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Decentralisation and Subnational Autonomy – Evidence from East and South Asia

Eunkyung Shin, University of York

PSA (Political Studies Association) Annual International Conference

21 – 23 March 2016, HiltonBrighton Metropole, Brighton, UK

Abstract

This paper aims to examine current literature on decentralisation and subnational

autonomy in East and South Asia. This systemic literature review illuminates driving forces,

actors, institutions, types, degree, and consequences of decentralisation in these nine

selected East and South Asian countries.

The main driving forces of decentralisation are political motivation (i.e. democratisation)

and managerial motivation (i.e. neoliberalism). While decentralisation China was triggered

by neoliberalism, decentralisation in Bangladesh, Taiwan and Philippines was based on

democratisation movement. In India, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, both political and

managerial motivations were promoted decentralisation reforms. Ethnic and religious

conflicts also encouraged decentralisation reforms in Indonesia and Philippines.

Actors are national, intermediate, and local governments, ruling and opposition parties, civil

society, and international organisations and donors. Two types of institutions are found in

the nine selected countries: political institutions (i.e. executive-legislative relations) and

historically and socially embedded institutions (i.e. Developmental State legacy, colonial

legacy, authoritarian regime legacy, centralised Kingdom legacy).

Then, the processes of decentralisation are investigated in terms of the types, the degree,

and the sequence of decentralisation by applying theories of Rondinelli (1983), Wolman

(1990), Mahoney and Thelen (2010), and Falleti (2010).

Lastly, the relation between decentralisation and subnational autonomy is investigated by

focusing on the interactions among actors, interests, ideas, and institutions.

In conclusion, this systemic literature review shows that there are relatively lesser research

about the relation between decentralisation and intergovernmental balance of power. In

particular, papers regarding Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan give lesser considerations on

interactions between agency, institutions, structure, and ideas. Therefore, comparative

study about decentralisation in these three countries, cross-national and cross-sectoral, is a

significant work to fill this research gap.

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Introduction

Decentralisation is generally understood as transfers of (political, administrative, and fiscal)

authorities, resources, and responsibilities from a higher level government to lower levels of

governments. Political decentralisation refers to transfers of political authority and decision-

making discretion from the central to the subnational government. Administrative

decentralisation is about the degree of managerial autonomy in terms of public service

planning, administration and provisions. Fiscal decentralisation is regarding the subnational

autonomy to collect and spend fiscal resources.

The matter whether decentralisation increases local autonomy or not is an important check

point in order to understand decentralisation and its outcomes. For example, if local

autonomy did not change after decentralisation, the diverse outcomes of decentralisation

on enhancing or deteriorating efficiency and equity may not be attributed to the

decentralised feature of governance. In the same vein, political accountability of local

politicians may not increase even after the introduction of local elections, political

decentralisation, if there was no substantial administrative and fiscal authority transfers

from the national government.

Therefore, this systemic literature review aims to examine whether decentralisation

increases subnational autonomy and trace the interactions among actors, interests, ideas,

and institution in the processes of decentralisation in East and South Asia.

Methods

Selection of Data Sources

Considering the main issues of interests are decentralisation, local autonomy, and social

policy, relevant electronic databases linked to social policy and social work and politics were

identified. Five electronic databases were selected in the electronic databases for social

policy and social work including those for social policy, management, public policy, public

administration and social care, but excluding those related to psychology, criminology,

traumatic stress and statistics. Similarly, five electronic databases were selected for politics

including political science but excluding political philosophy, statistics and Yearbooks. There

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were some duplication across social policy and politics giving a total of six databases as

detailed in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The result of electronic database selection

Total (6) ProQuest Web of Science

EBSCO Scopus Social Policy Practice (Ovidsp)

Sage Journals Online

Social Policy and Social Work (5)

o o o o o

Politics (5) o o o o o

Search Mechanism

Categories of key search terms were identified ‘decentralisation’ and ‘subnational

government’ and ‘local autonomy’ reflecting the focus on the relationship between

decentralisation and local autonomy. When the electronic databases were screened,

different expressions with same meaning were used in order to embrace a variety of

terminology. If those key search terms were in title, abstract and contents of a paper, it was

identified as a potentially relevant paper through following a screening procedure (See

Figure 2).

Figure 2. Concepts and key search terms

Concepts Key search terms used when screening

Decentralisation decentralisation or decentralization or devolution or deconcentration or

delegation

and

Subnational government

local government or regional government or provincial government or municipal government or subnational government

and

Local autonomy autonomy or authority or intergovernmental power or balance of power

Study Selection

Inclusion criteria for a first screening were decided based upon period, language, and

document type. Potentially relevant papers were to be peer-reviewed journal articles

containing empirical evidence and written in English. Inclusion criteria for the first screening

are shown in Figure 3.

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Figure 3. Inclusion criteria

Criteria Contents

Period From 2000.1.1 – 2014.3.25

Language English

Document type Published journal article

Study type Empirical study

Originality Primary and secondary data

Then, 928 potentially relevant papers were identified by screening the selected six

electronic databases. These potentially relevant papers come from different sources: 333

from ProQuest, 145 from Web of Science, 161 from EBSCO, 51 Scopus, 57 from Social Policy

Practice and 181 from Sage Journals Online. A total of 786 potentially relevant papers

remained after deleting duplicated papers (n=142).

Then, 250 from the total of 786 potentially relevant papers remained after 536 papers were

excluded based on title and abstract review. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for a second

screening stage are shown in the following Figure 4.

Figure 4. Defined as inclusion/exclusion criteria

Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria

Policy area Social policy (education, health care, social care, income support, policy/services for older, disabled people and children and family)

Poverty

Energy, climate change, environmental policy

Regulation, economic policy, urban development, local enterprise partnership

Information technology, e-government

Forest management, natural resource management

Cultural policy, film and media

Foreign policy

Human rights

Decentralisation Decentralisation from public to public (i.e. from central government to local government or intermediate government)

Privatisation (decentralisation from public to private)

arms-length and agencification

Capacity building - Participation, peoples’ empowerment

National and local relations

- Nationalism, localism, regionalism

(International) municipal cooperation

Other - Ethnicity

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186 relevant papers remained after excluding 64 papers on the basis of full text review

including a systemic review paper. Two papers were added based upon the author’s

previous reading. This gave a total 188 studies for a final systematic literature review.

This number was further reduced by a geographical focus on Asia and South-East Asia, in

order to shed light on the decentralisation in newly democratised and developing countries,

to give forty journal articles (Figure 5, flow chart).

Figure 5. Flow chart of search strategy process

Potentially relevant papers identified from electronic search;

333 from ProQuest 145 from Web of Science

161 from EBSCO 51 Scopus

57 from Social Policy Practice 181 from Sage Journals Online

(n = 928)

Duplicated papers exclusion

(n = 142)

Studies reviewed in detail (n = 786)

Papers excluded on the basis of title review and abstract review

(n = 536)

Studies reviewed in final analysis (n = 250)

Papers excluded on the basis of full text review

(n = 64)

Studies included in final analysis (n = 186)

A paper included on the basis of author’s reading

(n = 2)

Studies included in systematic literature review (n = 188)

Papers excluded on the basis of geographical location

(Other location except East and South Asia)

(n = 148)

Studies included in systematic literature review (Geographical location: East and South Asia)

(n = 40)

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Description of Included Studies

According to above procedures, forty journal articles were selected to conduct systemic

literature review. This section presents a general overview of the selected forty papers in

terms of periodical dispersion, geographical locations, and theoretical and methodological

approaches. First, the selected papers’ periodical dispersion was relatively even from 2000

to 2013 (Table 1).

Table 1. Periodical dispersion of selected papers

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

No. 2 4 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 3 6 2 3 7

Second, the selected papers cover total nine countries of five in South Asia and four in East

Asia. Twelve papers investigated decentralisation in China; majority of the papers about the

change of central-local relations under asymmetric decentralisation, such as fully

decentralised administrative and fiscal authorities and centralised political powers. Papers

on decentralisation in India, Indonesia, and Philippines were found six, respectively.

Decentralisation of Japan and South Korea were discussed in three papers, respectively.

Papers about Thailand and Taiwan were two, respectively and a paper about Bangladesh

was found.

In terms of research design, four papers were cross national comparative study.

Sudhiponpracha (2013) conducted a historical comparative study about the central-local

relation in Thailand and Philippines. Chang (2010) compared the central-periphery relations

in South Korea and Russia. Bossert and Beauvais (2002) analysed decentralisation of health

care in Ghana, Zambia, Uganda, and Philippines, and explain the diverse consequences of

decentralisation by comparing local decision space. Heller (2001) conducted a comparative

study about three regional governments in South Africa, India, and Brazil. Qualitative

methods were mainly adopted in the four comparative studies.

While 28 papers were a case study for a single country by using national level as an

analytical unit, the remaining twelve papers discussed decentralisation in a region or several

regions in one country. In the case of India, five out of six selected papers were inter-

regional comparative studies (Dyer, 2005; Gaiha and Kulkarni, 2002; Heller, 2001; Imai and

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Sato, 2012; Venugopan and Yilmaz, 2009). Three studies about Indonesia also executed in-

depth case studies or a comparative study (Firman, 2008; Hunter, 2004; Kristiansen et al.,

2006). There were three studies about decentralisation and the consequences in regional

level (Skinner et al., 2003; Wang et al, 2012; Yep, 2010). There was one in-depth case study

about Muslim Mindano Island in Philippines (Jimenez, 2009).

