PLYMOUTH UNIVERSITY

“Dead Soldiers and Live Generals?” How did the British Army and its ideas of

Grand Strategy evolve from 1870-1900;

how was it critically received by the

military community?

Module: HIST 362

Student No: 10354047

29/04/14

Word Count: 12,225

2

Contents Page

Acknowledgments 4

Introduction 5

Getting at the other side of the hill 9

Volley fire! Present! 16

A mouldering soldier lies… 24

Conclusion 30

Bibliography 33

3

List of maps and illustrations Page

The Mother’s Pet 15

Operations near Suakin 21

Too Late! 23

Too Hot to Hold 30

4

Acknowledgments

This essay is the culmination of my academic career so far and is something of a milestone in

my family’s history. Therefore, a much deserved measure of thanks must go out to a certain

number of people for helping me accomplish such a personal achievement. This essay would

not have been possible without the following people: Mum & Dad, despite reminding me of a

certain Phillip Larkin poem on occasion, I would not be in the position I am now if it were not

for you. Thank you for all your support, encouragement, and most importantly, cash that

allowed me to fuel my late night writing sessions with so much energy drink. Doctors M Darcy

and C Holt, without your support, insight, and empathy I would not have faced this task in a

decent state of mind and would have no doubt suffered for it. Dr James Gregory, providing

sound and pertinent advice throughout the year, you have been of great help. Andrew Cobb,

whose obsession for grammar helped make this essay appear eloquent and professional. Cathy

Slaughter, who support and empathy helped me through a difficult period. The occupants of 7

Gifford Terrace Road and the “North Devon Crowd” who were able to provide much-needed

comedic relief at times of stress; “The Bristol Gang”, for the same. Finally, Dell Computers; if

my laptop produced by your company was not so prone to constant and surprising crashes; I

would never have spent so much time in the library conducting research instead of

procrastinating at home. Thank you all.

5

Introduction “The nearest run thing you had ever seen”

The Legacy of Waterloo, 1815-1870

Over fifty years had passed since the victories in the Peninsula and on the fields of Quatre Bras

and Waterloo yet, the British army still appeared to be a remarkably similar beast to its

forebears. There were of course minor changes that set the men apart from Wellington’s

redcoats: religion was taken more seriously as was sobriety; the soldiers for the most part were

also less vulgar, and took more care and attention towards personal hygiene; as well as

individualistic changes, there were also collective changes throughout the army. The British

Army now used breech loading rifles, the uniforms had been modified, and there was a greater

proliferation of bearded soldiers, owing to the fashion of the time.

Most importantly, British strategic thought had remained unchanged. Yet from the start

of the Victorian era, events had begun to go awry for the British Empire. The disastrous

campaigns in Afghanistan (1839), the Crimean theatre (1854-57), and the Indian Mutiny (1857-

59) caused many to question the effectiveness of British strategists and to a lesser extent, the

British Army.1 There were now open debates questioning the logic behind using strategic

theory that had been cobbled together in an ad hoc manner to fight campaigns against the now

long dead Napoleon, by an under supplied and overstretched army that had had to constantly

beg for money and supplies from Horse Guards in London.2 The demands placed upon the

British Army in 1870 were now far more complex than it had been during the French Wars of

1792-1815.

While important members of the government and military in Britain lost themselves in

nostalgic daydreams of the past – the so called Military School of the Enlightenment3 – their

counterparts on the continent were engaged in something different. While the beginning of the

French Revolution and Napoleon’s rise to power had seen the once proud Prussian nation

humbled, the Prussians had learnt and evolved during the conflict and had won their own

victories.4 It was from this conflict that an obscure officer of the Prussian General Staff drew

inspiration, compiling a multi-volume work that was supposed to cover every aspect of warfare.

However, he, along with his mentor, Gneisenau, abruptly died of cholera in 1831, leaving his

1A.N. Wilson, The Victorians, (Reading: Arrow Books, 2002), pp. 175-223

2Peter Snow, To War With Wellington: From the Peninsula to Waterloo, (St. Ives plc: John Murray Publishers,

2011)

3This phrase was originally used by Azar Gat in 1989 and describes strategy either used by the French or is of

French origin.

4Richard Holmes, Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket, (St. Ives plc: Harper Perennial,

2003), pp. xv-419

6

work incomplete.5 Unpopular in Prussia owing to his middle-class origins, both his reformist

nature and his refusal to serve in a French controlled Prussian army in 1812, neither the name

Carl von Clausewitz nor his magnum opus Vom Krieg – better known in English speaking

circles as On War – resonated within European schools of strategic thought until the mid-

nineteenth century. Even after the successful use of the theories stated in On War by

commanders on the European continent, it still took a decade to be translated and be seriously

considered by British strategists.

Yet, despite this transitory period, On War soon acquired a cult following on its publi-

cation in Britain from the British public, the officer corps, and politicians which prompted a

fierce discussion on the future of British warfare. The debate between the advocates of the

Enlightenment versus the German was to last for over three decades, ultimately changing

British military strategy, thanks to the Cardwell Reforms and the Anglo-Boer war. It was the

key issues of this debate that steered the British army with both schools contributing to the

evolution of strategy through political reforms, changing opinions, and changing methods

within military education. The relationship between the Royal Military Academy at Sand-

hurst, the Staff College, and the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich were also important

for the strategic evolution as was the work of military historians such as G.F.R Henderson,

John Mitchell, William Napier, and Spencer Wilkinson.

This evolution would help guide the latter campaigns of the Victorian era, eventually

leading to the slaughter of the First World War on the carmine fields of France and Belgium.6

To understand the evolution, certain questions must be asked of the process; how far did

strategy change? How difficult was it to abandon the successful tactics that had reigned

supreme since the defeats of 1781 in the Revolutionary War? How significant was public

opinion? Did British Staff Colleges evolve? Finally, what role did British arrogance hinder

progress?

A number of both primary and secondary sources will inform the dissertation,

providing a counterpoint to the European strategic debate. These sources will provide context

for the opinions and decisions made throughout the thirty year period being covered as well

as offering an opinion with the benefit of hindsight. A large number of primary sources such

as parliamentary debates from Hansard as well as parliamentary reports and papers help chart

the progress of the British military evolution by documenting the state of the British army

5Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 60

6Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy. Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present, (Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press: 2010), p. 179

7

before, during, and after reforms had been implemented. The sources also allow readers to

view the debates in Parliament that prompted the reforms; giving an insight into the main

figures who were both for and against reform. Contemporary newspapers and periodicals will

also be utilised, such as The Daily Paper, The Argus, and illustrations from various

magazines. This allows an insight into the public’s thoughts and opinions on military matters.

Secondary sources are also vital to analysis. An important author on the subject of

Clausewitz and the debate within the British military is Christopher Bassford whose thesis

Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945

(1994) is considered a premier work on the subject. This thesis examines the critical

reception of Clausewitz's strategy and how it was received in the English speaking world.

