december 7, 1941 © nicholas noppinger 5/6/14. pearl harbor the attack on december 7 th, 1941 was...

December 7, 1941 Nicholas Noppinger 5/6/14

Pearl Harbor The attack on December 7 th, 1941 was not done in isolation, but was the culmination of years of declining relations between the United States and Japan. The reason for the attack and ultimate war was which nation would dominate commerce in East Asia. Commerce and Christianity-White Mans burden- Whaling

Early contacts In 1791, two American ships commanded by the American explorer John Kendrick stopped for 11 days on Kii Oshima island, south of the Kii Peninsula. He is the first American known to have visited Japan. He apparently planted an American flag and claimed the islands, although accounts of his visit in Japan are nonexistent. The USS Columbus of James Biddle, and an American crewman in Edo Bay in 1846. From 1797 to 1809, several American ships traded in Nagasaki under the Dutch flag, upon the request of the Dutch; they were unable to send their own ships due to their conflict against Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. n 1837, Charles W. King, an American businessman in Canton, saw an opportunity to open trade by trying to return to Japan three Japanese sailors (among them, Otokichi) that had been shipwrecked a few years before on the coast of Oregon. He went to the Uraga Channel with Morrison, an unarmed American merchant ship. The ship was fired upon several times, and it eventually had to sail back unsuccessfully. In 1846, Commander James Biddle, sent by the United States Government to open trade, anchored himself in Tokyo Bay with two ships, one of which was armed with seventy-two cannons. Regardless, his demands for a trade agreement remained unsuccessful. In 1848, Captain James Glynn sailed to Nagasaki, which lead to the first successful negotiation by an American with sakoku Japan. Upon his return to North America, Glynn recommended to the U.S. Congress that any negotiations to open up Japan should be backed up by a demonstration of force; this paved the way for the later expedition of Commodore Matthew Perry.

Tokugawa Japan Sakoku from mid 17 th century Ends when West wishes to open Japan to trade.

America expands outside the Continent The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1805

Japan(1852-1914) Begins a crash program of modernizing on the European model Looks at itself as equal to Europe Builds modern militaries. Wages aggressive war against Russia and China in order to acquire overseas territories Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895 Ends with Japanese victory. Russia, France and Germany do not allow Japan to occupy Port Arthur. Japan looks at this as a betrayal Japans forms an alliance with Great Britain 1902. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 end with Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan wins but is forced to give concessions thru US mediation.

World War 1 Japan seizes German possessions, Caroline, Marshall, and part of Marianas Islands, Chinese port of Tsingtao Australia prohibits Japanese from immigration US looks to increase the size and readiness of Pacific forces. US-Japan on a collision course Washington-London Naval treaties 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 Treaty 525,000, 525,000, 315,000

Japan 1931-1939 18 Sep31 Mukden Incident, followed by Invasion of Manchuria. Puppet State of Manchukuo established. Shanghai Incident, Jan 32 to Mar 32, City demilitarized Marco Polo Bridge Incident 7 Jul37 to 9 Jul 37, (Boxer Agreement)

Second Sino-Japanese War Beginning of World War 2? 7 Jul37 to 9 Sep45 Rape of Nanking Dec37 to Mar38 Panay Incident 12 Dec37 3 Killed 48 wounded

Second Sino-Japanese War

The Pacific 31-39

Battle of Khalkhin-Gol Arguably the most decisive battle of World War Two! 5/11/39 to 9/16/39 Japan is badly beaten decides not to take on the Red Army Georgi Zhukov

Formation of Modern Japan 1 st Sino-Japanese war 1894 Russo-Japanese War 1904- 05 Japan fights as ally in 1 st World War Rise of the Army 1930s Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere

The Road to Pearl Harbor 1940 to July 1941 US freezes Japanese assets, closes the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping, embargoes scrap metal, and all oil exports to Japan July 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy High Command informs government that is its oil stockpiles will last 2 years Nov 5, 1941 Hirohito approves war plan, including Operation Z, for Dec start if negotiations fail

Taranto

Planning Operation Z Jan 1941 General outline of plan prepared by Yamamoto Onishi and Genda work out detailed plan Operation Z by April 1941 June-Aug 41 pilots train at Kagoshima City, modifications to Type 91 torpedo completed

Pulp fiction predicts attack Throughout the 1930s there are many versions of a Pearl Harbor Attack in Japanese pulp fiction. As early as the 1931 the US Navy considered an air attack a possibility, however, extremely remote and unlikely. US Pacific Fleet moved to Pearl Harbor May 9, 1940, after fleet exercises, as a diplomatic posture towards Japan. Decision opposed by fleet commander James O Richardson. Hurt FDRs feelings.