Third, six papers approached the issue of decentralisation with theoretical frameworks

(Bossert and Beauvais, 2002; Haque, 2010; Heller, 2001; Kuo and So, 2013; Sudihiponpracha,

2013; Tsai et al., 2012, Wang et al., 2012). Bossert and Beauvais (2002) used ‘decision space

analytical framework’ based on a principle agent approach in order to evaluate

decentralisation. Haque (2010: 1532) stressed to take attention on ‘county’s contextual

determinants, such as the past legacies of centralisation, configuration of local power

structure, and bureaucratic eliticism, in decentralisation analyses. Heller (2001: 135-136)

compared diverse two approaches toward decentralisation, the technocratic and the

anarcho-communitarians views, and illustrated the latter approach has more persuasive to

explicate diverse consequences of decentralisation reforms in Kerala (India), South Africa,

and Porto Alegre (Brazil). Kuo and So (2013) and Wang et al. (2013) focused on fiscal

decentralisation by introducing Fiscal Federalism (Oates, 1972), Leviathan Hypothesis

(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), and Market Preserving Decentralisation (Weingast, 2009).

Sudihipongpracha (2013) challenged Riker’s Theory of Federalism (1964) and Falleti’s

Sequential Theory of Decentralisation (2010). Tsai et al. (2012) applied Down’s Median

Voters Theorem to their analysis.

Theoretical frameworks used in the six papers can be summarised into two types: rational

choice and historical institutional approaches. The theories based on the rational choice

approach which emphasize agency and externally given incentive designs are Decision Space

Analytical Frame Work (Principle-agent theory), Technocratic View, Fiscal Federalism,

Leviathan Hypothesis, Market Preserving Decentralisation, Riker’s Theory of Federalism, and

Down’s Median Voters Theorem. Contrary to the rational choice stream, the anarcho-

communitarians view and Falleti’s Sequential Theory of Decentralisation focus on the

interaction between actors and social structures, such as historical and institutional legacies,

in the process of decentralisation.

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Selected literature about decentralisation in East and South Asia mainly analysed

decentralisation reforms in the given countries in descriptive methods. Only six papers were

adopted concrete theoretical framework in order to examine what really happen in the

process of decentralisation. Furthermore, whereas most of the theories used in the six

papers were based on the rational choice approaches, only two adopted historical

institutional approaches (Heller, 2001; Sudihipongpracha, 2013). There was no article

applied ideological approaches explicitly.

Fourth, there was a proclivity toward qualitative methods. Whereas most of the papers are

a case study for a single country, a few papers discussed decentralisation in a region or

several regions in one country. Furthermore, majority of papers contains the processes and

contents of decentralisation reforms. The fact gave methodological dominance to a

qualitative document analysis. In fact, 29 papers used qualitative approaches including

document analysis, one-to-one interview and focus group interview. However, several

quantitative approaches were also found papers about the consequence of fiscal

decentralisation in terms of equity and efficiency. Nine papers adopted quantitative

approaches, such as descriptive statistical analysis, regressions and difference-in-differences

(DID), by using secondary data. The remaining two papers used mixed methods.

The detailed information about the selected papers is in Table 2.

Table 2. Detailed information of the selected papers

Area South Asia East Asia

Country Bangladesh India Indonesia Thailand Philippines China Japan South Korea

Taiwan

No. of Paper

1 6 6 2 6 12 3 3 2

Quanti 0 1 1 0 0 4 1 1 1

Quali 1 5 4 2 6 7 2 2 1

Mixed 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0

Compa-rative

0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0

Country 1 1 3 2 5 9 3 3 2

Regions 0 5 3 0 1 3 0 0 0

* Sum is more than forty due to comparative study on Thailand and Philippines.

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Findings of Systemic Literature Review

In this section, what have been studied in the selected forty papers are investigated in terms

of driving forces, main actors, institutions, processes, and consequences of decentralisation.

The driving forces of decentralisation in East and South Asia

The decentralisation reforms which took place during the last decades came from social and

political demands which generally implemented political or managerial approaches. The

contents of social and political demands triggering decentralisation reforms are highly

related to what follows decentralisation reforms. For example, when social and political

demands emerged from the sceptics of “big government” in terms of enhancing economic

development and public service efficiency, the decentralisation reforms that followed were

highly related to administrative and fiscal reforms in order to achieve managerial efficiency

and economic competitiveness. However, if the social political demands were triggered by

corruption under centralised authoritarian government and there was a lack of democracy

and peoples’ participation, political decentralisation, such as introducing elections of Chief

Local Executive officers and Local Council, will be the subsequent decentralisation reforms.

Within the forty articles, the argument about the relations between motivations and

decentralisation reforms is well corroborated by the nine countries represented. In the

managerial perspective, neo-liberalism reinforced by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and

New Public Management reforms are the main drivers of decentralisation in six countries

(i.e. China (including Hong Kong), India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand)

(Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Chang, 2010; Chien, 2010; Dyer, 2005; Jacobs, 2003;

Kang, 2006; Kim, 2012; Kuo and So, 2013; Lewis, 2005; Sudhipongpracha, 2013; Tandan,

2001). In Philippine, the Local Government Code (1991) provided subnational government

substantial administrative and fiscal authorities concerning public service provision. In the

literature of two countries (i.e. Bangladesh and Taiwan), there was no comment about

managerial motivations for decentralisation.

From the political perspective, democratisation was the strongest motivation of

decentralisation reforms. Seven out of nine countries (i.e. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,

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South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Philippines) implemented decentralisation reforms in

order to introduce or deepen democracy during last decades. In particular, pro-democratic

movements following strongly centralised autocratic governments led five countries (i.e.

Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Philippines) into democratic decentralisation

reform. Popular mobilisation for further democratisation, for example, the People Power

Revolution of 1986 in Philippines finished the Marcos dictatorship and the student-led

democratisation protests of the 1980s in South Korea, ended the Military dictatorships,

respectively (Langran, 2011; Kwon, 2003).

Literature concerning two further countries (i.e. China and Japan) did not mention

democratic motivations of decentralisation reforms. In the case of China (including Hong

Kong), democratic decentralisation has not yet taken place. Jacobs (2003) describes Japan as

a decentralised developmental state instead of the commonly known centralised

developmental state by elucidating the key role of prefectural government in economic and

regional development planning. Enhancing economic competitiveness is the main purpose

of decentralisation reforms implemented in Japan from the 1990s according to other

sources (Furukawa, 2003).

Another political motivation is to embrace ethnic and religious conflicts by granting local

autonomy to regional and local government in both Indonesia and Philippines. In other

words, they implemented political decentralisation reforms in order to prevent the

disintegration of the national state (Jimenez, 2009; Silver, 2001). Figure 6 summarises

motivations of decentralisation in the selected nine countries.

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Figure 6. Political and Managerial motivations of decentralisation

Political motivations Managerial motivations

Bangladesh Launch, abolish and reform local self-governance system according to ruling party’s partisan interests (in 1976, 1982, 1991, 2001)

Not mentioned

China Not mentioned Economic development

Entrepreneurial innovation for it

(Hong Kong) Not mentioned New Public Management; globalisation

India Democratisation

Reflection of local needs

Economic restructuring

Neo-liberalism; globalisation

Indonesia Democratisation

Antipathy to centralised authoritarianism

Prevention of the disintegration of the state

Asian Financial Crisis in 1997

Japan Not mentioned Economic and spatial development planning

South Korea Antipathy to centralised autocratic government

Democratisation

Asian Financial Crisis in 1997

Neo-liberalism; globalisation

Taiwan Antipathy to centralised autocratic government

Democratisation

Not mentioned

Thailand Antipathy to centralised autocratic government

Democratisation

Neo-liberalism; globalisation

Philippines Antipathy to centralised authoritarianism

Democratisation; the People Power Revolution

National advancement

Prevention of the disintegration of the state (in the case of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao)

Externally, international institutions and donor governments

National development

Market-oriented and community-oriented public service provisions

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The actors of decentralisation

This section illustrates actors and their interactions in the process of decentralisation

reforms. In the selected literature, there were four actors, including government (national,

intermediate and local), political party (ruling and opposition), civil society and international

institutions, who played a critical role in decentralisation reforms.

First, it is useful to provide an accurate definition of each actor. In this section, government

means an organisation which functions as an executive branch. Considering the roles of

national and local bureaucratic systems which are supposed to implement decentralisation

reforms, government is an actor who operates as an intermediate variable to explicate the

process and outcomes of decentralisation. Political party refers to ruling and opposition

party which together constitute a country’s legislative body. In many cases, a political party

is another active player in decentralisation reforms because these reforms are started and

implemented in the form of Constitutions and Law. Civil society is the origin of social and

political movements from below. In the process of decentralisation reforms, the role of civil

society is important in two respects: decentralisation reforms were often triggered by the

democratisation demands from civil society, and the degree of civil society’s participation is

one of the critical variables to explain the depth and length of decentralisation reforms and

the diverse consequences. Lastly, international organisations and donors exert their (explicit

and implicit) influences on the beginning and process of decentralisation reforms.

Second, the explanations about each actor’s preference towards decentralisation in the

process of decentralisation are presented. In particular, actors’ positive and negative

attitudes towards decentralisation are discussed based on the observed discrepancies

between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence reported by the selected literature.

