarines, by 1983 NATO could deploy 409 warshipsand submarines against the Warsaw Pact’s 309, with considerablenumerical superiority in the Mediterranean (144 to 118.) The SovietPacific Fleet deployed 158 ships against 142 for the US Pacific Fleet, but


this was more than redressed by Japan’s 48 destroyers and frigates and 14submarines, and by China’s 27 destroyers and frigates, 83 submarines,and vast numbers of small combatants.112 It should be remembered thatChina, perhaps even more than the United States and its NATO allies,was considered as posing a direct threat of war by the Soviets.

On the whole, the quality of these forces was significantly higher thanthat of the Warsaw Pact, which utilized obsolescent Soviet equipmentand replicated the difficulties in personnel found in the Soviet Navy.While the Chinese Navy left much to be desired in terms of capability, itwould have added substantial numbers to US and allied naval forces inthe Pacific in the event of war with the USSR. Added to the advantagesin ship endurance, weapons effectiveness, training, and overall war-fighting capability enjoyed by the US Navy, this portended a decisiveshift away from the Soviet Union in the naval balance.

The geopolitical shifts of the 1970s did little to improve the Soviet navalposition in areas outside the USSR. Soviet support for Ethiopia in theOgaden war gave her access to air and naval facilities at Massawa, on theRed Sea. However, this meant a loss of the facilities in neighboringSomalia, including the major base at Berbera, on the Indian Ocean. TheUnited States gained access to Berbera from 1981 and added an impor-tant new facility to its infrastructure in the Indian Ocean. The SovietNavy, meanwhile, was bottled up in the Red Sea, between the Strait ofBab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal (controlled by Egypt, a US ally.) TheSoviets did gain access to the American-built bases at Cam Ranh Bay andDanang, Vietnam during this time, but these were matched by the mightyUS base at Subic Bay in the Philippines, while air bases in Australia,Guam, and the Philippines more than compensated for the Soviet con-tingents in Vietnam. As for Cuba, Soviet installations there would havebeen among the first attacked in the event of global war.

By 1985, the United States had established a clear margin of maritimesuperiority over the Soviet Union. The ability of the US Navy to operate inforward areas adjacent to the USSR, as well as maintain an effective pre-sence in such regions as the Indian Ocean, was markedly superior to whatthe Soviet Navy could accomplish. Moreover, the US Navy gained combatexperience during this time in Grenada and Lebanon that taught it valuableoperational lessons in combined-arms operations. The variety of missionspracticed during the large-scale maneuvers of the early 1980s—anti-surfacewarfare, AAW, ASW, strategic strike, and amphibious operations—providedit with invaluable lessons. The fact that these exercises were carried out withallied forces broadened this experience considerably.

Conclusion

In looking at the 1976–85 timeframe, it becomes clear that the lack ofinvestment in US naval strength up to about 1980 played an important


role in the shift in the balance of sea power during the 1970s. Majorreductions in ship numbers occurred during the early 1970s, and USshipbuilding efforts did not keep pace, meaning that as older vesselswere retired, new ships entered service in far smaller numbers. Fur-thermore, the inconsistency of US naval planning, shifting from a plan-ned significant increase during the Ford years to apparent navalretrenchment under Carter, and combined with overruns of cost andshipbuilding meant that a steady response to the Soviet buildup was notachieved. For the Soviet Union, the situation was very different. AdmiralGorshkov’s leadership, combined with major naval investment, allowedthe USSR to shift the balance somewhat in its favor. The need todevelop a large ‘‘blue water’’ navy to project Soviet power into the ThirdWorld, as well as to support the central military balance in Europe,played a major role in driving this effort forward.

However, the balance began to shift from 1980. A greater emphasison US power projection capabilities by the Carter Administration led toincreases in naval spending. These included funding for the traditionalassets of US naval power—a nuclear-powered carrier, attack submarines,and major surface warships. Carter’s successor, of course, expanded thiseffort greatly. The vigorous naval buildup of the Reagan Administration,particularly Secretary Lehman’s efforts, saw a resurgence in US navalpower that left the Soviet Navy well behind by the mid-1980s, exacer-bating its existing difficulties while adding additional ones. Moreover,the Soviet Navy did not gain any actual combat experience during thistime, while it was forced onto the defensive by the US naval strategy.Soviet forward-deployed naval forces in such areas as the Caribbeansimply did not have the endurance or capabilities of similarly deployedAmerican flotillas (in the Indian Ocean, for example.)

Among the many important roles played by the US and Soviet naviesduring this period—and certainly the most visible—was that of powerprojection, training for or taking part in operations in the Third Worldin support of other forces assigned to this task. Given the growing con-cern during the 1970s that Soviet military power—including navalpower—was contributing to an unfavorable geopolitical balance in Mos-cow’s favor, the US naval expansion from 1980 was in step with theoverall American buildup of forces undertaken by the Carter andReagan Administrations. The renewal of confrontation between thesuperpowers during this period played a pivotal role in propelling thiseffort. The naval balance during the 1980s came to serve as an indicatorof a resurgence of American power and geopolitical will, particularly insuch actions as Grenada (1983) and the large-scale exercises in the Car-ibbean and off Central America (1982–84), which involved significantdisplays of US naval strength.113 Combined with the projection of USnaval forces into areas close to the Soviet heartland, these came torepresent the visibly thrusting effort by the United States to reassert its


military primacy vis a vis the Soviet Union. In the Third World, whichhad played a significant role in bringing about the renewed superpowerconfrontation of the early 1980s, such an effort was seen as crucial by USpolicymakers. This would become evident in the balance of power pro-jection forces as a whole, discussed in the following chapter.


7 Forces for rapiddeployment

The emergence of a balance of power projection forces between theUnited States and the Soviet Union during the 1970s was a relativelyrecent phenomenon. The United States had, since the end of WorldWar II (when the capability was acquired on a vast scale), been at theforefront here. The Korean and Vietnam wars, together with interven-tions in Lebanon (1958) and the Dominican Republic (1965), wereexamples of the American capacity for deploying and sustaining largecombat forces in regions far from its own territory. Apart from thedeployment of air defense personnel to Egypt in 1970, during thatcountry’s ‘‘War of Attrition’’ with Israel, the USSR was unable to matchsuch deployments. The stationing of nuclear weapons in Cuba during1962 was reversed by the United States, a dramatic example of Moscow’sinability to successfully engage in such actions during this time.

The experience of Vietnam, however, led to disillusionment withlarge-scale interventions, without a direct threat to national security.Congressional action, including the War Powers Act of 1973, reflectedthis mood. Accordingly, the emphasis on power projection forcesdeclined during the 1970s. Instead of utilizing its own forces, the UnitedStates would provide military equipment to local allies in order for thesecountries to play a stabilizing role in regions of importance. The NixonDoctrine led to such efforts in Southeast Asia and, most importantly, inIran, where the Shah came to be seen as a pillar of stability in an area ofvital importance for Washington.

At the same time, the Soviet Union began an expansion of its owncapabilities in this area. Along with its naval buildup, the USSR began toexpand its airlift and sealift capabilities, improved the infrastructure ofnaval facilities in areas like the Indian Ocean, and developed forces forpower projection missions.

These developments coincided with growing upheaval in the ThirdWorld. A series of successful guerrilla wars and coups in Africa led to theestablishment of left-leaning regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia,and elsewhere. The fall of pro-American governments in South Vietnam,Cambodia, and Laos in 1975 reflected this trend. From an American

perspective, the fact that many of these new regimes were (or appearedto be) pro-Soviet marked a shift in the global balance of power towardMoscow. The role of the Soviet Union was also seen to be decisive. TheSoviet support for the Vietnamese Communists in 1974–75, the combinedrole of Soviet arms and Cuban combat troops in Angola in 1975, as well asSoviet support for rebels in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau indicated aSoviet strategy of intervention (albeit through proxy troops and armssupplies) in the Third World.

Nor was the Soviet Union’s more assertive role the only concern inWashington. The embargo of oil supplies to the United States by Arabmembers of OPEC in 1973–74 drew American attention toward theissue of intervention in the Persian Gulf. The dependence of the UnitedStates on such supplies for its own prosperity was brought home sharplyby this event. Furthermore, the embargo was carried out by suchfriendly governments as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as a result of Amer-ican support for Israel in the 1973 war. If hostile forces—either internalor external—should seize control of these countries, the possibility of alonger and more comprehensive cutoff of oil supplies was much greater.

It was during the winter of 1974–75 that the issue of US militaryintervention to secure Persian Gulf oil was first broached. PresidentFord stated that ‘‘If a country is being strangled . . . that in effect meansthat a country has a right to protect itself against death.’’1 Schlesingernoted ‘‘it is indeed feasible’’ to use American military power in such anevent.2 In a widely read article in January 1975, Robert W. Tucker, aprofessor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University,argued that a case existed for the use of force to secure oil supplies insuch an eventuality. ‘‘There is a general consensus . . . that if the presentsituation goes on unaltered, a disaster resembling the 1930s is indeed adistinct possibility and that it would have as its immediate and pre-cipitating cause the present oil price.’’3

In August 1975, the US Congress issued a report on the subject of USmilitary intervention in the Persian Gulf. It highlighted the dependenceof the United States on imported oil, although this was lower than mostof the NATO allies and Japan (37 percent for the United States asopposed to 95–100 percent for these nations.)4 The consequences of‘‘sustained sanctions by the Arab [oil producing] states, perhaps abettedby Iran,’’ were described in stark terms:

. . . severe economic and social problems probably would alterAmerica’s fundamental lifestyle. Oil shortages up to 50 percent, forexample, could be expected in New England and some MiddleAtlantic States. Shifting essential oil supplies from west to east wouldbe a slow, laborious process. Pipelines are few and capacities low.Tankers would have to transit the Panama Canal, which excludes allsuch ships larger than 65,000 deadweight tons.5


This would be the result of a loss of at most 20 percent of US oilimports.6 As noted above, the economies of NATO Europe and Japanrelied to a much greater extent on Persian Gulf oil. As the events of1973–74 showed, such a denial of petroleum supplies would have a veryadverse effect on the economies of all developed nations, as well asmuch of the Third World.7 The interdependence of the Westernindustrial states meant that insulation from such economic turmoil wassimply impossible. This knowledge would influence American policytoward the Persian Gulf.

By 1977, concerns over the security of Persian Gulf oil had seguedinto concerns over the increase of Soviet influence in key areas of theThird World. The Soviet Union appeared to be filling the vacuum leftby Western powers, particularly in Africa. Moreover, the emergence of apro-Soviet regime in South Yemen had raised fears that the ArabianPeninsula could soon come under pressure from the Soviets and theirproxies. The perceived threat from the USSR in both mineral-rich sub-Saharan Africa and the petroleum-rich Persian Gulf began to have animpact on US policymakers by the time Jimmy Carter took office, andthese perceptions would come to play a role in shaping overall USnational security policy.

Carter and the RDF, 1977–81

The new administration began to take an interest in improving USmilitary capabilities for power projection. In outlining the requirementsfor study in PRM 10, President Carter directed its authors to ‘‘evaluatethe relative ability of the U.S. and its allies to achieve U.S. objectives inspecified military contingencies.’’8 PRM 10 outlined several scenariosinvolving US power projection forces, including situations in the MiddleEast and sub-Saharan Africa. In both contingencies, sizeable US forcesfrom the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force were committed.9

The authors of PRM 10 saw this capability as central to US strategy.Dividing their study into eight Alternative Integrated Military Strategies(AIMS), they cited three roles for such forces: as part of a global warwith the Soviet Union; for peacekeeping operations in the Third World;and for direct intervention where US interests were threatened.10 Insummarizing the roles of power projection for the various AIMS, theauthors stated ‘‘The Third World is seen to have such importance thatthe US requires significant capabilities for unilateral intervention, to theextent of risking a military confrontation with the Soviets if necessary.’’11

‘‘In all AIMS,’’ they continued, ‘‘the US would have a major capabilityfor intervention in the third world inherent in its forces even if notbought specifically for that purpose.’’12

This analysis led to discussion elsewhere, including the Pentagon.Secretary Brown, together with the JCS, listed some important questions

Forces for rapid deployment 155

in relation to PRM 10. Relating to US strategy and the availability offorces (which became an important issue in power projection planning),Secretary Brown and the JCS listed the following question: ‘‘To whatextent should the US acquire military capabilities, above those requiredfor the European theater, to undertake military operations (eitheroffensive or defensive) against the Soviets in a US-USSR war?’’13 Evenmore important were the questions regarding ‘‘US Military Strategy forCrisis Management and Potential Local Wars:’’

What should be the planned extent of US military forces (and sup-plies) available for crisis management or intervention in local wars?To what extent should these forces (or supplies) be available withoutdrawing from those required for a major US-USSR war? In whatindividual regions of the world should the US plan for the use of USmilitary forces in crises and potential local wars (Middle East,Korea)? Are there any regions where the US should plan for the useof land combat forces?14

As a review memorandum, PRM 10 was meant as a stepping stone to amore concrete American policy. This came in August 1977 with theissuing of PD 18, which included the objective that would lead to thecreation of a specialized, multi-service power projection force. In dis-cussing competition with the Soviet Union, Carter called for efforts to‘‘Counterbalance, together with our allies and friends, by a combinationof military forces, political efforts, and economic programs, Soviet militarypower and adverse influence in key areas, particularly Europe, the MiddleEast, and East Asia.’’ (My italics)15

Although it would not be established for almost two-and-a-half years,the PRM 10 study and PD 18 led to planning for what became known asthe Rapid Deployment Force—a specialized power projection forcemeant to swiftly deploy to Third World trouble spots in order to secureUS interests.16 This would consist of about 100,000 men, who wouldhave a self-sustained logistical capability.17 At its core would be‘‘a ‘deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility’ for globalcontingencies, particularly in the Persian Gulf region and Korea,’’according to National Security Adviser Brzezinski.18

Between 1977 and 1979, there was little headway made on the devel-opment of such a power projection force.19 In part, this reflected thegeneral view of the Carter Administration, which favored negotiation ofThird World issues with the Soviet Union or through the UnitedNations.

Events, however, began to push the Carter Administration, which hadconcentrated much effort on improvement of NATO forces and on astable strategic balance, toward a renewed effort in this area. The fight-ing in the Ogaden between Ethiopia and Somalia played a role in this.


Facing invading Somali forces and local guerrillas (as well as rebels inEritrea), a hodgepodge of Ethiopian and East Bloc forces, includingCuban armored units and East European specialists, were commanded bySoviet General Vasily I. Petrov, First Deputy Commander-In-Chief of theRed Army. A massive Soviet airlift of weapons to Ethiopia, followed by thecombined forces’ counterattack, drove the Somalis from the Ogaden. Thissuccess meant that Ethiopian forces were shifted to the Eritrean front,where they gained the upper hand against the insurgents.20

The conflict in the Ogaden led to a reappraisal of using US forces inregional conflict, even if only to present a show of force. In a meeting ofthe NSC’s SCC on February 22, 1978, US responses to the crisis weredebated. One possibility discussed was the deployment of a US carriertask force to the region. Brzezinski and Brown expressed support forthis. Brzezinski saw the need to deter an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia,a distinct possibility at the time, and also to serve two other purposes.First, to support the possible deployment of pro-US forces from suchcountries as Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Second, to give encourage-ment to these countries to supply arms to Somalia, because the taskforce would be able to protect arms shipments. Such a deployment‘‘could be a confidence building measure, encouraging countries in theregion that the U.S. is present, stands with them, will protect the flow ofarms, and will provide protection from the Russians.’’ Brown concurred,noting that the task force’s primary mission would be ‘‘to keep the Rus-sians from attacking arms transfer shipments.’’21

This was meant to support Somalia in case of an Ethiopian invasion. Itwas also raised as a means of effecting a Somali withdrawal from theOgaden. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs,raised this issue. ‘‘We might consider a carrier in the context of asking[Somali President Mohammed] Siad-Barre to withdraw from theOgaden and defend his country from the border.’’22

This meeting helped lead to of PD 32, setting out US policy towardthe Horn of Africa. Although Carter refused to send a carrier to theHorn, he ‘‘indicated willingness to consider moving a carrier closer tothe area—for example, Diego Garcia.’’23 In May, a NATO task force wasdispatched to the Horn, in order to reassure Somalia of the West’sdetermination to safeguard her territorial integrity.24 In Carter’s view,US support for Somalia could only be provided if her sovereignty werejeopardized by Ethiopia, and not for its actions in the Ogaden.25 How-ever, the growing importance of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf,as well as an apparently more assertive Soviet policy, helped shiftAmerican efforts toward a more direct military presence.26

A marked shift in tone toward the use of US Rapid Deployment Force(RDF) came to be heard during 1978. In a speech at Wake ForestUniversity in March, Carter declared that the United States would‘‘counter any threats to our allies and our vital interests in Asia, the


Middle East and other regions of the world.’’ This would be accom-plished by ‘‘quickly deployable forces—air, land and sea—to defend ourinterests throughout the world.’’27 On June 7, during commencementexercises at the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Carter identified thekind of threat these forces were meant to deter:

The Soviet Union apparently sees military power and military assis-tance as the best means of expanding their influence abroad.Obviously areas of instability in the world provide a tempting targetfor this effort and all to often they seem ready to exploit any suchopportunities. As became apparent . . . in Ethiopia . . . the Sovietsprefer to use proxy forces to achieve their purposes.28

The Iranian Revolution of 1978–79, as well as conflict between North andSouth Yemen, brought an added impetus to the creation of a combinedpower projection force. During the Yemeni crisis in the summer of 1979,a squadron of F-15 fighters, along with two AWAC aircraft, weredeployed to Saudi Arabia, which provided American weaponry to NorthYemen in order to defeat incursions from the Soviet-backed South. Thecarrier Constellation was deployed with a battlegroup to the Indian Oceanas well, protecting arms shipments to North Yemen.29 This marked a shiftin US policy toward the Gulf, displaying a determination to utilizeAmerican forces to counter moves by Soviet proxies. In January 1979,Brzezinski famously enunciated the growing alarm among US plannerstoward events in the region: ‘‘An Arc of Crisis stretches along the shoresof the Indian Ocean, with fragile political and social structures in a regionof vital importance . . .The resulting . . . chaos could well be filled by ele-ments hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries.’’30

The events that brought about the creation of the RDF came in 1979,with the seizure of the US embassy in Teheran in November and theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan the following month. These events, the firstspurred by the fall of the Shah, effectively marked the collapse of theNixon Doctrine. In its place, Carter enunciated his own doctrine, directedtoward the Persian Gulf. In his State of the Union address on January 23,1980, he spelled out the threat posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan:

The region now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of greatstrategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world’sexportable oil. The Soviet effort . . .has brought Soviet military forces towithin 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits ofHormuz . . .The SovietUnion is now attempting to consolidate a strategicposition that poses a grave threat to the freemovement ofMiddle East oil.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside forceto gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an


assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelledby use of any means necessary, including military force.31

Among the steps being taken, the President noted that ‘‘We areimproving our capability to deploy US military forces rapidly to distantareas,’’ as well as ‘‘making arrangements for key naval and air facilities tobe used by our forces in the region.’’32

With this bold declaration of American intent, an obvious needemerged for sufficient military forces to give the Carter Doctrine muscle.Plans were already in place for such a capability. Since PRM 10 and PD18 had been drafted in 1977, the JCS had planned for possible inter-vention in the Persian Gulf. In September 1978, they issued a report,titled ‘‘Review of US Strategy Related to the Middle East and the PersianGulf.’’ Among vital US interests were the need to maintain access to theregion’s oil and to prevent ‘‘an inimical power or combination of powersfrom establishing hegemony’’ in the Gulf.33 The report urged a con-tinual US naval presence—based on carrier battle groups and amphi-bious forces—in the Indian Ocean.34

General Bernard Rogers, US Army Chief of Staff, briefed reporters inJune 1979 on a ‘‘unilateral force’’ that would be centered around threeArmy divisions, including the 82nd Airborne.35 At the same time, Pre-sident Carter’s Policy Review Committee met to consider options for thePersian Gulf. Among these were the establishment of a Middle East com-mand, a major US naval presence in the Indian Ocean, expansion ofmilitary facilities, and a rapid reaction force of 100,000 men, as had beendescribed by General Rogers.36 On October 1, the RDF was establishedwith the mission of ‘‘conducting predeployment planning and training fornon-NATO contingencies.’’37 By January 1980, therefore, plans for anAmerican intervention capability for the Persian Gulf were underway.38

The establishment of the RDF had precedents. During the Kennedyand Johnson years, a similar force, known as Strike Command, wasestablished to respond to Third World contingencies. It was composedof some six Army divisions—two of which were airborne—and Air Forceunits.39 Its role was to formulate plans for deployment, and did not haveany forces under its direct control, except when used operationally. In1962, the United States established a task force combining forces fromthe different services for possible use during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In1965, this force was used in the Dominican Republic.40

In planning the RDF’s missions, three key threats appeared. First,Soviet military intervention in the Persian Gulf, either through an inva-sion of Iran or deployment of troops by air or sea into the Gulf itself.Second, that of a regional power (like Iraq) which, for its own reasons orin support of Soviet policy, invaded the Gulf oil-producing states likeSaudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman. Third, internal upheaval, akin to thatin Iran in 1978–79, which would threaten oil supplies.


Once its missions had been identified, the RDF would now comprisesubstantial forces from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.Given this fact, on March 1, 1980 the RDF was re-designated the RapidDeployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and given primary responsibilityfor the defense of Southwest Asia.41 As JCS Chairman General Jonesreported in 1980, ‘‘The RDJTF will be responsible for peacetime plan-ning and for exercising of designated forces in their RDF roles; in theevent of deployment to areas lacking adequate US command structure,the RDJTF would be the on-scene command element for operations.’’42

Its first commander would be Marine General Paul X. Kelley.As with Strike Command 20 years before, the RDJTF did not require the

establishment of any new combat units. All of the forces that would havecome under its control were already in existence and would simply havebeen ordered to deploy. Only the fact that all four services—as opposed tothe Army-Air Force combination of Strike Command—were includedmade this new force unique.43 The RDJTF would also have been able todeploy in a manner tailored to the situation at hand. As Secretary Brownwrote in 1980, ‘‘we have already designated specific units as components ofour Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) . . .The composition of the forcesdeployed will vary depending on the nature and location of the crisis.’’44

Accordingly, the RDJTF expanded greatly in terms of manpower,equipment, and assigned units. By 1981, the RDJTF, headquartered atMacDill Air Force Base, Florida, consisted of the following forces:

– Army: 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault Division, 24th InfantryDivision (Mechanized), plus one air cavalry, one armored and one airdefense brigades, two Ranger battalions and a Special Forces Group.

– Navy: Three carrier battle groups (20–30 ships), 3 amphibiousready groups carrying Marine units, 5 maritime patrol squadrons,plus 13 pre-positioned ships with equipment.

– Marine Corps: One Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) plus oneMarine Amphibious Brigade (MAB).

– Air Force: Six Tactical Fighter Wings (plus one Group), an AWACSwing, and the 57th Air Division, made up of B-52 bombers andsupporting tanker and reconnaissance aircraft.45

All told, these forces came to number some 200,000, with as many as 100,000reserve personnel in support.46 Apart from261 headquarters staff atMacDill,however, the RDJTF did not actually have operational control over theseforces. Instead, they would be drawn as necessary, in whatever ‘‘package’’ wasdeemed necessary for the situation at hand.47 As General Kelley noted:

Our task will be to develop a number of force packages, each with itsown political signals and each with its own combat capabilities. Atone end of the spectrum, we will have a light package that could


deploy to any crisis spot in the world in a matter of days. On theother end will be the entire rapid deployment force. Simply stated,our force packages will be tailored to what is required for a specificcrisis.48

Having identified the contingencies under which it would be used, andthe forces assigned to it, it is necessary to examine the third question,perhaps the most challenging of all: How would the RDJTF be deployedto Southwest Asia? This was no easy task, as even a relatively small forcewould have experienced considerable challenges in deploying to theregion. In order to allay such difficulties, the Carter Administration tookaction in three key areas. First, it improved US airlift and sealift cap-abilities. By 1981, US military airlift forces could call on 596 transportaircraft, 304 of which were long range. For sealift, there were 215 drycargo vessels directly available.49 A new cargo aircraft, known as theC-X, was to be developed, and improvements to existing airlift assetswere to be undertaken.50 A program to store or preposition militaryequipment on ships at Diego Garcia to support the RDJTF was toreceive over $310 million, while a longer term prepositioning programwould receive nearly $800 million.51

Second, bases in the region were identified and upgraded. Facilities inEgypt, Oman, Somalia, and Kenya began to be upgraded by the UnitedStates during this time. The base at Diego Garcia was also improved,with efforts to extend the runway there to 12,000 feet (enough toaccommodate B-52 bombers, C-5 cargo planes, and P-3 maritime patrolaircraft), as well as dredge the lagoon to accommodate an aircraft car-rier. In all, the United States planned to spend $2 billion over a five-yearperiod to improve these facilities.52 The third effort was prepositioning.This was meant to ensure that enough supplies existed to sustain RDJTFunits in combat. The Marine Corps embraced this concept early. The7th MAB was designated as the Marines’ rapid reaction unit for theGulf. Its equipment was stationed on the ships of the Near-Term Pre-positioning Force (NTPF). Numbering 12,500 men, the 7th MAB wasdeployed at Twentynine Palms, California. In a crisis, it would be flownto Southwest Asia and ‘‘marry up’’ with its equipment. Stationing ofNTPF ships began in May 1980, and by July a total of seven ships haddeployed.53

Despite the major efforts made during 1980 to expand the RDJTF’scapabilities, there remained serious issues and much criticism of theconcept. Jeffrey Record gave perhaps the most serious critique of theRDF on military grounds. In his view, the RDF was ‘‘a fatally flawedmilitary instrument for the preservation of uninterrupted U.S. access tovital Persian Gulf oil—the principal rationale underlying the force.’’54

Among his criticisms was the fact that the Army and Air Force elementswould be dependent on a major base infrastructure to carry out operations,


thus negating the concept of rapid deployment. Furthermore, many ofthe units were unsuited to desert warfare or for fighting large Sovietmechanized forces.55 Record suggested ‘‘a small, agile, tactically capableintervention force that is based at and supplied from the sea,’’ meaningthat the Marine Corps would assume primary responsibility.56 Thiswould avoid the political problems of a major US deployment ashore inthe region, which could have led to strains with local allies.57 ChristopherCoker concurred, noting the lack of suitable base facilities in the regionand the considerable need for support personnel, including mobilityforces.58

These critiques represented a fundamental debate over strategyregarding the RDF. Given the difficulties of distance and time that itsforces would have faced, the strategies for using the RDF during 1980–81 appeared to be quite risky. US planners saw the RDF as beingdeployed in a ‘‘pre-emptive’’ manner, meant to seize key objectives (i.e.,oilfields) before Soviet forces occupied them. This would mean that theRDF would serve as a ‘‘tripwire’’ force, meant to deter the Soviets bydisplaying American determination to defend the Gulf, albeit initiallywith very small forces. New York Times reporter Richard Halloransummed up the dangers of this strategy. ‘‘[The tripwire strategy] couldbe extremely risky, especially if the Soviet Union was the adversary. Itwould be the Cuban Missile Crisis on the ground, with two armies eye-ball to eyeball.’’59 Statements by US military planners cast doubt on theability of such a force to hold its objectives in the face of a Soviet assault.General Volney F. Warner, head of Readiness Command, warned that ifthe 82nd Airborne Division and a Marine brigade were sent to theGulf—a force of some 35,000 men—they could be overwhelmed bysuperior Soviet forces.60

This led to concerns over the use of nuclear weapons if RDF forces werefacing defeat. In early 1979, the Pentagon completed a study projecting aresponse to a Soviet invasion of Iran. It stated that US forces would needto resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to prevent a Soviet vic-tory.61 In classified Congressional testimony, General Kelley concurredwith this assessment, stating that nuclear weapons would probably have tobe used to prevent the loss of the Persian Gulf to Soviet forces.62

While the tripwire concept had many critics, some saw it as makingsense in the early years of the RDF. In the Spring 1981 issue of thejournal International Security, Kenneth Waltz called for ‘‘linking a minimaldefense to America’s strategic deterrent. What we should strive for is anasset-seizing, deterrent force that can handle both internal and externalthreats.’’ Elaborating on this, Waltz wrote that ‘‘a deterrent strategy,properly implemented, puts the Soviet Union on notice that maintaininga substantial flow of oil from Persian Gulf states is a vital Americaninterest . . .A deterrent strategy entails no use of nuclear weapons, if itsucceeds, and can entail a limited and selective use, if it fails.’’63


The development of the RDF concept between 1977 and 1980 pro-vides a clear example of how American perceptions of the Soviet threatcame to shape policy. Two key points are evident in this process. First,the nature of the perceived threat shifted. In 1977, the authors of PRM10 and PD 18 saw instability in the Third World—the Middle East, ofcourse, but also sub-Saharan Africa as well—as providing the main rolefor a power projection force. Soviet-backed proxy forces, like those ofCuba, were seen as potential opponents, necessitating a light, mobileforce as a counter. By 1979, after events in the Horn of Africa, Iran andAfghanistan had brought home the need for a direct US military role inthe Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the primary role of the RDF cameto be seen as countering a Soviet military thrust, leading to the planningand configuration of the RDJTF. While Soviet proxies and internalinstability were listed among the RDJTF’s missions, the Soviet threat wasgiven first priority. As General Kelley noted, ‘‘The toughest contingency,and the one that certainly has captured my attention needless to say . . . isthe direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.’’64

Second, the geographical area where such a force would have to fightbecame focused on the Persian Gulf and surrounding areas. Whereasthe RDF had originally been seen as having a global power projectionmission, the RDJTF was focused primarily on Southwest Asia, withdefense of the Persian Gulf its central role.65 There were several reasonsfor this. From 1977, for example, the CIA reported that the SovietUnion, despite considerable domestic oil reserves, might have to importpetroleum, particularly from the Persian Gulf. Although there was dis-agreement over whether this would occur or what it might portend, itincreased the Carter Administration’s concern over a Soviet threat to theregion.66 The invasion of Afghanistan, of course, was seen as an indica-tion of the USSR’s willingness to move directly into the region, nowconsiderably less stable than it had been two years previously. An April1980 NSC memorandum warned of a Soviet threat to Iran, and whysuch an action would be attractive for Moscow:

For more than 150 years, the Russians have aspired to advance inthis area . . . Iran could be a paying proposition with its vast oil andgas reserves—the first really profitable territorial acquisition for theSoviets. It could help pay for Cuba and Ethiopia and help surroundand subdue Afghanistan. (Underlining in original)67

It also pointed out that in the event of U.S. military action on this issue‘‘we must be prepared to go all the way and occupy a sizable part of thecountry. If we do not, we will merely open the way for a Soviet takeoverand Soviet utilization of its resources. (Underlining in original)68

The Persian Gulf, of course, was the geographical focus of the CarterDoctrine, and the Soviet Union the primary threat. As Robert Tucker


noted, ‘‘it is only the Soviet Union that represents ‘any outside force’capable of gaining control of the Persian Gulf.’’69

These factors were representative of a renewed Cold War. TheRDJTF, as configured, was perhaps the most visible instrument in arobust US response to what was seen as dangerous Soviet adventurism.Along with major increases in defense spending for FYs 1981–82 andthe ‘‘Countervailing Strategy’’ exemplified by PD 59, the RDJTF, ascontinually stressed, was a means of confronting the Soviet Union in theregion that most likely to witness a clash between the two superpowers,the Persian Gulf. It has been argued that the Carter Doctrine helpedspur several such measures during 1980–81.70

The concept of the RDF, therefore, is an example of the change notonly in the Carter Administration but in the perception of the Americanpublic of the superpower relationship. Just as the RDF evolved from aThird World intervention force, meant to battle Soviet surrogates, to aall-service task force with its primary mission the defense of the PersianGulf from a Soviet invasion, so too the public’s view of the Soviet threat.Whereas in 1977 the Soviets were seen as following an opportunisticpolicy in the Third World, by 1980 Soviet actions were seen as havingtriggered a new cold war, with the Persian Gulf its fulcrum. Policy-makers and public alike came to see a robust military capability in thisarea as a vital step in checking Soviet aggressiveness, and the RDJTFreflected this perception.

Reagan and the Central Command, 1981–85

By the time Ronald Reagan arrived in the White House in January1981, the RDJTF was a cornerstone of US military strategy. HaroldBrown had declared the RDJTF one of the four pillars of US militarystrength, together with the Navy, US forces committed to NATOEurope, and the US strategic forces.71 The outgoing administration hadbequeathed its successor a strategy emphasizing the security of the Per-sian Gulf as a top priority. Two directives, both issued January 15, 1981,bear this out. PD 62, focusing on US strategic interests, declared that‘‘While NATO will retain first call on force deployments in peacetime forwartime operations, the Persian Gulf shall have highest priority forimprovement of strategic lift and general purpose forces in the FiveYear Defense Program’’ (My italics).72 PD 63, addressing the PersianGulf, cited several areas of effort. Among these were ‘‘building up our. . . capabilities to project force into the region while maintaining a cred-ible presence there,’’ and ‘‘contribute to deterring and resisting Sovietpenetration—political, economic, or military.’’73

The Reagan Administration saw the RDJTF in similar terms, whilemaking it a part of a more expansive national strategy. NSDD 32 stated‘‘The U.S. must plan, in conjunction with its allies, for a successful


defense in a global war against the Soviet Union and its allies.’’ ForSouthwest Asia, the containment of Soviet influence and protection of oilsupplies were key objectives. ‘‘U.S. military strategy is to deter Sovietaggression; if necessary, to combat the Soviets in the theater; and toprepare for executing counteroffensives elsewhere.’’74 The last point wasin line with the new administration’s emphasis on ‘‘horizontal escala-tion,’’ by which a Soviet move in one part of the world could see a USresponse elsewhere, in order to keep Moscow off guard.75

In order to protect the Persian Gulf from a Soviet thrust, a three-‘‘tier’’plan was outlined in NSDD 32:

First, we must plan for and demonstrate our ability to project theRDJTF . . . quickly into the region to prevent a Soviet fait accompli . . .Second, if deterrence fails, we must plan to combat the Soviets in thetheater to dissuade them from continued aggression. The third tier ofDefense planning is to prepare for executing counter-offensives onother fronts where the U.S. has advantages.

