decentralisation policy in cambodia - united...

Decentralisation Policy in Cambodia

Exploring Community Participationin the Education Sector

U N I V E R S I T Y O F T A M P E R E

ACADEMIC DISSERTATIONTo be presented, with the permission of

the Faculty of Education of the University of Tampere,for public discussion in the Paavo Koli Auditorium, Kanslerinrinne 1,

Tampere, on August 10th, 2007, at 12 o’clock.

ARNALDO PELLINI

DistributionBookshop TAJUP.O. Box 61733014 University of TampereFinland

Cover design byJuha Siro

LayoutSirpa Randell

Printed dissertationActa Universitatis Tamperensis 1235ISBN 978-951-44-6977-0 (print)ISSN 1455-1616

Tampereen Yliopistopaino Oy – Juvenes PrintTampere 2007

Tel. +358 3 3551 6055Fax +358 3 3551 [email protected]/tajuhttp://granum.uta.fi

Electronic dissertationActa Electronica Universitatis Tamperensis 627ISBN 978-951-44-6978-7 (pdf )ISSN 1456-954Xhttp://acta.uta.fi

ACADEMIC DISSERTATIONUniversity of TampereDepartment of EducationFinland

Table of contents

Abbreviations and acronyms viiiAcknowledgments xiAbstract xiiiTiivistelmä xv

1 Introduction 171.1 Researchthemesandthedevelopmentdebate 181.2 Researchquestions 211.3 Thesisoutline 22

2 Theoretical framework of the study and findings of previous relevant research 24

2.1 State,educationanddevelopment 262.2 Definitionsandformsofdecentralisation 292.3 Findingsfrompreviousresearchondecentralisation 35

2.3.1 Qualityrationaleandeconomicargument 362.3.2 Politicalrationaleandparticipationargument 38

3

2.4 Decentralisationandschoolbasedmanagement: regionalexperiences 43

2.4.1 Asia 452.4.2 Africa 482.4.3 LatinAmerica 51

2.5 Concludingremarks 53

Cambodia: history and human development profile 553.1 Developmentandeducationinanhistoricalperspective 55

3.1.1 OriginsandFrenchprotectorate:until1953 563.1.2 The“GoldenAge”:KingdomofCambodia1953–1970 583.1.3 KhmerRepublic:1970–1975 593.1.4 DemocraticKampuchea:1975–1979 603.1.5 ThePeople’sRepublicofKampuchea:1979–1989 643.1.6 Transitiontowardspeaceanddemocracy:1989–present 66

3.2 HumandevelopmentprofileofCambodia 673.2.1 Humandevelopmentandeconomicgrowth 693.2.2 Humandevelopmentandhealth 703.2.3 Humandevelopmentandeducation 72

4 Decentralisation reforms in Cambodia and characteristics of Khmer communities 76

4.1 DecentralisationandtheelectionofCommuneCouncils 774.2 Decentralisationintheeducationsector 81

4.2.1 ClusterSchools:keyaspects 824.2.2 PriorityActionProgramforbasiceducation 87

4.3 Cambodiancommunities:mainconcepts 914.3.1 Kinshipandpatronage 924.3.2 Thequestionoftrust 944.3.3 Buddhismandcommunities 95

5 Research methodology 1005.1 Personalcontextoftheresearch 1005.2 Researchmethodologyandthedualroleresearcher–advisor 1025.3 Researchactivitiesandtheirlimitations 106

5.3.1 Literatureanddocuments 1075.3.2 Interviews 1085.3.3 Surveys 1095.3.4 Participants’observations,andpersonalcommunications 110


6 Community participation in schools: findings from Kampong Thom province 112

6.1 HumandevelopmentprofileofKampongThomprovince 1136.2 Bondingsocialcapital:characteristicsofSchoolAssociations 1196.3 Bridgingsocialcapital:thelinkbetweentraditionalassociations 128

6.3.1 Casestudy:Botumpagodaasaspaceforcommunityaction 1296.3.2 Strongorweakbridges? 133

6.4 Institutionalsocialcapital:linksbetweencommunities, schoolsandpublicinstitutions 138

6.4.1 Characteristicsofassociations’supporttoschools 1386.4.2 Decisionmakingandtrust 1446.4.3 CommuneCouncils 146


7 Conclusions 1517.1 Summaryoffindings 152

7.1.1 Decentralisationofeducation 1527.1.2 Themeaningof‘community’ 1537.1.3 Communityparticipationinschools 155

7.2 SituatingtheCambodianexperienceandpolicysuggestions 1567.2.1 Suggestionsforthenationallevel 1587.2.2 Suggestionsforthelocallevel 159

7.3 Directionsforfurtherresearchandconcludingremarks 160

References 162

Data sources 180

Annex 1 – List of interviews, observations and personal communications 183Annex 2 – Leading questions for interviews 186Annex 3 – School Association Checklist 187Annex 4 – Map and list of School Association checklists 196Annex 5 – Statute of Botum Pagoda Association 1952 198Annex 6 – List of traditional associations in Kampong Thom 201Annex 7 – Social Map of Don Lao pagoda (Stoung district) 203

List of FiguresFigure2.1.Formsofdecentralisation 30Figure2.2.Synergisedsocialcapitalmodel 43Figure2.3.Schoolclusterstructure 46Figure3.1.Demographictrendmale/female1950–2010 61Figure3.2.MapofCambodia 68Figure3.3.Populationestimatebyagegroup1994/2004 68Figure3.4.HumanDevelopmentIndextrendinselectedcountries 69Figure3.5.GNPpercapita1998/2002atPPP 70Figure3.6.Lifeexpectancyinselectedcountries1997/2003 71Figure3.7.Mortalityrate-5inselectedcountries 71Figure3.8.PrevalenceofHIVinselectedcountries (%ofpopulationages15–49) 72Figure3.9.Adultliteracyinpopulationabove15inselectedcountries 72Figure3.10.EducationexpendituresaspercentageofGDP inselectedcountries 74

Figure4.1.AdministrativestructureinruralCambodia 77Figure4.2.CommuneCouncilstructure 80Figure4.3.Decentralisedgovernanceofeducationand thepublicadministration 87Figure4.4.Pagodaascentreofcommunitylife 96Figure4.5.WatSangvorakinKampongThomandtrainingmeetinginasala 97Figure4.6.Anachar 97Figure4.7.Pagodaorganisationandsocialdevelopment 99Figure5.1.Locallevelanalysis 105Figure5.2.Policylevelanalysis 105Figure6.1.MapofKampongThomprovincewithinCambodia 113Figure6.2.MapofthedistrictsofKampongThomprovince 114Figure6.3.EducationattainmentmaleandfemaleinKampongThom 117Figure6.4.SchoolAssociationstructureandlinks 119Figure6.5.Distributionofcommitteemembers 120Figure6.6.Frequencydistributionofelectionsof SchoolAssociationmembers 122Figure6.7.Correlationage/numberofrolesinthecommunity 123Figure6.8.MembershipofSchoolAssociations 124Figure6.9.Percentagedistributionofthenumberofrolesin thecommunitybyassociations’members 124Figure6.10.Cumulativepercentageorrolesincommunityandvillage 125Figure6.11.FrequencydistributionofSchoolAssociationmeetingsperyear 127Figure6.12.MapofthedistrictofStoungwithBotumpagoda 129Figure6.13.PacocomemberswithtwofacilitatorsfromGTZandPDRD 136Figure6.14.Distributionofnumberofcontributionsprovidedby SchoolAssociations 139Figure6.15.Typesofcommunitycontributionstoschools 140Figure6.16.Typesofmaterialcontributions%ofpositiveanswers 141Figure6.17.DiscussiontopicbetweenSchoolAssociationmembers andschoolstaff 142Figure6.18.FrequencyofmeetingsbetweenSchoolAssociation membersandschoolstaff 142Figure6.19.Distributionofeducation-relatedprojectsfrom CommunePriorityActivitymatrixKampongThom2004 147Figure6.20.VillageNetworkapproach 149

List of TablesTable2.1.Formsofdecentralisationanddelegation 32Table2.2.Formsofdecentralisationandqualityrationale 33Table2.3.Formsofdecentralisationandpoliticalrationale 34Table3.1.Transitionofpolitical,legalandeconomicsysteminCambodia 56Table3.2.PrimarylevelNetEnrolmentRatio 73Table4.1.DonorsupportedprojectsinClusterSchools 84Table4.2.PriorityActionProgramsforeducation 88Table5.1.Sourcesofquantitativedataandstatistics 108Table5.2.Numberofresearchinterviews 109Table5.3.Numberofresearchobservationsandpersonalcommunications 111Table6.1.Percentagechangeofmaleandfemaleoccupationby economicsectorinKampongThom 115Table6.2.NetEnrolmentRatioboysandgirlsinprimaryschoolbydistrict (schoolyear2004/2005) 116Table6.3.Internationaldevelopmentorganisationsin KampongThomprovince 118Table6.4.NumberofschoolinKampongThomclusters 121Table6.5.FrequencyoffemalemembershipinSchoolAssociations 125Table6.6.Modalitiesofdisseminationofinformationto parentsandvillagers 128Table6.7.Capitalandfamilysupportincreaseinthe SchoolAssociationsofBotumandKantongRong 132Table6.8.AnnouncementofSchoolAssociationmeetingstothecommunity 135Table6.9.AssociationsrepresentedbyPacocoin2003 137Table6.10.Associations’beneficiariesin2003 137Table6.11.Problemsforcommunityparticipationinschoolgovernance 143

viii Decentralisation policy in Cambodia

ADB AsianDevelopmentBank

ADRA AdventistDevelopment&ReliefAgency

AusAID AustralianAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

BFDK BuddhistforDevelopmentKampongThom

CARERE CambodiaAreaRehabilitationandRegenerationProject

CAS CentreforAdvancedStudies

CBRDP CommunityBasedRuralDevelopmentProject

CDC CouncilfortheDevelopmentofCambodia

CDRI CambodiaDevelopmentResourceInstitute

CEFAC CommuneEducationForAllCommittee

CNGO CambodiaNon-GovernmentalOrganisation

CPK CommunistPartyofKampuchea

CPP CambodianPeople’sParty

DANIDA DanishInternationalDevelopmentAgency

DED DeutscherEntwiklungsdienst(trans.GermanDevelopmentService)

DfID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment

DK DemocraticKampuchea

EDUCO EducaciónconParticipacióndelaComunidad(trans.EducationwithCommunityParticipation)

EFA EducationForAll

ESP EducationStrategicPlan

ESSP EducationSectorSupportProgram

FAO FoodandAgriculturalOrganization

FUNCINPEC FrontUniNationalpourunCambogeIndépendant,Neutre,Pacifique,etCoopératif(trans.NationalUnitedFrontforanIndependent,Neutral,Peaceful,andCooperativeCambodia)

Abbreviations and acronyms

ixAbbreviations and acronyms

GDP GrossDomesticProduct

GDPWG Government-DonorPartnershipWorkingGroup

GNP GrossNationalProduct

GRET GroupedeRechercheetd’EchangesTechnologiques

GTZ GesellschaftfürTechnischeZusammenarbeit(trans.GermanAgencyforTechnicalCooperation)

HDI HumanDevelopmentIndex

IFAD InternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment

IIEP InternationalInstituteofEducationalPlanning

JICA JapaneseInternationalCooperationAgency

KHR CambodianRiel(Cambodiannationalcurrency)

KR KhmerRouge

LAMC LawonAdministrationandManagementofCommuneCouncils/Sangkats

MoEYS MinistryofEducation,YouthandSport

MoF MinistryofEconomyandFinance

MoH MinistryofHealth

MoP MinistryofPlanning

MRD MinistryofRuralDevelopment

MVFL MostVulnerableFamilyList

NEFAC NationalEducationForAllCommittee

NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisation

NIS NationalInstituteofStatistics

NPRS NationalPovertyReductionStrategy

OECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

Pacoco PagodaAssociationCoordinationCommittee

PAP PriorityActionPlan

PDRD ProvincialDepartmentforRuralDevelopment

PPP PurchasingPowerParity

PRK People’sRepublicofKampuchea

PRSP PovertyReductionStrategyPaper

PTSD PostTraumaticStressDisorder

RGC RoyalGovernmentofCambodia

SEDP Socio-EconomicDevelopmentPlan

SIDA SwedishInternationalDevelopmentAgency

x Decentralisation policy in Cambodia

SWA Sector-WideApproach

TPO TransculturalPshyco-socialOrganisation

UN UnitedNations

UNCDF UnitedNationsCapitalDevelopmentFund

UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

UNESCO UnitedNationsEducationalScientificandCulturalOrganization

UNICEF UnitedNationsChildrenEducationFund

UNOPS UnitedNationsOfficeforProjectServices

UNTAC UnitedNationsTransitionalAuthorityinCambodia

USAid USAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

USD UnitedStatesDollar

VDC VillageDevelopmentCommittee

WCEFA WorldConferenceonEducationforAll

WEF WorldEducationForum

WFP WorldFoodProgramme

WHO WorldHealthOrganization

xiAcknowledgments

Acknowledgments

In December 2006, in a seminar with the PhD researchers of the Department ofEducationoftheUniversityofTampere,Ipresentedmyreflectionsontheprocessof writing this doctoral dissertation and compared it with a marathon run. Botharelonesomeactivities.Bothalternatemomentsofgreatexcitementwithlowpointswhereonehastofindnewstrength.Inbothcasesstartingdoesnotsecurethecross-ingofthefinishline.Inbothcasesthesupportprovidedbyothersisveryimportant.This thesis couldnothavebeencompletedwithout family, friendsandcolleagueswhoatdifferentstagesoftheprocessandindifferentways,sometimewithoutmaybeknowing,havehelpedme.

FirstofallIwouldliketothankmysupervisorProf.TuomasTakala.Withhisac-tiveguidanceithasbeenpossibletobridgethedistancebetweenFinlandandCam-bodiaduringmyfouryearsinKampongThom.Moreover,hissupervisionandad-vicehavemademeexplorethesubjectofeducationandlocalgovernanceandgreatlyhelpedwiththemethodologicalaspectsof thethesisaswellasduringthewritingprocess.Theexternalexaminers,Prof.HolgerDaunandDr.KimmoKosonen,pro-videdusefulcommentsandsuggestionstoimprovethemanuscriptandclarifysomeofitsparts.

Many people have helped me during my stay in Cambodia to learn about thecountry,itshistory,anditspeoplethroughtheirstoriesandtheirdailystruggleforabetterlife.GiventhehelpIhavereceivedfromsomanyitisdifficulttoacknowl-edgeonlyfew.Neverthelesssomepeoplehavebeenparticularlyhelpfulanddeservespecial thanks.Firstof all,Da Nary, who worked with me as project assistant forDaNary,whoworkedwithmeasproject assistant forfouryearsandwithoutwhomIwouldhavenotbeenabletoconductinterviewsandlistentopeople’sstories.IwouldliketothankalsoSarinSamphorswhotranslateddocumentsfromKhmertoEnglish,conductedinterviewsinthefield,andprepareddataforthestatisticalanalysis.ThestaffofthelocalNGOswithwhomIworkedtopromotecivil societyparticipation in localgovernanceandwhohavehelpedwiththedatacollectionaswellasinorganisingmeetingsinvillagesandpagodas.Inpar-ticular,HongChhunHeang,YannSavan,PutBunkung,SorSothy,OuchSorn,PengSinal,LyKom.IamgratefultothemembersofPacocoinStoungdistrictwhohave

xii Decentralisation policy in Cambodia

taughtmethroughtheirworktherelevanceofBuddhistvaluesforcommunityde-velopment:GnekHay,SunChuot,ChhinYe,ThyNam,ChangKhea,MokMy,HongThoy,SothSim,EanTheun,TopEav,YotNorng,BuonNorm.ThecolleaguesofthecommunitydevelopmentcomponentofGTZinKampongThom:TopThat,KannSotheavy,ChanSotheavy,PengSan,SouSoveary.

I need also to thank DED Cambodia as well as the team leaders of GTZ withwhomIworked,MartinOrthandAngelikaFleddermann.Theyprovidedsupporttoattendconferencesandhaveallowedfor theresearchactivities togoalongsidetheprojectwork.DorotheeBoelinghelpedtoimprovemypresentationskillsfortheconferenceIattendedatvariousstagesoftheresearch.Jean-ChristopheDieparthasprovidedsupportandusefulsuggestionswiththestatisticalanalysis.

Severalpeopleprovidedfeedbackonarticleswritteninpreparationtothisdisser-tationandonpartsofthemanuscript.Inparticular,IamindebtedtoDavidAyresacolleagueandafriendwhohasbeenasourceofinspirationwithhisworkoneduca-tionandstateformationinCambodiaaswellasforproof-readingthefinalmanu-scriptandprovidingcommentsonspecificparts.CristianoCalcagnoforhisindepthknowledgeoftheCambodianhistoryandsociety.WalterAschmoneitalwaysfoundthetimetoreplytomymanyquestionsonthemeaningof‘community’inCambodiaandthelinksbetweenBuddhismandcollectiveaction.LynnLosertprovidedusefulcommentsforthesectiononeducationreformsinCambodia.LucdeMeesterpro-videdmewithfeedbackattheinitialstagesoftheresearchandhasbeenasourceofopenandcriticaldiscussionaboutthedecentralisationreformsdiscussedinthethe-sis.ThefriendsofthePhDseminarattheDepartmentofEducationoftheUniversityofTampereprovidedsuggestionsatvariousstagesoftheresearch.

TheresearchstipendsfromtheUniversityofTampereFoundationhavehelpedtoconcentratefulltimeonwritingthedissertation,whileagrantfromtheResearchFund(tiederahasto)ofthecityofTamperehassupportedtheprintingcostsofthethesis.

Idedicatethisthesistomydaughters,OlgaandVenla,andtothememoryofmybrother,Marco.Tomymother,Karin,whohasalwayssupportedmyinterestinde-velopmentandcultures.Mywife,Katja,whohasbeenasourceofconstantsupportduringthisjourneyallowingthisresearchtobepartofourfamilylifeforthelastfewyears.ItisbecauseoftheirsupportthatIcouldcrossthefinishline.

Toallofyou, ((Soum âr-kun)!

HaNoi,May2007

xiiiAbstract

Thisstudyanalyses thecharacteristicsofcommunityparticipation inCambodianruralschools.ItlooksatthespacesforparticipationcreatedbythedecentralisationreformsthatthegovernmentofCambodiahasundertakenintheeducationsectorthroughtwomainpolicies:schoolclusteringandPriorityActionProgramme.Whileinstitutionalisedspacesofparticipationcreatedbythesepoliciesarerelativelynew,Cambodiancommunities,despitetwentyfiveyearsofpoliticalturmoil,havetradi-tionallyprovidedsupporttoschoolsthroughschoolassociations.Thestudyreferstobonding,bridging,andinstitutionalsocialcapitaltoexplore,respectively,thechar-acteristicsofthehorizontallinksbetweencommunitymembersaswellasdifferentformsofcollectiveaction,andthevertical linksbetweencommunity,schoolsandlocalgovernmentinstitutions.

Researchactivitieshavebeenconductedattwolevels.Thefirst,‘policylevelanaly-sis’,concernedthereviewofrelevantliteratureonsocialcapitaltheory,theprinciplesofdemocraticdecentralisation,Cambodianmodernhistory,nationaldecentralisa-tionreforms,andthehumandevelopmentprofileofCambodia.Thesecond level,‘locallevelanalysis’,focusedontheprovinceofKampongThomtoinvestigatetradi-tions,normsandvaluesthatcharacterisecommunityparticipationinschoolsandlocalsocialdevelopment.Qualitativeaswellasquantitativeempiricaldatahavebeenobtained through participant observations, questionnaires and checklists, projectmonitoringdata,andsemistructured interviewswithcommunitymembers, localgovernmentauthorities,developmentworkers,andprojectstaff.

The analysis from Kampong Thom demonstrates that traditional associations,particularly under the umbrella of the local pagoda (Buddhist temple), representformsofcommunityactionsthatwereamongthefirstinstitutionstore-activateaf-tertheendofthecivilwarandKhmerRougeperiodin1979.Thelinkagesbetweenmembersofthesetraditionalassociationsarestrongandbasedontrust.Thisshowsthatbondingsocialcapitalisthedrivingforcebehindcommunitymobilizationandcommunity support to schools.At the same time,bridging social capitalbetweenschoolassociationandothertypesofcommunitybasedgroupsisstillweak.Like-wise,institutionalsocialcapitalbetweenschoolassociationsandschoolsishampered

Abstract

xiv Decentralisation policy in Cambodia

bymistrusttowardsschoolofficialsandparents’reluctancetobecomemoreinvolvedineducationalmatters.

The conclusion of the study is that, while traditional associations provide ma-terialcontributionsandsupporttoschools,theirparticipationininternaldecisionmakingprocessaswellaseducationalmattersisstilllimited.ThetraumacausedbyyearsofconflictsandtheCambodiansocioculturalnormsarefactorsthatexplainthedifficultyinestablishingmoredemocraticspacesforparticipation.Inaddition,decentralisationpoliciesineducationhavesofarpromotedcommunityparticipationinschoolsthroughthecreationofad hoccommitteesandcouncilsthathavefailedtogainthesamelegitimacyenjoyedbytraditionalassociationsatvillageandcom-munitylevel.

xvTiivistelmä

Tämä tutkimus erittelee yhteisöjen osallistumisen ominaispiirteitä Kambodžanmaaseutu kouluissa. Tutkimus tarkastelee hallinnon hajauttamisen, joka koulu-tuksenosaltaontoteutettupääasiassakahdenohjelman;koulujenklusterionninjaPriorityActionProgramohjelmankautta,luomiaosallistumisenmahdollisuuksia.Vaikka institutionaaliset puitteet yhteisöjen osallistumiselle ovat verrattain uusia,kambodžalaisetyhteisöt,kahdestakymmenestäviidestäpoliittisensekasorronvuo-destahuolimatta,ovattarjonneettukeakouluilleperinteistenkouluyhdistystenkaut-ta.Määrittäessäänyhteisöjenjäsentenvälisiähorisontaalisiasuhteitajakollektiivisentoimimanmuotoja,sekävertikaalisiasuhteitayhteisöjen,koulujenjahallinnollistentoimielintenvälillätutkimustukeutuusosiaaliseenpääomanteorioihin.

Tutkimus on toteutettu kahdella tasolla. ’Poliittisten ohjelmien analyysi’ sisäl-tää kirjallisuuskatsauksen sosiaalisen pääoman teoriaan, hallinnon hajauttamisenperiaatteisiin, Kambožan historiaan, Kambožan hallituksen toteuttamiin hallin-nonhajauttamisohjelmiin,jaKambožaninhimillisenkehityksenprofiiliin.Toinen’paikallisentasonanalyysi’kuvaayhteisönosallistumisentapoja,normejajaarvojapakalliskehityksessäjakouluissaKampongThominläänissä.Tutkimuksenempiiri-nenkvalitatiivinenjakvantitatiivinenaineistoonkerätty;observoimalla,kyselylo-makkeidenjatarkistuslistojenavulla,kehityshankkeidenseuranta-aineistoista,sekähaastattelemallayhteisönjäseniä,paikallisvirkamiehiäjakehitysyhteistyöntekijöitä.

TuloksetKampongThominläänistäosoittavatpaikallistenyhdistysten,jaerityi-sestipagodojen (Buddhalainen luostari) yhteydessä toimivienyhdistysten, edusta-vanensimmäisiäsiviilisodanjaPunaistenKhmerienaikakaudenpäätyttyä1970el-pyneitäyhteisöllisentoiminnanmuotoja.Jäsentenvälisetsuhteetnäissäperinteisissäyhdistyksissäovatvankatjaperustuvatkeskinäiseenluottamukseen.Jäsentenkeski-näistensiteidenmuodostamasosiaalinenpääomaonkintukemassayhteisöjenosal-listumistamukaanlukienavunantoakouluille.Samaanaikaanyhteydetperinteistenkouluyhdistystenjamuidenyhteisönsisällätoimivienryhmienvälilläovatkuitenkinyhäheikot.Tämänlisäksiepäluottamuskouluviranomaisiakohtaanjavanhempienhaluttomuusosallistuakoulutuksenkehittämiseenhaittaainstitutionaalisensosiaa-lisenpääomankehittämistäkoulujenjaperinteistenkouluyhdistystenvälillä.

Tiivistelmä

xvi Decentralisation policy in Cambodia

Tämän tutkimuksen päätelmänä perinteisten yhdistysten osallistuminen kou-lujen sisäiseen päätöksentekoon ja koulutuksen sisältöön on vähäistä, vaikka netarjoavatkinmerkittävääaineellistatukeajalahjoituksiakouluille.Sodanaiheutta-ma trauma ja Kambožan yhteiskunnalliset ja kulttuuriin luomat normit selittävätosaltaandemokraattistenosallistumisenmuotojenpuuttumisen.Lisäksihallinnonhajauttaminen koulutussektorilla on tähän asti toteutettu ohjelmien kautta, jotkaluovatuusiakomiteoita janeuvostoja tukemaanyhteisönosallistumistakouluissa.Nämäuudetrakenteeteivätolesaaneetsamanlaistaasemaajaluottamustayleisöissäkuinpaikallisetperinteisetkylä-jakuntatasonyhdistykset.

1 Introduction

Thecoreofeducationistheculturewhicheachgenerationpurposelygivestothosewhoaretobeitssuccessors,inordertoqualifythemforatleastkeepingup,andifpossibleforraising,the level of improvement which has been at-tained.

J.S.Mill,18671

It’sJanuary1979.VietnamesetroopsentertheCambodiancapitalPhnomPenhandfinditalmostempty.TheKhmerRougeleadersarefleeingnorth-westtowardstheThaiborder.Thecountryisonitknees.Yearsofcivilwar,theinvolvementintheAmerican–Vietnameseconflict,andthreeandhalfyearsundertheregimeledbyPolPothavecausedthedeathofmorethan1,7millionpeopleandthedisplacementandbreak-upofhundredofthousandsoffamilies.Theeconomyisnonexistentandmoneyisnolongerincirculation.Peopleinruralareas,whohadbeenforcedtoworkincollectivelabourcamps,sufferfromseriousfoodshortages.Roadsandirrigationinfrastructuresareinverypoorconditions.Mostschoolshavenotbeenusedforyearsandhealthcentresarenonexistentorempty.Unexplodedordinancesorlandmineslitterthecountryandmakeruralareasextremelydangerous.Mostoftheeducatedpeoplehavegoneabroadorhavebeenkilledandnomorethan300qualifiedpersonsfromalldisciplinesareleftinthecountry(Duggan1996).

Cambodia,withitshistory,maybeanextremeexample;itdoes,howeverrepre-sentasignificantcasetoasksomebasicquestionsaboutdevelopment:whereshoulddevelopmentstart?Whataretheinterventionsorsectorsthatneedtobeprioritised?Whoshouldprioritise?SincetheendofWorldWar-II,answerstothesequestionshavebeendifferentatdifferentpointsintime.Inthelate1950sandthe1960s,mod-

1 CitedinSmith(1957).

18 Decentralisation policy in Cambodia

ernisation theories emphasised the importance of industrialisation and economicgrowth. In the mid 1970s, development began to look also at basic needs such aseducationandhealth.Inthe1980sstructuraladjustmentandmarketeconomyre-formsunderlineddevelopmentinterventions,whilepovertyreduction,democratisa-tionandgoodgovernancearethefocussincethe1990s.Ontheonehand,alltheseapproachesdemonstratethecomplexityofdevelopment.Ontheother,theydemon-stratetheinfluencethatdifferent,andattimescontradictory,ideologiesexertintheefforttoliftThirdWorldcountriesoutofpoverty.

1.1 �esearc�� t��emes and t��e develo�ment debate�esearc�� t��emes and t��e develo�ment debate

Todayasubtlesenseoffailureseemstopermeatedevelopmentandinternationalaid.Tosimplifyacomplexdebate,criticsofcurrentdevelopmentapproachesarguethatthestrategiesandpoliciesdesignedduringthelastfiftyyearshavenotworkedmostlybecause aid and development are driven by planners who have failed to motivatecountries,haverisenexpectationsthathavenotbeenmet,haveadoptedglobalblue-printapproaches,andhaveshownalimitedconsiderationofthelocallevel(Easterly2002,2006).Ontheotherhand,therearethosewhoarguethataidanddevelopmentneedtobescaleduptobecomeaglobalefforttoaddressthemainconstraintsinthesocialandeconomicsectorsthatarecrucialfordevelopmentandeconomicgrowth.Thestrategies,theyargue,arethere;indicatorssuchastheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsprovidetheframework,andindustrialisedcountriesshouldkeepthepromiseofprovidingthe0,72percentoftheirGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)todevelop-mentassistance(Sachs2005).

Thedebate isopenand thechallenges remain.About100millionchildrenarestillnotenrolledinprimaryschool,55percentofthemaregirls.Sevenhundredsandseventyonemillionpeopleaged15andabovelivewithoutbasicliteracyskills(UNESCO2006).3Povertyremainswidespread.Thepercentageofpeoplelivingbe-low1or2USDperdayisdecliningonlyveryslowlyinSouthAsiaandSub-SaharaAfrica, has fallen quite sharply in China and East Asia, but at the same time hasrisen sharply in the formerSovietUnioncountries (Sutcliffe 2001).Theefforts ofinternationaldevelopmentagenciesaredescribedassufferingfrom‘donorsfatigue’,whiletheUnitedNationsisdescribedas“atroubledorganisationthathasneverbeensobadlyneedednorsoill-equippedtodealwiththechallengesitfaces–indevelop-ment,humanrights,HIV/AIDSprevention,internationalsecurityandpeacekeeping(GuardianWeekly2006:11).

2 ThisthesisadoptstheEnglish(UK)standardnumberformat.3 This is aglobal figure from theEFAGlobalReport2006which includesdata fromdeveloping

countries,countriesintransition,anddevelopedcountries.

19Introduction

Todayitisrecognised,asWheelanputsit,that“thereisnotaprovenformulaforgrowththatcanberolledoutinacountryaftercountrylikesomekindofdevelop-ment franchise” (2002: 207). The complexity of development processes cannot beadjustedonalinearpath,asarguedbymodernisationtheorists,anditmustbeun-derstoodasa‘qualitativechange’thatinvolves,besideseconomicgrowth,socialaswellasculturalchanges(Jacobs2000).

Thepresentstudyisconcernedwiththisqualitativechange.Inparticular,withtheimportanceoflocalandtraditionalnormsandvaluesfordevelopmentprocesses(seealsoLittle1999,Smith2003).FocusingontheruralareasofCambodia,thethesisexploresthreemainthemes:educationasakeysectorfordevelopment,institutionalreformsbasedongoodgovernanceanddecentralisation,andthecommunitydynam-icsofparticipation.Themainaimofthisstudyistocontributetounderstandingoftheinfluenceoflocalculture,definedastraditionalnormsandvaluesofcommunitysolidarityandaction,forlocalgovernanceandeducationmanagementattheschoollevel.WithregardtoCambodia,itisoftenassumedthatduetothecivilwarandtheKhmerRougeregime,socialcohesionoutsidetheextendedfamilycircleisextremelyrareorevenmissing.Theunderlyingargumentofthisstudyisthattraditionalcul-tureandsocialcapitalinCambodiaextendbeyondthesebordersandthat,thoughbadlydamaged,localcultureandtraditionalformsofcollectiveactionhavesurvivedandcanbeconsideredanimportantelementofthedecentralisationreforms.

This introductionserves topresenttheresearchquestions, thestructureof thethesis,andtosketchthemainthemesofthestudywhicharethefollowings:

Education as human capital and human right: earlyeconomicdevelopmentthe-oriesconsiderededucationandknowledgeasavitalelementofeconomicgrowthanddefineditas‘humancapital’.Thislimitedviewofeducationhasbeenchallengedbytheevidencethatthereisnotaclearcausalrelationbetweeneducationandeconomicgrowth(Lópezetal.1998,Easterly2002).Moreover,educationhasitsowncomplexi-tiestodealwith.Weick(1976)definedtheeducationsystemas‘looselycoupled’-thatis,asystemwhereelementsaretiedtogetherwithminimuminterdependenceand,whileallelementsofthesystemareresponsibleforthefinaloutcome,theyalsopre-serveanownidentityandseparateness.Thiscomplexityshowsthatthedevelopmentofasectorsuchaseducationdoesnotfitalinearmodelofdevelopment.Educationhastobeconsideredasabasicneedandahumanrightinitself(TakalaandTapa-ninen1995),whichplaysafundamentalroleinenhancingtherangeofindividuals’choicesandcapabilities(Sen1999).

Democratic decentralisation as an element of good governance: “Decentralisa-tionhasquietlybecomeoneofthefashionsofourtime”(Manor1995:81).Thisisduetothefactthattheaimofdecentralisationis“toachieveoneofthecentralaspirationsofmodernity:democratisation”(Agrawal1999:15).Atthesametime,decentralisa-tionalsorepresentsa“refugefromtheover-concentrationofpowerinlargebureau-cracies”(Smith1988:211).Bothaimsaretypicalofthereformistviewof‘thirdway’


politicswhichenvisagestheroleofthestateasbeingmid-waybetween“theviewofthepoliticalrightthatseesthestateastheenemyandwantstoreduceitssizeandtheleftwhichseesthestateastheanswer”(Giddens1998:76).

Decentralisationpolicieshavebeenadoptedinanumberofdevelopingcountriesasacentralelementof institutionalreformsbasedontheprincipleofgoodgover-nance, defined here as “the process where rules and well functioning institutionsareappliedtomanageanation’saffairsinamannerthatsafeguardsdemocracy,hu-manrights,goodorderandhumansecurity,andeconomics”(Tiihonen2004:18).Good governance has been found to have a casual relationship with developmentoutcomessuchashigherpercapitalincomes,lowerinfantmortalityandhigherlit-eracy (Kaufmann et al. 1990). Decentralisation reforms are complex phenomena,withculturalimplicationsthatcanchallengetraditionalnormsandvaluesaswellassocialstructures.Forthisreason,variousauthorshaveemphasisedtheneedformorecountryandsector-specificempiricalevidence,particularlywithregardtothelinkbetween decentralisation and community participation (McGinn and Street 1986,Lauglo1995,Fiske1996,Govinda1997,LitvackandSeddon1999,Manor1999,Mc-GinnandWelch1999,UNESCO2005).

Local culture and community participation: two extreme views dominate thedebateabouttherelationshipsbetweencultureanddevelopment.Thehyper-modern-ist perspectivearguesthatculturemattersbecausetraditionalculturesareunsuitedtoeconomicgrowthandmarket-orienteddevelopment.Thecultural critics’ perspective,ontheotherhand,remarksthatmodernisationtheorieshaveledtoaneo-colonisa-tionofWesternidealsinthedevelopingnationswhichcreatesandexacerbatesin-equalitiesbetweenrichandpoorcountries(RaoandWalton2004).Thesetwoviewsrepresenttheoppositeendsofacontinuum.