According to extant literature about decentralisation, social and political actors form their

own preferences toward decentralisation based on their interests in the case of the post-

developmental state (Falleti, 2010). Generally, whereas national government and the ruling

party adopt reluctant attitudes toward active decentralisation reforms, subnational

governments and opposition party hold positive preferences. Falleti (2010) argues that

national actors’ preferences for decentralisation are the order of administrative, fiscal, and

political decentralisation while subnational actors’ preferences are the order of political,

fiscal, and administrative decentralisation. Of course, what sorts of authorities, resources

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and responsibilities are decentralised can affect actors’ preferences about decentralisation.

Subnational governments welcome decentralisation not because of an increase of their

responsibility but of their authority and resources. In the same vein, national government is

reluctant to decentralise authority and resources, however, favours decentralisation of

responsibilities. Civil society and International institutions espouse decentralisation reforms

based upon their ideas and preferences about democratisation and good governance.

Unlike established predictions, government and political party are not always clearly divided.

For example, China has less developed democratic political systems, both national

government and ruling party are de facto the same body and an opposition party do not

exist. To effectively manage the breadth and depth of decentralisation reforms by personnel

and fiscal resources management systems, the Chinese Central Government favoured

decentralisation as a national reform strategy in order to obtain economic development and

macroeconomic stability.

When it comes to countries which have separate executive and legislative bodies, six

national governments (i.e. India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Philippines)

responded more or less negatively against decentralisation reforms in implicit and explicit

ways. In these cases, national bureaucracies attempted to stall decentralisation reforms

which sometimes resulted in substantial planning and implementation deficits of

decentralisation reforms.

In the case of Bangladesh, the contents and degree of decentralisation reforms have been

influenced by who took office in the presidential and general elections. In other words,

decentralisation reforms have been used for promoting the ruling party’s partisan interests

in local governments rather than developing local self-governance (Panday, 2011).

Decentralisation in Indonesia presents an extraordinary case of decentralisation reforms.

The Indonesian national government, which was led by Habibie in the transition

government after Suharto's resignation, actively embraced decentralisation reforms

because of several reasons such as the transition government faced public discontent about

the centralised authoritarian regime, the Asian Fiscal Crisis in 1997, and extreme

secessionist movements (Jammenez, 2009; Langran, 2011; Sudhipongpracha, 2013).

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To summarize, empirical evidence provided from this systemic literature review reaffirms

the established argument that national government is inclined to oppose and local

governments to support decentralisation reforms in six countries (i.e. India, Japan, South

Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Philippines). National government favours decentralisation

reforms only under extraordinary contexts, such as one party politics (i.e. China), the

transitional government (i.e. Indonesia), and huge discretion on decentralisation was given

to national government (i.e. Bangladesh).

In analysis of political parties, the ruling party in six out of nine countries had positive

attitudes towards decentralisation reforms. As aforementioned, the ruling party of China

supported decentralisation reforms under the strong personnel and fiscal restraints. The

ruling parties of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines favoured

decentralisation in political reasons such as making political bedrocks in regional

governments (i.e. Bangladesh) and accepting democratisation demands from below (i.e.

India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines). In the case of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan

which are going through post-developmental transitions, the ruling party was reluctant to

introduce, and often procrastinated, decentralisation reforms.

Interestingly, opposition parties, when they exist, supported decentralisation reforms in all

countries. It is not surprising given that decentralisation is usually used as a strategy of

those less advantaged to establish regional supporting basis, and national government

responds by granting power to local rather than intermediate government (Falleti, 2010;

Ayee, 2013).

In summary, in East and South Asian countries, only three countries (i.e. Japan, South Korea,

and Taiwan) are in accordance with the established arguments that a ruling party resists and

opposition party favours decentralisation reforms. Contrary to Falleti’s arguments (2010),

ruling parties in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines support

decentralisation reforms for their political interests (i.e. Bangladesh) and ideas (i.e. national

democratisation). China, which has only one party, cannot be explained by Falleti’s

framework.

Both civil society and international institutions favour decentralisation reforms. In the

selected literature, the strong civil societies were not evident in Bangladesh, China, and

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Japan. In contrast, democratisation from the civil society in India, Indonesia, South Korea,

Taiwan, Thailand and Philippines demands were the initiators and impetus of

decentralisation reforms. In particular, the Philippine government acknowledge the NGOs’

role in the democratisation process by stipulating NGOs as ‘Partners of Government’ in the

1987 Constitution, which was amended after the People Power Revolution in 1986.

Lastly, international institutions play a substantial role in South Asian countries (i.e.

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines). There was little influence from

international institutions in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In the selected literature, the

influence of international institutions was not reported in China (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Actors in decentralisation reforms

Government (Executives) Political party Civil society

International institutions

National Intermediate Local Ruling Opposition

Bangladesh N - * P/N P/N * P

China P * * P - * *

India * * * * * P P

Indonesia P P P P * P P

Japan N * * N P * -

South

Korea

N P P N P P -

Taiwan N * * N P P -

Thailand N P P N P P P

Philippines * * * * * P P

Note: P (Positive attitude), N (Negative attitude), - (non-existing), * (not mentioned)

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Institutions of nine selected countries

Campbell (2004) defines institutions as ‘formal and informal rules, monitoring and

enforcement mechanisms, and systems of meaning that define the context within which

individuals, corporations, labour unions, nation-states, and other organizations operate and

interact with each other’. Drawing on this definition, this section discusses nine selected

countries’ institutions, as facilitators and obstacles, of institutional changes of

decentralisation.

Political institutions and historically and socially embedded institutions were found in the

selected studies. As a political institution, the relation between executive and legislative

which is important in terms of veto points due to no matter what initiated decentralisation

reforms, decentralisation reforms are finalised in forms of acts by legislative bodies and

implemented by executive counterparts. While five (i.e. Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, and

Thailand) out of nine countries have legislative dominated systems, four (i.e. Indonesia,

South Korea, Taiwan, and Philippines) countries have executive dominance systems. Given

that the legislative and the executive body have more cooperative relations in legislative-

dominant systems, due to the executives being selected not by voters but legislative

members, an executive-dominance system tends to induce planning and implementation

deficits derived from more veto points and more often occurred coordination problems.

Four types of historically and socially embedded institutions were found in the selected

literature. The first historical and social institution is the Developmental State legacy.

Developmental State refers to a state that its bureaucracy takes a key role in planning and

implementing for economic development (Johnson, 1999). The developmental state legacy

of strong centralised bureaucracy state was found in seven countries except Bangladesh and

Philippines.

The second historical institution is the colonisation experience. Six out of nine (i.e.

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Philippines) have experienced

colonial rule at least once. For Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Philippines, the

decentralised institutions established in the colonisation era facilitate the decentralisation

reforms after their independence. For instance, the local self-governance in India and

Bangladesh started from the Bangal Local Self-Government Act passed in 1885 under the

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British Colonial rule (Panday, 2011). In the case of Philippines, two different perspectives

were found; Legaspi (2001: 132) argued that ‘Philippines have a long history of

centralisation from the colonial Spanish regime to the recent Marcos era’; however,

Sudhipongpracha (2013) maintained that colonial legacies in Philippines favoured the

implementation of decentralisation reforms by giving opportunities to strengthen local

taxing power under the Spanish colonial rules and to experience municipal elections, prior

to national elections, under the American colonial regime (Sudhipongpracha, 2013).

Furthermore, Sudhipongpracha (2013) argued that the colonial rule of Philippines left the

legacy of the spoils system in their bureaucracy. On the other hand, Japanese colonisation

experience resulted in rules encapsulating centralised planned state management for

military purposes, thereby leading South Korea and Taiwan in the opposite direction toward

centralised bureaucracy.

Authoritarian governance legacies, defined as a state system which privileges and enforces

strict obedience to authority at the expense of individual freedom, are the third type of

institutions which were found. Authoritarian regimes are divided into two types: military-

based and bureaucracy-based dictatorship. Authoritarian legacies were found in all eight

countries, except India. Whereas Bangladesh, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand had military

based authoritarian governments in the 1900s, Philippines had bureaucracy-based

authoritarian government. In the case of South Korea and Taiwan, their authoritarian

governments started from a military basis and moved to a bureaucratic one.

Lastly, centralised Kingdom legacies were found in five countries of China, Japan, South

Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Among these five, only two (i.e. Japan and Thailand)

developed as constitutional monarchy systems and the remaining three transformed into

republic countries. In the case of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Philippines, long

colonisation legacies attenuated the effects of centralised Kingdom legacies (Figure 8).

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Figure 8. Institutions in decentralisation reforms

Political institutions

Historically and socially embedded institutions

Executive-legislative relation 1

Developmental state legacies 2

Colonial legacies 3

Authoritarian regime

legacies 4

Centralised Kingdom legacies 5

Bangladesh L - Y, F Y, M (1982-90)

-

China L Y - Y, B (1949- present)

Y

India L Y Y, F - -

Indonesia E Y Y, F Y, M (in 1967-97)

-

Japan L Y - Y, M (in 1930s-45)

Y (Constitutional

monarchy)

South Korea

E Y Y, U Y, M+B (in 1961-87)

Y

Taiwan E Y Y, U Y, M+B (in 1949-86)

Y

Thailand L Y - Y, M (in 1932-73)

Y (Constitutional

monarchy)

Philippines E - Y, F Y, B (in 1965-86)

Y or -

Note: 1. The classification of executive-legislative relation is taken from Lijphart (2012).

Executive dominance (E) when the executives (i.e. president) selected by voters

and not dependent on legislative confidence.