Throughout this planning process, the potential for this conflict tobecome global must be recognized and planned for. (Underlining inoriginal)76

US general purpose force structure would reflect these priorities.‘‘General order of priority will be given to improvements of forwarddeployed forces, forces providing flexibility in deployment, such as theRapid Deployment Joint Task Force, other units earmarked for earliestdeployment, and associated lift forces.’’77

A similar approach was taken in the Reagan Administration’s five-yeardefense plan. Known as Fiscal Year 1984–1988 Defense Guidance, its con-tents were quickly leaked to the press. While much attention was focusedon plans for a ‘‘protracted nuclear war,’’ considerable attention wasgiven to a Persian Gulf contingency. Although US planning retainedscenarios dealing with internal instability or war between local powers,its main emphasis was on checking direct moves by the Soviets or theirproxies.78 Furthermore, a Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf would pre-sent Moscow with the danger of escalation in other geographical areas.79

The importance of Southwest Asia was repeatedly emphasized duringthis time. In Congressional hearings on defense appropriations in May1982, for example, the importance of the region—and the RDJTF—wasmade plain. ‘‘The emergence of the Rapid Deployment Force and theemphasis on Southwest Asia have significantly altered U.S. militaryplanning. The area is now considered to be a third potential . . . theaterof war—along with Europe and Northeast Asia.’’80

This approach was in line with the Reagan Administration’s view ofthe international situation at this time, based on its perceptions of the


Soviet Union. Whereas the Carter Administration had seen the Sovietthreat to the Persian Gulf as the first among a variety of overall issues inits foreign policy, Reagan saw this as being the most significant dangerpresented by the USSR, which had become the principal threat toAmerican security. In a May 1981 RAND Corporation report, JamesDigby described this approach—which he termed the ‘‘Strategy of FullRecourse’’—and its application to Southwest Asia. Among the points hedescribed were ‘‘the preparedness to deal with simultaneous challengesin many places . . . the enhancement of mobility forces, particularly navalforces . . . the restoration of a world-wide base system and selective for-ward basing in newly critical places,’’ and ‘‘the extension of the politicaluse of U.S. nuclear strength.’’81

Perceptions of the military balance were also critical to this approach.A Pentagon statement, issued by the US Embassy in London in March1982, stated ‘‘Nations in the region will shape their policies at least par-tially in accord with their perception of the prevailing military balancebetween the superpowers. The U.S. must not be perceived as wanting ineither the will or the capability to defend Western interests—interests weshare with regional states.’’82

Having inherited the RDJTF from Carter, Reagan moved to improveits effectiveness as a fighting force. Central to this was the staging ofexercises meant to familiarize these forces with the conditions theywould face in combat. In November 1980 the first of the annual BrightStar exercises in Egypt was carried out, which provided combined forcestraining for the RDJTF. One thousand four hundred troops of the 101stAir Assault Division took part in this exercise.83 In November 1981, asecond Bright Star exercise was held. It was considerably broader inscope than its predecessor. Some 4,000 US troops were airlifted toEgypt, while equipment for a mechanized infantry battalion was sent bysea. The US forces carried out an airborne assault and desert warfareexercises and were supported by six B-52s. In Sudan, 350 US personnelcarried out a joint exercise with Sudanese forces, while in Somaliaanother 350 Americans, using engineering equipment, carried out ajoint exercise with Somali forces at the port of Berbera. In Oman, USMarines carried out an amphibious landing with Omani troops.84

Bright Star ’82 was a clear display of the RDJTF’s capabilities, as well asa show of American geopolitical determination in the region (it was heldbarely a month after the assassination of Egyptian President AnwarSadat.) However, it also showed some of the lingering problems the newforce faced. It took four days for the 4,000-man force sent to Egypt to befully deployed. Furthermore, the inclusion of the B-52s appeared toreinforce the idea that the US military was continuing to rely on over-whelming firepower in lieu of flexible strategic and tactical concepts.85

At the same time, the RDJTF’s importance within the American defenseestablishment grew. On October 1, 1981, the RDJTF was chartered by the


Pentagon to be a separate joint task force reporting directly to the Pre-sident through the JCS. The RDJTF commander was ordered to limitforce planning to Southwest Asia, emphasizing the importance of thisregion and the need to focus the RDJTF’s attention on this area alone.86

This was a step closer to the Reagan Administration’s goal of elevating theRDJTF to a unified command.87

The Administration also sought to expand the RDJTF in terms ofboth forces assigned and prepositioning efforts. By 1982, the RDJTFhad available as many as 11 Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings, a Navysurface action group (centered around a recommissioned battleship),and a second MAF.88 The Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) pro-gram, an extension of the Carter effort, was planned for FY 1984. Uponcompletion, it would provide equipment and supplies for three MABs.89

These efforts increased the size and capability of the RDJTF.90 More-over, as had been promised, the RDJTF was both elevated in status andchanged in name. On January 1, 1983, the RDJTF became the USCentral Command (CENTCOM), responsible for the defense of South-west Asia.91 The establishment of CENTCOM removed the cumbersomesystem of shared responsibility between the JCS and Readiness Com-mand. Now, akin to his counterparts in Europe, the Pacific and LatinAmerica, the Commander-In-Chief, CENTCOM would be answerableonly to the JCS and the President.

By 1985, the size of CENTCOM’s forces had increased well beyond whathad been intended when planning for the RDF had begun in 1977.Including support units, CENTCOM could call on 291,600 personnel bythis time: 131,000 soldiers, 53,000 sailors, 70,000 Marines, and 33,000airmen. The augmented CENTCOM headquarters totalled 1,100.92 Thislast category is illustrative, as it is a four-fold increase over what the RDJTFhad five years earlier.

While most of these forces were deployed within the ContinentalUnited States, there were important forward-based forces already inSouthwest Asia. One of the three carrier battle groups assigned toCENTCOM was always on station in the Indian Ocean, while a detach-ment of AWAC aircraft was deployed in Saudi Arabia.93 A MarineAmphibious Unit, some 1,800 strong, was usually deployed in theIndian Ocean as well, providing an on-scene spearhead.94

The scope of military exercises grew as well. Bright Star ’83 involved26,500 US military personnel and covered Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, andOman. In addition to airborne training in Egypt, Marines carried outamphibious training in Somalia, and, for the first time, US, Egyptian,and Sudanese forces carried out combined exercises.95 Prepositioningefforts continued to improve the deployment capabilities of US forces.By 1985, the NTPF at Diego Garcia numbered 17 ships (with another inthe Mediterranean.)96 By FY 1986, plans called for 13 MPS ships toreplace the NTPF. These vessels would be able to carry supplies for


three MABs (46,000 men.)97 US airlift and sealift capabilities were alsoincreased. A program to acquire 50 additional C-5 transport aircraft wasbegun.98 In addition to MPS, the Navy converted eight SL-7 high-speedmerchant vessels into sealift ships capable of carrying the equipment ofan Army armored or mechanized infantry division.99

As during the Carter years, the Reagan Administration continued toimprove US access to facilities in the region. Along with Egypt, Oman,Somalia, and Kenya, efforts were made to improve bases in Turkey. A1982 agreement allowed US forces to establish NATO bases at Kars,Konya, and Van, near the Soviet border.100 The United States alsoreached an understanding with Saudi Arabia, allowing for use of bases.However, nearly all of these agreements were conditional on the situa-tion at hand. Even Turkey stated that the new bases were to be used fora NATO, rather than a unilateral American, contingency.101

These efforts reflected the Reagan Administration’s overall geopoli-tical strategy. Applied to Southwest Asia, these efforts reflected a deter-mination by US policymakers to thwart any Soviet threats there, as partof a global strategy. NSDD 75, issued January 17, 1983, outlined USpolicy toward the USSR. Militarily,

Worldwide, U.S. general purpose forces must be strong and flexibleenough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide variety of con-tingencies. In the Third World, Moscow must know that areas ofinterest to the U.S. cannot be attacked or threatened without risk ofserious U.S. military countermeasures.102

The directive went on to state ‘‘The U.S. effort in the Third World mustinvolve . . . readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary to protectvital interests and support endangered Allies and friends.’’103 NSDD 99,addressing Southwest Asia, listed as a regional security objective the abilityto ‘‘deter Soviet aggression and maintain readiness for combat if necessary’’as the top priority. This would ‘‘prevent the Soviet Union from attaining aposition of hegemony in the region by deterring Soviet expansion.’’104

Military strategy also remained a topic of debate. At first, given thelimitations in the RDF concept, the Reagan Administration viewed it as asort of ‘‘tripwire’’ force, akin to the view of US forces in Europe duringthe 1950s. In response to a Soviet invasion of Iran, a readily deployableforce (about 500 strong) would have been sent to defend the oilfields inthe southwest of that country. These troops would be supported by thefull range of US capabilities, including strategic nuclear forces.105 Such astrategy was risky, and as the RDJTF (and later CENTCOM) grew insize and capability, the ‘‘tripwire’’ concept faded. By 1983, according tothe IISS, ‘‘Having enhanced her capability to deploy quickly and heraccess to bases en route to, as well as in, the region, the US is in a rea-sonable position to deter Soviet action so long as she shows political will


to do so.’’106 However, while tremendous strides were made in the early1980s, doubts remained about the ability of US forces to hold against anall-out Soviet offensive.107

US and Soviet power projection capabilities compared

As a central objective of the RDF was to repel a Soviet intervention inthe Persian Gulf, it is important to examine the two superpowers’ capa-city for projecting military power. As US forces assigned to this task havebeen described in considerable detail, a comparable list of Soviet forcesis necessary.

The most effective Soviet forces for power projection were the sevenairborne divisions, each with around 8,500 men. These forces were keptat Category I readiness level. Due to their importance, they were notassigned as part of the Red Army but instead were designated a reserveof the High Command, reporting to the Ministry of Defense.108 Thesedivisions were well equipped109 and had seen action in recent years,including the invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in1979, on both occasions as a spearhead force.110 Providing airlift wasMilitary Transport Aviation, deploying between 1,200 and 1,400 air-craft, including 50 giant An-22 cargo aircraft. This force would havebeen augmented by planes from Aeroflot in times of war.111

The Soviet Naval Infantry (marines) numbered some 12,000 duringthis period, organized into regiments (one each stationed with theNorthern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific Fleets.)112 These forces weretailored for amphibious assault, but were largely directed to support theactivities of the fleets to which they were assigned. However, as the Soviet-Syrian exercise in 1981 showed, they did have the capability to operate ina power projection role, as did the presence of Soviet amphibious forcesin the Indian Ocean during this time.113 A total of 83 amphibious shipssupported these forces.114 Supply could have been provided by the Sovietmerchant marine, numbering some 1,723 ships by mid-1982.115

If the Soviets did decide on an overland intervention in the PersianGulf, they would rely on their heavy ground forces deployed adjacent tothe region. Around 27 divisions were stationed in the Transcaucasianand Central Asian military districts of the USSR. Six more weredeployed in Afghanistan. Supporting these forces were two tactical airarmies (300–500 aircraft each) with another 100 in Afghanistan.116

Supporting these forces was the Soviet Navy’s Indian Ocean Squadron,able to be built up to about 20 or more ships in times of crisis. Whilethese forces, taken as a whole, were formidable, the ability to deploythem effectively was debatable. Of the USSR’s seven airborne divisions,its most effective power projection force, only two (stationed in theOdessa and Transcaucasus Military Districts) had the Persian Gulf as aprobable primary target. The 106th Guards Airborne Division, based at


Tula near Moscow, was held in strategic reserve. However, as with USRDF forces, it would be ‘‘on call’’ for other contingencies.117 The SovietNaval Infantry were generally designed to seize the various straits inhi-biting the passage of the various Soviet fleets. The relatively smalldetachments deployed in the Indian Ocean would have been unable tosustain themselves after a few days.118

Nor would an overland assault have been easy. Soviet forces in Trans-Caucasia would have had to advance some 1,000 miles in order to reachthe head of the Gulf. The Zagros Mountains were filled with narrowpasses that either local Iranian forces or US forces (special operations orair power) could have blocked without much difficulty. Few modernroads existed here, and rail links were even less developed. Soviet forceswould be reliant on a long, tenuous supply line. An attempt by Sovietforces in Afghanistan to seize the Strait of Hormuz, at the mouth of theGulf, would face similar problems with transport links, as well as oppo-sition from US naval forces.119

Finally, there was also a major disparity in the forces needed forpower projection possessed by both sides. As Michael Klare notes, theUnited States possessed considerable advantages in sea-based air power(13 aircraft carriers with 800 fighter and attack aircraft, to just 4 with 40far less capable aircraft) and amphibious shipping (944,000 tons to175,000 tons), over the Soviet Union. In airlift, the Soviets did have anadvantage (24,140 tons to 21,135 for the United States), but payload andrange factors, as well as the higher quality of US aircraft, helped balancethis out.120 According to Klare, who listed the superpowers’ rapiddeployment forces (marines and ‘‘air-mobile forces’’), the United Stateshad 215,000 troops available for such missions, while the Soviet Unionhad just 72,000, a 3-to-1 advantage.121

Both superpowers would have also had support from their allies. TheUnited States could rely on small but well-trained British parachute, RoyalMarine and Special Air Service units, while France, although often pursu-ing its own goals in the Third World, did maintain sizeable forces (ForeignLegion and marine) in Africa.122 Moreover, the ability of these forces todeploy rapidly, often with American logistical support (as in Zaire in 1978),made them an important factor in the balance. On the other hand, theSoviet role in the Horn of Africa in 1977–78 was an example of a growingSoviet capability in the region. Specialist personnel from East Germany, aswell as Cuban troops, had proven their worth during the 1970s.123

The subject of military doctrine must also play a part in this analysis. TheUnited States had, since World War II, developed the projection of poweron a large scale as part of its strategy, as seen in Korea and Vietnam. Thedevelopment of the RDF concept for the Persian Gulf, therefore, whilerepresenting tactical difficulties, was familiar to US planners. The ability todeploy a joint service, combined-arms force to deal with a variety of con-tingencies had been common since at least the early 1960s.


For the Soviet Union, the situation was different. Not until the late1960s had the USSR begun to project power—initially through itsnavy—on a large scale. The operations in Angola and the Horn of Africain the following decade represented a limited direct role for the SovietUnion, while the invasion of Afghanistan was launched against a statebordering the USSR, and generally in a traditional manner, with heavyforces relieving the airborne troops who seized Kabul at the start of theoperation. Furthermore, Soviet rapid deployment force could not sus-tain themselves for long. The US Marines, by contrast, were designed asa self-sustained combined-arms force that could operate on their ownfor up to a month. Any significant Soviet military intervention in an arealike the Persian Gulf would have reflected the Soviet planners’ relianceon heavy forces. This, by necessity, would have limited the distance fromthe Soviet Union that such interventions could have been mounted.124

Such considerations are central to the superpowers’ military doctrinesand the role of power projection. The United States, as exemplified bythe RDF, saw deployments of large, self-sustaining military forces as partof its global strategy: the Soviet Union, by contrast, saw its power pro-jection capabilities as part of operations from its own territory or con-tiguous areas.

Conclusion

The debate over the power projection balance in the United Statesduring the 1970s and 1980s represents strongly the way in which thecountry viewed its role in the world, as well as that of the Soviet Union.The Persian Gulf, with its vital petroleum supplies, first brought atten-tion to the need for US power projection capabilities in 1975, as a resultof the Arab OPEC embargo. The Carter Administration, in PRM 10 andPD 18, reflected these concerns, with the inclusion of plans for whatwould become the RDF.

The evolution of the RDF concept, from a Third World interventionforce to a combined-arms task force meant to secure the Persian Gulf, isreflective of the shift in perception of the USSR’s role in the ThirdWorld, particularly in Southwest Asia. From 1977 until late 1979, theCarter Administration generally viewed US–Soviet relations as a mix ofcompetition and cooperation. In terms of military strategy, this meantmaintaining a strategic nuclear balance, strengthening NATO andestablishing a framework for a RDF. Power projection forces were to bemaintained as part of an overall package of national power, designed tomaintain stability in the Third World.

The events of 1979, culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,changed this approach. A renewed cold war emerged by 1980, markedby more assertive US defense and foreign policies. The RDJTF was for-mally established, assigned to defend the Persian Gulf. The Carter


Administration saw this as part of a more assertive policy toward theUSSR, meant to show American resolve, but not necessarily as a newcold war. Such a display of strength could, in the long run, force theSoviets to ameliorate their behavior and return to a more constructiverelationship.125

The Reagan Administration saw the situation very differently. TheSoviet Union was, in the new President’s words, ‘‘the focus of evil inthe modern world,’’ and an all-out Cold War approach was needed. Thebuildup of the RDJTF—and its evolution into CENTCOM—representeda determination to counter the Soviet threat as part of a robust contain-ment policy. The emphasis on integrating Persian Gulf strategy as partof a possible global war with the Soviet Union reflected the ReaganAdministration’s outlook. This emphasis on direct and indirect Sovietthreats differed from the Carter view. While Harold Brown noted both‘‘indigenous instability’’ and ‘‘Soviet adventurism’’ as being dangers inthe Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean,126 Caspar Weinberger saw theSoviet Union as the primary source of instability in Southwest Asia andAfrica.127

The development of the RDF/RDJTF reflects this shift in emphasistoward a direct Soviet threat. The initial 100,000-man RDF was to belight, with an emphasis on being able to put US forces into trouble spotsand diffuse crises quickly. The RDJTF, with an initial strength of some200,000 personnel—increased to nearly 300,000 in CENTCOM by themid-1980s—reflected the need to have large forces from all the servicesprepared to wage war against Soviet ground, naval, and air forces.While the emphasis on rapid deployment remained, US plannersaccepted the need to sacrifice at least some of these capabilities in orderto assure that forces for this requirement were included.

In the event, neither administration used these forces on a large scaleduring this time. The abortive attempt to rescue the hostages fromTeheran in April 1980 marked the only direct use of force during theCarter years. The deployment of US Marines in Lebanon in 1982–84and the invasion of Grenada in October 1983 were the limits of similaraction by Reagan. Although there were major US military exercises inCentral America and the Caribbean during the early 1980s, these didnot result in direct military action.128

Rather than direct action, these efforts sought to send a message tothe Soviets—that Washington was willing to defend American interestsin the Third World by force if need be. This had an impact on percep-tions of the balance in other quarters, including the Third World, par-ticularly regarding the USSR’s ability to support its proxies.129 By 1985,the Soviet Union was unable to compete in the Third World withoutpaying an unacceptable price, and soon signaled a desire to move awayfrom competition as part of a broader shift in its foreign and defensepolicies.


Part IV

Defense spending

8 The expenditure debate

In the debate over the US–Soviet balance in the 1970s, the issue ofmilitary expenditures emerged as one of its most persistent topics. It wasalso one of the most intangible measurements of relative militarystrength, for two reasons. First, the scale of Soviet defense expenditurewas extraordinarily difficult to ascertain, to say the least. A host of fac-tors—the difficulty of determining the actual value of the ruble with thatof the dollar, the USSR’s command economy, (which meant that muchof its military effort was enmeshed within a variety of different ministriesresponsible for various sectors), the endemic secrecy of the Soviet state—contributed to this. Second, the variety of factors determining Americandefense spending, (including differing criteria listed in open reports, aswell as such factors as inflation), meant that a determination of USexpenditures, while far easier than ascertaining concurrent Sovietefforts, was still difficult to discern.

Moreover, the impact of figures available, which juxtaposed risingSoviet spending levels and declining American expenditures, had aconsiderable impact on the overall defense debate. Generally overlookedwere such factors as what was being purchased by these increased Sovietsums. Often, the effectiveness of weapons procured was not commensu-rate to the sums invested. Nor did this focus on defense spending takeinto account the very different issues faced by the United States and theSoviet Union in making spending decisions. As John Collins cautionedin a study of the military balance published in 1978, ‘‘Comparingdefense budgets . . . is among the most publicized, but least meaningful,means of measuring military power.’’1

Aside from the issues of deducing the actual scope of the superpowers’military expenditures, political issues also played a role. The mid-1970ssaw a shift in American views toward Detente, particularly with regard tothe military balance. The vast increases in Soviet military powerthroughout the decade—in strategic forces, forces deployed in EasternEurope, and power projection capabilities—combined with a perceiveddecline in American military strength, were seen as indicators of theSoviet Union’s effort to utilize the Detente process to gain a decisive

edge in military power over the United States. Naturally, such an enor-mous military establishment needed similar vast financial inputs tomaintain and expand it. Defense spending thus became part of the oftenstrident debate over the military balance.

This debate reached into the various intelligence services of theUnited States, particularly the CIA. Charges that the Agency had nottaken into account the full nature of the Soviet buildup were driven byboth political and analytical factors. Many opponents of Detente viewedthe CIA’s leadership as supporters of this process. This view would playan important role in shaping the expenditure debate. The events of1975–77 in this area resulted from this mixture of political and analyticalissues and would set the tone for US defense spending—and nationalsecurity policy—into the next decade.

The balance of military spending in the mid-1970s

While discussions of defense spending were subject to divergent criteria,one fact did exist at the core of the debate: the US defense budget hadfallen during the early 1970s. According to a Pentagon report issued inJanuary 1977, the US defense budget had decreased by 12 percent in1975 from what it had been in 1964, by some $7 billion.2 An importantfactor was the Vietnam War. There had been major increases in thedefense budget in order to prosecute the conflict, but much of this hadgone to support US forces in Southeast Asia, meaning that the normalcycle of research, development, testing, and evaluation of new systems,followed by procurement, was considerably disrupted. During FYs1965–69, the budget rose from just under $120 billion to $165 billion,then fell sharply until levelling off in FY 1974. If the costs for the warare excluded, actual expenditures hovered around $120-125 billionbetween FY 1964–69, then declined to about $110 billion in FY 1973.3

These figures were part of the public record and generally easy toaccess. Far more difficult was the level of Soviet defense spending. Few inthe West or the USSR believed the figure listed under ‘‘Defense’’ in theSoviet State Budget, generally given as 17 billion rubles, was realistic inlight of the enormous Soviet military effort.4 More problematic wasmaking a reasonably accurate determination of the real level of Sovietexpenditures. Because other areas, like military education (which was theresponsibility of the Ministry of Education) and the large sectors of indus-try and the scientific community in the Soviet Union which supported themilitary effort (the Ministry of Transportation provided funding for mili-tary transport, for example), were not listed in the Soviet State Budget asbeing linked to defense, these areas had to be somehow estimated andincluded in an assessment of overall figures for Soviet expenditure.5

While the US intelligence community as a whole was geared towardthis effort, the CIA was the agency primarily involved in producing the

176 Defense spending

overall estimates. Given the numerous means of estimation and themany difficulties encountered in undertaking such a task, the CIA had,by the 1970s, established a framework for its efforts. Known as the‘‘building block’’ approach, it included two main stages. First, the CIA’sanalysts would count the production of military equipment in the USSR,as well as analyze the Soviet military’s order of battle (the number ofdivisions in the Red Army, for example). This information was providedby the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which coordinated US mili-tary intelligence.6 Second, the CIA would evaluate these figures throughtwo sets of criteria. The analysts would first determine what the costwould be for procurement and maintenance of such a force in US dol-lars. This would then be projected in rubles, which would give an idea ofthe overall Soviet defense effort relative to Soviet economic output. Bydoing so, the CIA was able to provide a relative estimate of US andSoviet expenditures, based in part on actual ‘‘hard’’ evidence (i.e., mili-tary production and deployment.)7

While the ‘‘building block’’ method appeared reasonable, there werenumerous flaws in its formulation. First, using a dollar-ruble comparisonbased on an estimate of what it would cost for the Soviets to maintain aforce at American levels was misleading. The CIA worked with USdefense contractors to ascertain the costs of Soviet equipment, which wascertainly different from that of the United States. Much of the infra-structure of the Soviet defense industry was state subsidized, unlike thatof the United States. Another problem was that the pace of many Sovietresearch and development projects was uneven, meaning that a com-parison of such efforts with their US counterparts was misleading.8

An even more glaring problem existed with regard to comparing USand Soviet military pay scales. By the early 1980s, a Soviet conscript waspaid 3.50 rubles (approximately $6.50) a month, while an US entry-levelenlistee received $573 per month, as well as bonuses for housing andother expenses. As the CIA estimates assumed parity, this vastly inflatedSoviet expenditures in this area.9 While the United States had con-sistently paid its military personnel more than the Soviet Union, theestablishment of an All-Volunteer Force in 1973 saw pay rates doubleduring the decade. As these levels were linked to cost-of-living increases,pay and benefits grew.10 By 1978, for every dollar spent on defense, payand allowances consumed almost 65 cents.11 For each cost-of-livingincrease in the United States—a frequent occurrence in the 1970s, anera of high inflation—the estimates for Soviet defense spending roseaccordingly.12

The main challenges to the CIA’s estimates, however, were not madeon the basis of an overestimation of Soviet spending, but rather thatthese levels were underestimated. Through the early 1970s, the CIAestimated that the Soviet Union allocated between six and eight percentof its GNP for defense. Other agencies disputed this figure. General

The expenditure debate 177

Daniel O. Graham, who became deputy director for estimates at the DIAin 1970, began to challenge the CIA’s estimates. The DIA differed withthe CIA’s pricing of Soviet weapons, because its analysts were using onlythose US equivalents closest to the Soviet equipment being estimated,rather than more sophisticated American weaponry. From 1970, theDIA refused to use the CIA’s spending figures in its reports.13 The DIAestimated that a full one-third of the Soviet State Budget went todefense.14 Upon becoming DIA director in 1974 (and later as a privatecitizen), General Graham challenged the use of the ‘‘building block’’approach.15

Nor was the intelligence community alone in this debate. Schlesinger,who became Secretary of Defense in 1973, began to question the levelsgiven for Soviet expenditure. Citing development and deployment ofnew, more sophisticated weapons by the Soviets, Schlesinger raised thequestion of ‘‘how . . . a country that is visibly deploying such weapons[can] do it with spending only 6–8 percent of its GNP on defense.’’16

By early 1975, matters had come to a head. Both the CIA and DIAundertook a major effort to find Soviet sources to provide a realisticpicture of Soviet defense spending. Defectors who had worked in plan-ning ministries provided information on this subject to the Americans.One of these defectors, whose reputation for reliability was somewhatquestionable, actually claimed to have seen the USSR’s defense budgetfor two years.17 The CIA and DIA established a joint team to debrief thissource in April 1975. According to his information (covering 1969–70),total defense expenditure came to 47.5 billion rubles for 1969 and 49.6billion (projected) for 1970. This helped to shift the CIA’s estimate ofruble value (heretofore estimated at 1955 levels and adjusted to 1970sprices) to one believed to be more accurate for the middle of thedecade.18 The CIA was able to obtain a copy of the Statistical Handbookof the Politburo, which provided the ‘‘actual’’ levels of defense spending,reportedly decided upon some years earlier.19

This new evidence forced the CIA to rethink its estimates over thepast several years. William Colby, the DCI, established a team of CIAand DIA analysts to draft an estimate based on this new information.Their report, SR 76–10053, was issued in February 1976. Incorporatingthe new information obtained the year before, the report nearly doubledthe percentage of Soviet GNP allocated for defense, to 10–15 percent.This meant that in real terms the Soviet Union was spending some 40percent more than the United States on defense.20 In May, the CIAissued SR-76-10121U, which estimated an increase of 10–20 billionrubles in Soviet defense spending between 1970 and 1975. Further-more, defense spending, estimated as having increased by 4–5 percentfrom 1970 to 1973, increased to between 5 and 6 percent from 1973onwards, as a result of strategic forces modernization.21 The report’sauthors discussed the economic impact of this effort: ‘‘ . . .we now realize


that Soviet leaders have been more willing than we thought to forgoeconomic growth . . . in favor of military capabilities. Nevertheless, we seeno evidence that economic considerations are deterring the Soviets fromcontinuing the present pace and magnitude of their defense effort.’’22

The CIA was quick to point out that this did not mean that the SovietUnion had outstripped the United States in terms of military capability,because it only pertained to spending. Indeed, the need to expend suchsums meant that the Soviet ‘‘military industrial complex’’ was only half asefficient as originally thought.23 Former CIA analyst William T. Lee, whohad argued that Soviet defense expenditure was actually at the levelslisted by the intelligence community in 1976, noted the implications.‘‘Each year, more labor and much more capital have been required toproduce a constant value of output, which indicates acute inefficiency.’’24

Many conservatives, who were suspicious of Detente and alarmed by anapparently adverse military balance, jumped on these findings as evidencethat they had been correct in their concerns. Schlesinger had alreadywarned of the dire consequences of this. In an October 23, 1975 letter toSenator John L. McClellan, Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of theSenate Appropriations Committee, Schlesinger noted that

By most of the available measures, American power is declining andSoviet power is rising. No one can say precisely where the perilpoints lie as this process unfolds. But if real expenditures by theUnited States remain constant or continue to fall, while real Sovietoutlays continue to rise, the peril points will occur in the relativelynear future.25

These concerns were echoed in the press. Henry S. Bradsher, whowould later become a senior CIA analyst, wrote in the Washington Star inFebruary 1976 that ‘‘The new evaluation shows that the Kremlin’sdetermination to drive toward greater military strength, its readiness tosacrifice for armed might, are much stronger than had been appar-ent.’’26 Although Bradsher noted later in his article that this did nottranslate into larger forces in being, the tone is reflective of the alarmraised over such developments.

Meanwhile, significant changes had occurred in high positions withinthe US intelligence community. In November 1975, President Ford hadfired William Colby as DCI, replacing him with George Bush. JamesSchlesinger had been replaced as Secretary of Defense by DonaldRumsfeld, who appointed Robert F. Ellsworth as Assistant Secretary forIntelligence in January 1976.27 Bush sought to shift the CIA toward therole of analyzing foreign intelligence, after the scandals wrought by theAgency’s role in covert operations.28 As the debate continued, Forddecided to bring into play the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory


Board (PFIAB). Its role was to provide an independent analysis of USforeign intelligence services, a sort of ‘‘watchdog’’ for the President.29

The issue that would bring PFIAB into the debate was the CIA’s esti-mate of Soviet strategic forces and their capabilities, known as NIEs.From the early 1970s, there had been increasing criticism of how NIEswere being conducted, because new Soviet strategic missiles and bom-bers were being deployed with greater capabilities than their pre-decessors. Moreover, the issue of higher Soviet defense expenditure wasalso implicit, because it was believed that the greater Soviet expendituretranslated into more effective weaponry.

PFIAB was well-placed to become involved in the debate. Since 1969,PFIAB had provided annual analyses of the strategic balance. Thesetended to differ from the NIEs, becoming more alarmist in their judg-ments on Soviet capabilities.30 Consisting of a varied group of profes-sionals from several fields, it was politically to the right in its view offoreign and defense policy and the Soviet Union’s role in the world.31 InAugust 1975, PFIAB’s chairman, retired Admiral George W. Anderson,Jr, wrote to President Ford to request a ‘‘competitive analysis’’ be heldregarding intelligence estimates.32 In December, CIA Director Colby,who would soon be replaced by Bush, agreed to undertake a review ofthe NIE system for gathering information on Soviet strategic forces,going back a decade. Issued to PFIAB in January 1976, the report gen-erally supported the CIA’s methods for preparation of NIEs, although itdid include some particular criticisms, particularly ‘‘the failure of theearlier estimates to foresee the degree to which Soviets would not onlycatch up to the United States in number of ICBMs but keep right ongoing.’’33 The ‘‘Track Record Study’’ appeared to vindicate the processby which NIEs were drafted. Most in PFIAB disagreed, focusing onshortcomings identified in the study to renew calls for competitive ana-lysis.34 In April, President Ford directed the NSC—supported byrecommendations from DCI Bush and Assistant Secretary Ellsworth—toundertake an experiment in this area.35 The group set up to carry outthis task came to be known as Team B.

Team B

The role of Team B, as its lettering suggests, was to provide a critique ofTeam A, the analysts engaged in drafting NIE 11-3/8-76, the CIA’s annualreview of Soviet strategic forces. Bush and Deputy National Security Advi-ser William Hyland determined the scope of Team B’s task through jointnegotiations. Separate reviews would handle technical issues, while a gen-eral review would ascertain whether or not the evidence would be able tosupport a conclusion different from the NIE analyses.36

The members of Team B were drawn from outside the intelligencecommunity. On the whole, this group consisted of men whose views


were shared by those critical of Detente and alarmed by the Soviets’military posture. Led by Richard Pipes, Professor of Russian history atHarvard, Team B’s associates were retired General Daniel Graham, formerDIA director; Professor William Van Cleave, a member of the US SALTdelegation; and Dr Thomas Wolfe, an analyst for the RAND Corporation,who had served as air attache (as a USAF colonel) in Moscow during the‘‘Bomber Gap’’ of the 1950s.37 The Advisory Panel included Paul Nitze,who had also been a member of the US SALT delegation and had played amajor role in drafting NSC 68 and the Gaither Report during the 1950s;and Paul Wolfowitz, who served in the ACDA at the time.38

Team B completed its report—titled ‘‘Soviet Strategic Objectives: AnAlternative View’’—in December 1976, about the same time as NIE 11-3/8-76 was finished. Both reports were sent to PFIAB for review, and forboth teams to argue their case. Although directed to analyze the CIA’sgathering of intelligence on Soviet strategic forces, Team B’s memberswere able to argue to PFIAB that their research illustrated that the CIAhad not satisfactorily addressed issues of the Soviet Union’s overall stra-tegic objectives, which Team B saw as using its growing military might aspart of a design for global domination. These arguments won the day forTeam B, as Team A’s arguments—that such considerations were outsidethe purview of the NIE 11-3/8 process—did not draw much support.39

Nonetheless, on January 7, 1977, DCI Bush approved NIE 11-3/8-76.40

Meantime, on December 26, 1976, the New York Times reported the gen-eral findings of Team B, which was used by opponents of Detente tocharge that this process had allowed the Soviet Union to expand its powerand influence at the expense of the United States.41 As William Hylandlater wrote, ‘‘The exercise turned out to be a license for an attack onFord’s own administration—a case of self-inflicted damage.’’42

Given the implications of Team B’s report, it is important to examineits contents and the language used by its authors. It consisted of threeparts. Part I, titled ‘‘Judgements of Soviet Strategic Objectives Under-lying NIEs and the Shortcomings of these Judgements,’’ analyzed theviews of Soviet strategy and geopolitical ambitions contained in theNIEs. Part II, ‘‘A Critique of NIE Interpretations of Certain SovietStrategic Developments,’’ discussed developments in Soviet strategicforces, from ballistic missiles and bombers to civil defense and ABMprograms, as well as forces dedicated to theater use. Part III, ‘‘SovietStrategic Objectives,’’ described the USSR’s political and military objec-tives in the context of the global power balance.43

Part II was within Team B’s purview, as it directly critiqued the CIA’smeans of gathering intelligence on Soviet strategic forces. However, theother sections of the report went beyond what had been planned.Instead of concentrating on Soviet strategic capabilities, Team B incor-porated this into a discussion of overall Soviet intentions, well beyondthe scope of the NIEs they were supposed to be critiquing.


Furthermore, the discussion used by Team B from the start empha-sizes this approach. ‘‘Team ‘B’ found that the NIE 11-3/8 series through1975 had substantially misperceived the motivations behind Soviet stra-tegic programs, and thereby tended consistently to underestimate theirintensity, scope, and implicit threat,’’ reads the first sentence of thesummary.44 Its conclusion was stark:

Within the ten year period of the National Estimate the Soviets may wellexpect to achieve a degree of military superiority which wouldpermit a dramatically more aggressive pursuit of their hegemonialobjecitves, including direct military challenges to Western vital inter-ests, in the belief that such superior force can pressure the West toacquiesce or, if not, can be used to win a military contest at any level.(Emphasis in original)45

This correlated with much of what PFIAB’s members believed regardingSoviet military power and global ambitions.

Team B concentrated on strategy and capabilities, rather than onexpenditures, in its report. However, some mention of what were seento be CIA misperceptions in this area were included. The authors listedone of the assumptions of NIE drafters as ‘‘The U.S. commercial tradi-tion and the business culture which permeates U.S. society,’’ whichtranslated into a view that ‘‘peace and the pursuit of profit are ‘normal’whereas war is always an aberration.’’46 Team B’s members believed that

The Soviet Union, by contrast, functions as a giant conglomerate inwhich military, political, and economic institutions—and the instrumentsappropriable to each of them—are seen as part of a diversified arsenalof power, all administered by the same body of men and all usable forpurposes of persuasion and coercion. The distinction between the civi-lian and the military sectors of society and economy, appropriate tocapitalist societies, is not very meaningful in the Soviet environment.47

The level of Soviet military spending, therefore, was determined bywhatever the leadership in the Kremlin saw as necessary to pursue theircoercive goals in the international arena.

A good summary of the exercise was produced by the US Senate’s SelectCommittee on Intelligence in February 1978. Among its findings was that‘‘the exercise had been so structured by the PFIAB and the Director ofCentral Intelligence (DCI) that the B Team on Soviet objectives reflectedthe views of only one segment of the spectrum of opinion.’’48 However, thecommittee members did cite the importance of the exercise, in that ‘‘NIE’son Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives still need improvement in anumber of important respects.’’49


Within a month of Team B’s report, Jimmy Carter became President.However, many of the report’s authors would play a major role in shapingthe debate on the military balance. In November 1976, the CPD was formed.Among its founding members were Paul Nitze and William Van Cleave, whohad been part of Team B. So too were Edward Teller and Claire BootheLuce, who had served on the PFIAB.50 The CPD would emerge as a keyopponent of Detente, based heavily on assumptions about Soviet geopoliticalobjectives and military strength made by Team B. It would influence the newPresident’s national security policy in significant ways.

The Carter years

At first, given candidate Carter’s statement in June 1976 that ‘‘withoutendangering the defense of our nation or commitments to our allies, wecan reduce present defense expenditures by about $5 to $7 billionannually,’’51 it appeared that the US defense budget would be reduced,rather than increased. Carter’s June 1977 decision to cancel the B-1bomber strengthened this view. However, this was not to be the case.

The new administration did not ignore Team B’s findings. A copy wassent to Carter soon after he took office. In response, Carter ordered amajor study of US national security policy and strategy, PRM 10.52 Thestudy that emerged, the ‘‘Military Strategy and Force Posture Review,’’included a section on ‘‘Fiscal and Economic Implications.’’ As part of alist of 16 options, the report projected (for 1981) a force posture rangingfrom $16 billion below the ‘‘baseline’’ budget figure ($586.8 billion,including $145 billion in defense and security outlays) for a ‘‘low forcestructure option,’’ to a high of $25–35 billion above this figure for 12 ofthese options.53 In June 1977, Brzezinski noted that ‘‘A reasonablerange [for future defense budgets] might be between $125 billion . . . and$135 billion.’’54 The recommendations made in PRM 10 would see asteady increase in defense spending through Carter’s term in office,albeit at a slower pace than had been planned by Ford and Rumsfeld.55

The Carter Administration began reversing the generally downwardtrend in US defense spending, as part of its 3 percent increase agreed towith the NATO allies. For FY 1979, the first Carter budget, defenseoutlays were set at $115.2 billion, up from $105.3 billion in FY 1978 and$95.7 billion in FY 1977.56 In his FY 1980 report, Secretary of DefenseHarold Brown projected an increase from $111.9 billion in outlays forFY 1979 to $165.7 billion in FY 1984.57 Most importantly, this reversedthe trend of declining funds for general purpose (i.e., conventional)forces that had been the norm since the Nixon years.58 In FY 1979,general purpose forces received $47.6 billion in funds, with just under$50 billion planned for FY 1980.59 By the end of Carter’s term in office,the defense budget request stood at $180 billion, an increase (in constantFY 1982 dollars) of $17.5 billion over the FY 1980 budget.60


The reasons for this increase were varied, including the necessity ofmaintaining a stable balance of military power with the Soviet Union inorder to maintain Detente, and the realization, particularly as a result ofthe crises in Iran and Afghanistan in 1979–80, that US military powerhad to be increased. Related to the need to maintain a viable balance wasthe issue of Soviet military expenditure.