Culture is receiving increasinglyattentionwithin thedevelopmentdebate.TheUNDP,forexample,dedicatedits2004HumanDevelopmentReporttoculturaldi-versityandstressedthat“culturallibertyandhumanrightsareimportantaspectsofhumandevelopment–andthusworthyofstateactionandattention”(UNDP2004:6).Inthisthesis,cultureisanalysedthroughthelensofcommunityparticipation,definedascivicparticipationinpoliticalprocessesaswellasformsofmutualinter-actionandsocialsolidaritythatareinfluencedbyculturalelements(Sen2004).Inordertoavoid,assuggestedbyLewin(1999)andSen(2004),takingadeterministicand insularviewofculture, this thesisapplies socialcapital theory toanalyse thecharacteristicsofcommunityparticipationandexplorethenormsandvaluesthatcharacteriseparticipationinlocalgovernanceandschoolmanagementinruralar-eas.

Culturalelementsofasocietymaynotalwaysbevisibleandtheycanbetterbeimaginedasanicebergwiththevisiblepart,themanifest culture,beingthe language,manners,food,etc.Theunderwaterpart,thecore culture,isformedbymoralnormsvaluesandthe fundamentalphilosophiesof life.Thecollective cultureof thesoci-

21Introduction

ety,andthereforethecharacteristicsofcommunityaction,resultfromtheinterac-tionbetweenthesetwoparts(Vaskoetal.1998).Policymakers,therefore,inordertomakeinformeddecisions,needtobeawareabouttheculturalelementsthatdefinenormsandvaluesandguidecollectiveaction(Bonnal1997).

1.2 �esearc�� uestions�esearc�� uestions

ThisthesisistheresultoffouryearsspentinCambodiaworkingasanadvisorforcivil society and local governance in the province of Kampong Thom and, at thesametime,collectingtheresearchmaterial.WhilethisexplainswhyCambodiahasbeenchosen,Cambodiarepresentsarelevantcaseforotherreasonsaswell.WhileitremainsoneofthepoorestcountriesinSoutheastAsia,since1998Cambodiahasreachedarelativestabilityandhasbeenimplementinginstitutionalreformsthatfo-cusongoodgovernanceanddecentralisationwhichcontrastwithanextremelyhi-erarchicalsocialstructure.

Asinthecasewithotherpost-conflictcountries,thetransitiontowardsamoredemocraticsocietyimpliesaculturalchangewhichcanalsoberesisted.AsnotedbyKaoKimHourn,“Cambodia’sattempt toembracedemocraticculture,valuesandideasisnotsimple.Thechallengetopoliticalstabilitytodaystillemanatesfrommis-trust,misperceptionsandtheimpactsofalonghistoryofconflictsandfactionalism(1999:17).

The largestpartof theacademic literatureonCambodia focuseson itshistoryand,inparticular,ontheKhmerRougeyears.AsnotedbyCoyne(2001),educationhasbeenasomehowneglectedareauntilveryrecently(seeBray1999,Sloper1999,Ayres2000,Clayton2000,BrayandBunly2005).Thespecificanalysisofthecharac-teristicsofcommunityparticipationandCambodiansocialcapitalhavebeenlimitedtoprojectreportsandaWorldBankpublication(seeKrishnamurthy1999,ColettaandCullen2000).Byplacingitselfamidstthefieldofcommunitydevelopmentandeducation,thisthesishopefullyprovidesanadditionalperspectivetotheanalysisofthelinksbetweendemocraticparticipatorygovernanceanddecentralisationreformin Cambodia. Lessons from Cambodia can also serve to inform policies in otherpost-conflictcountriesundertakingdecentralisationandhavinglimitedcommunityandcivilsocietyparticipationindevelopment.

Themainquestionofthestudyisthefollowing:

InthecontextofthedecentralisationreforminCambodia,whataretheelementsthatcharacterisecommunityparticipation–orlackthereof–inschoolsinruralareas?


Theresearchanalysestheeffectsofdecentralisationfromthelocallevelpointofviewand the influence on norms and values that characterize Cambodian society andparticipationinruralareaswithreferencetoeducation.Indoingso,thefollowingspecificquestionsareasked:

• Whatarethecharacteristicsofthedecentralisationreform,inparticularoftheeduca-tionsector?

• What is themeaningof ‘community’ intheculturalandsocialcontextofCambo-dia?

• Whatarethecharacteristicsofcommunityparticipationinschools?

This thesis incorporates findings from the collection of empirical data with datafromprojectactivities.Apartfrombeingadoctoraldissertation,itisdirectedatde-velopmentpractitionersthatareapproachingCambodiaforworkandareinterestedinderivingin-depthinformationaboutthemeaningofcommunityandcommunitydynamicsvis-à-visthedecentralisationreform.Thepolicylevel,aswellasthelocallevelanalysisofthisstudy,provideinformationforresearchersworkingontherela-tionshipbetweencommunitiesandschools,aswellasthelinkbetweensocialcapitalandcommunitydevelopmentinSoutheastAsia.

1.3 T��esis outlineT��esis outline

ThetheoreticalframeworkoftheresearchispresentedinChapterTwo.Thechapterstartswithanoverviewofthedebateontheroleofthestateindevelopmentandtheargumentsthatunderpindecentralisationreforms.Thechapterthencontinuespre-sentingsomedefinitionsofdecentralisationandcomparingdifferent formsof thereform.Inthelasttwosections,thechapterfocusesonthecentralthemeofthisthe-sis,participationanddecentralisation,usingtheanalyticalframeworkofsocialcapi-taltheoryandthelinkswitheducationandschoolbasedmanagement.ThechapterendswithexamplesofcommunityparticipationinschoolmanagementfromAsia,Africa,andLatinAmerica.

ThehistoryofCambodia,withspecificattentiontothepost-independenceperiodsince1953,isthesubjectofthefirstpartofChapterThree.ThechapterhighlightsthelinksbetweenhistoryandthenormsandvaluesofCambodiansociety.Thesec-ondpartofthechapterpresentsthehumandevelopmentprofileofCambodiaand,bycomparing itwithneighbouringcountries, situates thehumandevelopmentofCambodiainthecontextofSoutheastAsia.Thesectionfocusesoneducationand,inparticular,onthestateofprimaryeducation.

Thedecentralisation reforms ineducationaswell aspublic administrationarepresentedinChapterFour.Thechapterconcludeswithadescriptionofthemainso-

23Introduction

cialandreligiouselementsthatcharacteriseCambodiansocialcapitalinruralareasandthemeaningof‘community’.

Chapter Five describes the research methodology presenting also the personalcontextoftheresearcherduringthefouryearsintheprovinceofKampongThom.Thecomparativeanalysisofthequantitativeandqualitativeresearchparadigmsisusedinthesecondpartofthechaptertopresentthedatacollectiontoolsaswellasthelimitationsofthestudy.Thechapterendswiththedescriptionofthemainre-searchactivities.

ChapterSixisconcernedwiththeanalysisofthequantitativeandqualitativeem-piricaldata.AswithChapterThree, theprovinceofKampongThomispresentedthroughthecomparisonofitshumandevelopmentindicatorswiththeonesofotherprovinces.Thefollowingsectionspresenttheresultsoftheanalysisofcommunityparticipationandschoolsalongthethreemainsocialcapitaldimensions:thebond-inglinkbetweenmembersofSchoolAssociations;bridginglinksandspacesofpar-ticipationbetweendifferentcommunitygroups;andtheinstitutionallinkbetweencommunity,schools,CommuneCouncils,andlocalgovernmentbodies.

Thefinalchapterofthethesissummariesthemainfindingsoftheresearchrefer-ringtothemainquestionsandthetheoreticalframeworkpresentedinChaptersOneandTwo.Thefinalpartofthechapterpresentssomepolicyoptionsaswellasthepossibledirectionsforfurtherresearchandstudiesinthisfield.


2 T��eoretical framework of t��e study and findings of �revious relevant researc��

Developmentisaprocessofchange.Whetheritcomesfromwithinasocietyorisintroducedthroughexternalsupport,thechangemustconfrontthetraditionalval-uesoflocalcultures,oftenleadingtounpredictableeffects.JaneJacobs(2000)high-lightsitscomplexityandunpredictability,describingdevelopmentasanopenendedprocess,aqualitativechangethat“can’tbeusefully thoughtofasa line,orevenacollectionofopen-ended lines. Itoperatesasawebof interdependentco-develop-ments.”(p.19).Inthisrespect,developmentisanincrementalprocessthatwithtimeincreasesincomplexity.Putnametal’s(1993)analysisoftheelementsthatarefunda-mentaltoapluralisticdemocracyisbutoneofmanystudiesandtheoreticalpositionsthatfocusesonthehow ofdevelopment.Theirstartingpointisthatdemocracyisthepredominantmodelthatshapesthepoliticalvaluesofoursociety.However,itsappli-cationhasalsoledtodissatisfactionwiththepracticalresultsthatdemocracybringsindifferentsocialandculturalcontexts.AccordingtoPutnametal.(ibid.),economicgrowthandinstitutionaldevelopmentarenotsufficienttosecuredemocracy.Thereistheneedfortwoadditionalelements:decentralisationofpowerandanactiveciti-zens’participationintheformofsocialcapital,whicharethesubjectsofthisstudy.

Decentralisationisawidespreadtrendindevelopingcountries.In1999,astudyconcludedthat“outofseventy-fivedevelopingcountrieswithmorethanfivemillioninhabitants…sixty-three…aretakingstepstodecentralise”(Rossi1999:14).Morerecently,astudybyWork(2002)indicatedthatmostdevelopingcountriesaremak-ingmovestowardsdecentralisationreforms.In1997,52countrieshadcarriedoutfiscaldecentralisationpolicies.1 In1999,outof126countries in theWorldBank’sWorldDevelopmentReporttables,96hadatleastonesub-nationallevelofelectedgovernmentand46hadtwosub-levels.

1 SeealsoWorldBank(1997,1999).

25Theoretical framework of the study and findings of previous relevant research

Decentralisationhasbeenappliedduringthelasttwodecadesindifferentregionswithdifferentobjectivesandoutcomes.Generallyspeaking, inAfricadecisionstoadoptdecentralisationhavecoincidedwiththepoliticalchangefromone-partytomulti-party democracies and the increased policy focus on poverty reduction. InLatinAmerica,theshiftfromauthoritarianregimestodemocraticallyelectedgov-ernmentsresultedinagreaterattentiontotheintegrationofmarginalisedgroupsineconomicdevelopmentpolicies.Inex-socialistcountries,decentralisationhasbeencoupled with market-based economics to represent the alternative to centralisedeconomicplanning.Meanwhile, inEastandSouthAsiadecentralisationhasbeenmotivatedbytheneedtoprovideandimproveservicedeliverytolargepopulationsagainst a backdrop of recognising the limitations of a centralised administration(Bonnal1997,Litvacketal.1998,Ford1999,Manor1999,SDC2001,Work2002).

During the last twentyyears, support todecentralisationand localgovernancehavebecomemajorfieldsofoperationformostbilateralandmultilateraldonors.Ac-cordingtoanOECD(2004)report,supportusuallyhasalongtermperspectiveandcomesinthreemainformsdependingonthespecificcircumstancesinaparticularcountry:a)Creatingafavourablelegalandpoliticalenvironmentwhichinvolvesad-viceandtechnicalsupportforframingrelevantlegislationandpolicy;b)Assistancetostartimplementationthroughtrainingprogrammesforgovernmentstaffatvari-ouslevelsandassistancetoframespecificregulationssuchas,forexample,planningandfundtransfers;c)Assistancetodeepenandsustaindecentralisationthroughas-sistanceinsectordevolution,fiscaldecentralisationand/orsupporttocivilsocietygroups.

Despite its extensive adoption, there is limited evidence of the positive resultswhich directly stem from decentralisation (Manor 1999, Turner 2002, Astiz andWiseman2005,UNESCO2005).DyerandRose(2005)havesuggestedthatthis istheresultoftheincreasingattentiononwhytodecentraliseandwhat wemeanbydecentralisation,andalimitedcriticaldiscussionon“howtododecentralisationef-fectively”(p.109).

Asalientcharacteristicofdecentralisationisthatitdoesnotconformtoasinglepoliticalandeconomicideology.Rather,asnotedbyManor(1999),ineachcountrywheredecentralisationhastakenplace,itrepresentsaseriesofcausesthatledtodif-ferentformsofdecentralisation.Forthisreason,MohanandStokke(2000)arguethatdecentralisationissupportedbybothaneo-liberalperspectivelinkedtoeconomicefficiencyargumentsandamoreradicalperspectivewhichfavoursamultiplicityoflocalinitiativesthroughthepromotionofthehumandevelopmentandknowledgeatthelocallevel.

This chapter presents the concepts that form the theoretical framework of theresearch.Itstartswithanoverviewofthedebate,duringthelastfiftyyears,abouttheroleofthestateindevelopment.Thechapterthencontinuesbypresentingsomekeydefinitionsanddifferentformsofdecentralisation.Thethirdpartofthechapter


exploresthepromisesaswellasthe limitationsofdecentralisationreformsonthebasisoffindingsfrompreviousresearchandhighlightsacentralthemeofthisstudy:therelationshipbetweenparticipationanddecentralisationinthecontextofsocialcapitaltheory.Inthefourthpart,thechapterpresentssomeexperiencesofdecen-tralisationindevelopingcountrieswithparticipatoryschoolbasedmanagement.

2.1 State, education and develo�ment

AmartyaSen(1988)hasnotedthateconomictheoryhasalwaysbeenaboutdevelop-ment.Nevertheless,thestudyoftheeconomicdevelopmentprocessesofdevelopingcountriesgainedrecognitiononlyaftertheWorldWar-IIbecauseoftheeconomictheoriesof JohnMaynardKeynesand theestablishmentof theWorldBank(thencalled International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the Interna-tionalMonetaryFundattheBrettonWoodsconferencein1944.2

Keynes,inhisGeneral Theory of Employment, Interest and Money(1936),assertedtheimportanceofaggregatedemandasthedrivingfactoroftheeconomy,breakingwithmostclassicaleconomistswho,since the lateeighteenthcentury,hadarguedthattheeconomicprocesswasbasedoncontinuousimprovementsinpotentialout-puts.Keynestheoryattributesacentralroletothegovernmentindevisingpoliciestopromotedemandandfighthighunemploymentofthesortseenduringthegreatdepressionofthe1930s(Manor1999).Thesetheoriesalsoshapedeconomicpolicesindevelopingcountries,whichwere (and in somecases still are) trapped inwhatNurske(1953)definedasa‘viciouscycleofpoverty’.Inbrief,thismeansthatlimitedsavingcapacityresultsinlimitedcapacitytoinvest,ultimatelyleadingtotheadop-tionoflabourintensiveproductiontechniquesversustechnologyimprovementsandincreasedproductivity.Thislimitsthecreationofthenecessarysurplustoproducesavingsand therefore investments.Tobreak thisviciouscycle, economistsarguedthattherewastheneedfora‘bigpush’(Rosenstein-Rodan1961).Poorcountriesre-quiredlargeamountsofinvestmentinbasicindustriessuchaspower,transport,andcommunications.Theseweretobesupportedbyotherproductiveinvestments.Sincetheinvestmentsnecessaryforthe‘bigpush’wereconsideredtobebeyondthemeansoftheprivatesector,thestateassumedacrucialrole(ibid.).

Duringthe1950s,thesetheoriesledtothedesignofcentralisedmodernisationstrategiesthataimedatachievinghigherratesofeconomicgrowthandmirrortheprovision of public services in the developed world and/or the perceived success-ful rapid industrialisation of the Soviet Union (Turner and Hulme 1997, Burki etal.1999,Manor1999,Addison2005).Duringthe1950s,developmentwasequatedwitheconomicmodernisationtobeachieved,asdescribedinthetake-offmodelby

2 IneedtothankDavidAyresforbringingthispointtomyattention.


AmericaneconomistW.W.Rostow,throughfivelinearstagesofeconomicgrowth:traditionalsociety,preconditionsfortake-off,take-off,drivetomaturity,andhighmassconsumption(Rostow1960).Publicservicessuchaseducationdidnotreceivespecificattention,althoughitwasbelievedthatcentralplanningcouldprovidestan-dardeducationtoallandhelpconsolidateasenseofnationalunity(RiddelRubin1997,Bray2001).

Intheearly1960s, theeconomicdevelopmentdebateshifted.HansSingerrea-sonedthatthemainproblemineconomicdevelopmentwasnottheincreaseinthecapitalstockbutratherthe‘capacity’toincreasecapitalandproducewealth(1961).Theodore Schultz (1962) developed this idea further and coined the term human capitaltodescribethecrucialcontributionofknowledgeandschoolingforeconomicgrowth.Humancapital, inotherwords, canbedefinedas “the sumof skills em-bodied within an individual (i.e., education, intelligence, charisma, creativity, ex-perience).Whatwouldbeleftifsomebodywouldbestrippedawayofallassets:job,money, home, possession” (Wheelan 2002: 99). Schultz argued that in developingcountries“itissimplynotpossibletohavethefruitsofmodernagricultureandtheabundanceindustrywithoutmakinglargeinvestmentsinhumanbeings”(ibid.:120).AccordingtoSchultz,governmentshadanimportantroletoplayindevelopingedu-cationandtraininginstitutions.

The followingdecade is importantbecauseofa“critical re-examinationof theprocessofsocialandeconomicdevelopment”(Thorbecke2000:28).Qualitativeaswellasquantitativedatafromdevelopingcountriesshowedthepersistenceofhighratesofunderemploymentandageneralisedincreaseinthenumberofpeoplelivingbelowthepovertyline.Thefactthateconomicgrowthdidleadtopovertyreductionhelpedtofurtherseparatetheconceptofdevelopmentfromeconomicgrowth(Arndt1987).OfparticularimportancewerethecontributionsbyDudleySeersandMahbubulHaq,whoarguedthattheevidencefromtwodecadesofsocio-economicdatafromdevelopingcountriesshowedthateconomicgrowthdidnot translate intopovertyreduction.Theysuggestedthatpovertyneededtobetackleddirectly,andthatthefocusshouldmovefromtherateofgrowthtothequalityofgrowth.Meanwhile,theWorldBank,underthepresidencyofRobertMcNamara,begantosupporttheideathatpovertyshouldbetackleddirectlyandintroduceddevelopmentplansdefinedbyobjectivesandindicatorsaimedatincreasingtheincomeofthepoorestlivinginruralareas (Arndt1987).Singer(1979)posited thatdevelopmentshouldreach themarginalised and poor by concentrating on rural areas, providing education andhealthservices,strengtheningtheparticipationofpeople indecisionmakingpro-cesses,andsupportingadministrativedecentralisationasopposedtocentralplan-ning.Thestate,though,maintainedacentralresponsibilityinimplementingwhattheInternationalLabourOrganisationdefinedin1975asaBasic Needs Approach.

Inthelate1980s,“theintellectualpendulumswungback(albeitwithconsiderableresistance)towardsthemarketmechanism”(Addison2005:11).Threebasicpoints


underline this shift.The firstwas theeconomiccrisis in thedevelopingcountries(Thorbecke 2000). Second, with the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in theUnitedKingdomandUnitedStates,therewasrenewedemphasisonneo-liberalmar-ketmechanisms.Thiswassupportedbyacriticalperceptionbydevelopingcoun-triesthattheBasicNeedsApproachwouldactuallypreventmodernisationandkeepthempermanentlybehind thedevelopednationsby focusing, forexample,on theuntappedpotentialoftheinformalsector(Arndt1987,Adelman2000).AthirdpointislinkedtothepolarisationbetweenWesterncapitalismandEasternsocialismthatproceededthefalloftheBerlinWall(Addison2005).ThetermWashington Consen-sus,coinedbyJohnWilliamsontodefineapolicyagendaoftheWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFundtobedesirableinLatinAmerica,becamethestandardtermtodescribethepolicyprescriptionstodevelopingcountriesduringthe1980sandmid1990s.ThemainthrustofthesocalledStructural Adjustment Programme,wastopromotefreetrade,toreorientandreducepublicsectorexpenditures,supportprivatisation, reducepricedistortionsbyminimisinggovernment interventions intheeconomy,andachievecapitalaccumulation(Adelman2000,Williamson2004).Humancapitalaccumulationcontinuedtohaveanimportantrole.Economists’in-fluencedbytheEndogenous Growth Schoolstressedthatprogressstemsfromalloca-tionofinvestmentsinresearchanddevelopmentandthedisseminationofknowhowbetween industries and sectors (Adelman 2000). Governments maintained, there-fore,alimitedbutimportantroleandtheNew Institutional Economics Schoolarguedthateveninaneoclassicalworld,thesuccessorfailureofdevelopmenteffortswilldependonthenature,existenceandproperfunctioningofacountry’sfundamentalinstitutions(Thorbecke2000).

Bytheearly1990s,thesuccessfuldevelopmentofsomeEastAsiancountriesthatdidnotfollowthestructuraladjustmentprinciplesandtheworseningofhumande-velopment indicators in several countries thatdidundergo structural adjustment,contributedtoareturnof the focusonpovertyreduction(Adelman2000).At thesametime,theemergenceofthepoliticaldiscourseassociatedwith‘thirdway’poli-ticsstartedtoinfluencetheeconomicdevelopmentdebate.The‘thirdway’argumentisthatthereistheneedforthestatetoreformandacquireanewroleindevelop-mentandeconomicpolicy(Giddens1998,2005).ForThomas(1991),“governmentsneedtodolessinthoseareaswherethemarketworks,orcanbemadetowork.Atthesametime,governmentsneedtodomoreinareaswheremarketscannotbere-liedupon”(p.8).ThissecondareaisofparticularrelevanceforGiddens,whonotestheimportanceforthestatetobecometransparentandaccountable,guaranteetheruleoflaw,rootoutcorruption,helptodevelopacivilsociety,pursueequalitywhileembracingmarketmechanisms,andstimulateseconomicinvestmentsineducation.Inotherwords,thestateshouldfacilitatethecreationoftheconditionsthatexpandindividuals’freedomandchoices(Sen1999).Thesepoliciesareevenmorerelevant


fordevelopingcountries,“thoughmoredifficulttoachievegivenlimitedresourcesandinadequatelydevelopedinstitutions(Giddens2005:15).

Today,developmenttheoriesdescribethisnewroleofthestateandthesetofin-stitutionsthatareconducivetoacceleratedgrowthandsocio-economicdevelopment(Thorbecke2000).Thestatehasthereforeacquiredtheroleoffacilitator,inbuildinganinstitutionalenvironmentbasedontheprinciplesofgoodgovernanceanddemo-craticparticipationnecessarytoachievesustainabledevelopment.Oneofthemainstrategies,decentralisationreform,ispresentedinthenextsection.

2.2 Definitions and forms of decentralisation

Atamostbasic level,decentralisationrefers tobringinggovernmentcloser to thepeople.However,asnotedbyBrayandMukundan(2003),decentralisationmeansdifferent things to different people. Govinda argues that it is neither possible nordesirabletoidentifyonedefinitionfordecentralisation(1997).Forthesereasons,itisbettertodescribetheformsthatdecentralisationcantake,underlyingonebasicprincipleofdecentralisation: ‘subsidiarity’, according towhich“themosteffectivegovernance of any organisation occurs when authority for decision-making is lo-catedascloseaspossibletothesitewheretheactiontakesplace”(McGinnandWelch1999:94).

Rondinellietal.(1983)haveprovidedafirstcategorisationanddifferentiatedbe-tween: deconcentration; delegation, devolution and privatisation. These categorieshavebeendevelopedfurtherbyotherauthorsandrepresentthedefinitionsadoptedbytheWorldBank(Figure2.1).3

• Political decentralisation:theaimistogivecitizensandtheirelectedrepresenta-tivesmorepowerinpublicdecisionmaking.Thisformisoftenassociatedwithpluralisticpoliticsandsupporttodemocratisation.Thisisthemostfavouredformofdecentralisationbyinternationaldonorsbutalsothemostdifficulttoachieveasitrequiresconstitutionalreforms,thedevelopmentofpluralisticpoliticalpar-ties,strengtheningoflegislature,thecreationofpoliticalunits,andencourage-mentofeffectivepublicinterestgroups.

• Administrative decentralisation: is the transfer of responsibility for planning,financingandmanagingcertainpublic functionsfromthecentralgovernmentanditsagenciestofieldunitsorgovernmentagencies(e.g.provincialordistrictlineagencies).Thiscategoryisfurtherdividedintothreesub-categories,depend-ingonthedegreeofautonomygrantedbythehighestlevelauthoritytothelocalagencies:

3 See also Litvack et al. (1998) and Rondinelli (1999).SeealsoLitvacketal.(1998)andRondinelli(1999).


➢ Deconcentration:theredistributionoffinancialandmanagementtasksandresponsibilitiesamongdifferentlevelsofthecentralgovernment.Thisisoftenconsideredtheweakestformofdecentralisationandisoftenusedinunitarystates.

➢ Delegation:thecentralgovernmenttransfersdecisionmakingresponsibilitiestosemi-autonomousorganisationsnotwhollycontrolledbythecentralgov-ernment,butultimatelyaccountabletoit.

➢ Devolution: the transfer of authority, decision making, and managementpowertoquasi-autonomousunitsoflocalgovernmentwithcorporatestatus.Theseunitshaveowngeographicalboundariesandmaybeabletoraisefundslocally.

• Fiscal decentralisation:localgovernmentsaregivensomeautonomyforthecol-lectionanduseofresourcesneededtoimplementplannedtaskseffectively.Formsoffiscaldecentralisationareuserfees,contributionsofmoneyorlabour,andlocaltaxes.Thisformofdecentralisationisconsideredrareindevelopingcountries.

• Economic and market decentralisation:theshiftoffunctionresponsibilitiesfromthepublictotheprivatesector.Functionsthathadbeenprimarilyorexclusivelytheresponsibilityof thegovernmentarecarriedoutbybusinesses,communitybased organisations, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), and voluntaryassociations.Itispossibletodistinguishbetweentwoforms:➢ Privatisation:canrangeinscopefromleavingtheprovisionofgoodsandser-

vices entirely to the free operation of the market or to ‘public-private part-nerships’ in which government and the private sector cooperate to provideservicesorinfrastructures.

��u��

�ORMS O� DECENTRALISATION

POLITICALDECENT�ALISATION

ADMINIST�ATIVEDECENT�ALISATION

FISCALDECENT�ALISATION

ECONOMICDECENT�ALISATION

DELEGATION

DECONCENT�ATION

DEVOLUTION

P�IVATISATION

DE�EGULATION


➢ Deregulation:thecompetitionamongprivatesuppliersforservicesthatinthepasthadbeenprovidedandthatremainunderpubliccontrol.

Manor(1999)adoptsadifferentapproachtodefinedifferentformsofdecentralisa-tion.Heapplies theprinciple that thecentralgovernmentmust retain some formofcontrolandinvolvementintheprocess,andthenseparatesformsthatbelongtodecentralisationfromformsthatfalloutside.Hestartswiththelattergroup:

• Decentralisation by default:thesituationwhenthepublicsector,duetosevereadministrativeandfinancialconstraints,cannotensurethedeliveryofbasicser-vices.Theseareoftentakenupbycommunitybasedorganisationsthroughself-help initiativesorNGOprojects. Inbothcases, thecentralgovernmenthasnocontrolorcannot influence theactivitiesat the local level, thuswithouta linkbetweencentralandlocallevelitisnotpossibletotalkofdecentralisation.

• Privatisation:thedeliveryofpublicservicesistakenoverorisgiventotheprivatesector.Alsointhiscase,thegovernmentlosesthecontrolovertheactivitiesatthelocallevel.Oneriskassociatedwithprivatisationisthatstatemonopoliescanturnintoprivatemonopolies.AsnotedbyTurnerandHulme(1997),privatisationhasbeenaddedtotheformsofdecentralisationbyRondinelliduetotheinsufficientscopeprovidedbytheterritorialdimensionofdecentralisationindefiningdiffer-enttypologiesofthepolicy.

• Delegation: when the responsibility to manage the implementation of projectsandprogramsisgiventopara-statalbodiessuchasad hocinterorintra-ministe-rialcommittees.Manorarguesthatthissolutionhasverylimitedevidenceand,inthefewoccasionsthatithasbeenapplied,hasfailedtotransferdecisionmakingpowertothosebodies.

ForManor,genuinetypesofdecentralisationare:

• Deconcentration or administrative decentralisation: thedispersalofresponsi-bilitiesfromhigherlevelofgovernmenttolowerlevelagencies.Inthiscase,thegovernmentretainspoliticalauthorityandcontrolonthelowerlevels.

• Fiscal decentralisation:theprocessthroughwhichthecentralgovernmentgivesfinancialresponsibilityto lowerlevelofadministration.Alsointhiscase, locallevelbureaucratsremainresponsibletohigherlevelsoftheadministration.

• Devolution or democratic decentralisation: the transferofpoliticalpower,de-cisionmakingauthority,andaccountabilitytolowerlevelauthoritieswhicharelargelyorwhollyindependentofhigherlevelsofgovernmentandwhicharedem-ocraticinsomewaysandsomedegrees.

Giventhemanyformsdecentralisationcantake,Manor’stypologiesareusefulbe-causetheyhelptoseparatewhatis‘in’andwhatis‘out’,usingtheprincipleofgov-


ernment involvement.Withregard toprivatisation, it ispossible toargue that thegovernmentmaynotcompletelylosecontrolbecause,forprivatisationtotakeplace,thereistheneedtodefinerulesandregulationsthatwillprovideaframeworkforprivateinitiatives.Thedifferencebetweendeconcentrationanddecentralisationre-quiresanadditionalcomment.InManor’sview,deconcentrationrepresentsarela-tivelyeasystep,sincethegovernmentretainspoliticalcontrol.Thedifficultyariseswiththedelegationtolocalauthoritiesofdecisionmakingauthorityandfinancialautonomyimplicitindemocraticdecentralisation.Forthisreason,mostdecentrali-sationreformshavebeenlimitedtodeconcentration(Manor1999).

AnadditionaldescriptionofthedifferentformsofdecentralisationisprovidedbyTurnerandHulme(1997)whoarguethatthebasisfortransferofauthorityandresponsibilitytolowerlevelscanbetwofold:‘territorial’and‘functional’(Table2.1).Itisterritorialwhenservicesaregeographicallyclosertotheclients/citizens,whileitisfunctionalwhenauthorityistransferredtoanagencythatisfunctionallyspe-cialised.

T��

B�� D��

Territorial Functional

N��u

��

D��

��

��

Within formalpolitical structures

D��v��u�� I�� G��up�� R��p��

Within public administration D��P��

Qu��

Form state tonon-state

P��v��P��v��

N�� u��

Source:TurnerandHulme1997.

TurnerandHulmeintersectterritorialandfunctionaldelegationwithdifferentde-greesofdelegation,rangingfrom‘withinthestate’ to ‘non-state’.Alongthe ‘terri-torialdimension’ theydefinedevolution,deconcentrationandprivatisationwhichhave been seen earlier. Along the ‘functional dimension’, Turner and Hulme listthreeadditionalformsofdecentralisation.Thefirst,Interest Groups Delegation,hasnotreceivedmuchattentioninthedecentralisationliterature;thesecondreferstothetransferwithintheadministrationtoad hoccommitteesinchargeofspecificactivi-tiesdefinedasParastatalandQuangos,4likewisetothedelegationinthedefinition

4 Quangos, abbreviation of ‘quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations’. These aresemi-publicadvisoryandadministrativebodysupportedbythegovernmentandhavingmostofitsmembersappointedbythegovernment(TheConciseOxfordDictionary1982).


bytheWorldBankandRondinelli.DifferentlytoManor,TurnerandHulmeindicatePrivatisationasthethirdformofdecentralisationandspecifythatitdoesnotreferexclusivelytotheprivatesectorbutalsoto‘thirdsector’actorssuchasNGOs.

ForTurnerandHulmenoneoftheseformsmaybefoundinrealityalone;theyareratherinterlinkedwhenthespecificcircumstancesofacountryareconsidered.Moreover,decentralisationdoesnotimplythatallauthoritymustbedelegated;thecentralgovernmentmustinfactretaincontroloveressentialnationalmattersandre-organise,ifneeded,decentralisedunits.Anadditionalproblem,indevelopingcoun-tries,iswhatTurner(2002)defines,asinthecaseofCambodia,‘piecemealdecen-tralisation’: whendifferentformsofdecentralisationresultfrominitiativesplannedbyseparateministriesindifferentsectorsleadingtopolicycoordinationproblemsanddiscrepancies.

Withregardtothedecentralisationofeducation,twoauthorsareparticularlyrel-evantforthepresentstudy.ThefirstisJonLauglo,whoseanalyticalstartingpointistherecognitionofthetraditionalbureaucraticcentralisminbuiltintheeducationsector(1995).SimilarlytotheterritorialdimensionofTurnerandHulme(1997),heconsidersdecentralisationofeducationinspatialtermsanddefinesitasthedistribu-tionofauthorityfromacentralpointtowardstheperiphery.Lauglothenproceedsbydifferentiatingtwomainrationalesfordecentralisation:a‘politicalrationale’,linkedtothefactthateducationcanbeasourceofchangeinthepowerrelationsamonggroupsinthesociety(Table2.2);anda‘qualityrationale’,wherebydecentralisationshouldpursuequalityandtheefficientuseofscarceresources(Table2.3).

T�� qu��y ��

QUAL

ITY R

ATIO

NALE

Ch��Typ�� -

��Eff��

P��

Autonomy of s�ecific �rofes-sional categories (e.g. teac��ers).

Being �art of t��e category means to �osses skills

Inde�endent local level grou�s

Limited �artici�atory democ-racy since �rofessional grou�s

��ave decision �ower

M�� y ��j��v��

Promotion of efficiency and activities becomes goal oriented t��roug�� t��e use of measurable

Indicators

Centralised �lanning and evaluation

Hig�� skills needed and �rocesses not always �artici-

�atory

M��k�� h�-��

Com�etition im�roves services PrivatisationNo country ��as a��lied a

100% �rivatisation of �ublic services

D��Transfer to local official of �oliti-cal aut��ority and management

tasks

Political decentralisa-tion

Government is closer to local demands and needs t��roug��

�artici�ation in decision mak-ing �rocesses

Source:Lauglo1995.


Basedonthesetworationales,Laugloidentifieseightformsofdecentralisation.Aswith Turner and Hulme, he also mentions that no decentralisation process takesplaceinjustoneoftheseforms,butthereisalwaysacombinationoftheserationalesbehindcertaindecentralisationforms-forexample,whenthequalityrationaleofmanagement by objectives resultsinanorientationtowardstheprivateprovisionofeducationalservices.

T�� p�� p�� p�� p�� p��

POLIT

ICAL

RAT

IONA

LE

Ch�� Typ�� Eff��

L��Individual freedom and trust in invisible ��and of market

mec��anismMarket based �rivatisation

May increase ine�uality in access to basic services

��Service �rovided under federal

state aut��orityFederalism

Can offset inde�endence movements

P�pu�� -��

Em�owerment of communities and fre�uent ex�ression of

�o�ular will. Use of manage-ment by objectives

Partici�atory management and community based

bodies

Im�rovement in �o�ular �artici�ation, little need for

tec��nical assistance and learn-ing from ex�erience

P��p��y ��y

T��ose w��o work in institutions s��ould also be able to influence t��e decision making �rocesses

wit�� limited outside control

Inside management t��roug�� s�ecific/local management

bodies

Cor�oratism is en��anced and lead to creation of flat

organisations

Source:Lauglo1995.