Bassford's further works on the subject, a review of Clausewitz and his magnum opus On

War (1996) describes how, in his opinion, On War is the most import piece of military

literature ever written.7 Bassford, a former US Army officer and now a professor, strategist,

and author for the National War College in Washington D.C has now become known as one

of the world’s leading experts on Clausewitz as well as nineteenth and twentieth century

strategy. This résumé has provided Bassford with a great amount of respect from the

academic community, giving credence to his works.

Another important commentator on strategic thinking in the nineteenth century is Gat

whose monographs The Origins of Military Thought: From The Enlightenment to Clausewitz

(1989) and The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century (1992) provide

not only succinct description of the international context for the changing schools of strategic

thought but also explains his rationale, provides analysis of the strategy itself, he also

analyses recent historiography and details the impact of key changes in strategic thought.

While both of Gat's academic publications were his first and second academic works, they are

still held in high regards by military historians and strategists. However, the thesis has been

criticised for putting too much emphasis on his arguments concerning Clausewitz at the

extent of other thinkers, yet Gat's work is still undeniably useful to the subject. There is also a

continued debate between Gat and Bassford over the influence of Clausewitz within the

western hemisphere that is vicious, sometimes becoming hypocritical. This flaw is seen in

several of Gat’s arguments demonstrating that an extensive historiography is required in order

to present a balanced hypothesis.

7Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945'

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994)

8

Strachan's The Politics of the British Army (1997) and European Armies and the

Conduct of War (2004) are a reaction against Clausewitz popularity during the late twentieth

century; Strachan arguing that Clausewitz beliefs that the military is an arm of political

discourse to be false. Strachan argues that both the military and politics have an equal

standing in strategic manoeuvring. Scathing of Clausewitz, Strachan suggests that a wilful

ignorance of the true meaning of On War has caused Clausewitz to become more popular

than he deserves,8 with Strachan citing the examples of military governorship in as a key

argument against the German movement, particularly Clausewitz and Mitchell.9 Although his

opinion is atypical, Strachan holds international posts on defence boards, as well as being an

international professor of military history adding credence to his controversial views.

However, Strachan is trained as a military historian and not a strategist who could lead to his

misunderstanding of the strategic concepts involved. He is also highly outspoken of his

opinion which could result in author bias.

8Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)

9Major General John Mitchell (1785-1859) was a soldier and author whose main concerns were the British

army. Son of a diplomat, he spent most of his childhood in northern European Royal Courts. He joined the army

in July 1803 and after a year was promoted to the 1st Royal Scots. He remained with the regiment throughout the

Napoleonic wars, mainly serving in staff roles. He was frequently used by the Duke of Wellington as a

diplomatic liaison owing to his background and was highly thought of. He was placed on half-pay in 1821

where he began to write on military reform at both a tactical and strategic level. Mitchell advocated the

abandonment of bayonets, corporal punishment, and was generally favourable of all things espoused by the

Prussian military, most likely owing to his time spent in north Germany. A believer in Clausewitz and other

Prussian military writers he often became involved in arguments with William Napier. While impossible to say

if enmity existed outside of their profession, the two had remarkably similar backgrounds, resulting in the two

becoming the champion of their respective views in Britain before 1870. Azar Gat, The Development Of

Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 9-14

9

Getting at the other side of the hill The Call for Strategic Reform

1870-1880

1870 saw the European continent plunged into a ferocious war by two continental powers.

European conflict was not unusual; however this conflict was different from the norm owing

to the belligerents. Despite the exaggerated threat presented by the French army or the more

troubling and technologically advanced French navy – a threat that had struck terror into the

hearts of the British government in the previous decade – the legacy of the still reviled

Napoleon was still pertinent. With Prussia temporarily subsumed into the French Empire

during the reign of Napoleon I, the campaigns fought by the Prussian soldiers in the War of

Liberation and subsequent conflicts in Poland and Austria saw Prussian ambitions grow while

at the same time seriously antagonising France. By 1870, the situation had come diplomatically

untenable for France and the Prussian led North-German Confederation, founded four years

before out of the ashes of the Austro-Prussian war. Headed by the astute Otto von Bismarck,

Prussian demands for a unified Germany at the expense of French strategic security caused

outrage amongst the French monarchy and the military leadership, leading to a declaration of

war eventually being presented to Emperor Napoleon III after much political wrangling.

Despite the territorial loss and the national humiliation felt by the French at the

conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war, both the British establishment and the military were

becoming increasingly concerned at the changing balance of power on the continent. Although

Britain had not been engaged in a European conflict on mainland Europe since the Napoleonic

Wars there were fears that Britain’s military powers had been diminished. The disastrous

bungling and hideous losses experienced in the Crimea and in India during the mutiny raised

questions as to how Britain would fare against a competent European power. During a debate

in the Houses of Parliament in late 1871, Lord Strathnairn10 was one of the first to suggest a

radical departure from the traditional “Enlightenment School of military thought” that had been

practised since the end of the Napoleonic Wars by both Britain and France. He proclaimed:

10Field Marshal, Sir Hugh Rose, 1st Baron Strathnairn (1801-1885) was a soldier and politician whose main

political concerns were the British Army. He served in several garrisons, most notably in Ireland and India

where he advanced up the ranks and became known as a father to his men. He also briefly served as an Aide-de-

Camp to the Duke of Cambridge. He served on several fronts, most notably with the Turks during the 1840's

when acting as liaison, the Crimea where he was a liaison to the French, and the Indian Mutiny where he fought

in several major engagements. He displayed acts of extreme bravery in every theatre and was repeatedly

commended. He later served as Commander-in-Chief of both India and Ireland before retiring in 1870 where he

lobbied in the House of Lords. Mathew Robson, Sir Hugh Rose, 1st Baron Strathnairn, In The Oxford Dictionary

of National Biography, Volume 47, ed. Mathew Robson et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 754-

758

10

I consider it my duty to bring to your Lordships' notice, with the view to their

amendment, serious deficiencies in our military training and education, and especially

in its first requisite, strategy11

Prussia's use of an obscure strategist had trounced the widely popular works of Napoleon’s

chief advocate, Jomini, resulting in a fast and brutal campaign instead of a protracted, civilised

war of attrition. Britain’s own strict adherence to the Enlightenment theory allowed for limited

strategic flexibility and had proved costly to implement in previous engagements. Strathnairn

continued:

Yet it is strategy, my Lords, which, in an incredibly short time, has made Prussia

mistress of the destinies of France, as 65 years ago it placed Prussia and her

independence at the mercy of France. We ought not to be blind to the lessons which

recent Continental events are so well fitted to teach12

Strathnairn’s warnings of Britain becoming strategically backwards were prescient. Although

France had not yet been entirely defeated when he made his speech, it was increasingly ap-

parent that a German-centric Europe was inevitable, possibly resulting in a major war threat-

ening British interests. By failing to successfully prepare against master Prussian strategists,

the fear of reduced British influence in Europe would be realised. Strathnairn’s opinions were

not baseless as his father had been an envoy to Berlin, allowing his son to view the German

military establishment from a young age. Strathnairn’s strategic concerns are extensively sup-

ported by Azar Gat, who claims:

The shift in the centre of military power from France to Germany after 1870-1 marked

a decisive change in the fortunes of the two contending conceptions of military theory13

Yet the Establishment, spearheaded by Lords and Monarchy were unsupportive, creating

opposition towards strategic reform. One of the key figures in the British government who

disagreed with Strathnairn’s view was William Napier. Sir William Napier (1785-1860) was an

Anglo-Irish soldier who was influential within the Enlightenment Movement. Born into a

11Parl. Debates, Address for returns, vol 205, HL Deb., 28 March 1871, cc.752-65, Lord Strathnairn 12Ibid, cc752-65

13Gat, The Development Of Military Thought, p. 3

11

family with royal connections, William’s father and three of his brothers served in the military.