Among those arguing that the USSR was outspending the United Stateswas the CPD. In a March 14, 1978 discussion titled ‘‘Peace With Free-dom,’’ Eugene Rostow, Chairman of the CPD’s Executive Committee,stated that some ‘‘estimates conclude that the Soviet military budget todayis between 60 and 80% higher than our own’’ and that, even with a 1.8percent real increase in defense spending announced by Carter, ‘‘we willfall further behind.’’61 In a report issued in October of that year, titled ‘‘IsAmerica Becoming Number 2?’’ the CPD stated that ‘‘Independent ana-lyses have suggested that the CIA still underestimates current Sovietmilitary expenditures because it estimates 3 to 5 percent growth in theseexpenditures during the 1970s, whereas for 1970–75 the figure should be8 percent or more.’’ Estimating the total Soviet effort as being between 13and 15 percent of GNP, the authors noted ‘‘This is, in peacetime terms,the allocation pattern of a partially mobilized economy. It means that theSoviets are operating, on a sustained and increasing basis, above the U.S. peakallocation of 13 percent during the Korean War.’’ (Emphasis in original)62

In an analysis similar to the Team B report, Richard Pipes, writing forthe CPD in September 1979 on the Soviet desire for a SALT II agree-ment, noted that ‘‘the Communist system, which places the country’sentire human and economic resources in the hands of a self-perpetuat-ing elite of rulers, is excellently adapted for purposes of military mobi-lization . . . economic factors making for militarism are reinforced by anideology which views the modern age as the time of a life-or-deathstruggle between ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism.’ ’’63

In a June 1978 report, the CIA noted that

Defense activities have been well-funded, even during periodic eco-nomic setbacks, and follow-through on key programs has beenstrong . . .

. . .All of the evidence available to us on Soviet defense programsunder way and planned suggests that the long-term upward trendin allocation of resources to defense is likely to continue into the1980s . . .The atmosphere in Moscow with regard to the economy,however, is one of concern, and the Soviet leaders could be con-sidering modest alterations in military force goals. But even if suchalterations were undertaken, the overall rate of growth of defensespending over the next five years or so probably would slow onlymarginally.64


In an August 1978 report on the Soviet economy, the CIA noted that

Although continued worsening of the economic scene is likely totrigger debate in Moscow over the future levels and patterns of mili-tary expenditures, to date the defense sector has not been affected bythe changes in the rate of economic progress. Defense programs havegreat momentum as well as powerful political and bureaucratic sup-port, and major military programs have been well funded.65

In contrast to the alarmist views of groups like the CPD, however, theCIA took a more restrained view of Soviet expenditures relative toAmerican. In January 1979, the CIA issued a dollar-cost comparison ofUS and Soviet spending. It found that ‘‘For the 1968–78 period, thecumulative estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activities exceeded USoutlays by more than 10 percent . . .Estimated in constant dollars, Sovietdefense activities increased at an average annual rate of 3 percent.’’66

The authors stated that ‘‘Evidence on weapon systems currently inproduction and development . . . and the increasing costs of modernweapons indicates that the long-term growth trend in Soviet defenseactivities will probably continue into the 1980s.’’67 In absolute fiscal esti-mates, however, the figures were more worrisome. ‘‘In 1978 the Soviettotal was about $146 billion, nearly 45 percent higher than the USoutlay of $102 billion.’’68

The Pentagon also warned of the gap between the US and Sovietspending. In his FY 1982 report, Secretary Brown noted that

Over the past decade, U.S. investment [R, D, T & E, procurement,etc.] has fallen 20 percent, while Soviet investment has risen 50percent. Cumulative Soviet investment from 1968 through 1979 hasbeen about $270 billion more than ours. The important point is thatthe effects of today’s investment balance will be seen in the militarybalance in future years.69

In terms of overall spending,

Soviet defense spending has increased steadily and significantly byan average of four to five percent a year (measured in ruble costs),for each of the past 20 years, while U.S. defense spending (evenexcluding the Southeast Asia increment) rose and fell several timesover the same period. This Soviet trend has continued, even as therate of growth in Soviet GNP has declined.70

Other studies meant for official use concurred. A RAND note preparedfor the US Air Force in February 1979 on comparative military spend-ing noted ‘‘there is little question that the aggregate of Soviet military


programs . . . are larger in size than those of the United States, and havebeen so for most of this decade. The Kremlin has maintained a fairlysteady pace of increase in Soviet military outlays for 10–15 years, andU.S. ME [Military Expenditure] declined during the first part of the1970s.’’71 The authors concluded that ‘‘Given the duration of the SovietME buildup and the only somewhat shorter period of decline in Amer-ican ME, a change must have taken place in comparative capabilityrelative to the situation of the early 1960s’’ (Underlining in original).‘‘Unless internal economic and political pressures act to slow down theSoviet military buildup, the United States must expect that stabilizationof American ME will mean a continued lag in improvement of militarycapability relative to that of the USSR.’’72

In a September 1980 hearing before the Senate Intelligence Commit-tee, several experts on the subject of Soviet defense expenditure, includ-ing analysts from the US intelligence community, provided worrisometestimony on the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union inthis area. Robert Huffstutler, Director of the CIA’s Office of StrategicResearch, stated that Soviet defense spending grew to some 12–14percent of Soviet GNP. According to Huffstutler, ‘‘The estimated dollarvalue of Soviet defense activities has exceeded U.S. outlays by a wideningmargin since 1971. By 1979 the Soviet total was about $165 billion, about50 percent above U.S. outlays.’’73 Dr Steven S. Rosefielde, an adjunctprofessor at the US Naval Postgraduate School who had made extensivestudies of Soviet military expenditures, sounded a similar theme:

According to my calculations, real Soviet procurement 1960 to 1979grew at 12.9 percent per annum in ruble terms and 9.6 percent . . .in dollars. For the decade of the seventies . . . Soviet procurementexpenditures were twice those of the United States. In 1979 alone,the Soviets spent three times as much as the United States did onweapons measured in dollars. By 1977, the Soviet burden of defensemeasured in rubles had risen to a level that exceeded the burden. . . on the eve of the Nazi invasion.74

Most extensive was the testimony of former CIA analyst William T. Lee.According to his figures, the growth rate of Soviet military expenditurewas an annual eight percent from 1970, meaning that by 1980 this levelwould double. Furthermore, the defense effort’s percentage of SovietGNP would be some 18 percent in 1980, up from 12 to 13 percent in1970.75 Like Rosefielde, Lee emphasized Soviet procurement of weap-ons and equipment. ‘‘Currently procurement’s share has risen to over60 percent [of the budget.]’’76

The press began to show concern over this issue. An October 1979Time Magazine article noted that ‘‘When reckoned in ‘constant dollars’ toavoid the distortion of inflation, the estimated U.S. defense outlays for


fiscal 1980 are just about what they were in the strikingly low militarybudgets of the last Eisenhower years and lower than in most years sincethen.’’77 The article noted serious deficiencies in US military posture,particularly in retention of skilled personnel and recruitment, due tospiralling cost of living increases caused by inflation.78

By the time Ronald Reagan was elected in November 1980, a broadconsensus had emerged over the issue of superpower military expendi-tures. Two key areas of agreement had been reached. First, the SovietUnion had, since at least the late 1960s, been spending more for defensethan had the United States. As much of the US military effort during theformative years of the Soviet buildup had gone to the war in Vietnam,the additional American funds were therefore not utilized for RDT & Eand follow-on procurement, as was the case for the Soviet Union.Second, and related to this last point, the Soviets had been able, thanksto their largely conscript forces, to invest a far higher percentage of theirincreasing budgets in such areas as procurement and research. Thismeant that as large quantities of new weapons were added to the Sovietarmed forces, the next generation was already well into the develop-ment stage and would soon enter service.

Despite the apparent economic difficulties facing the Soviet Union, areversal of Soviet military expenditure rates was not believed to be inthe offing. As Robert Huffstutler testified in 1980,

The available evidence indicates that if the Soviets do not alter theircurrent plans, defense spending probably will grow over the next 5years at or near the rate of the past 15 years . . .

. . . In the longer term, growing economic difficulties may push theSoviet leaders to reexamine their plans with a view to reducing thegrowth of defense spending . . .Whatever choices they make . . .wethink it highly unlikely that even in the longer term economic diffi-culties will force a reversal of the Soviet leaders’ longstanding policyof continuing to improve their military capabilities.79

This consensus on Soviet defense spending led to a similar consensus onthat of the United States—it had to be significantly increased. However,differing schools of thought existed on how much was needed. Officialsof the Carter Administration, like Harold Brown, saw the levels spent inFY 1981–82 as providing a steady base for growth into the 1980s. Manyon the right, however, saw these as mere stopgap measures, meant toprovide only a bare minimum of increased military strength and inade-quate to match the far greater effort of the Soviet Union. The debate, asit were, on how much was enough would continue into the ReaganAdministration, many of whose top officials had been in the CPD. Howthey would succeed in making their ideas policy remained to be seen.


The Reagan increases, 1981–85

Among the views Ronald Reagan brought with him to the White Housewas a belief that the Soviet Union had consistently outspent the UnitedStates on defense throughout the 1970s. In his first State of the Unionaddress, given on February 18, 1981, Reagan stated that ‘‘Since 1970,the Soviet Union has invested $300 billion more in its military forcesthan we have.’’80 For President Reagan, this translated into an unfavor-able military balance. ‘‘The truth of the matter,’’ he said off-the-record inMarch 1982, ‘‘is that, on balance, the Soviet Union does have a definitemargin of superiority.’’81 In October 1981, the Pentagon issued anassessment of Soviet strength, Soviet Military Power, in which SecretaryWeinberger stated

To support the continuing growth and modernization of the armedforces, the Soviet Union over the past quarter century has increasedmilitary expenditures in real terms, devoting an average of 12-to-14percent of its Gross National Product each year to the Soviet mili-tary. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet military investment excee-ded comparable US spending by 70 percent in 1979.82

Reagan had served on the Board of Directors of the CPD,83 and muchof his thinking on defense matters had been shaped by his tenure. In aMay 1980 report, ‘‘Countering the Soviet Threat,’’ the CPD criticizedthe increased Carter defense program as being far too low to matchSoviet expenditures. ‘‘That figure [some $260 billion for FY 1980–85]approximates the amount by which the Soviets have exceeded theUnited States in military expenditures over the last decade.’’84 Otherconservative critics agreed. Analyzing the FY 1981 budget, Francis P.Hoeber and William Schneider wrote that

Using the median ratio of Soviet-American defense expenditure in1978 estimated by the CIA—1.5–1—and further assuming that Pre-sident Carter agrees to increase US defense expenditure from hisrecommended rate of growth of three percent to five percent, 42years will elapse (i.e. until the year 2022) before US defense expen-diture will catch up to Soviet expenditure (four percent per year.)85

The Reagan Administration moved swiftly not only to prepare increasedfuture defense budgets, but to add funds to the existing Carter budgetsas well. Carter’s final budget request stood at just over $200 billion, a$26.4 billion increase over the previous year’s budget. Within a monthof taking office, Reagan had approved an increase of $32.6 billion abovethis level. Congress provided nearly all of the funds requested byReagan.86


Whereas the Carter Administration had planned for 5 percent growthin outlays for the FY 1980–86 period, Reagan and Weinberger plannedto increase outlays for this same time frame by 8.4 percent.87 In his firstreport to Congress, Weinberger outlined his Five-Year Defense Plan,which would see total outlays of over $1.4 trillion for the FY 1983–87period (in current dollars.)88 Defense, which stood at 5.9 percent ofGNP in FY 1982, would grow to 7.4 percent for FY 1987.89

By any standard, these were enormous sums, and questions were soonraised about the need for such a massive increase. Given the apparentincreases in Soviet military capability and the perception of Americanweakness during the 1970s, public support for Reagan’s buildup was atfirst considerable. However, as budgets for health, welfare, and educa-tion were sharply reduced in order to help pay for the defense increase,and reports of waste and mismanagement of funds came to light, thisposition shifted. In a 1981 poll, 51 percent of respondents believed thatthe United States was spending too little on defense, with only 15 per-cent believing that too much was being spent. The following year, 36percent believed that too much was being spent, and 19 percent too little(the percentage who believed defense spending was adequate grew from22 percent in 1981 to 36 percent in 1982.)90

Reagan’s defense increases drew criticism from several quarters. TheCDI strongly criticized the approach to the defense buildup in 1981,noting official studies identifying waste in defense spending, warning ofhigher inflation, and criticizing the lack of a coherent strategy to supportthese increases. It called for a national commission to be established todetermine US defense needs and for the military to be given a year todevelop its case for a buildup of the size being undertaken.91 In 1982, theCDI stated its belief that the United States retained military superiority visa vis the Soviet Union. Moreover, its threat to US interests was alsojudged to be far less than was believed by the Reagan Administration.92

That liberal groups like the CDI would oppose the Reagan buildupwas not surprising, but many well-respected conservatives also came toquestion its pace and scope. In March 1983, six former policymakers—W. Michael Blumenthal, John B. Connally, C. Douglas Dillon, Henry H.Fowler, Peter G. Peterson, and William E. Simon—sent a letter to Pre-sident Reagan arguing that his defense buildup was unsustainable.93

Another, perhaps more surprising opponent of the Reagan buildupwas the CPD. Its view was that these increases were not doing enough toredress the balance. Reagan’s expenditures were merely enhanced var-iants of Carter’s FY 1981 and 1982 budgets, well below what was neededto reverse the dangerous imbalance of military power. In a March 1982study, ‘‘Is the Reagan Defense Program Adequate?’’ the CPD called for abudget that was $91 billion above the Reagan budgets for FY 1981–85.94

Citing the USSR’s growing military capability, the authors stated ‘‘TheAdministration’s defense program is a minimal one. It will not halt the


unfavorable trends in the U.S.-Soviet military balance, let alone reversethem.’’95 Its June 1982 report, ‘‘Has America Become Number 2?’’showed Soviet defense outlays at $250 billion for 1981, while USspending was near $160 billion.96 ‘‘The important gains in the militarybalance that have already resulted from the Soviet effort . . .will becomeeven more impressive over the next several years as this differential ininvestment is reflected in fielded capabilities,’’ the authors noted.97

The CDI took a different view of Soviet expenditures. In its 1982review of Soviet military strength, the CDI noted that

The military capability of the Soviet Union is best measured by thesize, composition and location of its forces. The number of tanks,aircraft, ships, and combat personnel which the Soviets have is a sig-nificant measure of their military strength. But whether they spend alot or a little is not by itself a valid measure of military strength.98

The CDI also noted that, in terms of overall military spending, theUnited States, its NATO allies, and China together spent $298 billion in1980, whereas the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies spent just$202 billion that year.99

A useful analysis of the reasoning behind the Soviet military increaseswas provided by Abraham S. Becker’s September 1983 report for theRAND Corporation:

The USSR’s propensity to expand its military expenditure from yearto year is rooted in security concepts that pose almost open-endeddemands for military resources; it is anchored in a political structurethat fuses party and military in unchallenged control of policy . . . onsecurity issues. There is, therefore, enormous momentum behindthe Soviet military buildup . . . 100

This debate was, of course, fueled by views on what the Soviets werespending, as well as what this meant for the military balance. For thefirst two years of the Reagan Administration, this remained based on theCIA estimates of the 1970s and particularly the revised figures providedafter 1976. The Agency itself continued to sound a somber tone. A July1981 memorandum—itself an update of a 1978 NIE regarding Sovietgeopolitical ambitions—emphasized Moscow’s military buildup. ‘‘Themomentum of programs already under way and the Soviet leaders per-ception of actual and potential threats in the 1980s makes any letup intheir efforts unlikely.’’101 In language similar to that used in the Team Breport, the memorandum’s authors stated ‘‘We believe that Moscowperceives military power to be the most critical factor underlying Sovietforeign policy.’’102 They went on to note that


As it enters the 1980s the current Soviet leadership sees the heavymilitary investments . . .paying off in the form of unprecedentedlyfavorable advances across the military spectrum, and over the longterm in political gains where military power or military assistancehas been the actual instrument of policy or the decisive complementto Soviet diplomacy.103

NIE 11/4-82, issued in August 1982, concurred. ‘‘The Soviets recognizethat . . . continued high levels of defense investment are necessary tosustain the present dimensions of Moscow’s global role . . .we expect thatSoviet defense spending will continue to grow at about its historical rateof 4 percent a year at least through 1985.’’104

From 1982, however, the CIA’s estimates changed. In that year theUSSR carried out major price reforms, including the valuation of theruble. The CIA thus began the challenging task of updating its rubleestimates from 1970 values to those of 1982. This process showed thatdefense spending consumed a steady 14 percent of Soviet GNP through-out the 1970s and early 1980s. In part, this was due to considerableinflation that accompanied the ruble price adjustments in 1970 and1982.105 Although not fully completed until 1986,106 this effort began toshift the CIA’s estimates of Soviet military expenditure. In February 1983,a CIA study of Soviet spending in dollar and ruble values noted that ‘‘thisyear’s review shows a period of almost no growth in the dollar costs forSoviet procurement from 1976 to 1981.’’107

In September 1983 Congressional hearings, Deputy Director for Intelli-gence Robert Gates disclosed that improved intelligence and informationhad led the CIA to reassess Soviet expenditure growth rates. Accordingly,whereas Soviet increases had been on the order of 4–5 percent annuallyduring the early 1970s, by the end of the decade this had fallen to around 2percent.108 Even more importantly, ‘‘procurement of military hardware—the largest category of defense spending—was flat in 1976–81 . . . [and thattrend] appears to have continued in both 1982 and 1983.’’109

These were important revelations regarding the actual levels of Sovietspending. However, the US intelligence community was slow to react.Robert Huffstutler, now director of the Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA),responsible for coordinating estimates of the Soviet military and econ-omy, ordered the figures checked and double checked to ensure thatestimates issued in 1982 were correct. Not until July 1983 did the CIAissue a paper regarding these new figures, and then listed a host ofreasons (production and transportation difficulties, delays in technicaldevelopment, etc.) that lessened the impact of the Agency’s findings.110

The Reagan Administration played down Gates’ figures for Sovietspending, emphasizing more tangible factors in the military balance inorder to sustain the momentum of its defense buildup.111


Even if the Reagan Administration had decided to significantly reduceUS spending as a result of these disclosures, the momentum of its effortsmeant that such reductions would not occur until nearly the end ofReagan’s second term. Outlays for FY 1983 stood at $205 billion, thosefor FY 1984 at nearly $221 billion and for FY 1985 $246.3 billion. Therequest for FY 1986 was $277.5 billion.112

The vast increases in US defense spending during Reagan’s first termwere meant to restore American military strength vis a vis that of theSoviet Union. Two key reasons for this effort stand out. First, there wasthe need to establish the perception of restored US strength in the globalarena. The American public tended to recognize this shift. In a 1982 poll,41 percent of respondents believed that the Soviet Union was militarilysuperior to the United States, with the same percentage believing that thetwo powers were equal in this category. Just 7 percent believed that theUnited States enjoyed military superiority. Just two years later, afterthe major increases began to make themselves felt, the number ofrespondents believing the USSR to be superior had fallen to 27 percent,while 10 percent believed the United States was superior. Fifty-sevenpercent believed that parity existed between the superpowers.113

The second reason, only fully recognized (and still debated) after theend of the Cold War, was the effort to force such a heavy burden on theSoviet Union through its military effort that it would be forced to alterits foreign and military policies. Key Reagan Administration officials, aswell as the CIA, came to recognize the very serious economic difficultiesfaced by the Soviet leadership. Harry Rowen, Chairman of the NationalIntelligence Council, testified before the U.S. Congress’ Joint EconomicCommittee (JEC) in October 1981 that ‘‘The overall state of the [Soviet]economy can be summarized very briefly. It is an economy in a greatdeal of difficulty . . . there is a very serious problem that the Soviet lea-dership faces.’’114 The authors of NIE 11/4-82 noted that the Sovieteconomy would probably only grow by 1–2 percent in the 1980s, andwith defense spending increasing by 4 percent annually, its share ofGNP could grow to nearly 20 percent by 1990.115 The consequenceswere seen as serious:

This level of military spending would drastically reduce the ability ofthe Soviet leadership to allocate additional resources to investmentand consumption. Under these conditions, continued growth indefense spending at its historical rate could lead to declines in livingstandards. Per capita consumption probably would continue to growmarginally for the next few years, but, by mid-decade, would almostcertainly be in decline.116

Analysts outside government agreed. Abraham S. Becker wrote that‘‘Accelerated defense spending poses grave dangers for the [Soviet]


economy and the society . . . even if military budget growth is cut to zero,the economic effects will be small.’’117 In Becker’s estimation, only amajor reduction in Soviet military expenditure would significantly affectthe economy.

Such concerns were recognized in policy planning. NSDD 32’s authorsnoted that ‘‘the Soviets will continue to have important vulnerabilities.The economies and the social systems of the Soviet Union and of mostSoviet allies continue to exhibit serious structural weaknesses.’’118 Amongthe objectives listed for US national security policy was

To foster, if possible in concert with our allies, restraint in Sovietmilitary spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken theSoviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its eco-nomic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing andnationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.(My italics)119

The combination of vast increases in US defense spending, combinedwith significant efforts to reduce sales of ‘‘dual-use’’ technologies (super-conductors, for example) to the USSR, was therefore an integral part ofthe Reagan Administration’s national security policy. Such efforts wereundertaken with the goal of weakening the USSR’s economic structureand thus the base of support for the Soviet military establishment.120

Conclusion

Although difficult to quantify as a means of measuring military strength,it could be said that the issue of defense spending remained a constantthroughout the period 1976–85. Because Americans tend to look uponfiscal issues as being central to policy, the issue of which of the super-powers was spending more on its military took a central role in theoverall debate over the balance. At its core, this debate was political.

What made it important in the 1970s was that it was used not simplyto call for an increased US defense budget (which really did not occuruntil the Carter Administration late in the decade), but also as part of anoverall effort to shift US foreign policy. The establishment of Team Band its subsequent report displayed this approach. The growing oppo-sition to Detente in the Ford Administration, and particularly amongagencies like PFIAB, was expressed through debates over intelligence.Charges that the CIA had underestimated the Soviet strategic threat ledto the Team B exercise, which broadened the scope of its analysis toargue that in fact the CIA had misperceived Soviet intentions as well.Team B, it should be remembered, had little to say on Soviet expendi-tures, but rather assumed that these were part of the overall Sovieteffort to attain global hegemony. The goal of the Team B report was to


serve as a clarion call for the United States to compete with the SovietUnion and thus thwart its aggressive ambitions.

This had an impact on the Carter Administration. The shape of thepublic debate on defense, including expenditure levels, was taken up bygroups like the CPD, which presented a picture of a massive Sovietbuildup overtaking the United States. Moreover, Carter had beeninfluenced by the Team B report and had, in conjunction with theNATO allies, set an annual goal of 3 percent growth in defense spend-ing. From 1978, as Detente went into decline, US defense expendituresrose. The large-scale increases in FY 1981–82, while necessary toimprove US capabilities, also had the effect of being seen as indicating arobust US national security policy, meant to redress the Soviet geopoli-tical gains of the past decade.

The true impact of the right’s arguments came during the first termof the Reagan Administration. Many of the CPD’s members, includingPaul Nitze and Richard Pipes (who had helped draft the Team Breport), served in the new administration, and Reagan had himself beena member of the CPD. Reagan’s outlook on the military balance,including of course expenditure, was almost wholly in line with that ofthe CPD. The vastly increased US defense budgets from 1982 to 1985were a logical outcome of the Reagan Administration’s approach tonational security issues. Placing a burden on the Soviet Union due to itshigh military expenditure was a central tenet of Reagan’s nationalsecurity strategy, made possible by the enormous increases in USspending.

Although the intricacies of strategic weapons, the military balance inEurope or the naval balance, waxed and waned with varying intensityduring this time, the constant of each year’s defense budget helpedfocus attention on this issue. Because all aspects of military power restedon the funding provided to maintain and expand the forces in being,the debate over how much was enough became intricately linked withissues of policy and strategy. Given the importance of the debate overthe military balance, it comes as no surprise that this often most elusivemeans of its measurement came to occupy such a central position. Inmany ways, the expenditure debate—combining both perceptions ofSoviet efforts and the development of US strategy and force posture—isa useful representative of the overall debate on the military balance. Asthe central input for the armed forces of both superpowers, militaryexpenditure determined their scope and global reach, and thus under-pinned all the key issue areas of military power during the decadeexamined here.


Conclusion

The military balance was key in shaping US–Soviet relations between1976 and 1985, and perception was central to the debates over themilitary capacity of the superpowers. In each of the four main categoriesexamined here—strategic forces, forces in Europe, power projectioncapabilities, and military expenditure—perceptions of growing Sovietcapabilities and a declining American position were central concerns forUS policymakers. Closely linked with this was the concern that this shiftwould lead to a more bellicose policy by the Kremlin, meant to establishSoviet global hegemony. It was feared that a serious imbalance of mili-tary power in Moscow’s favor could, in the event of a superpower crisis,lead the United States and its allies to acquiesce to Soviet demands.

Beyond these concerns, each category of the military balance had issuesunique to it. With strategic forces, strategy and technological innovationdrove developments, themselves linking with foreign and domestic policyto shape perceptions of superpower relations. In Europe, the role ofNATO, central to US national security policy, meant that key allies likeWest Germany came to play a prominent role in US decision-making,particularly on nuclear forces. The issue of power projection capabilitieswas tied in with growing Third World instability, and thus came to serveas a bellwether for US–Soviet relations throughout the decade in ques-tion. Military expenditure levels were of particular concern for Amer-icans, who tended to see military effectiveness as dependent upon howmuch money was spent on defense. Some of these concerns overlapped,as with the notion of Soviet coercion. The belief held by alarmists thatSoviet superiority in strategic forces—particularly in ICBMs—could forcethe United States to acquiesce to Soviet demands in a crisis, was matchedby similar concerns regarding Europe, where the phenomenon of ‘‘Fin-landization’’ was seen as the consequence of unfavorable trends in thesuperpower military balance. Such concerns were seen as part of anattempt by the USSR to achieve superiority across the board, as part of astrategy whereby all aspects of military power—strategic nuclear, theaterand conventional forces in Europe, and power projection—would com-bine to provide a basis for the establishment of Soviet hegemony.

These perceptions and concerns were based upon what was known andbelieved about Soviet military capabilities in the United States. As noted inthe introduction, a good deal was known about the performance of Sovietweaponry and military strategy and was listed in official publications,classified documents, and in both specialized publications and the generalpress. The US intelligence community was able to gather copiousamounts of information regarding the specifications of Soviet equipment,even of those systems about which data were most difficult to obtain. Theissue of ICBM accuracy provides a case in point. During October–November 1977, CIA analysts, utilizing information from satellite recon-naissance of six tests of Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, came to realizethat Soviet designers had developed modified versions of these missileswith far greater accuracy than had been the case previously. Further-more, the new guidance systems on the SS-18s and SS-19s were similar tothose installed on US Minuteman III ICBMs being fitted with Mark 12Awarheads.1 Information obtained since the end of the Cold War hasproved the CIA’s analysts to be correct in their estimates.2 Informationobtained on Soviet conventional forces (generally easier to find due to amultiplicity of sources, including allies) provided US analysts with a rea-sonably accurate view of Soviet capabilities across a broad spectrum.Similarly, Soviet military strategy found its way into the arguments ofboth alarmists and non-alarmists. Both Richard Pipes, writing in 1977about Soviet views of ‘‘victory’’ in a nuclear war, and Fred Kaplan,describing Soviet strategic capabilities with skepticism three years later,used Soviet sources to support their arguments. One source used by bothauthors is Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii’s Military Strategy, from which bothauthors draw conclusions amenable to their positions.3

While much was known about Soviet weaponry and military strategy,there were areas in which knowledge was limited and based in part onconjecture. The morale of the Soviet armed forces provided a case inpoint. Andrew Cockburn went to great lengths in his 1983 study of theSoviet military to expose the violence, racism, and drunkenness rifeamong Soviet conscripts, as well as the vast gulf between men and offi-cers, whose main objective was to obtain promotions and social status.4

Edward Luttwak, acknowledging that such problems existed, took a dif-ferent view. Addressing problems of morale and troop performance,Luttwak noted that these were present in all armed forces to a degree,while divisions between officers and men were mitigated by the fact thatthese were a long-standing and accepted tradition in the Soviet (andCzarist Russian) armed forces. As for ethnic tensions, Luttwak pointedout (as did Cockburn) that the Soviet military tended to put non-Slavicconscripts in support formations (such as construction and transport) inorder to maintain efficiency in their combat units.5

This raised the question of whether or not the Soviet fighting man—upon whose shoulders rested the success of any military operation initiated

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by the USSR—would be capable of carrying out the tasks assigned him,particularly in a war of conquest. Much of the high esteem afforded to theSoviet soldier stemmed from the experience of World War II, when, inspite of staggering losses, the Red Army managed to play the primary rolein the defeat of Nazi Germany, culminating in the capture of Berlin in May1945. This effort, however, was in response to an invasion meant to sub-jugate the Russian nation. Followed by mass extermination along nationaland racial lines. A war of aggression launched against NATO Europe, forexample, would not have the same motivation of national survival presentin World War II, any more than an attempt to conquer the Persian Gulf’soil reserves would have.

The invasion of Afghanistan provided evidence for both alarmists andnon-alarmists on Soviet capabilities. Luttwak saw Afghanistan as repre-senting an enormous improvement in Soviet military capability, withwell-coordinated airborne and ground operations marking a very dif-ferent level of performance from the invasion of Czechoslovakia 11years before.6 Cockburn, however, warned against placing too muchemphasis on Soviet performance in Afghanistan because ‘‘the motleygroups of poorly armed tribesmen against which the Soviets are fightingbear little resemblance to the kind of opposition they would face in adirect assault on the West.’’7 It is important to note that althoughAfghanistan would later become a serious drain in both lives and treas-ure for the USSR, at the time (1983–85) of Cockburn’s and Luttwak’swriting, it had yet to reach that point.8

Beyond debates over Soviet capabilities and the intentions that laybehind them was their relation to US national security policy and mili-tary capabilities. This relationship is central to understanding theimportance of the issues that came to the fore in these debates. Theissues within the categories examined here—strategic forces, European-based forces, power projection capabilities, and military expenditure—were interwoven, while each of these categories was linked to the others.Since the formation of NATO in 1949, US national security policyemphasized defense of overseas allies as equal to the defense of US ter-ritory. By the late-1950s the geographic scope of US strategic interestsencompassed Western Europe, East Asia and, to varying degrees,Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Despite the withdrawal from Viet-nam, this strategic outlook—now centered more on Europe and North-east Asia—remained intact in the 1970s.

To successfully support this strategy, the United States relied on asymbiotic relationship between its nuclear and conventional forces sta-tioned overseas and the strategic nuclear forces based in the UnitedStates. This offset Soviet numerical superiority in conventional forces inEurope, and of Communist China and North Korea in Asia. The tech-nological superiority of US and Allied conventional forces, as well as USnaval superiority, ensured a decisive edge in the East–West military

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balance throughout the 1950s and 1960s, most dramatically revealed inthe Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the combination of US super-iority in strategic and conventional forces at the point of crisis proveddecisive in ensuring a favorable outcome. By the mid-1970s, the balancebegan to shift. The Soviet Union began a major military buildup fromthe mid-1960s. A decade later, it had achieved parity in strategic andEuropean-based theatre forces. Moreover, major improvements toSoviet conventional forces had taken place, particularly in Europe, andpower projection capabilities (particularly naval forces) had also beensignificantly enhanced.

The comprehensive nature of the Soviet military buildup appeared toseriously challenge US national security strategy. First and foremost, atthe level of strategic forces, the achievement of parity by the USSRundermined the perceived utility of US strategic forces for extendeddeterrence. If Soviet ICBM’s could knock out their American counter-parts—the only strategic weapons capable of similarly accurate, promptattacks—in their silos, the other elements of the strategic forces—ballisticmissile submarines and bombers—would inflict only limited damage onSoviet forces, while Soviet strategic defenses, including civil defense,would minimize damage and casualties. This appeared to betoken a‘‘war-winning’’ nuclear strategy on the part of the Soviet Union, whichwould eliminate the use of US strategic forces for extended deterrenceon the grounds of unacceptable risk.

The issue of nuclear strategy was thus important to change the per-ception that US strategic forces had lost their utility in providing exten-ded deterrence. The growth in Soviet strategic capabilities appeared tobe central in an overall buildup of forces providing Moscow with themeans to pursue an aggressive geopolitical strategy. The need to createthe perception that the US strategic forces were capable of an extendeddeterrent role was vital to counteract this. Moreover, the geographicalexpansion of US strategic interests, most particularly to the Persian Gulffrom 1980, meant that US strategic forces had to provide a credibleumbrella in areas where US conventional strength would take time toplay a decisive role in a confrontation. The ‘‘Schlesinger Doctrine’’ of1974 set the pattern of flexible options for US strategic planners, evol-ving into the ‘‘Countervailing Strategy’’ of the late 1970s and to plans for‘‘protracted nuclear war’’ in the early 1980s.

The development of more ambitious nuclear strategies in many wayscoincided with the decline of Detente between the superpowers, as otherfactors—particularly what appeared to be a more aggressive Sovietapproach in international affairs—led to a confrontational tone in US–Soviet relations. A US nuclear strategy that appeared robust was seen asa prerequisite for a determined American effort to challenge what wasseen as destabilizing Soviet behavior. Intertwined with planning wereefforts to improve strategic defenses, as the minimizing of civilian

198 Conclusion

casualties was central to a successful nuclear strategy. Civil defensereceived considerable attention from 1978 through 1983, when its utilityas a means of minimizing the effects of nuclear attack appeared to beless than expected. This, in part, led to President Reagan’s SDI programas a means for providing an effective strategic defense.

The region most vital to US national security strategy was Europe.Along with the strategic forces, the forces assigned to NATO Europewere the most consistently important. It was here that consistent effortsto improve US forces were made from the mid-1970s, and that alliancepolitics came to play a role in decision-making. Perceptions amongNATO allies, particularly West Germany, that the East–West militarybalance was tilting in the USSR’s favor did much to spur the UnitedStates to take action to rectify this perceived imbalance and thus reas-sure the Europeans of American reliability. Considerations similar tothose existing in the debate over strategic forces were present regardingEurope. The combination of greatly improved Soviet theatre and con-ventional forces was seen as posing a danger of intimidation for NATO,which could force the Allies to adopt a neutralist policy rather than facewar with superior Soviet forces (backed up by superior strategic forceschecking those of the United States.) The indecision regarding the ERWin 1977–78 increased the pressure on US policymakers to take the leadin LRTNF during 1979. Similarly, improvements to US conventionalforces, underway from 1974, were enmeshed in NATO as a whole withthe May 1977 decision on a 3 percent defense spending increase and theLTDP.

Perhaps the issue that contributed most to the shift in superpowerrelations during the late 1970s was the Third World. The collapse ofpro-US regimes in Southeast Asia in 1975, followed by the crises inAngola that year and in the Horn of Africa in 1977–78, appeared toindicate an expansion of Soviet power and influence in the developingnations, concurrent with a decline of the US position here. One reasonfor this was the expansion of Soviet power projection forces, as well assupport from key proxies like Cuba and East Germany. The Horn ofAfrica was seen as a watershed in terms of Soviet involvement in theThird World, indicating the ability and will on Moscow’s part to useforce. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 ended Detente andushered in the Second Cold War. It is important to note that Afghani-stan marked the convergence of two key elements that played a majorrole in the deterioration of US–Soviet relations in the 1970s: Sovietactions in the Third World and American perceptions of the militarybalance.

Central among the actions taken by the United States at the beginningof the Second Cold War was the Carter Doctrine designating the PersianGulf as an area of vital interest. The establishment of the RDJTF inMarch 1980, a large, combined-arms force consisting of ground, naval,

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and air units from all of the armed services, was clearly directed towardthe defense of the Gulf from a Soviet invasion. The development of theRDJTF from the original RDF, conceived as a light mobile strike force tomaintain stability in the Third World, indicated Washington’s percep-tion of Soviet military involvement as the key threat to Third Worldstability. The Reagan Administration expanded the RDJTF into theCentral Command and also emphasized Soviet military threats in theThird World. The expansion of US naval power from 1980 was closelylinked with the buildup of power projection capabilities. At first meantto support forces like the RDJTF, during the Reagan years, naval powercame to be seen as a means of forcing the Soviet Union onto the defen-sive in the Cold War, both through its potential of threatening the Soviethomeland and in supporting Third World interventions meant to rollback Soviet influence.