Thishasbeenthecasewithmarketbaseddecentralisationandprivatisationchar-acteristicofthestructuraladjustmentprogrammesinthe1980s.Atthesametime,Lauglo argues that the post-modernist idea of people’s participation may supportthepopulist localismorparticipatory democracy politicalrationalestogetherwiththedeconcentrationqualityrationalessotoensuretheempowermentoflocalcommuni-tiesthroughparent-teacherassociationsandcommunityschoolmanagementcom-mittees.Lauglo’sanalysisisrelevantbecauseitlinksthepoliticalnatureofeducationdescribedbyFiske(1996)withdifferent formsofdecentralisation.For thepresentresearch, particularly relevant are forms of decentralisation related to popular lo-calismandparticipatorydemocracy,becausetheseformsaremostcloselylinkedtocommunityparticipationinschools.

Thesecondauthor,whoseworkisparticularrelevanttothisstudy,isR.Govinda.Hefocusesonthedecentralisationofthemanagementofeducationandreasonsthat“decentralisationlexicallyimpliesmovingawayfromthecentre”(1997:5).Depend-ingonthespecificcontextandcircumstances,thiscanimplyaspreadingofcentralcontroltolocalunitsoragreaterempowermentofthesemanagementunits.Govindarefers to forms of decentralisation, but prefers to adopt the concept of trends. Heidentifiesthreemaintrendsindecentralisation.Thefirsttrendisreflectedbythede-cisiontoaddtothe“existingpoliticalandadministrativestructureanumberofde-


concentratedordecentralisedbodies,eitheratthelocallevelaloneorattwoorthreelevels”(p.6).5Thesecondtrend,‘delegation’,relatestothe“transferofsomedecisionmakingpowerstobodiesoutsidethegovernmentbureaucracy”(ibid.).RatherthanNGOs,thisgenerallyinvolves“para-statalentitiescreatedbythestateitselftohandlespecialareasofpublicconcern”(ibid.).Athirdtrendistheonelinkedto‘devolution’, whichGovindaconsidersasthemostgenuineformofdecentralisationofmanage-mentfunctions.Inthiscase,heexplains,“specifiedpowersaretransferredtosub-national units through appropriate legal reforms; generally these units consists oflocalself-governmentconstitutedthroughdemocraticmeans”(p.7).AswithManor,inthecaseofprivatisationGovindaarguesthatthereisnoevidencesupportingtheideathateducationisbeingcompletelyhandedovertotheprivatesectorandthatthegovernmentshouldcontinuetoexertsomeformofcontrolonsuchanessentialpublicservice.

Severaltasksandresponsibilitiescanbetransferredthroughdecentralisationtothelocallevel.TheanalysisofGovindahelpstofocusonmanagementandcommu-nityparticipation,which isalsoreferredtoasschool-based management. Includedintheconceptofschool-basedmanagementareknowledge, technology,materials,people,timeandfinances,allofwhicharetobemanagedwithadegreeofautonomywithin the schools (Abu-Duhou1999).Caldwell (1994) suggests that school-basedmanagementrefersto“developmentsinsystemsofpublicorgovernmentschoolsinwhichtherehasbeensignificantandconsistentdecentralisationtotheschoollevelofauthorityandresponsibilitiestomakedecisions,inparticular,totheallocationofresources” (pp. 5302-5303). “Therefore,” he continues, “it is administrative decen-tralisation rather than political decentralisation” (p. 5305). When associated withincreasedparticipationbyparentsandcommunitymembers,school-basedmanage-mentacquiresapoliticaldimensionbecauselocalstakeholdersreceiveamoredirectresponsibilityineducation.Inthiscase,asarguedbyDeGrauwe(2005),itismoreappropriatetospeakof‘schoolbasedgovernance’,“whichimpliesgivingauthoritytoalocallyelectedschoolboardwhichrepresentsparentsandthecommunity”(p.1).

2.3 Findings from �revious researc�� on decentralisation

Kemmerer(1994),withregardtotheobjectivesofdecentralisation,hasobservedthat“proponentsbothofgreaterdecentralisationandgreater centralisation rationalisetheirpositionsonthebasisofequityandefficiency”(p.1412).ForTurnerandHulme(1997)realityshowsthatcentralisationanddecentralisation“representhypotheticalpolesonacontinuumthatcanbecalibratedbymanydifferentindices[and]theper-

5 The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ underlines this trend and, as a result, there can be an increasedTheprincipleof‘subsidiarity’underlinesthistrendand,asaresult,therecanbeanincreasedroleofthestateinlocaldecisionmakingprocesses.


sistentdilemmaforgovernmentsistofindtherightcombinationofcentralcontrolandlocalautonomythatsatisfiesregimes’needsandpopulardemands”(p.152).

Allthestudiesreviewedinthischapterexpressacautiousoptimismforthepo-tentialbenefitsassociatedwithdecentralisation.Theinterestinthedecentralisationofeducationisdemonstrated,forexample,byaseriesofbookletspublishedbytheWorldBankonthegeneralaspectsofthereforms(Fiske1996)aswellasmorespe-cificissuessuchascommunityfinancing(Bray1996),demand-sidefinancing(Pa-trinosandAsiasingam1997),teacher’smanagement(Gaynor1998),andlegalissues(FlorestalandCooper1997).Atthesametime,however,theyalsomakeclearthatdecentralisation cannot be considered as a panacea to development problems andthatdecentralisationalsoinvolvesrisks.Oneproblemisthattheevidencetosupportthepositiveimpactofdecentralisationreformsismixed.Sincedecentralisationhastakenplaceindifferentformsindifferentcountries,comparativeanalysisisdifficult(Manor1999,Azfaretal.1999).Nonetheless,theincreasingnumberofcountrystud-ies,sectorprogramstudies,andassessmentsproducedbydonorsandresearchersishelpingtoexpandtheavailableinformation.

Inordertoexploretheeffectsandlimitationsofdecentralisation,thisthesisreferstothe‘quality’and‘economicefficiency’rationalesarticulatedbyLauglo(1995)insection 2.2 and links them to the democratic participation argument (Kemmerer1994,Ford1999,Seddon1999).

2.3.1 Quality rationale and economic argument

Themostcommonargumentinfavourofdecentralisationisthatithasthepotentialtoimprovetheefficiencyofresourcesallocation.Decisionstakenclosertothelocallevel benefit from a reduced bureaucracy (Azfar et al. 1999). This notion accordswiththeprincipleof‘subsidiarity’seenearlierandastandardargumentofwelfareeconomics,wherebytotalwelfarecanbeincreasedbyallocatingresourcesaccordingtolocalpreferences(ListerandBetley1999).

Ford(1999)hassuggestedthatdecisionsaboutpublicexpendituresthataretakenbyalevelofgovernmentclosertothelocalconstituencyarealsomorelikelytobetteraddresslocalneeds,resultinginamoreefficientdeliveryofpublicservice.Inaddi-tion,cleardefinitionsoftasksandresponsibilitiesatdifferentlevelsoftheadminis-tration,arelikelytoimproveefficiency(Rondinellietal.1989,Ford1999).Amorecritical perspective is presented by Prud’homme (1994), who, referring to variousWorldBankstudiesonfiscalandredistributiveaspectsofdecentralisationprogramsimplementedduringthefirsthalfofthe1990s,arguesthattheassumptionthattotalwelfarewillincreasewhendemandforservicesismatchedbyasupplyforthosebasic


servicesatthelocalleveldoesnotholdinmostdevelopingcountries.6Theproblemisthatatverylowlevelsofincome,themainneedforindividualsisactuallytoincreaseincome,whileotherissuesaresecondary.

Afurther importanteconomicargumentrelatestocost-sharing.Moredemandorientedservicesprovidedbylocalauthoritiesarelikelytomotivateindividualsandcommunitiestopayforthoseservicesand/ortocontributewithcashorinkindtosupport local development activities. Typical examples are school construction orruralroadsmaintenance.Whilecost-sharinghasthepotentialtostrengthentrans-parency and accountability (Ford 1999, Lister and Betley 1999, Azfar et al. 1999),theevidenceonthispointismixed.Centralauthoritiesmay,forexample,delaythedefinitionofguidelinesandregulationsthatassignagreaterautonomyinthecollec-tionanduseoffinancialresources;electedlocalrepresentativesmaybereluctanttoimposetaxesorcontributionsonlocalelites;andcitizensmaynotwanttopaytaxesiftheyperceivethegovernmentcorrupt(Parker1995,Manor1999).Moreover,fis-caldecentralisationcanleadtoregionaldisparitieswhenlocalauthoritiesaregivenpermissiontocollect taxesoruser fees.Thiscan in fact increase thegapbetweenpoorandrichregionsofacountryandleadtounevendevelopment.Inresponse,thecentralgovernmenthastodesignintergovernmentalfiscalprogramsthathelpshiftresourcestodisadvantagedareas.Anexampleofsuchaprogramwouldbeaschol-arshipssystemthatcomplementsthehouseholdincomeofpoorfamilies,enablingthemtosendtheirchildrentoschool(Prud’homme1994,Litvacketal.1998,Ford1999).Otherpointsthatneedtobetakenintoconsiderationfromtheeconomicar-gumentpointofviewinclude:

• decentralisationnormallyleadstoanincreaseinpublicexpendituresduetotheneedtoestablishnewlineagenciesatthelocallevel,andrecruitandprovidecapacitybuild-ingforlocalofficials(Ford1999,Manor1999),

• decentralisationhasthepotentialtocontributetoeconomicgrowthbutcannotbeanengineofgrowth(Shah1997).

EvidencefromAfricaandAsia(butnotLatinAmerica)suggeststhatlocalauthori-tieshaveoftentakenanarrowandlessriskyperspectiveofthedevelopmentprocessbyfocusingonsmall-scaleprojectssuchasroads,bridges,schoolrooms,andwells.Theresult,accordingtoManor(1999),hasbeenthatbasicpublicservices“havesuf-feredatleastalittle”(p.94).

6 Prud’hommereferstoWorldBankstudiesconductedbetween1990and1992onthewholeLatinAmericaaswellasindividualcountriessuchasVenezuelaandArgentina.OtherstudiesmentionedbyPrud’hommerefertoAfrica,Philippines,Poland,andRussia.


2.3.2 Political rationale and �artici�ation argument

The nineteenth century philosopher and economist, John Stuart Mill, poignantlyremarkedthat“peoplecanlearnwhatdemocracyis,asaresultoftheiractivepar-ticipationinpoliticaldecisionmakingprocessesatthelocallevel”(Pateman1970).Decentralisation reforms, by bringing the government closer to the people, fosterpoliticalparticipationandhelptoestablishmoredemocraticinstitutionsbasedonprinciplesofgoodgovernance.Decentralisationcanalsohelptoreconcilethesome-timesdiverginginterestsortensionsbetweencentralandlocalauthoritiesbygrant-ing some degree of responsibility to local level agencies and contribute to greaterpoliticalstabilityandabroaderdistributionofpoliticalpower.Atthesametime,itcanimprovethebottom-upandtop-downflowofinformationandtheoveralldis-seminationofnationalplansandprograms(Smith1985,Manor1999).7Atthesametime,thecoordinationbetweencentreandthelocallevelisforManorthe“Achilles heelofdecentralisation”(ibid.:99).

Oneofthesignificantironiesassociatedwithdecentralisationisthatwhilede-centralisationaimstoprovideafoundationforgreaterpoliticalrepresentationandthe participation of marginalised groups, decentralisation must be understood asa politically motivated initiative stemming from central government that is oftentheresultofapoliticalstruggle(McGinnandStreet1986,LitvackandSeddon1999,Manor1999).Rondinelli(1983)describesthisinherentparadoxofdecentralisationreformsandsuggeststhat“strongcentralpoliticalcommitmentisnecessarytoiniti-atethem;theycannotbeeffectivelyimplementedandsustainedwithoutdiffusedpo-liticalsupportandwidespreadparticipation.Butthosewhosepoliticalcommitmentisnecessarytoinitiatethereformsoftenconsidersuchadiffusionofparticipationandpowerasaseriousthreat”(p.134).Inthecaseofeducation,thepoliticalnatureofdecentralisationstemsfromtheinherentlypoliticalnatureofeducationitself(Fiske1996).Schoolsaresourcesofpoliticalpowerbecauseofthelargenumberofpeopleemployedintheeducationsystemandtheshareofthenationalbudgetallocatedtoeducation.Thiscanresult inpatronageandclienteleswithinthebureaucracythatcan be threatened by the redistribution of power involved with decentralisation(Lauglo1995,Fiske1996).

Greater participation contributes to strengthened accountability and transpar-ency. The more people are involved in decision making processes, the more theyknowabouttheavailabilityanduseoffunds,therebyreducingopportunitiesformis-management. In addition, accountability and transparency are political tools thatstrengthendemocratic leadershipversusclientelesandpatronageand increase the

7 With regard to this point, it is important to note that in some cases decentralisation has beenWithregardtothispoint,itisimportanttonotethatinsomecasesdecentralisationhasbeenadoptedtopreservetheunityofacountry.Thisisthecase,forexample,withEthiopia,whereethnicdifferenceshavealwaysbeenasourceoftension.Decentralisation,bygrantingsomedegreeofregionalautonomy,hashelpednationalunity(deJongetal.1999).


possibilityforre-electionoflocalleaders.Inotherwords,decentralisationcanhelptobreakobsoletepoliticalpowerstructures,at leastatthelocal level(Kälin1999).Seddon(1999)observesthat,duetothe‘symbioticrelationship’betweenparticipa-tionanddecentralisation,participationcanbeconsideredasapreconditionforsuc-cessfuldecentralisation.Shepointsoutthatlocalgovernmentsneedproximitywithcitizensinordertobetterassesslocalneedsandtheuseofpublicfunding.Moreover,incountrieswithhierarchicalsocialstructuresandapoortraditioninparticipation,theprocessofdecentralisationhelpstoincreaseinteractionbetweencitizenandthestate(ibid.).

Whileoneofthegoalsofdecentralisationistopromoteparticipation,greaterau-tonomyatthelocallevelcanexacerbateexistingpowerstructuresandempowerlocalelites,ratherthancommunities.ForManor(1999),“mostoftheempiricalevidenceindicatesthatgreaterlocalparticipationhastended–sofar,intheseyoungsystems–eithertounderminepovertyalleviationortohavelittlepositiveimpactuponit…Ihaveasyettodiscoverevidenceofanycasewherelocalelitesweremorebenevolentthanthoseatthehighestlevels”(pp.106-107).

Twospecificthemesassociatedwithparticipationanddecentralisationreformsareimportantforthepresentresearch:theconceptof ‘spacesofparticipation’andsocialcapitaltheory.Theyprovidetheoreticalargumentsfortheanalysisanddiscus-sionofparticipationanddecentralisationofeducationinCambodia.

Spaces of participation:duringthe1970s,asshowninsection2.1,thelimitationsofdevelopmentmodelsbasedsimplyoneconomicgrowthwererevealed.Thisledtotherecognitionoftheincreasedneedforcitizenstobepartofthedevelopmentpro-cess.Duringthe1990s,asarguedbyManor(1999),participationbecameacentralelementof thedesignofdecentralisationreforms.At thesametime,participationcameunderclosercriticalscrutinywithregardtoitscontributionstotheprocessofdevelopment.Cleaver(2001)claimsthatdespitethelimitedevidenceofthelong-termeffectivenessinmateriallyimprovingtheconditionsofthemostvulnerable,partici-pationhasbecome“anactoffaith…somethingwebelieveinandrarelyquestion”(p.36).Likewise,CookeandKohtari(2001)positthattheauraofdogmathatsur-roundsparticipationtodayhastransformeditfroma‘mean’tosupportdevelopmentprocessesintoan‘end’initself.

Thediscussionaboutthefunctionofparticipationhasrecentlyreturnedtomoremildpositionsand,aspointedoutforexamplebyHickeyandMohan(2004),“theproperobjectiveofparticipationistoensurethe‘transformation’ofexistingdevel-opment practices and capacity gaps which cause social exclusion” (p. 13). AndreaCornwall belongs to this group and observes that “the literature on participationindevelopmentlargelyfocusesonmethodologiesormechanismsandhowtheyaresupposedtowork.Lessattentionhasbeenpaidtowhatactuallyhappensinpractice,towhotakespart,onwhatbasisandwithwhatresources”(2002:7).Shethereforede-fines‘spacesforparticipation’asthe“sitesinwhichdifferentactors,knowledgeand


interestsinteractandinwhichroomcanbemadeforalternatives,butfromwhichsomepeopleandideasremainalsoexcluded”(2002a:51).Arelevantthemethatap-pearsfromthisdefinitionisthatbeneficiaries,whousedtoprovideusefulinforma-tiontoplanprojects,havetoacquireamoreactiveroleasdoersandshapersoftheirowndevelopment(Hailey2001).Itiswithinthe‘spaces’ createdbydecentralisationreforms,forexample,thatindividualsandcommunityrepresentativeshavetoplayanactiveroleindecision-making.Thegovernmentthereforehasanimportantroleinguaranteeingthecreationandexistenceof ‘spaces’ forparticipationthatpeoplecanthenshapeaccordingtotheirneedsandpriorities.ForBray(2001)thisimpliesthemovefromparticipationtopartnership:“partnersshareresponsibilities,whereasparticipantsmaymerelycooperateinsomeoneelse’sactivity”(p.5).

AccordingtoBonnal(1997),politicaldecentralisationreformsoftenfailbecausetheydonottakesufficientlyintoaccounttheinfluenceoflocalnormsandinstitu-tions.Forthisreason,Cornwall(2002a)callsforamorethoroughanalysisofspacesofparticipationbystudyingwhoisparticipatingandwhoisexcluded,howpartici-pationistakingplace,andwhattheinfluenceofthebroadersocioculturalenviron-mentis.Shedistinguishestwocategoriesofspaces:‘transientspaces’,whichlacktheofficial recognition from the government but play a supporting role. Examples ofsuchspaceswouldincludesupporttoschoolsprovidedthroughself-helpinitiativesor communitybasedassociations.Theyare the resultof thepressureor initiativefrom the bottom to participate in development activities and Cornwall considersthem as traditional forms of participation. ‘Institutionalised spaces’, on the otherhand,includethecommitteesandcouncilsthatarepartoftheinstitutionaldesignofpoliciesandreforms.Inthecaseofdecentralisation,theyaimatlinkingcitizensandlocalgovernment.Cornwallconsiderstheseasmodernformsofparticipation.Heranalysisof‘spaces’ ofparticipationhighlightstheimportanceandtheneedtounder-standwhatarethesocioandculturalfactorsaswellastheinstitutionalarrangementsthatinfluencecommunitydynamicsandcollectiveaction(Cornwall2002a).

Social capital and participation:socialcapitalhasenteredthedevelopmentpoli-cydebateinthe1990s,withdifferingopinionsaboutitsusefulness.Grootaert(1998),presentingtheperspectiveendorsedbytheWorldBank,arguesthatsocialcapitalisthemissinglinkintermsofunderstandinghowdifferentformsofcapitalleadtoeco-nomicgrowth.Socialcapital,heexplains,isconcernedwiththewaytheeconomicactorsinteractandorganisethemselvestogenerategrowthanddevelopment.Thisconcepthasalsoraisedcriticism.BenFine,forexample,definessocialcapitalasthe“latestconceptualwunderkind”(2001:189).He is surprisedby theextentandthepaceofitsinfluenceinsocialdevelopmenttheoryandits“readyacceptanceasbothanalytical,empiricalandpolicypanacea”(ibid.).Moreover,hepointsoutthatasare-sultofthenumberofvaryingdefinitionsgiventosocialcapitalduringthelastyears,themeaningoftheconceptisakinto“asackofanalyticalpotatoes”(p.190).


Whiletheideaofsocialcapitalisarelativelynewtoolforeconomicanalysis,inthepoliticalscience,sociologicalandanthropological literature ithasmoreestab-lishedcredentialsandisconcernedwiththe“connectionsamongindividuals”(Put-nam2000:19).AWorldBankreportdefinesitas“theinstitutions,relationshipsandnormsthatshapethequalityandquantityofasociety’ssocialinteractions…[it]isnotjustthesumoftheinstitutionswhichunderpinasociety–itisthegluethatholdsthemtogether”(WorldBank1999).

Anumberofdefinitionsareusedtoexplainsocialcapital.RobertPutnam(1996)definesitasthe“featuresofsociallife–networks,norms,andtrust–thatenablepar-ticipantstoacttogethermoreeffectivelytopursuesharedobjectives”(p.56).Thisdef-initionisprimarilyconcernedwiththehorizontallinkagesandassociationsbetweenpeople.Putnamdefinesthisbonding social capitalasthe“linksthatexistsbetweenlike-mindedpeoplethatcontributetoreinforcehomogeneitybutcanalsobuildwallsthatexcludethosewhodonotqualify”(Schulleretal.2000:10).Examplesofbondingsocialcapital includekinshiprelationshipsandreligion.Bridging social capital, ontheotherhand,referstothehorizontalconnectionsbetweenheterogeneousgroups.Theselinksarelikelytobemorefragilebutaremorelikelytofostersocialinclusion(ibid.).Thesehorizontalassociationsconsistofsocialnetworksandassociatednormsthathaveaneffectoncommunityproductivityandwell-being(seeBebbington1997,Woolcock1998,Narayan1999,Krishna2000).ThisanalysisisalsolinkedtotheworkofColeman(1988),whosestudyofeducationaloutcomeshasincludedalsoverticallinkagesbetweenassociations characterisedbyhierarchical andunequaldistribu-tionofpoweramongmembers.Thisviewrecognizesthathorizontaltiesareneededtogivecommunitiesasenseofidentityandcommonpurpose,butalsostressesthatwithout‘bridging’tiesthattranscendvarioussocialdivides(e.g.religion,ethnicity,socio-economicstatus),horizontaltiescanbecomeabasisforthepursuitofnarrowinterests,andcanactivelyprecludeaccesstoinformationandmaterialresourcesthatwouldotherwisebeofgreatassistancetothecommunity(Krishna2000).Themostencompassingviewofsocialcapital,accordingtoGrootaertandvanBastelaer(2002)includesthesocialandpoliticalenvironmentthatshapessocialstructuresanddrawsonOlsen’s(1982)andNorth’s(1990)worktoincludeformalisedinstitutionalrela-tionshipsandisdefinedhereasinstitutional social capital.Thisanalysisextendstheimportanceofsocialcapitaltoformalizedinstitutionalrelationshipsandstructures,suchasgovernment,politicalregimes,ruleoflaw,thecourtsystem,andcivilandpo-liticalliberties.Thisviewnotonlyaccountsfortheimportanceofthetieswithinandacrosscommunities,butrecognizesthatthecapacityofvarioussocialgroupstoactintheirinterestdependscruciallyonthesupport(orlackthereof)thattheyreceivefromthestateaswellastheprivatesector.Likewise,thestatedependsonsocialsta-bilityandwidespreadpopularsupport.Inshort,economicandsocialdevelopmentthriveswhenrepresentativesofthestate,thecorporatesector,andcivilsocietycreateforumsinandthroughwhichtheycanidentifyandpursuecommongoals.


Theformsofsocialcapitaldiscussedaboveneverexistinisolation.Societiesal-waysdemonstrateamixbetweenthemthatisdeterminedbythedegreeororienta-tionofaspecificculture towardscollectiveaction.Therefore,Krishna(2000)poi-gnantlyarguesthatitisimportanttoconsiderthespecificculturalfactorsthatshapeandinfluencesocialcapitalformation.

Severalanalystshave identifiedtrustasacriticalelementofall formsofsocialcapital.Uphoff(2000)definesitas“theessentialglueforsociety”(p.227).Theba-sicargumentisthattrustcangrowandfacilitateexchangeandinteractionbetweenindividuals,groupsandinstitutions.Itislinkedtotheavailabilityofinformationaswellasformalandinformalnormsandrules.Wetrustindividualsand/orinstitu-tionsbecauseweknowthat inthepasttheyhavebehavedcorrectly.Wealsotrustthembecauseweknowthatthereare lawsanda judicialsystemthatregulateandpunishwrongbehaviours.Therecanalsobestronginformalnormsandruleswhich,asinmanypartsofSoutheastAsia,rewardtrustworthybehaviourbyapplyingsocialsanctionssuchasshametothosewhoviolatethenorms(Pye1999).Dasgupta(2000)suggeststhattrustiscentralinthediscussionaboutsocialcapital,though“untilre-centlyitwastreatedlikebackgroundenvironment,presentwhenevercalledupon,asortofever-readylubricantpermittingvoluntarilyparticipationinproductionandexchangetotakeplace”(p.330).Hearguesconvincinglythatwhentrusterodes,forexamplethroughwarsandcivilconflicts,“itcanbringanawfullotdownwithit”(p.332).

Thisstudyadoptsthesocialcapitaldefinitionillustratedinfigure2.2,whichsyn-ergisesthethreeapproachesoutlinedaboveincludingbonding,bridgingandinstitu-tionalsocialcapitalatthecommunitylevel,andlinkingthesetothenotionoftrust.Theanalysisof communityparticipationand schoolgovernance,which is centraltothisthesis,isexaminedthroughbondinglinkagesbetweenmembersofthesamecommunitygroupsorassociations,thebridginglinkagesbetweendifferentassocia-tionsatthevillagelevel,andtheverticallinkagesofcommunitybasedassociationswithschoolsandlocalgovernment/agencies.ThemodelbuildsonUphoff ’s(2000)argumentthatrelational social capital (bondingandbridging/horizontal)predispos-esindividualsforcollectiveaction,whileinstitutional social capital (vertical)createstheconditionsandspacesthatfacilitatecollectiveaction.


2.4 Decentralisation and sc��ool based management: regional ex�eriences

The decentralisation of education systems can be considered as one of the mostimportantphenomenonineducationalplanningoverthepast20years(UNESCO2005).Theeducationsystem,morethanotherpublicsectors,seemstobeparticu-larlysuitedfordecentralisationreformsasitsstructuretypicallyconsistsofbothacentral-leveladministrationandanetworkoflocaleducationofficesandschoolsthatextendsthroughoutthenationandemploythelargestshareofpublicsectorwork-force(Winkler1989).

ThissuitabilitybecomesmorerelevantifweconsiderthecrisisofeducationindevelopingcountriesdescribedbyCoombs(1985).Since1980s,centralgovernmentshavefacedincreasinglydifficultiestodirectandadministerallaspectsofexpand-ingmasseducation.Theresultisthatmoderneducationsystemshaveoftenfailedtoreachperipheralregions(i.e. ruralareas)andhavetendedtoserve thepoliticalinterestsofthecentre(i.e.urbanareas)(Cummings1997,Whitacre1997).8InSub

8 McLean(1983)expands thisargumentandgives itamoreglobaldimension,arguing thatThirdWorldstates(theperiphery)havenotbenefitedfromeducationtransfersfromthede-velopednations(thecentre).

��u�� Sy�� p�� (Pellini and Ayres 2005)

BRIDGINGSOCIAL CAPITAL

INST

ITUT

IONA

LSO

CIAL

CAPI

TAL

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

BONDINGSOCIAL CAPITAL

A��

A��

BONDINGSOCIAL CAPITAL


SaharaAfrica,forexample,thesituationhasbeenexacerbatedbytherapidexpan-sionofschoolsystemstoachieveuniversalprimaryeducationtargets(Rose2003).Thiscannotbedonebyacentralgovernmentaloneandthereforerequirestheadop-tion of alternative approaches. As Cummings (1997) points out, during the 1990sthereemergedtheneedtomovefromanoldapproachtoeducationthatentailsstan-dardisedandcentralisedcontrol,towardsamodernapproachthatenablesflexibilityanddiversitytoshapeeducationtolocalcircumstances.

Theearliersectionshaveexplainedthattheappealofdecentralisationliesinthepromisesofimprovedefficiency,transparency,accountability,andserviceprovisionthatreflectlocalpriorities(McLeanandKing1999).Themaininternationalconfer-encesoneducation,fromJomtienin1990toDakarin2000,haveemphasisedthesepointsandhighlighted,amongotherthings,thecriticalimportanceofcommunityparticipationinschoolstoimprovegovernanceandstrengthendemocraticpractices(seeWCEFA1990:articleVII,WCEFA1990a:sectionsI.2, I.3, I.6andIII.3,WEF2000:pp.18-19).

Unfortunately, the creation of spaces of participation does not automaticallytranslate intodemocraticdecisionmakingpractices.Forthisreason,researchandstudiessuchastheonesbyBonnal,Cornwall,Senandothers,havehelpedtoclarifyanunderstandingthatparticipationandgovernancearestronglyinfluencedbyspe-cificculturalandsocialnorms.Moreover,itisimportanttorememberthatparticipa-tionnormallyputsanadditionalburdenonindividualsintermsoftimeand/orre-sourcesthattheyneedtocontributetotheprocess.This,arguesShaeffer(1994),maybeparticularlydemandingforparentsandcommunitymembers livinginsociallyand economically marginalised regions. Other aspects that have to be taken intoconsiderationinaddressingschool-communityrelationsarethelackofcommunityappreciationoftheoverallobjectiveofeducation,theculturalgapbetweencommu-nityandschool,andthepopularbeliefthateducationisataskofthestate.Whitacre(1997)notesthatdecentralisationoftenhasbeenlimitedtosimpledeconcentrationandhasinsomecasesactuallyexpandedthecontrolandpresenceofcentralgovern-mentinsteadoftappingintoindigenousinstitutionstosupportthedecentralisationeffort.

ItisusefulatthisstagetopresentsomeexamplesofcountriesthathavealongerexperiencethanCambodiawithdecentralisationreformsandparticipatoryschoolgovernance.Theseexamplesarerelevantbecausetheyhighlightthecriticalimpor-tanceofsocialcapitalinshapingdemocraticspacesofparticipation.Theprinciplesofdemocraticdecentralisationareusuallyspelledout ingeneraltermsinnationalpoliciesandguidelinesandtheirtranslationintopracticalactionshastotakeintoconsiderationdifferentlocalcircumstances.Inotherwords,tosearchfortheoppor-tunitiesprovidedbydiversityinsteadofhomogeneity.


2.4.1 Asia

AccordingtoChapman(2000),“atnotimeinhistoryinnoregionoftheworldhaveeducationsystemexpandedas fastoraseffectivelyashavethose inAsia,particu-larlyinEastAsia,duringthepastthirtyyears”(p.283).Healsonotesthat“virtu-ally all developing countries in Asia follow a pyramidal model in which nationalpolicy,programmesandlogisticsareformulatedbyacentralministryofeducation…theministrythenworksthroughanetworkofprovincial,regionalanddistricteducationofficesthatlargelyduplicatethestructureofthecentralministryandareresponsibleforensuringthatcentralpoliciesarecommunicatedandimplementedintheschools”(p.290).Despitethisbackground,decentralisationreformshavebeenimplementedalsoinAsiawithimportantconsequencesforschoolmanagementandschool-communityrelations.

SimilarlytoAfrica,mostAsiancountriesgainedindependenceintheaftermathofWorldWarIIandinheritedcentralisedadministrations.Somecountrieshadal-readyexperiencedorganisedformsoflocalgovernment.Thisisthecase,forexample,withthepanchayat(villagecouncils)thatevolvedinancientIndia,andarestillactivetoday.Inshort,panchayatareformedbyelectedmemberstakingdecisionsonissuesthatarerelevanttothesocial,culturalandeconomiclifeofthevillage.Theyactasa link between local government and people (Govinda 1997).9 In the Philippines,barangaysrepresentedanindigenoussystemofcommunityorganisationcharacter-isedbystrongkinshiplinks(Turner1999).TheyweredestroyedduringtheSpanishcolonialperiod,buthavebeeninstitutionalisedthroughtheLocalGovernmentCodepassedin1991andgivenanambitiouslistofservicestoperform(ibid.).

With regard to forms decentralisation and community participation in educa-tion, School Clusters represent a particularly important experience in Asia. Theirorigingoesbacktothe1950swhentheywerepilotedinThailandinajointinitiativeby theMinistryofEducationandUNESCOin theprovinceofChachoengsao.Astheapproachprovedsuccessful,itwasexpandednation-widebetweenthe1960sand1980s(Wheeleretal.1994).Duringthisperiod,SchoolClustersbecameapopularapproachinseveralAsiancountriesaffectedbyeconomicrecessionandhighpopula-tiongrowth(e.g.Burma,India,PapuaNewGuinea,Philippines).10InAsia,thefirstwaveofschoolclusteringlasteduntiltheendofthe1980swhenhighratesofeco-nomicgrowthachievedinsomecountriesprovidedsufficientresourcestosupporteducation.Duringthe1990s,asecondwaveofschoolclusteringtookplaceinformersocialistcountrieslikeCambodia,LaosandVietNamandwasdrivenbythecollapse

9 Gandhi, advocated theGandhi,advocated thePanchayati Raj asadecentralized formofgovernment,whereeachvillageisresponsibleforitsownactionsandsubsistence,asthefoundationofIndia’spoliticalsystem(seeMeenakshisundaram1994,Singh2006).

10 Bray (1987) explains that the School Clusters have also been popular in Latin America andBray(1987)explainsthattheSchoolClustershavealsobeenpopularinLatinAmericaandhavebeenintroducedinBolivia,Colombia,Ecuador,Guatemala,Honduras,Nicaragua,Pan-ama,andPeru.


ofthesocialistmodelofcentralisedadministrationandthepressureformorelocal-izeddecision-makinganddemocratization (Fiske1996,LitvackandSeddon1999,McGinnandWelch1999,BredenbergandDahal2000).

SchoolClustersaredefinedbyBrayas“groupingsofschoolsforadministrativeandeducationalpurposes”(Bray1987:7).Atypicalcluster,showninfigure2.3, con-sistsofsixtosevenschools.Atthecentrethereisacore schoolresponsibleofthead-ministrationofclusteractivities.Thecoreschoolislinkedtosatellite schools.Inmoreremoteareas,satelliteschoolcanbefurtherlinkedtoannex schools.11

ThereareanumberofobjectiveslinkedtotheSchoolClustersmodel.Fromtheeco-nomicpointofview,oneofthemostimportantistoimprovecosteffectiveness,bysharingfacilities,staffandenablingbulkordersofmaterial(ibid.).Fromthepeda-gogicalpointofview,themainobjectiveistoimprovethequalityofeducationinin-dividualschoolsbyeasingtheaccessandsharingofeducationalresources.Fromtheadministrativepointofview,clustershelptolinkdistrictswithgroupofschools,andthereforereducetransactionandinformationcosts.Theclustermodelalsopursuespoliticalobjectivessuchasconsciousness-raising,communityparticipation,reduc-

11 The number of schools that belong to a cluster can vary greatly. Bray (1987) mentions that inThenumberofschoolsthatbelongtoaclustercanvarygreatly.Bray(1987)mentionsthatinPeruclusters(nucleos)canhaveupto30or40schools.

��u�� S�h�� u�� u��u��

ANNEXSCHOOL

ANNEXSCHOOL

ANNEXSCHOOL

ANNEXSCHOOL

CORE SCHOOL

SATELLITESCHOOL

SATELLITESCHOOL

SATELLITESCHOOL

SATELLITESCHOOL

SATELLITESCHOOL

SATELLITESCHOOL


tionofinequalities,andethnicharmony.12InIndia,clustershavehelpedtorevitaliseParentandTeacherAssociations,thoughcommunitymembersarenormallyinvitedtomakecontributionsbutnottoproposeradicalchanges(ibid.).InthecaseofSriLanka,clustershavebeenpromotedtoreduceethnictensions.

TheconclusionbyBrayisthatclusterscanplayapositiveroleandareparticularlyvaluableforsmallschoolssincetheyprovide“extraresourcesandwidersocialcon-tacts”(p.139).However,hewarnsthatclustersuccessdependsonacarefulassess-mentanddesignof,amongothers,attitudesofthepeopleinvolved.