Enlisting in 1800, he transferred into the Horse Guards before moving to several less glamorous

units, possibly as a reaction against nepotism displayed towards him. He became a protégée of

Sir John Moore and fought with distinction throughout the Napoleonic Wars, rising through

the ranks through a combination of luck and merit. Seriously injured several times throughout

the Iberian Campaign he left the Army owing to his wounds before deciding to become a

military historian in 1821. Owing to his Whig views – he was married to C.J Fox’s daughter –

as well as his pro-French sympathies, criticism was mixed. Despite this, he supported both

flogging and the Purchase System in the military.14 In spite of seeing the strategic brinkmanship

of the Bonapate/Jomini doctrine first-hand, Napier still insisted that:

[The Napoleonic Wars] was the period in which the principles of the military art were

brought to all the perfection of which they appear to be capable… Napoleon

incontestably surpassed all who preceded him and left nothing in which he could

himself be surpassed15

Napier firmly believed Jomini had written the definitive strategic treatise on conflict, a feeling

expressed by Jomini’s superior, Bonaparte himself, in 1808. Despite the fact that Napier had

been dead for a decade by the time Strathnairn began his protest, his legacy, and his admiration

for the Enlightenment school of military theory had not been forgotten. Gat continues to

criticise the Enlightenment School:

The military thinkers of the Enlightenment [have an] all-embracing uniformity of their

theoretical outlook. They differed in some respects... however; they did not differ in the

fundamentals of their guiding objectives [sic]16

Jomini himself admitted his opinions on war were from a bygone era. His longing for all battles

to be fought in a gentlemanly style, was an admirable if not naïve desire, believing a campaign

could be fought so if armies kept to the so called “Lines of Operation”. While Jomini’s wish

for a neat form of combat with the minimum of human casualties was commendable, the

advances in weapons technology dictated such methods would still produce massive loss of

14John Sweetman, Sir William Francis Patrick Napier, In The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Volume

40, ed. John Sweetman et al, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 195-197 15Gat, The Development Of Military Thought, pp. 7

16Gat, The Origins of Military Thought. From The Enlightenment to Clausewitz, (Guildford: Oxford University

Press: 1989), p. 119

12

life. By following these strategic lines, disorder would be kept to a minimum. Jomini

complained that:

War, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and impassioned drama, regulated, it

is true, by three or four general principles, but also dependent for its results upon a

number of moral and physical complications…As a soldier [I] prefer loyal and

chivalrous warfare to organised assassination17

Interestingly, this sentiment is illustrated in Clausewitz’s own work, yet he expresses this

“virtuous quality” can be harnessed only by a certain number of soldiers in a nation's army.18

Napier’s legacy was not the only issue blocking strategic reform. It was difficult enough to

establish specialised schools dedicated to strategic thought, let alone convincing officers to

attend one of the academies.19 A further difficulty was how strategy was to be practised in the

field. It was one thing for an officer to read a military philosopher's opinions on combat

manoeuvrings, but if that theory could not be put in to practice on the march, it was useless.

The Duke of Cambridge20 stated in a debate in March 1871:

Every officer of the Army is as desirous and anxious to advance this question of military

education as either my Friend [Strathnairn] or myself. But ... the officers of the British

Army are exposed to enormous difficulties. We have never been allowed to collect large

17Strachan, European Armies, p. 60

18Carl von Clausewitz., On War – Book 3, Chapter V -, (Chatham, Wordsworth Editions: 1997), p. 155

19Edward Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1914, in The Oxford Illustrated History Of The British Army,

The Oxford Illustrated History Of The British Army, ed. Edward Spiers et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1994), pp. 194-195 20Field Marshal, Duke of Cambridge, Prince George William Frederick Charles (1819-1904) was a member of

the British Royal Family and Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. With his cousin Victoria becoming

queen in 1837, he was given several colonelcies in British regiments, before rising to the rank of Major-General

in 1845. In 1852 he was made Inspector-General of Cavalry where he began demanding reform within the

British army, suggesting divisional organisation, annual manoeuvres, and the placing of younger officers in

senior positions. He also expressed great interest in military education. He commanded a division during the

Crimean War and although he was a mediocre general, he cared deeply for the lives of his men and was

apparently distraught at both the amount of casualties his division suffered and his orders to return to Britain

mid-campaign. He became Commander-in-Chief of the army in 1856 and although he was seen as an arch-

conservative he oversaw a number of reforms as well as co-founding and becoming Commissioner for the Royal

Military College (Camberley), as well as becoming commissioner at RMA Sandhurst, the Duke of York’s

School in 1850, and governor of Woolwich in 1862. He was promoted to Field Marshal in 1862. Despite

favouring reform, he did not agree with the Cardwell Reforms as he believed that reducing units would weaken

the army as well as greatly resenting his demotion and displacement from Horse Guards to Pall Mall. He

disliked Garnett Wolseley although the two worked successful together on several occasions. He retired his

position in October 1895, handing command over to Wolseley, age 76. Edward Spiers, Prince George, Duke of

Cambridge, In The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Volume 21, ed. Edward Speirs et al (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 799-802

13

bodies of troops together, as is constantly done upon the Continent

He further observed:

Let me fairly tell your Lordships that it is much more difficult in this country to carry

out combined movements of troops, such as take place upon the Continent, than your

Lordships generally may imagine. I have frequently attended reviews abroad, and I can

assure your Lordships that I was surprised to see the injury that is done without the

slightest consideration, the fields passed over and the property destroyed, in a manner

that would never for an instant be tolerated at home.21

Cambridge's concern was well founded as the British military could not afford to drill in a

manner that would result in famine and a rash of unemployment, unlike France or Prussia

which practised manoeuvres during the autumn months.22 Nevertheless, Strathnairn was able

to bring about the reformation of the British Army's education system and although problematic,

the British army administration – now at Pall Mall instead of Horse Guards – organised a

manoeuvre that aped the Prussian model; the location yet to be decided but as was repeatedly

stressed as “somewhere up the Thames”.23 Strathnairn had been so vocal on the subject that on

28 July, Lord Northbrook said:

The attention of the War Office would be seriously directed to those improvements

which the noble... Lord [Strathnairn] had so zealously advocated during the last two or

three years. He hoped the... Lord would not press his Motion24

Yet, despite wearing down the government with years’ worth of debates, those who wished to

reform the army were repeatedly attacked by Whig politicians. Almost two years after