The basic input of military power is the money provided to maintainand expand the forces in being. The reductions in US defense spendingfrom FYs 1973–78 coincided with continued increases of up to 4 percentin Soviet expenditures during this period, continuing a trend that hadbeen underway since the mid-1960s. Because Soviet capabilitiesappeared to improve while those of the United States declined, thedivergence in expenditures was seen as central, and thus became a keyissue in the debate over the military balance. Furthermore, defensespending played a role in various aspects of policy. The decision toincrease the NATO members’ budgets by 3 percent was in step with theAmerican decision to increase spending by this amount, occurring in theFY 1979 budget.

Military expenditures were perceived as an indication of Americandetermination to rectify what was seen as an unfavorable military bal-ance with the Soviet Union. From 1980, major increases in US defensespending occurred, coinciding with the emergence of the Second ColdWar. The Reagan Administration undertook a massive military buildup,supported by enormous increases over the last two Carter budgets,which themselves reflected steady growth over previous fiscal years. ForPresident Reagan and many of his national security planners, thisincrease was seen as a corrective not only to under-investment in the1970s but as the keystone to an overdue and necessary adaptation of anassertive US geo-strategic policy vis a vis the Soviet Union.

The perceptions of the military balance held by Americans in the1970s came to play a crucial role in shaping of strategic policy in the1980s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a shift in the CarterAdministration’s strategic outlook, particularly with regard to powerprojection capabilities. A policy of containment, akin to those of theTruman and Eisenhower years, was adopted, directed toward thePersian Gulf. The Reagan Administration came into office convinced ofthe need to confront the USSR in the international arena. The new

200 Conclusion

President, together with several of his key national security advisers likePaul Nitze, Richard Pipes, and John Lehman, had been members of theCPD, which had warned of the growing military imbalance between thesuperpowers and the danger of increased Soviet aggression as a result.9

The policies that would be followed between 1981 and 1985—increasedstrategic forces and ‘‘protracted’’ nuclear warfighting strategies, con-tinued improvements for US forces in Europe, the massive buildup ofnaval and other power projection forces, and the enormous defensebudget increases—reflected strongly the remedies called for by the CPDin order to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining military superiorityover the United States.10 These steps combined with other aspects of theReagan Administration’s national security policy, including economicwarfare, support for anti-Communist insurgents in the Third World,and a diplomatic offensive against the USSR as part of a thrusting ColdWar strategy, meant to regain the initiative for the West in the conflict.11

The rollback of Soviet power and influence, as opposed to the contain-ment espoused by Carter in 1980–81, was now the objective. For bothapproaches, significantly enhanced US military capability was critical, aswas the perception of its efficacy.

Ultimately, the debates of the 1970s and the policies they set intomotion in the 1980s played a crucial role in bringing the Cold War to anend. First, and perhaps most obvious, the attempt by the Soviet Unionto match US defense outlays did much to weaken the Soviet economy toan unacceptably dangerous point. Related to this was the shift in USstrategy. The development of nuclear strategies that emphasized ‘‘vic-tory’’ in a nuclear conflict, together with concepts for a thrusting use ofconventional forces, meant that the Soviet leadership now had to facethe possibility of its homeland becoming a battleground in the event ofwar. This appeared to nullify the principles of existing Soviet strategy,emphasizing offensive operations at all levels against the territory of theUSSR’s enemies. Now, the USSR was on the defensive and forced toshift its strategic precepts accordingly. This applied to the Third Worldas well. Whereas the Soviet Union appeared to enjoy the initiative in the1970s, by 1985 the advantage had shifted to the United States. Alongwith covert action, the visible deployment of US forces in CentralAmerica, the Caribbean and in the Persian Gulf, as well as a majorincrease in power projection capability, indicated Washington’s deter-mination not only to defend its interests in the developing world but toactively undermine those of the USSR.

A second and related impact of developments in the 1980s was onAmerican perceptions of the military balance. Whereas many strategicanalysts, political leaders and the general public had become alarmedover what was seen as an dangerous shift in the balance in the USSR’sfavor during the 1970s, by 1985 this view had changed. The view thatthe United States had, at the very least, considerably narrowed the gap

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in military capacity with the Soviet Union helped lead to a shift in policy.As early as 1984, Reagan had begun to emphasize a thawing of the ColdWar. His belief was that with the restoration of American power andwill, the United States could now take the initiative in reducing tensions.The return of self-confidence among the American public, based bothon economic recovery and the perception of a restoration of respect forthe United States abroad, bolstered this view. The result was the thawingof tensions during 1985, which led to a genuine rapprochement from 1987to the end of the Cold War.

As important was the change in the Soviet leadership. The accessionto power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 has come to be seen asmarking the end of the Second Cold War. Although a wary Detentewould last until the Reykjavik Summit in late 1986, Gorbachev’s rise topower marked a profound shift in US–Soviet relations. More thansimply reducing the burden of the USSR’s military effort, Gorbachevaimed to restructure Soviet domestic and foreign policy, as part of adramatic reorganization of society. A key rationale behind Gorbachev’sthinking was the realization that the level of superpower competition,resulting from the emergence of the Soviet Union as a truly globalpower in the 1970s, was unsustainable. This level was reached due to theenormous Soviet military buildup that occurred from the mid-1960s on.The large-scale US buildup of the early 1980s was a response to thiseffort, based on American perceptions that developed in the second halfof the 1970s. The cost to the Soviet Union had been so high that only agenuine reordering of the international system could allow the USSR totransform itself into a viable and productive society. The result would bethe collapse of the Soviet system, beginning with the fall of Communistregimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and finally of the USSR itself twoyears later. In part, perceptions that evolved some 15 years beforewould play a role in one of the twentieth century’s most importanttransformations.

Related to the military buildup of the 1980s and the end of the ColdWar was a technological revolution. The 1970s witnessed a flowering ofcomputer development, which made these systems both more compactand capable. Whereas computers had once filled large rooms andrequired an entire staff to operate them, now many were fitted to table-tops for individual use. This led to vastly improved communication sys-tems for use by the military. The development of microprocessorsallowed for the computerization of weapons, leading to the introductionof ‘‘smart’’ bombs and missiles. With the reduced defense budgets of the1970s, and the concentration on nuclear forces and conventional weap-onry, the true impact of these developments would not be felt until the1980s, when US defense spending grew exponentially.

Although it would take time, the computer revolution would bringabout a transformation in the American way of war. The experience of

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the two world wars, particularly World War II, had led to an attritionstrategy being adopted by US military planners. Firepower, particularlyartillery and air strikes, would inflict such massive casualties on anenemy that he would be unable to continue operations. Bombardmentof the enemy’s homeland would destroy war industries as well as com-munication centers and follow-up forces. Beginning with flexible nuclearstrategies, US planners began to see the possibilities offered by compu-terization. The Arab–Israeli War of 1973 also showed the importance ofcombined-arms warfare, with ground combat units and air forces oper-ating in support of one another on the battlefield. The Air–Land Battlestrategy, first issued in 1976, exemplified the shift away from theattrition warfare of the past: ‘‘Today the US Army must above all else,prepare to win the first battle of the next war’’ (Italics in original).12 By themid-1980s, Air–Land Battle had been refined and was now the center-piece of US conventional strategy. The integration of new technologiesmade the execution of fast-paced combined arms operations feasible.The US naval strategy of the 1980s, emphasizing operations against theSoviet homeland, complemented Air–Land Battle by emphasizing theneed to take the fight into the enemy’s territory, rather than fighting adefensive battle that would relinquish strategic initiative.13

Computerization also led to shifts in nuclear strategy, in a process ofevolution going back to the early 1970s. It had been the establishment ofparity by the Soviets in the 1960s that had helped spur the developmentof alternative strategies and the technology that enabled them to be putinto practice. The development of microprocessors had enabled USweapons designers to develop more accurate warheads for ballistic mis-siles, as well as smaller, more accurate long-range cruise missiles. Thisenabled US strategists to develop ‘‘war winning’’ nuclear strategies bythe early 1980s. SDI, developed from 1983, exemplified the computerrevolution, because it would not have been possible to even considersuch a system without the development of microprocessors and infor-mation systems (like the Internet) that had taken place over the previousdecade.

The impact of these developments would be felt in the 1980s, and theSoviets would be the first to understand their implications. NormanFriedman describes the strategic situation at the start of the 1980s:

they [the Soviets] also faced a reversal of their military position,due to a new military revolution, computer proliferation. Few if anyin the West seem to have realized just how quickly the balanceof military power was tipping, probably because in the late 1970smost analysts concentrated on nuclear weapons, which were rela-tively easy to count and to understand. Yet, once both sides wereheavily armed, once a first strike was no longer practical, nuclearweapons were essentially unusable . . .By the early 1980s . . .Western

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microcomputers provided a potentially winning edge—which theSoviets found they could not match. Computers and the related‘‘brilliant’’ weapons matured just as Ronald Reagan decided to boostU.S. defense spending.14

Although the Soviets attempted to redress the imbalance in technology,they were unsuccessful, due to the rigidity of the Soviet system. Centralplanning led to an ossification of efforts, an inability to adapt to new trendsin technology and means of production. This extended to the militarysector, which received the bulk of economic resources. Because long-termplanning set goals for production well in advance of new technologicaldevelopments, innovation and flexibility simply could not be utilized.Furthermore, the existing bureaucracies within the Soviet military-indus-trial complex were loath to divert resources to new technologies that couldthreaten their lock on resources. Such resistance was found in the Polit-buro, which had little desire for a re-structuring of the economy, despitegrowing evidence of the revolutionary potential of new technologies.15

Gorbachev’s efforts to bring about political change in the Sovietsystem, namely Glasnost, were spurred by the USSR’s dire economicsituation. A primary cause was the debilitating military competition withthe West, particularly the United States. Thus, perceptions and actionsof the 1970s and 1980s again come into play, since these contributed tothe situation inherited by Gorbachev. Because political liberalization wasneeded to bring societal change (and improve economic performance),it was undertaken to a degree never before seen in the USSR. The scopeof change led eventually to the collapse first of Soviet hegemony inEastern Europe and then to that of the Soviet Union itself.16

The end of the Cold War left the United States largely unchallengedas the global hegemonic power. Its new position was confirmed by theGulf War. Iraq’s armed forces were organized and trained by Sovietadvisers and followed Soviet tactical precepts, and the USSR had beenIraq’s largest supplier of military equipment. In many ways, the GulfWar, waged by both rapidly deployable and European-based US forces,and allies, including large British and French contingents, against theSoviet-configured Iraqi military resembled a hypothetical conventionalwar in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Maneuver warfare,deep penetration of enemy territory, the integration of land, naval andair forces, the use of computers for C3I, and above all the use of PGMsat all levels of combat operations were hallmarks of the revolution inwarfare that had occurred over the past decade. The defeat of Iraq inthe Gulf War could therefore be seen, in a roundabout way, as a defeatfor the military establishment of the Soviet Union, and thus an indirectdenouement of the Cold War.17

Despite the reduction of its armed forces after 1991, the United Statesutilized the technology deployed in the last decade of the Cold War to

204 Conclusion

maintain a force structure that outclassed any potential opponent in thepost–Cold War era. The concepts developed during the 1970s and1980s were refined to take account of ever improving technologies,particularly information processing. The ability to adapt such technolo-gies into the existing force structure stemmed from the changes made inthe 1980s that placed these systems at the center of operational planningand procurement. The emphasis on rapid deployment remained a cor-nerstone of US planning, with threats of instability in failed states (likeSomalia and Yugoslavia) replacing those of Third World intervention bySoviet and proxy forces. This emphasis enabled the United States toproject power in areas of conflict with relatively small forces and frombases at some distance from the battle area. Bosnia and Kosovo wereexamples of such operations. In the Persian Gulf, the United Statesrelied on an ‘‘over the horizon’’ presence—not unlike that of the 1980sinvolving rapid deployment forces—that could ensure a large-scalebuildup if necessary. The War on Terror has seen similar operationalconcepts in Afghanistan (special operation forces and light infantry sup-ported by airpower) and Iraq (an operational model similar to 1991,albeit on a smaller scale, with even greater integration of PGMs andcomputers.) Although the importance of nuclear forces declined withthe end of the Soviet threat, a strategy emphasizing selective nuclearoptions remained, in order to deter revanchist Third World states (Iranand North Korea) from using weapons of mass destruction against USforces and allies. Strategic defense remained part of US planning,although it was scaled down from the ambitious SDI program of theReagan years to a more modest system of land-based ABMs.18

The development of US–Soviet relations between 1976 and 1985, theturn from Detente to confrontation and the emergence of the SecondCold War, had many factors, of which the military balance was but one.However, with hindsight, it may be seen that perceptions of the militarybalance, particularly on the American side, came to play the most far-reaching role in helping to bring about the change in the internationalsituation. This was because the military balance, with its numerous cate-gories of importance, overlapped into other areas of debate regardingsuperpower relations. The strategic balance was intricately linked toissues regarding the NATO alliance and the Third World, particularly asthe United States moved to develop a specific direct intervention cap-ability from 1980. The European balance was shaped heavily by theconcerns of European NATO allies in relation to the balance of forces inCentral Europe. Issues regarding power projection forces reflectedgrowing American concerns over Third World stability during the1970s. All of these concerns came to shape debate over military expen-diture, because it was believed that the strengths and weaknesses of USforces in each category depended on the funding allocated. Many of thekey events of the period in international relations—the SALT II debate,

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NATO’s decision to deploy Pershing II and Cruise missiles, the pro-mulgation of the Carter Doctrine, SDI—reflected American perceptionsof the military balance.

The influence that the debate had on developments in US–Sovietrelations was of course mixed in with other factors, including trade,human rights, and domestic politics. Its impact, therefore, was notreadily apparent to analysts at the time these events were unfolding. Norwere all the links between certain categories of the military balance andother areas clearly visible. ICBM vulnerability was intertwined with thedevelopment of nuclear strategy during the 1970s, itself central to theconcept of US national security strategy. Often differences in assump-tions regarding the role of military power led to widely differing views.The CPD viewed strategic nuclear forces as supporting US theatre andconventional forces in Europe, as well as forces in East Asia and thePersian Gulf, as part of overall US strategy. For the CPD, this translatedto large, flexible strategic forces. The CDI, on the other hand, viewedthese forces as providing deterrence against a Soviet nuclear attack onthe United States, a finite role that allowed for a relatively modestnumber of delivery systems and warheads. A similar dichotomy of viewsexisted regarding other areas of the military balance, leading to debatesbased on widely varying assumptions about the role and importance ofmilitary power.

The end of the Cold War, and the resultant debate among historiansover its cause, has led to a clouding of the importance of the militarybalance in shaping policy during the 1970s and 1980s, and thus the role ithad in bringing about the events of 1989–91. One school of thoughtattributes the end of the Cold War to the efforts of Ronald Reagan, due toboth his military buildup (which bankrupted the Soviet Union) and hisrefusal to compromise with the Soviet leadership until the arrival of Gor-bachev in the Kremlin heralded a new approach for the USSR. Anotherapproach cites the failures of the Soviet system as leading to the resolutionof the East–West struggle, including the inability to adapt to the evermore interdependent global system that emerged from the 1970s on.19

Both schools have drawbacks when attempting to discern the role of themilitary balance. The first school emphasizes the role it played during the1980s, but tends to limit its scope to that of the Reagan years, ignoringthe role played by the Carter Administration in such key areas as theevolution of nuclear warfighting strategies, the US buildup in Europe,and the identification of the Persian Gulf as an area of strategic interest,leading to the creation of the RDF. The second school de-emphasizes therole of the military balance, focusing instead on factors within the Sovietbloc (including economic and social strains) in a manner that separatesthem from the international setting, that is, the Cold War.

In completing this study of the US–Soviet military balance, two keyconclusions can be reached. First, and most obvious, perceptions, even

206 Conclusion

when initially held by a relatively small number of individuals, can cometo shape overall policy. Whereas in 1976 only a handful of analysts wereexpressing alarm over what they saw as a shift in the military balance inthe USSR’s favor, by 1980 their views were central in the debate overUS national security policy. By 1985, these policies significantly reflectedthese views. This was due in no small part to the presence of influentialfigures among the alarmists, especially Ronald Reagan. Just as importantwas the persistence of the alarmists in disseminating their message to theAmerican public. By establishing a framework in which superpowerrelations came to be seen in light of the military balance—especially thealarmists’ views of it—policy came to reflect this outlook. This phenom-enon first came to be felt in the Carter Administration during 1979–80,when a series of Third World crises, together with the alarmists’ warn-ings over Soviet military strength, combined to shift policy decisivelyfrom Detente toward confrontation.

The second conclusion is linked to the first: that perceptions can havean impact on the course of events that is completely unexpected andunforeseen. Few in the mid- and late 1970s could have predicted eitherthe end of the Cold War within 15 years, let alone the impact that thedebates of the time would have on shaping the international order afterthe Cold War. Such foresight was simply not possible, any more thananalysts in 1910 could foresee the collapse of the existing Europeanorder within a decade, or in 1945 the shape of the Cold War that wouldcome to dominate international relations five years later. Because themilitary balance was part and parcel of the Cold War, and had been fordecades, the debates about it were simply seen within the context of thetimes, not something that would contribute to revolutionary transfor-mations. It is perhaps this point that is most important to rememberwhen attempting to draw lessons from the past to determine futuredevelopments. No doubt that the debates today regarding internationalrelations will have a similar—and perhaps unexpected—impact in futuredecades. It is true that the past is prologue, but as predictor of what is tocome, it can tell us only so much.

Conclusion 207

Notes

Introduction

1 F. Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, rev. edn (Verso, London,1986), Chap. 3.

2 Ibid., p. 79.3 Ibid., p. 80.4 J. G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 4th edn (St. Martin’s Press, Inc.,

New York, 1985), p. 213.5 Ibid., pp. 216–17.6 J. Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (Vintage Books, New York,

1988), Chaps IX and XI. Halliday also notes this factor in The Making of theSecond Cold War, Chap. 5.

7 R. Crockatt, The Fifty Years’ War: The United States and the Soviet Union in WorldPolitics, 1941–1991 (Routledge, London, 1995), p. 260.

8 O. A. Westad, The Fall of Detente: Soviet–American Relations During the CarterYears (Scandinavian University Press, Oxford, 1997), p. 18.

9 Ibid., pp. 65–66.10 Ibid., p. 66.11 As Andrew Cockburn (The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (Vintage

Books, New York, 1984), p. 30) notes, when NATO was trying to find outthe caliber of the T-72 tank’s main gun in the early 1970s, a French militaryattache in Moscow asked his Soviet liaison whether it would be possible toinspect a T-72. The liaison was only too willing to oblige, which allowed theFrench attache to determine that the T-72 was equipped with a 125-mmmain gun.

12 These included the work by Andrew Cockburn cited above as well as by EdwardLuttwak (On the Meaning of Victory (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986) andThe Pentagon and the Art of War (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1985)); JohnM. Collins (U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960–1980(McGraw-Hill Publications Co., New York, 1980), U.S.-Soviet Military Balance1980–1985 (Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, McLean,VA, 1985); and Norman Polmar (Guide to the Soviet Navy and The Ships and Air-craft of the U.S. Fleet (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD), both publishedroughly every 3–5 years.)

13 See Luttwak, The Pentagon, pp. 111–14.14 Ibid., pp. 114–17.15 Ibid., pp. 97–111.16 In D. P. Steury, Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–

1983 (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, DC, 1996), p. 370.

17 Ibid., pp. 370–71. The authors stated their belief that the primary goal ofSoviet policy was ‘‘America’s isolation from its allies as well as in the separa-tion of the OECD nations from the Third World, which, it believes, willseverely undermine ‘capitalism’s’ political, economic, and ultimately, militarymight’’ (p. 371).

18 C. Tyroler II, Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger(Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, McLean, VA, 1984),p. 4.

19 Luttwak, On the Meaning of Victory, pp. 263–74.20 ‘‘The Artificial Crisis of American Security,’’ The Defense Monitor, Vol. V,

No. 3, May 1976, p. 4.21 Ibid., p. 5.22 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 10.23 Ibid., pp. 12–13.24 Ibid., pp. 10–15. Cockburn also noted that the United States, which of course

was the first to develop atomic weapons, also was far ahead of the SovietUnion when it came to developing intercontinental strategic bombers (1948as opposed to 1954 for the USSR), ballistic missile submarines (1960 to 1968for the USSR), and multiple warhead missiles, in which the gap was nineyears (p. 15).

25 F. Kaplan, Dubious Specter: A Skeptical Look at the Soviet Strategic Threat (Insti-tute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC, 1980), p. 24.

26 Ibid., p. 74.27 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 32.

1 The counterforce doctrine

1 P. Bobbitt, L. Freedman and G. Treverton, eds, US Nuclear Strategy: AReader (New York University Press, New York, 1989), pp. 191–92.

2 T. Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ The Atlantic Monthly(November, 1982), pp. 93–94. McNamara shared these ideas with the NATOallies. At the NATO Council meeting in Athens on May 5, 1962, he noted that‘‘if both sides were to confine their attacks to important military targets,damage, while high, would nevertheless be significantly lower than if urban-industrial areas were also attacked.’’ In Bobbitt et al., US Nuclear Strategy,pp. 206–7.

3 Bobbitt et al., US Nuclear Strategy, p. 393.4 L. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd edn (Palgrave Macmil-

lan, London, 1989), pp. 376–77.5 NSSM 169, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Policy,’’ February 13, 1973 in Presidential Direc-

tives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cam-bridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #586.

6 NSDM 242, ‘‘Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,’’January 17, 1974 in Presidential Directives on National Security: FromTruman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994),Record #504.

7 Ibid.8 Ibid.9 D. Ball and J. Richelson, eds, Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Cornell University

Press, Ithaca, NY, 1986), p. 74.10 Ibid. This requirement led to a considerable amount of activity within the

defense bureaucracy, the US Air Force, and private think tanks like RAND

Notes 209

and the Hudson Institute, to determine which sectors of the Soviet econ-omy should be targeted to achieve NUWEP-1’s objectives.

11 M. Getler, ‘‘U.S. Studies Re-Targeting of Missiles,’’ The Washington Post,January 11, 1974, pp. A1, A16; J. W. Finney, ‘‘U.S. Retargeting Some Mis-siles Under New Strategic Concept,’’ The New York Times, January 11, 1974,p. A1.

12 Briefing on Counterforce Attacks: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control,International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, UnitedStates Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, USGPO, Washington, DC, Septem-ber 11, 1974 (sanitized and made public on January 10, 1975), p. 3. Hen-ceforth Briefing on Counterforce Attacks.

13 Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 7.14 Ibid., pp. 9–10. A Defense Department study showed Soviet ICBM accuracy

as being between 500 and 700 meters. (p. 10.)15 ‘‘Letter, Gerald R. Ford to Edward W. Brooke,’’ July 25, 1975, Presidential

Directive-59, 8/23–31/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler, Jimmy Carter Library.16 B. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces

for Europe, 1949–2000 (Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1999), p. 53.17 As Fritz Ermarth noted,

It has long been U.S. policy to assure that U.S. strategic nuclearforces are seen by the Soviets and our NATO allies as tightly cou-pled to European security. Along with conventional and theatrenuclear forces, U.S. strategic nuclear forces constitute an elementof the NATO ‘‘triad.’’ The good health of the alliance politicallyand the viability of deterrence in Europe have been seen torequire a very credible threat to engage U.S. strategic nuclearforces once nuclear weapons come into play above the level ofquite limited use.

‘‘Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought,’’ International Security.Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), p. 147.

18 L. E. Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine,IISS Adelphi Paper No. 121 (IISS, London, 1976), p. 6.

19 Ibid.20 Ibid.21 C. S. Gray, The Soviet-American Arms Race (Saxon House, D. C. Heath Lim-

ited, Hampshire, England, 1976), p. 78.22 DoD Annual Report FY 1975 (USGPO, Washington, DC, March 4, 1974),

p. 36. Henceforth Report FY 1975.23 Ibid., p. 38.24 Ibid., p. 42.25 DoD Annual Report FY 1976 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 5, 1975),

p. II-6. Henceforth Report FY 1976.26 Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces. Congress of the United

States: Congressional Budget Office (USGPO, Washington, DC, 1978), p.32. Henceforth Counterforce Issues.

27 Prompt hard-target kill capabilities refers to the ability to strike such targetsat the outset of a nuclear exchange; in this context, ICBM’s were seen as themost effective means to accomplish this.

28 See esp. Report FY 1975 pp. 40–41 and Report FY 1976 pp. II-8—II-9.29 C. H. Builder, D. C. Kephart, A. Laupa, The U.S. ICBM Force: Current Issues

and Future Options (RAND Corporation, PR-1754-R, October 1975), p. 82.

210 Notes

Excised copy. From the National Security Archive, Launch on Warning: theDevelopment of U.S. Capabilities, 1959–1979.

30 DoD Annual Report FY 1977 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 27, 1976)pp. 46–47. Henceforth Report FY 1977.

31 Report FY 1977, p. 47.32 NSDM 348, ‘‘U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture,’’ National Security

Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 1, Gerald R. FordLibrary.

33 PRM 10, ‘‘Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force PostureReview,’’ February 18, 1977 in Presidential Directives on National Security:From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994),Record #1382.

34 PRM 10, ‘‘Military Strategy and Force Posture Review, Final Report,’’ June1977 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman toClinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1919.

35 PRM 10, ‘‘Final Report,’’ p. 33.36 Ibid., p. II-6.37 ‘‘PRM 10 Force Posture Study,’’ June 6, 1977 in Presidential Directives on

National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge,Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1918.

38 D. Ball, Developments in U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy Under the Carter Adminis-tration (Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of Cali-fornia, Los Angeles, February 1980), p. 7.

39 Ibid.40 PD 18, ‘‘U.S. National Strategy,’’ August 24, 1977 in Presidential Directives

on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge,Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1350.

41 ‘‘[Nuclear Employment Policy],’’ 1977 in Presidential Directives on NationalSecurity from Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1360.

42 DoD Annual Report FY 1979 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 2, 1978),p. 55. Henceforth Report FY 1979.

43 Ibid., p. 58.44 Ibid., p. 59.45 Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1980

Budget, FY 1981 Authorization Request and FY 1980–1984 Defense Programs(USGPO, Washington, DC, January 25, 1979), p. 77. Henceforth Report FY1980.

46 Ibid.47 Defense Posture Statement FY 1978 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 20,

1977), p. 6. Henceforth Posture FY 1978.48 Defense Posture Statement FY 1979 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 20,

1978), p. 21. Henceforth Posture FY 1979.49 See Freedman, Evolution, pp. 392–94. A White House official told Richard

Burt of The New York Times that ‘‘targeting should not be done in a politicalvacuum . . . Some targets are of greater psychological importance to Moscowthan others, and we should begin thinking of how to use our strategic forcesto play on these concerns.’’ R. Burt, ‘‘Pentagon Reviewing Nuclear WarPlans,’’ The New York Times, December 16, 1977, p. A7.

50 See Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ pp. 90–91 for an in-depth discussion of Brzezinski’s view.

51 PD 53, ‘‘National Security Telecommunications Policy,’’ November 15, 1979in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton(microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), record #1369.

Notes 211

52 Ibid.53 R. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to

Reagan, rev. edn (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1994),p. 869.

54 PD 57, ‘‘Mobilization Planning,’’ March 3, 1980 in Presidential Directives onNational Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge,Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), record # 1372.

55 Ibid.56 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 869.57 DoD Annual Report FY 1981 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 29, 1980),

p. 66. Henceforth Report FY 1981.58 Freedman, Evolution, pp. 393–94; D. Ball, The Future of the Strategic Balance

(Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,Canberra, Australia, November 1980), pp. 23–24.

59 PD 59, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,’’ July 25, 1980, Jimmy CarterLibrary. http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd59.pdf

60 Ibid.61 DoD Annual Report FY 1982 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 19, 1981),

pp. 40–42. Henceforth Report FY 1982.62 Nuclear War Strategy: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United

States Senate, 96th Congress, 2nd Session on Presidential Directive 59 (USGPO,Washington, DC, September 16, 1980), p. 37. Henceforth Nuclear WarHearing.

63 Nuclear War Hearing, p. 17.64 Ibid., p. 24.65 Memo, Jasper Welch to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘‘Senate Foreign Relations

Committee Paper on PD-59,’’ September 11, 1980: PD-59, 5/80–81/81, Box35, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Jimmy Carter Library.

66 P. Pringle and W. Arkin, S.I.O.P.: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1983), p. 185.

67 Nuclear War Hearing, p. 10.68 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, p. 185.69 Ibid., p. 190.70 T. B. Cochran, W. M. Arkin and M. M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook:

Volume 1 U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Ballinger Publishing Co.,Cambridge, MA, 1984), p. 116.

71 Ibid., p. 116; Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ p. 106.72 Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ p. 106.73 Cochran, Arkin and Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons, p. 177.74 Ibid., p. 142.75 Ibid., p. 140.76 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, p. 190.77 Ibid.78 Report FY 1982, p. 121.79 Ibid., p. 122. The E-4B fleet included three aircraft converted from E-4A

standard.80 Ibid.81 Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ pp. 108–9.82 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, p. 186. It is important to note that the US strate-

gic arsenal consisted of just 10,000 warheads at this time.83 Ibid., pp. 186–87. These target groups were those described to the Senate

Armed Services Committee by the Pentagon in March, 1980, when SIOP-5D was adopted.

84 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, p. 187.

212 Notes

85 Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, p. 79.86 From the forward to C. Coker, US Military Power in the 1980s (The Mac-

millan Press, Ltd., London, 1983), p. xi.87 Report FY 1975, p. 29.88 Ibid., p. 30.89 Report FY 1977, p. iv.90 DoD Annual Report FY 1978 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 17, 1977),

p. 18.91 Ibid.92 General George S. Brown, USAF. ‘‘United States Military Posture for FY

1976,’’ cited in N. Polmar, Strategic Weapons: An Introduction (Macdonald andJane’s, Ltd., London, 1976), p. 111.

93 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The Military Balance 1976–77 (IISS, London, 1977), p.106.

94 Ibid., p. 107.95 Ibid.96 IISS, Military Balance 1977–78 (IISS, London, 1978) p. 77.97 Ibid.98 NIE 11-13/8-76, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s

(1976), p. 16. Henceforth NIE 11-3/8-76. The authors (p. 18) includedcommentary by the Assistant Chief of USAF Intelligence that Soviet inter-ventions in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Angola were made possibleby improvements to Soviet strategic forces.

99 NIE 11-13/8-76, p. 18.100 NIE 11-4-77, Soviet Strategic Objectives (January 12, 1977), p. 7.101 ‘‘Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: Soviet Strate-

gic Objectives: An Alternative View; Report of Team ‘B,’ ’’ December 1976, p.10. Henceforth ‘‘Team ‘B’ ’’.

102 ‘‘Team ‘B,’ ’’ p. 11.103 Ibid., p. 21.104 Report FY 1979, p. 62.105 Ibid.106 Report FY 1980, p. 80.107 Ibid.108 Report FY 1981, p. 83.109 Nuclear War Hearing, p. 31.110 Ibid.111 United States Military Posture for FY 1980 (USGPO, Washington, DC, 1979),

p. v. Henceforth Posture FY 1980.112 United States Military Posture for FY 1981 (USGPO, Washington, DC, 1980),

p. iii. Henceforth Posture FY 1981.113 Posture FY 1981, p. 30.114 NIE 11-3/8-77. Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the Late

1980s (February, 1978) p. 1. Henceforth NIE 11-3/8-77.115 NIE 11-3/8-77, pp. 1–2.116 NIE 11-3/8-79. Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the

1980s (March 17, 1980), p. 4.117 ‘‘Senate Foreign Relations Committee-1:Brown,’’ July 23, 1979, p. 113:

Presidential Directive-59, 8-22-80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy CarterLibrary.

118 ‘‘Senate Foreign Relations Committee-3:Kissinger,’’ July 31, 1979, p. 164:Presidential Directive-59, 8-22-80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; JimmyCarter Library. General Alexander Haig testified before the Senate ArmedServices Committee that ‘‘in crises with the Soviet Union from the Cuban

Notes 213

missile crisis of 1962 . . . our . . .President was always reassured by a back-drop of strategic superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.’’ Such historicalcomparisons to the situation in the late-1970s were often made as an indi-cation of a shift in the global power balance resulting from a loss of USsuperiority. ‘‘Senate Armed Services Committee-1: Haig,’’ July 26, 1979, p.359: Presidential Directive-59, 8/22/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; JimmyCarter Library.

119 ‘‘Secretary Muskie: U.S. Nuclear Strategy (September 16, 1980),’’ UnitedStates Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC:Presidential Directive-59, 9/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy CarterLibrary.

120 D. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (Yale University Press,London, 1983), p. 50.

121 Ibid.122 In J. Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger, eds, Soviet Military Power and Perfor-

mance (The Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1979) pp. 164–65.123 In J. Baylis and G. Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (Osmun & Co. Publishers, Inc.,

Montclair, NJ, 1981) pp. 108–17.124 R. Pipes, U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Detente (Westview Press, Inc.,

Boulder, CO, 1981) p. 149.125 Ibid., p. 147.126 See Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ and esp. L. Sloss and

M. D. Millot, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution,’’ Strategic Review, Vol.XII, No. 1 (Winter 1984), pp. 19–28.

127 See Survival, Vol. XXI, No. 5 (September/October 1979), pp. 217–30 forthe text of SALT II.

128 See J. Anderson, ‘‘Not-So-New Nuclear Strategy,’’ The Washington Post,October 12, 1980, p. C7 for a succinct description of the links betweenNSDM 242 and PD 59.

129 In Bobbitt et al., US Nuclear Strategy, p. 410.130 ‘‘Secretary Muskie: U.S. Nuclear Strategy (September 16, 1980),’’ United

States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC:Presidential Directive-59, 9/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy CarterLibrary.

131 Memo, Carl. R. Smith to Lloyd N. Cutler, ‘‘PD-59,’’ September 11, 1980,Presidential Directive-59, 9/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy CarterLibrary.

2 Protracted nuclear war

1 This was echoed by the Republican Party’s 1980 platform: ‘‘Before armscontrol negotiations can be undertaken, the security of the United Statesmust be assured by the funding and deployment of strong military forcessufficient to deter conflict at any level or to prevail in battle should aggres-sion occur’’ (Underlining in original). Position Paper, ‘‘Republican PartyPlatform—Detroit—July 1980; The Role of Arms Control in Defense Policy,’’March 26, 1981, Folder NSC 00006, Box 91282, Executive SecretariatMeeting Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

2 Tyroler II, Alerting America, pp. ix–xi. According to this list, 59 of the Com-mittee’s members were appointed to the Reagan Administration.

3 Tyroler, Alerting America, p. ix. Gray served as a member of the GeneralAdvisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament.

4 C. S. Gray, ‘‘Nuclear Strategy: the Case for a Theory of Victory.’’ InternationalSecurity Vol. 4, No.1 (Summer 1979), p. 56.

214 Notes

5 Gray, ‘‘Nuclear Strategy,’’ pp. 68–69.6 C. S. Gray and K. Payne, ‘‘Victory is Possible.’’ Foreign Policy 14 (Summer

1980), pp. 14, 18.7 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 337.8 T. B. Allen, War Games: Inside the Secret World of the Men who Play at World

War III (William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1987), pp. 205–13. Thereason for official notification was ‘‘to tell the Soviet Union and the rest ofthe world that decapitation would not stop the United States frommassive retaliation’’ (p. 211). Previously, most Presidential nuclear wargames had been kept strictly classified and strictly denied (Allen, Op cit.,p. 213).

9 J. Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 337.10 NSDD 12, ‘‘Strategic Forces Modernization Program,’’ October 1, 1981 in

Presidential Directives on National Security From Truman to Clinton(microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1225.

11 Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan 1981. January 20–December 31,1981 (USGPO, Washington, DC, 1982), p. 878.

12 Ibid., pp. 878–79.13 NSDD 13, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,’’ December 1981 in Pre-

sidential Directives on National Security From Truman To Clinton (micro-fiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1226. The details thathave been uncovered about NSDD 13 are described in R. Garthoff, The GreatTransition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (The Brook-ings Institution, Washington, DC, 1994), p. 36.

14 NSDD 91, ‘‘Strategic Forces Modernization Program Changes,’’ April 19,1983 in Presidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton(microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1310.

15 NSDD 32, ‘‘U.S. National Security Strategy,’’ April 1982, Folder 8290283,Box 4, Related Documents (System II), Ronald Reagan Library.