A further example of school and community interaction is found in the Par-ents Learning Support System established in the Philippines (Cariño et al. 1994).Theprinciplebehindthisprogrammeisthat“schoolsarenottheonlyspacewhichprovidesteachingandlearning;homesandcommunitycanequallyhelp”(p.1).Allthreesettingsshareacommonobjective,whichistoprovidelearnerswithnewskills,attitudesandvalues.Themainfeatureoftheprogrammeisthatparentsandcom-munitymemberscollaboratewithteachersandadministratorsinteachingactivitiesinschools.Parentsandcommunitymembersmonitorchildren’steachingandassistthemwithlearningtasksorprojects.Theyalsodiscusstogetherwithteachersandadministratorsproblemsandachievements.Theprogrammeisconsideredtorepre-sentabreakwithtraditionalteachingandlearningprocessesthathavelimitedtheroleofcommunitiestofinancialcontributionstoschools(ibid.).

InthecaseofIndonesia,thegovernmenthascreatedParentOrganisations(Badan Pembantu Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan)ineachschooltomobiliseparentsandcom-munityresourcestosupporteducation(Moegiadiet al.1994).Oneobjectiveoftheapproachistoencourageorganisationalandpersonalrelationshipsamongfamilies,community,andschools.OneweaknessoftheParentOrganisationsisthatinordertoavoidinterference,teachingstaffcannotbeamember.ThereforetheParentOr-ganisationsrelyexclusivelyonthededicationofcommunitymembersandtheirca-pacitytoraiseresourcesfortheschool.Inthesameway,Organisations’membersarenotsupposedtointerferewithteaching.Thispreventscommunitymembersgivingeducationalsupportand,accordingtoMoegiadietal.,contradictstheEducationalLaw which requires the development and application of local content in the cur-riculum.ParentOrganisationsinIndonesiarepresentanexampleofthelimitationsinbuiltinblueprintformsofparticipationdesignedatthecentrallevelandappliedtoacountrycharacterisedbyalargepopulationanddiversity.

ThecaseofNepal,beforetheescalationoftheMaoistinsurgencyandtheadoptionofmartiallaw,representsanexceptionalexampleoftheopportunitiesaswellastheproblemsassociatedwitheducationdecentralisationandcommunityparticipation(Lamichhaneetal.1994).Theestablishmentofademocraticsystemofgovernment

12 ThisisparticularlyrelevantforLatinAmericawhere,accordingtoBray(1987),clusters (clusters(nu-cleos)inEcuador,NicaraguaandPeruhavehadalsoaFreireianconsciousness-risingfunc-tion.


in1950markeda large increase in thenumberofprimaryandsecondaryschoolsinthecountry.13TheNationalEducationSystemPlan,startedin1971,helpedthisexpansionofeducation,butfailedtoinvolvecommunitiesbyplacingtheresponsi-bility for implementationalmostexclusivelyon lineagencies.Moreover, theLocalDevelopmentAct,whichmarkedthebeginningofdecentralisationreformsin1966,withelectionofVillageDevelopmentCommittees,didnotgohandinhandwiththedecentralisation of education. Decentralised management and greater communityparticipationinschoolswereintroducedinthe1980s.Lamichhaneetal.citeasex-amplesthreemainprojects(ibid.):theEducationforRuralDevelopmentintheSetiZone,thePrimaryEducationProject,andtheBasicandPrimaryEducationProject.Theseprogrammescontributed,todifferentextents,totheestablishmentofSchoolClustersandtheestablishmentofcollaborativesystemsthroughagreater involve-mentoflocalcommunities.Withregardtothelastpoint,theauthorsnotethatthegovernmenthastriedtore-activateschoolmanagementcommitteesthroughtrain-ingprogrammes.However,Lamichhaneetal.,concludethatcommunitymembershavenotbeeninmostcasesawareoftheroleschooleducationplaysintheirlives.Thishascontributedtocreatingalargegapbetweenthecentralandthelocallevelabouttheexpectationslinkedtoparticipation.

2.4.2 Africa

OneofthemostimportantlegaciesoftheFrench,British,andPortuguesecolonisa-tioninAfricahasbeenacentralisedadministration.Forthisreason,themodernisa-tioneffortduringthepost-independenceperiodhasbeenplannedandimplementedbasedonthesamecentralisedinstitutionalsetup.Economicsystemshavebeenre-formedwithdecentralisationonlyduringthelasttwentyyears.Inaddition,theex-periencefromSub-SaharanAfricasuggeststhatreformshaveoftenbeenlimitedtodeconcentration(Whitacre1997).

AstudybyLugazetal.(2006),ondecentralisationofeducationinfourFranco-phonecountries,Benin,Guinea,MaliandSenegal,describesthreemaintrends.Thefirstisthatdecentralisationofeducationoftengoesinhandwithgeneraladministra-tivedecentralisation,whichmeansthatelectedlocalauthoritiesaregivenanumberofresponsibilitiesalsointhefieldofbasiceducation.Asecondtrendisrelatedtothewideningof responsibilityof regional anddistrict educationoffices regarding theuseofbudgetandnominationofprincipals.Athird,lessevident,trendislinkedtoagreaterautonomythat isslowlybeinggiventoschools inresourcemanagement.InBenin,forexample,thereportnotesthatsincetheschoolyear2001-2002,fundsaretransferreddirectlyfromthecentralleveltoschools.Animportanteffectofthis

13 Primaryschoolswentfrom321in1951to19.498in1992.Secondaryschoolsfrom11in1951to2.309in1992(Lamichhane et al. 1994: 167).Lamichhaneetal.1994:167).


greaterautonomyisthatcommunityteachersarehiredbyschoolsandarepaidsmallstipendsthroughparents’contributionorcollectionsbyParentandTeacherAssocia-tions.Despitethesepromisingexamples,thereportconcludes,inlinewithManor’sargument in section 2.2, that decentralisation in these countries has been drivenmorebyadecisiontosupplementthelackofresourcesbythecentralgovernment,ratherthanagenuineinterestindevolvingdecisionmakingpowerthelocallevel.

With regard to school management and community participation, results arealso mixed. A study by Rose (2003), defines two forms of participation. The firstis ‘genuineparticipation’,implyingtheabilitytotakepartinrealdecisionmakingand governance of schools by parents and community members. In this case “allmembershaveequalpower todetermine theoutcomeofdecisionsand share inajointactivity”(p.47).Thesecondform,‘pseudo-participation’,isatbest“aconsul-tativeprocesswherebycitizensaremerelykeptinformedofparticipationdevelop-mentattheschoollevel,andareexpectedtoacceptdecisionsthathavealreadybeenmade”(ibid).Inthiscase,participationisextractiveandlimitedtocontributionsincashorinkindforschoolconstruction.InMalawi,Rose’scasestudy,communitieshavetraditionallysupportedtheprovisionofeducationwithcontributionsincashandinkindforschoolconstructionandmaintenance.Shereportsthatbeforeinde-pendence,in1964,self-helpinitiativeswerethemainsourceofsupporttoprovideeducationinruralareas,becausethecolonialadministrationfavouredschoolinginurbanareas.AlthoughMalawigainedindependence in1964, itwasonlyafter thefirstdemocraticelectionsin1994thatthegovernmentintroducedpoliciestoguar-anteefreeprimaryeducationwhichresultedina50percentincreaseinschoolen-rolment.As forothercountries in the region, theWorldBankhas influenced themovetowardsdecentralisationofeducationwithintheframeworkoftheMalawianPovertyReductionStrategyPaper(PRSP)(Rose2005).Duringthe1990s,asnotedbyRose(2003),otherdonors increasedtheirsupport tocommunitiesthrough, forexample,theCommunitySchoolProjectfundedbytheBritishDepartmentforIn-ternationalDevelopment(DfID)andtheVillageBasedSchoolsjointlyfundedbytheUS Agency for International Development (USAid) and Save the Children. Theseinitiativesprovidedfinancialandtechnicalsupporttoremoteschoolsandgavecom-munities responsibility for school constructionandmaintenance, aswell asbeinginvolvedinschoolgovernance.AccordingtoRose(2003),theseprojectshavehelpedtoimprovecommunityinvolvementinschools;howevertheyhavealsoraisedtheis-sueofcoordinationwithnationalpoliciesandtheirintegrationintheformalpublicsystemofschooling.In1995,withsupport fromtheWorldBank, thegovernmenttriedaslightlydifferentapproachbystartingtheMalawiSocialActionFundwhichaimsatpovertyalleviationandcommunityempowermentthroughproposalspre-paredbycommunitieswhohavealsotocontribute20percentoftheofresourcesfortheproposedproject.Thisfundhasbeenparticularlyinfluentialintermsofschoolconstruction(Rose2003).


TheparadoxofthepolicyinMalawiisthat“thefocusoncommunityparticipa-tionoccurredwithouttheinvolvementofdifferentstakeholders,includingteachers,parents,andcommunities.LocalleadersandNGOsinvolvedineducation,inpolicyformulation, with the Ministry of Education and international agencies continuetodominatedecision-makingandplanning”(Rose2003:51). In the1990s,SchoolCommitteeshavealsobeenintroducedtobridgethegapbetweenschoolsandcom-munity,buttheirinvolvementinschoolaffairshasbeenrareinpractice.Theresultisthattheparticipationcontinuestobemerelyextractive.Roseconcludesthat,despitetheevidence,participationisimportantandthattobesuccessful“themotivationforparticipationneedstooccuratthelocallevel,ratherthandirectedbypolicymakers”(p.62).

MovingtoGhana,Pryor(2005)explainsthatthedecentralisationreformpolicyofthegovernmentinvolvesbothagreaterdeconcentrationtoregionalanddistricteducationofficesandgreatercommunityparticipation.Donorsareinvolvedinbothareas.DfIDsupportstheWholeSchoolDevelopmentwhichaimsatprovidinglogis-ticalsupporttoselectedschoolsinpilotdistricts.AnumberofNGOsareinvolvedatthesametimeinprojectstofacilitatecommunityparticipation.Pryor,inhisstudy,asks thequestionofwhether communityparticipationcanmobilise social capitalfor the improvementof rural schooling. Inhisopinion, thedevelopmentand im-plementationofthepolicyhasbeenpatchyandslow.Withregardtoparticipation,Pryorconcludesthatinruralareashesurveyed,povertyandthetraditionalsupportfunctionofchildrenfortheirhouseholdshavereducedtheimportancethatparentsattributetoschooling.Asschool-communityrelationshipsalsodependontheopen-ness thatschoolsshowtoparentsandcommunities, thestudybyPryorfindsthatparentsdonothaveastronginterestforparticipationmainly“becausethestructuresthroughwhichtheyweresupposedtoassumesomecontroldidnotseemtoincludethem[and]when theygavevoice to their ideas,nobodyappeared tobe listening”(pp.198-199).Pryorconcludes that colonialism,migration, and thedisintegrationofmatrilinealfamilystructuresaffectthedispositionofpeopletowardsschoolinginruralareas.Chapmanetal.(2002),alsostudyingcommunitysupporttoschoolsinGhana,concludesthat“communitiesthathavelittleexperiencewithdecentraliseddecision making process need adequate training on how to participate effectivelyinthedecisionprocess”(p.187).14Thestudyalsonotesthatthisneedforcapacitybuildingisalsoaweaknessthatmakescommunitymembersvulnerabletoexternalmanipulationaboutwhatpracticesconstituteeffectiveteaching.Forthisreason,gov-ernmentanddonordriveninitiativesintermsofdecentralisationofeducationand

14 Thestudywasconductedin1998in18communitiesinfiveregionofruralGhanaforatotalof643interviewsthatincludedteachers/guardian,communitymembers,schoolmanagementassociationsexecutives,schoolmanagementcommitteesandotherlocalleaders(Chapmanetal.2002:183)


communityparticipationoften“operateonpremises thatdonotcorrespondwiththoseofthepeopleinthevillage”(Pryor2005:200).

2.4.3 Latin America

LatinAmericaisprobablytheregionwhere,duetoculturalfactorsandthecolonialheritage, central administration remains the strongest. Turner and Hulme (1997),citingHarris(1983),arguethat“theconcentrationofdecision-makingwithincen-tralgovernmentministriesisafundamentalcharacteristicsofLatinAmericangov-ernments”(p.166).Withregardtoeducationsystems,thedecentralisationthathastakenplaceduringthelasttwodecadescanbeexplainedbytwofactors:thefiscalconstraintsofgovernmentbudgetsandtheincreaseddemandfordemocraticsociet-ies(Cuéllar-Marchelli2003).

InColombia,forexample,thefirststepsofthedecentralisationreformgobackto 1985 with the mayors’ election at municipality level (Fiske 1996). In 1989, mu-nicipalitiesweregrantedagreaterroleinhealthandeducation.ThestrategyadoptedbythegovernmentisdescribedbyFiskeastwo-folds:municipalisationofeducationandincreasesinlocalschoolsautonomy.Thefirstobjectivewasreachedbytransfer-ringresourcesforeducationtomunicipalities;thesecondbygrantingschoolsmoredecision-making power in managing personnel, designing aspects of the curricu-lum, and finance. While communities and parents also became more involved inschoolactivities,theimplementationoftheplanencounteredstrongresistancefrombureaucrats,politiciansandteachers’unionsthatfavourednationalnegotiationsofcontracts.Asaresult,thereformwasre-drafted,considerablyreducingthepowersofmunicipalitiesandlocalschools.

ColombiaisalsoknownfortheEscuela Nuevaprogramwhichstartedin1976.It stemmed from the recognition of the impracticality of providing each primaryschool with a multi-grade teaching staff in rural areas (Williams 1997). By 1978,more than500schoolswere involved;another1.500wereaddedby1982.Furtherexpansion, partially financed by the World Bank, extended the support to 17.948schoolsby1989,servingapproximately800.000students(Psacharopouloetal.1992). Escuela Nueva schools areinaruralschoolandhaveoneortwoteacherswhoofferallfiveyearsofprimaryeducationinoneortwomulti-gradeclassrooms.

Theinstructionalmaterialsreflecttherealityofdailylifeinruralareas.More-over,thecurriculumisdesignedsothatchildrencanmovetoagovernmentschoolatanytime(Williams1997).AcomparativeevaluationbyPsacharopoulosetal.(1992),onstudents’performancein168Escuela Nueva schoolsand60traditionalschools,foundthattheformerhadsignificantlyimprovedstudentoutcomes,reduceddrop-outrates,andastrongercommunityparticipation.TeachertrainingintheEscuela Nueva schoolsisgivenahighpriorityandteachersareexpectedtoplayaleadership


roleinfosteringthecommunity-schoollink.TheideabehindEscuela Nueva, isinfact to integrate, with limited government interference, students, schools and thecommunitybyencouragingteachers,students,andparentstoparticipateinschoolactivities.Examplesofsuchactivitiesincludeaschoolsurroundingsmap,familyre-cords,acountymonographandagriculturalcalendar(Psacharopoulosetal.1992,Williams1997).OneconcernexpressedbyPsacharopoulosetal.isaboutthereplica-tionofthemodelandtheconflictthatcanarisebetweentheEscuela Nuevaschoolsandthecontrolbylocaladministrators.

TurningtoElSalvador,EDUCO(Educación con Participación de la Comunidad)isoftencitedasasuccessfulexampleofdecentralisationofeducationandcommu-nityparticipationinschools.Intheearly1990s,afterthecivilwarfoughtduringthe1980s,peacereturnedtothecountry.EDUCOstartedin1991as“amajorstrategytoaccesspreschoolandbasiceducationinpoorruralareas”(Cuéllar-Marchelli2003:7).Underthisprogramme,groupsofparentsareorganisedtoformnon-profitCom-munityEducationAssociationsresponsibletomanageschoolsfinancedbythestate.Theprogramme,afterapilotinsixdistricts,receivedsupportfromtheWorldBankandwasexpanded.ThefactthattheprogrammebecameWorldBank-sponsored,ac-cordingtoDiGropello(2006),contributedtoitscontinuitydespitefrequentchangesingovernmentadministration.TheimportanceofEDUCOliesinthefactthatthedesignoftheprogramme“wasbasedontheexperienceofpeasantcommunitiesthathad created local schools separately from the state” (ibid.). Through EDUCO, thecentralgovernmenthasachievedtwoimportantobjectives:ithasgainedcontrolofthepopularschoolsthatwereestablishedoutsidethestatesystemandhasaccessedadditionalresourcesthatcommunitieswerewillingtoputineducation.Atthesametime,theMinistryofEducationhasalsohelpedtoinstitutionalisetheapproachbysigningpartnershipagreementswiththeCommunityEducationAssociationsoncetheyareestablished(ibid.).Thishelpedtodefineclearrolesandresponsibilitiesintheuseof fundstransferredfromthecentralgovernment.OtherAssociations’re-sponsibilities include thehiringof teachersandsupport staff and thepurchaseofclassroom material. Association members are not paid for administering the ser-vices. Cuéllar-Marchelli points out that their main incentive lies in the socio andeconomicdevelopmentoftheircommunitythrougheducation.EDUCOassessmentshavefoundthatwithclosecommunitymonitoringandthepotentialsanctionthatteacherswouldnotberehired,teachersandstudentsabsenteeismwaslowerthanintraditionalschools,thoughstudents’achievementsinEDUCOschoolswasnodiffer-entfromthatoftraditionalschools(JimenezandSawada1998,WorldBank2006).ForCuéllar-Marchelli(2001),EDUCOhasimprovedequityineducation,thoughshealsoadmitsthattheprogrammehasthepotentialtoexacerbateexistinginequalitiesinruralareas.

Fromthesocialcohesionpointofview,EDUCOhasprovidedthemainbenefits.DiGropello(2006)hasnotedagrowthofsocialcohesioninthecommunitieswhere


parents’empowermentisstrengtheningdemocraticparticipation(i.e.bondingandbridgingsocialcapital)aswellas therelationswithschoolsand localgovernmentbodies(i.e.linkingsocialcapital).Consideringthebackgroundofthecivilwar,EDU-CO,startingfromexistingformsofsocialcapital,hascontributedin“fosteringcom-munitybuilding,socialdevelopmentanddemocracy…makingtheschoolacom-munitycentreforeducationandsocialdevelopment”(Cuéllar-Marchelli2001:18).

2.5 Concluding remarks

Thischapterhaspresentedthemaintheoretical frameworkandsomerelevantre-searchfindingsunderpinningthepresentstudyoneducationaldecentralisationandcommunityparticipation.Theliteratureandpolicydocumentsreviewedshowthatwhile decentralisation entails potential improvements in the efficiency of publicservicedeliveryandthecreationofdemocraticspacesofparticipation,atthesametimetherearealsopossibleshortcomingslinkedtothepoweroflocalelitesandtheexclusionofmarginalisedgroups in localdecisionmakingprocesses.Likewise,asconcludedbyBray (2003),communityparticipation ineducationcan increase therelevanceandimpactofeducation,butatthesametimecanalsoexacerbatedisso-nanceswithinsocieties.Whenthishappensitisusuallyduetothefactthatpolicymakers“have failed toexamine insufficientdetail the typesofcommunitybeingconsideredandthecircumstancesofoperation”(ibid.:41)

Intheanalysisofthedecentralisationofeducation,itisimportanttorememberthe political nature of education and the need that governments have to find therightbalanceintermsofwhichresponsibilitiesremainatthecentrallevelandwhichonesaredecentralised.Whilethedevelopmentanddistributionoftextbooksandtheplanningofcurriculumandassessmentsystemsshouldremainaresponsibilityofthecentralgovernment,Govinda(1997)arguesthatcommunitybasedorganisationsandParent-TeacherAssociationscanbeinvolvedinday-to-daymanagementsuchasmaintenance.However,asshownbysomeofthecountryexperiencespresentedinthischapter,communitymemberscanplayaroleinsupportingteachingandlearn-ingactivitiesaswell.Moreover,thedevelopmentofa‘participatoryculture’shouldbebasedonlocalnorms,andgivensufficienttimetodevelopfurtherinapartnershipwithlocalgovernments,lineagencies,andserviceproviders.

Inordertoachievepositiveresultsintermsofcommunityparticipationinschoolgovernance,somepre-conditionsseemtobeofparticularimportance:communitiesneedtobeinformedabouttheobjectivesofthereformsandneedtohaveopportuni-tiestoexpresstheirpreferencesinawaythatisbindingforpoliticiansandofficials;thedefinitionofcommunityparticipationshouldtakeintoaccounttraditionalformsofsocialcapitalsuchascommunityandself-helpinitiatives(bondingandbridging)


anddefinespaceswherethesecanactivelylinkwithlocalinstitutionsandmakeaconcretecontributiontogovernanceandmanagementofpublicservices(linkingso-cialcapital);havelocalelections;cooperation(versuscompetition)betweenvariouslevelsoftheadministration;andharmonisationwithotherrelevantdecentralisationinitiatives(Fiske1996,Govinda1997,Manor1999).Thesearelongtermprocessesthatrequirecommitmentfromthegovernmentand,inmostdevelopingcountries,externalsupportfrominternationaldonorsintermsoffinancialresourcesandtech-nicalassistance.Keepingthesepre-conditionsinmind,thenextsectionexploresthecaseofdecentralisationreformsinCambodia.

55Cambodia: history and human development profile

3 Cambodia: ��istory and ��uman develo�ment �rofile

JournalistTizianoTerzani,whoreportedaboutCambodiaduringthecivilwarandtheKhmerRougeyears,haswrittenthat“whathappenedinCambodiabetween1975and1979duringtheKhmerRougedefiesanyfantasyofhorror–itwasmorefright-fulthananythingamancouldimagine”(1998:242).Muchoftoday’sliteratureaboutCambodiaisconcernedwiththoseyears.Thischapter,whileexploringtheimpactoftheKhmerRougeregime,willalsoinvestigatethesocialandculturalcontinuitiesthattranscendtheKhmerRougeperiodandcharacterisethetensionbetweentra-ditionsandmodernity in today’sCambodia (Ayres2000and2000a).Thechapterstartsbylookingatthemainhistoricaleventsandlinksthemwiththedevelopmentofeducation.InthesecondpartitpresentsCambodia’smainhumandevelopmentindicatorsandcomparesthemwithothercountriesintheregion.

3.1 Develo�ment and education in an ��istorical �ers�ective

Thepresenceofthepastintoday’sCambodiaissymbolisedbythetempleofAngkorWatwhich,sinceitsre-discoverybyFrenchexplorerHenryMouhotinthemidnine-teenthcentury,representstheemblemofthepastgrandeuroftheKhmercivilisation.ThereferencesthatallpoliticalregimeshavemadetoAngkorduringthelastfiftyyearsshowstheimportanceattributedtothepastcomparedtothedisruptionofthepresentcausedbywarandgenocide.ThissectionprovidesanoverviewofthemainhistoricaleventsfromthecolonialperiodtopresentCambodiaandisdividedalongthemainpoliticalchangesassummarisedintable3.1.


T�� T�� p�� y�� C�� T�� p�� y�� C�� T�� p�� y�� C�� T�� p�� y�� C�� T�� p�� y�� C��

E�� / N�� L�� Sy�� P�� Sy�� P�� p�w�� E��y

P��-�95�Frenc��-based code

and judiciaryFrenc�� rotectorate Held by Frenc�� Colonial ty�e

�95�–�970(K�� C��-

��)

Frenc�� based civil code and judiciary

Constitutional monarc��y

Held by Prince Norodom Si��anouk as

Prime Minister

Market and national-ization

�970–�975(Kh�� R��pu��)

Frenc�� based civil code and judiciary

�e�ublicHeld by Lon Nol as Prime Minister and

t��en PresidentMarket, war economy

�975–�979(D�� K��-

pu�h��)

Legal system destroyed

Extreme Maoist agro-communism

Pol Pot and central committee of CPK

Agrarian, centrally �lanned

�979–�989(P��p��’�� R��pu��

K��pu�h��)

Vietnamese-oriented model

Central communist committee and local

committees

Kam�uc��ea Peo�le’s �evolutionary Party

Soviet style central �lanning

�989–�99�(S�� C��)

Greater economic rig��ts

Central communist committee and local

committees

Cambodia’s Peo�le’s Party (CPP)

Liberalized central �lanning

�99�-p��(K�� C��-

��)

Frenc�� based civil code combined wit��

common law

Constitutional monarc��y

S��ared between FUNCINPEC and CPP

Transition to market economy

Source:Katoetal.2000,Ayres2000.

3.1.1 Origins and Frenc�� rotectorate: until 1953

TheIndiantraderswhoreachedCambodiaaroundthebeginningofChristianerarepresentthefirstknowncontactwiththeKhmercivilisation.1The‘indianization’ofCambodiaprovided“awritingsystem,alanguage(Sanskrit),avocabularyofsocialhierarchies(butnotacastesystem),Buddhism,andtheideaofuniversalkingship”(Chandler1998:12).TheAngkorperiodreached its zenith in the twelfthcenturywhen,underKingJayavarmanVII(1181–1219),itsterritoryincludedwhattodayareCambodia,ThailandandpartsofMyanmar,VietNam,Malaysia,andLaos.

Vickery(1993)describestheKhmerpre-colonialsocietyasbeingdividedbetweenpeasants,officials,androyalty.Eachclasshadaspecific functionessential for thewellbeingofthesociety(Vickery1984).Thegod-king(dharmaraja)wasconsideredtheprotectorofsociety(Ayres2000).Thekingwasconnectedtothevillagesthroughtheadministrativecadres(oknyas)(ibid.).ThedisappearanceoftheAngkorEmpireinthefifteenthcenturydidnotproducechangesinthedivisionofsociety.Theso-cialpositionofthemajorityofthepopulationwasgiven,and“itwouldhavebeen

1 Cambodian and Khmer are used as synonymous in this and the following chapters.CambodianandKhmerareusedassynonymousinthisandthefollowingchapters.


unthinkable to rise above the class into which one was born” (Vickery 1984: 13).Buddhismlegitimizedthestatusofthekingandthesystemofsocialhierarchybyas-sertingtheimperfectionofhumanbeingsandtheirneedforguidance(Ayres2000).RuralareasweredistantfromAngkorandweregovernedwithrelativeautonomybyappointedofficials.Atvillagelevelawebofpatron-clientrelationships“guaranteedthoseatthebottomtheirsurvivaland,totheoneatthetop,asufficientclienteletoneutralizepotentialrivals”(ibid.).TheBuddhisttemple(vatorpagoda)representedthecentreofeducationandmaintenanceofthesocialsystem(Vickery1993,Ayres2000).2

InAugust1863,inordertosecurethecountryagainsttheterritorialexpansionbyVietNamandSiam(today’sThailand),KingNorodomsignedaprotectorateagree-mentwithFrance.3WhileCambodiaremainedofficiallyakingdom,theFrenchhadthepolitical,economicandadministrativecontrolandestablishedacentralisedad-ministrativesystem.Thelinkbetweenprovincialcitiesandthecapital,PhnomPenh,wasmaintainedthroughappointedresidénts (Chandler1998).TheFrenchadmin-istrationintroducedthemodernkhum(communes)in1908as“theterritorialandadministrativedivisionoftheKhet(province)whichisdirectedbytheMekhumandassistedbytheKhumCouncil”(TitleI,Article1).4Electionsthathadbeenheldspo-radically since 1901, were formally introduced in 14 provinces though they neverbecomegeneralelectionsandtookplaceindifferentpartsofthecountryatdiffer-enttimes.Themaintaskofthekhumwastoactasanagentofthecentralauthority,guaranteesecurity,andcollecttaxes.TheFrenchauthoritiesattemptedwithoutsuc-cessvariousreformstosimplifythekhum(i.e.in1919,1925,1931,and1935),butfi-nallyin1941abolishedthem(Flametal.2002,Locard2002).Despitetheseattempts,ithasbeenarguedthatoveralltheFrenchmission civilisatricedidnotshowastronginterestinruralareasandthatpeoplecontinuedtofollowaBuddhistlifestyleandpatron-client relationshipsof thepast (Vickery1984,Chandler1991,Ayres2000).Intheearly1950s,however,Frenchcontrolofthecolonialterritories,startingfromVietNam,begantoweaken.KingNorodomSihanouklaunchedthe‘royalcrusadeforindependence’,whichconcludedsuccessfullywhenindependencewasobtainedon9thNovember1953.

Withregardtoeducation,beforethearrivaloftheFrench,pagodasandmonksweremainly inchargeofprovidingschoolingbyteachingtheBuddhistscripturesandprecepts(Ayres2000).Teachingwasprovidedtoboysandonlyrarelytogirlsandteachersenjoyedahighstatus.TheFrenchadministrationfocusedonurbanschoolsandintroducedaFrenchcurriculumtoformthefutureélite.Ruralschoolscontinued

2 Vickery (1993) adds that villagers were divided into two groups:Vickery (1993) adds that villagers were divided into two groups: neak mean (the one whohave)andneak kro (theoneswhodonothave).

3 Locard (2002), with regard to the French presence in Cambodia, notes that “the fiction of theLocard(2002),withregardtotheFrenchpresenceinCambodia,notesthat“thefictionoftheprotectoratewasaflimsylegalveilfortherealityofade factocolonialrule”(p.9).

4 Ordenannce Royale No. 42, 5OrdenannceRoyaleNo.42,5thJune1908,inLocard(2002).


tobeorganisedbycommunitiesaroundpagodasandtobefinancedthroughlocalcontributionscollectedduringreligiousceremonies.In1918theFrenchadministra-tionstartedareformaimedatthemodernisationofpagoda-schools,whichultimate-lyfailedbecauseofthegapbetweentheurbancurriculumandthetraditionalformsofeducationinpagodas,alackoftrainedteachers,andlimitedfinancialresourcesavailabletoimplementit(Ayres2000).5

3.1.2 T��e “Golden Age”: Kingdom of Cambodia 1953–1970

Theperiodthatgoesfromindependencetothebeginningofthecivilwarisremem-beredasaperiodofpeace,security,sufficientfood,andgoodsalariesforteachers(Informant).6Chandler,however, considers thisperiodmorecriticallyas the timewhenpluralismendedinCambodia(1991).Havinggainedindependence,KingNo-rodomSihanoukdecidedinfact totakeanactiverole inpolitics.Heabdicated in1955,turningthethronetohisfather,PrinceSuramarit,andcreatedhisownparty,theSangkum Reastr Niyum (PopularSocialistCommunity),whichdominatedpoli-ticsuntil1970(ibid.).ThepoliticalprogrammeoftheSangkumwasbasedontheideaofBuddhist Socialism,whichblendedthetraditionalmoralorderofBuddhism,king-ship,nationandmodernprogress(CorfieldandSummers2003).

Admittedly, the programme was successful in mobilising society. At the sametime,however, itperpetuated traditional social structureswithreferences toAng-korandthelegitimisationoftheabsolutepowerofSihanouk(Chandler1991,Ayres2000).In1961,PrinceSihanoukcameunderpressurefromseveralsides.Hestrug-gledwithoutmuchsuccesstomaintaintheneutralityofCambodiaintheVietnam-ese-Americanconflict.Sincehehadallowed,in1965,NorthVietnamesetroopstousetheharbourofKampongSaom(alsoknownasSihanoukville)tosupplyweaponsandmedicines,theUnitedStatedlaunchedin1969asecretbombingcampaignoverCambodiatohitVietnamesetroopsstationedinthesouthofthecountry(Shawcross1993).7Othersourcesofpressureagainsttheprincewerethegrowingeconomicgapbetween rural and urban areas, the anti-Sihanouk demonstrations asking for de-

5 In the school year 1932–33 there were 225 pagoda-schools. In 1938–39, there were 908 (AyresIntheschoolyear1932–33therewere225pagoda-schools.In1938–39,therewere908(Ayres2000).

6 The informant became a primary school teacher in 1956 and worked in the provinces of Kam-Theinformantbecameaprimaryschoolteacherin1956andworkedintheprovincesofKam-pongThomandPreahVihearuntilthebeginningofthecivilwar.Herememberedthatthesalarywas4.800KHRpermonth(ca.150USDattheexchangerateof1USD=30KHRofthattime).Todaytheaveragesalaryforaprimaryschoolteacheris20–25USDpermonth.KHRistheCambodiacurrency:CambodianRiel.

7 Shawcross (1993) maintains that in 1969, the Nixon administration began, without approvalShawcross(1993)maintainsthatin1969,theNixonadministrationbegan,withoutapprovalfromCongress,B-52bombing raidsunder thenameof “OperationMenu”.Thebombingsweredisclosedin1970andcarriedonuntil1973.Bythen,thetotaltonnageofbombsdroppedonCambodiawas539.129,comparedto160.000tonnesdroppedonJapanduringWorldWarII.


mocracy,andthegrowingnumberofstudentswhowereattractedtothecommunistinsurgencythathadstartedintheruralareas.TheemergingurbanmiddleclasssawinthiscrisistheopportunitytoseizepowerandoustedSihanoukon17thMarchof1970whilehewasonastatevisitinMoscow.GeneralLonNol,arightwingmem-berofSihanouk’sSangkumparty,withthebackingoftheUnitedStates,becametheleaderofthenation.

Modernisationandtheneedforaqualifiedworkforcewereatthecentreoftheeconomicagenda.AreportpublishedbyUNESCOin1954,recommendedagradualexpansionofeducationandlinkingthecurriculumtopeople’seducationalneeds.8While Khmer was reintroduced as the language for instruction, the governmentstartedaprogrammeof rapideducationalexpansion throughschoolconstructionand teacher training. The number of primary schools increase between 1955 and1968from2.731to5.857,theLycéesfrom10to180,anduniversityfacultiesfrom5to48(SangkumReastrNiyum1994).

Asaresult,educationboomed.Vickery(1984)calculatesthatschoolattendancewent from50–60.000children inprimary schools in1936, to271.000by1954, toreachamillionin1970.Communitieswereactiveintheirsupporttoschools.Oneinformantremembersaparentsassociationandateachersassociationlinkedtohisschool.Theformerwasresponsibleforcollectingcontributionstosupporttheim-provementoftheschoolbuildings,whilethelatterprovidedsupporttohelpthefami-liesofteacherswhohadpassedaway(Informant).Sinceeducationhadbeenneglect-edduringthecolonialperiod,therapidexpansionthattookplaceunderSihanoukwasnotmatchedbyimprovementsinqualityanddidnottakeintoconsiderationtheabsorptivecapacityofthelabourmarket(Vickery1984).Furthermore,educationatthattimewasconsideredfirstofallasavehicletoacquirehighersocialstatus,sothattheincreasingnumberofeducatedunemployedpeopleconsideredthemselvesasdeprivedoftherightforasocialposition(ibid.).

3.1.3 K��mer �e�ublic: 1970–1975

Followingtherepublicancoup,NorodomSihanouktookrefugeinChinaandestab-lishedanalliancewithhisformerenemies,thecommunistguerrillas,whichbecameknownastheKhmerRouge.9LonNolpromisedmoreparticipationanddemocracy,whilethearmywaslosingcontroloflargepartsoftheterritorytoNorthVietnamese

8 Bilodeau (1954) in Ayres (2000).Bilodeau(1954)inAyres(2000).9 Norodom Sihanouk used the term Khmer Rouge as a pejorative in the 1950s to discredit hisNorodomSihanoukusedthetermKhmerRougeasapejorativeinthe1950stodiscredithis

critics in thedemocratic extreme left. In the1970s theEnglish languagemediapickedupontheofficialrhetoricoftheKhmerRepublicandbegantouseKhmerRougefortheCom-munistPartyofKampucheatodistinguishthemfromtheVietCong(CorfieldandSummers2003).


troopsandtheKhmerRouge(Thion1993).10By1974,theescalationofthecivilwarhadcausedthedeathanddisplacementofhundredsofthousandsofpeopleandby1975 thepopulationofPhnomPenhhadswollenwithabout twomillionrefugees(Chandler1998).InJanuary1975,theKhmerRougestartedtheirfinaloffensiveandenteredPhnomPenhon17thApril.