Strathnairn's victory, the Lord De L'isle and Dudley expressed his disgust at the new military

academies and modern military reform, proclaiming that:

What might suit the Prussians very well, where the whole system of training was

21Parl. Debates, Address for returns, vol 205, HL Deb., 28 March 1871, cc.752-65, Duke of Cambridge

22Gat, The Origins of Military Thought. p. 199

23 Parl. Debates, Motion for an address, vol 208, HL Deb., 28 July 1871, cc.388-91, Lord Northbrook

24Ibid

14

arranged in conformity, I thought it would be found to be repugnant to the habits and

feelings of young Englishmen [sic]25

It was unfortunate Britain decided to imitate Prussia at this period as the German state

had now replaced France as the new continental superpower, rivalling Britain. Not only was

France still seen as a realistic danger, Russia’s push towards Constantinople and Afghanistan

was also an alarming development for the Disraeli government who, if pushed into conflict,

would find it hard to mount a strong counter-attack owing to the confusion prevailing through

the British army and the War Office. During the early stages of the Cardwell Reforms the

disharmonious relationship between the Army and the War Office was seen during the debate

concerning general service. General Service was a practice that involved transferring a

soldier, usually a new recruit, into a different regiment than the one they were originally

recruited into. The soldier was often transferred without any prior warning and was often

devastating to the soldiers’ morale. However, it was a quick way of improving the numbers of

depleted regiments. While the War Office wished to continue the practice, the Army was now

very much against it as it was administratively confusing and logistically counter-productive.

Had Britain become engaged in a major engagement during the debate, the British military

may have been adversely affected.26

While typical British haughtiness had been ignored by the Prussians during the Anglo-

Prussian alliance against Napoleon, relations were now poor. France was still considered to be

Britain’s natural enemy; while German thought was still widely admired, relations would

steadily decline into the Twentieth Century. Although Strathnairn was able to see the

beginnings of strategic reform, strong opposition meant that actual change at a national level

was not achieved. Strathnairn’s reputation was further hindered by continued success for the

British military throughout the 1870’s. However, the incompetence of Lord Chelmsford during

the First Zulu War led to the annihilation of a British Column after the British forces split,

allowing the Zulus to bring their entire might on one section of the British at Isandlwana.27 The

fluke of Rourke’s Drift later that day was the only thing that prevented total disaster.

Complaining bitterly at the House of Lords, Strathnairn stated “The columns invading Zululand

were too far distant from one another for mutual support … The result of this was that 20,000

Zulus were enabled to pass through the interval”28 The public were also outraged by the defeat

25Parl. Debates, Question, vol 216, HL Deb., 7 July 1873, cc.1835-9, Lord De L'isle and Dudley

26Allan Mallinson, The Making Of The British Army: From The English Civil War To The War On Terror

(London: Bantam Press, 2011), pp. 289 27Mallinson, The Making Of The British Army, p. 299

28Parl. Debates, Question. Observation, vol 256, HL Deb., 2 September 1880, cc.1025-35, Lord Strathnairn

15

as well by the absence of punishment for Lord Chelmsford.

The Mothers Pet

Mrs Dizzy: Never mind my dear; here are more soldiers to play with (original caption). Gordon Thompson, Fun, March 19 1879 in Mark Bryant, Wars Of The Empire In Cartoons, (London:

Grub Street, 2008), p. 75

Despite an eventual British victory, the Army showed that strategic reform was needed

if future defeats were to be avoided. Strathairn gave one last rebuke towards his Whig

opponents and proclaimed:

It was eight or nine years ago that I [Strathnairn] drew your Lordships' attention, in a

long speech on military education, to the disadvantages of the British system of

mechanical drill without an object—that was, without the elementary or higher rules of

strategy; and I have since never failed, at the cost of their Lordships' patience and

indulgence, to press it upon the House29

Despite overwhelming evidence of the need for reform, there was still much fighting –

both on the battlefield and in Whitehall – before serious change was undertaken.

29Ibid, cc1025-35

16

Volley fire! Present! Lessons from Africa

1880-1890

By 1880 the British Army was smarting from a damaged reputation while contention flowed

throughout London. Despite being victorious in the Anglo-Zulu War the previous year, as

well as subsuming Afghanistan into the Empire, the British, especially the senior officers,

were now being seen as militarily incompetent by Queen Victoria herself.30 While debate

raged through Parliament, alarming news was to come, once again from South Africa.

Although the British had been successful in annexing both Natal and Transvaal into the

British Empire after they had been recaptured from the Zulus, there was much discontent

amongst the native population of Boers.31This was hardly a new phenomenon, as there had

been Boer protests against British rule in South Africa since the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

However, throughout 1880 the Boers claimed, justifiably so, that the British had violated

several treaties protecting their territorial sovereignty and had been ignored. The Boers

enjoyed much sympathy in London.32

Tensions rose to breaking point by December with the Boers quickly proclaiming

independence on 16th December, providing the British with a casus belli. The British

responded much as they had done the previous year and began marching relief columns to

various settlements whereby disaster stuck. Owing to having spent their entire lives in the

tough environment of South Africa, the Boers were able to quickly transfer from their life as

farmers to irregular soldiers. Despite having mostly obsolete equipment, the Boers chose to

harass, harry, and ambush the British by utilising light horsemen, wearing khaki coloured

clothing, and firing from concealment.33 The British suffered heavy losses almost

immediately, especially amongst senior officers.

Suffering heavy losses by a foe that was rarely seen and a constantly severed supply-

line, the British quickly became demoralised and confused. The further loss of senior officers,

including General Colley - the commander of local forces in South Africa – soon led to a

humiliating capitulation by the British; the first cessation of hostilities signed by Britain on

unfavourable terms since the American Revolution. Embarrassingly, the British had perfected

the use of Light Infantry a mere hundred years before during the American Revolution. One

30Mallinson, The Making Of The British Army, p. 308

31

Parl. Debates, Address in answer to her majesty’s most gracious speech, vol 250, HC Deb., 5 February 1880,

cc.62-144, Col. Drummond-Morray 32Parl. Debates, Observations, vol 256, HC Deb., 31 August 1880, cc.839-79, Mr Leonard Courtney

33Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, p. 199

17

explanation by David Galula is:

[In an insurgency for one belligerent] there is overwhelming superiority in tangible

assets [which] favours the powers against whom it is staged; diplomatic recognition;

legitimate power in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; control of the

administration and police…yet the insurgents, with their blatant inferiority in all other

dimensions, have moral factors on their side, which might ultimately bring victory…

In view of this, the insurgent needs so little to achieve so much whereas the

counterinsurgent needs so much to achieve so little34

The British were concerned. To suffer a defeat was embarrassing but to capitulate to a

foe whose ranks were mostly farmers after a mere ten weeks was humiliating. To the British,

the antiquated ideas of honourable warfare still existed and thus the senior officers did not

know how to react to irregular warfare. While the campaign was fought with civility and

respect between both parties, the belligerents used highly different strategies. Jomini’s desire

for a quick, civilised campaign with the minimum loss of loss of life was expressed thus:

The conduct of war should be subordinate to the war’s objective, for how else could

we contrive to bring its horrors under control?35

This sentiment was espoused by the British as well as one of the leading military

families, the Napiers, officers, military historians and strategists, including Patrick

MacDougal, son in law of William Napier. MacDougal, the first commandant of Britain’s

staff college, wrote The Theory of War, a regurgitation of Jomini, which was highly regarded

as was his successor E.B Hamley’s book The Operations of War, published in 1866, which

was written in a similar vein. Operations was so popular that it remained the only set text at

the Staff College until the 1890’s. The Boers however, were determined in their efforts and

did not subscribe to Jomini’s morally safe beliefs. They instead fought a campaign

recommended by Clausewitz, although it is highly unlikely that any Boer commander had

even heard of the Prussian officer. Since the 1790’s Clausewitz had recommended, in certain

scenarios, that:

There are three things of decisive importance to us: surprise, advantage of ground,

34David Galula, Counter Insurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 2005), p. 46 35Strachan, European Armies, p. 61

18

and the attack from several quarters. The surprise produces an effect by opposing to

the enemy a great many more troops than he expected at a particular point. The

superiority in numbers in this case is more powerful than superiority of numbers36

Relying on a few marksmen making judicious use of ground, the Boers instead had

able to inflict massive casualties on the conspicuous British. Not only did it demonstrate the

failings of Cardwell’s Short Service reforms, it also made Britain’s overseas territories more

vulnerable to attack from rival nations. The War Ministry had feared as much since 1879

when they demanded a report on the reorganisation of the army. Theoretically, the British

army was supposed to have 70 battalions on active service abroad with another 71 battalions

in garrison quarters in Britain. For battalions on active service, 250 men were to remain at the

unit’s billet undergoing training so as to replace any casualties. Yet, the report complained

that:

It is to be observed that an allowance of fifteen per cent for casualties of the infantry

in the regular army is far below what experience has shown it should be. In the last

two years (1878-79) the loss of the regular infantry was sixteen and a half per cent…

It is expected that the casualty rate will rise to twenty per cent in the near future while

the militia suffered casualties at thirty three and a half per cent. The regular infantry

therefore requires 328 replacements a year while the militia require 549

replacements37

Owing to the ineffectiveness of the Cardwell system, the large number of British

casualties that could not be replaced would severely limit any engagement that the British

might be forced to undertake. Yet there was still limited development in Britain’s strategic

thinking. Despite the fear of a cross-channel-invasion from France now becoming unlikely,

and the gradual emergence of German military hegemony in Europe, the British still

maintained that strategic orthodoxy was still valid, even while gleefully participating in the

scramble for Africa. Strachan complains:

The study of strategy and military history was therefore centred on the writings of the

Germans, but the Germans had precious little experience of colonial fighting. It was a

36Clausewitz, On War – Book 6, Chapter 2 -, p. 281

37HoC Parliamentary Paper, Army re-organization. Report of a committee of general and other officers of the

army on army re-organization, 1881 [C.2791], p.8

19

continental power that founded Germany’s claim to attention. This… is an indicator

of where the priorities of the true colonial powers – Britain and France – lay.

Orthodox war was a European war… [Yet] The enormous variety of colonial

campaigns was itself a powerful disincentive towards rationalism. It was very hard to

generalise when there was just so many variables38

Another danger was the quality of the officers being sent to fight. In a report on

military education in 1883, the War Office complained about the quality of the officer

candidates at Sandhurst:

The competition for entrance has not been very keen, the number of vacancies being

competed for bare to the number of competitors the proportion of 1 to 1.73… A

commencement has recently been made to remedy the defects by limiting to two the

number of languages being taken up, and by encouraging students to study either

French or German39

With the limited number of volunteers plus the continued emphasis on facing a

continental power somewhere in the near future, it is evident to see how British strategy had

remained stagnant over a period of time. It is not surprising that a similar embarrassment

would again be inflicted on the British, once again, in Africa. The outbreak of the Mahdi’s

revolt in the Sudan would again tax the British military as their enemies were, again, very

unconventional.

Britain took control of Egypt in 1882 after a coup d’état and subsequent rebellion

overthrew the local Ottoman ruler, at the same time threatening British trade interests, and

several hundred British citizens. The British, with approximately 40,000 men under Sir

Garnet Wolseley,40 quickly ended the rebellion and restored the Ottoman ruler, with Egypt

38Strachan, European Armies, p. 76

39HoC Parliamentary Paper, Third report on the education of officers; by the Director-General of Military

Education, 1883 [C.3818] p. 9

40Field Marshal, Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley, 1st Viscount Wolseley (1833-1913), was an Anglo-Irish soldier. He

fought in numerous campaigns from the Crimea to the Sudan Campaign (1884-85). His bravery, coolness under

fire, and his competence in both tactical and strategic matters resulted in rapid promotion. A controversial man,

he agreed with the Cardwell reforms, wrote extensively on military matters – including preparations for war in

times of peace – and formed “The Wolseley Ring”. Despite his disagreement over the creation of a General

Staff, the Ring was comprised of favoured and capable officers who micro-managed logistics, communications,

intelligence, reconnaissance, and administrative duties. However, Wolseley preferred to plan campaigns and

battles himself, rather than depend on a Chief-of-Staff. The Ring, as well as his creation of elite brigades,

alienated many and prompted enmity from the Duke of Cambridge. Serving exclusively in Britain after 1885,

20

effectively becoming a British client. While an unremarkable campaign – the British only

suffered 57 fatalities – it was the first time in British military history that railways were used

with military intent, instant telegraph communications were established between forces while

in the field, and the first ever appearance of the Army Post Office Corps.

The next year saw a small rebellion in Sudan spiral out of the local government’s

control. Believing the conflict to be a holy war against the moderate Turks and the European

armies, the Mahdi twice destroyed relief columns before refusing to disperse when asked to

by the British, and then besieging a town and massacring the entire refugee population there.

With these early successes, the jihadist continued their advance north.

Fearing that British interests would again be threatened, the British began deploying

troops. General Charles Gordon was despatched to the city of Khartoum and placed in

command. Gordon’s main concern was to save the life of the city’s thirty thousand

inhabitants and turn the city into a base for the military to operate from, the city being located

in a central position within the country. While Gordon was preparing the city to be the

springboard for an offensive, the Mahdi surrounded the city and laid siege to it. As part of the

now halted offensive, the British began landing troops at Suakin. The British reinforcements

quickly began to set up their main base from which to support columns advancing into Sudan.