16 Ibid.17 NSDD 97, ‘‘National Security Telecommunications Policy,’’ August 3, 1983 in

Presidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton(microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1315.

18 Ibid.19 Ibid.20 See Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 36.21 NSDD 97.22 NSDD 145, ‘‘National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Infor-

mation Systems Security,’’ September 17, 1984 in Presidential Directives onNational Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1425.

23 R. Halloran, ‘‘Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy For Fighting a LongNuclear War,’’ New York Times, May 30, 1982, p. A1.

24 L. Freedman, Evolution, p. 406.25 G. C. Wilson, ‘‘Preparing for Long Nuclear War Is Waste of Funds, Gen.

Jones Says,’’ Washington Post, June 19, 1982, p. A3.26 Halloran, ‘‘Long Nuclear War,’’ p. A12.27 A Pentagon official who briefed the press on the Defense Guidance, perhaps

concerned that this might have been the view of the doctrine set forth by it,stated that ‘‘[N]o one is suggesting that a protracted [nuclear] war is . . .something that we are planning to do. But the capability of dealing with aprotracted attack upon us is important to develop, because if we develop thecapability . . .we can hope to deter it.’’ Wilson, ‘‘Preparing For Long NuclearWar,’’ p. A2.

Notes 215

28 Ibid.29 ‘‘U.S. Arms Plan Bared,’’ Chicago Tribune, January 17, 1983, p. 8.30 F. FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the

Cold War (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000), p. 182.31 Ibid., pp. 153–54.32 Their debates made them something of a pair of duelists in they eyes of the

press. As John Newhouse notes, the pair ‘‘were Shultz-Weinberger surro-gates.’’ (p. 351.)

33 M. Perry, Four Stars (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA, 1989), pp. 279–83.Weinberger had argued that a massive strategic buildup was needed imme-diately, or the United States would be ‘‘in grave peril’’ (p. 281), something thatwent beyond what Jones and the other JCS members believed to be the case.

34 Perry, Four Stars, p. 284.35 FitzGerald, Way Out, p. 184.36 Ibid., pp. 183–84. Burt had initially proposed a level of 1,200.37 Wilson, ‘‘Preparing for a Long Nuclear War,’’ p. A2.38 DoD Annual Report for FY 1983 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 8, 1982),

p. I-17. Henceforth Report FY 1983.39 DoD Annual Report for FY 1984 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 1, 1983),

p. 32. Henceforth Report FY 1984.40 Report FY 1984, p. 51.41 DoD Annual Report for FY 1985 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 1, 1984),

p. 29. Henceforth Report FY 1985.42 Memo, John H. Stanford to Col. Michael O. Wheeler, October 13, 1982, ID

# 06578, FG 013, WHORM: Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library.43 These systems are given priority in Administration documents from this

time. See esp. Report FY 1983, pp. III-57–63; Report FY 1984 pp. 219–25;Report FY 1985, pp. 185–92; DoD Annual Report for FY 1986 (USGPO,Washington, DC, February 4, 1985) pp. 52–53, 206–13. Henceforth ReportFY 1986; and NSDD-91.

44 J. N. Gibson, Nuclear Weapons of the United States: An Illustrated History (Schif-fer Publishing, Ltd., Atglen, PA, 1996), p. 38 (missile) and p. 50 (submarine).

45 Ibid., pp. 79–81.46 Freedman, Evolution, p. 406; Gibson, Nuclear Weapons, pp. 29–30, 82, 115–18,

156–59. For a good discussion on weapons development during thistime, see C. Campbell, Weapons of War (Peter Bedrick Books, New York,1983), pp. 195–201.

47 These were influenced by SALT II provisions, to which the Reagan Admin-istration adhered. These stipulated that cruise missiles could not be deployeduntil 1982, which was when these weapons first entered service with USAFB-52G squadrons.

48 Gibson, Nuclear Weapons, p. 24.49 NSDD 73, ‘‘The Peacekeeper Program Assessment,’’ January 3, 1983 in

Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton(microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1290.

50 Report FY 1985, p. 186.51 Ibid., p. 190.52 See A. H. Cordesman, Deterrence in the 1980s: Part I—American Strategic Forces

and Extended Deterrence, IISS Adelphi Paper 175 (IISS, London, 1982), p. 26for an in-depth description of the Trident II/D-5’s capabilities and theirimplications for US strategic doctrine.

53 Report FY 1986, p. 57.54 Campbell, Nuclear Weapons Fact Book (Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1984),

p. 107.

216 Notes

55 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, p. 237.56 Ibid., pp. 229, 232.57 C. Chant and I. Hogg. Nuclear War in the 1980s? (Nomad Publishers, Ltd.,

New York, 1983), p. 38. A total of six aircraft was planned by 1983.58 In Bobbitt et al., US Nuclear Strategy, p. 490.59 Ibid., pp. 492–503.60 Ibid., p. 504.61 Ibid.62 Fitzgerald, Way Out, pp. 193–94. An indication of the political motivations

involved can be gauged by the fact that the Commission’s members ‘‘hadbrokered a deal between Representative Les Aspin, a key Democrat on theHouse Armed Services Committee, Secretary Weinberger and others.’’(p. 193.) The broad nature of recommendations bears this out.

63 NSDD 91, for example, directed the immediate deployment of MX ICBMsin Minuteman silos, as well as the programs regarding bombers, submarines,strategic defense and C3I outlined in the report.

64 Soviet Military Power (USGPO, Washington, DC, September 1981), p. 95. Thiswas included in Secretary Weinberger’s 1983 Report to Congress as an annex.

65 Soviet Military Power 1983 (USGPO, Washington, DC, March 1983), p. 13.66 Ibid., p. 16.67 United States Military Posture for FY 1983 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January

1982), p. 19. Henceforth Posture FY 1983.68 Posture FY 1983, pp. 19–20.69 United States Military Posture for FY 1984 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January

1983), pp. 13–14. Henceforth Posture FY 1984.70 Posture FY 1983, p. 23; United States Military Posture for FY 1985 (USGPO,

Washington, DC, January 1984), p. 23; United States Military Posture for FY1986 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1985), p. 21.

71 NIE 11-3/8-82, ‘‘Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1982–92’’(Washington, DC, February 15, 1983), p. 5. Henceforth NIE 11-3/8-82.

72 NIE 11-3/8-82, p. 16.73 See A. H. Cahn. Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA (The Pennsylvania

State University Press, University Park, PA, 1998) for a history of this periodand the events surrounding ‘‘Team B.’’

74 Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 30. Fitzgerald (p. 157) quotes Robert Gates, Casey’sexecutive assistant at the CIA and later DCI himself, as describing Casey’spriority at the Agency as ‘‘primarily to wage war against the Soviet Union’’ inhis capacity as DCI.

75 NIE 11-3/8-81, ‘‘Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1981–91’’(Washington, DC, March 23, 1982), p. 1. Henceforth NIE 11-3/8-81.

76 NIE 11-3/8-81, p. 4. The authors define hard-target re-entry vehicles as‘‘those that have a 50-percent or greater probability of destroying a targethardened to 14 megapascals (2,000 pounds per square inch.)’’

77 NIE 11-3/8-82, p. 19. It is interesting to note that the figure for reductionsparalleled Richard Perle’s throw-weight controls in his arms control proposals.

78 NIE 11-3/8-81, pp. 18–19.79 NIE 11-3/8-82, p. 28.80 NIE 11/4-82, ‘‘The Soviet Challenge to US Security Interests’’ (Washington,

DC, August 10, 1982), p. 14.81 NSDD 98, issued on June 14, 1983 and outlining policy on the START nego-

tiations, noted that ‘‘The Report of the Commission on Strategic Forcesheaded by General Scowcroft . . .has provided a consistent and coherentframework to guide our thinking about the . . . elements of our national secur-ity policy, deterrence, defense and arms control.’’ NSDD 98, ‘‘U.S. Approach

Notes 217

to START Negotiations-VI,’’ June 14, 1983, Folder ‘‘NSDD’s 91–100,’’ Box 1,National Security Decision Directives 1-250, Ronald Reagan Library.

82 NSC Meeting, September 18, 1984, Folder ‘‘NSPG 96,’’ Box 4, Records Declas-sified and Released by the National Security Council, Ronald Reagan Library.

83 Ibid.84 Fitzgerald,Way Out (pp. 266–68), describes how an NSC meeting on achiev-

ing a secure peace in Central America broke down along ideological lines,and how the President was unable to make a decision. She notes that bothShultz and Weinberger met with Reagan privately later on, with Shultzstressing that the President needed to shake up his foreign policy team.However, he did not do so.

85 T. Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ p. 91.86 L. Sloss and M. D. Millot, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution,’’ Strategic

Review, Vol. XII, No.1 (Winter 1984), pp. 22–23.87 Ibid., p. 24.88 Ibid.89 Ibid., p. 25.90 Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980–1985, p. 60.91 IISS, The Military Balance 1985–1986 (IISS, London, 1985), p. 6.92 IISS, The Military Balance 1981–1982 (IISS, London, 1982), p. 5.93 Collins, Military Balance 1980–1985, p. 58; Military Balance 1981–1982, p. 5.94 IISS, Military Balance 1985–1986, p. 3. A total of 52 Titan IIs were in service

in 1981.95 J. G. Stoessinger, Nations at Dawn: China, Russia, and America, 6th edn

(McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, 1994), p. 249.96 T. C. Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War (Presidio Press,

New York, 2004), pp. 241–45 (on the SIOP briefing); 254–57 (on SDI.)97 L. Freedman, Atlas of Global Strategy (Facts on File, Inc., New York, 1985),

pp. 110–11.

3 Of shelters and Star Wars

1 Pipes, U.S.-Soviet Relations, p. 166.2 Ibid.3 ‘‘Report of Team ‘B,’ ’’ p. 25.4 Tyroler, Alerting America, p. 58.5 Ibid.6 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 376.7 Kaplan, Dubious Specter, p. 34.8 See ‘‘The New Nuclear Strategy. Battle of the Dead?’’ The Defense Monitor,

Vol. V, No. 5 (July 1976) for a discussion of this view.9 IISS, Strategic Survey 1976 (IISS, London, 1977), p. 32.

10 Ibid., pp. 32–33.11 Ibid., p. 32.12 Ibid., p. 34.13 Ibid.14 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 222.15 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 375.16 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 222.17 H. F. and W. F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Westview Press,

Boulder, CO, 1979), pp. 243–44.18 J. Shaw et al., eds, Nuclear Attack: Civil Defence Aspects of Civil Defence in the

Nuclear Age (Brassey’s Publishers, Ltd., Oxford, 1982), p. 260.19 Ibid., p. 264.

218 Notes

20 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 377.21 Ibid.22 Ibid., pp. 379–80. These figures pertain to the early 1980s.23 Ibid., p. 380.24 Ibid., pp. 380–81.25 Ibid., p. 381.26 Kaplan, Dubious Specter, p. 37.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 R. Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War (Random

House, New York, 1982), p. 116.30 Report FY 1977, p. 57.31 Report FY 1978, p. 64.32 Report FY 1979, p. 52.33 Report FY 1980, p. 74.34 Report FY 1981, p. 78.35 U.S. Military Posture for FY 1978 (Washington, DC, January 20, 1977), p. 29.

Henceforth Military Posture FY 1978.36 Ibid.37 U.S. Military Posture for FY 1982 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1981),

p. 108. Henceforth Military Posture FY 1982.38 The Nuclear War Effects Advisory Panel included General Russell F.

Dougherty, USAF (Ret.), former commander-in-chief of SAC; AdmiralGene R. LaRocque, USN (Ret.), Director of the CDI; and several scientists,including Sidney Drell, Richard Garwin and Jack Ruina, all of whom hadexperience with defense scientific matters.

39 The Effects of Nuclear War, Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of theUnited States (Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1980), p. 5.

40 Ibid., p. 57.41 Ibid., p. 37.42 Ibid., p. 27. Conditions were the same for Detroit.43 Ibid., p. 39.44 Ibid.45 NI 78-10003, ‘‘Soviet Civil Defense,’’ July 1978, p. 4.46 Ibid.47 Ibid., p. 12.48 NIE 11-3/8-76, ‘‘Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the

Mid-1980s,’’ December 21, 1976, p. 56.49 NIE 11-3/8-77, ‘‘Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through

the late 1980s,’’ February 1978, p. 22.50 Ibid., p. 23.51 Ibid.52 Report FY 1983, p. II-11.53 ‘‘Soviet Military Power,’’ in Report FY 1983, p. 69.54 Ibid.55 Posture FY 1983, p. 26.56 See Posture FY 1984, p. 18; Posture FY 1985, p. 33; Posture FY 1986, p. 32.57 NIE 11-3/8-81, pp. 17–18.58 NIE 11-3/8-82, p. 40.59 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 384.60 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 212.61 Shaw et al., Nuclear Attack, p. 197.62 Report FY 1976, p. II-54.63 Report FY 1975, pp. 78–79.

Notes 219

64 Ibid., p. 80.65 Report FY 1976, p. II-57.66 Ibid., pp. II-55–56.67 NSSM 244, ‘‘U.S. Civil Defense Policy,’’ July 24, 1976, in Presidential

Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche:Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record # 2150.

68 PRM/NSC 32, ‘‘Civil Defense,’’ September 30, 1977, in Presidential Direc-tives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cam-bridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record # 1197.

69 PRM/NSC 32, ‘‘Civil Defense,’’ Jimmy Carter Library, June 23, 1980. http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/prmemorandums/prm32.pdf

70 Ibid.71 PD/NSC 41, ‘‘U.S. Civil Defense Policy,’’ Jimmy Carter Library, June 23,

1980. http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd41.pdf72 Ibid.73 Report FY 1981, p. 139.74 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 212.75 Report FY 1979, p. 127.76 Report FY 1981, p. 139.77 Ibid.78 Shaw et al., Nuclear Attack, p. 202. NI 78-10003 estimated Soviet civil

defense expenditures at around 400 million rubles in 1976, or the equiva-lent of $2 billion for the United States (p. 3.) Cockburn, however, notes thatthe CIA’s estimates were determined by how much an equivalent programwould have cost the United States, in terms of pay and costs. This certainlyinflated the estimates, since Soviet military civil defense personnel werepaid a mere $6.50 in rubles per month. (pp. 375–76)

79 This included some Soviet plans for urban evacuation. The authors of PD41, for example, noted that ‘‘U.S. civil defense programs will take advantageof the mobility of the population stemming from wide ownership of privateautomobiles, the extensive highway systems, and the large number of non-urban potential housing facilities to achieve crisis relocation of the urbanpopulation.’’

80 NSDD 12.81 NSDD 23, ‘‘U.S. Civil Defense Policy,’’ February 3, 1982, in Presidential

Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche:Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1235.

82 Ibid.83 Ibid.84 NSDD 26, ‘‘U.S. Civil Defense Policy,’’ February 25, 1982, in Presidential

Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche:Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1238.

85 NSDD 47, ‘‘Emergency Mobilization Preparedness,’’ July 22, 1982, in Pre-sidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (micro-fiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1266.

86 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 394.87 ‘‘Battle of the Dead?’’ p. 12.88 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 379.89 D. Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (John Murray Publishers, Ltd.,

London, 1998), p. 151.90 Best known are T. K. Jones’ statements, made while serving in the Reagan

Administration: ‘‘if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody’sgoing to make it’’; and ‘‘It’s the dirt that does it [provides the most effectiveprotection against fallout],’’ Scheer, With Enough Shovels, p. 18.

220 Notes

91 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 379; Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 508.92 Address, Ronald Reagan to the nation, March 23, 1983, ID #83–12, SP735,

WHORM: Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library.93 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 363.94 B. M. Jasani, Outer Space-Battlefield of the Future? (Taylor & Francis Ltd.,

London, 1978), p. 182.95 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 360.96 F. FitzGerald, Way Out, p. 118.97 Ibid., p. 119.98 Ibid.99 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 360.

100 D. Baker, The Shape of Wars to Come (Stein and Day Publishers, BriarcliffManor, NY, 1982), p. 193.

101 NSDD 12.102 White House Fact Sheet, ‘‘National Space Policy,’’ July 4, 1982, folder ‘‘SDI

1982,’’ Box 1 of 2, Donald Baucum Files, Ronald Reagan Library. Among theuses of such an ASAT system would be the destruction of satellites used to assistthe targeting of ballistic missiles. By putting these out of action, a potentialnuclear aggressor—most likely the USSR—would be unable to coordinate astrategic attack upon the United States. (P. M. Boffey, ‘‘Pressures Are Increas-ing For Arms Race in Space,’’ The New York Times, October 18, 1982, p. B9.)

103 Letter, Edward Teller to Ronald Reagan, July 23, 1982, folder ‘‘SDI 1982,’’Box 1 of 2, Donald Baucum Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

104 Ibid.105 Ibid.106 See FitzGerald, Way Out, pp. 20–21, 99–102 for an in-depth analysis of the

NORAD visit.107 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 339.108 Freedman, Evolution, pp. 413–14.109 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 348.110 Letter, Teller to Reagan.111 Ibid. Newhouse describes Reagan as ‘‘an abolitionist’’ regarding nuclear

weapons. ‘‘He wanted to have the advantage in nuclear weapons or else torid the world of them . . .Before very long, he would decide that technologycould give America a security moat in outer space.’’ (p. 339)

112 FitzGerald, Way Out, pp. 256–57. Speaking to the National Press Club in May1984, Weinberger noted ‘‘[SDI] does not preclude, of course, any intermediatedeployment that could provide, among other things, defense of the offensivedeterrent forces, which of course we still have to maintain.’’ Perle, a staunchopponent of the 1972 ABM Treaty, saw SDI as a means of undermining thisagreement, as well as hampering US–Soviet arms control efforts. (pp. 257–58)

113 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 363.114 NIC M 83-10017, ‘‘Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense

Initiative,’’ Interagency Intelligence Assessment, September 12, 1983, p. vii.115 Ibid.116 Ibid.117 Ibid.118 Ibid., p. viii.119 Ibid., pp. vii–viii.120 CIA working paper, ‘‘Soviet Directed Energy Weapons—Perspectives on

Strategic Defense,’’ March 1985, p. iii.121 Ibid.122 Ibid.123 Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp. 516–17.

Notes 221

124 NSDD 153, ‘‘Instructions for the Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva,’’January 1, 1985, in Presidential Directives on National Security: FromTruman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994),Record # 1434.

125 Ibid.126 Memo, Fred C. Ikle to George A. Keyworth, November 17, 1983, folder

‘‘Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),’’ Box 1 of 2, Donald Baucum Files,Ronald Reagan Library.

127 Ibid. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1984, Key-worth noted that SDI provided ‘‘Options to begin disarming the perception ifnot the fact, of each other’s first-strike capability’’ (My italics). Statement on thePresident’s Strategic Defense Initiative by Dr. George A. Keyworth, Science Adviser tothe President, Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (98thCongress, Second Session), April 25, 1984, folder ‘‘SDI 1984 (1),’’ Box 1 of 2,Donald Baucum Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

128 Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 334–35.129 See esp. Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 360; note: FitzGerald, Way Out,

pp. 22–23, 25, 38. Both Newhouse and FitzGerald note the Alfred Hitchcockfilm Torn Curtain (1966) as having an important influence on Reagan’sviews of missile defense. In it, an American agent states that ‘‘We [theUnited States] will produce a defensive weapon that will make all offensivenuclear weapons obsolete—and thereby abolish the terror of nuclear warfare.’’(Newhouse, p. 360; FitzGerald, p. 23. My italics)

130 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 339.

4 The nuclear balance

1 Posture FY 1980, p. vi.2 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 309; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 941.3 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 942.4 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 53. Contrary to popular belief, the ERW would

not produce higher radiation effects than existing nuclear warheads. Rather,these effects would be emphasized due to the reduced blast effects of thewarhead itself. This was often overlooked at the time. See esp. Garthoff,Detente and Confrontation, p. 937.

5 Ibid.6 Report FY 1976, P. III-3.7 Report FY 1978, p. 83.8 R. Crockatt, The Fifty Years’ War, p. 269.9 Ibid.; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 937.

10 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 937.11 Report FY 1979, p. 72. For a diagram and accompanying description of ERW,

see J. Dornan (Cons.) The U.S. War Machine: An Encyclopedia of AmericanMilitary Equipment and Strategy (Salamander Books, Ltd., London, 1978), pp.84–85.

12 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 938. This was suggested in February1978, in an NSC meeting on SALT.

A U.S. decision to produce the ER, looking to its initial deployment inEurope in about two years; a simultaneous offer to the Soviets to forgoER deployment in return for non-deployment of the SS-20; a statementof Allied support for this approach, including ER deployment in Europeif the arms control objective is not achieved.

222 Notes

However, in a prophetic statement that indicated how this issue would beresolved, the authors noted that ‘‘the President noted that he wishes toreserve the final decision on the ER production and final clearance of anypublic statements to himself.’’ Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to the Vice Pre-sident et al., ‘‘SCC Meeting on Allied Consultations and SALT, February 14,1978,’’ February 16, 1978, USSR Related Documents Opened (II), Box 116,Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

13 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 310. According to James Schlesinger, whoserved as Carter’s Energy Secretary (responsible for the production of USnuclear weapons), Carter wanted Schmidt to accept ERW deployment if itwas produced, while Schmidt wanted other NATO members to accept itsdeployment before West Germany did so. Carter linked these two issues(production and deployment), leading to the trouble in negotiations. Inter-view with James Schlesinger, Miller Center Interviews, Carter PresidencyProject, Vol. XXII, July 19, 1984, pp. 61–62, Jimmy Carter Library. Hence-forth Interview with James Schlesinger.

14 Crockatt, The Fifty Years’ War, p. 269.15 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 938.16 Ibid., pp. 938–39.17 According to James Schlesinger, Schmidt should have explained his position

to Carter, and urged him to take the lead on the ERW issue. Carter, for hispart, should have maintained the production-deployment formula, which heeschewed. Interview with James Schlesinger, pp. 61–62.

18 From the perspective of two key American foreign policymakers comes aslight difference of opinion on how the issue of ERW played out. Secretary ofState Cyrus Vance, in his Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy(Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983), sees both sides of the issue.

In our minds, the decisions on production and deployment were linked.There was no sense in producing the ERW unless it could be deployedin Europe . . .Yet if it were to appear that the allies were being pressuredby the United States to accept the weapon, European political oppositioncould become unmanageable. (pp. 68–69)

For National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, the denouement of ERWhad a different cause. In his Power and Principle: Memoirs of the NationalSecurity Adviser 1977–1981 (Farrar-Straus-Giroux, New York, 1983), he seesHelmut Schmidt as being responsible for widening the breach in Trans-Atlantic relations. ‘‘Schmidt had obviously manoeuvred to make the decisionappear a purely American one’’ (p. 306). As Brzezinski tells it, Carter,recognizing the pressure Schmidt was under politically, took most of theblame for deferment of ERW. ‘‘To protect Schmidt and allied unity, Carterthus paid a high personal price’’ (Ibid.). Given the poor state of personalrelations between Brzezinski and Schmidt, this is not surprising (see New-house, War and Peace, p. 308 for a good description of this relationship.)

19 Memo, Gregory F. Treverton for Members of the European Task Force onComprehensive Net Assessment (PRM/NSC-10), ‘‘Summary and Differencesof View,’’ May 20, 1977, Presidential Review Memoranda 10 Through 36–47,Box 105, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

20 NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons (NATO Information Service,Brussels, 1984), p. 34.

21 For a good description of this phenomenon, see W. Laqueur, The Political Psy-chology of Appeasement: Finlandization and Other Unpopular Essays (Transaction,

Notes 223

Inc., New Brunswick, NJ, 1980), esp. ‘‘Finlandization,’’ pp. 3–22. For a cri-tique of this theory, see D. Allin, Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and SovietPower 1969–1989 (Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1994), esp. Chap. 4.

22 Memo, Gregory F. Treverton to Members of the European Task Force onComprehensive Net Assessment (PRM/NSC 10), ‘‘Summary and Differencesof View,’’ May 20, 1977, Presidential Review Memorandum-10, Box 105, Ver-tical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

23 Ibid. The authors went on to stress that ‘‘NATO Allies stress the Americannuclear commitment because they have no other choice . . .Europe could, butwill not, develop its own independent strategic deterrent based on the Britishand French forces.’’

24 Memo for the Secretary of State et al, ‘‘SCC Meeting on PRM 10, July 7,1977,’’ July 25, 1977, USSR 1980–1995, Box 116, Vertical File, Jimmy CarterLibrary.

25 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 936.26 Ibid.27 IISS, Military Balance 1977–1978, p. 17.28 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 943.29 PRM/NSC 38, ‘‘Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Con-

trol,’’ June 22, 1978 in Presidential Directives on National Security: FromTruman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record#1204.

30 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 944.31 Ibid., p. 945.32 Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 323–24.33 Ibid., p. 324.34 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 946.35 Ibid., p. 947.36 There were no formal notes of the meeting at Guadeloupe. However, Brze-

zinski (p. 295) did record is observations in his journal, and believed that themeeting ‘‘was a thoroughly stimulating and comprehensive review of thesecurity situation . . . I could sense out of the dialogue there was emerging arecognition that a common Western position was needed that has to be moreconcrete.’’ However, while praising Giscard and Callaghan, as well as Carter(‘‘very effectively taking the lead and pressing the others to define theirresponse to the perceived threat’’), Brzezinski remained critical of Schmidt,who ‘‘gave us a rather elementary lecture on nuclear strategy,’’ and appeared‘‘least inclined to agree on any firm response’’ to the perceived threat ofSoviet LRTNF forces.

37 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 947.38 G. Treverton, Nuclear Weapons in Europe, IISS Adelphi Papers No. 168 (IISS,

London, 1981), p. 25. Whereas the HLG included NATO defense ministers,the Special Group consisted of foreign ministers.

39 Final Communique, Nuclear Planning Group, The Hague, November 13–14,1979. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95

40 This was enshrined in PD 51, amended on March 28, 1980. The withdrawalwas meant to

permit a streamlining of the overall stockpile to leave ore modern andeffective capabilities . . . and provide the basis for greater operationalflexibility and efficiency . . . the 1000 warhead withdrawal is in the overallsecurity interest of the US and its allies and will contribute to achieve-ment of greater stability in the military balance in Europe.

224 Notes

‘‘Amendment to Nuclear Weapons Deployment (PD/NSC 51),’’ March 28,1980, www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pd51.

41 Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers, Brussels, December 12,1979. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95

42 Treverton, Nuclear Weapons, pp. 31–32.43 Memo, Stansfield Turner to Jimmy Carter, ‘‘An Assessment of Soviet Per-

ceptions on SALT-May 1977,’’ June 2, 1977, USSR Related Documents Opened(I), Box 116, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

44 Ibid.45 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to The Vice President et al, ‘‘SCC Meeting on

Allied Consultations and SALT, February 14, 1978,’’ February 16, 1978,USSR Related Documents Opened (II), Box 116, Vertical File, Jimmy CarterLibrary.

46 The Pershing II’s range was just 1,800 km, west of Moscow, while that of theGLCM was 2,500 km. See Force Comparisons, pp. 34, 37; Posture FY 1983,p. 29.

47 H. Kissinger, For the Record: Selected Statements 1977–1980 (Weidenfeld &Nicholson Ltd. and Michael Joseph Ltd., London, 1981), p. 241.

48 Ibid., p. 242.49 Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 342–43.50 R. Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 551; NATO Final Communiques 1981–1985

(NATO Information Service, Brussels, n.d.), p. 7, 28.51 J. Stoessinger, Nations at Dawn, p. 252. This was spelled out officially in

NSDD 15, issued on November 16, 1981. This policy would be part of anapproach ‘‘to seek subsequent limits with significant reductions for othernuclear weapons systems to achieve global, equal and verifiable levels ofweapons.’’ NSDD 15, ‘‘Theater Nuclear Forces (Intermediate-Range NuclearForces),’’ November 16, 1981 in Presidential Directives on National Security:From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994),Record #1228.

52 Memo, Richard Allen to Ronald Reagan, ‘‘Telephone Call to Paul Nitze ChiefU.S. Negotiator–INF Negotiations,’’ November 25, 1981, Folder Phone Calls(015), Box 1, Presidential Handwriting File, Ronald Reagan Library.

53 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 354.54 Stoessinger, Nations at Dawn, p. 252.55 See Campbell, Weapons of War, pp. 142, 224, 226; D. Miller, The Cold War,

p. 418. The British Polaris A-3TK missiles had recently been upgradedthrough the Chevaline program; The French effort included deployment ofS-3 IRBMs and new SLBMs, while the Mirage IVA force received new bombs.

56 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 551.57 Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 355–56.58 The Reagan Administration also listed its objections through a directive,

NSDD 56, issued on September 15, 1982, that stated ‘‘The U.S. cannotaccept a position in which the Soviets retain short time-of-flight SS-20 ballisticmissiles while the U.S. foregoes Pershing II ballistic missiles (and retains onlythe slower, air-breathing GLCMs.)’’ NSDD 56, ‘‘Private INF Exchange,’’ inPresidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton(microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1273.

59 Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 356–57.60 Ibid., p. 357.61 NSDD 104, ‘‘U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations-II,’’ September 21, 1983,

Folder NSDDs 101–110, Box 1, National Security Decision Directives 1-250,Ronald Reagan Library.

Notes 225

62 This was reinforced by the fact that at a meeting of NATO’s Nuclear Plan-ning Group (NPG) at Montebello, Canada on October 27, 1983, a decision towithdraw 1,400 nuclear warheads from NATO stockpiles ‘‘during the nextseveral years’’ was taken. ‘‘Moreover, this reduction will not be affected byany deployment of Longer-Range INF (LRINF) since one warhead will beremoved for each Pershing II or . . .GLCM warhead deployed.’’ NATO FinalCommuniques, p. 106.

63 J. N. Gibson, Nuclear Weapons, p. 162, 175.64 Report FY 1980, p. 83.65 Report FY 1984, p. 232.66 Posture FY 1981, pp. 46–47.67 ‘‘Theater Nuclear Force Negotiations: The Initial Soviet Approach,’’ August

10, 1979, pp. i–ii.68 282-AR, ‘‘INF Negotiations: The Likely Soviet Approach,’’ November 20,

1982, p. iii.69 As Christopher Coker, writing during the height of the debate in 1983, noted,

The SS-20s do not present as immediate a threat to European securityas the SS-4s or SS-5s did in the early 1960s . . .They hardly give rise toany particular concern that the Soviet Union intends to devastate Wes-tern Europe, since it has had that capability for 20 years and does notneed intermediate forces to do it.

US Military Power in the 1980s, p. 26.

5 Conventional forces

1 This chapter is based, in part, on my MSc thesis, American Perceptions of theU.S.–Soviet Military Balance: NATO’s Central Region, the Long-Term DefenseProgram and LRTNF, 1977–1980 (2000). However, while I draw from thatwork (and have found the works referenced within to be useful in the pre-paration of this chapter), it differs considerably, as it deals with the LRTNFissue (discussed in Chapter 4) along with the conventional balance in onestudy, whereas the two are separate here.

2 Geographically, this term encompasses West Germany and the Benelux statesfor NATO and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for the WarsawPact. This corresponds with NATO military delineation at the time.

3 J. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture(Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1995), pp. 179–80.

4 North Atlantic Council, ‘‘The Future Tasks of the Alliance,’’ Brussels, December13–14, 1967. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95

5 Ibid.6 Duffield, Power Rules, p. 182.7 W. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe (The Brookings

Institution, Washington, DC, 1983), pp. 21–22.8 Duffield, Power Rules, p. 210.9 Report FY 1975, p. 91.

10 Report FY 1976, pp. I-19, III-29.11 Report FY 1977, p. 231.12 Report FY 1978, p. 228; Posture FY 1978 (Washington, DC, January 20, 1977),

pp. 38–39; Posture FY 1979, p. 48.13 Report FY 1978, p. 229.

226 Notes

14 PRM 9, ‘‘Comprehensive Review of European Issues,’’ February 1, 1977 inPresidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton(microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1381.

15 Ibid.16 Memo, Robert Hunter to the Members of the European Task Force on

Comprehensive Net Assessment (PRM/NSC-10), ‘‘Terms of Reference,’’March 28, 1977, Presidential Review Memorandum 10 through 36–47, Box 105,Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

17 Ibid.18 Memo, Gregory F. Treverton to Members of the European Task Force on

Comprehensive Net Assessment (PRM/NSC 10), ‘‘Summary and Differencesof View,’’ May 20, 1977, Presidential Review Memorandum 10 through 36–47,Box 105, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

19 Ibid.20 Ibid.21 Ibid.22 PRM/NSC 10 Related, ‘‘PRM/NSC 10: Military Strategy and Force Posture

Review, Final Report,’’ June 1977 in Presidential Directives on NationalSecurity: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record # 1919.

23 Duffield, Power Rules, pp. 213–14; D. Greenwood, ‘‘NATO’s Three Per centSolution,’’ Survival Vol. 23, No. 6 (November–December 1981), p. 253.

24 Duffield, Power Rules, p. 214.25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.; Final Communique, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels December

5–6, 1976. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–9528 Ministerial Guidance-1977, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels May

17–18, 1977. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–9529 Final Communique, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels May 17–18,

1977. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–9530 Ministerial Guidance-1977, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels May 17–18,

1977. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 Another reason for this level wasthat this is what the Carter Administration had decided was a stable level forUS defense spending increases. (Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 936.)

31 Ministerial Guidance-1977, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels May17–18, 1977. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95

32 Ibid.33 ‘‘The Long-Term Defence Programme-A Summary,’’ Documents section,

NATO Review Vol. 26, No. 4 (August 1978), pp. 30–31.34 Final Communique, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels May 18–19,

1978. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–9535 Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, Washington May 30–31, 1978.

http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–9536 Duffield, Power Rules, p. 216.37 Ibid., p. 217.38 Ibid.39 Ibid., p. 219.40 Greenwood, ‘‘NATO’s Three Per cent Solution,’’ pp. 254–55.41 Report FY 1982, p. 218. The 1980 figure was preliminary at the time.42 Report FY 1981, p. 207.43 White Paper 1979: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Devel-

opment of the Federal Armed Forces (Ministry of Defense, Federal Republic ofGermany, Bonn, September 4, 1979), p. 119.

Notes 227

44 See my American Perceptions for more detailed discussions of these issues. Fora description of reserve mobilization, see Cockburn, The Threat, Chap. 7.

45 D. Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (Jane’s Publishing, Inc., NewYork, 1981), p. 12.

46 Posture FY 1978, p. 37.47 NIE 11-14-79, ‘‘Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO’’ (Washington, DC,

January 31, 1979), p. 54.48 NIE 4-1-78, ‘‘Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in

Europe: Implications for NATO Warning of War’’ (Washington, DC, April10, 1978), p. 39.

49 According to the authors, a front would number between three and fivearmies, each with three to five tank and/or motor rifle (mechanized) divi-sions, supported by an air army of 600 aircraft. Brought up to full strength, afront would number some 400,000 men, including some 100,000 supportpersonnel (NIE 4-1-78, p. 27).

50 NIE 4-1-78, p. 39.51 Ibid.52 Ibid.53 Duffield, Power Rules, p. 206.54 Collins, Military Balance 1960–1980, p. 311.55 Ibid.56 Miller, The Cold War, p. 252.57 In S. Cordier, Calculus of Power: The Current Soviet-American Conventional

Military Balance in Central Europe, 3rd edn (University Press of America, Inc.,Washington, DC, 1980), p. 6.

58 Ibid., p. 11.59 Ibid., pp. 11–12.60 ‘‘Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations from the East

German Archives,’’ translated and annotated by Mark Kramer. http://cwihp.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf

61 Ibid.; And also my ‘‘American Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Military Bal-ance,’’ p. 13.

62 H. Faringdon, Confrontation: The Strategic Geography of NATO and the WarsawPact (Routledge & Kegan Paul Inc., New York, 1986), p. 269.

63 Ibid.64 Ibid., p. 270.65 Miller, The Cold War, p. 234.66 Ibid., p. 232.67 Report FY 1979, p. 237.68 Ibid., p. 238.69 See Faringdon, Confrontation, p. 268. As he notes, ‘‘It is as if France in the

1850s was still garrisoned by the victorious allies of 1815, and the British andPrussians preserved the alignment they had taken up at Waterloo.’’

70 R. Fischer, Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces, IISS AdelphiPapers No. 127 (IISS, London, 1976), p. 23.

71 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 936.72 Report FY 1980, p. 206.73 Report FY 1981, p. 110.74 Ibid., p. 49.75 Duffield, Power Rules, p. 220.76 Ibid., pp. 210–11.77 Report FY 1980, p. 216.78 Report FY 1982, p. 213.

228 Notes

79 NSDD 32, ‘‘U.S. National Security Strategy,’’ April 1982, Folder 8290283,Box 4, Related Documents (System II), Ronald Reagan Library.