Thisistheperiodwheneducationsufferedmostofthematerialandhumande-struction(Vickery1984,Chandler1991,Ayres2000).AstudybytheNGOReddBar-na(Kuløy1996),foundthatin1969(theyearbeforethecoupbyGeneralLonNol),therewere5.270primaryschools inCambodia.Ayear later, in1970, thenumberhaddropped to1.064,while thenumberof students fell from936.000 to333.000.ThishadbeenmainlyduetoarushtostrengthentheCambodianarmybydraftingchildrenandyoungsters.Educationalsobecamepoliticisedandwasusedasatoolforanti-Sihanoukpropaganda(Ayres2000).

3.1.4 Democratic Kam�uc��ea: 1975–1979

ThearrivaloftheKhmerRougesawpeoplefillthestreetsofPhnomPenhtowel-comethem.Theirpresencemeantthatthewarwasover(Ayres1999).ThecitizensofPhnomPenhcouldnotknowthattheregimethatwasgoingtoruleCambodiaforthenextthreeandahalfyearswouldcause500.000refugeesandthedeathofover1,5millionpeople(oroneinseven)fromoverwork,starvation,misdiagnoseddiseases,andexecution(Vickery1993,Duggan1996,Chandler1998).11Asaresult,thedemo-graphicstructureofCambodiawasalteredsignificantly(Figure3.1).

Theaimof theKhmerRougeregimewas to transformCambodiaso that“thepoorcouldfinallybecomethemastersoftheirlivesandthecollectivemastersoftheircountry” (Chandler 1998: 209). The political and economic programme includedself-sufficiencythroughagriculturalproduction,thereturntobarterbyabolishingmoney,theprevalenceofcommunitytiesandcommonpropertyoverfamiliesandindividualism,theforceddissolutionofreligion,and,withtheexceptionofChina,internationalisolation(Vickery1984,Chandler1998).12

Transformation started immediately. A few hours after the Khmer Rouge hadenteredPhnomPenhcametheordertoevacuatethetown.Thesameorderwasgiveninothercitiesofthecountry,andintheweekafterthefallofPhnomPenhovertwo

10 Thion (1993) argues that the rural areas supported the Khmer Rouge in this initial stage large-Thion(1993)arguesthattheruralareassupportedtheKhmerRougeinthisinitialstagelarge-lybecauseoftherespecttheyhadfortheformerkingandhisallies.

11 Shawcross (1993) and Kiernan (1996 and 2004) estimates are higher: between 1,6 and 1,8 mil-Shawcross(1993)andKiernan(1996and2004)estimatesarehigher:between1,6and1,8mil-lionpeople.

12 The example of rice production shows how unrealistic the policies of the regime were. RiceTheexampleofriceproductionshowshowunrealisticthepoliciesoftheregimewere.Riceproductionwastargetedatanaveragenationalyieldof3metrictonnesperhectare,fromlessthan 1 metric tonneper hectare inpre-revolutionary period (Chandler 1998). In2004 theaverageyieldwas1,9metrictonnesperhectare(FAO2004).


millionCambodianswerepushedintothecountryside(Chandler1998).Thisishowoneinformant,whowasabout15atthattime,rememberedthattime:

“BeforethearrivaloftheKhmerRougetherewereabouttwomillionpeople inPhnomPenhwhohadcomefromalloverthecountry.DuringthefirstthreetofourdaystheKhmerRougestartedtoevacuatethetown.Theywentaroundwithloudspeakerssayingthat theAmericansweregoingtobombthetownanymo-ment.Everybodyhad to leave.Anybodywhodelayedor tried tohidewasshot.Weweretenpeople,includingfamilyandrelatives.ThefourthdaywestartedtowalkinthedirectionofKampongSpeu[SouthWestofPhnomPenh].Isawmanybodiesonthesideoftheroad:armypeople,KhmerRogue,civilians.Deadbod-ies,burninghouses,andshooting.Irememberedinjuredpersonspushedontheirhospitalbeds.Isawthecorpseofawoman.Herbabystillalivetryingtogetmilkfromherbreast.Butwecouldnothelphim,wecouldnothelpanyone.Theywouldhaveshotus.WestoppednowandthenforonehourandhadthentocontinuepushedatgunpointbyKhmerRougegroupsbehindus.Weweretenwhenweleft,andonlyfourofusarrived.”

ThecountrywasrenamedDemocratic Kampuchea(DK)andanewconstitutionwasdrafted(seeEtcheson1984,Jennar2006).TheleadershipoftheregimeandtheCom-munistPartyremainedsecretiveandwasknownasangkar (theorganisation)andportrayedasanOrwellianomnipresententity“comprisingboththepartyleadershipandthepopulace thatshouldbeworshippedbyeveryone”(Hinton2002:68).Themain differences with the past were the dismantling of the market economy, theextremeviolenceoftheregime,andtheauthoritygiventopoorandilliteratepeople

��u�� D��ph�� /�� 950–�0�0 (��xp��) (FAO 2004)

0

1.000

2.000

3.000

4.000

5.000

6.000

7.000

8.000

9.000

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

P�pu

��

� (��

000)

Males

Females


fromruralareas(Vickery1984,Chandler1991).13Despitethechanges,continuitiesbetweenDKandthepastincludedthereferencestotheAngkoreanEmpire,theex-tremelyhierarchicalorganisationofthepartystructure,andthecentralisedcontrolofpower,andthereturnofPrinceSihanoukwhoremainedasymbolicheadofstateduringtheregime(Ayres2000).

DuetotheinternationalisolationpursuedbyDK,theatrocitiesthattookplaceinCambodiadidnotbecomeapparentuntil1978,andeventhen,asnotedbyShaw-cross (1984), theaccounts fromrefugeeswhomanaged toslip through theborderintoThailandwerereceivedwithscepticismintheWest.14VickeryhaslabelledthesepersonalaccountscollectedintherefugeecampsalongtheThai-CambodianborderastheStandard Total View. Accordingtothisview,theregimeaimedattheexter-minationofallclassenemies(e.g.civiladministrators,armypersonnel,urbanelite,teachers, doctors, and technicians) and abolished schooling, medical care, family,andreligionalloverthecountry(Vickery1984).ForVickery, theseaccountshaveelementsoftruthbuttheyalsocontributedtooversimplifytherealsituationinthecountry.VickerythereforeproposesanalternativeviewwhichholdsthatthehardestlivingconditionswereexperiencedintheNorthwestwherehighnumbersofurbanpeoplenotaccustomedtorurallifediedfromoverworkorexecution.IntheEast,atleastuntil1978,andtheSouthwest,livingconditionswerebetterandurbanpeoplewere given time to get accustomed to their new life by more experienced KhmerRougecommanders(ibid.).

VickerypositsthatthefamilypolicyintheDKwasthatmarriageswerealloweduponapprovalfromauthorities.ForVickery,theaimwasnottodiscouragethenu-clear family (wife, husband, and children), but rather to impede the formation ofextendedfamilylinksofthepastwhich,fromtheDKperspective,hadresultedinthediffusionofnepotism.WithregardtoreligionandBuddhism,theDKConstitutionstatedthat“everycitizenofKampucheahastherighttoworshipaccordingtoanyreligion” (Chapter15,Article20 inEtcheson1984, Jennar2006).Thearticle thencontinues stating that “reactionary religionswhicharedetrimental toDemocraticKampucheaandKampucheanpeopleareabsolutelyforbidden”.Theresultisthatnoreligiouspracticesweretolerated,andonthis,Vickeryadmits, theStandardTotalViewiscorrect.WhileBuddhistmonkswereoneithersideofthefrontduringthecivilwar,Buddhismwasseenbyauthorities“asapropfortraditionalelitesandanorganisationthatencouragedfeudalattitudesandrelationships”(1984:191).Though

13 People living in rural areas were calledPeople living in ruralareaswerecalledneak chah (oldpeople/ruralpeople) todistinguishthemfromthepeoplecomingfromtowns,whowerecalledneak thmei(newpeople/urbanpeople).

14 As an example the economist Samir Amin described the experience of the Cambodian Com-AsanexampletheeconomistSamirAmindescribedtheexperienceoftheCambodianCom-munistrevolutionsayingthat:“thelessonofCambodiaisquiteessential,becauseitoccurredinacountrywhosestructuresandsituationarehighlyreminiscentof thoseof theaverageAfricancountryandofsomeregionsofAsia.ThusthevictoriousstrategyofourCambodiancomradesmustbesystematicallycomparedwiththoseadvocatedelsewhere”(1977:147).


Vickeryarguesthatmonkswerenotmassexecutedandhadtodisrobeandjointhepeopleworkinginthefields,Kent(2003)showsthatpriortothe1975–79eratherewasanestimated88.000Buddhistmonksinthecountryandabout3.500monaster-iesandthatitisbelievedthatonethirdofmonkswasexecutedandthathalfofthecountry’smonasterieswererazed,damagedordesecrated.

ThepersonalaccountbyPicq(1989)showsthathungerandfearswerethetoolsusedbyDKtocontrolpeople.Ebihara(2002),returningtothevillageofSvay,wheresheconductedherseminalethnographicresearchin1959–1960(seeEbihara1968),discoveredthat50percentofthepeople(70outof139)shehadknownduringherresearchperiod,haddiedduringtheDK.Sherecordsthefollowingaccountfromavillager:

“People’s worthwasmeasured in termsofhow manycubicmetresofdirt theymoved.Wehadtodigcanals:measureanddig,measureanddig.I’dfallcarryingheavyloads.Youhadtoworkandwalkuntilyoufell,soyou’dwalkandfall,walkandfall:evenwhenyougotsickyoudidnotdaretostopworkingbecausethey’dkill you, so you kept working until you collapsed. They used people without athoughtastowhethertheywouldliveordie”(p.97).

Thesepersonalaccountshaveanintrinsicvaluethatreachesbeyondgenocidenum-bers,astheyhighlighttheextentoftrauma,guiltandlossthatstillaffectsindividualsandtheirrelationshipstoday.

Thecollapseoftheregimeprecipitatedduring1978wheninternalparanoialedtopurgesthatcausedthekillingofthousandsofKhmerRougecadres.15Inaddition,in1978,thehistorichatredwithVietNambrokeoncemoreintowar,andVietnamesetroops,afterlaunchinganattackattheendofDecember1978,enteredPhnomPenhby7thJanuary1979.TheKhmerRougeleadersfledandtookrefugeintheforestareasborderingThailand.

Withregardtoeducation,VickeryagreesthatinDKbeyondprimaryeducation,schoolingwasabolished,butadds that“theviewof totaldestructionofeducationneedsagooddealofmodification”(Vickery1984:183).Inbetterrunareas,childrenwheregivenfewhoursofteachingonruralmattersandmanualwork.Teacherswhohadjoinedtherevolutionarymovementorshowedaproperrevolutionaryattitudewerealsonot indanger.Chandler (1998)presentsadifferentperspective,arguingthatteachersconsideredhostiletotheregimewereoftenkilledorassignedtoothertasks.Ayres(2000),arguesthattheregimedidnotattributesignificantimportancetoeducation;thefewwhoworkedasteachersweremainlyneak chah(oldpeople/ru-ralpeople),almostilliterateandrarelytrainedwhilethecurriculumincludedrevo-lutionarysongsandslogans.Asaresult,basicschoolingremainedmoreapolicyin

15 This is the period when the S21 torture centre was set up at the Tuol Sleng high school inThis is theperiodwhentheS21torturecentrewassetupat theTuolSlenghighschool inPhnomPenh.Of the20.000prisoners thatpassed throughTuolSlengbetween1975–1978,onlysevensurvivedwhentheywerefreedbytheVietnameseon7thJanuary1979(Chandler1991,Chandler1998).


principleduringthisperiod.Whenbasicschoolingortechnicalcourseswerestarted,theywereoftentheresultof local initiatives(Vickery1984,Thion1993,Chandler1998,Ayres2000).

3.1.5 T��e Peo�le’s �e�ublic of Kam�uc��ea: 1979–1989

The Vietnamese brought with them Cambodians and ex-Khmer Rouge who haddefected to Viet Nam and formed the National United Front for the Salvation ofCambodia.HengSamrinwasnominatedasheadofthegovernmentandthePeople’sRepublicofKampuchea(PRK)wasborn.Thenewregimeconfronteddevastation:“there were not institutions of any kind – no bureaucracy, no army or police, noschoolsorhospitals,nostateorprivatecommercialnetwork,noreligioushierarchy,no legalsystem.Infrastructureshadcollapsedthroughneglect,andtherewerenofunctioningurbancentres.Millionsofpeoplewandered thecountry” (Gottesman2002inBluntandTurner2005:76).Vickery(1986)writesthat“basichealthcarewasnon-existent,medicineshaddisappearedandtherewereonlyfiftyorsixtydoctorsleftinthecountry.”(p.44).Duggan(1996)suggeststhat“nomorethan300qualifiedpersonsfromalldisciplineswere left inthecountry”(p.365).FeelingsamongtheCambodianpeopleabouttheVietnamesepresencearestilldividedtodaybetweenthosewhoconsiderittheliberationfromtheKhmerRougeandthosewhothinkitmarkedthebeginningoftheoccupationbyalongtimeenemy.Neverthelessitmustbe recognised that theVietnamesepresence inCambodia startedaprocessof re-constructionandrecovery,albeitalongsocialistlinesandwithastronglycentralistemphasis(BluntandTurner2005).

Westerncountries,ledbytheUnitedStates,establishedanembargothatdeniedWestern aid and assigned Cambodia’s United Nations’ seat to the Khmer Rouge(Mysliwiec1988).BesidesVietNam,mostofthebilateralaidcamefromtheSovietUnion, Eastern European countries, India and a few international NGOs. UnitedNationsagencies,suchasUNICEFandWFP,wereallowedtoprovideonlyhumani-tarianassistance.

Accordingtooneinformant“peoplewerenotreadytofollowacommunistideol-ogyagain”.Indeed,oneofthemainpreoccupationsofthePRKgovernmentwastodifferentiateitssocialistideologyfromtheKhmerRougecommunism.Thedistinc-tionbetweenneak chah(oldpeople/ruralpeople)andneak thmey(newpeople/urbanpeople) introducedinDKwasabolished, freedomofmovementwasreintroduced,andBuddhismwasallowedinacontrolledform.Kent (2003) mentions that, by 1981,Kent(2003)mentionsthat,by1981,over700pagodashadbeenrestoredwithsignificantlocalcontributionsintermsoflabour, timeandresources inadditiontomoneysentbyCambodians livingover-seas.


Thegovernmentorganisedagriculturalproductionincollectivekrom samaki(sol-idaritygroups)formedbyten–fifteenfamiliesresponsibleforbetweenfifteen–twentyhectaresofland(Slocomb2003).Thegroupswereorganisedindifferentformstosuitspecificlocalconditionsbutbytheendof1984,thegovernmentestimatedthatonly10percentofthe102.500krom samaki establishedinthecountryhadarealcollec-tiveeconomy.16Thisconfirmsthatpeoplehadlittleinterestinsocialistideasandthattothemareturntonormalitymeantratherareturntopre-warlife(ibid.).

The PRK government attributed a high priority to education and, contrary toDK,consideredschoolsanimportantspacetolegitimisethenewsocialiststateandeducationavehiclesofantiKhmerRougepropaganda(Geeves2002).OneinformantexplainedthateducationwasorganisedinaveryhierarchicalstructureinlinewiththesocialistpreferenceforcentralisedinstitutionalstructureandtheFrenchadmin-istrativetradition.

AsnotedbyGeeves(2000),“peopleweretogethertorebuildeducation”andthereconstruction effort of schools received substantial help from communities andvillagers,whocontributedmaterialsandlabour.Despitetheseefforts,however,thesystemsufferedfromaninsufficientnumberofqualifiedteacherteachersas“outofthe22.000teachers inthecountryat thebeginningof1970,only7.000werealiveandinthecountryin1979andonly5.000returnedtoteaching”(Mysliwiec1988:40).Therefore,trainingofteacherswasprovidedinlargenumbers.17Duggan(1996)suggeststhatthemassiveexpansionofbasiceducationthatstartedin1979hastobebalancedbytheverypoor teachingstandardsandthatachievementsofeducationduringthisperiodhavetobeassessedagainstthefactthatthereconstructionhadtostartalmostfromscratch.Paradoxically,asnotedbySarNaketal.(2002),thelimitedcapacityoftheMinistryofEducation,YouthandSport(MoEYS)toreachandcontrolprovincesanddistrictsfavoured,morebydefaultthanbyintentions,theemergenceofgreatercommunityinvolvementineducationandabroadsenseofownershipofthesystem.

16 There were basically three types ofTherewerebasicallythreetypesofkrom samaki:thefirsttypewasbasedonamorecollec-tive model where the krom directly managed all the rice land and where the krom leaderwasinchargeofsharingtheproductionandoffooddistributionwithinthegroup;asecondtypewherethekromdividedthelandamongsmallerteamsof3–5membersandwherethekromleaderactedassupervisor;athirdtypewherethekromworkedsomelandbutfamilieswerealsogivenlandtoworkseparatelyoraccordingtomutualassistancepractices(Slocomb2003).

17 One specific aspect of this was the scholarships offered to government staff and universityOnespecificaspectofthiswasthescholarshipsofferedtogovernmentstaffanduniversitystudentsinUniversitiesintheSovietUnionandtheEasternbloc(Informant).


3.1.6 Transition towards �eace and democracy: 1989 – �resent

The fall of the Berlin Wall, that triggered the beginning of the dissolution of theSovietUnion,broughttoanendtheSovietsupporttoVietNamandledtothewith-drawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in late 1989. For the following fouryears,thePRKbecametheState of Cambodiaandadoptedanewconstitutionwhichreintroducedprivateproperty,amarketeconomy,andBuddhismas thestatereli-gion.In1991,thepeacenegotiationsheldinParis,resultedinthedecisionstodeployaUnitedNationspeacekeepingmissioncalledUnited Nations Transitional Author-ity in Cambodia (UNTAC)whichhadthreemainobjectives:overseethereturnofthe370.000Cambodians fromtherefugeecamps inThailand, thedemobilisationofallarmedfactions,andtheorganisationofdemocraticnationalelections.WhilethereturnoftherefugeesprovedextremelydifficultandtheKhmerRougerefusedtosurrendertheirweapons,fourmillionpeopletookpartinthenationalelectioninMay1993.Theresultsgaveanunexpectedrelativemajoritytotheroyalistparty,theFront Uni National port in Camboge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif(FUNCINPEC), of Prince Ranariddh over the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) ofPrimeMinisterHunSen.Thepost-electionturmoilandnegotiationsresultedinthecreationofanuneasycoalitionwiththetwoleadersasco-primeministers.

TheUNTACperiodissignificantalsoforanotherreason: thearrivalen masseof international NGOs and Western donors (Ayres 2000). This is also the periodwhenmostCambodianNGOs(CNGOs)werestarted,mainlybyreturneesfromtherefugee camps in Thailand who had been exposed to the NGO idea through theinternationalorganisationsworkinginthecamps.DuringandaftertheUNTACpe-riod CNGOs received funding from international organisations reluctant to workwith the government (Mysliwiec 1988,Mysliwiec 1993,Thida Kus2000). Duggan(1996)mentionsthat,from1991onward,assecurityimproved,projectsstartedintheprovinces,andby1993morethan30internationalorganisationsprovidedsupport(thoughwithlittlecoordination)toover100educationalprogramsmainlyfocusedonteachertraining.

InSeptember1993,theNationalAssemblypromulgatedCambodia’ssixthCon-stitutionwhich, in itspreamble,againmakesreferenceto thegloriousAngkoreanpast:

“Accustomed to having been an outstanding civilization, a prosperous, large,flourishingandgloriousnation,withhighprestigeradiatinglikeadiamond.Hav-ingdeclinedgrievouslyduringthepasttwodecades,havinggonethroughsuffer-inganddestruction,andhavingbeenweakenedterribly.Havingawakenedandresolutelyralliedanddeterminedtounitefortheconsolidationofnationalunity,the preservation and defence of Cambodia’s territory and precious sovereigntyandthefineAngkorcivilization,andtherestorationofCambodiaintoanIslandof Peace based on multi-party liberal democratic responsibility for the nation’s


futuredestinyofmovingtowardperpetualprogress,development,prosperity,andglory”(RGC1993).

TheconstitutionchangedalsothenameofthecountryfromStateofCambodiatoKingdom of Cambodia.Sihanouk,whohadbeeninexilesince1979,wasreinstatedasking,albeitwithreducedpowers.

The coalition between FUNCINPEC and CPP did not last long. Historically,“Cambodiahasenjoyedstabilityonlywhenonepartyhadcompletepowerandthepowerimbalancewasgreatest”(Informant).TroopsclashedinPhnomPenhinJuly1997.DonorsandinternationalNGOssuspendedmostoftheiractivitiesinthecoun-try.HunSenemergedasthestrongmanandwasconfirmedasPrimeMinisterbywinning the national elections in 1998 which were declared “sufficiently free andfairtotheextentthatitreflectsthewilloftheCambodianpeople”byinternationalobservers (inVanderWeyden2000:619).HunSen’sparty, theCPP,won the rela-tivemajorityandestablishedanewcoalitionwithPrinceRanariddh’sFUNCINPEC.Thealliancewasre-confirmedafteraoneyearstalematefollowingthe2004nationalelections.Since1998,Cambodiahasexperiencedrelativepeaceandpoliticalstabil-ity.AtrialofKhmerRougeleadershasbeenpainstakinglynegotiatedamidpoliti-cal resistance between the government and the United Nations since 1997 and isnowscheduledtostartin2007.Thegovernmenthasembracedmarketeconomyandhasopeneditsborders.ItisamemberoftheAssociationofSoutheastAsiaNations(ASEAN)andenteredtheWorldTradeOrganisationin2004.Nevertheless,themainhumandevelopment indicators, as shown in thenext section, lagbehind thoseofotherSoutheastAsiancountries.

3.2 Human develo�ment �rofile of Cambodia

CambodiabordersLaos,ThailandandVietNam.Itisthesmallestofthethreefor-mercountriesofIndochina(Figure3.2).Thepopulationis13,6millionandisgrow-ingrapidlyatarateoftwopercentperannum(WorldBank2004a).Thegrowthisduelargelytotheyoungageofthepopulation,resultofpost-KhmerRougedemo-graphicdevelopments(Figure3.3).Thepopulationisrelativelyhomogeneouswithanestimated90percentethnicKhmerandtheremaining10percentdividedbetweenVietnamese(thelargergroup),Chinese,KhmerLou,indigenousgroups,andCham.ThemajorityofthepeopleliveinthelowlandsoftheMekongRiverandtheTonleSapLake.


��u�� M�p �� C�� (WHO 2006)

��u�� P�pu�� y �� up �994/�004 (MoP 2004)

0

1 .0 0 0

2 .0 0 0

2004

1994

A�� up

P�pu

��

� (��

000)

0–4

5–9

10–1

4

15–1

9

20–2

4

25–2

9

30–3

4

35–3

9

40–4

4

45–4

9

50–5

4

55–5

9

60–6

4

65–6

9

70–7

4

75+


3.2.1 Human develo�ment and economic growt��

Therateofeconomicgrowthbetween1999and2003hasbeenhigh,atsix–sevenpercentperannumandcomparabletotheoneofVietNamandThailand(WorldBank2004,ADB2005).Despitethisprogress,Cambodiaranks130th(outof177)intheUNDP’sHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)andbelongstothelowerendoftheMe-diumHumanDevelopmentgroup(UNDP2005).Duringthelasttenyears,theHDIhasremainedwellbelowthatofThailandandVietNam,whileLaoPDRisclosingthegapwithCambodia(Figure3.4).

TheanalysisoftheindicatorsthatformtheHDI(income,health,andliteracy),showsinmoredetail someof theproblemsofCambodia. Incomepercapital (atPPP)18,between1998and2002,hasincreasedbutremainsthesecondlowestintheregion,withanincreasinggapwithVietNam(Figure3.5).

Povertyremainswidespreadinruralareas,where85percentofthepopulationlives.WorldBank(2006a)estimatesshowthatoverthelasttenyears,thenumberofpeoplelivingunderthepovertylinehasdecreasedbybetween10and15percent.De-spitethis,between40and45percentofpeopleinruralareasliveunderthepoverty

18 PPP – Purchasing Power Parity is a conversion factor that shows how much of a country’sPPP–PurchasingPowerParity isaconversionfactor thatshowshowmuchofacountry’scurrencyisneededinthatcountrytobuywhat1USDwouldbuyintheUnitedStates.Byus-ingthePPPconversionfactorinsteadofthecurrencyexchangerate,itispossibletoconvertacountry’sGNPpercapitaintoGNPpercapitainUSD.Forthesereasons,PPPhelpstocom-pareGNPsofdifferentcountriesmoreaccurately(Soubbotina2004).

��u�� 4� Hu�� D��v��p�� I��x �� u��(UNDP 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005)

C��

V�� N��

L�� PDR

Th��

0,000

0,200

0,400

0,600

0,800

1,000

1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

HDI


line,withpeaksof75–80percentinsomeareasaroundtheTonleSapbasin(ibid.).19AccordingtoAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB)estimates,about35to40percentofthepopulationhasexpenditurelevelsbelowtheincomepovertyline,with15–20percentlivinginextremepoverty(ADB2005).

3.2.2 Human develo�ment and ��ealt��

Lifeexpectancyhasincreasedslightlybetween1997and2003(from53to56years),thoughthegapwithVietNamandThailandhasincreased(Figure3.6).

Accordingtogovernmentstatistics,in200045percentofchildrensufferedfrommoderateandseveremalnutrition(MoP2000).Themortalityrateofchildrenundertheageoffivecontinuestobethehighestintheregionand,aftertheimprovementsofthe1990s,hasworsenedsince2000from135to141perthousand(Figure3.7).20

Landminescasualtieshavemarkedlyreducedfrom4.320(or12perday)in1996,but were still high at 898 causalities in 2004 (more than 2 per day) (ICBL 2005).Psychologicalproblemshavebeenonlyrecentlyrecognisedasapartof thehealthsectorproblemsduetothepublicationoftheresultsofstudiessuchastheonebydeJongetal.(2001)whichshowsthat28,4percentofthepopulationsuffersfromPost

19 The poverty line in Cambodia was set in 2004 at 1.826 KHR per person per day which at theThepovertylineinCambodiawassetin2004at1.826KHRperpersonperdaywhichattheat2004exchangeratesisabout0,45USD(MoP2004).

20 It should be noted that in the period 1973–1978 the figure has been estimated at 187�� (MoHItshouldbenotedthatintheperiod1973–1978thefigurehasbeenestimatedat187��(MoH1998).

1.760

5.620

1.5101.350

1.660

6.890

2.3001.970

0

1.000

2.000

3.000

4.000

5.000

6.000

7.000

8.000

Cambodia Lao PD� T��ailand Viet Nam

USD

(PPP

)19982002

��u�� 5� GNP p�� p�� 998/�00� �� PPP��5� GNP p�� p�� 998/�00� �� PPP�5� GNP p�� p�� 998/�00� �� PPP5� GNP p�� p�� 998/�00� �� PPP� GNP p�� p�� 998/�00� �� PPP (UNESCO 2006)


TraumaticStressDisorder(PTSD).21Anadditionalproblemwhichiscausinggreatconcernforthefuture is theHIVprevalencerate,which isestimatedbetween2,6and3,0percent(Bith2004,WorldBank2006a)andisthehighestintheAsia-Pacificregion(Figure3.8).21 The study was conducted between 1997 and 1999 among survivors of war or massThestudywasconductedbetween1997and1999amongsurvivorsofwarormassviolence

(aged ≥16 years) randomly selected from communitypopulations in Cambodia (N = 610)(WHO2005).

��u�� 6� L�� xp��y �� u�� 997 �� 003 (UNDP 1999, 2005)

��u�� 7� M��y ��-5 �� u��7� M��y ��-5 �� u��7� M��y ��-5 �� u��7� M��y ��-5 �� u�� M��y ��-5 �� u��(WHO 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005)

C��

L�� PDR

Th��

V�� N��

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

1992 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

M��

��

y ��

�� -5 (

��00

0 p�p

u��

��)

53,4 53,2

67,4 68,8

77,1 78,5

56,2 54,7

70,5 70

78,7 81,6

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Cambodia Lao PD� Viet Nam T��ailand Singa�ore Hong Kong

Y��

��19972003


3.2.3 Human develo�ment and education

Cambodia’sNationalPovertyReductionStrategy(NPRS)statesthatoneofthemaincausesofthehighnumberofpeoplelivinginpovertyandbelowthenationalpovertylineisthelowlevelofcapabilitiesofthepopulationrelatedtohighilliteracy(CSD2002).Thirtypercentof theadultpopulation isestimated tobe illiterateand theliteracyrateofthepopulationabove15yearsofageintheperiodbetween1997and2003hasremainedthesecondlowestintheregion(Figure3.9)(WorldBank2006b).

��u�� 8� P��v�� HIV �� u�� (�� p�pu�� 5–49)��8� P��v�� HIV �� u�� (�� p�pu�� 5–49)�8� P��v�� HIV �� u�� (�� p�pu�� 5–49)8� P��v�� HIV �� u�� (�� p�pu�� 5–49)� P��v�� HIV �� u�� (�� p�pu�� 5–49) (World Bank 2006a)

3,0

0,1

0,1

0,4

0,2

2,0

0,4

0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5

Cambodia

Hong Kong

Lao PD�

Malaysia

Singa�ore

T��ailand

Viet Nam

��u�� 9� A�u�� y �� p�pu�� v�� 5 �� u��9� A�u�� y �� p�pu�� v�� 5 �� u��9� A�u�� y �� p�pu�� v�� 5 �� u��9� A�u�� y �� p�pu�� v�� 5 �� u�� A�u�� y �� p�pu�� v�� 5 �� u�� (World Bank 2006b)

Cambodia

Lao PD�

T��ailand

Viet Nam

0

20

40

60

80

100

1985 1990 1995 2000

��


ThesefigureshavebeencheckedwithasystematicsurveyconductedbytheMoEYSwithsupportfromUNESCOin1999(seeSoChunnandSupotePrasestri2000).22

Whileearliersurveywerelimitedtoquestionssuchas“Canyouread?Canyouwrite?”with “Yes”and“No”answers, this studywentmore indepthbyassessingfunctional literacy defined as “people having acquired essentials knowledge andskillsinreading,writing,arithmeticandproblem-solvingtofunctioneffectivelyinallareasof their livesandcontribute to theircommunities” (ibid.:2).Theresults,projected nationwide, show that earlier estimateswereoptimistic and that a stag-gering62,9percentoftheadultpopulation(orabout4millionpeople)inCambodiaarefunctionallyilliterate,36,3percentoftherespondentswerecompletelyilliterate(24,7percentofmalesand45,1percentoffemales)and26,6percenthadjustaru-dimentaryliteracy.

T�� P��y ��v�� N�� E�� R�� (%)

�990 �995 �000 �00�

C�� 66,6 97,7 90,9 93,3L�� PDR 62,6 70,0 81,7 85,0Th�� 75,9 n.a. 84,3 84,5V�� N�� 90,5 87,8 95,3 94,0

Source:WorldBank2006b.

Withregardtoschoolenrolment,attheprimarylevel,theNetEnrolmentRatiohasimprovedsincethebeginningofthe1990s,toreach93,3percent(Table3.2),withmaleandfemalestudentenrolmentsat95,5percentand90,9percentrespectively(WorldBank2006b).

Schooling inCambodia isorganisedaccording toa6+3+3 system: sixyearsofprimaryschool,threeyearsoflowersecondary,andthreeyearsofuppersecondary.Attheendofprimarylevel,adiplomaenablesenrolmentinlowersecondaryschool,withoutpassinganyotherexamination.Entranceinuppersecondaryisdeterminedbyanexaminationandtheavailabilityofplaces.Whileprimaryeducationintakeshaveincreased,dropoutsremainaproblem,asprimaryschoolcompletionratesforboysandgirlsare85and78percentrespectively(UNESCO2004).

Withregardtotheeducationsectorfinancing,thegovernmentstrategychangedradically from2000onwards.ExpendituresoneducationasapercentageofGDP,whichwere1percentin1996and0,9percentin1997and1998,haverisento1,9percentin2002,althoughtheyremainlowerthanexpendituresinsomeneighbouringcountries(Figure3.10),andbelowtheaverageof3,6percentforEastAsiaor4,2per

22 During the field work, 6.548 respondents aged 15 and over were interviewed and randomlyDuringthefieldwork,6.548respondentsaged15andoverwereinterviewedandrandomlyselectedfromeveryprovinceofthecountrywithspecialefforttoreachpeopleinremoteareas(seeMoEYS2000binSoChunnandSupotePrasestri2000).


centfordevelopingcountries(UNESCO2006).Thegovernmentbudgetallocationtoeducationhasalsoshownremarkableprogressfrombetween8,4percentand9,6percentintheperiod1994–97,wheninrealtermsfundingforeducationfell,to13,9percentin2000and19,1percentin2004(Phengetal.2001,WorldBankandADB2003,BrayandSengBunly2005).23

Thedatapresentedinthissectionsuggestthatthepositiverateofeconomicgrowthachievedsince1993hasnotyetfullytranslatedintoanimprovementinpeople’slive-lihoods.TheRoyalGovernmentofCambodiaisawareofthisandhasdrafted,withsupport fromWorldBankandtheADB, theNationalPovertyReductionStrategy2003–2005(NPRS)andtheSecondSocio-EconomicDevelopmentPlan2001–2005(SEDPII).24ThetwopapersformthebasisfortheGovernment’sRectangularStrate-gy2004–2008,whichaimsatenhancingeconomicgrowth,employment,equity,and

23 Bray and Seng Bunly (2005) note that the larger proportion of this increase has been in theBrayandSengBunly(2005)notethatthelargerproportionofthisincreasehasbeeninthenon-wagerecurrentsector.

24 TheNGOForumofCambodia,anumbrellaorganizationrepresenting73 localand inter-nationalNGOsworking inCambodia issuedastatement in2001questioningtheneedfortwopovertyreductionpapers(NGOForum2001).TheADB(2005)andWorldBank(2004)arguedthatthetwodocumentssharesimilaritiesbutalsohaveimportantdifferences.Inpar-ticular,theSEDPIIisa“comprehensivedevelopmentprogramfocusingongrowthpromo-tion,regionalintegration,andpovertyreduction”(ADB2005:10),whiletheNPRS“isbasedontheSEDPIIandelaboratesthepovertyreductionagendathatprovidestheframeworkforinter-nationaldevelopmentpartnersandacomprehensivesetofindicatorstomonitorprogresstowardsachievingCambodia’sMDGs”(ibid.).TheWorldBankacknowledgestheproblemsemergingfromoverlappingdocuments,notingthat“thesituationhasbeenfurthercomplicatedbytheproductionin2003oftheCambodiaMDGReport,whichintroducedathird,onlypartiallycompatibleofficialsetofbaselineandtargetindicators”(WorldBank2004:113).