The first troops were under the command of Sir Gerald Graham who planned a limited and

traditional campaign:

The first priorities were base security and logistical supply. Once the engineers had

erected a wire entanglement, soldiers were able to bivouac in and around the earthwork,

whereupon they laboured to bring stores, artillery and, above all, supplies of fresh water

across the marsh41

Securing a beachhead, Graham began to march inland. After successfully engaging

the local Mahdist forces, the British sailed back to Suakin and once again began to march

through the desert. Despite his advance already being ponderous, Graham planned to advance

towards the enemies force with two brigades whose commanders were under strict orders to

Wolseley served as Adjutant General until 1890 before being promoted to Commander-in-Chief of forces in

Ireland before becoming national C-in-C in 1895, a position which he resigned from in 1899. From 1882, his

reforms included modernising the drill books for infantry and cavalry, improving the diet and equipment of the

troops, securing 41,000 acres of land at Salisbury Plain for the army, and promoting the formation of a military

intelligence service. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, pp. 194-195

41Spiers, The Victorian Soldier in Africa, (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2004), p. 102

21

“undertake short marches (to limit the risk of sunstroke) and to protect themselves by con-

structing zarebas whenever it halted”.42 Despite these precautionary measures, dozens of men

were struck down by sun stroke and water was made available only on a limited basis. Alt-

hough eventually victorious, the British were forced to withdraw from the theatre as the cam-

paign had turned into a poorly supplied sideshow with impossible logistic considerations ow-

ing to the mass casualties caused by sunstroke.

Spiers, The Victorian Soldier in Africa, p. 101

By August 1884, almost six months after Khartoum had been besieged, internal politi-

cal pressure forced the British Prime Minister to dispatch General Wolseley to relieve the

42Spiers, The Victorian Soldier in Africa, p. 106

22

city. At Wolseley’s instance, his somewhat unpopular clique of favourites were once again re-

formed and given free rein on how to conduct the upcoming campaign. After seeing the dam-

aging effects of sunstroke during the Suakin campaign, the clique decide that instead of

marching 500 miles to reach the city without a fixed supply-line and no direct access to wa-

ter, the British force would travel down the Nile, a distance of 1650 miles but with the ad-

vantage of a fixed supply-line. Strachan writes that:

[In regards to Wolseley et al success in African campaigns] This was above all due to

their organisation of supply. Supply in particular depended on geographical factors; it

lay at the root of most operational difficulties and to a large degree determined the

pattern of a campaign. Battles were fought to secure water. Lines of Wells dictated

lines of march.43

Sending an advanced party ahead of his main force, Wolseley ensured that the bulk of

his army would not arrive at the next battle dying of thirst. This resulted in the British for-

ward units coming into contact with Mahdist forces at Abu Klea, a vital supply of water, and

resoundingly defeating the enemy.44 Despite the Mahdists demonstrating the vulnerability of

British tactics both in the Suakin and Nile Campaigns, the British were still confident. With

the Mahdists defeated, the British continued to advance to Khartoum. A smaller column was

sent overland in order to improve the time it took to reach Khartoum but encountered moder-

ate resistance and were ordered to return to the main column after securing a small victory.45

Yet, by this time, the rumour that Khartoum had fallen was proven correct. With Wolseley’s

objectives now redundant he decided to retreat. Unlike Lord Chelmsford at Isandlwana,

Wolseley was seen by the British public to be free of blame, most choosing to grieve instead.

43Strachan, European Armies, p. 81

44R.H. McGuffie, Rank and File: The Common Soldier at Peace and War 1642-1914, (London: Hutchenson &

Co., 1964), p. 269-272

45Spiers, The Victorian Soldier in Africa, p. 120

23

Too Late! John Tenniel, Punch, 14 February 1885 in Bryant, Wars Of The Empire, p. 104

In March 1885, General Graham was sent back to Suakin to resume his campaign

against the Mahdists. Having learnt that such an operation would require better logistics than

his previous campaign, Graham was given 13,000 troops and numerous auxiliary support ele-

ments in the shape of “hospital ships, vessels able to condense 85,000 gallons of water daily,

and 6,000 baggage and 500 riding-camels”.46 Yet despite his logistical preparedness, Graham

fought the campaign much as he had previously. Blunt and unsubtle, Graham’s strategy often

led to the destruction of native villages, resulting in collateral damage. One junior officer

complained of Graham and his subordinates:

I hope Wolseley sees what a disgracefully ignorant lot of Generals we have and with-

draw us. No expedition was ever commanded so badly or so many gross errors made

– the attack on the Zereba on the 22nd was entirely due to General McNeil’s swagger-

ing ignorance… General Graham is also a gigantic failure & everybody is thoroughly

disgusted.47

Forts were also built to defend the area which was garrisoned by Graham’s men. The

British troops at Fort Wadhi Halfa were besieged in a counter-attack in late 1885. The relief

force under General Stephenson was able to outflank and attack the enemy from the rear as

46Ibid, p.122

47Ibid, p.125

24

would have been done by Wolseley’s forces at Khartoum had the British reached the city in

time. Although the Mahdists were routed, the British were soon after ordered home by the

Prime Minister. However, the British had merely been forced into a stalemate and still har-

boured desires for the Sudan.

25

A mouldering soldier lies… Hitting Rock Bottom

1890-1900

The British Army deployed on numerous occasions during the latter half of the 1880’s, yet

the campaigns were simple affairs. A bloodless action in South Africa, the complete annexa-

tion of Burma, a small religious revolt in the Punjab, and the annexation of Sikkim were not

taxing enterprises. However, events both at home and abroad would rock the British Army

during the last decade of the nineteenth century. It was now in the 1890’s that Britain began

to acknowledge the importance of the new German state and the political influence it exerted

internationally, now having eclipsed the French on a limited scale. Possibly owing to this ac-

knowledgment, British strategists, although aware of the German School, now began to pro-

mote the hitherto obscure ideas from the continent. Yet, despite this shift in consciousness,

Britain was still unable to view the Germans as a true military rival, preferring instead to be-

come excited at the prospect of another war with France, sparked by the Fashoda Incident.48

Britain’s bi-polar relationship with Germany was demonstrative of Britain’s refusal to accept

that France was no longer their primary rival.

By 1896 problems had once again risen in Sudan. Led by a disciple of the Mahdi, his

followers were causing concern in Europe, especially in Britain. Thus, the British dispatched

an expedition under General Kitchener to the country in order to finish what General Wolse-

ley had started. However, owing to the clearly opportunistic nature of the campaign, there

were many criticisms aired to the British government.49

Having already served in Sudan, Kitchener understood that a constant water supply

was required for sustained operations in a desert. Although the campaign took two years, the

British suffered minimum casualties and decapitated the enemy leadership with the seizure of

Omdurman, also the site of the campaign’s last major battle. By fighting directly outside the

enemy capital, victory could quickly be gained in the aftermath.