Legislative dominance (L) when the executives are selected by legislative and

dependent on legislative confidence.

2. Developmental state (Jonson, 1982; 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999): Y (Yes), - (No)

3. Colonial legacies: Y (Yes), F (Legacies favourable for decentralisation), U (Legacies

unfavourable for decentralisation), - (No)

4. Authoritarian government legacies: Y (Yes), - (No), M (Military based

dictatorship), B (Bureaucratic based dictatorship)

5. Centralisation Kingdom exist before modern state building: Y (Yes), - (No)

19

The processes of decentralisation reforms

It is important, theoretically and empirically, to identify processes of the actual

decentralisation reforms in order to obtain a clearer picture about the dynamics of

decentralisation as an institutional change (Pierson, 2004). In analysing institutional changes

toward decentralisation in the given nine countries, this paper adopts several theoretical

building blocks from extant literature: types of decentralisation (Falleti 2010:34-39; Wolman

1990), degrees of decentralisation (Rondinelli et al. 1983), and typical processes of an

institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 15-16).

According to Falleti (2010) and Wolman (1990), decentralisation means transfers of

authorities, responsibilities, and resources in political, administrative, and fiscal terms from

national to subnational government. Political decentralisation is concerned with the degree

of democratic representation by elected and non-elected representatives as well as direct

and non-direct decision making autonomy. Administrative decentralisation is about the

degree of managerial autonomy in terms of public service planning, administration and

provisions. Fiscal decentralisation is regarding the degree of resource autonomy in the base

and rate of resource raising and spending (Dubois and Fattore, 2009).

Rondinelli’s (1983) well utilised typology which classified decentralisation into four

categories, deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation, by the degree of

transferred authorities. Deconcentration refers to dispersing administrative power and

responsibility from higher to lower administrative authority within an organisation. The

higher government holds authority over lower administrative authority and exerts

hierarchical administrative power on deconcentrated tasks. Delegation means that to some

extent autonomy such as responsibility for decision making and administration of public

functions is given to subnational governments or semiautonomous organisations.

Devolution means that authority for decision-making, finance, and management transfers to

legally separate organisations. Devolution usually happens between the central government

and politically decentralised subnational government or quasi-autonomous entity.

Privatisation refers to the transfer of public service provision responsibility from public to

private sector which including both profit and non-profit organisations (Rondinelli, 1983;

Bahl, 1999; Schneider, 2003; Saltman et al., 2007; Dubois and Fattore, 2009).

20

Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 15-16) presented four concepts based on how new institutions

coexist or replace the existing institutions in the processes of institutional changes. While

Layering refers to adoption of some new components into the current institutional settings,

Conversion means an institution changes its role by taking new roles different to the present

one. Replacement refers that the existing rules are eliminated and new rules are introduced.

Drift is the regulatory power of the existing rules are diminished or removed due to the

social and political environments are changed. Another concept to explain causal

mechanisms of institutional changes is ‘diffusion’ which means institutions and ideas which

adopted in one organisation and country transfer to another place (Dolowitz and Marsh,

1996).

Based on these three theoretical frameworks, the processes of decentralisation reforms are

investigated in terms of the type, the degree, and the sequence in nine East and South Asian

countries.

The types of decentralisation

In terms of Wolman’s typology, the East and South Asian cases of decentralisation showed a

clear predilection for political decentralisation but retained a relative degree of

administrative and fiscal decentralisation. That administrative and fiscal decentralisation

reforms in East and South Asia are retarded compared to political decentralisation is

explained by the interactions between interests, ideas, and institutions. Each actor exerts

his/her agency based upon territorial (i.e. national and subnational) and partisan (i.e., ruling

and opposition) interests and ideas (i.e. conservative, liberal, deepening democracy, and

enhancing efficiency) under constraints such as institutions and (social) structures (Bevir and

Rhodes, 2004; Campbell 2004; Falleti, 2010).

Political Decentralisation. In the selected literature, decentralisation reforms in all the

countries except China and Japan were triggered by political eagerness towards

democratisation and deepening democracy. It means that all the selected countries’

incumbent governments had to accept political decentralisation gladly (i.e. Indonesia) or

reluctantly (i.e. the remaining countries) in order to increase the legitimacy of their regimes.

Five countries (i.e. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Philippines) implemented

21

political decentralisation, including direct elections for executives and legislative members

of all the layers of local governments, as the first type of decentralisation reforms in the

1990s. It is noteworthy that Japan implemented the same types of political decentralisation

in the 1940s which was driven by political motivations of democratisation, notwithstanding

due to pressures from the US and Allied government, after the Second World War and its

long military authoritarian regime.

In the case of the Indonesia after stepping down of Suharto, the transition government of

Habibie had no option except to implement extensive levels of administrative, fiscal and

political decentralisation in order to prevent the disintegration of the state.

Taiwan and Thailand adopted partial political decentralisation. Taiwan has executive and

legislative elections in each local level (i.e. County, Town, City, Direct-controlled municipality)

including executive and legislative bodies except districts in direct-controlled municipality.

In Thailand, governors, the executive head of provinces, have been appointed by an elected

Prime Minister, except directly elected executives in special self-governing cities such as the

governor of Bangkok and the mayor of Pattaya. In the self-governing city of Bangkok, district

heads of Bangkok are appointed by the governor of Bangkok, but the district council

members in Bangkok are elected by the citizens. The legislative body of both intermediate

and local government are elected by the people and mayors in local governments are

directly elected.

Among the East and South Asian countries, decentralisation of China is unique regarding its

political dimension. Under the communist regime, there has been little progress in political

decentralisation despite extensive democratisation movements, such as the Beijing Spring in

1978 and the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989. Until 2014, China had direct elections for

only the lowest legislative members. All the legislative members in other levels of

governments are elected indirectly by the lower governments’ legislative members. This

indirect election system is linked to the election for the national leader. The chancellor of

the Chinese National People’s Congress is elected through indirect election of its members.

The chancellor retains the authority to appoint governors of provinces and the appointed

governor has the right to appoint mayors in his/her province. Therefore, the Chinese central

government holds a strong reign on their provincial and local government by exerting power

to appoint the executives in provincial and local governments. Executives at all levels of

22

local governments in China adopt an upwards accountability toward the central authority

but neglect downward accountability toward the people (Lam, 2010).

Administrative Decentralisation. The selected literature rarely mentioned administrative

decentralisation in Bangladesh and Taiwan. There are a few pieces of information about the

remaining seven countries (i.e. China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and

Philippines). China has implemented an extensive level of administrative decentralisation

from investment decisions, land-use planning to health, education and social services after

1978 (Chien, 2010; Wang et al., 2012). Concerning India, there were two case studies about

the process and results of administrative decentralisation in Kerala and one case study

about decentralisation of India (Heller, 2001; Tandon, 2001; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2009).

However, they did not investigate what kind of administrative functions were devolved but

how the devolved administrative functions worked in terms of citizen participation and

accountability.

Studies about Indonesia and Philippines contains detailed explanations about the processes

of administrative and fiscal decentralisation and the lists of decentralised administrative

authority (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Langran, 2011; Sudhipongpracha, 2013; Yu,

2013). The Indonesian central government granted extensive administrative authorities to

local governments in public works, health management, education and cultural affairs,

agricultural development, transportation, the management of manufacturing and trading

activities, the management of investment, environmental matters, land management, the

matters relating to cooperatives, and manpower management. Philippines also devolved

the administrative authorities concerning health, agriculture, social services, environmental

protection, and specified public works functions.

According to Jacobs (2003), prefectural governments in Japan have substantial authority in

economic and spatial development planning although subnational autonomy varied upon a

prefectural government’s population size, employment base, and fiscal capacity.

In South Korea, there was an attempt to devolve extensive administrative authority in terms

of public security, education, and social services (Kang, 2006). However, the achievement of

decentralisation differs across sectors. As of 2014, subnational governments of South Korea

do not have any authority for national security, have moderate powers for social policy, and

23

extensive power for education. The status of administrative decentralisation in Thailand is

described as implemented with considerable restraints, including supervision and audit

authorities of the Central Government (Haque, 2010; Sudhipongpracha, 2013).

Fiscal Decentralisation. Fiscal decentralisation was implemented in three countries (i.e.

China, Indonesia, and Thailand). Several articles acknowledged the managerial motivation of

the Chinese Central government to achieve better economic outcomes through fiscal

decentralisation (Skinner et al., 2003; Tsui and Wang, 2004; Sheng, 2007; Chien, 2010). In

the case of Indonesia and Thailand, fiscal decentralisation took place in tandem with

administrative and political decentralisation after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997

(Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Silver, 2001; Sudhipongpracha, 2013). However, both of

the two countries adopted fiscal decentralisation in the form of revenue equalisation

transfers from central government rather than devolving revenue raising power and shared

tax. This method of fiscal decentralisation via revenue equalisation system increased local

governments’ reliance on the central government in Indonesia after decentralisation (Silver,

2001). The Thai national government still hold a strong influence on the allocation of fiscal

resources to local government (Haque, 2010).

Fiscal decentralisation in Philippines was implemented in 1991 after its political

decentralisation in 1987. Researches on Philippines showed that their local governments

achieved high levels of fiscal autonomy (Yu, 2013). Fiscal decentralisation in South Korea

was implemented in the 1980s, 1995, and 2004 (Kang, 2006; Kim, 2012). In Philippines and

South Korea, fiscal decentralisation reforms increased local governments’ fiscal autonomy.