US military responses 1940-1941 Both the Army and Navy intel and ops considered an air attack on Pearl harbor unlikely, because the Pacific Fleet was incapable of doing much to hinder anticipated Japanese movements. Largely because the support ships, Oilers, etc, were being sent to the Atlantic. Well publicized in newspapers. However, Jan 24, 1941 in a communiqu from Navy Sec Frank Knox (authored Richmond Kelly Turner at Navy WarPlans)sent to CinCPAC that an aerial attack on Pearl a possibility, and that steps should be taken to remedy deficiencies. However, the remedy (ies) were well beyond the capability of both the Army and Naval forces in Hawaii at that time. In response US drops War Plan Orange in favor of Rainbow 5 which included accepting the lose of the Philippines.

US military responses 1940-1941 However, chromic shortages because of the material aid to Great Britain and Russia, material sent to the Philippines, in contradiction to existing war plan, and material kept stateside prevented minimum recommendations from being implemented in Hawaii. The revised memo in conjunction with the War Dept. emphasized possible sabotage. (160,000 Japanese 38,000 foreign born) Sudetenland.

New Commanders Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short March 1, 1941 Vice Adm. Husband Kimmel- Feb 1941

Short and Kimmel accomplishments Steps taken by Short Restored harmony between air corps and ground forces Established radar air defense system (new and untried in US hands)- fights with NPS Steps taken by Kimmel Viewed air attack as a possibility Under orders from Washington prepared force for offensive operations

Washington doublespeak Marshall to Short- Mar 5- deferred to NPS on setup of radar sites on Park service grounds. Let it be known to overseas commanders that they wished Japan to make first overt move and stressed that no action was to be taken to provoke hostile action Navy sent official intelligence estimates that stressed that no air delivered torpedo could be used at Pearl Denied Magic intercept machines to both commanders, in spite of one being sent to MacArthur Washington adopted a policy of crewing newly constructed ships by taking &2 of their crews from the Pacific.

Magic and counterintelligence Read Japanese diplomatic (not military codes) Army and Navy dominated Japanese politics and did not always provide Diplomatic corps with information Magic intercepts could be days and weeks behind because of lack of interpreters FBI, Naval and Army intelligence ignored Honolulu consulate personnel

Martin-Bellinger Report Composed by Hawaiian Air Corp Co MG Edawrd Martin and R Adm Patrick NL Bellinger head of Air Patrol Japan may attack before declaration of war. Will attack on a Saturday or Sunday or holiday at dawn. The effectiveness of defense depended entirely upon advance knowledge of an attack. There were not enough planes or crews to establish a permanent air patrol and that an effective air seach was entirely dependent upon advanced warning from resources outside the Dept of Hawaii.

Diplomatic front Japan was pressed for time. United States was doing everything to could to delay. Neither Britain of the United States were prepared for war in the Pacific because of priority to the Atlantic theater. US expected an attack, but all indicators focused on theaters other than Hawaii.

Short and Kimmel Short never appreciated airpower. In fact spent much time training his airmen as infantry, etc. Short bunched his aircraft. Short failed to appreciate that his mission included protecting Pacific Fleet and not just the islands. Both short and Kimmel repeatedly and emphatically informed Washington that the forces at their disposal was inadequate Kimmel informed FDR that the Pacific Fleet was being stripped of men and material at a rate that was jeopardizing the command. Also chastised President for National policy of using the military more for diplomatic measures than for national defense. June 9, 1941

Major Ship Types BB- Battleship 20,000 plus tons, 11 inch or better BC-Battlecruiser- 20,000 plus tons, 11 inch or better CA- Heavy Cruiser 8000-20,000 tones 8 inch guns CL-Light Cruiser 6000-12,000 6 inch guns DD- Destroyer 3000-7000 tons- 5 inch guns CV- aircraft carrier 40- 100 planes CVL-light carrier- 20-50 planes CVE-escort carrier less than 25 planes

The Rise of the Air Power Enthusiasts July 21, 1921

The Birth of the Aircraft Carrier

Was Billy Mitchell correct?