80 Duffield, Power Rules, p. 222.81 NATO Final Communiques 1981–1985, p. 33. Henceforth NATO Final Commu-

niques.82 NATO Final Communiques, p. 47.83 Duffield, Power Rules, p. 222.84 Ibid., p. 346.85 Ibid., pp. 222–23.86 NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons, p. 46.87 Duffield, Power Rules, pp. 225–26.88 Ibid.89 NSDD 32 reiterated US support for MC 14/3, while stressing a stronger

conventional capability, in order to lessen the possibility that NATO mighthave to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of war.

90 See Duffield, Power Rules, pp. 226–28.91 One significant success was the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control

Program, initiated in the late 1970s. From January 1982, 18 E-3A AWACSaircraft were deployed to NATO for use in West Germany. Report FY 1983,p. III-118.

92 Report FY 1985, p. 207; Report FY 1986, p. 227.93 Herbert, Major P. H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy

and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Paper No. 16(Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,Fort Leavenworth, KS. July 1988), pp. 7–8.

94 Ibid., p. 9.95 FM 100-5, issued in an updated form in August 1982, noted that,

regarding NATO Europe, ‘‘The ultimate goal is interoperability in bothequipment and methods of operations, allowing multinational forces tooperate smoothly and effectively together. Allied tactical publicationsestablish a basis for a common understanding of doctrine among nationsand provide NATO commanders with guiding principles.’’ Operations FM100-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, August20, 1982, pp. 17–4.

96 Duffield, Power Rules, p. 221.97 Ibid., pp. 179–80.

6 The naval balance

1 Report FY 1975, p. 117.2 N. Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 11th edn (Naval Institute

Press, Annapolis, MD, 1978), p. 2.3 For a complete list of US naval vessels decommissioned between 1970 and

1980, see N. Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 12th edn (NavalInstitute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1981), pp. 400–414.

4 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 11th edn, pp. 91, 94.5 Ibid., p. 64.6 Ibid., p. 48.7 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 12th edn, pp. 121, 29.8 For a detailed analysis of Soviet naval development since World War II,

see S. Breyer and N. Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 2nd edn (Naval

Notes 229

Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1977), pp. 29–49: N. Polmar, Soviet Navy,pp. 67–80.

9 Breyer and Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 2nd edn, p. 12.10 Ibid., p. 488; Polmar, Soviet Navy, pp. 22–26, 330–31.11 Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 61.12 Ibid.13 B. W. Watson, Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas,

1956–1980 (Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO, 1982), pp. 98–99.14 Ibid., p. 99.15 Ibid., p. 103.16 D. F. Winkler, Cold War at Sea: High Seas Confrontation between the United

States and the Soviet Union (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000),p. 120.

17 Watson, Red Navy at Sea, p. 103; Winkler, Cold War at Sea, p. 120.18 Watson, Red Navy at Sea, pp. 103–5.19 Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 19.20 Winkler, Cold War at Sea, p. 121.21 Ibid., pp. 120–21.22 Ibid., p. 121.23 Ibid., p. 122.24 Winkler (p. 121) states that ‘‘the Soviets had the capability to launch a

coordinated salvo of forty surface-to-surface missiles’’ at the U.S. fleet. Inorder to prevent this, US forces were ordered into close proximity to theirSoviet counterparts. ‘‘American destroyers and cruisers positioned them-selves within gun range of tailing Soviet missile ships, ready to fire at thefirst hint of a missile launch . . .Over the horizon, armed American attackaircraft constantly circled the Soviet missile ships.’’ (Ibid.)

25 Report FY 1975, p. 117.26 Ibid., pp. 119, 121.27 Ibid., pp. 119, 127–29, 130.28 Ibid., pp. 119, 123.29 Ibid., pp. 147–49.30 Ibid., pp. 133–34, 135.31 Report FY 1976, p. III-74.32 Ibid., pp. III-76–77. In addition, the Trident submarine program, which

was part of the Navy, consumed over $9.5 billion during this same period.33 Report FY 1977, p. 130.34 Report FY 1978, p. 190.35 Ibid., p. 177.36 NSDM 344, ‘‘Navy Shipbuilding Program,’’ January 18, 1977, Box 1, National

Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Gerald R. FordLibrary.

37 Ibid.38 Report FY 1978, pp. 191–92.39 PRM/NSC 10 Related, ‘‘PRM/NSC-10: Military Strategy and Force Posture

Review, Final Report,’’ June 1977 in Presidential Directives on NationalSecurity: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record # 1919.

40 F. H. Hartmann, Naval Renaissance: The U.S. Navy in the 1980s (Naval Insti-tute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1990), pp. 30–31. One telling differencebetween Options 1 and 3 was in the number of ships needed for powerprojection missions. Option 1 listed 10 carriers, 10 Aegis ships, 74 cruiser/destroyer and 52 amphibious ships in its total, while Option 3 listed,respectively, 14, 28, 114 and 78 in its total.

230 Notes

41 Report FY 1979, pp. 164–67.42 Ibid., pp. 193–95.43 Ibid., p. 169.44 Report FY 1980, p. 174.45 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 12th edn, p. 48.46 Report FY 1981, p. 189.47 Ibid., p. 170.48 Ibid., p. 172.49 Report FY 1982, p. 171. The acquisitions and conversions were mainly of

civilian ships for use as military cargo and hospital ships. This total includedtwo British-built Lyness auxiliaries.

50 Report FY 1982, p. 154.51 J. M. Collins, American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis

(Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University,Washington, DC, 1978), pp. 260–81. These lists compare the performanceof US and Soviet aircraft and missiles, as well as ship tonnage andweaponry.

52 J. M. Collins and A. Cordesman, Imbalance of Power: Shifting U.S.-SovietMilitary Strengths (Presidio Press, San Rafael, CA, 1978), p. 152.

53 In Power at Sea II. Super-powers and Navies, IISS Adelphi Paper No. 123(IISS, London, 1976), p. 10.

54 E. Morris, The Russian Navy: Myth & Reality (Hamish Hamilton Ltd.,London, 1977), p. 59.

55 W. H. Bagley, Sea Power and Western Security: The Next Decade, IISS AdelphiPaper No. 139 (IISS, London, 1977), p. 16.

56 Morris, The Russian Navy, pp. 59–60.57 Erickson and Feuchtwanger, Soviet Military Power, pp. 84–85.58 Ibid., p. 85.59 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 11th edn, p. 10.60 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 12th edn, p. 11.61 Ibid., p. 12.62 John Charles Daly, Moderator: Charles E. Bennett, Patrick J. Leahy, John

Moore, John Warner. The U.S. Navy: What is its Future? AEI Forums (Amer-ican Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 1977) p. 19.

63 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Office of the Chief of NavalOperations, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, April 1975), p. 9.

64 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments 3rd edn (Office of the Chief of NavalOperations, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, January 1978),pp. 10–11.

65 DDB-1200-159-80, ‘‘Defense Intelligence Report: Soviet Naval IndianOcean Operations,’’ February 1980, p. 10.

66 IISS Strategic Survey 1979 (IISS, London, 1980), p. 23.67 According to Watson, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron in 1980 consisted

of 20–22 ships, of which the largest number—10 ships—were auxiliaries. (p.148.)

68 The Northern Fleet deployed over 70 major warships and 135 attack sub-marines; the Baltic Fleet 46 warships and 29 submarines; the Pacific Fleetsome 83 warships and 80 attack submarines; the Black Sea Fleet 32 war-ships and 15 attack submarines (as of January 1980.) (listed in Collins,Military Balance 1960–1980, p. 250.)

69 Collins, Military Balance 1960–1980, pp. 242–43.70 According to Collins, Military Balance 1960–1980, p. 247, the US Atlantic

Fleet (Second and Sixth Fleets) consisted of 5 carrier task forces and 42attack submarines, while the Pacific Fleet (Third and Seventh Fleets) con-

Notes 231

sisted of 5 carrier task forces and 35 attack submarines. Two additionalcarrier task forces were deployed in the Indian Ocean (as of January 1980.)Each carrier task force numbered between 8and 10 ships of all types.

71 F. Barnaby, ‘‘Maneuvers in the Indian Ocean,’’ The Bulletin of the AtomicScientists, May 1980, p. 8.

72 Breyer and Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, p. 49.73 See Report FY 1977, p. 95. This was also the level set in Option 3 of Sea Plan

2000.74 Report FY 1983, p. II-12.75 Ibid., p. III-20.76 Ibid., p. III-36.77 Ibid., p. III-29.78 Report FY 1984, p. 140.79 Report FY 1985, p. 136.80 Report FY 1986, p. 155. This number was projected to grow to 555 by the

end of FY 1986.81 N. Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 13th edn (Naval Institute

Press, Annapolis, MD, 1984), p. 26.82 Ibid.83 Ibid., p. 28.84 Ibid., p. 26.85 J. F. Lehman, Jr, Command of the Seas (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD,

1988), p. 141.86 Ibid., pp. 121–38.87 Ibid., p. 137.88 NSDD 32.89 Ibid.90 See esp. Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp. 37–38; J. A. Nathan, ‘‘Return of

the Great White Fleet,’’ The Nation, March 5, 1983, p. 270; R. W. Komer,‘‘Maritime Strategy Versus Coalition Defense,’’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No.5, (Summer 1982), p. 1128.

91 Report FY 1983, pp. I-15–16.92 NIE 11-15-82/D, ‘‘Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990s,’’

March 1983, p. 5.93 Ibid.94 Ibid.95 Ibid, p. 7.96 Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 2.97 Ibid., p. 3.98 Ibid.99 IISS Military Balance 1982–1983 (IISS, London, 1982), p. 15; Military Bal-

ance 1983–1984 (IISS, London, 1983), p. 16; Military Balance 1984–1985(IISS, London, 1984), p. 19; Military Balance 1985–1986, p. 24. There aresome variations on numbers in the IISS analyses. In the 1985–1986 edition,for example, the authors note that 10 Yankee I-class ballistic missile sub-marines were being converted for use as attack subs. Accordingly, theauthors list 203 for total attack submarines, and note, in parentheses, the213 total if these vessels were included in that count. This also reflects inthe grand total of all Soviet submarines for that year (371–81), whichincludes command, rescue, and research subs.

100 IISS Military Balance 1982–1983, p. 7; 1983–1984, p. 7; 1984–1985, p. 7;1985–1986, p. 9. As with the Soviet figures, numbers of major surface war-ships, in terms of definitions, fluctuated. In the 1983–1984 issue, theauthors, breaking with earlier practice, placed aircraft carriers (of which

232 Notes

there were 14) in a separate category from major surface warships. Theyreturned carriers to this category the following year. Also, in the 1985–1986issue, the US Navy’s training carrier was not included in the total of majorcombat ships, as it had been in earlier issues.

101 Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 126.102 Miller, The Cold War, p. 431. Each carrier had 2 fighter and 2 light attack

squadrons.103 Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 126. According to Andrew Cockburn (p. 408), the

Soviet Yak-36 Forger VTOL (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) aircraft had atotal flight time of just 16 minutes, due to the amount of fuel it consumed ingetting airborne.

104 Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 3.105 Miller, The Cold War, pp. 429–30.106 As Cockburn notes, ‘‘when the Soviet Alpha class submarine was under-

going sea trials in the Norwegian Sea in the spring of 1980, the US Navywas able to hear it from Bermuda’’ (p. 426.)

107 Allen, War Games, p. 288; N. Polmar, E. Wertheim, A. Bahjat andB. Watson. Chronology of the Cold War at Sea, 1945–1991 (Naval InstitutePress, Annapolis, MD, 1998), pp. 189–90. The Norwegian Sea phase isparticularly illuminating. A total of 83 ships—British, Canadian and Nor-wegian, led by the Eisenhower battle group—sailed undetected through theGreenland–Iceland–UK Gap. In an even more daring move, a cruiser andthree other ships were detached from the task force and managed to roundthe North Cape and into the Barents Sea, where they operated for ninedays near important Soviet military installations on the Kola Peninsula. SeeB. B. Fishcer, A Cold War Conundrum (Center for the Study of Intelli-gence, Washington, DC, 1997), pp. 5–6. http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/coldwar/source.htm

108 Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum, p. 6. Earlier in 1983, the carrier CarlVinson led a battle group undetected into the Bering Sea for 12 days, andthe battleship New Jersey entered the Sea of Okhotsk (Hartmann, NavalRenaissance, pp. 246–47.)

109 Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum, p. 5. As the author puts it, ‘‘Fleet exer-cises conducted in 1981 and 1983 near the far northern and far easternregions of the Soviet Union demonstrated US ability to deploy aircraft-car-rier battle groups close to sensitive military and industrial sites, apparentlywithout being detected or challenged early on.’’ (Ibid.)

110 Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 61.111 Ibid., p. 17; M. Kidron and D. Smith, The War Atlas: Armed Conflict-Armed

Peace (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983), Map 7.112 Cockburn, The Threat, pp. 412–13.113 Among the largest naval maneuvers undertaken during this time came

with Ocean Venture ’82, carried out in June, 1982. Some 60 warships,including the carriers Forrestal and Independence, took part in thethree-week exercise, which featured an amphibious landing by 2,000marines in Puerto Rico. It showed that the US Navy was capable ofnumerous operations, including a possible blockade of Cuba to haltthat nation’s support for guerrillas in El Salvador. Indeed, SecretaryLehman had declared that the US Navy was capable of establishing ablockade ‘‘anywhere in the Caribbean.’’ M. T. Klare, ‘‘Testing Out Haig’sNew War Policy,’’ The Nation, June 19, 1982, front cover, pp. 750–51;‘‘Marines Hit Island Beach in Cuba Signal,’’ Washington Post, May 9, 1982,p. A3.

Notes 233

7 Forces for rapid deployment

1 R. W. Tucker, ‘‘Further Reflections on Oil & Force,’’ Commentary, March1975, p. 47. It is important to note that Ford based his statement on a‘‘hypothetical question’’ regarding an embargo.

2 ‘‘The Oil Crisis: Is there a Military Option?’’ Defense Monitor, Vol. VIII, No.11 (December 1979), p. 2.

3 R. W. Tucker, ‘‘Oil: The Issue of American Intervention,’’ Commentary, Jan-uary 1975, p. 24.

4 U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, Special Subcommittee onInvestigations: Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study, Report pre-pared by the Congressional Research Service, 94th Congress, 1st Session,Parts I and II (USGPO, Washington, D. C. August 21, 1975), pp. 8–9.Henceforth Oil Fields.

5 Oil Fields, p. 5. This would also directly affect national defense. As thereport noted, ‘‘U.S. Armed Forces . . . already have severely curtailed man-euvers, other training exercises, flight schedules, and ship steaming time forReserves as well as active elements. Additional restrictions would affectoperational readiness adversely.’’ (Ibid.)

6 Oil Fields, p. 6. The Arab OPEC members supplied 12.3 percent of this total,Iran 7.7 percent.

7 Tucker notes that the GNP growth rate for OECD countries fell from 6.3 percentin 1973 to �0.2 percent in 1974. ‘‘Further Reflections on Oil & Force,’’ p. 48.

8 PRM 10.9 PRM 10 Related. For the Middle East contingency the authors listed three

carrier task groups, an MAF, three Army Divisions, and 12 Air Force fightersquadrons. For sub-Saharan Africa, one or two carrier task groups, anMAB, an Army division and two Air Force fighter squadrons. A MarineAmphibious Force consisted of a Marine division, a Marine Air Wing, and aForce Service Support Group for logistical backup. Each MAF consisted ofthree MABs. The Marine Corps in the 1980s: Prestocking Proposals, the RapidDeployment Force, and Other Issues, Congress of the United States: Congres-sional Budget Office (USGPO, Washington, DC, May 1980), p. 12.

10 Ibid.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 PRM/NSC 10 Related, ‘‘PRM-10 Force Posture Study.’’ The emphasis on a

possible US–Soviet confrontation in the Middle East was made in an NSCmemorandum issued on July 8, 1977. It warned that

the U.S. is more likely to see a need to employ forces outside theNATO/[Warsaw] Pact context than in it. The most obvious possibilityis the Middle East: U.S. interests there continue to grow as Westernaccess to oil becomes more important; the possibility of conflict,potentially involving the USSR, remains higher there than in otherparts of the world.

O. Njolstad, ‘‘Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planningin the Carter Years,’’ Cold War History, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 2004, p. 26.

14 Ibid.15 PD 18.16 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 1085.17 M. T. Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome’’: U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s

(Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC, 1981), pp. 69–70.

234 Notes

18 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 177. In September 1977, SecretaryBrown emphasized the need ‘‘to maintain a defense posture that permitsus to respond effectively and simultaneously to a relatively minor as wellas to a major military contingency.’’ This would include ‘‘a limited numberof relatively light land combat forces . . .moderate naval and tactical airforces; and strategic mobility forces with the range and payload to mini-mize our dependence on overseas staging and logistical support bases.’’ D.A. Quinlan, The Role of the Marine Corps in Rapid Deployment Forces (NationalDefense University Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1983),p. 2.

19 As General Paul X. Kelley, the first commander of what would become theRapid Deployment Force, testified before the House Budget Committeein October 1980, the Pentagon began planning for such a force in1977. With the Carter Administration’s emphasis on NATO, however,such plans were ‘‘placed on the back burner.’’ Military Readiness and theRapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF): Hearings Before the Committee onthe Budget, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session (USGPO,Washington, DC, September 30–October 1, 1980), p. 45. HenceforthHearings RDJTF.

20 Luttwak, On the Meaning of Victory, p. 269; IISS Strategic Survey 1977 (IISS,London 1978), pp. 21–26; IISS Strategic Survey 1978 (IISS, London 1979),pp. 94–98; Westad, The Fall of Detente, p. 20.

21 Special Coordination Committee, ‘‘The Horn of Africa,’’ February 22, 1978,pp. 9–10. USSR-US Conference, 3–95 Briefing Book (I), Box 117, VerticalFile, Jimmy Carter Library.

22 Ibid., pp. 10–11. Brzezinski, however, saw a carrier deployment as provid-ing ‘‘military support if the Iranians or other outsiders provide air cover forSomalia. We should not engage the Ethiopians or Cubans directly.’’ JCSChairman General Jones opined that, due to Ethiopian momentum to crossthe border, ‘‘once a task force is sent in, there will be much harder decisionsafterward’’ (p. 11)

23 PD 32, ‘‘Horn of Africa,’’ February 24, 1978. http://www.jimmycarterlibrary. gov/documents/pddirectives/pd32.pdf

24 C. Coker, NATO, The Warsaw Pact and Africa (St. Martin’s Press, Inc., New York,1985), p. 109. This task force included seven US destroyers, but not a carrier.

25 James Schlesinger, Energy Secretary during the Carter years, notes thatCarter saw Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa as detrimental to US inter-ests and wanted to give greater support to Somalia. However, due to Somaliaggression in the conflict, Carter felt that such support would be unac-ceptable. Interview with James Schlesinger, pp. 13–15.

26 Strong divisions existed in the Carter Administration over such issues.Brzezinski sums this up well. For the more dovish members of the Admin-istration ‘‘The Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region was to be addressedthrough arms control efforts with the Soviets. The other side, on which Ifound myself, pointed to the momentum and character of Soviet militaryprograms, the vulnerability of the oil-rich region around the Persian Gulf,and the growing Soviet projection of power.’’ (pp. 177–78)

27 R. P. Haffa, Jr, The Half-War: Planning U. S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet aLimited Contingency, 1960–1983 (Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO, 1984), p. 115.

28 Address by the President (Carter) at the US Naval Academy’s Commence-ment Exercises, Annapolis, June 7, 1978 (Excerpt), ‘‘Confrontation orCooperation with the Soviet Union,’’ USSR-US Conference 3/95: BriefingBook (II), Box 117, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

Notes 235

29 D P. Jones, ed., U.S. Defense Policy: Weapons, Strategy and Commitments, 2ndedn (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, DC, 1980), p. 75, 78;A. Hughey, ‘‘The Age of Aircraft Carrier Diplomacy,’’ Forbes, July 21, 1980,p. 57.

30 F. Halliday, Threat from the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to theHorn of Africa (Penguin Books, Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1982), p.25. In a memorandum prepared for President Carter on December 2,1978, Brzezinski sounded an even more alarmist tone. ‘‘There is no ques-tion in my mind that we are confronting the beginning of a major crisis, insome ways similar to the one in Europe in the late [19]40’s . . . the West as awhole may be faced with a challenge of historic proportions.’’ Njolstad,‘‘Shifting Priorities,’’ pp. 23–24.

31 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Secretary of State et al., ‘‘The U.S. Responseto Afghanistan,’’ February 12, 1980, National Security Affairs, Box 1,Country File, Afghanistan 2/80, Jimmy Carter Library.

32 Ibid.33 M. A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in

the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992 (The Free Press, New York, 1992), pp. 102–3.34 Ibid., p. 103.35 Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 71.36 Haffa, The Half-War, pp. 61–62.37 M. O. Johnson, Military Force and American Policy in Southwest Asia, 1979–

1982: A Study of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Doctoral Dissertation,University of Virginia, May 1982, p. 77.

38 According to his memoirs, Brzezinski played a considerable role in spurringthe efforts of 1979 toward establishment of the RDF. Dissatisfied with thePentagon’s ‘‘slow reaction,’’ he pressured Secretary Brown for progressreports on this issue. He notes that, in a discussion with Brown, the idea ofcalling this force the Rapid Deployment Force was born (p. 456). As Njol-stad (p. 27) notes, in July 1977

Brzezinski recommended that the United States should increase itscapability to intervene militarily in the Persian Gulf region and othernon-European theatres on a large scale and at fairly short notice. Morespecifically, he suggested the creation of ‘‘a highly responsive, globalstrike force’’-what would soon be referred to as the Rapid DeploymentForce (RDF).

39 Haffa, The Half-War, pp. 93–103, 130.40 C. Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 241.41 Report FY 1982, p. 189. This role was actually assigned in August 1980

(Posture FY 1982, p. 55.)42 Posture FY 1981, p. iv. In day-to-day operations, the RDJTF would be part

of the Readiness Command, headed by the Army, while in operationalsituations it would come under the direct control of the JCS. Polmar, U.S.Fleet, 13th edn, p. 22.

43 Haffa, The Half-War, p. 130. As General Kelley noted in October 1980, ‘‘tothe best of my knowledge, it is the first time in the history of our countrythat we have amalgamated the combat capabilities of all four services underone headquarters in peacetime.’’ Hearings RDJTF, p. 44.

44 Report FY 1981, p. 9.45 Johnson, Military Force, pp. 138–39; Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p.

73. It is interesting to note that this force structure was nearly identical tothat listed in the AIMS for a Middle East contingency in PRM 10.

236 Notes

46 Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 76. Until 1980, the President wasauthorized by law to call up 50,000 reserve personnel without Congressionalapproval. In that year, due to the need for significant additional forces tosupport the RDJTF, this level was raised to 100,000. Department of DefenseAppropriations for 1983: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee onAppropriations, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 6(USGPO, Washington, DC, May 25, 1982), p. 73. Henceforth Hearings 1983.

47 A Discussion of the Rapid Deployment Force with Lieutenant General P.X.Kelley, American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Special Analyses (AmericanEnterprise Institute, Washington, DC, February 5, 1980), p. 4.

48 Ibid. As Paul Davis, Director of the RAND Corporation’s Strategic Assess-ment Center, noted ‘‘A given RDJTF might be battalion-sized, or mightinstead consist of a number of Army and Marine divisions as well as sup-porting air and naval forces.’’ P. K. Davis, Observations on the Rapid Deploy-ment Joint Task Force: Origins, Direction, and Mission, P-6751 (RANDCorporation, Santa Monica, CA, June 1982), p. 3.

49 Report FY 1982, p. 199.50 Ibid., p. 201–2.51 Ibid., pp. 205–6.52 IISS Strategic Survey 1980–1981 (IISS, London, 1981), p. 18; ‘‘Digging in at

Diego Garcia,’’ Time, July 14, 1980, p. 29.53 D. Eshel, The U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces (Arco Publishing, Inc., New York,

1985), p. 169; Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 13th edn, p. 23; J. Record, The RapidDeployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf (Institute forForeign Policy Analysis, Inc., Washington, DC, 1981), p. 49.

54 Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, p. vii.55 Ibid. Record also cited an issue that had been at the center of the RDF’s

creation; many units had a dual role in US military plans. According toRecord, all 4 Army divisions and a brigade, together with the 12 Air Forcetactical fighter squadrons, had a NATO role (p. 54).

56 Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, pp. vii–viii.57 Ibid., p. vii.58 Coker, US Military Power, pp. 32–33. Coker points out that ‘‘Simply to

deploy the 15,700 strong 82nd Airborne Division in the Gulf’’ wouldrequire ‘‘11,000 more support personnel.’’

59 R. Halloran, ‘‘Gaps in Training and Equipment Hinder Rapid DeploymentForce,’’ The New York Times, September 26, 1980, p. A24.

60 G. C. Wilson, ‘‘Outlook Grim in a War for Mideast Oil,’’ Washington Post,October 28, 1980, pp. A1, A7. The units listed were the most that could bedeployed in a 21-day period. General Warner himself stated that deploy-ment of most RDF forces in a timely manner would be unlikely before1985, due to a lack of airlift and sealift assets.

61 R. Burt, ‘‘Study Says a Soviet Move in Iran Might Require U.S. AtomArms,’’ The New York Times, February 2, 1980, p. A1. See also Halloran,‘‘Gaps in Training,’’ p. A24.

62 J. Anderson, ‘‘Political Problems for the RDF,’’ Washington Post, January 3,1981, p. C9. The idea of using nuclear forces in support of conventionalforces had become part of US strategy. In September 1980, Secretary ofState Muskie stated ‘‘I am confident that the countervailing strategy . . .establishes a firmer basis for our diplomacy with the Soviets. It underlinesour determination to respond to any challenges to our vital interests.’’‘‘Secretary Muskie: U.S. Nuclear Strategy (September 16, 1980),’’ Pre-sidential Directive-59, 9/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler, Jimmy Carter Library.

Notes 237

63 K. N. Waltz, ‘‘A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force,’’ InternationalSecurity, Vol. 5, No. 4, (Spring 1981), pp. 63, 68–69. Waltz (p. 67) likenedsuch a force to the 4,500-man US garrison in West Berlin, who ‘‘are therefor the sake of deterrence.’’

64 Hearings RDJTF, p. 58.65 According to General Kelley, ‘‘My mission includes any contingency outside of

NATO. We are focused primarily for the near term on Southwest Asia . . .Weare a force to contend with anything up to and including the Soviet Union out-side of NATO’’ (My italics). Hearings RDJTF, p. 52. Haffa (p. 130) notes thatthe RDJTF’s primary focus was on Southwest Asia.

66 Johnson, Military Force, pp. 16–17.67 Memo, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘‘Iran and the Soviets,’’ April

11, 1980, ‘‘4/80,’’ Box 4, Horn Special (27), Jimmy Carter Library.68 Ibid.69 R. W. Tucker, ‘‘American Power & the Persian Gulf,’’ Commentary, November

1980, p. 29.70 Melvyn Leffler, for example, saw Brzezinski as being the main architect of

this overall approach:

Brzezinski’s inclination to challenge Soviet power . . . came to the fore-front of administration concerns. Carter’s national security adviserwanted to use the crisis atmosphere generated by the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan to implement earlier plans for a new American–led securityframework and military presence in the Persian Gulf-Middle Eastregion. Brzezinski also sought to redefine the nation’s deterrence andnuclear war strategies.

‘‘From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmasof the Cold War,’’ Diplomatic History, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 1983), p. 255.

71 Waltz, ‘‘A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force,’’ p. 50.72 PD 62, ‘‘Modifications in U.S. National Strategy,’’ January 15, 1981. http://

www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd62.pdf73 PD 63, ‘‘Persian Gulf Security Framework,’’ January 15, 1981. http://

www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd63.pdf74 NSDD 32.75 This view was held by JCS Chairman General Jones. In a May 1981 inter-

view, Jones alluded to the idea of widening a conflict—such as a Sovietintervention in the Gulf—by moves elsewhere. Although for security rea-sons not overly specific, Jones stated that an effort to ‘‘clean out the Sovietfleet in the Indian Ocean’’ was a possible response. E. Ulsamer, ‘‘The Pen-tagon Is Gearing Up for the ‘80s,’’ Air Force Magazine, May, 1981, p. 51.

76 NSDD 32. The Directive saw a superpower clash in the region as the pre-lude to a wider conflict. ‘‘It is questionable whether either superpowercould restrict to one theater a war which would impact critically on theeconomies of the US, Western Europe, and Japan.’’

77 Ibid.78 As Johnson (pp. 54–55) noted, ‘‘Reagan seems to have recognized that the

Soviets might be equally tempted to take advantage of internal stability or ofintraregional conflicts.’’

79 R. Halloran, ‘‘Long Nuclear War,’’, p. A12; ‘‘U.S. Arms Plan Bared,’’ p. 8.80 Hearings 1983, p. 1. The term ‘‘Southwest Asia’’ generally covers Asia from

the Suez Canal to Pakistan. However, Sudan and the Horn of Africa wereincluded in US planning for the RDJTF. Hearings 1983, p. 70.

238 Notes

81 J. Digby, The Emerging American Strategy: Application to Southwest Asia,N-1700-FF (Santa Monica, CA, May 1981), p. vii.

82 ‘‘Defense Department Statement on the Mission of the Rapid DeploymentTask Force,’’ International Communication Agency, U.S. Embassy, London,March 16, 1982, p. 5.

83 IISS Strategic Survey 1980–1981, p. 18.84 United States Military Posture for FY 1983 (Washington, DC, 1982), p. 102.

For a in-depth discussion of the exercise, particularly in Egypt, see M.J. H. Taylor, ed., Jane’s 1982–83 Aviation Review (London, 1982), pp. 51–58.

85 Coker, US Military Power, p. 32. In the earlier Bright Star exercise, it took sixdays for a 900-man infantry battalion to be deployed to Egypt.E. O’Ballance, ‘‘The US Rapid Deployment Force,’’ Foreign AffairsResearch Institute, London, October 1981, p. 3.

86 Report FY 1983, p. III-103. Several top administration officials emphasizedthis focus. Weinberger and Navy Secretary Lehman stated in 1981 that thePersian Gulf was the RDJTF’s area of operations, and that Soviet forceswere the main threat to be countered. General Robert C. Kingston, RDJTFcommander, declared his mission to be defense of Persian Gulf oil fromboth Soviet and Soviet proxy forces. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1981,motion picture (US Information Agency, 1982), National Archives (II) atCollege Park, MD, Henceforth RDJTF, 1981.

87 Report FY 1983, p. III-105.88 Report FY 1983, p. III-103. This corresponded to the forces listed for the

RDJTF in the Defense Guidance, issued the same year. Halloran, ‘‘LongNuclear War,’’ p. A12.

89 Report FY 1983, p. III-105.90 As General Kingston declared in 1981, ‘‘When you look at the components

that I have . . .You’re talking about the best front-line troops that the UnitedStates has, in any service.’’ This meant that the RDJTF could ‘‘go in harm’sway against Soviet forces, in strength and with significant capability.’’RDJTF, 1981.

91 In order to form CENTCOM, the European and Pacific commands hadtheir geographic boundaries revised, corresponding to the area of respon-sibility for the RDJTF. United States Central Command, 1983, motion picture(US Information Agency, 1983), National Archives (II) at College Park, MD.Henceforth CENTCOM, 1983.

92 Eshel, The U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces, p. 202.93 IISS Strategic Survey 1982–1983, p. 136. Although the AWACs were under

Saudi control, US forces maintained access to information provided bythese aircraft.

94 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 13th edn, p. 21.95 R. Halloran, ‘‘Poised for the Persian Gulf,’’ The New York Times Magazine,

April 1, 1984, p. 61.96 Freedman, Atlas of Global Strategy, p. 67.97 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 13th edn, p. 2398 IISS Strategic Survey 1982–1983, p. 135.99 These were the fastest vessels to be built for the US merchant service, cap-

able of 33 knots (Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 13th edn, p. 270).100 IISS Strategic Survey 1982–1983, p. 136.101 Ibid.102 NSDD 75, ‘‘U.S. Relations with the USSR,’’ January 17, 1983, Folder

‘‘NSDDs 71-80,’’ Box 1, National Security Decision Directives 1-250, RonaldReagan Library.

103 Ibid.

Notes 239

104 NSDD 99, ‘‘United States Security Strategy for the Near East and SouthAsia,’’ July 12, 1983, Folder ‘‘NSDDs 91-100,’’ Box 1, National SecurityDecision Directives 1-250, Ronald Reagan Library.

105 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 247. In discussing the use of nuclear weaponsto defend the Gulf, both the Carter and Reagan Administrations weredrawing on the growing set of options presented by evolving nuclear stra-tegies. Carter’s PD 59 and Reagan’s NSDD 13 provided a role for the USstrategic forces in such contingencies. See Freedman, Evolution, esp. Chaps25–26.

106 IISS Strategic Survey 1982–1983, p. 137.107 NSDD 32, for example, states bluntly: ‘‘For at least the next several years,

we are unlikely to succeed in achieving our objectives against a determinedSoviet attack in Southwest Asia.’’ The Defense Guidance issued in 1983declared ‘‘We must acquire a reasonable assurance of achieving UnitedStates war-fighting objectives in Southwest Asia by the end of the decade.’’Halloran, ‘‘Poised for the Persian Gulf,’’ p. 39.

108 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 250. It should be noted that Red Army sup-port troops were assigned to these divisions.

109 Each division had 107 armored fighting vehicles, 30 self-propelled assaultguns, 18 122-mm howitzers, 18 multiple-rocket launchers and 36 mobileanti-aircraft guns.(U. Ra’anan, R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr and G. Kemp, Projection ofPower: Perspectives, Perceptions and Problems (Archon Books, Hamden, CT,1982), p. 144.)

110 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 250.111 Ibid., p. 249; Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 124. The Soviets also

maintained special operation brigades, comparable to US Army Rangers,and special forces, akin to US Special Forces, designed for long-rangepenetration operations (Campbell, p. 250.)

112 N. Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 31.113 Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 123.114 Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 3.115 Ibid., p. 412.116 Kidron and Smith, The War Atlas, Map 19.117 Ra’anan et al., Projection of Power, p. 146.118 Klare (p. 123) notes that these forces had only 4–5 days of supplies.119 Collins, 1960–1980, pp. 385–86.120 Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 128. US amphibious ships, num-

bering 60, could lift 1.15 MAFs, considerably more than the Soviet fleetcould. M. L. Bartlett, Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of AmphibiousWarfare (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1983), p. 407.

121 Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 128. Such figures are somewhatdeceptive. In Southwest Asia, for example, the USSR would have a largeforce of heavy divisions on the scene to support such light forces, while USforces would have had to arrive over several weeks.

122 By 1981, France maintained 4,500 troops in Djibouti, on the Horn ofAfrica, and another 4,000 on Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean (Klare,p. 131.)

123 See esp. W. S. Thompson, Power Projection: A Net Assessment of U.S. andSoviet Capabilities (National Strategy Information Center, Inc. New York,1978), pp. 33–38 and S. S. Cordier, U.S. Military Power and Rapid DeploymentRequirements in the 1980s (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1983), Chap. III foran analysis of Soviet actions during this time.

124 According to Lawrence Freedman Atlas of Global Strategy, by 1985 the SovietUnion had just 12 naval anchorages outside of the Warsaw Pact area

240 Notes

(pp. 18–19.) By contrast, the United States (excluding air bases in NATOEurope and Japan) at this time had 21 forward air bases, 18 forward navalbases, and 17 naval anchorages (pp. 22–23.) Moreover, the US facilitieswere generally well distributed across the globe, whereas their Sovietcounterparts were (apart from along the Indian Ocean littoral) spread verythin.

125 Zbigniew Brzezinski outlined this approach in December 1980. ‘‘By movingas we have to contain a possible Soviet push into Southwest Asia, we alsoposition ourselves to work for a more constructive and positive relationshipwith the Soviet Union . . . our ability to deter Soviet pressure . . .providesus . . .with the foundation for a stable dialogue.’’

‘‘Building a Security Framework in the Persian Gulf,’’ International Com-munication Agency, U.S. Embassy, London, December 8, 1980, pp. 5–6.

126 Report FY 1982, p. vii.127 Report FY 1983, p. II-19. As Weinberger stated in 1983, ‘‘The main threat

to the Central Region [CENTCOM’s area of responsibility] is the samethreat we face all over the world. It is the threat of increased Sovietaggression and aggressiveness and increased Soviet military activity.’’CENTCOM, 1983.

128 However, their intent was to make it clear to the Soviet Union, as well asCuba, that such action could take place. Ocean Venture ’82, a three-weekexercise held in May 1982, involved some 45,000 US personnel, 60 war-ships, 360 combat and 132 transport aircraft. It covered parts of Florida,Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, and the simulated enemy, known as‘‘Brown,’’ was intended to be Cuba. As the Washington Post noted, ‘‘U.S.officials say the three-week . . . operation is designed to ‘send a signal’ thatWashington is prepared to protect its Caribbean interests.’’ As Klare noted,‘‘[I]t can be seen as a significant military operation in its own right—as awarm-up for the forces and command centers that would be employed inany actual attacks.’’ Klare, ‘‘Testing Out Haig’s New War Policy,’’; ‘‘MarinesHit Island Beach in Cuba Signal,’’.