For the remaining countries (i.e. Bangladesh, Japan, and Taiwan), no clear time table for

fiscal decentralisation presented but fiscal decentralisation were discussed in terms of local

autonomy and equity. Panday (2011) argued that local governments retains inadequate

financial resources generated from their revenue sources in Bangladesh. Several literatures

about China dealt with the consequences of the 1994 recentralisation tax reforms (Niu,

2013; Nui, 2013). The relation between fiscal resources and intergovernmental politics is the

main focus of writing studies about Japan (Jacobs, 2003; Sheiner, 2005). The relation

between soft-budget constraint problems and local autonomy is at the centre of

intergovernmental relations in South Korea and Taiwan (Kim, 2012; Kuo and So, 2013).

24

In sum, grassroots democratisation movements are the major driving forces of political

decentralisation in East and Asia countries. All the countries except China implemented

political decentralisation in order to meet the demand for initiating and deepening

democracy from the civil society. In particular, it can also be argued that neo-liberal ideas of

enhancing efficiency and achieving economic growth drove the administrative and fiscal

decentralisation reforms in Indonesia and Thailand which gained their reform impetus from

the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Financial crisis challenged their incumbent governments

directly and called the end of long authoritarian regimes in Indonesia and Philippines. As a

result, administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms were implemented at almost the

same time with political decentralisation.

On the other hand, in the case of India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan political

decentralisation took place in advance of the Asian Financial Crisis. However, it is clear that

the Crisis advanced the speed and the depth of the following administrative and financial

decentralisation reforms, while the central governments sought efficiency enhancement.

China has implemented extensive administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms in order

to accomplish economic development by promoting local governments’ entrepreneurial

innovations from the late 1970s even though the Chinese Central government recentralised

its fiscal authority in 1994 (Chien, 2010). However, arguably, there is less evidence of neo-

liberal influence on the administrative and fiscal decentralisation of Philippines (Langran,

2011, Yu, 2013).

Figure 9. The types of decentralisation

Administrative Fiscal Political

Bangladesh

(Panday, 2011)

Not mentioned Not mentioned □1 1976; the Local

Government Ordinance

□2 From 1980,

establishment and abolition of local self-governing system repeated according to who the Ruling Party

China

(Lam, 2010) □1 1984

□1 In the middle of

1980s

□2 Decentralisation

reform in 1994

(Partially) For the lowest level

of government

25

Administrative Fiscal Political

India

(Tandon, 2001)

Not mentioned Not mentioned □1 1993

Indonesia

(Brodjonegoro and

Asanuma, 2000)

□1 1999

Public works, health

management, education,

and cultural affairs,

agricultural development.

□1 1999 □1 1999

Japan Not mentioned

Not mentioned □1 In the 1940s

South Korea

(Kim, 2013) □3 1990s

□5 2004

□1 1981

□4 1999

□6 2006

1951, stop 1961

□2 Resume, 1991 - (local

legislative body)

□3 1995 - (local

executive body)

Taiwan

(Kuo and So, 2013)

Not mentioned

Not mentioned 1950, stop

□1 Resume, 1994

Thailand

(Haque, 2010;

Sudhipongpracha,

2013)

□1 The 1997 decentralisation

reform with substantial restraints (regulations and auditing)

□1 The 1997

decentralisation reform (revenue equalisation transfer)

□1 The 1997

decentralisation reform (the direct election of local councillors, the direct or indirect election of mayors)

Philippines

(Langran, 2011;

Sudhipongpracha,

2013; Yu, 2013)

□1 The decentralisation Act of

1967 (deconcentration)

□3 The Local Government

Code of 1991 (devolution);

Health, agriculture, social

services, environmental

protection, specified public

works function including

personnel management

□3 The Local

Government Code of 1991 (shared tax)

□2 Local and municipal

official election in 1988 under the new Constitution of Philippines which was ratified in 1987

The degree of decentralisation

While the prevailing motivation, either political or managerial ideas, drives different types of

decentralisation, the interactions between agency and institutions engender diverse

outcomes in terms of the degree of decentralisation. When decentralisation is understood

as an example of institutional changes, the degrees of decentralised authorities and

26

responsibilities (i.e., deconcentration, delegation, and devolution) are identified by typical

processes of institutional changes (i.e., replacement, layering, drift, conversion and diffusion)

(Pierson, 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). This approach is

useful to understand the roles of ideas and institutions as facilitators and constraints of

institutional changes in the selected East and South Asian countries.

In the administrative dimension, diverse processes of decentralisation were found. India,

Indonesia, and Philippines grant significant administrative authorities to their local

government. The degree of decentralisation in these three countries is understood as

devolution which means the subject of administrative responsibilities is replaced from

national to subnational governments. In China, substantial level of administrative authority

and responsibility, in particular, economic policy, are transferred to subnational government

though the executives of prefectures are appointed by Chinese national government.

However, in the remaining countries, the status of administrative decentralisation looks

more complex than that of political one. In Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, administrative

decentralisation reforms were layered devolved functions on the top of the existing

deconcentrated and delegated functions. Finally, Bangladeshi national government rarely

transferred administrative authority and responsibility to subnational governments

(deconcentration).

Alongside administrative decentralisation, the degree of fiscal decentralisation also shows a

complex picture. Most of the countries operate intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems

after fiscal decentralisation in order to equalise fiscal disparity resulting from the insufficient

local revenue. In the selected studies, fiscal decentralisation reforms in Bangladesh, India,

Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand are not mentioned. Instead of decentralisation, in 1994, a fiscal

recentralisation reform took place in China. In Indonesia, South Korea, and Philippines fiscal

decentralisation of increasing intergovernmental fiscal transfers took place alongside with

administrative decentralisation. Therefore, in Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and

Philippines, revenue sharing systems which favour to subnational government are layered

to the existing intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems.

Though political decentralisation in Bangladesh since 1982 shows instable status according

to the national administration changes, seven out of nine selected countries except China

27

and Thailand took devolution as their political decentralisation reform. Devolution is the

highest degree of decentralisation which means transfer of authority for decision-making,

finance, and management transfers to legally separate organisations. By introducing elected

legislative and executive bodies in subnational government, national government of seven

countries (i.e. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Philippines)

devolved their political authorities to subnational government. Furthermore, their

subnational counterparts take accountability towards their own citizens about their political

decisions. This political devolution of in the seven countries demonstrates a causal

mechanism of replacement by adopting new elected system for governors and mayors from

the appointing system. However, China and Thailand did not introduce a full-fledged direct

election system in subnational levels and their degree of political decentralisation still

remained in the stage of either deconcentration or delegation.

In all countries except China, decentralisation reforms aim to replace the old centralised

government institutions into new decentralised ones. The firm support from below enables

seven countries except Thailand to implement full-fledged political decentralisation

(devolution) by displacing local executive appointment systems into direct election system

and by introducing local legislative bodies. Absent or weak public mobilisation to

democratisation and political decentralisation constrains further administrative and fiscal

decentralisation. For example, in Bangladesh and Thailand, national governments who

promoted decentralisation reforms retained robust controls over the delegated or devolved

administrative and fiscal affairs due to decentralisation was promoted in order to

strengthen the incumbent administrations democratic legitimacy. Less developed

subnational interests, as the case of Taiwan shows, subnational governments are reluctant

to exert the devolved fiscal power due to the elected governors and mayors concern their

political risks.

Institutional factors, such as the solid national bureaucratic power derived from the

centralised developmental state legacy and executive dominant political institution,

embedded constrain East and South Asian countries from reaching fully-fledged subnational

self-governance and led the nine selected countries to layered type of decentralisation

reforms. For example, solid executive power, backed up strong developmental centralised

bureaucratic legacy, deterred and minimised the degree of administrative and fiscal

28

decentralisation, followed by political decentralisation in the case of South Korea and

Taiwan. In the same vein, the solid national bureaucratic power derived from the centralised

developmental state legacy prevents Thailand from political decentralisation in spite of the

Constitutional Reform toward Decentralisation in 1997. On the other hand, it is observed

that Indonesia and Philippines achieved an extensive degree of administrative and fiscal

decentralisation when their executive favourable political institutions are not bolstered by

strong centralised bureaucracy. All the cases show how effectively the strong centralised

bureaucratic legacy combined with unstable political situations hinders the realisation of

decentralisation reforms.

Furthermore, the existence of fiscal disparity between subnational governments gives

national government more political and logical leeway to avoid further fiscal

decentralisation. With the excuse of regional fiscal disparity, fiscal decentralisation often

implements in the form of intergovernmental fiscal transfer system reforms such as Local

Shared Tax or revenue sharing system. Therefore, administrative and fiscal institutions have

not changed entirely, unlike their counterpart political institutions. Institutions regarding

administrative and fiscal decentralisation were rarely replaced by the new ones but layered,

which refers to new elements being attached to existing institutions. On the other hand,

the actual practices of administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms are implemented

gradually and the actual practices sometimes head to recentralised direction implicitly (i.e.

expansion of ear-marked transfers in South Korea) or explicitly (i.e. the 1994 tax reforms in

China).

China still remains as an outlier of this trend. From the late 1970s, China has driven

administrative decentralisation as a means of it economic development by promoting

entrepreneurial leadership at provincial level. In its fiscal dimension, China recentralised its

decentralised fiscal system to some extent in 1994 in order to stabilise its macro economy

and increase the Chinese central government revenue (Chien, 2010; Li, 2010).