Taranto

Midget Subs Kazuro Sakamaki

Nakajima B5N Kate

Aichi D3A1 Val

Mitsubishi A6M2 Type 0 Model 21 Zero

Japanese War games Misconception of what military wargames hope to achieve No need to practice operations that would be canceled. For example when the wargames cited by Prange showed 2 carriers sunk, the umpires noted what effective measures needed to be taken to make sure of their survivial and allowed them back in the game. Admiral Ugaki notes state emphatically that the operation would have been called off by the Naval General Staff if the risk was deemed to great. The summary of all the war games expected a 50% loss of aircrew and aircraft, a contingency deemed acceptable.

Pre-War/ Early War Japanese Naval strategy Fight battleship battle in near Japanese waters in conditions favorable to Japanese

Japanese Carrier tactics for Pearl Harbor Lack of combined arms attacks Too many AP level bombers with a low probability of inflicting damage (Yamamoto/Fuchida) to torpedo A great priority given to sinking battleships vs cruisers and other types of ships No consideration or ordnance for attacking shipyard facilities or oil fields The early plan called for a 2 wave attack and in spite of reports to the contrary (Fuchida) a 3 rd attack was never seriously considered. Adding the midget subs to the plan could have seriously compromised operational security for little gain (Yamamoto).

Last Events November 26: The Japanese Hawaii task force leaves the Kurile Islands, bound for Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Later in the day, in a note to the Japanese ambassador, U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull demands the complete withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China. Japanese prime minister Hideki Tojo will refer to this as "an ultimatum. FDR notifies Philippines of imminent attack

Last Events Stark and Marshall issue joint statement asking for additional time through diplomatic means.. FDR passed news of expected failure in diplomatic activity to British.

Last Events November 27: War Warning issued to Army and Navy commands Negotiations with Japan appear to terminated for all practical purposes Further action by Japan unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoidedthe United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. However, this should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Reconnaissance and other measures should be carried out with caution so as not to alarm the civilian populace or disclose intent. However, Marshall was aware of Hawaiis inability to conduct proper reconnaissance only 8 operational aircraft existed. Hawaiian Army forces placed on Alert 2 (air attack) through November30.

Last Events November 28: War Department sends Short message warning of possible sabotage to aircraft and asks for what concrete steps he has taken to ensure safety of air forces. Navy ordered to ferry aircraft to Wake and Midway weakening Army and Navy fighter aircraft in Hawaii by 20%. November 30: Tojos inflammatory speech, however, Japan advises ambassadors to continue.

Last Events December 1: Japanese Navy changes ships call signs. Army (Miles Memorandum) and Navy issue intel estimates stressing importance of Atlantic, while stressing Japans limited ability to project is forces. Expected Japanese offensive targets: Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Burma, Philippines, Dutch East Indies. Concluded that Japan was unable to project its forces into the Eastern Pacific for extended periods. No mention of Pearl Harbor. Kimmel and Short given summary. Japan alerts Berlin of impending war Japan orders embassys worldwide (US and Allied) to destroy cipher machines.***** FDR assures Britian of support in event of Japanese attack in the Pacific. Adm Hart ordered to locate and shadow convoys. Japanese government issues order for war.

Last Events December 2: Hirohito briefed on War Plans. Kimmel ask PacFlt Intel for assessment-Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldnt know it? Japan orders all embassies and consulates in US to burn secret documents. Climb Mt. Niitaka message sent to Adm Nagumo

Last Events December 3: War Departments orders military attaches to destroy secret codes, equipment and messages in embassies and consulates in Japan and Germany. Japans Wind Codes message Navy orders outposts to destroy secret documents. US Army in Hawaii goes to Alert 1 (Sabotage) thru December 5

Last Events December 5: Navy Dept assesses the Japanse attack on Southeast Asia imminent December 6: US recon picks up Japanses task force in South China Sea. Army-Navy signals pick up the 1 st part of the 14 part message This is considered by Administration that war with Japan was imminent. The message to destroy codes interpreted by US intel. FDR sends direct note to the Emperor.