��u�� 0� E�u�� xp��u�� p�� GDP �� u��0� E�u�� xp��u�� p�� GDP �� u��0� E�u�� xp��u�� p�� GDP �� u��0� E�u�� xp��u�� p�� GDP �� u�� E�u�� xp��u�� p�� GDP �� u�� (UNESCO 2006)

1,3

2,5

5,2

1,9

2,8

4,7

0,0

1,0

2,0

3,0

4,0

5,0

6,0

Cambodia Lao PD� T��ailand

��19982002


socialjustice(RGC2004).Goodgovernanceisatthecentreofthisstrategy.Oneofitscentralelements,decentralisation,ispresentedinthenextchapter.


4 Decentralisation reforms in Cambodia and c��aracteristics of K��mer communities

TheadministrativedivisionofCambodianterritoryisspelledoutinArticle126oftheCambodianConstitution(RGC1993:ChapterXI):

“TheterritoryoftheKingdomofCambodiashallbedividedintoprovincesandmunicipalities.Provincesshallbedividedintodistricts(srok)anddistricts intocommunes(khum).MunicipalitiesshallbedividedintoKhanandSangkat”.1

Theterritorycomprises20provincesand4municipalities,183districts,1.510com-munes and 111 Sangkat. The 13.409 villages are not considered as administrativeunits,butratherasadministrativearmsof thecommunes(Oberndorf2004).Thisresearchisconcernedwiththeadministrativedivisionofruralareas(provinces,dis-trictsandcommunes,asshowninfigure4.1.

Asdiscussedinsection3.1,thecurrentadministrativestructurehasitsorigininthecolonialperiod,whenthecentreextendeditscontrolandinfluencetotheperiph-ery through centrally appointed officials. While provincial governors and districtchiefscontinuetobeappointedbythegovernment,theelectionsatcommunelevelintroduced in2002havebeenpossiblebecause“Cambodiahasachievedarelativestabilityaftertheturmoilandpoliticaltensionupto1997,andtherearethecondi-tionstolookatthefuture”(Informant).

1 Khancanbetranslatedas‘urbansector’whileSangkat as‘urbancommune’.

77Decentralisation reforms in Cambodia and characteristics of Khmer communities

Thechapterisdividedintwomainparts.Thefirstdescribestheoriginsandchar-acteristics of the political decentralisation reform which started in 2001 with thepromulgationoftheLawonAdministrationandManagementofCommuneCoun-cils (RGC2001), and thoseof theeducation sector,whichbegan tenyears earlier.Referenceismadetothemainlawsandsub-decreesthatgoverntheprocessandsetthemainguidelines.Additionally,ministerialpolicypapersaswellasreportscom-missionedbyinternationaldonorsprovidingtechnicalassistancetorelevantminis-triesarealsoreviewed.Thesecondpartofthechapterexploresthemainsocialandculturalelementsthatcharacteriseandinfluencethemeaningof‘community’intheCambodiancontext.

4.1 Decentralisation and t��e election of Commune Councils

TheoriginofdecentralisationinCambodiacanbetracedto1992andtheCambodiaAreaRehabilitationandRegenerationProject(CARERE),ajointinitiativebetweenthegovernment, theUnitedNationsOffice forProjectServices (UNOPS)and theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to implement reconstruction

��u�� 4�� A��v�� u��u�� u�� C��4�� A��v�� u��u�� u�� C�� A��v�� u��u�� u�� C�� A��v�� u��u�� u�� C�� A��v�� u��u�� u�� C��

Village Village Village

Commune Council

District

Province

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT


projects at the local level (Rusten et al. 2004). CARERE II, implemented between1996and2000,markedthebeginningoftheSeila programme, ajointinitiativebyseven ministries, and received support from donors forming the Seila Task Force Secretariat.2ThesecondphaseofSeilalastedfiveyearsandendedin2005.3Seila’sgoalistocontributetopovertyalleviationthroughgoodgovernanceandtheestab-lishmentofadecentralizedanddeconcentratedsystem(RGC2000).Seilacoversall20provincesofthecountryandhasshownthatdecentralisationispossiblebypro-vidingaroleforthecommuneinlocaldevelopment(Biddulph2000,Turner2002,CDRI2003).CriticsoftheSeilaprogrammehavearguedthatSeiladependsheavilyondonorsfundingandattractsskilledpersonnelwithsalarysupplements(Turner2002),thelogicofitsplanningprocessesistoocomplicatedandhasledtoasituationwhereadecentralisedprogrammehasbeen implemented inacentralisedmanner(Biddulph1997,SIDA1998,SIDA2000), ithascreatedaparallelstructuretopro-vincialanddistrictlineagencies(Informant),andhasatendencytoprioritiseruralinfrastructureprojectsoversectorssuchaseducationorhealth.

Withregardtocommunityparticipation,Seilahascontributed,since1991,totheintroductionand institutionalisationofVillageDevelopmentCommittees (VDCs)asthe“foundationoftheruraldevelopmentstructureandautonomouscommittee[s]thatworktoensurecoordinationandcommunicationbetweenthevillage,civilso-cietyandgovernment institutions”(MRD1999:4).However,accordingtoastudybyGermanAgencyforTechnicalCooperation(GTZ)andtheMinistryofRuralDe-velopment,amongtheapproximately8.000VDCsthathavebeenestablished,onlythosethatreceiveexternalfundingthroughSeilaorNGOprojectsseemtobeactive(HorChanRotha2004).

ThoughSeilahasbeenthebasisforthedesignofthegeneraldecentralisationre-formthatweremarkedbytheelectionsofCommuneCouncils/Sangkats (CommuneCouncils)inFebruary2002,itsaimof‘establishingadecentralizedanddeconcen-tratedsystem’wasonlypartiallysuccessful.RevertingtothedefinitionsbyManor(1999)presentedinsection2.2,Seilahasachievedadministrativedeconcentration,buthasproducedonlyalimitedtransferofpoliticalpoweranddecisionmakingau-thoritytolowerlevelauthorities.

TheCommuneCouncilselectionsuccessfullymarked thebeginningofdecen-tralisationreformsthat,despitelimitedinitialdonorsupport,theCambodiangov-

2 SeilaisaKhmernamewhichmeans‘foundationstone’andevokestheconceptoflocaleffortsas the ‘foundation’ of all national development (RGC 2000). In addition to a Governmentcontributionof2,2mlUSD,thedonorssupportingSeiladuringthisphasewere:UN,SIDA,Netherlands(total60mlUSD).SupporttolocalfundscamefromIFAD,UNCDFandWorldBank.UNOPSexecutedtheCAREREIIprogramme(Rustenetal.2004)

3 Seilareceiveddonors’fundingintwoways:abaskedfundthroughthePartnershipforLocalGovernance(PLG)comprisingUNDP,DFID,SIDA(total37mlUSD),andadditionaldonors’supportforspecificprogrammesand/projectsbyGTZ,DANIDA,UNICEF,WFP,IFAD,TheWorldBank,andAusAID(Rustenetal.2004).


ernment has been determined to pursue. The reforms have three main objectiveswhichrecall thedefinitionofpoliticaldecentralisationbyRondinellipresented insection2.2(NCSC2005):

• Promotedemocracy,goodgovernanceandequityoflife;

• Giveordinarypeoplegreateropportunitiestodeterminetheirfuture;

• Encouragegreaterandsustainabledevelopment,especiallythedeliveryofbasicser-vices.

TheelectionoftheCommuneCouncilsfollowedthepassageofthetwomainpiecesoflegislationthatformthepresentlegalframeworkfordecentralisation:theLawfortheElectionofCommuneCouncils (RGC2001a)and theLawonAdministrationandManagementofCommuneCouncils(LAMC)(RGC2001).Theelectionlawhasintroducedaproportionalsystemwherebyvotesaregiventopartiesandnottoindi-vidualcandidates.Inthe1.621CommuneCouncils/Sangkatsofthecountry,11.261councillorswereelected,951(or8,5percent)ofwhomwerewomen(UNDP2002).TheCPPhaswonthe61,2percentofalltheseats,followedbyFUNCINPECwith21,9percentandSamRainsyPartywith16,7percent.Otherpartiesreceivedtheremaining0,2percent(ibid.).AsnotedbyTurner(2002),theproportionalsystemmeansthatmorethanonepartycanberepresentedinthesamecommune.

TheLAMC(RGC2001) states that theCommuneCouncilmustbe formedbybetweenfivetoelevenmembersdependingonthepopulation(Figure4.2).TheCom-muneChief(thefirstnameofthemostpopularlist)hastwodeputies(fromthelistofthenextmostsuccessfulparty/ies).TheCommuneClerk,whoisanappointedstaffof theMinistryof Interior, is responsible foradministrative (oragency) functionssuch as civil and election registration. The Commune Council can establish sub-committeescomposedbycouncillorsandvillagerstoadviseandassistthecommune(RGC2001:Chapter3,Article27).Onesub-committeeismandatory:thePlanningandBudgetingCommittee (PBC),which is comprisedof thecommunechief, andtworepresentatives(amanandawoman)fromeachvillageinthecommune(RGC2002a).Theprimaryresponsibilityof thePBCis to“assist theCommune/Sangkatchief in the preparation of the Commune/Sangkat development plan, investmentprogramandannualbudget”(ibid:Chapter2,Article9).

TheCommuneCouncils’roleandfunctionsarestatedinrathergeneraltermsinthelawandinclude:maintainpublicsecurityandorder;arrangefortheprovisionofnecessarypublicservicesandensuretheproperimplementationoftheservices;promoteandencouragethecomfortandcontentmentofresidents;promotesocialandeconomicdevelopmentandupgrade the living standardsof residents;protectandconservetheenvironment,naturalresources,nationalcultureandheritage;rec-onciledifferencesofopinionandencouragemutualunderstandingandtolerancebe-tweenresidents;undertakegeneralaffairstomeettheneedsofresidents(RGC2001:


Chapter4,Article43).TheLAMCisalsonotclearinitsdescriptionofthemecha-nismsthatcouldenablegreaterconsultationsandparticipationbyvillagersinlocaldevelopmentandlocalgovernance,besidesmentioningthemandatoryselection(notelection)ofvillagechiefs(mephum)bytheCommuneCouncils(RGC2001:Chapter3,Article30).Itfurtherstatesthatthevillagechief“shallrepresentallresidentsofthevillageandactasamainlinkbetweenthevillageandCommune/SangkatCouncil”and that he/she should “participate in meetings of various commune committeestoshareviewsonmattersrelatingtothevillage; …regularlyconsultwithresidentsofhis/hervillage”(RGC2002:Chapter2,Article23and24). Theseareimportantarticles,fortheydescribetheneedtoestablishtwoclearlinks:ahorizontalbridgebetweenvillagechiefandvillagersonmattersofvillagedevelopment,andaverticallinkwiththeCommuneCouncil.

Citizenconsultation isdescribed in sub-decreeN.022 (RGC2002)whichpre-scribesthat:“ACommune/SangkatCouncilshallactivelypromoteandfacilitatetheprocessofdemocracyintheCommune/Sangkatbydevelopingmechanismstocon-sult with Commune/Sangkat residents and community organisations” (Chapter 1,Article 12).Itfails,however,toexplainhowthisshouldtakeplace.Themainspacesforcitizens’participationdescribedintheLAMCaretheannualCommuneInvest-mentPlanningprocessandthemonthlyCommuneCouncilmeetingwhere“everyCommune/Sangkatresidentcanattend…butcannotvote”(RGC2002:Chapter3,Article30).

��u�� 4�� C��u�� C�u�� u��u��4�� C��u�� C�u�� u��u�� C��u�� C�u�� u��u�� C��u�� C�u�� u��u�� C��u�� C�u�� u��u��

Elected members A��ointed member

Sub-committees

COMMUNE CHIE�

COMMUNE CLERK

�� D��pu�y

S�� D��pu�y

OTHER COMMUNE MEMBERS

P�� Bu�� C��

C�� B…

C�� A…


ThefirstmandateoftheCommuneCouncilswillexpireintheendof2006andmustbeconsideredmainlyasalearningexperience(Rustenetal.2004).Thegovern-mentcommitmenttopoliticaldecentralisationhasproducedpositiveachievementssuchasthepreparationoffiveyearscommunedevelopmentplansandimprovementsininternaladministrationofcommunes(Turner2002,Rustenetal.2004).Asurveyconductedin2004hasshownthatcitizensperceivecommuneperformancepositive-lyandtrustthemmorethandistrictorprovincialauthorities(KimNinhandHenke2005).Themainproblemsencounteredbythereformsofarare:

➢ TheabsenceofanOrganicLawondecentralisationwhichhasresulted in thegov-ernmentrelyingonsub-decreestoregulatespecificaspectsof thereformandcon-firmstheperceptionofanincrementalandnonunitaryapproachtodecentralisation(Turner2002).

➢ Thedistinctivepoliciesthatunderlinethepresentreformledtoaperceptionthatpo-liticaldecentralisationandadministrativedeconcentrationareseparatepolicies,withthetwoprogressingatadifferentpace.TheCambodiangovernmentisrespondingtothisperceptionthroughbydraftinganOrganicLawwhichisexpectedtobevotedbytheNationalAssemblyduring2007.

➢ Communeshavenofinancialautonomyandreceivegrantsfromthecentralgovern-mentwhicharestill limited.Turner (2002),calculatedanaverageof1.000–2.000USDperCommuneintheyear2002.Theseamountswereincreasedin2003,whenCommunesweredividedintwogroups:1A(1.037Communes)receivingonaverage6.846USDfordevelopmentactivitiesand1B(584Communes)receiving1.897USD(STF2003).4

➢ While thegeneral toneof the lawavoids theestablishmentof formalisedandrigidspacesforparticipationandsuccessfullylimitstheperceptionofanextensionofthestateintotherealmofcivilsociety,itisunclearabouthowtoinvolvealreadyexist-ingbodiessuchasVDCs.Consequentlyitcouldlimitlocalinitiativessinceitisnotexplainedinmoredetailabouthowparticipationcantakeplacewithintheexistinglegislativeframework(PelliniandAyres2005).

4.2 Decentralisation in t��e education sector

Educationis indicatedasoneofthemost importantsectors inCambodia’sNPRS.Accordingly, thegovernment iscommitted“toaddresssimultaneouslysupply,de-mand,quality,andefficiencyconstraintsfocusingespeciallyonthepoorestandthegroupsat risk of exclusion” (CSD 2002:6). Several educational policies havebeendraftedtomeetthetargetsmentionedinthemaininternationalconventionsfrom

4 The total budget for Commune Councils’ development activities in the fiscal year 2003 wasThetotalbudgetforCommuneCouncils’developmentactivitiesinthefiscalyear2003was10mlUSDtobedisbursedinthreeinstalments.InSeptember2003,only42,5percenthadbeentransferredtothecouncils(STF2003).


JomtientoDakar.TheEducationStrategicPlan(ESP)2001-2005 (MoEYS2000),up-datedwiththeESP2006-2010(MoEYS2005),listsaseriesofstrategiestoachievethepolicygoalofEducationforAlland,withregardtodecentralisation,agreaterdel-egationofauthorityandresponsibilitiestoprovincial,district,communeandschoollevel. A second policy document, the Education Sector Support Program (ESSP)2002-2006 (MoEYS2001),nowupdated for theperiod2006-2010 (MoEYS2005a),describeshowthepoliciesandstrategieslaidoutintheESPwillbeputintopractice.TheESSPstressestheimportanceofpartnershipfortheeducationsectorbetweengovernmentagencies,NGOsandcivil societyanddefines themainguidelines forthedecentralisationofeducationby listingaseriesof responsibilitiesdelegated toProvincialandDistrictOfficesofEducation,Communesandindividualschools.InJune2003,theMoEYSlaunchedathirdpolicydocument:theEducationForAllNa-tionalPlan2003-2015(MoEYS2003a),whichdefinesthestrategyforachievingtheEFAtargetsandintegratestheESPandESSP.ThemainfeatureoftheEducationForAllNationalPlanistointroduceplanningthroughEducationForAllCommittees(EFAC)establishedatnationalaswellaslocallevel.TheroleoftheseCommitteesistodevelopimplementationplanswhichwillleadtotheachievementofEducationforAlltargets.5

Historically,educationwasdecentralised,inthesensethattheteachingthattookplace in pagodas was organised locally. Centralisation of education started in thecolonialperiodwith thereformof thepublicadministration.Today,decentralisa-tion,asnotedbyLosertandCoren(2004),doesnotappearasaspecificgoalinanyeducationpolicydocument.Itisratheracrosscuttingissuetoenablemorelocalizeddecision making processes with a strong element of Manor’s definition of decon-centration(seeChapterTwo,section2.2).Educationisneverthelessregardedasthesectorwheretherehavebeenthegreatestadvancesinbothareas(Turner2002a)andtwogovernment initiativesappearprominently: theClusterSchoolpolicyandthePriorityActionProgram.

4.2.1 Cluster Sc��ools: key as�ects

Thepeaceprocessthatstartedin1990andsawthearrivalofUNTACin1992openedCambodia’sdoorstointernationalaid.Duetosecurityconcerns,theinitialassess-

5 National, Provincial, District and Commune EFA Committees. The Commune EducationNational, Provincial, District and Commune EFA Committees. The Commune EducationforAllCommittee(CEFAC)isthecommitteeatthelowestlevel.Itsmembersaretheschooldirector,thecommunechief,andthevillagechief.TheCEFACmeetsregularlytodiscusstheneedsofschoolsinthecommune.Oneinformantmentionedthatatthemoment(i.e.2006)theNationalEFACommittee(NEFAC)istheonlyEFAfunctioningbody.CEFACsarenotfunctioningastheydonotreceivefundingfromdonorsoractionplansfromthegovernment.TheymaybecomeredundantonceCommuneCouncilswillbecomemoreinvolvedwithedu-cation.


mentsonthestateofeducationwerelimitedintheirgeographicalcoveragebutfoundthatprimaryschoolshad“regionalvariationsbut[were]fairlyorganizedalloverthecountryandwithcommunityparticipation”(Galasso1990:7).Themainproblemsidentifiedwerethe lowqualityof teaching, limitedhumanandmaterialresourcesatboththecentralandlocallevels,andcentralizeddecision-makingprocessesthatlimitedparticipationinschools.“BasedontheseassessmentsandtheexperienceofThailand,thegovernmentdecidedin1991toimplementaClusterSchoolapproach”(Informant).In1992,theMoEYSlaunchedapilotincooperationwithReddBarna(SavetheChildrenNorway)inthreeprovincesandwithUNICEFinsixmore(ibid.).Thefollowingyear,theMoEYSestablishedtheNationalClusterSchoolCommitteetostarttheplanningofanationwideexpansionoftheapproach.ThisinitialphaseisdescribedbyBredenberg(2002)asaperiodof‘cautiousoptimism’,sincetheap-proachwasimplementedwithcontrolfromthecentralministryandalimiteddegreeofautonomyfor theclusters. In1995, thedevelopmentofClusterSchoolsbecamea national policy through the adoption of the directive 334 EYS/S.N.N. (MoEYS2000a:5).Thissecondphase,until1998,isdefinedasaperiodof‘rapidexpansionandstalledevolution’. Donorschangedtheformofsupport,fromdirectfunding,tograntsdisbursedafterproposalswerepreparedintheschoolsandclusters(ibid.).Thethirdperiod,from2000to2001,hasbeencharacterisedbya‘convergenceofprojectdesigns’. ThisphaseismarkedbytheMoEYSrecognitionofitsownlimitationsandshortcomingsinmanagingarapidlyexpandingeducationsectorandstudytourvis-itsbyMoEYSofficialstoothercountriesintheregion(Geeves2002).

ClustersaredefinedintheClusterSchoolGuidelines(MoEYS2000a)as“anef-fectiveworkingmechanismtoprovidedirectsupportforthecommunityinordertopromoteeducationalaccessforchildren”(p.5).InCambodiaclustersaveragefivetosix‘satelliteschools’arounda‘coreschool’andfollowthestructuredescribedbyBray(1987)presentedinChapterTwo(section2.4.1).Governmentstatisticsshowthat,in2000-2001,95percentofthe5.468primaryschoolsinCambodiaweregroupedinatotalof760clusters.Ofthese,325(43percent),receiveddirectsupportfromdonors(Table4.1).6Theremaining435clusterslaggedbehind,withinadequatehumanandfinancial resources (Bredenberg2002,MoEYS2002,LosertandCoren2004).Thepolicy involvesa certaindegreeofdeconcentrationbyassigning to theProvincialOfficesofEducationtaskssuchasthecreationofProvincial,DistrictandLocalClus-terSchoolCouncils,andtheestablishmentofclusterlibrariesandresourcecentres(Pellini2007).

6 This figure does not include the clusters that have received support in the past and have nowThisfiguredoesnotincludetheclustersthathavereceivedsupportinthepastandhavenowbeenphasedout.


T�� 4�� D�� upp�� p��j�� C�u�� S�h��

P��/A��y Nu�� u�� A��v��y Supp��

EQIP/W�� B��k 157Tec��nical assistance and

materials1998

UNICE� �� SIDA 60Tec��nical assistance and

materials1993

R�� B�� 41Tec��nical assistance and

materials1992

K��pu�h�� A�� P��y E�u�� (KAPE)

14Tec��nical assistance and

materials1999

W��E�u��

Ca.50 Tec��nical assistance 1998

CARE 3 Tec��nical assistance 1998

Total supported clusters 325

Total unsupported clusters 435

TOTAL 760

Source:Bredenberg2002.

Furthermore, theMoEYS(2000a)guidelinesprescribealsoacomplexstructureofClusterSchoolCommittees(CSC)atalllevelsoftheeducationadministration,fromtheNationalClusterSchoolCommittee,toClusterSchoolCommitteesatprovincialand district level. Cluster School Committees “must have a Council for consulta-tion,discussion, evaluationofoutcomesandplanningcontinuedactivities” (ibid.:19).ThisCounciliscalledLocalClusterSchoolCommittee(LCSC)andisselectedinthecoreschoolofthecluster.MembersoftheLCSCaretheprincipalofthecoreschoolaschairpersonandaseniormonk,villagechief,communechief,chairpersonofVDC,andlocalpeople(ibid.).ThemaintasksoftheLCSCaretoassistthedevel-opmentandimplementationofallcluster’splans,liaisewithlocalauthorities,involvecommunitiesinschoolactivities,andcoordinatewiththeDistrictEducationOffice.Tomakethingsmorecomplicated,theMoEYSguidelinesindicatethat“inordertopromotechildrightsinschoolsandcommunities”,theLCSCisdividedintoaClusterSchoolCouncilandLocalClusterSchoolCommittee(ibid.:22).Thesecommitteesaremeanttoimproveschoolgovernanceandparticipation.Theresult,however,isacomplexorganisationalstructurethatprobablyexistsonlyonpaperandinwhichmembersarenotclearabouttasksandobjectives(Informant).

Theclustersystemhasbeenthebasisforseveraldonorinitiativestosupportpri-maryeducation.TheEducationQualityImprovementProject(EQIP),whichstartedin1998witha5mlUSDloanfromtheWorldBankandendedin2004(Turner2002,WorldBank2005),aimedatproducingamodel forquality improvement throughgrantsgiventoindividualclusters.Thegrantsarebasedonplanspreparedbythe


clusters through a consultative process involving school staff, communities andLCSCmembers(Geevesetal.2002).Thegrantshavebeenusedtoimplementactivi-tiessuchas:stafftraining,improvementoftheschoolenvironment,supplyofteach-ingmaterials,supporttocommunityparticipation,andimprovingstudents’healthandnutrition.EQIPwasfirststartedin10clustersintheprovinceofTakeoandwasgraduallyexpandedtoreach157clusterscomprising984schools(representing18percentofCambodia’sprimaryschoolsand23percentofCambodia’sprimaryschoolenrolments)inthreeprovinces:Takeo,Kandal,andKampot.

EQIPisimportantforseveralreasons.Firstofall,itmarkedthedecisionofthegovernmenttoimplementeducationsupportprojectsthatdidnotinvolveaconstruc-tioncomponentandaddressedmainlyeducationalquality(MoEYS2002).Second,EQIP tried to encourage local level innovative activities and supported decisionmaking processes at school level that involved community representatives. Third,itaimedatincreasingaccountabilitybyprovidingabudgettoclustersinthehandsof theauthorsof theplansand letting themimplementandmonitor it (Geevesetal.2002).EQIPcoordinationwasgiventoaProjectImplementationUnit(PIU)attheMoEYS.Atprovincialanddistrictlevel,thirty-two‘animators’wereinchargeoftrainingandactivitysupportatclusterandschoollevel.Theywereministerialstaffandreceivedasalarysupplementfromtheproject.AtotalofsixteenexpatriatestaffprovidedtechnicalassistancetotheMinistrystaffatthePIUandtodistrictanima-tors(ibid.).7

WhileEQIPhashadapositiveeffectonpromotionratesandindecreasingstudentdropoutinthetargetprovinces(WorldBank2005),theexperiencehasalsohelpedtohighlightopportunitiesaswellaslimitationsoftheClusterSchoolapproach.Clus-terscanbeachanneloffinancialresourcestolocallyplannedactivities.Accordingly,EQIP proved popular in participating clusters because the grant process that hadbeenintroducedwasconsideredtransparentandtimely(Turner2002a).EQIPhasshownthataccountabilityintheuseoffinancialresourcesinclustersincreaseswhenalargenumberofstakeholderstakepartintheplanningprocess.EQIPhasthere-foreshownthatitispossibletoachievelocalizeddecisionmakingprocesseswherebyplannedactivitiesreflect localneedsandconcerns(ibid.).Thegovernmentclusterreviewconcludedthat“withtheirstrongfocusonplanning,ClusterSchoolprojectshaveprovidedastructuredcontextforschoolstocollectivelymakedecisionsbasedonarationalizedassessmentoflocalneeds”(MoEYS2002:9).

Clustersalsorepresentasuitablestructuretoorganizecommunitycontributionsto education, which in Cambodia have traditionally been substantial. A study byBray(1999)foundthathouseholdscontributedinvariousforms77percentofthetotalexpendituresforprimaryeducation.AfollowupstudybyBrayandSengBunly

7 The project employed or seconded a total of 56 full-time staff from the MoEYS. TechnicalTheprojectemployedorsecondeda totalof56 full-timestaff fromtheMoEYS.TechnicaladvisersweredividedintooneattheMoEYS,oneineachprovinceand12EducationAdvisers(fourineachprovince)fromtheVolunteerServiceOverseas(VSO)fundedbyDfID.


in2004,foundthathouseholdcontributionsremainhighat56percentofthetotalexpendituresdespitegovernmenteffortstoincreaseitsshare(BrayandSengBunly2005).The success of the school feeding programme implemented in cooperationwithWorldFoodProgramme(WFP)underEQIPconfirmedthatparentsandcom-munitiesarereadytoparticipateingroupsatschoollevelinchargeofsettingupafoodpreparationarea.8Thisshowsthatclustersofferopportunitiesforinformal(ortransient)groupssetupforspecificpurposes(Pellini2005).

The positive elements of the cluster approach and the positive experiences ofEQIPhavetobebalancedwithsomelimitations.Firstofall,thelowlevelofteachers’salariesposedaseriouslimittothecommitmenttoundertakenewactivities.Geeveset al. (2002) found that although teachers received additional training, often theydidnotapplywhattheyhadlearnedbecausetheyneededtofindadditionalsourcesofincomeoutsidetheirteachingjob.Second,thepositiveexperiencesoftheEQIPproject have not been sufficient to dissipate doubts about whether the model canbereplicated.TheestablishmentofaPIUhelpedtocoordinateandmonitorprojectactivitiesbut,atthesametime,hasplacedtheproject‘outside’theofficialsystem.Additionally,anationwidereplicationwouldposeseriousproblemsintermsofhighinputofhumanrecourses(e.g.animators)thatthegovernmentisinnopositiontofund(Geevesetal.2002,Turner2002a).Athirdlimithasbeentheemergenceofatwo-tieredclustersystemwherebyonlyclustersthatreceiveexternalsupportseemtobeoperational.InthistheyaresimilartoVDCs,whichalsodependonthefinancialsupportfromexternalsources.

TheCommuneCouncilelectionsbroughtadditionalelementsofuncertainty.Ed-ucationisnotspecificallymentionedintheroleandfunctionsoftheCommunesbutisincludedinmanycommunedevelopmentplans,intheformofschoolconstructionand renovation projects (Kim Ninh and Henke 2005). An additional difficulty intermsofpolicycoordinationisthatclustersaren’tadministrativeunitsoftheMoEYSandtheirborders,asshowninfigure4.3,donotcorrespondtothecommunebound-aries.Further,thecommunechiefisatthesametimeamemberoftheLCSCandtheCommuneEducationForAllCommittee(CEFAC).Bothcommitteesareinchargeof establishing plans to improveeducation in the schools of the cluster/commune(LosertandCoren2004).

TheMoEYShasaddressedtheseproblemsintheclusterreviewof2002,conclud-ing thatwhileeducationmustremainaprimaryresponsibilityof theMoEYSandits lineagencies,communescanplayarole instrengtheningtheaccountabilityofschoolstaffbybeinginformedaboutplanningattheclusterlevel.Asecondareaofcooperationistheexchangeofinformationaboutpoorfamiliesthatcouldthenbesupportedwithscholarships.Theseareinitialstepswhichhavestilltobetranslatedintoconcretemoves.

8 Geeves et al. (2002) mention that the school feeding programme in cooperation with WFPGeevesetal.(2002)mentionthattheschoolfeedingprogrammeincooperationwithWFPwassosuccessfulthatitledtoanincreaseinunder-ageenrolmentinthefirstclass.


4.2.2 Priority Action Program for basic education

AstudybyPakKimchoeun(2006),describestheCambodianbudgetsystemasusinga“traditionalcentralisedapproachderivedlargelyfromtheFrenchsystem…oncethebudgetisapproved,itisrigidlyimplementedwithahighdegreeofcentralisedauthority”(p.1).9ApprovalfromtheMinistryofEconomyandFinance(MoF)isre-quired for fundtransferswithinbudget lines.TheMinistryand itsprovincialde-partments, as well as the national and provincial treasuries, oversee and approvespending, procurements and payments. The whole system is acknowledged to beineffectiveandpronetofinancialleakagesandlackoftransparency.In2000,totrytosolvetheseproblems,thegovernmentintroducedchangesinthenationalbudgetdisbursementsystemfortheeducationandhealthsectors.TheMoF,incooperationwithMoEYSandtheMinistryofHealth,establishedthePriorityActionProgram(PAP)tochannelfundsmoreefficientlytothe local level,bypassingrigiditiesand

9 The study by Pak Kimchoeun (2006) was undertaken by the Cambodia Development Re-The study by Pak Kimchoeun (2006) was undertaken by the Cambodia Development Re-sourceInstitute(CDRI)andinvolved200primaryschoolsin21districtsinsevenprovinces:ineachschool,interviewswereconductedwiththeschooldirectors,sixteachers,threemem-bersoftheschoolsupportcommitteeandsixparents.Schoolrecordswerealsochecked.

��u�� 4�� D�� v�� u�� h�� pu��

Pu�� v��

E�u��v��

National level

Province

District

Commune

Village

SCHOOL CLUSTERS

NCSC

M��y �� I��

M��y �� E�u�� Y�u�h

�� Sp��

P��v�� L�� A��

U��

P��v�� O�� E�u��

C��u�� C�u��

V�� Ch�� S�h��

D�� O�� E�u��


delayscausedbythetraditionalcentralisedbudgetexecutionsystem.Asshowninthepreviouschapter,section3.2.3,thegovernmentdecidedatthesametimetoin-creasethefinancialresourcestoeducation(WorldBankandADB2003inBrayandSengBunly2005).

PAPstartedasapilotintenprovincesin2000withtheaim“toreducethecostbur-denofthepoorestfamiliesandtoincreaseparticipationoftheirchildreningrades1-9”(BrayandSengBunly2005:13).Ithasbeenexpandedtoall20provincesandfourmunicipalities in2001andrepresents thegovernmentstrategy to finance theESPandachievetheEFAgoals(ibid.).TheMoEYShasdefined12PAPs(Table4.2)thatservetoguidetheallocationoffinancialresources.ThemostrelevantbudgetlineinPAPisPAP2(i.e.PrimaryEducationQualityandEfficiency)whichrepresentsoveraquarteroftheentirePAPbudget(PakKimchoeun2006)10.

T�� 4�� P��y A�� P�� u��

PAP � Education Service Efficiency

PAP � Primary Education Quality and Efficiency

PAP � Secondary Education Quality and Efficiency

PAP 4 Tec��nical and Vocational Education Quality Efficiency

PAP 5 Quality and Efficiency of Hig��er Education

PAP 6 Continuous Teac��er Develo�ment

PAP 7 Sustainable Provision of Core Instructional Material

PAP 8 Ex�ansion of Non-Formal Education

PAP 9 Yout�� HIV/AIDS Awareness

PAP �0 S�orts Develo�ment

PAP �� Strengt��en Monitoring Systems

PAP �� Sc��olars��i�s and Incentives for E�uitable Access

Source:MoEYS2001.

UnderPAP2,particularlyrelevantisPAP2.1,PrimarySchoolOperationalBudget,which provides budget grants to schools based on a formula which comprises anequallumpsumforallschoolsof500.000KHR(125USD)plusthetotalnumberofstudentsmultipliedbyanindividualallowanceof6.000KHR(1,5USD)(ibid.).

10 In 2003 out of 77bl KHR (ca. 19ml USD) for the twelve PAP, PAP 2 received 34 per cent of theIn2003outof77blKHR(ca.19mlUSD)forthetwelvePAP,PAP2received34percentofthewholeallocation(PakKimchoeun2006).In2002outof73,1blKHR(ca.18,2mlUSD)forthewholePAP,PAP2received23,9blKHR(ca.5,9mlUSD)32percent(MoEYS2003).


Turner(2002,2002a)hasarguedthatwhilePAPisnotdecentralisationinitself,PAPcouldnotworkwithoutthedelegationofdecisionmaking.Thedisbursementoffundsreachedindividualschoolsinanaverageofsixinstalmentsduringthebudgetyear2002(PakKimchoeun2006).This transferdoesnotuse thebankingsystem.Instead the Provincial Office of Education picks up the cash from the ProvincialTreasury and passes it to the District Office of Education and schools. For man-agementproceduresBudgetManagementCentreswerecreatedinProvincialOfficesofEducationandin144ofthe185DistrictOfficesofEducation(ibid.).WithPAPschoolsknowhowmuchtheywillreceiveandhavetoprepareyearlyplanswiththeinvolvementofparents,communitymembers,andCommuneCouncils.

InitialassessmentsofPAPhaveshownimprovementinseveralareas.Firstofall,the decision that accompanied PAP to abolish school registration fees to increaseschoolenrolmenthasproducedalargeincreaseinthenumberofstudents.BrayandSeng Bunly (2005) have calculated that between 1996-97 and 2003-2004, primaryschoolenrolmentexpandedby36,5percent.Thismeans,fortheprimarylevel,anaverageannualgrowthof10,2percent.Studentenrolmentincreaseshavebeenfasterthanteachers’employment,whichhascontributedtoaworseninginstudent-teacherratiosfrom37,5in1985to55,1in2004(WorldBank2006b).