In conclusion, not all the nine selected countries, decentralisation resulted in extensive

changes in administrative, fiscal, and political dimensions. The degree of decentralisation in

administrative, fiscal, and political realms differs across the nine East and South Asian

countries. In spite of the centralised legacies of East and South Asia, under the strong

democratisation movements from below, the degree of political decentralisation is

29

relatively higher than that of administrative and fiscal dimensions. In fact, the idea of

deepening democracy plays a key role in the process of decentralisation in all countries

except China and Thailand. However, in administrative and fiscal dimensions, the degree of

decentralisation brought about diverse intergovernmental balance of power upon the given

institutions and (social) structures in East and South Asian countries. It is reported that

political institutions (i.e. the executive and legislative relations), historical legacies (i.e.

Developmental State legacy, strong centralised bureaucracy), social structures (i.e. inter-

local fiscal disparity) facilitated and constrained deeper degrees of administrative and fiscal

decentralisation.

Figure 10. The degrees of decentralisation

Administrative Fiscal Political

Bangladesh (Panday, 2011)

Deconcentration

Not mentioned Devolution

China Delegation Devolution

Delegation Recentralisation

Deconcentration Delegation

India (Venugopal and

Yilmaz, 2009) Devolution

Delegation Devolution

Devolution

Indonesia (Silver, 2001)

Devolution Delegation Devolution

Devolution

Japan (Jacobs, 2003; Sheiner, 2005)

Deconcentration Delegation Devolution

Not mentioned Devolution

South Korea (Kang, 2006; Kim,

2013)

Deconcentration Delegation Devolution

Deconcentration Delegation Devolution

Devolution

Taiwan (Tsai et al., 2012; Kuo and So, 2013)

Deconcentration Delegation Devolution

Not mentioned Devolution

Thailand (Haque, 2010;

Sudhipongpracha, 2013)

Deconcentration Delegation

Devolution (in Bangkok and Pattaya)

Deconcentration Delegation Devolution

Devolution in local level

Deconcentration in intermediate level

except Bangkok and Pattaya

Philippines (Lesgapi, 2001; Yu,

2013) Devolution Devolution Devolution

30

The sequence of decentralisation

Falleti (2010) argues that the prevailing territorial interests play a crucial role to decide the

first type of decentralisation reform which has self-reinforcing or reactive power to decide

the second type of decentralisation reform. Consequently, the sequence of decentralisation

reforms has a causal power to decide the change of intergovernmental balance of power in

post-developmental decentralisation reform. Based on this Falleti’s sequential theory of

decentralisation, the sequence of decentralisation reforms in the selected nine countries is

examined. The evolving processes of decentralisation (i.e., the sequence of decentralisation

reforms) also provide insight to understand the roles of ideas and institutions as facilitators

and constraints of institutional changes in the selected East and South Asian countries.

With the reference from Figure 9, the sequence of decentralisation reforms is examined in

China, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and Philippines. In China, administrative and fiscal

decentralisation reforms took place in the 1980s. Then, the 1994 fiscal recentralisation

reform was implemented under deconcentrated political system. In Indonesia and Thailand,

all three types of decentralisation reforms happened at the same time according to the

Constitutional reforms in 1999 and 1997 respectively. In South Korea, the sequence of

decentralisation reforms is fiscal in the 1980s, political in 1991, administrative in the 1990s,

political in 1995, administrative in 2004, and fiscal in 2006 (Kim 2012). In Philippines, the

sequence of decentralisation reforms shows administrative in 1967, political in 1988, and

administrative and fiscal in 1991.

In conclusion, information revealed in this systemic literature review seems not enough to

investigate the causal pathway from actors, interests, and ideas to the sequence of

decentralisation reforms. Further in-depth case studies are required to trace the causal

pathways.

31

Decentralisation and subnational autonomy

Regardless of what drives decentralisation reforms, decentralisation generated significant

repercussions from resource mobilisation and allocation to intergovernmental balance of

power and the effectiveness of public service (Litvack et al., 1998). This section discusses the

change of intergovernmental balance of power after decentralisation. As a consequence of

decentralisation, the change of subnational autonomy is highly related to not only the

strategic choices of actors but also the institutional arrangements such as social and

historical contexts, balance of social power and political institutions (Pierson, 2004). The

selected nine selected countries can be categorised into four groups according to the level

of subnational autonomy after decentralisation. The subnational of local autonomy was

measured by two criteria (Rondinelli et al. 1983; Wolman 1990): if decentralisation reforms

contain all of administrative, fiscal, and political dimensions; and to what extent subnational

governments became independent from central government after decentralisation.

With these two criteria, intergovernmental balance of power after decentralisation was

assessed based on the selected papers. While three countries in South Asia of India,

Indonesia, and Philippines are grouped as a high subnational autonomy country, Bangladesh

and Thailand belong to a low subnational autonomy group. Three countries in East Asia of

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan show a medium level of subnational autonomy after

decentralisation reforms. In the case of China, literature about the evaluation of the

intergovernmental balance of power after decentralisation shows unequivocal conclusions.

Rarely significant changes in local autonomy were found between pre and post

decentralisation in Group 1 (Bangladesh and Thailand). Panday (2011: 217) argued that

subnational autonomy has not been improved in Bangladesh despite its several attempts for

political decentralisation. Bangladeshi decentralisation reforms were initiated by its central

government which aimed to forge a robust political basement and planned by a local

government commission which consists of appointed members by central government.

Furthermore, decentralisation reforms were implemented with neither a comprehensive

plan nor public consultations. Bangladeshi decentralisation reforms showed these defects in

planning and resulted in a large deficit in implementation due to its central government’s

inappropriate political purposes and insufficient endeavour for adjusting conflicting

interests.

32

A similar case was observed in the case of Thailand. Even though decentralisation reforms

were initiated by demands from civil society, subnational autonomy were not increased

significantly (Sudhipongpracha, 2013). According to the intent of the 1997 Constitution

Reform and Local Government Organisation Act of 1999, the National Decentralisation

Committee, which consisted of deputies from local governments, government agencies, and

experts, were established and proposed ‘Action Plan’ including specific administrative and

fiscal decentralisation reforms (Haque, 2010). However, transfers of administrative and

fiscal power to local governments were not implemented as planned. Substantial

implementation deficits in administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms were observed

in Thailand (Haque, 2010: 682). Alongside with imperfect political decentralisation, such as

the coexistence of elected mayors in municipal level and appointed governors in provincial

level, continuing subnational governments’ financial dependency on the Thai national

government and strong central control on subnational governments were the obstacles for

advancing local autonomy (Haque, 2010; Sudhipongpracha, 2013). Both Haque and

Sudhipongpracha attributed retarding increase of subnational autonomy after

decentralisation to the dominant legacies of centralised governance and hierarchical

central-local relations which had been formed in a long state building history of Thailand.

Also, unstable political circumstance and socially embedded feudal structure still influence

in local election and governance in forms of the feudalistic patron-client relations and family

ties (Haque, 2010).

A substantial change of subnational autonomy was found between pre and post

decentralisation, however, subnational autonomy were not fully developed for some

reasons in Group 2 (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). Hill and Fujita (2000) argued that neo-

liberal administrative decentralisation reform from the 1980s did little succeed in Japan. The

Japanese central-local relation was design to aggrandise available resource mobilisation in

all government levels under a developmental state and state-lead economy legacy.

Japanese intergovernmental systems maintained the value of equity across local

governments, such as standardisation in service provision and equity in fiscal resource

distribution even after decentralisation reforms. According to Hill and Fujita (2000), fiscal

and administrative decentralisation reforms in Japan drifted until the 1990s and there was

little change in intergovernmental balance of power.

33

However, Jacobs (2003) claimed that the level of prefectural autonomy in Japan is not

identical but diverse across regional governments even though all prefectures own the same

legal status except Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Diverse levels of subnational

autonomy were attributed to prefectures’ population size, employment induction, fiscal

capacity and historical importance. He argued that Japan is still a developmental state but

not a centralised state any more. Prefectural governments wield substantial autonomy on

the municipal governments by guiding and instructing related to national laws and

regulations. This fact implies that the intergovernmental balance of power depends not only

on the formal relation between centre and periphery but also on subnational governments’

historic, economic, and political capacities. Sheiner (2005) discussed the reasons why the

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been privileged in Japanese subnational elections is

highly related to the centrally controlled financial system and strong political parties’

influence on national budget. This shows the interactions between national party politics

and the degree of subnational fiscal autonomy. To summarise, decentralisation reforms in

Japan aim to enhance subnational autonomy but there were substantial deficits in

implementation due to the certain restraints of legacies from a developmental state,

centrally controlled fiscal system, and diverse levels of local autonomy.

Whereas subnational autonomy increased significantly after its political decentralisation in

the 1990s, the central-local relation in South Korea still has a moderate level of hierarchy

(Kang, 2006). In particular, the level of administrative and fiscal decentralisation remains in

the status of deconcentration and delegation. In order to challenge the South Korean

centralised government system, the Rho MooHyun government planned and implemented

decentralisation reforms. In 2004, National Assembly of Korea passed ‘the Special Law for

Decentralisation’ and newly established ‘the Presidential Committee for Government

Innovation and Decentralisation’ suggested a comprehensive decentralisation plan including

administrative and fiscal decentralisation (Kang, 2006). However, the plan encountered a

substantial opposition from central government bureaucracy and resulted in a certain

degree of implementation deficits.