However, not pleased at the narrow minded approach to both national rivalry and mil-

itary strategy, the small but outspoken group of military thinkers who differed from the estab-

lishment began to speak out. A small number of observers were still concerned by the novel

48Winston Churchill, The River War. An Account of the Re-Conquest of the Soudan, Chapter 17,

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4943/4943.txt

49Parl. Debates, Soudan Expedition, vol 39, HC Deb., 30 March 1896, cc.484-96, Mr Henry Labouchere

26

“The Battle of Dorking” (1871) written by General Chesney, in which a German proxy in-

vades Britain and destroys the British home forces.50 Written as a warning to the British na-

tion of how the German military was a formidable force which was being ignored by the con-

try’s senior commanders, “Dorking” inspired an entirely new genre of writing, invasion liter-

ature. Further writers sought to further reinforce the fear of the defeat of the British Army

such as Augustin Garçon in “The Siege of London” (1884) which followed a similar theme as

Chesney.51 Others believed that Germany should be supported and copied. One of the more

outspoken supporters of Germany was Spencer Wilkinson.5253 Owing to his profession and

his obsessive study of military affairs, Wilkinson was an influential man and friend to many.

Bassford notes that “Wilkinson recalled advising Lord Milner (Governor, South Africa), to

read On War in 1898… [As well as] Foster Cunliffe, later the first lecturer in military history

at Oxford”54 despite admitting that there were some aspects of On War of which he did not

understand. Wilkinson nonetheless supported the idea of moral forces. He stated:

“It seems to me that war is essentially a conflict of wills… for this reason discipline – the

training of the will – is always, and always will be, the foundation stone of an army”55

Colonel G. Henderson was also influential amongst British strategists, as he was a

professor at Camberley Staff College during most of the 1890’s. Although he was not as sup-

portive of the German School as Wilkinson, he agreed with Clausewitz on “moral forces”.

According to Reid “Henderson [sic] transformed the Staff College into the centre for the

study and writing of military history… [His writing was also] sober, judicious on tactical

matters, and safe”.56 It is therefore ironic that at a time when British military writers were

concerned about the morally correct way to fight a campaign, described as moral forces by

Clausewitz, that the British Army caused outrage in two theatres of war; the Boxer Rebellion,

and the Anglo-Boer War. While Britain’s actions in China were forgiven,57 the atrocities in

50I.F Clarke, Before and After The Battle of Dorking, Science Fiction Studies, #71 = Volume 24, Part 1 = March

1997 http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/71/clarke71art.htm 51Ibid 52Bassford, ‘Clausewitz in English’, Chapter 9 53Wilkinson worked as a lawyer and then a journalist having spent only a limited time in his university militia.

Nevertheless, he wrote frequently and accurately on military affairs and claimed to be one of the first pro-

German writers. His work “The Brains of an Army” (1890) strongly encouraged the education of senior officers

for staff positions and called for the formation of a British General Staff.

54Bassford, ‘Clausewitz in English’, Chapter 9

55Strachan, European Armies, p. 106

56

B.H. Reid, Studies in British Military Thoughts: Debates with Fuller and Liddell Hart (Omaha: University of

Nebraska Press, 1998), p. 4 57The campaign of raping and pillaging was also undertaken by other nations, although most enthusiastic were

the French.

27

South Africa were not. Despite Britain’s history of successful campaigns in Africa, the sav-

agery of the native behaviour, combined with a racist mind-set held by many Britons, caused

many of these small engagements to be extremely bloody. The high body count and racist re-

actions amongst the British troops in turn prompted stronger resistance. Spiers writes “These

wars … were essentially limited in scale and scope, and the army’s record of success…hardly

prepared it for the challenges posed by the Second South-African War”.58

Kennedy observes that:

Here as elsewhere in the colonial realm arose an entirely new style of warfare, one

that stood in marked contrast to the gentlemanly codes of conduct in Europe… The

British possessed the technological means to wreak havoc on their indigenous oppo-

nents… When combined with a racialist dogma that dismissed Africans and other

non-white peoples as hardly human, the stage was set for thoughts of genocide.59

As was seen during the Second Boer War (1899-1902), racial and xenophobic ideas

reserved for black natives transformed to include any person that was an enemy of Britain

living in the area of operations. These opinions included the Boers, who as they had done in

their previous conflict, fought as guerrillas. From the first, it appeared that the British had

learnt nothing of how to conduct a counter-guerrilla campaign. Dixon writes:

Progress in adopting new military techniques was conspicuous by its absence. Right

up till the outbreak of the war, training manoeuvres were characterised by a disregard

of new weapons. The accent was on solid line formations, mechanical precision, rigid

dependence on order, firing strictly in volleys at the word of command.60

As before, the British began to suffer appalling losses. Despite the transition from red

coat to khaki, advanced artillery, and the infrequently used machine gun, the British had not

changed their strategy from the previous South African engagement. Henderson wrote:

58Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, p. 204

59Dane Kennedy, Britain and Empire 1880-1945, (London: Pearson Education, 2002), p. 14

60Norman Dixon, On The Psychology Of Military Incompetence, (London: Pimlico, 1994), p. 53

28

When the preponderant masses suffer enormous losses; when they feel, as they will

feel, the other less costly means of achieving the same end might have been adopted,

what will become of their morale?61

The incompetence of the senior officers did not help matters. General Buller, a pro-

tégé of Wolseley, was the first commander of British forces in South Africa.62 Although he

was a competent staff officer, his inability to carry out strategies led to the prolonging of the

war. Owing to the success of Kitchener’s stratagem in the Sudan as well as the new found

popularity of the German School, the original plan had been a direct strike at the two admin-

istrative centres of the Boers in Natal and the Orange Free State. Dixon writes that:

Instead, distracted by the sieges of Ladysmith and Kimberley, he [Buller] split his

army into three unequal parts, for the simultaneous relief of these beleaguered towns

and the capture of the Stormberg Junction.63

In what became known as Black Week, all three forces were defeated in five days dur-

ing mid-December 1899. While the British generals either passed the blame onto the Boers

their own subordinates, or belatedly declared a victory when the Boers withdrew, the British

public were soon made aware that the British army had been humiliated. W.T. Stead, a noted

pro-Boer journalist, claimed that the war was being fought on behalf of Jewish diamond mer-

chants, stating: “Jewish financiers are serpents with no bowels of compassion [sic]”64 while

an Australian war correspondent reported that “The enemy swept our front with such fire that

it became impossible for us to advance another yard. So we patiently waited for a change, all

the while we were losing men”.65 These reports either praised the Boers ideology or reported

on grievous commonwealth losses.

By refusing to follow the original plan, Buller allowed his forces to be defeated in

pointless engagements. The battles at Spion Kop further demonstrated that uncoordinated at-

tacks across open ground against troops who had both cover and concealment were doomed

to fail. No thoughts of flanking entered the minds of the senior staff. The continued use and

61Michael Howard, Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914, in Makers of Modern Strategy.

From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Michael Howard et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.