AsecondachievementofthePAPistheimprovedallocationofgovernmentspend-ingineducation.PAPrepresentsthelargestshareinthenon-wagebudgetincreaseforeducation(BrayandSengBunly2005).Overall,accordingtoaWorldBankreport(2005),“thoughitisverydifficulttoascertainhowmuchoftherecentimprovementinenrolmentrates,particularlyattheprimarylevel,canbeattributedtothevariousPAPs….itissafetosaythatPAPhasplayedanimportantrole,particularlyastotheremovalofschoolfeesandtheaccompanyingschooloperationalbudgets”(p.76).

Themainchangecomparedwithpreviouspolicieshasbeenthedecisiontopro-videbudgetsdirectlytoindividualschools,thusbypassingtheclustersystem.Unfor-tunatelydisbursementshavesufferedfromdelaysandlackofcoordinationbetweentheMoEYSandtheMoFwhichcontrolsthereleaseofthebudget.Inthelastquarterof2001,only56percentofthePAPfundsforthatyearhadbeenreleased(Turner2002).Thesituationdidnotimprovein2002,whentheMoEYSestimatedthatonly46percentofthePAPfundshadbeenreleased.Whiledisbursementsaresubjecttodelays,leakagesoffunds,especiallyinPAP2.1,arequitelimited,withafundinggapforthefiscalyear2002calculateatonly4,2percent(PakKimchoeun2006).Therea-sonforthisrelativelylowleakageisthatschoolsknowtheformulaandthereforehowmuch they should receive, the various administration levels involved do not havemuchpowertocapturefunds,andthereisajustifiedperceptionamongofficialsthatinspectionsandauditsofthefundareheavy.

Withregardtoparticipationinschoolgovernance,theachievementsofPAParemixed.DatafromtheMoEYS(2002)showsthatbetween60and80percentofpar-entsknowabouttheabolitionofschoolregistrationfeesandjust20percentindicated


thattheyhadbeeninvolvedinsomeformofawarenessabouttheschoolcommittees’rolesandplans.Only10percentofparentshavereceivedinformationaboutschoolspending and the availability of budgets. For Pak Kimchoeun (2006), communityparticipationinPAPisthereforestilllimited.SchoolAssociationsarenotmuchin-volvedinPAPspending,asthisisconsideredaresponsibilityoftheschooldirectorandteachers.Inaddition,theyalsodonotseemtohavearoleinthemonitoringofthePAP,andfocusonschoolconstructionandimprovement.OnlyninepercentoftheparentsinterviewedinthestudywereawareofthePAPandnoneoftheparentsinterviewedknewaboutthedetailsofthefunds.

AccordingtoTurner(2002)PAPhashelpedtodecentralisedecisionmakingpro-cesses,butproblemsinthefunds’release,andrulesthat impedeshiftsofunspentfundsbetweenPAPsraisequestionsaboutthewillingnessofthecentralgovernmenttoprovideand increaseautonomytoschoolsand lineagencies.For thesereasons,PAPhasbeendescribedasaweakformofdecentralisation(WorldBank2004).

Toconclude,ClusterSchoolapproachandPAPsharesimilargoals:reductionofdropoutandrepetitions,andincreasesinparentsandcommunityparticipationinschoolgovernance.Bothpoliciesapplydecentralisedmanagement.Wheretheydif-ferandcontradicteachotherisintheprovisionoffundingtothelocallevel.Whileclustersremainanofficialgovernmentpolicy,itislikelythatinthefuturetheywilllooseevenmoreimportancewiththeMoEYSasPAPhasbeenrelativelysuccessfulinstrengtheningthecapacityofindividualschoolsaswellasBudgetManagementCentresintheprovinces(Personalcommunication).Thisfollowsalsothedecisiontaken,withinternationaldonors,tocontinuetheSector-WideApproach(SWA)ineducation,whichinCambodiastartedin1999(GDPWG2004).11BasedontheSWAprinciplesfundingisnolongerorganizedviabilateralprojects,butratherthroughasinglesectorpolicyandexpenditureprogramandaclosercooperationandcoordi-nationwithandbetweendonoragenciesthatresultsinthegovernmentbeingintheproverbial‘drivers’seat’(Gouldetal.1998).TheimpactofSWAintheCambodianeducationisreflectedbythepreparationoftheESPandESSP,whichasdescribedbyTakala(1998),areatypicalresultoftheadoptionofasectorapproach.12

Withregardtothelinkbetweencommunitiesandschools,ClusterSchoolsandPAPrepresentpoliciesthatattempttocreateandstrengthenspacesofcommunity

11 The total amount of donor funding to education for the period 2001-2007 has been calculatedThetotalamountofdonorfundingtoeducationfortheperiod2001-2007hasbeencalculatedat 321.164.224 USD, divided among the following donors now joining in the SWAP: ADB(26percent),France(6percent),AusAID(3percent),BTC(Belgium)(2,7percent),DfID(1,5percent),EuropeanCommission(8,9percent),JICA(10,1percent),SIDA(channelledthoughUNICEF)(3,1percent),UNESCO(1,8percent),UNICEF(10,1percent),WFP(7,5percent),USAid(2,1percent),WorldBank(17,1percent)(GDPWG2004).

12 SWAcanalsohavenegativeoutcomessuchasthecreationofan‘inner’and‘outer’groupofdonors,theconcentrationofeffortintheministryinthecapital,theexclusionofNGOsandcivilsocietyorganizationsfromthediscussionanddecisionmakingprocess,andanincreasein the administrative burden and external tolls for monitoring and evaluation (Sack et al.2004).


participation. They have helped to achieve a greater upward accountability fromschools towards line agencies mainly through planning and reporting. However,with regard to downward accountability to parents and communities, the resultshavebeenweak.Turner (2002) shows that there is still evidenceof ‘etiquettepar-ticipation’withcommunitiesresponsibleforplanningandmanagementofmaterialcontributionsandteachersandheadmastersresponsibleforeducationalissues.Theexpectations attached to participation have to be balanced with cultural elementsthatdefinewhichtraditionalnormsandvaluescharacteriseparticipationineduca-tion.Inthenextsection,theseelementsareexploredstartingwiththemeaningof‘community’intheCambodiancontext.ThisdiscussionservesasabackgroundfortheempiricalanalysisinChapterSix.

4.3 Cambodian communities: main conce�ts

Thesearchforasingledefinitionoftheword‘community’isnotsimple.Bray (2000)haspointedoutthatthetermcanmeandifferentthingstodifferentpeopleindif-ferentcontexts.Thisdiversityisreflectedintheoutcomeofaninternationalconfer-ence,theMeaning of Community in Cambodia,whichtookplaceinPhnomPenhin1999.Thion(1999), inanarticle thatsummarisedtheproceedings,notedthat thediscussiondidnot result inone singledefinitionof ‘Cambodiancommunity’,butthree.13Thefirstmadeacleardistinctionbetweenpre-PolPotcommunities,charac-terisedbyanetworkofmutualrelationshipsbetweenindividuals,andpost-PolPotcommunitieswhererelationshipsandnetworkshadbeendestroyed(MeasNee1999,Watts1999).ThesecondarguedthatcommunityfeelingshavesurvivedthecivilwarandKhmerRougeregimeandthatinCambodiaitispossibletoapplytwodefini-tions:geographical community, thepeoplewholiveandsharecommoninstitutionsinacertaingeographicalarea(e.g.village)andfunctional community, peoplewhojoininformalorinformalgroupstoshareproblemsandacttogethertosolvethem.Thethirddefinitionhighlightedtheimportanceofthelink between family membersandpointedoutthatinCambodiacooperationbetweenindividualsrarelyexistsbeyondthislevel.

Cambodiancommunitiespresentelementsofallthreedefinitions.LedgerwoodandVijghen(2002)havesuggestedthatcommunitieshaveneitherbeensweptawayby thewarand theKhmerRougeregime,norare theyreturning to theirpre-warcharacteristics.Theyarguethattheconceptof‘community’isratherbeingconstant-lyrecreatedthroughpeople’severydaydecisions,actions,theadoptionofamarket

13 He also noted that the translation into Khmer of the word ‘community’ is not simple. TheHealsonotedthatthetranslationintoKhmeroftheword‘community’ isnotsimple.TheKhmerwordsahakumcaninfactbeusedindifferentlyforcommunity,society,andunion(Thion1999).


economy,andthepresenceofdonorswiththeirdevelopmentprojects.TheargumentbyLedgerwoodandVijghen isrelevantbecause itdoesnot limit the ideaofcom-munitytoaspecificgeographicalareasuchasthevillage,butexpandsittoincludesocialcapitalelementssuchasindividualrelationsandactionswhichgobeyondthevillage’sborder.

AsmentionedbyAschmoneitetal.(1996), intheruralareasofCambodiait iscommontofinddifferentorganizationsandgroupsinvolvedinselfhelpinitiatives.At thevillage level,householdsoftencreatemutualhelpgroups that exchange la-bour, animals, or agricultural tools. Village associations, linking most families ofavillage,arealsocreated torunmoreorganizedself-helpactivities suchascreditgroups.Beyondthevillage,thepagodaisusuallythespacewherevillagegroupsandassociationsmeettoorganiseandmanagethecollectionofmaterialcontributionsbyvillagers.

Basedontheseelements,thedefinitionofruralcommunityadoptedinthisstudyistheonebyAschmoneitetal.(1997):“aclusterofvillagesrelatedtoapagodaasitssocial,culturalandreligiouscenter”(p.3).Thekeyelements thatcharacterise thestructureandnatureofCambodianruralcommunitieswhichareexploredinthefol-lowingsectionsare:kinshipandpatronage,trust,andBuddhism.TheseelementsarenotjustthebasicsocialcharacteristicsrelevantforCambodia,butalsootherAsianruralsocieties.

4.3.1 Kins��i� and �atronage

Kinshipandpatronageconstitutetwoimportant“buildingblocksoftheKhmerpeas-antvillage”(LedgerwoodandVijghen2002:112).Withregardtotheformer,Ebiharaarguesthat“thoughkinshipisnotascriticalfortheorganizationandfunctioningoftheKhmerpeasantsocietyasitisinsomeothercultures;nonethelessitconstitutesoneofthemostimportantbasesforinterpersonalrelationshipsinvillagelife”(1968:93).MostvillagesinCambodia,sheexplains,originatedfromaclusterofhouseholdsofclosekinsmensothatthelinksbetweenindividualsincludetheextendedfamilywhichhasoftenrepresentedthesurvivalmechanisminperiodsofconflict(Ebihara1968,ColettaandCullen2000,ThidaKus2000).Kinshiprepresents“animportantbaseforthefunctioningofaKhmerpeasantcommunity”(LedgerwoodandVijghen2002:113).Theboundsbetweenkinsmenarestrong,thoughthedisplacementandlossesproducedbytheyearsofconflictshavealteredtherelationshipsbetweenkins-meninawaythatitisnotpossibletothinkofareturntoapre-warkindofcommu-nity(Aschmoneitetal.1997,MeasNee2003).

Thebondinglinksbetweenkinsmenalsoshapethesocialhierarchyandcontrib-utetostrengthenitinawaythatcanleadtoexclusionandlimitedsolidaritytowardsindividualswhodonotbelongtoone’sfamilycircleorhierarchicallevel(Pelliniand


Ayres2005).Gyallay-Pap(2004)attributesthis,amongotherthings,totheFrench mission civilisatricewhichintroducedacentralisedadministrativestructuresandtheideaofnationstatethatinfluencednegativelythe“sharedculturalsymbolism,reli-giousandmoralnorms,andcommunalactivitiesthatcharacterisedvillagesinruralareas”(p.35).Atthesametime, itmustbenotedthattheinfluenceoftheFrenchadministrationhasnotbeenstronginruralareas,wherevillagershadnochoicebuttodevelopduringperiodsofcrisiscopingsystemsandself-helpinitiatives.14

Patronagerepresentsthesecond‘buildingblock’ofKhmerpeasantsociety.Inthepast,asshowninChapterThree(section3.1.1), individualsweredefinedaseitherneak mean (the ones who have) and neak kro (the ones who do not have). Strongpatron–clientrelationshipshavealwaysbeenacharacteristicofCambodianruralcommunitiesandcameunderattackduringtheKhmerRougeregime.WhileintheWestpatronagehasanegativeconnotationandisusuallylinkedtoexploitation,intheCambodiancontext, thoughitcanalsohavenegativeeffects, it isperceivedascommonsense, sincepeople search for securityduring troubled times (MeasNeeandHailey1995,LedgerwoodandVijghen2002).Thereciprocitybetweenpatronandclientisbasedonaformoftrustlinkedtothemoralobligationsbetweenthetwopartiesandconstituteakeysocialbondinthecommunity(LedgerwoodandVijghen2002).Patronageisinbuilt inCambodiantraditionsandhasprovided,inadditiontokinship,asurvivalmechanism.InCambodiansociety,itisthereforeonlyfairtosupportone’sclienteleandtheinterestofthegroupisoftenputbeforetheinterestof individuals inneed.Thishasresultedinapreferencetowardshierarchicalrela-tions,ageneralunwillingnesstotakeinitiativewithoutclearapprovalfromabove,andareluctancebypeople toactively takepart inpublicmeetings(Ebihara1968,Vickery1984,O’LearyandMeasNee2001,LedgerwoodandVijghen2002,Rustenetal.2004).

Patron-clientrelationshipsarealsochangingascommunityrelationshipsarebe-ingtransformedbymodernisation,liberalizationoftheeconomy,themonetarizationofsocialrelations,andrural-urbanmigration(Ovensenetal.1996,Krishnamurthy1999, Kim Sedara 2001). According to Meas Nee, ‘traditional patronage’ has nowbeenreplacedbyadifferentkindofpatronagelinkedtopoliticalpower,therebyfuel-lingcorruption.Inhisopinion,thelimitedtrustbetweenpeoplehasreducedcom-munitysolidarityandpushedpeopletoseemoneyasthealternative.Thelongtermeffectistheemergenceofacultureofcorruptionwithrepercussionsintermsoftrusttowardspublicauthorities(MeasNeeandHealy2003).

14 For a more in depth analysis, see Pellini and Ayres 2005.Foramoreindepthanalysis,seePelliniandAyres2005.


4.3.2 T��e �uestion of trust

Onerespondent,talkingabouthismemoriesofvillagelifeduringtheKhmerRougeperiod,concludedthat“PolPotdividedthepeople”(Informant).Thesewordssum-marisetheimpactoftheregimeandtheyearsofconflictonindividualrelationshipandtheerosionoftrust.AccordingtoMeasNeeandHealy(1995),thiserosionhadstartedin1970,withthecoupthatoustedPrinceSihanoukandmarkedthebegin-ningofthecivilwar.

DuringtheKhmerRougeregime,thedestructionoftrustwasalmosttotal.There-gimerecruitedpeopletospyononeanother,familymemberswereseparated,monkswerekilledandpagodadestroyed.MeasNeeremembersthat“astrustwasbroken,wereachedatimewhenwecouldthinkonlyofourselvesandourgreatneeds;thedignityandprideofour identity, formerlyanimportantpartofour lives,entirelydisappeared” (ibid.: 27). After the defeat of the Khmer Rouge by the Vietnamesearmy,trustcouldnoteasilyreturntocommunities,asmanyCambodiansfeltthattheyhadbeenrescuedbytheirlongtimeenemyandthepoliticalideologyofthePRKremindedthemonetoomuchoftheKhmerRouge.

Despitethishugedamage,itisarguedherethattrustandsocialcapitalhavenotbeencompletelydestroyed.Forexample,Krishnamurthy(1999)inherstudyoftwovillagesintheprovincesofKampongSpeu(PreyKohandPrasath),foundsocialcap-itallinkedtopagodashadbeentemporarilysuspended,butnotdestroyed.DuringthePRK,therevivalofspontaneoussocialandreligiouslifewasbasedontheurgentneedforbasicvillageinfrastructureand,moreimportantly,onpeople’sstrongsenseofself-helpandthepowerfulroleofBuddhisttraditions(ibid.).Forthesereasons,theclaimthattrustisthemissingelementofsocialcohesioninCambodiansociety,isnotvalid(seedeMonchyinUNICEF1996).Thoughsolidarityandtrusthavebeenseverely damaged, the re-emergence of self-help and associational initiatives haveshownthattheseelementsarenotmissing(PelliniandAyres2005,Pellini2005a).

Putnam(2000)hasnotedthatasocietythatreliesongeneralizedreciprocity ismoreefficientthanadistrustfulsociety,andthat“otherthingsbeingequal,peoplewhotrusttheirfellowcitizensvolunteermoreoften[and]participatemoreofteninpoliticsandcommunityorganization”(2000:137).ThisisthecaseinruralCambodia,wherethepresenceofassociationsandnetworksthathaveemergedandre-emergedafteryearsofwarandconflictsmeansthatitispossibletobringpeopletogetherinthenameofself-help.Developmentprojectshave,however,oftentriedtopromotepeople’sparticipationandcommunitymobilisationbyestablishingnewgroupsandcommittees,suchasVDCsandLCSC,whichhavenotbeensuccessfulbecausetheyhavebeenperceivedastop-downinitiatives(MeasNeeandHealy2003,Gyallay-Pap2004).Interestingly,traditionalgroupsoftenstruggletoberecognisedaslegitimatemembersofCambodiancivilsociety.KaoKimHourn(1999),forexample,definedcivilsocietyintermsofmostlyPhnomPenh-basedorganisationssuchasthegrowing


numbersofNGOs,politicalparties,independentmedia,tradeunions,thinktanksandresearchinstitutes,butfailedtomentiontraditionalassociations.

4.3.3 Budd��ism and communities

Buddhism, which is practiced by 90 per cent of the population, is an importantpart of Cambodia’s social capital. Historically it has appealed to Cambodians be-cause“salvationwaspromiseddirectlythroughtheeffortsbyeveryperson-andnotthroughcorvéeforthegod-kingalongHinduslines”(personalcommunication).15Atthesametime,thereistheideathatBuddhismonlyfocuseson‘ownsalvation’,whichcontributestothewidespreadviewthatBuddhismishostiletoprogressbycondon-ingthestatusquo(personalcommunication,Ebihara1968).

Thisisacontroversialpoint.Buddhism,ontheonehand,stressestheprincipleofkarmaandthefundamentalhelplessnessofindividualsintheirefforttochangetheiractualcondition(Ebihara1968,Aschmoneit1998,Franci2004).Atthesametime,however, italsoencouragesgroupactionand integration(Ebihara1968).Asindividuals have the possibility to earn ‘merits’ in this life by doing good actionsandimprovingtheirconditioninthenextlife,peoplearemotivatedtoparticipateinself-helpinitiativesandcommunitybasedgroups(Informant).16Ebihara(1968)hasarguedthat“nomatterhowmuchtheKhmervillagermayvalueindependenceandindividualism, thesocial reality is thateach individual is inextricablyboundwithotherinhislife.Buddhismrecognisesthissociologicalfactinitspreceptswhichurgeharmonious,courteous,andgenerousrelationshipswithothers”(p.422).

PagodasarethespacewhereBuddhismandthesecularworldmeet.TheyarethemoralcentrefromwheremonksdisseminateBuddhistteachingsandlaymenearn‘merits’.Theyare thesocialcentrewhereBuddhist festivalsandceremoniesbringpeopletogetherfromdifferentvillagesandforalongtime,asshownatthebeginning

15 ItisimportanttonotethatthoughBuddhismistheofficialanddominantreligioninCambo-dia,itcoexistsandisintertwinedwithafolkreligionthatisalsoofconsiderablesignificanceinKhmerculture.Thisoldnativereligioussystemisbasedonbeliefinavarietyofanimistic,ancestral,guardian,ghostlyordemon-likespiritsandithas itsownritualsandspecialists(Ebihara1968).

16 Ebiharawritesthat‘merits’areearnedindividuallybutarealsospreadtofamilymembers.Becomingamonkisthehighestmeanstoearn‘merits’foramale,andthisradiatesalsotofamily members. A second way is to participate in Buddhist festivals and ceremonies andmakingdonations.Athirdwayistocontributefood,money,andlabourtothetempleandmonks(Aschmoneitetal.1997).Afourthway,whichisparticularly importantforwomenwhocannotbecomemonks,istofollowtheBuddhistFourNobelTruths:1)existenceisin-evitablesorrowfulbecauseofthetransienceofallthings;2)unhappinessiscausedbydesireforsuchthings;3)suchsorrowcanbeavoidedbytheextinctionofsuchdesire;4)desirecanbestoppedbyfollowingtheEightfoldPath:rightunderstanding,rightpurpose,rightspeech,rightconduct,rightvocation,righteffort,rightalertness,andrightconcentration(Ebihara1968).


ofthischapter,representedtheonlyopportunityforpeasantstoreceiveeducation(Ebihara1968,Aschmoneit1998,Collins1998,Sasse1998,Ayres2000,Gyallay-Pap2003).Typically,apagodainruralareasservesbetweenthreeandsevenvillages(Fig-ure4.4),andislocatedontheoutskirtsofoneofthem.

Itscompoundissurroundedbyabrickorcementfence.Asshowninfigure4.5,themainbuildingwithinthepagodacompoundisthevihear(sermonhall,sanctuary)whichrisesonafoundation,hasstepsonallsides,andcontainsthemainstatueofBuddha(Ebihara1968,Aschmoneitetal.1997).Anotherimportantstructureisthesala,aroofedstructurebuiltonstilts,openonallsides,whichcontainsasmallaltar.Itservesasashelterforovernightguestsandisusedbythemonksfortheirmeals,toreceivevisitors,andforcommunitymeetings(Figure4.5).

Otherstructuresinthecompoundsareoneormoredormitoriesforthemonksand theabbot (kot), thekitchen,various stupas tohold theashesof thedead, thecremationtower(pachar),andsomeshrinesforanimisticfolkspirits.Oftenthecom-poundincludesthePaliteachingschoolbuilding(sala rien plaey)oraschool(sala rien).

Theorganisationofthemonkcommunity(sangha)ishierarchicalwiththeabbot(mevat)atthetop.17Hismainresponsibilitiesaretomanageandsupervisetheper-sonnelandpropertyofthepagoda(Ebihara1968,Aschmoneitetal.1997).Inthecaseoflargepagodas,theheadmonkisassistedbytwomonks(kru sot).Therestofthesanghaisformedbyfullyordainedmonks(pikuk)above20yearsofageandnovices

17 The head monk is normally appointed by the superior in the national hierarchy with approvalTheheadmonkisnormallyappointedbythesuperiorinthenationalhierarchywithapprovalfromtheProvincialDepartmentofCultsandReligions(Sasse1998).

��u�� 4�4� P�� u��y ��

PAGODA

PAGODACOMMITTEE

V��

V��

V��

V��

V��

V��

V��


(samne)whoareunder20(ibid.).Inadditiontherearekonsuh look,youngchildrenbetweensevenand12yearsofagethatspendsometimeinpagodatoreceiveeduca-tionandearn‘merits’fortheirfamilies.Thenumberofmonksinpagodasfluctuates,asitiscommonforpeopletospendsometimeoftheirlivesasmonks.Inaddition,everybody, includingtheheadmonk, isallowedistodisrobeandleavethemonk-hoodatanytime.

Most pagoda have a Pagoda Committee, a social and not political-administra-tiveinstitutiontoseetotheneedsofthemonksandnovices,maintainandrepairthe pagoda buildings and compound and organize a number of activities to sup-portthecommunity.ThemembersofthePagodaCommitteecomefromnearbyvil-lagesandarenormallyappointedbyconsensus.Thereareusuallysevenelderlymen

whoserveinthePagodaCommittee(rarelyawoman)(Sasse1998).Monksarenotmembersofthecommitteebuttheheadmonknormallyexchangeinformationwiththem(Aschmoneitetal.1997,Sasse1998).

Animportantfigureinthepagoda,andofthePagodaCommittee,istheachar (layman)(Figure 4.6). An achar is a mature man whohasnormallybeenamonkatsomepointinhislifeandwhovolunteerstosupportthepagoda(Ebihara 1968). Achars generally have rela-tivelygoodeducationandsufficienttimeandresources tospendtime in thepagoda(Sasse1998).TheyusuallycomefrompoorfamiliesandbelongtotheethnicKhmergroup.18Theyare trustedmembersof thecommunity,who

18 Rich families in rural Cambodia are normally of Chinese origin and follow different religiousRichfamiliesinruralCambodiaarenormallyofChineseoriginandfollowdifferentreligiousceremonies.

��u�� 4�5� W�� S��v��k �� K��p�� Th�� (��) �� 4�5� W�� S��v��k �� K��p�� Th�� (��) �� 5� W�� S��v��k �� K��p�� Th�� (��) �� 5� W�� S��v��k �� K��p�� Th�� (��) �� W�� S��v��k �� K��p�� Th�� (��) �� sala (��h�)

��u�� 4�6� A�4�6� A��6� A�6� A�� A� achar


considerthemasleaders(Aschmoneitetal. 1995).Severalachars serveinapagoda,usuallyonefromeachofthevillageslinkedtothetemple.Oneachar,theachar vat,is the leader of the group. The main responsibilities of the achars are to lead thecommunity in ceremonies and act as a spokesman between monks and the com-munity.Otherresponsibilitiesrefertoteachingchildrenandmonks,organisingtheconstructionofpublicschoolsoutsidethepagodacompounds,reconcilingconflicts,instructvillagestoplanttrees,advisevillagersonhygieneandsanitation,cooperatewithexternalprojects,andeducatingvillagersonmoral,cultureandtraditions.Ac-cordingtoCollins(1998),someofthesetasksgobackinhistory,whenacharswerethelinkbetweenpeopleandlocalauthorities,andsometimeseventheking.

Anationalsurveyconducted in2003 foundthat84percentofpeople inruralareastrustthepagodaasapublicinstitution(AsiaFoundation2003).Insomecases,asfoundinastudybytheCentreforAdvancedStudiesandTheWorldBank(2006),traditionalleaderslinkedtopagodascanalsohaveadivisiveroleintheircommunityduetotheaffiliationtomajorpoliticalparties.Nevertheless,thegeneralisedtrustto-wardspagodasaspublicinstitutions,explainswhyacharsareusuallyresponsibleforcollectingmoneyandcontributionsduringceremonies.These fundsarenormallyusedtoimprovethepagodacompound.However,thePagodaCommitteecanalsodecidetofundsocialdevelopmentactivitiessuchasschoolconstruction,roadmain-tenance,ortheestablishmentofacreditgroup.Inthiscase,thePagodaCommitteesetsupanad hocAssociation tooverseeandcoordinatespecificcommunitybasedactivities(Figure4.7).19

Cashassociationsprovidesmallloans.SchoolAssociationsfunctionascreditas-sociations.DependingontheaimoftheAssociation,interestsorashareofthecapitalareusedtofundrepairstothepagoda,maintaintheschool,constructionwork,andinsomecases,verysmallemergencyrelief(Sasse1998).Associationsaremanagedbyacommitteewhosemembersareusuallyappointedandinchargeofthecollectionofcontributions(cash,labour,andmaterials),theuseofthefunds,thedistributionofcredits,withlinkstothePagodaCommitteeandsometimestheabbot.PagodaCom-mitteesandAssociationsusuallyhaveastatutethatemphasisesthelinkbetweenthereligiousaspectoftheirworkaswellasthedevelopmentofthecommunity.

AccordingtoBiddulph(2003),thesetraditionalformsofcollectiveactionmaynotbeactiveeverywhereinCambodia.Wheretheydoexist,however,theycanhaveadirectandpositiveinfluenceondevelopment.Hesuspectsthatthereisstillmuchtolearnfromtheseformsofcollectiveactionandtorecognisetheirpotentialaswellastheirlimitations.Thisisacoreaimofthisthesis.

19 In her study, Ebihara (1968), wrote that “a striking feature of Khmer village life is the lackInherstudy,Ebihara(1968),wrotethat“astrikingfeatureofKhmervillagelifeisthelackofindigenous,traditional,organizedassociations,clubs,factionsandothergroupsthatareformedonnon-kinprinciples”(p.181).ThismayhavebeentherealityinthevillageofSvaywheresheconductedherresearch.


Thestartingpointof this chapterhasbeen the influenceofhistorical events, tra-ditionalculture,andelementsofCambodiansocietysuchaspatronage,trust,andreligiousnormsandvalues.Theviolenceof themodernhistoryofCambodiahascertainlydamagedthesociety,butkeyculturalelementshavenotbeendestroyed.ThekeytraditionalelementsofCambodianculturethatcharacterisecollectiveac-tionseemtohaveadaptedtodifferenthistoricalcircumstancesandhavere-emergedwhenthepoliticalsituationhasaccommodatedit.Locard(2002),forexample,men-tionstheunpublishedmemoirs byNhiekTioulong,ahighprofileadministratordur-ingthe1960sintheSihanoukgovernment,whowrotethatsolidarityamongcitizensandmutualhelphavealwaysexistedatvillageandpagodalevel.Thesetraditionalas-sociationsshowthatsocialcapital,thoughdamaged,hasnotbeendestroyedandhasthepotentialtosupportlocaldevelopmentinitiatives.ItisexploredmoreindepthinChapterSix,whichexamines thecharacteristicsofcommunityparticipation inschools.

��u�� 4�7� P�� v��p��


5 �esearc�� met��odology

Thischapterpresentsthemethodologyadoptedduringthestudyanddescribestheoverlappingareasbetweenprojectworkandresearchactivities.ThechapterstartswiththedescriptionoftheprojecttasksduringthefouryearsspentbytheresearcherintheprovinceofKampongThom.Thesecondpartfocusesontheresearchmeth-odologybycomparingthecharacteristicsofthequantitativeandthequalitativere-searchparadigmsaswellaspresentingsomereflectionsonthedualroleofresearcher–advisorduringtheresearchprocess.Thethirdconcludesthechapterbypresentingthemainresearchactivities.

5.1 Personal context of t��e researc��

IarrivedinKampongThominDecember2001toworkfortheGermanDevelop-mentService(DED-DeutscherEntwiklungsdienst)1asadvisorforcivilsocietyandlocal governance in the Community Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP).Theproject,whichhasdurationofsevenyears(2002-2008),isimplementedunderthesteeringof theCambodianMinistry forRuralDevelopment intwoprovinces,KampotandKampongThom.FinancialsupportcomesfromtheGermanGovern-ment,theInternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment(IFAD),WorldFoodPro-gramme(WFP),andfromtheAustralianGovernmentthroughAustralianAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(AusAID).Themaintechnicalassistanceisprovided

1 DED is a governmental organisation receiving most of its funding from the German FederalDEDisagovernmentalorganisationreceivingmostofitsfundingfromtheGermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment.Itwasfoundedin1963andisoneoftheleadingEuropeandevelopmentservicesforpersonnelcooperation.Almost1.000develop-mentworkersarecurrentlyworkinginapproximately40countriesinAfrica,AsiaandLatinAmerica(www.ded.de).

101Research methodology

bytheGermanTechnicalCooperationAgency(GTZ-GesellschaftfürTechnischeZusammearbeit).2

CBRDPisamulti-sectoralprojectwhichinKampongThomcoversfouroutoftheeightdistrictsof theprovince.Themainactivities are support toagriculturalproduction,ruralinfrastructuredevelopment,localeconomicpromotion,andcom-munitydevelopment.Theprojectobjective,asstatedinthe2004Mid Term Review,is“toreduceruralpoverty[and]assistapproximately49.600poorhouseholdsintheprojectareatosustainincreasedfoodproductionandfarmincomesfromintensifiedanddiversifiedcropandlivestockproductionandincreasethecapacityofthemem-bersofthetargetgrouptousetheservicesavailablefromthegovernmentandothersourcesfortheirsocialandeconomicdevelopment”(IFAD2004:2).

Asadvisorforcivilsocietyandlocalgovernance,IworkedwithinCBRDP’scom-munitydevelopmentcomponentat theProvincialDepartment forRuralDevelop-ment(PDRD)ofKampongThom.Thesetupof theproject involves,betweenthetwoprovinces,eighttoteninternationaladvisorsfromGTZandDED,about20GTZlocalstaff,andabout70governmentcounterparts.InmyworkIsupervisedtwolo-calstaff,onegovernmentcounterpart,andsixstaffofCNGOs.Theworkofourcivilsocietyteamfocusedontwomainareas:

• Supporttotraditionalassociations

• EstablishmentandcapacitybuildingofVillageNetworks

Thefirstareaofworkfocusedmainlyononedistrictoftheprovince,Stoung,wheretheprojectprovided support to the11membersof thePagodaAssociation Coor-dinationCommittee(Pacoco),anelectedbodyrepresenting96traditionalassocia-tions(about6.000households)involvedinorganisingthecollectionofcashandricecontributionsandprovidingsmallcreditstoassociation’smembersandsupporttoschools.Thecivilsocietyteamprovidedtrainingonmanagementandadministra-tion,monitoring,and, inorder topromotenetworkingandexchange, studyvisitsto meet similar associations in other provinces. With regard to local governance,PacocomembersreceivedtrainingontheroleandfunctionofCommuneCouncilsandwereencouragedtotakepartinthemonthlycommunemeetingstopresenttheactivitiesoftheirassociationsandplanthecommunitycontributionstosmallruraldevelopmentprojects.ThesecondareaofworkofthecivilsocietyteamconcernedthepromotionofparticipatorylocalgovernancethroughtheestablishmentofVil-lageNetworks.TheaimoftheseNetworksistoidentifyactiveindividualsorgroupsatthevillagelevel,bringingthemtogetherinaninformalgrouptolinkthemwith

2 GTZ is an international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development with worldwideGTZisaninternationalcooperationenterpriseforsustainabledevelopmentwithworldwideoperations.GTZworksmainlyfortheGermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopmentandisimplementingsome2.700developmentprojectsandprogrammeinover130countries(www.gtz.de).


Commune Councils while, at the same time, identifying ways for the CommuneCouncilstosupportthedifferentgroups.3

Thetopicofthepresentresearchtouchesonmostoftheareasoftheprojectwork,althoughthefocusonthelinkbetweencommunitiesandschoolsprovidesaspecificperspectivethatwasnotatthecentreofprojectactivities.InSeptember2003,duringaresearchers’seminarattheUniversityofTampere,whereIpresentedtheresearchquestionsandmethodology,afellowPhDstudentnotedthepossibleproblemsthatIcouldfaceinmydualroleofresearcherandprojectadvisor,observingthatIneededtobecarefulinkeepingtheresearch‘academicenough’.4I interpretedherremarkasawarningaboutthepossibilitythatmyinvolvementwithcommunitiesthroughprojectactivitiescouldlimittheobjectivityrequiredbytheconventionsofadoctoraldissertation.Thatcommenthasaccompaniedmeallalongtheresearchprocessand,Ibelieve,hashelpedtobetterdefinethepurposeofthisresearch,thechoiceoftheresearchmethodsandtools,andinawayclarifythequestionofwhethertheroleofadvisor and researcher can be compatible. The next sections present the researchmethodologyandactivitiesbyreflectingalsoonthelimitationsandopportunitiespresentedbytheresearcher–advisorroleandhowthishasinfluencedtheresearchprocess.