Chang (2010) argued that economic crises in 1997 and 2008 had a detriment subnational

autonomy by increasing local dependency on central government in South Korea. By

quantitative analysis, Kim (2012) illuminated that Korean subnational governments prefer

34

utilising their political capacity toward central government in order to increase

intergovernmental transfers rather than raising their own source revenues. In conclusion, in

spite of a series of decentralisation reforms from the 1990s, subnational autonomy in South

Korea increased only to a moderate level. The moderate level of local autonomy is

attributed to central bureaucracies’ implementation deficits, subnational governments’

preferences to raising intergovernmental transfers instead of increasing their own fiscal

revenues, and economic crises hit South Korea.

Subnational autonomy in Taiwan after decentralisation has been enhanced in a moderate

level. Kuo and So (2013) investigate that the subnational government behaviours induce no

substantial improvement of their revenue autonomy after fiscal decentralisation in Taiwan.

Similar to the South Korean case, Taiwanese subnational governments had a strong

incentive to ask central government to increase intergovernmental transfers and to avoid

increasing local tax and user fees under inter-jurisdictional competition. Therefore, their

revenue autonomy does not increase in spite of fiscal decentralisation.

There were huge changes of subnational autonomy after decentralisation in Group 3 (India,

Indonesia, and Philippines). The three countries implemented all three types of

decentralisation and the selected papers generally acknowledged the enhancement of local

autonomy after decentralisation in India, Indonesia, and Philippines.

The evaluation about the intergovernmental balance of power in post-decentralisation is

varied; however, political autonomy after decentralisation seems to hugely increase in India.

The local governments in Kerala Panchayat gain high degree of discretion and increased

local autonomy after decentralisation reform in 1991 (Heller, 2001; Venugopal and Yilmaz,

2009). Long historical demands for more accountable local governments in Kerala are

attributed to the advancement of local autonomy (Heller, 2001). Furthermore, Tandon

(2001) also argues that decentralisation from below is highly related to debureucratisation

and increased subnational autonomy in India. However, Gaiha and Kulkarni (2002) argue

that, in spite of decentralisation, fiscal autonomy is still limited by the Indian Central

government’s supervisions including auditing and financial reporting.

In sum, in spite of regional disparity, there was little implementation deficit in

decentralisation reforms in India due to it was initiated by civil societies, planned a standing

35

committee, and upheld by international donors (Heller. 2001; Tandon, 2001). Instead,

challenges came from weak local governance were main issues in the decentralised Indian

local governments (Tandon, 2001; Imai and Sato, 2012).

Most of literature about Indonesia illustrated that subnational autonomy increases in the

post-decentralisation period (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Firman, 2008; Hunter,

2004; Lewis, 2005). Both national level study and regional level studies in rural Lombok and

Jakarta Metropolitan Area provide evidence of the increase of subnational autonomy

(Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Hunter, 2004; Firman, 2008). Evidence that fiscal

decentralisation increased local autonomy toward local tax revenue increase was also

presented (Lewis, 2005) while Silver et al. (2001) claimed that the Indonesian local

governments became more dependent to the central government under new decentralised

government allocation system (DAU) introduced in 1999 than under the previous fiscal

system.

Three out of five papers about Indonesia discussed the lack of readiness and the weak

subnational governance as a problem at the same time (Hunter, 2008; Firman, 2008; Lewis,

2005). Furthermore, more centralised planning, gradual decentralisation, and more

intervention from the central government are often suggested (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma,

2000; Firman, 2008). Notwithstanding most of the actors related to decentralisation

processes, such as government, both of the national and subnational levels, political parties,

both of ruling and opposition, and civil society, agreed and cooperated for wide transfers of

central power to subnational government. Following enactments and administrative

processes were implemented with little deficits.

Five out of six studies argued that subnational autonomy in Philippines increased after

decentralisation (Bossert and Bauvais, 2002; Jimenez, 2009; Legaspi, 2001; Sudhipongpracha,

2013; Yu, 2013). All the studies argued that Local Government Code in 1991 devolved

decision making authorities to subnational governments and, consequently, increased

subnational autonomy in Philippines. However, challenges involved in decentralisation, such

as weak governance, organisational capacity and corruption, were found in Filipino

decentralisation reforms (Jimenez, 2009; Langran, 2001; Yu, 2013). However, as powerful

mobilisation from civil society linked democratisation initiated decentralisation reforms,

parliament promoted decentralisation reforms. Then,national government ought to comply

36

with the firm demands from below. Therefore, little implementation deficits were found in

the Filipino decentralisation reforms.

In a nutshell, though there are issues concerning decentralisation such as inefficiency,

corruption, and lack of capacity of subnational government, the selected literature argued

that decentralisation granted a significant level of autonomy to local governments in India,

Indonesia, and Philippines.

Lastly, the case of China illustrated a mixed picture of decentralisation and subnational

autonomy. Whilst China was not decentralised in politically at all, China has a high level of

administrative decentralisation and a middle level of fiscal decentralisation. The Chinese

central government’s political monopoly has negative impact on the development of local

autonomy. Tsui and Wang (2004) challenged the ‘market preserving federalism’ claim,

which regards China as a de facto federal state, by illustrating the negative impact of

Chinese cadre management system toward local governments’ autonomy. Sheng (2007) also

argued how the Chinese political centre uses its personnel monopoly power in order to

control local autonomy of well-off local governments. Chien (2010) argued the Chinese local

governments were politically dominated by the Chinese Communist Party whereas they

obtained extensive administrative and fiscal autonomy. Lam (2010) acknowledged

increasing bargaining power of provincial governments based on their political and fiscal

resources as well as the centralised personnel management power of the Chinese central

government. Ghai and Woodman (2009) illuminated that less legislative power

decentralised toward the five autonomous regions in China than ordinary provinces.

However, administrative decentralisation has a positive impact on advancing subnational

autonomy. Skinner et al. (2003) also insisted that the regulatory role of Chinese local

governments increased in health care, education, and environmental protection policies

after administrative decentralisation. In the fiscal dimension, Niu (2013) argued that the

Chinese fiscal autonomy increased in sub provincial level but decreased in provincial level in

the past two decades. Song (2013) insisted that the 1994 tax reform reduced the Chinese

local governments’ fiscal autonomy sharply.

In sum, the Chinese Central government can control the timing and ranges of

decentralisation by her personnel management power. For example, In 1994, the

37

centralised political power enables the Central government to recentralise revenue

authority.

Figure 11. The level of local autonomy after decentralisation

LOW (Group 1) MEDIUM (Group 2) HIGH (Group 3)

Bangladesh o

China o (political)

o (fiscal)

o (administrative)

India o

Indonesia o

Japan o

South Korea o

Taiwan o

Thailand o

Philippines o

38

Conclusion

Summary of findings

The forty selected papers were outlined China (12 papers), India, Indonesia, and Philippines

(6 papers, respectively), Japan and South Korea (3 papers, respectively), Taiwan and

Thailand (2 papers, respectively), and Bangladesh (1 paper). Four papers were cross-country

comparative studies. While 28 papers were a single country case study, 12 papers were a

single region or cross-regional comparative studies in one country. Majority of papers

focused on the decentralisation status in descriptive ways. Six papers discussed

decentralisation with theoretical frameworks including rational choice (i.e. principle and

agent theory, fiscal federalism) and historical institutional approaches (i.e. Falleti’s

sequential theory of decentralisation). Methodologically, 29 papers took qualitative

approaches and 11 papers took quantitative.

This systemic literature review illuminated driving forces, actors, political and historical

institutions, the types and the degree, and the consequences regarding decentralisation in

these nine selected East and South Asian countries. The main driving forces of

decentralisation were political motivations (i.e. democratisation) and managerial

motivations (i.e. neoliberalism). While decentralisation China was triggered by neoliberalism,

decentralisation in Bangladesh, Taiwan and Philippines was based on democratisation

movement. In India, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, both political and managerial

motivations were promoted decentralisation reforms. Ethnic and religious conflicts also

encouraged decentralisation reforms in Indonesia and Philippines.

Actors found in this systemic literature review were national, intermediate, and local

governments, ruling and opposition parties, civil society, and international organisations and

donors. There were found two types of institutions in the nine selected countries: political

institutions (i.e. executive-legislative relations) and historically and socially embedded

institutions (i.e. Developmental State legacy, colonial legacy, authoritarian regime legacy,

centralised Kingdom legacy). In the case of East and Asian countries, the influence of

Developmental State legacy and authoritarian regime legacy were left a strong path

dependency in the process of decentralisation.

39

Rather than extensive changes in administrative, fiscal, and political dimensions, differences

were found in the types and degree of decentralisation across the nine East and South Asian

countries. Though the centralised legacies of East and South Asia, the degree of political

decentralisation is relatively higher than that of administrative and fiscal dimension. The

idea of deepening democracy plays a key role in the process of decentralisation in all

countries except China.

The sequence of decentralisation is also investigated though no clear causal pathway from

actors, interests, ideas, and institutions to the sequence due to limitations of data.

Lastly, as a consequence of decentralisation, the changes of intergovernmental balance of

power were different in the nine selected countries. By analysing actors and institutions

regarding decentralisation, the level of local autonomy after decentralisation can be

predicted by the planning and implementation deficits.

Discussions

Two distinctively different research trends were found in the 40 selected papers. While

papers about South Asian countries tended to focus on the issue of ‘Good Governance’,

papers about East Asian countries discussed more current status and ideal design of

intergovernmental relations.