129 Garthoff (The Great Transition, pp. 720–21), notes that the Soviet Unionrefused to send MiG-21 fighters to Nicaragua, as a result of Americanthreats to destroy such aircraft, in 1983. The following year, Moscowrefused to deploy a naval force off Nicaragua, as Cuba requested. Shortlyafter Reagan took office, a Cuban delegation, headed by Raul Castro,Fidel’s brother and defense minister, conveyed Cuban alarm over the pos-sibility of a US attack. In reply, Leonid Brezhnev reportedly said ‘‘Wecannot fight in Cuba because it is 11,000 kilometers away. If we go there,we’ll get our heads smashed’’ (p. 684). That, as much as anything else, is anexample of the balance of power projection capability at this time.

8 The expenditure debate

1 Collins and Cordesman, Imbalance of Power, p. 9. The authors of a RANDCorporation study of the superpowers’ military expenditures elaborated onthis theme:

Military Expenditure (ME) cannot be an indicator of national security oreven of military security, because these concepts incorporate many otherfactors besides the development, preparation or use of military forces. . . it is inputs to force potential, not output, that ME actually measures—the potential to produce military goods and services. (My italics)

Notes 241

A. J. Alexander, A. S. Becker, W. E. Hoehn, Jr, The Significance of DivergentU. S.-USSR Military Expenditure, N-100-AF. (RAND Corporation, SantaMonica, CA, February 1979), p. v.

2 U. S. Defense Perspectives Fiscal Year 1978 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January1977), pp. 8, 33.

3 U.S. Defense Perspectives, p. 8. All figures are in FY 1978 dollars. A Brook-ings Institution study found that, in constant 1978 dollars, the US defensebudget, according to Ford Administration plans, would grow to $129.2 bil-lion in outlays for FY 1982. This would put it some $6 billion above the FY1964 budget, the first post-Vietnam budget to exceed that level. B. M.Blechman, et al., The Soviet Military Buildup and U.S. Defense Spending (TheBrookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1977), p. 2.

4 Collins and Cordesman, Imbalance of Power, p. 10.5 Ibid.6 Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 133.7 J. Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military

Strength (The Dial Press, New York, 1982), p. 246.8 Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 133.9 Cockburn, The Threat, pp. 56, 126.

10 In his FY 1975 report, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, in hisrequest for supplemental funding for the FY 1974 budget, listed militarypay and cost of living increases (including military retired pay) to accountfor just over $3.4 billion, out of a total request of more than $6.2 billion.Report FY 1975, p. 17.

11 Collins, American and Soviet Military Trends, p. 46. This category includedrecruiting and human relations.

12 Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 133.13 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 246.14 Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 134.15 Ibid.16 Ibid.17 Ibid., pp. 133–34; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 247.18 N. E. Firth and J. H. Noren, Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Esti-

mates, 1950–1990 (Texas A & M University Press, College Station, TX,1998), pp. 61–64. In mid-1967, the USSR had adjusted industrial prices,which of course included military equipment. The CIA eventually correctedits estimates based on this development. (p. 64)

19 Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 135. Prados, Op cit. As CIA analyst Hans Heymannnoted, the defector who provided this document ‘‘was a so-so source; themore we delved, the less sure we were’’ (Cahn, p. 135.)

20 Prados, Op cit.21 SR 76-10121U, ‘‘Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970–75,’’

May 1976, p. 1.22 SR 76-10121U, p. 2.23 Cahn, Op cit. According to Prados (pp. 247–48), this view was expressed by

Andrew Marshall, head of the Net Assessment Group at the Pentagon.Whereas the Soviet economy was only 47 percent as large as the US econ-omy in 1964, it had risen to just 52 percent by 1980, the year when NikitaKhruschev predicted it would equal that of the United States.

24 In W. Schneider, Jr and Francis P. Hoeber, Arms, Men, and Military Budgets:Issues for Fiscal Year 1977 (Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., New York, 1976), p. 255.

25 Cahn, Killing Detente, pp. 135–36. Eight days earlier, Schlesinger had raisedthe same concerns with President Ford. With inflation running high,

242 Notes

Schlesinger noted that ‘‘The [five-year defense] program will shrink about7% in real terms from last year.’’ To preserve it, a budget of some $100billion, rather than the $122 billion requested by the military, was seen asrealistic by Schlesinger. Memorandum of Conversation, President Fordet al., ‘‘Defense Budget,’’ October 15, 1975, Box 16, National SecurityAdviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Gerald R. Ford Library.

26 Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 136.27 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 249.28 Ibid.29 Cahn, Killing Detente, pp. 100–101; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 249.30 Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 103; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 249.31 Cahn (p. 104) notes that PFIAB’s members—who included Edward Teller,

Claire Boothe Luce, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, and GeorgeShultz—‘‘were openly skeptical about detente, viewed the Soviet Union asan expansionist totalitarian state that posed a great threat to world peaceand freedom, and believed that the survival of free institutions around theworld depended on a resurgence of American military power.’’

32 Prados, Op cit.33 Cahn, Killing Detente, pp. 128–29.34 Ibid., pp. 129–32.35 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 249.36 Ibid., p. 250.37 Ibid.38 Ibid.39 Ibid., pp. 252–53.40 Ibid., p. 253.41 D. Binder, ‘‘New C.I.A. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms,’’ New

York Times, December 26, 1976, pp. A1, A14. A CIA analyst quoted in thearticle called the exercise ‘‘a somewhat unfair setup,’’ while another stated that‘‘It [the Team A-B exercise] was an absolute disaster for the CIA,’’ since itsmethodology was stridently attacked as ‘‘faulty’’ by Team B’s members.

42 W. Hyland, Mortal Rivals: Understanding the Hidden Pattern of Soviet-AmericanRelations (Touchstone, New York, New York, 1988), p. 85. DCI Bushexpressed similar views in an NSC meeting in January 1977. ‘‘The compe-titive analysis idea seemed good at the time and I certainly did not think itwould go public . . . I am against institutionalizing the alternative analysisapproach.’’ Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, ‘‘SemiannualReview of the Intelligence Community,’’ January 13, 1977, Box 2, NationalSecurity Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, Gerald R. FordLibrary.

43 ‘‘Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: Soviet Stra-tegic Objectives: An Alternative View; Report of Team ‘B’, ’’ December1976.

44 ‘‘Report of Team ‘B,’ ’’ p. 1.45 Ibid., p. 50.46 Ibid., p. 10.47 Ibid., pp. 10–11.48 The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic

Capability and Objectives: Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality, United States Senate togetherwith Separate Views (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 16, 1978), p. 2.

49 Ibid.50 Tyroler, Alerting America, pp. 5–9.

Notes 243

51 M. Thompson, ed., U.S. Defense Policy: Weapons, Strategy and Commitments(Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, DC, April 1978), p. 5.

52 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 253.53 PRM/NSC 10 Related, ‘‘Military Strategy and Force Posture Review, Final

Report.’’54 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, ‘‘Review of the FY 79-83

Defense Program,’’ June 1, 1977, Presidential Review Memorandum-10:Presidential Review Memorandum-10 through Presidential Review Mem-orandum 36-47, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

55 H. Smith, ‘‘Carter Study Takes More Hopeful View of Strategy of U.S.,’’New York Times, July 8, 1977, pp. A1, A4. A State Department official wasquoted as saying that PRM 10 ‘‘sets a middle course. You don’t have topanic with the Russians, but you do have to have some real growth in ourforces.’’ In contrast to the Carter levels, Rumsfeld had planned for a$150 billion budget by FY 1981.

56 Report FY 1979, p. 12.57 Report FY 1980, p. 320.58 In 1970, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger had stated in an NSC

memorandum that ‘‘The priority for General Purpose Forces reductionsshould be given to tactical air forces, ASW forces, escort ships and amphi-bious task forces. The Defense Program should maintain no fewer than 16-1/3 active divisions.’’ NSDM 84, ‘‘Defense Program FY 72-76,’’ September11, 1970 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman toClinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #712.

59 Report FY 1980, p. A-1.60 Report FY 1982, p. 307.61 Tyroler, Alerting America, p. 29.62 Ibid., p. 86.63 Ibid., pp. 166–67.64 SR 78-10121, ‘‘Estimated Soviet Defense Spending: Trends and Prospects,’’

June 1978, pp. 9–10.65 ER 78-10512, ‘‘The Soviet Economy in 1976–77 and Outlook for 1978,’’

August 1978, pp. 10–11. DCI Stansfield Turner emphasized the difficultySoviet leaders would have in reversing the long-term trends of increasedspending. In June 1979, Turner told members of the Joint EconomicCommittee (JEC) that ‘‘Reducing defense spending . . . in a period of veryprobable leadership change could be equally difficult since those vying forpower will be reluctant to take actions which might alienate the military.’’ D.J. MacEachin, CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus theCharges: An Intelligence Monograph, CSI 96-001 (Center for the Study ofIntelligence, Washington, DC, May 1996), pp. 13–14.

66 SR 79-10004, ‘‘A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activ-ities, 1968–78,’’ January 1979, p. 3.

67 Ibid.68 Ibid.69 Report FY 1982, p. 16.70 Ibid., p. 17.71 Alexander et al., U.S.-USSR Military Expenditure, p. 22.72 Ibid., pp. 23–25.73 CIA Estimates of Soviet Defense Spending: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on

Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representa-tives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session. (USGPO, Washington, DC, September 3,1980), pp. 8–9. Henceforth CIA Estimates.

244 Notes

74 CIA Estimates, p. 16.75 Ibid., p. 22.76 CIA Estimates, p. 24. Huffstutler saw the allocation of Soviet expenditures

somewhat differently. ‘‘Since about 1965, about half of the estimated Sovietdefense spending has gone to investment in weapons, equipment and facil-ities, almost one-third to operating costs, and roughly one-fifth to militaryresearch and development.’’ CIA Estimates, p. 7.

77 ‘‘The Price of Power,’’ Time, October 29, 1979, p. 26.78 ‘‘The Price of Power,’’ p. 31. The article also noted (p. 27) that inflation led

to vast increases in the cost of even the cheapest items. A 5.56-mm roundfor an M-16 rifle increased from 6 cents to 19 cents during the 1970s, or217 percent higher. The same was true for an M-16 ($82 to $260.) Thebiggest increase in price was for the CH-53A Sea Stallion helicopter, from$1.9 million to $10.4 million, or 447 percent.

79 CIA Estimates, p. 7.80 Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 132.81 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 41.82 Report FY 1983, p. 9.83 Tyroler, Alerting America, p. ix.84 Ibid., p. 179.85 F. P. Hoeber, W. Schneider, Jr, N. Polmar and R. Bessette. Arms, Men, and

Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1981 (Transaction Books, New Bruns-wick, NJ, 1980), p. 17.

86 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 33.87 C. Coker, US Military Power, p. 64. Richard Crockatt, writing more than a

decade later, pointed out that

Though clearly a trend towards higher expenditure had begun underCarter-real growth for the years 1979–81 was 4.0 percent, 3.1 percentand 4.8 percent respectively-under Reagan real annual growth forthe four budgets of his first term 7.8 percent, 7.3 percent, 4.2 per-cent, and 9.5 percent. (p. 306)

88 Report FY 1983, p. I-4. The FY 1982 budget ($182.8 billion in outlays)would be followed by a FY 1983 budget of $215.9 billion.

89 Ibid.90 Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp. 41–42. A Newsweek poll in June 1981

showed 64 percent of respondents approving of Reagan’s budget increases.This marked a strong overall consensus on defense at the time. A plurality(48 percent) believed that Reagan had ‘‘developed an effective defensepolicy for the United States.’’ M. Sheils et al., ‘‘Searching for a Strategy,’’Newsweek, June 8, 1981, p. 31.

91 ‘‘Military Budget up $80 Billion in Two Years,’’ The Defense Monitor Vol. X,No. 3, 1981.

92 ‘‘Soviet Military Power: Questions and Answers,’’ The Defense MonitorVol. XI, No. 1, 1982.

93 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 39. It is also interesting to note thatConnally, Dillon, and Fowler were Founding Board Members of the CPD(Tyroler, pp. 5–6.)

94 Tyroler, Altering America, p. 187.95 Ibid., p. 196.96 Ibid., p. 210.97 Ibid., p. 208.

Notes 245

98 ‘‘Soviet Military Power: Questions and Answers,’’ p. 3.99 Ibid. p. 12.

100 A. S. Becker, Sitting on Bayonets? The Soviet Defense Burden and Moscow’s Eco-nomic Dilemma, P-6908. (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, September1983), p. 34.

101 ‘‘Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-4-78, ‘Soviet Goals and Expectationsin the Global Power Arena,’ ’’ July 1981, USSR/US Conference 5/94: Brief-ing Book II, Box 117, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

102 Ibid.103 Ibid.104 NIE 11/4-82, p. 34.105 Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, pp. 80–81.106 Ibid., p. 80.107 Ibid., pp. 75–76. Newhouse (p. 377) noted that Soviet defense spending had

‘‘flattened out in 1977’’ and had remained at that level into the 1980s.108 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 41.109 Ibid.110 Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, pp. 77–78.111 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 41.112 Report FY 1985, p. 64; Report FY 1986, p. 71.113 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 42. The CPD conducted its own poll on

defense in 1984. Seventy-one percent supported ‘‘current or greater levelsof U.S. defense spending.’’ As for who was more powerful militarily, 40percent believed that the United States was stronger, 41 percent the SovietUnion. Tyroler, Altering America, pp. 284–86.

114 MacEachin, ‘‘The Record Versus the Charges,’’ p. 16. A CIA reportsubmitted to the JEC in August 1981, ‘‘Consumption in the USSR: AnInternational Comparison,’’ noted that ‘‘In the USSR, long-continuedinvestment priorities favoring heavy industry and defense, coupled with arigid and cumbersome system of economic organization, have combined toproduce a consumer sector that . . . is in many respects primitive, grosslyunbalanced and in massive disequilibrium.’’ (My italics) (pp. 15–16)

115 NIE 11/4-82, p. 34.116 Ibid.117 Becker, Sitting on Bayonets? p. 33.118 NSDD 32.119 Ibid.120 Independent political analysts, both at that time and since, noted the pre-

sence of such efforts. Fred Halliday, in The Making of the Second Cold War(p. 51), noted that

the expenditure burden that the USSR carries, with a GNP lessthan half that of the USA, has enormous debilitating consequencesfor the rest of the economy . . . given the Soviet desire to match UScapabilities, US advances have imposed new expenditures on theUSSR.

Peter Schweizer, in Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle andFinal Triumph over Communism (Anchor Books, New York, 2003), p. 155,argues that Reagan pursued a strategy to defeat the Soviet Union in theCold War. According to Schweizer, as early as 1963 Reagan had ‘‘conceiveda plan to squeeze the Soviet economy with a military buildup and a cutoff oftrade.’’

246 Notes

Conclusion

1 D. H. Dunn, The Politics of Threat: Minuteman Vulnerability in American NationalSecurity Policy (Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1997), p. 110.

2 The SS-18 had significant enhancements to its capability thanks to thesemodifications: ‘‘The missile’s improved accuracy allowed to reduce the war-head yield. This was done without sacrificing the missile’s effectiveness,which meant that the number of warheads on the MIRVed version of themissile could be increased from 8 to 10.’’ (P. Podvig, ed., Russian StrategicNuclear Forces (The MIT Press, London, 2001), p. 217.) The improved SS-19s had both improved accuracy and greater warhead yield, with six MIRVseach with a yield of 550–750 kt. (Podvig, p. 222.)

3 Pipes, U.S.-Soviet Relations, p. 156, used a quote from Sokolovskii to sup-port his thesis that the Soviets saw nuclear war in Clausewitzian terms;that is, an extension of politics by other means: ‘‘It is well known that theessential nature of war as a continuation of politics does not change with chan-ging technology and armament’’ (Italics in original). Kaplan, Dubious Specter,p. 15, uses the same quote by Sokolovskii as Pipes, but then uses anotherSoviet source, Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, published in 1972, toargue against what he sees as a narrow view of Soviet strategic concepts(pp. 16–17).

4 Cockburn, The Threat, Chaps 3–4.5 Luttwak, Pentagon, pp. 114–17.6 Luttwak, Pentagon, pp. 112–13; On the meaning of Victory, pp. 269–71.7 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 272. He also noted a report by a British photo-

grapher who accompanied Afghan rebels on an ambush of a Soviet columnin April 1982 indicated that Soviet infantry in BMP armored personnelcarriers did not leave the safety of their vehicles and outflank the Afghans,‘‘although this would have been very easy to do’’ (p. 273). Such rigidityindicated a continued inflexibility in Soviet tactical precepts.

8 Luttwak (Pentagon, pp. 111–12), noted that

The powerful urge to see a Vietnam in Afghanistan remains frustrated. . . fewer than 5 percent of all Soviet Army troops, no more than fivedivisions, are in Afghanistan . . .More than one-third of all AmericanArmy troops were in Vietnam by 1968, by contrast . . .What we see inAfghanistan is . . . a leisurely imperial pacification . . . there will be nohurried evacuation, no abandonment. (Italics in original)

9 Tyroler, Alerting America, p. x.10 According to Norman Friedman, The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy

in the Cold War (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000), two keystrategic plans complemented these efforts. The Maritime Strategy putinto practice by John Lehman (see Chapter 6) caused the Soviets to con-sider US conventional operations against their territory. As Friedmannotes,

A credible threat would force the Soviets to hold back large forces . . .Their [the Soviets’] naval exercises began to concentrate on homedefense against an attacking U.S. fleet rather than . . . attacks on Westernshipping. They strengthened their coast defenses—which meant redu-cing the threat they could deploy against the NATO army on the Cen-tral Front. (p. 462)

Notes 247

The US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine (see Chapter 5), which would haveseen US and other NATO forces advance into East Germany in order todestroy follow-up Warsaw Pact forces. According to Friedman,

Both Maritime Strategy and AirLand Battle showed an aggressivenesshitherto absent in NATO . . . the offensive emphasis in AirLand Battlemust have suggested to many in Eastern Europe that, in the event ofwar, Allied forces might liberate their countries. That message was cer-tainly widely understood in the United States of the early 1980s. (p. 463)

11 According to Peter Schweizer, esp. Chaps 13–14, Reagan and his adviserswedded the military buildup to a long-term strategy of bringing about ideo-logical change within the USSR. Richard Pipes, serving as the NSC’s Sovietaffairs expert, drafted a study—eventually leading to NSDD 32—establishingthis as the centrepiece of US Cold War strategy. Pipes summarized theobjectives of this approach:

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must . . . address . . . the requirementto contain and reverse Soviet expansion and the need to strengthen andsustain a process of promoting change within the USSR . . . that willreduce the Soviet threat to U.S. interests and those of our allies. Thissecond track of US policy toward the Soviet Union is not designed to pre-serve the status quo, but to assist internal forces that might lead to constructivechange. (My italics) (p. 158)

12 Doughty, Major R. A., The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76,Leavenworth Paper No. 1 (Combat Studies Institute, US Army Commandand General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 1979), p. 41.

13 The US Army Field Manual that outlines Air–Land Battle, FM 100-105,states that ‘‘Economy of force, mobility, surprise, and bold, aggressive actionsshould achieve decisive results . . . Support from the other services is essentialto the success of the Army mission in joint operations.’’ Operations FM 100-5,p. 16–2.

14 Friedman, The Fifty Year War, p. 445. ‘‘Brilliant’’ refers to a weapon that isable to determine a target and isolate it from background terrain (Friedman,p. 448.) Lawrence Freedman (The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, IISS AdelphiPaper 318 (IISS, Oxford, 1998), p. 27), concurs with this analysis. ‘‘Sovietplanners were painfully aware of their country’s deficiencies in advancedtechnology, especially in electronics, and sensed that the US was gaining asignificant qualitative advantage.’’

15 Friedman, The Fifty Year War, pp. 449–50. As William Odom noted, ‘‘Steadytechnological change in the West did not have the same impact on the overalleconomy; thus Soviet industry accumulated an ever-larger stock of olderindustrial technology, creating an ever-widening technology gap.’’ The Col-lapse of the Soviet Military (Yale University Press, London, 1998), p. 224.

16 Michael Ignatieff summarized the impact of the technological revolution onthe end of the Cold War. ‘‘America won the Cold War because it entered anew type of economy—based on knowledge and computers—and leftits strategic competitor marooned inside the crumbling remains of theindustrial era.’’ Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (Picador USA, New York,2000), p. 167.

17 As the geographic location of the Gulf War indicates, the development of theRDF in the early 1980s came to play an added role in the evolution of US

248 Notes

force structure and strategy. James Digby, in a December 1980 RAND paper,outlined several ‘‘Principles for the Design of Projection Forces.’’ Amongthose he listed were the need ‘‘to make full use of information gathering andprocessing capabilities in order to send forces where they are needed themost . . .Units from all services . . .need to be able to communicate with eachother while they are part of a joint task force.’’ In his conclusion, Digby notedthat ‘‘we have a great potential for making it [U.S. military strength] moreflexible and deployable.’’ (Underlining in original) Modern Weapons for Non-NATO Contingencies, RAND Paper P-6521 (RAND Corporation, SantaMonica, CA, December 1980), pp. 9, 15.

18 Emblematic of this approach was the Nuclear Policy Review submitted toCongress by the Bush Administration in January 2002. While maintaining ascaled-down Triad of strategic forces, it offered some changes. According toLawrence Freedman, ‘‘The shifts were in the integration of non-nuclear andnuclear systems, an enhanced role for active defenses . . . and the develop-ment of a system that could respond quickly to changes in the strategicenvironment.’’ Only in the development of deep-penetrating warheads(‘‘bunker-busters’’) did the strategy differ significantly from what had gonebefore. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd edn (Palgrave Macmillan,Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire 2003), p. 433.

19 An example of the first school is Peter Schweizer’s Reagan’s War, in which theauthor states ‘‘it is . . .not possible to understand the collapse of the SovietUnion separate from Ronald Reagan: the two are intertwined.’’ (p. 3)Schweizer concludes by noting the defeat in Afghanistan, together with thesurvival of Solidarity in Poland, ‘‘burned a hole in the heart of the [Soviet]empire that could never be filled. In both of these cases, Reagan proveddecisive in victory.’’ (p. 284) The second school is exemplified by FrancesFitzGerald. She writes that ‘‘Gorbachev launched a political revolution in theSoviet Union . . . and the Cold War was over long before the Americanforeign policy establishment knew it.’’ (p. 18) FitzGerald goes on to describethe second school’s view of the Cold War’s conclusion:

What did happen in the 1980s was that the Soviet economy continuedto deteriorate as it had during the 1970s. The economic decline . . .resulted form the failures of the system created by Lenin and Stalin—not from any effort on the part of the Reagan administration . . . It wasGorbachev’s efforts to reverse the decline and to modernize his countrythat knocked the props out from under the system. The revolution wasin essence a series of decisions made by one man, and it came as a surpriseprecisely because it did not follow from a systemic breakdown. (p. 475)

Notes 249

Bibliography

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SR 78-10121, ‘‘Estimated Soviet Defense Spending: Trends and Prospects,’’National Foreign Assessment Center, Langley, VA, June 1978.

NI 78-10003, ‘‘Soviet Civil Defense,’’ Langley, VA, July 1978.

ER 78-10512, ‘‘The Soviet Economy in 1976–77 and Outlook for 1978,’’ Langley,VA, August 1978.

SR 79-10004, ‘‘A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities,1968–78,’’ Langley, VA, January 1979.

Defense Intelligence Agency Reports

DDB-1200-159-80, ‘‘Defense Intelligence Report: Soviet Naval Indian OceanOperations,’’ February 1980.

Interview series

Interview with James Schlesinger, Miller Center Interviews, Carter PresidencyProject, Vol. XXII, July 19, 1984.

Letters

Gerald R. Ford to Edward W. Brooke, July 25, 1975, Presidential Directive-59,8/23–31/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler, Jimmy Carter Library.

Edward Teller to Ronald Reagan, July 23, 1982, folder ‘‘SDI 1982,’’ Box 1 of 2,Donald Baucum Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

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Robert Hunter to the Members of the European Task Force on ComprehensiveNet Assessment (PRM/NSC 10), ‘‘Terms of Reference,’’ March 28, 1977, Pre-sidential Review Memoranda 10 through 36–47, Box 105, Vertical File, JimmyCarter Library.

Gregory F. Treverton for Members of the European Task Force on Compre-hensive Net Assessment (PRM/NSC 10), ‘‘Summary and Differences of View,’’May 20, 1977, Presidential Review Memoranda 10 through 36–47, Box 105,Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, ‘‘Review of the FY 79–83 Defense Pro-gram,’’ June 1, 1977, Presidential Review Memorandum-10: Presidential ReviewMemoranda 10 through 36–47, Box 105, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

Stansfield Turner to Jimmy Carter, ‘‘An Assessment of Soviet Perceptions onSALT – May 1977,’’ June 2, 1977, USSR Related Documents Opened (I), Box 116,Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo for the Secretary of State et al., ‘‘SCC Meeting on PRM 10, July 7, 1977,’’July 25, 1977, USSR 1980–1995, Box 116, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

Zbigniew Brzezinski to the Vice President et al., ‘‘SCC Meeting on Allied Con-sultations and SALT, February 14, 1978,’’ February 16, 1978, USSR RelatedDocuments Opened (II), Box 116, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

Zbigniew Brzezinski to Secretary of State et al., ‘‘The U.S. Response to Afghanistan,’’February 12, 1980, National Security Affairs, Box 1, Country File, Afghanistan2/80, Jimmy Carter Library.

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National Intelligence Center (NIC)

NIC M 83-10017, ‘‘Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense Initia-tive,’’ Interagency Intelligence Assessment, September 12, 1983.

National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)

NIE 11-3/8-76, ‘‘Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s,’’ December 21, 1976.

NIE 11-3/8-77, ‘‘Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through theLate 1980s,’’ February, 1978.

NIE 4-1-78, ‘‘Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War inEurope: Implications for NATO Warning of War,’’ April 10, 1978.

NIE 11-14-79, ‘‘Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO,’’ January 31, 1979.NIE 11-3/8-79, ‘‘Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the1980s,’’ March 17, 1980.

‘‘Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-4-78, ‘Soviet Goals and Expectations in theGlobal Power Arena,’ ’’ July 1981, USSR/US Conference 5/94: Briefing Book II,Box 117, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

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NIE 11-15-82/D, ‘‘Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990s,’’March 1983.

National Security Council meeting minutes

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NSSM 244, ‘‘U.S. Civil Defense Policy,’’ July 24, 1976 in Presidential Directiveson National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge,Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #2150.

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NSDM 242, ‘‘Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,’’ January17, 1974 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman toClinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record # 504.

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NSDM 348, ‘‘U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture,’’ January 20, 1977, Box 1,National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Gerald R. FordLibrary.

Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM)

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‘‘Amendment to Nuclear Weapons Deployment (PD/NSC 51),’’ March 28, 1980,www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pd51

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PD 59, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,’’ July 25, 1980, Jimmy CarterLibrary. http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd59.pdf

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PD 63, ‘‘Persian Gulf Security Framework,’’ January 15, 1981, Jimmy CarterLibrary. http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd63.pdf

National Security Decision Directives (NSDD)

NSDD 12, ‘‘Strategic Forces Modernization Program,’’ October 1, 1981 in Pre-sidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche:Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1225.

NSDD 13, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,’’ December 1981 in Pre-sidential Directives on National Security : From Truman to Clinton (micro-fiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1226.

NSDD 15, ‘‘Theater Nuclear Forces (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces),’’November 16, 1981 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Trumanto Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1228.

NSDD 23, ‘‘U.S. Civil Defense Policy,’’ February 3, 1982 in Presidential Direc-tives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microfiche: Cambridge,Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1235.

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—— The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, Thirteenth Edition, Naval InstitutePress, Annapolis, MD, 1984 . . .

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‘‘The Artificial Crisis of American Security,’’ The Defense Monitor, Vol. V, No. 3,May, 1976. Entire Issue. No Author Listed.

Barnaby, Frank. ‘‘Maneuvers in the Indian Ocean,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,May 1980, pp. 8–11.

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—— With Keith Payne. ‘‘Victory is Possible,’’ Foreign Policy, Vol. 14, Summer1980, 14–27.

Greenwood, David. ‘‘NATO’s Three Per cent Solution,’’ Survival, Vol. XXIII,No. 6, November/December 1981, 252–60.

Halloran, Richard. ‘‘Posed For the Persian Gulf,’’ New York Times Magazine, April1, 1984, pp. 38–40, 61.

Hughey, Ann. ‘‘The Age of Aircraft Carrier Diplomacy,’’ Forbes, July 21, 1980,pp. 57–62.

Klare, Michael T. ‘‘Testing Out Haig’s New War Policy,’’ The Nation, June 19,1982, Front Cover, pp. 750–51.

Komer, Robert W. ‘‘Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense,’’ Foreign Affairs,Vol. 60, No. 5, Summer 1982, 1124–44.

Leffler, Melvyn P. ‘‘From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessonsand Dilemmas of the Cold War,’’ Diplomatic History, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1983,245–66.

‘‘Military Budget up $80 Billion in Two Years,’’ The Defense Monitor, Vol. X, No.3, 1981. Entire Issue. No Author Listed.

Nathan, James A. ‘‘Return of the Great White Fleet,’’ The Nation, March 5, 1983,pp. 269–71.

‘‘The New Nuclear Strategy: Battle of the Dead?’’ The Defense Monitor, Vol. V,No. 5, July 1976. Entire Issue. No Author Listed.

Njolstad, Olav. ‘‘Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planning inthe Carter Years,’’ Cold War History, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 2004, 21–55.

‘‘The Oil Crisis: Is There a Military Option?’’ The Defense Monitor, Vol. VIII, No.11, December 1979. Entire Issue. No Author Listed.

Powers, Thomas. ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ Atlantic Monthly,November 1982, pp. 82–110.

‘‘The Price of Power,’’ Time, October 29, 1979, pp. 24–33. No Author Listed.‘‘The SALT II Treaty,’’ Survival, Vol. XXI, No. 5, September/October 1979,217–30. Documentation Section.

Sheils, Merill, David C. Martin, Christopher Ma and John L. Lindsay. ‘‘Search-ing for a Strategy,’’ Newsweek, June 8, 1981, pp. 30–39.

Sloss, Leon and Marc Dean Millot. ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution,’’ StrategicReview, Vol. XII, No. 1, Winter 1984, 19–28.

‘‘Soviet Military Power: Questions and Answers,’’ The Defense Monitor, Vol. XI,No. 1, 1982. Entire Issue. No Author Listed.

Tucker, Robert W. ‘‘Oil: The Issue of American Intervention,’’ Commentary,January 1975, pp. 21–31 . . .

—— ‘‘Further Reflections on Oil & Force,’’ Commentary, March 1975, pp. 45–56 . . .

—— ‘‘American Power & the Persian Gulf,’’ Commentary, November 1980,pp. 25–41.

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Anderson, Jack. ‘‘Not-So-New Nuclear Strategy,’’ Washington Post, October 12,1980, p. C7 . . .

—— ‘‘Political Problems for the RDF,’’ Washington Post, January 3, 1981, p. C9.Binder, David. ‘‘New C.I.A. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms,’’New York Times, December 26, 1976, pp. A1, A14.

Boffey, Philip M. ‘‘Pressures Are Increasing For Arms Race in Space,’’ New YorkTimes, October 18, 1982, pp. A1, B9.

Burt, Richard. ‘‘Pentagon Reviewing Nuclear War Plans,’’ New York Times,December 16, 1977, p. A7 . . .

—— ‘‘Study Says a Soviet Move in Iran Might Require U.S. Atom Arms,’’ NewYork Times, February 2, 1980, pp. A1, A4 . . .

Finney, John W. ‘‘U.S. Retargeting Some Missiles Under New Strategic Con-cept,’’ New York Times, January 11, 1974, p. A1.

Getler, Michael. ‘‘U.S. Studies Re-Targeting of Missiles,’’ Washington Post, Jan-uary 11, 1974, pp. A1, A16.

Halloran, Richard. ‘‘Gaps in Training and Equipment Hinder Rapid Deploy-ment Force,’’ New York Times, September 26, 1980, pp. A1, A24 . . .

—— ‘‘Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy For Fighting a Long Nuclear War,’’New York Times, May 30, 1982, pp. A1, A12.

—— ‘‘Marines Hit Island Beach in Cuba Signal,’’ Washington Post, May 9, 1982,p. A3. No Author Listed.

Smith, Hedrick. ‘‘Carter Study Takes More Hopeful View of Strategy of U.S.,’’New York Times, July 8, 1977, pp. A1, A4.

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Wilson, George C. ‘‘Outlook Grim in a War for Mideast Oil,’’ Washington Post,October 28, 1980, pp. A1, A7 . . .

—— ‘‘Preparing for Long Nuclear War Is Waste of Funds, Gen. Jones Says,’’Washington Post, June 19, 1982, p. A3.

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Department of the Army (U.S.A.)

Operations FM 100-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC,August 20, 1982.

Department of the Navy (U.S.A.)

Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, April 1975.

Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, Third Edition, Office of the Chief of NavalOperations, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, January 1978.

Department of Defense (U.S.A.)

DoD Annual Report FY 1975, US Government Printing Office (USGPO),Washington, DC, March 4, 1974.

DoD Annual Report FY 1976, USGPO, Washington, DC, February 5, 1975.DoD Annual Report FY 1977, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 27, 1976.DoD Annual Report FY 1978, January 17, 1977.U.S. Defense Perspectives FY 1978, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1977.DoD Annual Report FY 1979, USGPO, Washington, DC, February 2, 1978.DoD Annual Report FY 1980, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 25, 1979.DoD Annual Report FY 1981, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 29, 1980.DoD Annual Report FY 1982, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 19, 1981.DoD Annual Report FY 1983, USGPO, Washington, DC, February 8, 1982.DoD Annual Report FY 1984, USGPO, Washington, DC, February 1, 1983.Soviet Military Power 1983, USGPO, Washington, DC, March 1983.DoD Annual Report FY 1985, USGPO, Washington, DC, February 1, 1984.

DoD Annual Report FY 1986, USGPO, Washington, DC, February 4, 1985.

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.A.)

Defense Posture Statement FY 1977, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 20, 1976.Defense Posture Statement FY 1978, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 20, 1977.Defense Posture Statement FY 1979, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 20, 1978.United States Military Posture for FY 1980, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1979.United States Military Posture for FY 1981, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 29, 1980.United States Military Posture for FY 1982, USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1981.

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U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Doughty, Major Robert A. The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76,Leavenworth Paper No. 1, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 1979.

Herbert, Major Paul H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuyand the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Paper No. 16,Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, July 1988.

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Department of State (U.S.A.)

‘‘Theater Nuclear Force Negotiations: The Initial Soviet Approach,’’ Bureau ofIntelligence and Research, August 10, 1979.

‘‘Secretary Muskie: U.S. Nuclear Strategy (September 16, 1980),’’ United StatesDepartment of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC: PresidentialDirective-59, 9/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy Carter Library.

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‘‘Defense Department Statement on the Mission of the Rapid Deployment TaskForce,’’ International Communication Agency, US Embassy, London, March16, 1982.

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United States Congress

Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organizationof the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd Ses-sion on Briefing by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger on Casualties andDestruction Expected to Result from so-called Nuclear Counterforce Attacks againstMilitary Installations in the United States, Secret Hearing held on September 11,1974; Sanitized and Made Public on January 10, 1975, USGPO, Washington,DC, January 10, 1975.

U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, Special Subcommittee on Investi-gations, Oil Fields As Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study, Report Prepared by the

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Research papers

Alexander, Arthur J., Abraham S. Becker, William E. Hoehn, Jr The Significanceof Divergent U.S.-USSR Military Expenditure: A RAND Note Prepared for the UnitedStates Air Force, N-1000-AF, Santa Monica, CA, February 1979.

Ball, Desmond J. Developments in U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy under the CarterAdministration, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, CA, February 1980 . . .

—— The Future of the Strategic Balance, Australian National University, Strategicand Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, November 1980.

Becker, Abraham S. Sitting on Bayonets? The Soviet Defense Burden and Moscow’sEconomic Dilemma, RAND Paper P-6908, Santa Monica, CA, September 1983.

Davis, Paul K. Observations on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force: Origins, Direc-tion, and Mission, RAND Paper P-6751, Santa Monica, CA, June 1982.

Digby, James. Modern Weapons for Non-NATO Contingencies, RAND Paper P-6521,Santa Monica, CA, December 1980 . . .

—— The Emerging American Strategy: Application to Southwest Asia, RAND Publica-tion Series N-1700-FF, Santa Monica, CA, May 1981.

O’Ballance, Edgar. The US Rapid Deployment Force, Foreign Affairs ResearchInstitute, London, October 1981.