516 62Mallinson A, The Making Of The British Army, p. 353 63Dixon, The Psychology Of Military Incompetence, p.56 64W.T. Stead, “The Trail of the Financial Serpent: Full Report of the Speech in the House of Commons by John

Burns, MP,” Stop The War Committee Pamphlet, The Daily Paper, May 20, 1900) 65Captain O’Farrell, “At Hartebeestfontein: Victorian Losses,” The Argus, April 29, 1901, p. 5

http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/10546773

29

failure of the obsolete Enlightenment strategies, used in favour of the more decisive German

method, was met with glee in Berlin. Count von Bülow stated:

The vast majority of German military experts believe that the South African War will

end with a complete defeat of the English… Nobody here believes that the English

will ever reach Pretoria.66

While von Bülow was wrong about the British defeat, he could not have foreseen the

methods used by the British to force the Boers to surrender. The British set up small self-con-

tained forts named “block houses” throughout the country all linked by barbed wire, limiting

effective movement by the Boers. The British also interned thousands of civilians who were

family members of Boer commandos, where a lack of supplies led almost 28,000 civilians to

die of malnourishment.67 Ben Viljoen lamented:

The British had constructed so formidable a network of barbed wire, and their block-

houses were so close together and strongly garrisoned, that hitherto our attempts [to

conduct successful military operations] had been abortive….68

The use of concentration camps removed any sympathy for the British and prompted

condemnation from the international community. The War Office and the British Public were

also concerned by the manner in which the war was fought. While Kitchener’s tactics were

effective, the deaths of thousands of women and children left a bad taste in the mouth of

those in Whitehall. W.T Stead reported:

The massacre of … children proceeds with unabated rapidity. The death-rate of these

slaughter-camps has scared even Mr. Chamberlain, who evidently feels uneasy at hav-

ing to answer before the House of Commons for having done to death 11,000 chil-

dren.69

Although Britain was able to claim victory after a year of brutality, there were a large number

of British politicians that gave little fanfare to the news. The appalling loses, bungling, and

66Mallinson, The Making Of The British Army, p. 353 67Ibid, p. 355 68General Ben Viljeon, My Reminisces of the Anglo-Boer War, (London: Hood, Douglas, & Howard, 1902), pp.

446-450 69W.T. Stead, Our Death Camps In South Africa, The Review of Reviews, vol. XXV, Jan 1902, p. 8

http://www.attackingthedevil.co.uk/reviews/death_camps.php

30

ruthless targeting of civilians prompted many to demand change. After thirty years of discus-

sion, serious strategic reform of the British army was to be attempted.

Too Hot to Hold! J.M Staniforth, Western Mail, 27 January 1900 in Bryant, Wars Of The Empire, p. 132

31

Conclusion “If nothing else works, a total pig-headed unwillingness to look facts in the face will see

us through”

1900-1914

Britain’s military establishment had once again been humbled. Such embarrassments could

not be allowed to continue. In 1904 a Royal Commission headed by Lord Esher investigated

the failings of the British military during the South African War and made some crucial rec-

ommendations. Owing to the strategic failings in the first Boer War, the first Sudan campaign,

and the Anglo-Boer War, Esher claimed that future wars would require prior planning and

could not be fought in an ad hoc manner. He recommended:

Strengthening the interdepartmental Committee of Imperial Defence with a permanent

secretariat, the creation of an Army Council, and the creation of the Inspector-General

of the Forces – replacing the Commander-in-Chief – as well as creating a General

Staff, headed by a Chief with a seat on the Army Council.70

By improving operational planning in London, fixed objectives of a clear strategic

value could be followed by senior commanders in the field. The Army Council also deter-

mined a policy of compromise between the military and parliament while the model of the

General Staff was replicated down through the army structure, stopping at brigade level.71

This would promote cohesion and stability amongst senior officers and allow for more inde-

pendent decision making. The arrival of Secretary of State for War R.B. Haldane into the

reformation was also of great importance as he first re-organised the structure of the British

Army – the amalgamation of various home forces to create the Territorial Army – as well as

creating the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) amidst fears that Germany would soon en-

gage in a continental war.72 Reforms were also undertaken at a lower level. As was experi-

enced in South Africa, frontal assaults had proven extremely costly. One military scholar con-

cluded that:

70Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, p. 205

71Mallinson, The Making Of The British Army, p. 358

72Chandler, History Of The British Army, p. 206

32

Defensive fire power had made the frontal bayonet assault hazardous, and therefore

stressed flank attacks, envelopment, and fire superiority. At the same time, the inten-

sity of modern war, plus a certain spirit of hesitancy in attack that the War Office

claimed to observe among junior officers in South Africa and on manoeuvres, led…

to a[n] emphasis on individuality, initiative, morale, character, and the necessity for

developing a resolutely offensive spirit. Subsequently, the results of the Russo-Japa-

nese war led the War Office to reject the first conclusions drawn from South Africa,

but to re-emphasize the second.73

This led the British army to believe that artillery bombardments followed by a large scale

bayonet assault was the key to winning offensives. Despite this strategy supposedly having

been proven in the Russo-Japanese war, foreign observers did not witness this strategy being

undertaken with modern technology, such as machine guns deployed en masse. Furthermore,

continental observers of both the Second Boer War and the British reforms were conflicted as

to what lessons could be learnt. Jeremy Black avers:

There was considerable disagreement over whether to consider it just another colonial

war – therefore… not relevant in Europe – or as a war between two opponents of

equal stock, and thus with lessons to teach… Many analysts correctly observed that

factors such as long range marksmanship of the Boers and the tenacious guerrilla war-

fare were not likely to be duplicated in clashes between mass armies on the conti-

nent… Nevertheless, the war had important implications for World War I. However,

due to their notorious unreliability at the time, machine guns did not dominate the

Boer War Battlefield.74

It is therefore unfair to say that the British army entered into the twentieth century

clinging to the memories of the past. On the contrary, the British army had had three decades

worth of build up toward strategic reform, with real change gradually occurring from the mid

1890’s, The British were also now aware of the importance of decisive battle, owing to the

huge casualties inflicted on the enemy when they had seized the opportunity presented to

them, and the huge casualties they had sustained when they had not. This promoted the idea

of the offensive amongst the British generals and while mass bayonet attacks had failed in

73T. H. E. Travers, The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought 1870-1915, Journal

of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jul., 1978), p. 537

74Jeremy Black, Warfare In The Western World 1882-1975, (Acumen: Chesham, 2002), p. 36

33

South Africa, the Japanese successes in 1904-05 convinced the British that such an aggres-

sive attack could work. The British were also highly conscious of effects of moral forces on

the battlefield.

Despite having learnt these lessons, the British Army had no experience with the

modern machine gun, nor was it familiar with the concept of fighting an enemy that was its

technological and strategic equal. Although the British had been engaged in multiple wars

from the latter half of the nineteenth century, they were all colonial engagements and gave no

indication of what European warfare would be like. The British army’s experience at colonial

warfare, its hyper-aggressiveness, and belief that a decisive battle could turn the tide of the

war ignored the technological prowess of the machine gun and indirect artillery fire. This

was for the simple reason that the British Army observers had limited experience with ma-

chine guns. Those used in South Africa were used sparingly and often malfunctioned as well

as observers never seeing machine guns deployed en masse against a European enemy; there-

fore not realising how truly effective they could be. It was this tragic mistranslation of strat-

egy that ultimately led to the slaughter of World War I.

34

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