Last events All on Washingtom time December 7 th : 8:45 Army Navy Signals decipher 14 th part 10:20 Adm Stark briefed on contents 11:25 Gen Marshall briefed on contents

The 14 th Part WAS NOT A DECLARATION OF WAR Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interest by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese- American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost. The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

Japanese Dramatis Personae

1 st Wave he first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu, commanded by Captain Mitsuo Fuchida. It included: [nb 9]CaptainMitsuo Fuchida [nb 9] 1st Group (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers) [58] [58] 50 Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor piercing bombs, organized in four sectionsNakajima B5Narmor piercing bombs 40 B5N bombers armed with Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sectionsType 91 torpedoes 2nd Group (targets: Ford Island and Wheeler Field)Ford IslandWheeler Field 54 Aichi D3A Val dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombsAichi D3Ageneral purpose bombs 3rd Group (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barbers Point, Kaneohe) 45 Mitsubishi A6M Zeke fighters for air control and strafinMitsubishi A6Mstrafin

2 nd Wave The second wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki. [57] Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties. [36] This wave and its targets comprised: [57]Lieutenant-CommanderShigekazu Shimazaki [57] [36] [57] 1st Group 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg) general purpose bombs [58] [58] 27 B5Ns aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point 27 B5Ns hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field 2nd Group (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers) 81 D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs, in four sections 3rd Group (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barbers Point, Kaneohe) 36 A6Ms for defense and strafing

Battle Damage Assessment Japan claims 4 BBs, 2 CAs, 1 tanker and 1 type uncertain sunk 2 BBs, 2 CLs and 2 DDs heavy damage 2 BBs 4 CLs light damage Usual for WW2 aircrews to assess damage by a factor of three to actual. Actual 2 BBs total loss, 2 aux (Utah, Oglala) sunk, 4 BBs heavy damage, 2 BBs lightly damaged. 2 CLs heavy damage, 2 CLs minor damage. 2 DDs scrapped, 2 DDs minor damage.

Battle Damage Assessment Japanese claimed 90$ effectiveness of torpedo attacks- actual 48% Claimed for AP bomb 26%- actual 20% GP bomb claimed 63%-actual 19% In Mid-1942 the Japanese Naval Staff reassessed the Pearl Harbor claims and rebuked Mitsuo Fuchida for overinflated claims.

Myths and controversy FDR knew of the date and time of the attack on Pearl Harbor in order to get us into the war with Germany The preponderance evidence suggests that while an attack was expected its date and time was impossible to determine. An attack on Pearl would inflate anti-German opinion FDR would risk the fleet when the BB-CV argument was still unsure

The 3 rd Wave Myth Nagumo was unsure of location of American carriers Fuchida and Genda argued with Nagumo for an additional attack. Denied by Genda, not mentioned by Fuchida in March 46 interview to Naval Intelligence. Nobody thought about it. Naval officer attached to the US Strategic Bombing Survey in a 147 report stated that Japanese ordance on the Strike Force were inadequate to seriously hinder shipyard operations or damage fuel facilities. The estimates that if a 3 rd attack took place stated that the base would remain operational as the Navy had 4 repair ships and the fact that shipyard facilities are durable. Worst case scenario- Pearl Harbor at 45% efficiency for one month. Attacking the shipyard effectively could only be done by consistent attack by land based air assets.

3 rd Wave Myth 563,000 gallons of fuel and diesel. Strategic Bombing Survey- (Ploesti Raids included) stated that for aircraft weapons only those greater than.50 cal could cause minimal damage to the oil tanks. HE explosive and incendiary bombs needed over long term The Germans were able to recover 87% of the leaked oil. Red Hill Underground Storage facility Tankers able to bring 60,000 gallons per month. 11 tankers existed. The 7.7 and low velocity 20mm on Japanese aircraft unable to damage tanks. The 250 in gp bomb insufficient to damage oil tanks.

december 7, 1941 © nicholas noppinger 5/6/14. pearl harbor the attack on december 7 th, 1941 was...

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