In the case of research on South Asian countries, even though majority of the selected

papers dealt with decentralisation issues rather descriptive approaches, their conclusions

were gathered to the importance of ‘Good Governance’ (Dyer, 2005; Imai and Sato, 2012;

Jimenez, 2009; Kristiansen and Santoso, 2006; Langran, 2011; Tandon, 2001). ‘Good

Governance’ refers that the process for making and implementing decision with

accountability, transparency, predictability, and public participation (UNDP, 1997). In the

countries obtained high degree of local autonomy after decentralisation(i.e. India, Indonesia,

and Philippines), often, decentralisation resulted in not the transfer of authority from

central government to local governments but the transfer of authority from central

government to local elite (Gaiha and Kulkarni, 2002; Imai and Sato, 2012). Without

40

accountability and transparency, decentralisation merely transfers the field of corruption

from the central to local governments.

In several articles, ‘Good Governance’ is closely linked to the local governments’ capacity to

manage newly decentralised political, administrative, and fiscal systems. The case of India,

Indonesia, and Philippines demonstrated that the harmful consequences, such as lack of

accountability and corruption, of autonomous local government without proper capacity in

order to execute decentralised tasks (Jimenez, 2009; Kristiansen and Santoso, 2006; Langran,

2011). In particular, Kerala in India where decentralisation was promoted by radical

democratic movement mobilised by women advocacy groups was identified to have high

degree of accountability towards citizens but need to enhancing administrative and fiscal

management capacity (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2009).

In the same vein, several papers emphasized not only the importance of decentralisation

reform design itself but also the importance of decentralisation sequences and the

surrounding contexts (Dyer, 2005; Haque, 2010; Sudhipongpracha, 2013). It is reported that

political institutions (i.e. the executive and legislative relations), historical legacies (i.e.

Developmental State legacy, strong centralised bureaucracy), intergovernmental institutions

(i.e. inter-local fiscal disparity) facilitated and constrained decentralisation reforms in East

and South Asian countries. In particular, Dyer’s (2005: 151) regional comparative study in

India argued that decentralisation reform plans should contain not only the contents of

newly introduced decentralised institutions but also the ways to rearrange components of

current institutions and to build up capacity to implement decentralisation reforms.

Compared to the studies about South Asian countries, studies about East Asian countries

adopted more descriptive approaches and focused on the design of decentralisation

reforms. The focus of the East Asian countries’ research was not ‘Good Governance’ but the

status and ideal design of intergovernmental relations. Unlike India, Indonesia, and

Philippines, which obtained a high degree of administrative, fiscal and political autonomy

after decentralisation, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan gained a medium degree of local

autonomy after decentralisation. These three East Asia countries shared common features

of high degree of political autonomy with obscure intergovernmental division of

administrative and fiscal authority. Therefore, the main issues in East Asia countries were

41

the description of current status and the outcomes of the complex intergovernmental

relations, and how to improve the intergovernmental relations.

Future research avenues

In spite of ample discussions provided in the selected papers, several missing issues can be

reviewed here. First, majority of the selected papers adopted a descriptive approach rather

than theoretical approaches in order to illuminate causal mechanisms. Future researches

can take advantages of more concrete theoretical frameworks to elucidate more detailed

causal mechanism of decentralisation.

Second, while case studies for single country were dominant in the selected papers, a few

comparative studies existed. Comparative studies own advantages to explain causal

mechanism by discovering casual similarities and differences (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer,

2003). While there were a few cross regional and cross country comparative studies, there

were no cross sectoral comparative studies in the selected papers. Given the fact that

political dynamics differ across sectors (i.e. education, healthcare, social assistance), cross

sectoral comparative studies can add more insights to understand diverse dynamics and

consequences in decentralisation reforms.

Third, abundant of papers acknowledged that institutions play a key role in the processes

and outcomes of decentralisation. Broad social contexts and historically and socially

embedded institutions (i.e. Developmental State, Strong centralised bureaucracy) were

dealt with the main example of institutions. However, political institutions (i.e. legislative-

executive relations, election systems) were not regarded as important variables.

Fourth, few paper takes the view of decentralisation as an institutional change. Only Dyer

(2005) understood decentralisation as an institutional change and underlined the

requirement of a comprehensive approach including identification of each agency’s roles,

building of agency’s capacity, and promotion of cooperation. Furthermore, there are few

studies adopted a comprehensive approach about the interaction between agency,

institutions, structures, and ideas at the same time.

42

In conclusion, this systemic literature review showed that there are relatively lesser

research about the relation between decentralisation and intergovernmental balance of

power in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. There was no empirical study neither comparing

decentralisation reforms nor applying to historical institutional theoretical framework in

these three East Asian countries. Papers regarding Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan did not

consider the interaction between agency, institutions, structure, and ideas at the same time.

Therefore, comparative study about decentralisation in these three countries, cross-national

and cross-sectoral, is a significant work to fill this research gap.

43

The list of the selected 40 papers

NO Year Author Title country

1 2000 Brodjonegoro and Asanuma

Regional autonomy and fiscal decentralisation in democratic Indonesia

Indonesia

2 2000 Hill and Fujita State restructuring and local power in Japan Japan

3 2001 Heller Moving the State: the politics of Democratic decentralisation in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre

South Africa, India, Brazil

4 2001 Legaspi The changing role of local government under a decentralised state

Philippines

5 2001 Silver intergovernmental transfers and decentralisation in Indonesia

Indonesia

6 2001 Tandon Globalisation and decentralisation: emerging issues from the Indian experience

India

7 2002 Bossert and Beauvais

Decentralisation of health systems in Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and Philippines: a comparative analysis of decision space

Ghana, Zambia, Uganda, Philippines

8 2002 Gaiha and Kulkarni

Panchayats, communities, and the rural poor in India India (regions)

9 2003 Jacobs Develving Authority and expanding Autonomy in Japanese prefectures and municipalities

Japan

10 2003 Skinner et al. social and environmental regulation in rural China: bringing the changing role of local government into focus

China

11 2004 Hunter Local issues and changes: the post-new order situation in rural Lombok

Indonesia (regions)

12 2004 Tsui and Wang Between separate stoves and a single menu: Fiscal decentralisation in China

China

13 2005 Dyer Decentralisation to improve teacher quality? District institutes of education and training in India

India (regions)

14 2005 Lewis Indonesian local government spending, taxing and saving: an explanation of pre- and post-decentralisation fiscal outcomes

Indonesia

15 2005 Scheiner Pipelines of pork: Japanese politics and a model of local opposition party failure

Japan

16

2006 Kang Globalisation of the economy and localisation of politics?: Restructuring of Korean Developmental State via decentralisation

South Korea

17 2006 Kristiansen and Santoso

Surviving decentralisation? Impacts of regional autonomy on health service provision in Indonesia

Indonesia (regions)

18 2007 Sheng Global market integration and central political control: Foreign trade and intergovernmental relations in China

China

19 2008 Firman In search of a governance institution model for Jakarta metropolitan area (JMA) under Indonesia's new decentralisation policy: old problems, new challenges

Indonesia (regions)

20 2009 Ghai and Woodman

Unused powers: contestation over autonomy legislation in the PRC

China

21 2009 Jimenez Anatomy of autonomy: Assessing the organisational capacity and external environment of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao

Philippines (regions)

22 2009 Venugopal and Yilmaz

Decentralisation in Kerala: panchayat government discretion and accountability

India (regions)

23 2010 Chang Reforms and decentralisation in Korea and Russia: issues and research agendas in the center-periphery relations

South Korea, Russia

44

NO Year Author Title country

24 2010 Chien Economic freedom and political control in post-Mao China: a perspective of upward accountability and asymmetric decentralisation

China

25 2010 Haque Decentralising local governance in Thailand: contemporary trends and challenges

Thailand

26 2010 Lam Central-provincial relations amid greater centralisation in China

China

27 2010 Li Central-local relations in the people's republic of China: Trends, processes and impacts for policy implementation

China

28 2010 Yep Understanding the autonomy of Hong Kong from historical and comparative perspectives

China (regions)

29 2011 Langran Decentralisation, democratisation and health: the Philippine Experiment

Philippines

30 2011 Panday Local government system in Bangladesh: how far is it decentralised?

Bangladesh

31 2012 Imai and Sato Decentralisation, democracy and allocation of poverty alleviation programmes in Rural India

India (regions)

32 2012 Tsai, Hsu, and Chen

The effects of population aging, the ruling political party, and local governments on welfare spending in Taiwan: 1993-2007

Taiwan

33 2012 Wang et al. Fiscal reform and public education spending: a quasi-natural experiment of fiscal decentralisation in China

China (regions)

34 2013 Brixi et al. Engaging subnational governments in addressing health equities: challenges and opportunities in China's health system reform

China

35 2013 Kim Political decentralisation, subnational political capital, and intergovernmental transfers in Korea

Korea

36 2013 Kuo and So Pursuing revenue autonomy or playing politics? Fiscal behaviour of local governments in Taiwan

Taiwan

37 2013 Niu Fiscal decentralisation in China revisited China

38 2013 Song Rising Chinese regional income inequality: the role of fiscal decentralisation

China

39 2013 Sudhipongpracha The Specter of Leviathan in the central-local relations: a comparative historical analysis of the Decentralisation reform in Thailand and Philippines

Thailand, Philippines

40 2013 Yu Devolution: Discontinuity and dissonance Philippines

45

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