266 Bibliography

Index

5.56-mm automatic rifles 1217.62-mm automatic rifles 1207th MAB 16116th Air Army 11934th Guards Artillery Division 11982nd Airborne Division 159, 162101st Air Assault Division 166106th Guards Airborne Division

169, 170

Aaron, David 157ABM see anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs)ABM Treaty 79, 85‘‘Action Areas’’, of LTDP 115–16,

121, 123active strategic defense, Reagan’s idea

of 79AdvancedTechnologyBomber (ATB) 51Aegis system for ship defense and

battle management 135, 137Aeroflot 169AfghanistanSoviet invasion of 5, 102, 116, 138,

158, 171Soviet operations in 6

AH-64 attack helicopter 125Air Force Satellite Communication

System (AFSATCOM) 52Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings 167air-land battle strategy 126, 203air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)

29, 51Airborne National Command Post

(ABNCP) 29‘‘air-mobile forces’’ 170All-Volunteer Force 177Alliance Defense in the Eighties

(AD-80), RAND study 114Alliance, military capacity of 115

Alliance’s naval forces, role of 137Alternative Integrated Military

Strategies (AIMS) 155Altunin, Alexandr T. 66–67, 74American nuclear strategy see US

nuclear strategyAn-22 cargo aircraft 169Anderson, George W. 180Angola, Soviet actions in 171anti-air warfare (AAW)

capabilities 137anti-armor, program of short-term

measures in 115anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) 63ABM-1 Galosh missiles 80development of 79effective 80

anti-nuclear movement 53, 104anti-satellite (ASAT)applications 84capability 81

anti-ship cruise missiles 132anti-ship weapons 134anti-submarine warfare (ASW)

capabilities 135anti-surface warfare 150Arab–Israeli War 203Arab OPEC embargo 171Armaments Planning Review,

NATO’s 123arms control 4, 40, 47, 53, 108agreementsneed for 100realistic objective of 53

American perceptions of 3Carter Administration’s approach

to 3effort, announced by Reagan 48emphasis on 54

arms control (Continued)European 105in Europe, to include ERW in

negotiations 94impact on LRTNF

improvements 99linchpin of superpower Detente 4negotiationsERW in 94importance of SDI in 85–87success over forces in Europe 95

policies, determination of 20PRM 38 focus on 99proposals 62role of 59US proposals 58US-Soviet efforts, resumption of 59see also SALT (Strategic Arms

Limitation Talks); START(Strategic Arms reductionTalks)

Arms Control and Disarmamentagency 59, 68agreements 115negotiations 42

Arms race 20Aspin, Les 9, 65Atlantic Alliance 93, 96, 107strengthening of 112

attack aircraft, A-typesA-6/A-7 100A-10 125see also B-type bombers; F-type

fighters/fighter-bombers;MiG-23/27 fighter-bombers

AWAC aircraft 158, 167

Bagley, Worth H. 140Baker, David 81Ball, Desmond 24ballistic missile defense (BMD)

system 83US 84

Baltic Fleet 143Becker, Abraham S. 190, 192–93Benjamin S. Lambeth 38Black Sea Fleet 143blast sheltersadvantages of 70construction, Brown on 69

Blumenthal, W. Michael 189‘‘Bomber Gap’’ 181bomber payload 32Bradley infantry fighting vehicle 125

Bradsher, Henry S. 179Breyer, Siegfried 144Bright Star’82 166’83 167

Brooke, Edward 18Brown, George 25Brown, Harold 23–28, 30, 32, 35, 37,

40, 49, 50, 69, 70, 73, 76, 94, 105,118, 123, 137–38, 155–57, 160,164, 172, 183, 185, 187

Brzezinski, Zbigniew 26, 28, 99,156–58, 183

B-type bombersB-1 41, 44B 52, 54–55

B-2 51B-52 9, 39, 149, 161, 166conversion of G/H models to carry

ALCM 29‘‘building block’’ approach,

CIA’s 177Burt, Richard 38–39, 48Bush, George H. W. 57, 179, 180–81

C3 (command, control, andcommunications) system 25–26

C3I (command, control,communications andintelligence) 27–28, 36, 52

C3I centers, Soviet 48C-5 aircraft 161, 168Callaghan, James 99Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, Soviet access

to 150Canadian brigade group 121capitalism 57and socialism, life or death struggle

between 184‘‘capitalist bomb’’ 93Carter and the RDF (1977–81) 155–64Carter, Jimmy 3, 22–23, 27–28, 35,

37, 39, 40–43, 45–47, 51–52,59–60, 62, 75–76, 94–96, 102,106, 113–14, 125, 128, 136, 138,144, 151, 155–59, 161, 163–64,166–68, 172, 183–84, 188–89,194, 200–201

Carter years 35–39defense spending during 183–87PRM 10 to PD 59 (1977–80) 22–31

Casey, William 57, 59Center for Defense Information

(CDI) 8, 65, 125, 206

268 Index

approach to the defense buildup,criticized by 189

view of Soviet expenditures 190Central Army Group (CENTAG) of

NATO 121Central Command (CENTCOM)

167–68Central Europe, Soviet power and

influence in 91Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

criticisms of 6Chinamilitary spending 190posing a direct threat of war by

Soviets 150as a threat to Soviet Union 6, 8navy 150

civil defense 63–66investment during Carter years 76Soviet: view in 1970s 66–72Soviet: view in 1980s 72–74

Clausewitz 9, 38, 65Clausewitzian concept of war, Soviet

adherence to 65Clausewitzian principle 38Cockburn, Andrew 6, 8–9, 67–68, 74,

196–97Coker, Christopher 162Colby, William 8, 178–80Cold War 10, 38, 207end of 2, 202, 206First/Second 4renewed 87, 105, 164US strategic policy during 91

Collins, John 60–61, 139, 175Committee on the Present Danger

(CPD) 3–4, 42‘‘Comrades-in-Arms-80’’ 120Conference of National Armament

Directors, NATO’s 123Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe(CSCE) 5

Congressional Research Service 60Connally, John B. 189Constellation 158conventional forces 109the balance in the central

region 117–23continued efforts and similar results

(1981–85) 124–26improvements, American initiatives

regarding 114LTDP

and the 3 %decision 114–17prelude to (1974–77) 111–13

Coral Sea 149Cordier, Sherwood 120counterforce doctrinethe Carter years 35–39PRM 10 to PD 59 (1977–80)

22–31counterforce and Soviet strategy:

role of perception 31–34development of 29LNOs, development of (1974–77)

15–22Corps (NATO)I Belgian 121I British 121I French 121I Netherlands 121I West German 121II French 121II West German 121III West German 121V US 121VII US 121

counterforce strategy 38counterforce war, possibility of 33‘‘Countering the Soviet Threat’’ 188‘‘Countervailing Strategy’’ 25–26, 40,

52, 66, 198basis for 30incorporated in PD 59 27

Crockatt, Richard 2cruisers 132Cuban Missile Crisis 159, 162, 198C-X 161Czechoslovakia, Soviet invasion

of 197

Danang, Vietnam, Soviet accessto 150

Davis, Lynn Etheridge 19Defense Condition 3 alert 133Defense Intelligence Agency

(DIA) 65, 83, 177Defense Planning Committee

(DPC) 100, 114–15defense spendingthe expenditure debate 175the balance of military spending

in mid-70s 176–80the Carter years 183–87the Reagan increases, 1981–85

188–93Team-B 180–83

Index 269

deliverable strategic warheads, in USand Soviet Union, comparisonof 32

‘‘Dense Pack’’ system, feasibilityof 52

destroyers 132DetenteAmerican views toward, shift

in 175decline and fall of 1in Europe 105Reagan’s view on 42superpower 4

Diego Garcia 9, 143, 161NTPF at 167

Dillon, C. Douglas 189Director of Central Intelligence

(DCI) 182‘‘Dual-Track’’ formula for

deployment 108Duffield, John 116, 127Dwight D. Eisenhower 148

E-4B command aircraft 29, 61procurement of 53

Eastern Europeground forces in 113Soviet divisions in 119Warsaw Pact conventional forces in,

improvements in 114East–Westmilitary balance, issues of 108military balance, throughout 50s

and 60s 197relations, improvement in 110tensions 125

Ellsworth, Robert F. 179, 180Enhanced Radiation Warhead

(ERW) 92damage limitation features of 93deployment 95indecision regarding 199role in military balance 100as weapon to allay fears of Soviet

threat 96Enterprise 149Erickson, John 119escort ships 132‘‘Eurocommunism,’’ rise of 4Europemilitary balance in 92US combat strength in 125US forces in 122US nuclear commitment to 98

US support troops in, reductionof 111

Europe, balance inconventional forces 109the balance in the central

region 117–23continued efforts and similar

results (1981–85) 124–26LTDP, and the 3 %decision

114–17LTDP, prelude to (1974–77)

111–13the nuclear balance 91the LRTNF debate (1979–83)

97–105‘‘neutron bomb’’ and alliance

cohesion (1977–78) 92–97US perceptions and the Soviet

threat 105–7European military balance, impact of

Soviet doctrine on 112European NATO alliesrelations with 104US military equipment to, control

on 123European NATO defense

spending 125European nuclear war 98European Task Force 97on Comprehensive Net

Assessment 112extended deterrence, concept of 28

fallout shelter program 75fallout sheltersconstruction of 66for essential workers 67

Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA) 26, 46

funding to improve US civil defensecapabilities 77

to oversee development of civildefense planning 76

Fifth Eskadra 133, 140, 143Finlandization 97, 195Fiscal Year (FY) reports1976, Schlesinger on nuclear

conflict in Europe 931977 691978 93Brown’s military posture

statement for 1181979 69, 76on ERW 94

270 Index

1980, Brown on Soviet LRTNFcapabilities in 105

1981 26, 291983, Military Posture

statement 731985, additional sets of deployment

to Netherlands and Belgiumby 126

Five Year Defense Program/Plan164, 189

five-year shipbuilding programs136, 138

FLEETEX 83–1 148flexible nuclear strategies 87, 203refinement of 75

Flexible Responseconcept in NATO military

planning 127doctrine of 109

forces for rapid deployment 153Carter and the RDF (1977–81)

155Reagan and the Central Command

(1981–85) 164–69US and Soviet power projection

capabilities 169–71Ford, Gerald R. 18, 22, 31, 39, 42,

51, 77, 93, 137–38, 151, 154, 179,180–81, 183, 193

Forrestal 148Forward Based Systems (FBS) 100Soviet demand for reduction 101

Fowler, Henry H. 189Frederick the Great 31French nuclear weapon program 99F-type fighters/fighter-bombersF-4 100F-14 Tomcat 135F-15 125, 158F-16 123, 125F-111 dual-capable strike aircraft

98, 100

Garthoff, Raymond 85Giscard d’Estaing 99Glasnost 204Gorbachev, Mikhail 59, 62, 87, 202,

204, 206Gorshkov, Sergei 132, 141,

147, 151Graham, Daniel 65, 68, 178, 181Gray, Colin S. 20, 42–43Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles

(GLCM) 100–102

deployment in UK, West Germany,Italy, and Belgium 104, 106

Group of Soviet Forces Germany(GSFG) 119

Gulf War 204

Halliday, Fred 2Halloran, Richard 162Harmel Report 109–10, 114Harpoon missiles 135, 137helicoptersAH-64 125Mi-24 120UH-60 125

Helsinki Accords 110Herbert, Paul H. 126High-Level Group (HLG) of NATO 99Hoeber, Francis P. 188Holst, Johan Jorgen 140Home Defense brigades (West

German) 123Horn of Africa 1, 3, 8, 163, 199Soviet role in 170–71

Howard, Michael 31Huffstutler, Robert 186–87, 191Hyland, William 180–81

ICBMsAmerican 28with hard-target-kill capability 35land-based 16LSOs as special role for 21Minuteman see Minuteman III

ICBMsMIRVed 39MIRVed warheads by USSR 18MX ICBMs 51–53

10-warhead 39residual number of 23and SLBM developments,

Soviet 34and SLBMs warheads 51Soviets’ 10Soviet superiority in 195types of 33in United States/Soviet Union 32US, threat of Soviet counterforce

attack on 17warheads on 48, 70see also specific types

ICBM silos 25, 51as indicator of ICBMs 10Soviet 21vulnerability of 29

Index 271

ICBM throwweight 31Ikle, Fred 86Indian OceanAmerican buildup in 9Soviet naval presence in 142

industrial dispersal programs 65INF missiles 107interceptors, active forces of 63intermediate-range ballistic missile

(IRBM) 92Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

(INF) 102–3missiles 107Soviet reduction 104talks 42

International Institute for StrategicStudies (IISS) 66, 140, 148, 168

intra-war deterrence 18Iowa-class battleships 144IranHostage Crisis in 138hypothetical Soviet invasion of

162, 168revolution in 138, 158

Isby, David 117–18IsraelAmerican support for 154full-scale attack by Egypt and

Syria upon 133Ivy League (exercise) 43

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 25, 46, 48Jones, David 35, 48–49, 70, 91,

105, 160

Kaplan, Fred 9, 65, 68, 196Kelley, Paul X. 160, 162–63Keyworth, George 85Kiev 132, 148Kissinger Henry 17, 37, 101–2Kitty Hawk 144Klare, Michael 170Komer, Robert W. 114, 116Kremlin 27, 72arrival of Gorbachev in 206bellicose policy by 195for greater military strength 179on level of military spending 182,

186Kvitsinsky, Yuli 103

Lance missiles 92, 95Laser technology 84launch control centers (LCC) 33

Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory 80

Lee, William T. 179, 186Lehman, John F. 145, 148, 151, 201Leopard 1/2 main battle tanks 120Limited Attack Options (LAO) 30Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) 36adaptation of 20, 74development of (1974–77) 15–22

London Summit (NATO) 114Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces

(LRTNF) 40debate (1979–83) 97–105Trans-Atlantic relations strained

by 124Long-Term Defense Program

(LTDP) 115, 199‘‘Action Areas’’ of 121importance of 116prelude to 111–13and three percent decision 114–17

LRTNF see Long-Range TheatreNuclear Forces (LRTNF)

LSOs, as special role for ICBMs 21LTDP see Long-Term Defense

Program (LTDP)Luce, Claire Boothe 183Luttwak, Edward 6, 8, 196–97

M-1 Abrams main battle tank 125M-16 121MAD see Mutually Assured Destruction

(MAD)Major Attack Options (MAO) 30Marine Amphibious Brigades

(MABs) 161, 167–68Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)

160, 167Marine Amphibious Unit 167Marine Corps (U.S.) 155, 160–62Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)

program 167maritime strategy (US), 145Mark 12A warhead 28Minuteman IIIs with 29, 51, 61

‘‘massive retaliation’’ 15, 19American strategy of 109

McClellan, John L. 179McNamara Robert 15–17, 19megatonnage 32, 61Mi-24 helicopters 120Middle East oil, movement of 158Midgetman ICBM 52–53Midway 144, 149

272 Index

MiG-23/27 fighter-bombers 120military balancein 1970s 10ERW role in 100in Europe 92importance of 206shift in USSR’s favor 206

Military Committee document 14/3(MC 14/3) 109–10

military deterrence, categories of 134military forces, problems in 6military personnel, pay scale in

Soviet and US, comparisonof 177

military power, and political objectives,links between in Sovietstrategy 36, 38

‘‘Military Strategy and Force PostureReview’’ 183

Military Transport Aviation 169Milstar 52Minuteman force 28Minuteman ICBM silos 53Minuteman II ICBM warhead 70Minuteman III ICBMs 68, 196Mark 12A-equipped 51, 61MIRVed 28with NS-20 guidance system 29

MIRV see multiple, independentlytargetable re-entry vehicle(MIRV)

missiles 51air-launched cruise missile

(ALCM) 29deliverable strategic warheads, in

US and Soviet Union 32ICBM, Soviets 10INF 107Minuteman III with Mark 12A

warhead 28MX and cruise 48SLBMs 29SS-20 ballistic 4Trident I 29see also specific types

Mobilization Designee (MOBDES)program 74

Moore, John 141Moscow 4, 149, 163, 198on acceptance of ‘‘zero option’’ 103approach to countering SDI 85assessment of relative military

power 58geopolitical balance in favor of 151

global balance of power toward, shiftin 154

global role 191importance of building fleets to

challenge American navalforces 132

to keep off guard 165LRTNF exploitation by 106military balance in,

imbalanced 195military build up 190reduction in the number of SS-20s

by 94relationship with 42shift in ‘‘correlation of forces’’ in

favour of 134US competition with 102willingness to use force 1

multiple, independently targetablere-entry vehicle (MIRV) 15, 20

ballistic missiles, MIRVed,development of 79

ICBM types carrying 33warheads added to ICBMs by

USSR 18multiple protective shelters (MPS) 51Carter program for 52

Muskie, Edmund 28, 37, 40Mutually Assured Destruction

(MAD) 15–17, 39American theory of 64theories, MAO corresponding

to 30MX ICBMs 51–5510–warhead 39ABM system to protect 80deployment in silos 45deployment, congressional debate

over 53mobile 29

NASA 81National Command Authority

(NCA) 25–26National Emergency Airborne

Command Post (NEACP) 29National Intelligence Estimates

(NIEs) 36NIE 11–13/8–76 33, 71, 180, 181NIE 11–13/8–81 58NIE 11/4–82 191–92process, ‘‘competitive analysis’’

of 57series of 56

Index 273

National Security Agency (NSA) 46National Security Council (NSC) 17,

22, 59to oversee development of civil

defense planning 76National Security Decision Directive

(NSDD)NSDD 12 44emphasis of strategic defense

in 81plan for improved US strategic

force posture 77NSDD 13 45NSDD 23 77NSDD 26, role of civil defense in US

strategic planning 77NSDD 32 45, 164on US policy toward NATO 124

NSDD 35 51NSDD 47 77NSDD 73 52NSDD 75 168NSDD 91 45NSDD 97 45key requirements outlined in 46

NSDD 99 168NSDD 104 104NSDD 145 46NSDD 153 85

National Security DecisionMemorandum (NSDM)

NSDM 242 17, 19–20, 24, 28, 29,40, 43, 52, 59, 75

counterforce strategies from 30nuclear employment policy

directed by 22operational basis for 18

NSDM 344 136NSDM 348 22

National Security Study Memorandum(NSSM) 17

NSSM 169 20NSSM 244 75

NATOallies 5, 6, 98protection of 80

attention towards 112Central Region defense, planning

for 118Central Region forces, combat

capabilities of 123defense policy, basis of 113defense spending by 8defense strategy, MC 14/3 109

deployment of Pershing II andGLCM in support of 106

Europe 6defense of 94need for enhanced support of US

and Allied forces in 28focus of PRM 10 137military planning, concept of

‘‘Flexible Response’’ in 127mobilization 122strategy during Cold War, crux

of 91strategy on first use of nuclear

weapon 19threat to 113unity and cohesion 96US policy toward 124

NATO Mutual Support Act 123NATO naval forces 149NATO/Warsaw Pact balance 112naval balance 131the 1970s, of missions and

dollars 135–39the 1980s, balance of sea power

in 144–50lists and capabilities 139–40shifting balance of power at sea

132–35naval power balance during 1970s 131naval superiority, necessity of for

U.S. 144naval personnel, US and Soviet,

compared 141Navy (U.S.), need for quality

personnel 145Near-Term Prepositioning Force

(NTPF) 161‘‘neutron bomb’’ and alliance cohesion

(1977–78) 92–97Newhouse, John 2, 83, 86NIE see National Intelligence

Estimates (NIEs)Nimitz 132, 144, 148Nitze, Paul 1–2, 6–7, 34, 42, 102–4,

181, 183, 194, 201Nixon, Richard 16–17, 31, 39, 51,

62, 136, 138, 153, 158, 183Njolstad, Olav 3North American Aerospace Defense

Command (NORAD) 82North Atlantic Council 102, 115Northern Army Group (NORTHAG)

of NATO 121, 122Northern Fleet 143

274 Index

Norwegian Institute of InternationalAffairs 140

NSDD see National Security DecisionDirective (NSDD)

NSDM see National Security DecisionMemorandum (NSDM)

NSSM see National Security StudyMemorandum (NSSM)

nuclear balance 91the LRTNF debate (1979–83)

97–105‘‘neutron bomb’’ and alliance

cohesion (1977–78) 92–97US perceptions and Soviet threat

105–7nuclear conflict 38nuclear delivery systems 16‘‘nuclear freeze’’ 83Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 99nuclear strategyNSDDs on, integrated objectives

of 45Reagan Administration’s approach

to 61nuclear war 16preparedness of Soviets to protect

leadership, population &industry 73–74

protracted see protracted nuclearwar

nuclear weapon program, French 99nuclear weaponsdeployment by superpowers, call for

‘freeze’ on 82first use of 19reserve of 16

Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy(NUWEP) 18, 30

Nunn Amendment 111, 113Nunn, Sam 111, 125

Ocean Venture ‘81 148offensive weapons 51Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) 191Office of Technology Assessment

68, 70Office of the Director of Defense

Research and Engineering 21Ogaden war 150oil embargo 154Okean exercises 132, 134, 149

P-3 maritime patrol aircraft 161PD see Presidential Directive (PD)

‘‘Peace With Freedom’’ 184Peacekeeper see MX ICBMsPearl Harbor 143Pentagon 55acceptability of wide range of

nuclear options in 24annual report for FY 1979 122civil defense, evacuation as main

effort of 76defense spending among Allies,

increase in 116Schlesinger’s term/tenure at 20, 28Soviet counterforce strike, estimated

fatalities in the event of 78on US defense budget 176

Periodic Armaments PlanningSystem 123

Perle, Richard 42, 48, 83, 103–4Pershing missilesIA 100II 100–102deployment in West

Germany 104, 106Persian GulfRDF concept for 170US military intervention in 154

Persian Gulf oil 161security of 154

Peterson, Peter G. 189PFIAB see President’s Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board(PFIAB)

Pipes, Richard 6–7, 34, 38–39, 42,63–65, 68, 72, 181, 184, 194,196, 201

Polaris missiles 33, 61, 98Polmar, Norman 141, 144, 147POMCUS (Pre-Positioning of Materiel

Configured to Unit Sets)111–12, 123, 125

Poseidon missiles 29, 33, 51, 68,71, 98

power balance at sea, shifting of132–35

power projectionforces for rapid deployment 153Carter and the RDF

(1977–81) 155Reagan and the Central

Command (1981–85)164–69

US and Soviet power projectioncapabilities 169–71

the naval balance 131

Index 275

power projection (Continued)the 1970s: of missions and

dollars 135–39the 600-ship navy, and balance

of sea power in the1980s 144–50

lists and capabilities139–40

shifting balance of power atsea 132–35

Presidential Directive (PD)PD 18 24, 156PD 32 157PD 41 75–76PD 53 26, 46PD 57 26PD 58 26PD 59 27–28, 164provision for revised NUWEP

in 30regarding role of US strategic

forces 45on selective use of strategic

weapons 38on silo-killing capability 29

PD 62 164PD 63 164

Presidential Review Memorandum(PRM)

PRM 9 112PRM 10 22, 95, 112, 113, 136,

155, 156NATO focus of 137on role of US strategic nuclear

forces 23on US national security policy and

strategy 183PRM 10 to PD 59 (1977–80)

22–31PRM 32 75

President’s Foreign IntelligenceAdvisory Board (PFIAB) 179,182, 193

PRM see Presidential ReviewMemorandum (PRM)

protracted nuclear war 42emphasis during Carter

years 28plans in early 1980s for 198plans in Reagan Administration

for 165the Soviet threat 54–59strategy 44–50weapons 50–54

Quadripartite Agreement overBerlin 110

RAND Corporation report 166,181, 190

on ICBMs 21Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) 116,

156and Carter 155–64creation of 40emergence of 165establishment of 159formation of 128redesignation of 160Soviet 171as ‘‘tripwire’’ force 162

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force(RDJTF) 160–61, 163–64,165–68

establishment of 199–202Rapid Reinforcement Program 123Rationalization, Standardization,

and Interoperability(RSI) 121

goal of improving 123Reagan, Ronald 2, 42–44, 47–48,

52, 57, 59, 61–62, 79–83,85–87, 102, 104, 107, 149, 164,166, 172, 187–89, 194, 199–200,202, 204–7

military buildup, public supportfor 189

Red Army forces, effectiveconcentration of 119

Reed, Thomas C. 61Regional Nuclear Options (RNO) 30Report of the President’s Commission

on Strategic Forces see ScowcroftReport

reserve/sealift vessels 137Reykjavik Summit 202Rogers, Bernard 124, 159Rosefielde, Steven S. 186Rostow, Eugene 184Rowen, Harry 192Rumsfeld, Donald 21–22,

31–32, 69, 73, 93, 136,138–39, 183

S-3 aircraft 135Sadat, Anwar 166‘‘Schlesinger Doctrine’’ 20, 26,

43, 198inheritance of 23

276 Index

outlined by NSDM 242 46on selective use of strategic

weapons 38Schlesinger, James 18, 20–21, 23, 26,

28, 31, 38, 43, 46, 50, 68, 74,75–76, 93, 111, 131, 135, 154,178–79, 198

Schmidt, Helmut 92, 94–95, 97,99, 103

Schneider, William 188Scowcroft Report 53, 59Scowcroft, Brent 53, 54, 59SDI see Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)‘‘Sea Control Ship’’ 135Sea Plan 2000 137sea powershifting balanceof during 1970s 132–35

balance in 1980s 144–50Second Cold War 1, 35, 40, 42, 199emergence of 200end of 202US military programmes of 2

Selected Attack Options (SAO) 30Senate Armed Services

Committee 21Senate Foreign Relations

Committee 35, 37, 65Senate Intelligence Committee 186‘‘shelter survey’’ 75shelters and star warscivil defense 63–66the Soviet challenge 83–86Soviet civil defense

1970s view 66–721980s view 72–74strategic defense initiative

(1983–85) 79–83US civil defense, programs and

plans 74–79ship construction programs, nuclear-

powered 135shipbuilding programfor FY1981–85 138for FY1982–86 139FY1983–87 144

Shulman, Marshall 68Shultz, George 48, 59Simon, William E. 189Single Integrated Operational Plan

(SIOP) 16, 29execution of nuclear option

under 52Reagan’s briefing on 61

SIOP-5D 30Sino-Soviet split 8SL-7 sealift ships 168Sloss, Leon 59Social Democratic Party (SPD) 94socialism 7, 57Sokolovskii, V. D 196Somalia, possible Ethiopian invasion

of 157Southeast Asia, deployment of US

troops in 110Southwest Asia, importance of 165Soviet aggression 60increased 201

Soviet bureaucracy, inefficiency of 78Soviet C3I centers 48Soviet challenge 83–86Soviet civil defense 631970s view 66–721980s view 72–74American view of 78CIA report 71danger posed by 64General Jones on 70and industrial dispersal

programs 65policy, discussion of 64

Soviet defense expenditure 115Soviet defense industry 177Soviet defense spending 176increase in 185

Soviet doctrineimpact on European military

balance 112key themes of 38

Soviet economy 10Soviet fleets 132, 134, 143Soviet forces, effective for power

projection 169Soviet GNP, allocated for

defense 178Soviet grand strategy 34Soviet ICBM silos 21Minuteman IIIs against 29

Soviet ICBMs 10and SLBM launchers, growth in 63

Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron144, 169

Soviet leadership, contradictory facetsof 10

Soviet LRTNF superiority 107Soviet militaryairlift capacity of 170buildup 63, 92, 99

Index 277

Soviet military (Continued)in 1974, implications of according

to Schlesinger 31in the East/West 8formative years of 187nature of 198purpose behind 10

capacity, operational confidencein 8

doctrine, role with regard tostrategic nuclear forces 33

expenditureCIA’s estimates of 191issue of 184

spending 181strategy 35

Soviet naval aviation 132Soviet Naval Infantry 169–70Soviet Navy 5, 132, 134division of fleets 143Kiev-class vessel for 148capability during 1970s 141loss of access to Berbera port 142surface combatants in 148warfighting capability of 142

Soviet nuclear forces 30Soviet numerical superiority in

conventional forces 197Soviet Pacific Fleet 143, 149Soviet rapid deployment forces 171Soviet society, inadequacies

challenging an effective civildefense 68

Soviet SSBN force 33Soviet strategic capability 31–32Soviet strategic buildup 53implications of 33

Soviet strategic forcesbuild-up of 15CIA on 57long-term peacetime and wartime

objectives of 54see also strategic forces

Soviet Strategic Objectives, part ofTeam B report 181

Soviet strategic policy 57Soviet strategic threat 54Soviet strategyand counterforce 31–34links between military power and

political objectives in 38views of 39

Soviet-Syrian exercise 169Soviet threat 54–59

on nuclear balance, and USperceptions 105–7

Soviet Uniondeterring of 31‘Fortress Russia’ image of 8Gross national product (GNP) 9increase in military power 119military superiority over, as a US

priority 106nuclear parity achievement by 16relations with 53and United Statesdefense expenditure, median

ratio of 188Detente between 42deterioration in relations

between 1imbalance of nuclear strength

between 36strategic relationship

between 66see also USSR (and also relevant Soviet

entries)Soviet weakness 113Soviet weaponrydesign of 6improvements in 6and military strategy 196and strategy 10

space-based defense 81Space Shuttle 81SR 76–10053 178SR-76–10121U 178SS-4s/-5s/17/-18/-19 39, 48, 103, 196types of ballistic missiles 33

SS-20 92, 94, 103deployment of 97

SS-N-8 SLBM 33SSBNs 29, 51improved communication with 53

‘‘Star Wars speech’’ 79START (Strategic Arms Reduction

Talks) 48, 58efforts, renewal of 59level, JCS proposal 49

Stoessinger, John G. 2strategic and other forces, relationship

between 56Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

(SALT) 3, 7, 99negotiations 18SALT I Agreement 100SALT II Agreement 3, 47–48, 92,

98, 184

278 Index

debate over 205drafting of 39European support for 99withdrawal by Carter from US

Senate consideration 102SALT III agreement, plans

for 101Strategic Arms Limitation Talks see

SALT (Strategic Arms LimitationTalks)

strategic defense 63inclusion among priorities 77

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 2,62, 79–83

expected Soviet approach to 83origins of 80overall reaction by USSR to 84as solution to arms race 83Soviet reactions to 85

strategic delivery systems 29strategic forcesCarter Administration’s policy

for see CountervailingStrategy

the counterforce doctrinethe Carter years 35–39the Carter years—PRM 10 to PD

59 22–31counterforce and Soviet strategy:

role of perception 31–35‘‘limited nuclear options’’,

development of 15–22development, key areas for 45imbalance of, implications of 37program, objectives of 44protracted nuclear war 42the Soviet threat 54–59strategy 44–50weapons 50–54

of shelters and star warscivil defense 63–66the Soviet challenge 83–86Soviet civil defense, 1970s

view 66–72Soviet civil defense, 1980s

view 72–74strategic defense initiative

(1983–85) 79–83US civil defense—programs and

plans 74–79strategic nuclear policy, criteria for 44strategic objectives study 17strategic reserve force 23strategic weaponry 41

strategic weapons, selective use of 38strategy, and the weapon, relationship

between 60‘‘Strategy of Full Recourse’’ 166Strike Command 159–60Subic Bay, Philippines 150submarine-launched ballistic missiles

(SLBMs) 29submarines 132Ohio-class 51

Sukhoi Su-24 strike aircraft 120superpower(s)crisis 15, 195maritime balance 135military balance, perception of 1naval balance 146navies, parity between 132security relationship between 58

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe(SACEUR) 98, 124

T-64/T-72 tanks 120Take Charge and Move Out—Navy

SSBN C3 aircraft (TACAMO)aircraft 29

‘‘Team B’’ 6–7, 64, 71report 34, 38, 57, 65goal of 193

set up of 180telecommunications, importance

of 45Teller, Edward 80–83, 87, 183Third Worldinstability in 147, 163, 195Soviet strategy of intervention

in 154stability 205

Third World intervention force 171Throw weight 23, 32Titan II ICBMs 53silos for 33warhead 70

Tomahawk cruise missiles 137torpedoes 134‘‘Track Record Study’’ 180Trident missiles 44, 54–55D-5 variant of 41, 53I and II missiles 29, 51–52

Trident submarines 53‘‘tripwire’’ force 162, 168Tu-22M Backfire bomber 31, 97,

132Tucker, Robert W 154, 163

Index 279

UH-60 transport helicopter 125United States (US)air defense forces, rundown of 63buildup 3, 10civil defenseobjectives of 75–76overall goal of 77programs and plans 74–79

defense budget 176defense planning, flexible nuclear

options in 50defense spending 185, 202factors determining 175increase in 124–25, 192

deterrent force, capability of 66deterrent policy, cornerstone of 15deterrent strategy 25fleets 133, 140, 149Atlantic 148Second 143Seventh 143Sixth 133, 140, 143Third 143

foreign policy, and globalstability 37

involvement in Vietnam 114military see US militarynational security policy 30, 195key goal of 24Reagans proposal 79SDI, as unique approach in 86

national security strategy, analysisof 45

national security telecommunicationpolicy, objectives of 46

naval forces 134 (see also US Navy)nuclear war plan 16 (see also US

nuclear strategy)relations with the European allies,

influence by ERW 95safeguard systems 80space policy, White House fact sheet

on 81Strategic Air Command 63strategic defenses, Reagan’s

concerns over lack of 82strategic forces (see also strategic

forces)basis for modernization of 44‘‘coupling’’ of 100expansion of 54nuclear, PRM 10 on role of 23

strategic modernization effort 54strategic policy

basis of 54civil defense in 66during Cold War 91

strategic weaponry 54strategy, Soviet perceptions of 37US–West European

cooperation 112war planning 29, 39

United States (US), and SovietUnion

confrontation, resurgence of 1defense spending, gap

between 185Detente between 42, 110imbalance of nuclear strength

between 36military balance 42, 65, 206during 70s 131unfavorable trends in 190

power projection capabilities169–71

relationsin 70s, deterioriation of 199between 1976 and 1985 195confrontational era in 62shift in 202strategic 56

resurgence in confrontationbetween 54

tensions, resumption of 78US counterforcecapabilities 28strategies 65

US INF deployment 107US LRTNF weapons, in Western

Europe 99US militarybuildup of 10CENTCOM 167–68conventional strategy 126space policy, purpose of 81strategyfor crisis management and

potential local wars 156key principle of 49

strength, pillars of 164superiority, decline of 2

US Navy 149challenge from rival fleet 134planning in the 1970s 135warfighting capability of 142

US nuclear strategy 40development of 77drafting of 39

280 Index

foundation for 50reassessment of 16, 49shifts in 15strategic nuclear potential, growth

of 31technological advancements to

shape 20Weinberger’s emphasis on

continuity of 49–50US RDF, objective of 169US SALT delegation 181see also SALT (Strategic Arms

Limitation Talks)USSR 4, 8, 54addition of MIRVed warheads to

ICBMs by 18airborne divisions of 169civil defense and military strategy in,

link between 69collapse of 10deployment of SS-20s 109hard-target missile re-entry vehicles/

warheads 58influence throughout Western

Europe 97military buildup, scope of 73military capabilities in,

modernization of 9naval strength 132production capacity for chemicals,

primary metals, powergenerators and other vitalequipment 68

propaganda against ERW 93reaction to SDI 84and United States,

relative military powerbetween 58

and Warsaw Pact satellites 91see also Soviet Union

Van Cleave, William 34, 181, 183Vessey, John W. 73Vietnamdeployment of US troops in 110experience of for US 153US involvement in 114US military experience in 126

Vietnam War 5, 176Vietnamese Communists, Soviet

support for 154V/STOL (Vertical/Short

Take-Off and Landing)carriers 137–38

‘‘Walk in the Woods’’ 103–4, 107Walsh, John B 21Waltz, Kenneth 162‘‘War of Attrition’’ 153War Powers Act 153war-survival program 65war, as extension of politics 65warhead missiles 98warheadsdeliverable strategic, in US and

Soviet Union 32Mark 12A, Minuteman III ICBMs

with 51Warner, Volney F 162Warsaw Pact 92–93, 98, 109, 112–13,

116, 137–38, 150ability for gradual buildup 119allies 4conventional forces in Eastern

Europe, improvements in 114East European forces of 120forces 121, 126state of 117

mobilization 122satellites 91

‘‘war-winning’’ nuclear strategy 42weapons 50–54anti-ship 134space-based 80

Weinberger, Caspar 48–49,50, 52,59, 72, 83, 103–5, 144, 146, 172,188–89

West Germany‘‘Forward Defense’’ of 126support for ERW production 95Warsaw Pact invasion of 126

West German parachutedivision 121

Westad, Odd Arne 3Western Europe, US LRTNF weapons

in 99Wolfe, Thomas 181Wolfowitz, Paul 34, 181world peace, threat to 7World War II 64, 122, 131, 144, 203experience of 197

Yemen, North and South, conflictbetween 158

Zapad ‘81 149‘‘Zero Option’’ 102–3, 107, 108Zumwalt, Elmo 133

Index 281