5.2 �esearc�� met��odology and t��e dual role researc��er – advisor

Theoretical and methodological approaches of scientific research are shaped, ac-cordingtoHusén(1994),byparadigmsdefinedas“culturalartefacts,reflectingthedominantnotionsaboutscientificbehavioursinaparticularscientificcommunity”(p.5051).During the twentiethcentury, the twomainparadigmsemployed inre-searchingeducationalproblemshavebeenthe‘scientificparadigm’andthe‘human-isticparadigm’, whichhaveoftenbeenjuxtaposedtodescribedifferentandsomehowincompatibleresearchphilosophies(Keeves1988,Muijs2004).

The‘scientificparadigm’is“modelledonthenaturalscienceswiththeemphasisonempiricallyquantifiableobservationswhichlendthemselvestoanalysesbymeansofmathematicaltools”(Husén1994:5051).Asthetaskoftheresearchistoestablishcasualrelationshipsandtoexplain(Erklären),quantitativeresearchisconsideredtogenerateknowledgeforunderstandingwhichmaybeindependentofitsuseinplan-ningandimplementation(Husén1994,CornwallandJewkes1995).The‘humanisticparadigm’,ontheotherhand,is“derivedfromthehumanitieswithanemphasison

3 FormoredetailsseePelliniandAyres2005.4 IthankNelliPiattoeva,academicassistantandPhDcandidateattheDepartmentofEduca-

tionoftheUniversityofTampere,forthiscomment.


holisticandqualitativeinformation”andhelpstoprovideaninterpretationorunder-standingofevents(Verstehen)(Keeves1988,Husén1994).

Theideaofopposedparadigmsisusefultoillustratetwotheoreticalends.How-ever,asmentionedbyHusén(1994),inrealitythesetwopositionsarelinkedalonga continuum and complement each other to the point that it is possible to speakof“onlyoneparadigmbutmanyapproaches”(Keeves1988ainHusén1994:5054).Likewise,CornwallandJewkes(1995)arguethattheseparationofbetweenqualita-tive and quantitative approaches, with the former being the field of participatoryresearchandthelatterthefieldofconventionalresearch,isactuallytoosimplistic.Thisrecognitionhas ledtoageneralisedconsensusthat inmostcasesresearchinthesocialsciencesistosomeextentparticipatory,andparticipatoryresearchreliesonquantitativeaswellasqualitativetoolsofdatacollectionandanalysisthattodaymoreandmoretendtobecombinedandcharacterisethesocalled‘post-positivist’approach(Muijs2004).Accordingtothisdefinition,post-positivists“acceptthatitisnotpossibletoobservetheworldwearepartofastotallyobjectiveanddisinterestedoutsiders…[post-positivists]believeinthepossibilitytoapproximaterealitybyre-alisingthatourownsubjectivityisshapingthatreality”(ibid.:5).

Atthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury,oneimportantelementofthe‘scientificparadigm’was theneutralityandobjectivityof theresearcher inorder to limitoravoidbiases.Theunderlyingbeliefwasthatthescientificmethodcouldhandlesocialreality“withoutanymoralcommitment”(Husén1994:5053).Inthe1930s,SwedisheconomistandpoliticianGunnarMyrdal,wasamongthefirstswhoquestionedthisassumption,arguingthatsocialresearcherscouldnotbefreeoftheirownvaluesandpoliticalconvictionsandthatresearcherscouldarriveatmorevaluableandcredibleconclusionsbyactuallymakingtheirpremisesandvaluesexplicit(Myrdal1969inHusén1994).Theneedfortheresearcherstoremainaneutralobserverofsocialre-alityhasbeenquestionedbyotherauthorsaswell.C.WrightMills,forexample,inThe Sociological Imagination (1959),arguedthat“thereisnowayinwhichanysocialscientistcanavoidassumingchoicesofvalueand implying theminhisworkasawhole”(p.196).Theresearchisinfluencedbyexternalpoliticalandeconomicfactorsandthesocialscientistcannotbeconsideredasan“autonomousbeingstandingout-sidesociety”(p.204).Similarly,Americananthropologist,CliffordGeertz,arguedinthelate1960sthat“aprofessionalcommitmenttoviewhumanaffairsanalyticallyisnotinoppositiontoapersonalcommitmenttoviewthemintermsofaparticularmoralperspective”(1968:157).Austrian-bornphilosopherFeyerabend(1999),writ-ing during the 1970s and 1980s, has posited that, given the complexity of reality,objectivityisdifficulttoreachsinceresearchersareinfluencedbytheirworldview(Weltaschaung),personalvalues,theaimoftheirresearch,andthesocialandeco-nomicenvironmenttheylivein.BothMills(1959)andFeyerabend(1999)arguethatthe simple physical presence of the researcher creates a non-neutral situation andthatinformationisabsorbedthroughtheprismofourexperiences,interests,andval-


ues.Accordingly,thepresentstudyhasbeenconductedkeepingtheseviewsinmindandthereforeappliesaflexibleandreflexiveperspective“toexplorelocalknowledgeandperceptions”(CornwallandJewkes1995:1668).

Theinvolvementoftheresearchersintheresearchprocesstypicalofthepartici-patorymethodologycantaketwoforms:‘participatingobserver’or‘observingpar-ticipant’(Bernard1994).5Thesetworolesrepresenttheendsofacontinuumalongwhichtheresearcherandtheresearchmove.Atoneendtheresearcherismainlyanobserverwhoconsultsindividualsfortheiropinions;attheotherendtheresearcherisafullparticipanttogetherwithlocalpeopleinaprojectthatheorshehasinitiatedandmanages(GlesneandPeshkin1992, Cornwall and Jewkes 1995).CornwallandJewkes1995).).

The initialplanfor thisresearchwas tobe based on action research principlesbebasedonactionresearchprincipleswhich,asdefinedbyHallandKassam(1988),would“combinesocialinvestigation,educational(andcapacitybuilding)work,andaction…fortheimprovementofthelivesofthoseinvolved”(p.150).Amixofqualitativeandquantitativetoolsfordatacollectionwouldhaveenabledacloserdialoguewithlocalcommunitiesandatthesametimehelpedtoplananddevelopsmallscalecommunityprojects(Huizer1997).Thisinitialaimresultedinaconflictwiththerealityoftheadvisoryworkandthere-forehadtobechanged.Direct involvementwitha fewcommunitieshasnotbeenpossiblebecausetheprojectactivitiesextendedinfour(outofeight)districtsoftheprovince.Theprojectwork involvedmainlycoordination tasks rather thandirectworkwithtargetgroupsandbeneficiaries.Inaddition,thelanguagebarriermeantthatprojectworkandresearchactivitieshad tobeconductedwith thehelpof in-terpretersorthroughfieldfacilitatorsresponsibleforprojectactivitiesatthevillagelevel(i.e.CNGOstaff,projectstaff,governmentcounterparts).Duetothesecircum-stances,theresearchmethodologymovedtowardsthe‘participating observer’ end of‘participatingobserver’endofthecontinuumdescribedearlier..

Oneconcernwiththeresearchprocesshasbeentheneedtomaintainalinkbe-tweenprojectworkandresearchactivities.Onepre-conditiontoconductacademicresearchwhileworkingasadvisorinadevelopmentproject,giventheconstraintsintimeandresourceswiththeadvisorywork,isfortheresearchandworkingtopictobethesameortooverlapasmuchaspossible.Onlyinthiswayisitpossibletoplanandorganisedatacollectionthatcouldhelpbothareas.Inthecaseofthepresentstudytheoverlapanddifferencesbetweenadvisorandresearchactivitiesareconsid-eredhereattwoanalyticallevels:‘locallevelanalysis’and‘policylevelanalysis’.

Withregardto‘locallevelanalysis’(Figure5.1),therehasbeensubstantialoverlapwithalltheinformationrelatedtothetraditional,normsandvaluesthatcharacteriseCambodiancommunitiestoday.Inparticular,theroleofpagodasasspacesforcom-munityparticipationandmobilisationandthe linksbetweenCommuneCouncilsandcommunities.Specificdatacollectionhadtobeorganisedabouttherelationships

5 IneedtothankVirveLapinlampiandAnne-MariRaivo,PhDcandidatesattheDepartmentofEducationoftheUniversityofTampere,forbringingthesedefinitionstomyattention.


betweenschoolsandSchoolAssociationsandtheirrolenotonlyinschoolgovern-ancebutalsoinlocalgovernancethroughtheirlinkwithCommuneCouncils.Thegatheringofthesedatainvolvedmembersoftraditionalassociationsthatwerepar-ticipatinginprojectactivities.Atthesametime,theresearchactivitieswerelimitedmainlytoKampongThomprovince.ThelinkestablishedwithinformantsthroughprojectactivitieshelpedtooffsetoneoftherisksofparticipatoryresearchdescribedbyCornwallandJewkes1995,thatis,thelossofinterestbyinformantswhodonotseeanimmediateimpactfromtheirparticipation.Inthecaseofthisresearch,thetwoprocessesweremixedand,besidesbeingasourceofdataandinformationoncommunities,projectactivitieswerehelpingindividualstostrengthentheirassocia-tionaswellastheirparticipationwithCommuneCouncils.

Withregardtopolicylevelanalysis(Figure5.2),themainoverlapconcernedsec-ondary data on the history of Cambodia, national policies and donor policies ondecentralisationanddevelopment.Tocompletetheresearchmaterial,areviewwas

��u�� 5�� L�� v�� y��

LOCAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

PROJECT RESEARCH

Norms, values and traditions ofCambodian communities

Meaning of community and role of�agodas for community develo�ment

�elations��i� between �olicy and t��eca�acity at t��e local level

Awareness of role and functions ofCommune Council

Ca�acitybuilding

�oles of sc��oolassociations

Community�artici�ation in

sc��ool

��u�� 5�� P��y ��v�� y��

PROJECT

POLICY ANALYSIS

RESEARCH

Modern ��istory of Cambodia

T��eory of decentralisation and socialca�ital formation

Decentralisation reform in Cambodia

Donor coordination and su��ort todecentralisation in Cambodia

Educationsector �olices in

Cambodia

Donor su��ort toeducation

National datacommunity

�artici�ation ineducation


conductedofeducationsectorpoliciesaswellasdonorstudiesandreportsoneduca-tiononCambodiaandotherdevelopingcountries.

Returningtotheobservationposedduringtheresearchseminarin2003andtheriskthattoomuchpersonalinvolvementcouldturnthestudyintoanadvocacyre-port,hopefullythishasbeenavoidedbymakingpersonalvaluesexplicitandbypre-sentingalsodifferingperspectives.Oneoftheunderlyingvaluesofthisstudyisthatparticipationisindispensableforsustainableanddemocraticdevelopment.Tomakethis point, Chapter Two presented some critical views of participation. Likewise,whiledecentralisationreformscanpromotedemocracy,theycanalsostrengthenthepowerof localelites.Thiscriticalanalysishelpstosituatetheresearchresultsinaspecificcontextandanalyseopportunitiesaswellaslimitationsofcommunitypar-ticipationintheruralareasofKampongThomthatcanprovidevalidsuggestionsatamoregenerallevel.Thiscriticalperspectiveaimsathelpingtotakeintoconsider-ationthepointofviewoflocalaswellasnationalstakeholders.6

5.3 �esearc�� activities and t��eir limitations

TheresearchactivitiesdescribedinthissectionrefertotheperiodfromDecember2001toDecember2005.WhiledecentralisationreformsinCambodiaareanongoingprocessshapingnotjusteducationbutalsoCambodiansociety,thedataandinfor-mationpresentedheredonotextendbeyond2005,whenIreturnedtoFinland.

Most of the field work, besides two study visits to the provinces of KampongChamandKandalandvariousmeetingsinPhnomPenh,tookplaceintheprovinceofKampongThom.WhilerecognisingthatthisislinkedtothefactthatIwasboundto the province because of my project work, the study explores traditional normsandvaluesthataretobefoundinotherpartsofthecountry.AsarguedbyCollins(1998),“theextremelylivelyanddiversecivilsocietyactivityfoundinthevillagesofKampongThommaynotbeuniquetothisprovinceinitspreservationortraditionalCambodiansocialandculturalorganizations,associationsandactivities”(p.15).

The research activities encompassed the study of relevant literature and docu-ments,interviews,asurvey,acasestudy,personalcommunication,andobservationsfromthefield.

6 IthankAngelikaFleddermann,GTZCBRDPteamleader,forbringingthispointtomyatten-tion.


5.3.1 Literature and documentsLiterature and documents

Theanalysisofthemaintheoriesondecentralisation,socialcapital,andinpartic-ipatory local governance formed the core of the initial stages of the research andcontributedtoshapethetheoreticalframeworkpresentedinChapterTwo.Researchactivitiesconsistedofareviewofacademic literatureand,withregardtoCambo-dia,thereviewofmainlyEnglishlanguagesourcesonthehistory,politicsandsocialdevelopment of the country.7 A study by Bijker and Henke (2007) on social capi-Bijker and Henke (2007) on social capi-tal–relatedliteratureavailableinCambodiafoundthatEnglishlanguagesourcesaredominant.Outof208titlesonsocialcapital,communityandparticipation,198areinEnglishand10inFrench.Sixty-sevenpercentofthesourcesarebyauthorswhosefirstlanguageisEnglish,22percentareCambodiansasthemainauthors,fivepercentofthelistedtitlesarebyFrenchauthors,andsixpercentarebydonororganiza-tionswithoutreferencetospecificauthors.8

Reportsandpolicydocumentsbyinternationaldonors,NGOsandgovernmenton Cambodian development policies, decentralisation reforms, and the educationsectorcompletedthedocumentarysources.WithregardtoKampongThomprov-ince, the documentary sources refer to GTZ reports, Khmer language documentsfromassociationsthathavebeentranslatedintoEnglishbyMr.SarinSamphors,andthestatisticalsourcespresentedintable5.1below.

7 TwoexceptionsaretheGTZreportbyAschmoneit(1994),whichisinGerman,andFranci(2004),whichisinItalian.Theresearchdatabase,whichcontainsallthepublicationreviewedfortheresearchandwhicharenotallincludedinthisthesis,has126referencesonCambodiadividedintocommunity(18),decentralisation(26)development(18),education(27),govern-ment(8)history(25),participation(3),socialcapital(1),allofwhichareintheEnglishlan-guageorareEnglishversionsofrelevantdocumentsandpublications.

8 Onetitlehasnoindicationoftheauthorandisthereforemissingfromthetotalof208.ThetotaloftitleswithCambodianauthorsis60,with12percentofthesetitlesreferringtoKimSedaraandanother12percenttoMeasNee,whothereforealonerepresentonequarteroralltitles.HenkehasnotedthatFrenchremainssomewhatunderrepresentedbecauserelevantFrenchmaterialoftendoesnotentertheEnglishpublicdomainbutremainsintheFranco-phoneNGOscene.Inaddition,FrenchacademicmaterialismoredifficulttofindbecausetheinternationalacademicsocialsciencedebateisEnglishdominated.Germanisalsounderrep-resentedbecausemostofthesourcesareacademicandthereforenotavailableinCambodia.HenkethinksthatbyincludingthemthepatternwillnotdramaticallychangeiftheaboveunderrepresentationswouldberepairedbyaddingtheFrench,GermanandKhmerpublica-tions(thelatternotincludedinthestudy)thathavebeenmissedbythestudy(Personalcom-munication).


T�� 5�� S�u�� qu��v��

D�� Y�� S�u��

Po�ulation census 1998 Ministry of Planning

Socio-Economic Survey 1999 Ministry of Planning

Cambodia Demogra��ic and Healt�� Survey 2000 Ministry of Planning

Commune Database (CDB) 5.3 2003–2005 SEILA / Ministry of Planning

Inter-Censual Po�ulation Survey (CIPS) 2004 Ministry of Planning

Education Statistics & Indicators 2004/2005 2005 Ministry of Education Yout�� and S�orts

Most Vulnerable Families List 2005 CB�DP Kam�ong T��om

The followingremarksneed tobemadewith regard to thedocumentary sources.First, it is important to recognise the damage produced by the civil war and theKhmerRougeyears.AsnotedbyAyres(1997),“asignificantconcern inresearch-ingCambodianmodernhistoryisthedepletionofaplethoraofpotentialsources.DocumentsweredestroyedinCambodiainactsofpoliticalmalice,inanefforttoobscuretheinvolvementofcertainindividualsinthepoliticsofapreviousregime,orasanexpedientforashortageofrawmaterials”(p.25).Second,themajorityoftheexistingacademic literature focuseson thewarandtheKhmerRougeperiod.Littleinformationisavailableonthefieldofsocialdevelopmentandtheyearsbeforethecivilwarandgenocide.Third,itmustberememberedthatexistingsourcesareinfluencedbythepoliticalorientationofauthors,officialdocumentsrelatetospe-cificregimesandideologies,governmentdocumentstendtoemphasisethepositiveresultsandachievementsoverpolicyfailuresanddonors’reportshavetobebalancedagainsttheirspecificaim(ibid.).Byreviewingdifferentsources,thisthesisattemptstopresentdifferentperspectivesofCambodianhistoryanddevelopmentaswellasthetraditionalnormsandvaluesthatshapecommunityparticipation.

5.3.2 InterviewsInterviews

Interviewshavebeenanimportantpartoftheresearchprocess.Theyhaveprovidedrelevantinformationthatcomplementedthedocumentaryanalysis,especiallyatthelocal levelwheresuchsourcesarescarce.This isalsotheareawhereprojectworkandresearchhavethestrongestsynergy,sinceinterviewshaveprovidedextremelyvaluableinformationfortheworkwithpagodaassociationsandVillageNetworks.Atotalof58interviews(53individualinterviewsand5groupinterviews)havebeencollectedthroughresearchaswellasprojectactivities.Theyhavebeencodedand


dividedintofourmaincategories:Cambodianbackground,educationbackground,communityparticipation,andcivilsociety(Table5.2).9

T�� 5�� Nu�� h ��v��w�� 5�� Nu�� h ��v��w��

C��y I��v��w��

C�� k��u�� 9

E�u�� k��u�� 9

C��u��y p��p��

C�v�� y 8

TOTAL 58

Whenconsideredrelevant, interviewscollectedforprojectactivitieshavebeenin-cluded in theresearchdatabase.Thirtyone interviewswereconducted inEnglishwithforeignadvisorsorCambodianstaffworkingforinternationalNGOsanddo-nors. Twenty-seven interviews were conducted in Khmer with translation by DaNary,projectassistantof thecivil societycomponentofCBRDP.FocusGroupin-terviewswere triedontwooccasions,butwerenotpursuedfurtherbecausea fewpeople,andoftenjustoneperson,spokeforthegroup.SocialmappingwasusedonceinaninterviewwiththeabbotofapagodainStoungdistrict.Mostoftheinterviewsatthe local leveltookplacewithcommunitymembersandleaderswhohavebeenalsoinvolvedinCBRDPprojectactivities.Byusingasemi-structuredformatfortheinterview,basedonleadingquestions,Ihavebeenabletokeepaconsistencyintheenquiriesandreducethelossofinformationthroughtranslation.10

TwoprojectvisitsoutsideKampongThomintheprovincesofKampongCham(March2003)andKandal(August2002)wereconductedto interviewforeignandCambodian advisors involved in education and to observe annual school clusterplanningmeetingsinthreecoreclusterschools.

5.3.3 SurveysSurveys

Quantitativedatawascollectedusinga‘SchoolAssociationChecklist’,derivedfromVillageNetworksmonitoringactivitiesandadaptedtointerviewSchoolAssociations’members.Thechecklistwasdesignedtobesimpleandnottimeconsumingquestion-naireswherethereplytospecificquestionswasmainly‘yes’,‘no’,or‘Idon’tknow’.11

9 Forthefulllistofinterviews,observations,andpersonalcommunicationsrefertoAnnex110 ForleadingquestionofinterviewsatthelocallevelseenAnnex211 SeetheSchoolAssociationChecklistinAnnex3.


Thechecklistalsoservedasacapacitybuildingtoolforlocalstafftostrengthentheirexperiencewithqualitativedatacollectionandanalysis.

ThechecklistwastestedinJune2003,withthehelpofKetSobinastranslator.TheresultshelpeddeterminethedesignofthefinalchecklistusedbetweenJulyandAugust2005tointerview30SchoolAssociationCommitteemembers.TheexercisewasconductedwiththehelpofSarinSamphorwhocarriedouttheinterviewsinthefieldandenteredthedatainanExcelspreadsheet.Analysis was done using SPSS toAnalysiswasdoneusingSPSStoderivedescriptiveuni-variatestatisticssincethechecklistcontainedmainlymultiplechoiceanswersanddiscrete informationsuchascategories.Among the 30 SchoolAmongthe30SchoolAssociationssurveyedthroughthechecklist,28supportedaprimaryschool(7,2percentofthetotal416primaryschoolsintheprovince,seeMoEYS2005b)andoneasecondaryschool;28of30schoolsareapartofacluster.12AccordingtotheMoEYS(2005b)estimates,thetotalnumberofstudentsinthesurveyedschoolswas7.858,about6percentofthetotaloftheprovince.Thechecklistcovered30villagesin10communesoftheprovince(12,3percentofthetotalof81communes)in5districts(ofthetotalof8districts).13

5.3.4 Partici�ants’ observations, and �ersonal communicationsPartici�ants’ observations, and �ersonal communications

AcasestudytoillustratetheexperiencesofatraditionalassociationinthepagodainBotumvillageinKampongThomsincethelate1950swasderivedfrominterviews,personal communication and recollections during meetings and interviews withcommunitymembers.Projectactivitiesservedasanimportantsourceofinforma-tionaboutcommunitydynamicsthroughparticipants’observations.Observationsandnotesrelevantfortheresearchwerederivedfromaresearchlogbookandfromprojectnotes.TheobservationsandpersonalcommunicationswithprojectadvisorsandconsultantsbasedoutsideCambodiawithexperience in the field relevant forthestudy,werecodedandcataloguedusingthesamecategoriesaswasusedfortheinterviews(Table5.3).

12 TotalnumberofschoolsinallclustersrepresentedbytheSchoolAssociationsinterviewedis74schoolswithanaverage4,8schoolspercluster.

13 SeesurveymapinAnnex4.


T�� 5�� Nu�� h ��v�� p�� u��

C��y O��v��P��

��u��

Cambodia background 4 4

Education background 2 4

Community �artici�ation 11 8

Civil society 1 0

TOTAL �8 �6


Thischapterhasexploredthelimitationsaswellastheopportunitiesofthedualroleofadvisor–researcherforthisstudy.DuringthefouryearsspentinCambodia,Ihavetriedtominimisetheformerandmaximisethelatterbyoverlappingasmuchaspos-sibleprojectworkandresearchactivities.HadIbeeninCambodiaonlyasadvisor,itislikelyIwouldnothavereachedthesamein-depthknowledgeofthecharacteristicsofthelinksbetweencommunitiesandschools.MoreoverIwouldhavenotexploredin-depththeconceptsofsocialcapitalthatwerethebasisfortheVillageNetworksapproach.Likewise,ifIwouldhavespentashortertimeinKampongThomonlyasaresearcher,Iwouldhavenothavehadthepossibilitytocontributetoproducesomechangethroughtheproject,and,atthesametime,learnaboutthedynamicsoflo-calgovernanceandcommunitydevelopment.Moreover,Iwouldhavenotbeeninapositiontoestablishthesamepersonallinkswithrepresentativesoftraditionalasso-ciations,localCNGOs,andcolleaguesthatalsoallowedmetoenquireaboutpainfulmemories.Itisnoteasytodeterminebetweentheresearcherandtheadvisor,whohasbenefitedthemost.But,onabalance,itseemsthatbothroleshavecontributedtothisdoctoraldissertation.


6 Community �artici�ation in sc��ools: findings from Kam�ong T��om �rovince

ChapterFourreviewedthegrowingnumberofpublicationswhichexploretheroleoftraditionalassociationsinlocaldevelopmentinCambodia.1Thischaptermovesbeyondthisliteraturetoanalysethequantitativeandqualitativeresearchdatacol-lectedbetween2002and2005inKampongThom.Thefirstpartofthechaptersetsthebackgroundbypresentingthehumandevelopmentprofileoftheprovince.Thenextthreesectionspresenttheresultsoftheanalysisofcommunityparticipationinschoolsalong the threemainsocialcapitaldimensions: thebonding linkbetweenmembersofSchoolAssociations,bridginglinksandspacesofparticipationbetweentraditionalassociations,andtheinstitutionallinksbetweenassociationsandschoolsaswellasCommuneCouncils.Whilebonding,bridgingandinstitutionallinksarepresentedseparatelyforanalyticalanddescriptivereasons,inrealitytheyarenotsoclearlydividedandshowconsiderableoverlapandinterconnection.

Before moving to the description of Kampong Thom, it is necessary to clarifysometerminologyusedinthechapter.Theterm‘SchoolAssociation’usedherein-cludesalltheinformalgroupssetupvoluntarilybycommunitymemberstosupportlocalschoolsandwhichlackofficialrecognitionfromthegovernmentasdescribedbyCornwall(2002a)insection2.3.2.‘SchoolAssociation’isthereforeusedforPar-ents Associations and informal School Support Committees.2 The definition ex-cludestheofficialcommitteesandinstitutionalisedspacesofparticipationincluded

1 SeeAschmoneit(1998),Collins(1998)Krishnamurthy(1999),ColettaandCullen(2000),KimSedara(2001),Kusakabeetal.(2002),LedgerwoodandVijghen(2002).

2 WithregardtoSchoolSupportCommitteesthereissomeconfusiononwhethertoconsidertheminformalorinstitutionalisedgroups.TheClusterSchoolGuidelines(MoEYS2000a)donotmentionthemandoneinformantsaidthattherewasanattemptbytheMoEYS,whichfailedtoinstitutionalisethem(Informant).Forthesereasons,thisresearchconsidersthemasinformalortransientgroups.

113Community participation in schools: findings from Kampong Thom province

innationalpolicyguidelinessuchastheLocalClusterSchoolCommitteesorLocalClusterSchoolCouncilorganisedatclusterratherthanschoollevel.

6.1 Human develo�ment �rofile of Kam�ong T��om �rovince

BorderingtheTonléSaapLakeinthewest,KampongThomprovinceislocatedincentralCambodia,northofthecapitalPhnomPenh.ItisthethirdlargestprovinceinCambodia,measuring181.035km²(DeAgostini2003).

Theeconomyoftheprovinceismainlybasedonagriculture,althoughonly21percentofthelandisundercultivationandsoilfertilityislow.Fifty-onepercentoftheprovinceiscoveredwithforest,whichrepresentsanimportantsourceoflivelihoodthatisdecliningatanalarmingrate(NethTopetal.2006).Theprovinceisdividedintoeightdistricts:Baray,KampongSvay,StuengSaen,PrasatBalangk,PrasatSam-bour, Sandan, Santuk, and Stoung (Figure 6.2). There are 81 communes, and 737villages(SEILA-MoP2005).

��u�� 6�� M�p �� K��p�� Th�� p��v�� w��h�� C��


Thepopulationoftheprovince,basedonthelastnationalcensus,is569.060or4,8percentofthetotalofCambodia(MoP1998).Themalepopulationis272.844(48percent)andfemale296.216(52percent).Thepopulationisyoungandgrowingquickly,with47,1percentunder17yearsofage(SEILA-MoP2005).3Populationdensity,with50inhabitantspersquarekilometre,isjustbelowthenationalaverage(MoP2004).The average size of the population per village is 847 inhabitants (ibid.), while theaveragehouseholdssizeisinlinewiththenationalaverageof5,3persons.Thetotalfertilityrateis4,3children(MoP1998,MoP2000,SEILA-MoP2005).

Theaverageannualpercapitaincome,calculatedaddingmonetaryandnonmon-etarysources,is4.926.200KHR(1.231USD)(MoP1999,Diepart2007).4Thecoef-ficientofvariationoftheincomesat65percentshowsahighdisparityintherelativepercapitaincomes.Insemi-urbanareas,percapitaincomeis7.359.000KHR(1.840USD)comparedto3.781.000KHR(945USD)invillages(ibid.).Themajorityofthepopulation is involved in agriculture, although economic development since 19983 Ithasbeenestimatedthatbetween2001-2021thepopulationoftheprovincewillgrowby51

percent,withanannualaveragegrowthrateof2,08percent.Thisisinlinewithnationalprojections(SanSyThanandHasBunton2003)

4 Surveyconductedin25villagesoftheprovincewithasampleof250households.Exchangerate:4.000KHR=1USD.

��u�� 6�� M�p �� h�� K��p�� Th�� p��v��


hasresultedinaslightshiftoftheworkforcetowardsindustryandservices(Table6.1).

T�� 6�� P�� h�� up�� y �� K��p�� Th��

A��u��u�� I��u��y S��v��

�998 �004 �998 �004 �998 �004

M�� 86,1 75,6 1,7 4,6 12,2 19,8

�� 82,2 79,7 2,5 2,8 15,5 17,5

Source:MoP1998,MoP2004.

Intermsoffoodsecurity,KampongThomisamongoneofthefourmostvulnerableprovincesinCambodia.Duetothehighrateofpopulationgrowth,theamountoflandownedbyhouseholdsisonaveragelessthan0,6hectares(MRDandGTZ1995).Themainstaplefoodandcultivationisrice,whileotherimportantcropsarefruits,vegetables,andcashewnut(GTZ1998,Keskinen2003).InthecaseofthedistrictofSantuk,forexample,ithasbeenestimatedthatmorethan50percentofhouseholdshavefoodshortagesbetweenfiveandeightmonthsperyear(GTZ1998).

With29percentofhouseholdslivingbelowthenationalpovertyline,KampongThomissituatedinthemidrangeofCambodianprovinces(MoP1998).Morere-cently,CBRDP,throughtheMostVulnerableFamilyLists,identifiedatotalof26.887householdsasmostvulnerable,21,8percentofthetotalnumberoffamiliesintheprovince(GTZ/MRD/MoP2005,SEILA-MoP2005).5

Healthandsanitationarealsoofconcernforvillagerssince,accordingtothe1998census,lessthan10percentoftheruralpopulationhadaccesstosafewater(MoP1998).Malnutritionisalsoaseriousproblem,with49,4percentofchildrenbeingun-derweight.Thehighprevalenceofrespiratoryinfectionsanddiarrhoeacontributetoaninfantmortalityrateof64,5perthousandbirths,andamoralityrateofchildrenundertheageoffiveof98,8perthousand.Thisisbelowthenationalaverage(MoP

5 IneedtothankChanSotheavy,GTZcommunitydevelopmentadvisorinKampongThom,forprovidingmewiththisinformation.TheMostVulnerableFamilyLists(MVFL)arepre-paredbyaVillageLevelWorkingGroupwithkeyvillagerepresentatives.Villagersareaskedtocheckandcommentonthelists.TheprocessisundertheguidanceoftheCommuneCoun-cilsthatmanagestheprocess,agreesoncriteriaforinclusion,harmonisesthevillagedraftlists,andendorsethem.ProvincialauthoritiesareinvolvedbyprovidingcapacitytrainingtoCommuneCouncils.CriteriaforinclusioninMVFLare:verybasichousingconditions,noregularincomeoutsideagricultureandwhodependondailyincomeforfood(noreserves),nodraughtanimalsoronlyoneyoungdraughtanimalandnoothermeansoftransporta-tion,lessthantwohectaresofproductiveland,thefamilyriceproductioncanonlycovertwomonthsofconsumptionperyear(GTZ/MRD/MoP2005).


2000).6HIV/AIDSprevalenceisasworryingasintherestofthecountryatarateofapproximately2,2percent(MoH2002).LandminesarenotasseriousaproblemasinWesternCambodia,butstillrepresentathreat.In2003,33casualtieswererecordedbeingcausedbyminesorUnexplodedOrdinances.Thiswas3,5percentofthena-tionaltotal(CambodiaRedCross2003).

Turningtoeducation,theofficialstatisticspresentrelativelyhighilliteracyratesinKampongThom,with17,4and14,7percentofthetotal femaleandmalepop-ulation being illiterate (SEILA-MoP 2005).7 However, if only the female and malepopulationover15yearsofageareconsidered,thevaluesworsenat29,6percentforfemaleand25,6percentformales(ibid).TheprimaryschoolNetEnrolmentRate,at89,9,islowerthanthenationalaverageof93,3presentedinChapterThree(seetable3.2).Onaverage,girlsshowahigherenrolmentthanboysinthe416primaryschoolsoftheprovince,asshownintable6.2(MoEYS2006).

T�� 6�� N�� E�� R�� y�� p��y ��h�� y �� (��h�� y�� 004/�005)

D�� M��

B��y 91,6 91,2

K��p�� Sv�y 91,4 96,0

P�� B��k 82,0 80,7

P�� S��u� 88,2 93,3

S�� 91,1 93,5

S��uk 81,7 97,0

S��u�� 83,2 87,6

S�u�� S�� 95,4 93,2

T�� p��v�� 88,5 91,4

Rural 95,4 93,2

Urban 87,8 91,2

Source:MoEYS2006.

Nevertheless,asshowninfigure6.3,themajorityofstudentsdonotcompletepri-maryschool.Thisdataisconfirmedbythelowrateofprimaryschoolcompletion,

6 Prevalenceofdiarrhoeaishigh,particularlyamongchildren,at19,9percent,butinlinewiththenationalaverageof19,4percent(MoP2000).

7 Thesepercentagesarecalculatedonthetotalfemaleandmalepopulationsrespectively.Ifweconsiderthefemaleandmalepopulationover15yearsofage,thepercentagesarehigher,with29,6percentforfemalesand25,6percentformales.


whichseesKampongThominthelowerendofCambodianprovinces,with34,9percent(MoEYS2006).8

Asintherestofthecountry,schoolsinKampongThomareorganisedinclusters.Allbutoneofthe413primaryschoolsoftheprovinceareapartofthe55schoolclustersoftheprovince(MoEYS2005b).9Theaveragenumberofschoolsperclusteris7,5,butthenumbercanbehigherindistrictswithmoreremoteareasandsparsepopulationsuchasPrasatSambourandStoung,with10,7and15,2respectively.

Severalaidorganisationsarepresent inKampongThom.Mostof themare in-volved,asCBRDP,inruraldevelopmentandagriculture(Table6.3).

8 Thecompletionrateofgrade9(lowersecondary)isnotbetter.KampongThomisinthelowerend,with15percent(MoEYS2005b).Thetotalsurvivalratefromgrade1throughtograde6is40,6percent(girls41,8percent)(ibid.).

9 TheonlyschoolnotinaclusteristheprimaryschoolinKampongThomtown.In2005theMoEYSadded3primaryschoolsinKampongThombringingthetotalto416,with64coreschoolsand352satelliteschools.

��u�� 6�� E�u�� K��p�� Th�� (MoP 2000)

0 %

10 %

20 %

30 %

40 %

50 %

60 %

70 %

80 %

90 %

100 %

Male (N=1.245) Female (N= 1.483)

No education Pre-sc��ool Some �rimary Primary (6t��) Some secondary Secondary (12t��)

0��8 ��

�0��5 ��

5��

6��7 ��

0��7 ��

�0��

0��4��5��9 ��

��

57��4 ��

0��5 ��

��5 ��


T�� 6�� I�� v��p�� K��p�� Th�� p��v��*

E�u�� A��u��u�� u��y

Ru�� D��v��p�� H��h / S��

D�� UNICEF GTZAusAID

WFPFAOADB

GTZWFPIFADADBWB

UNICEF

GTZ

I�� NGO�� World VisionC��urc�� World Service

World VisionC��urc�� World Service

CA�ITASG�ET

World VisionC��urc�� World Service

AD�ATPO

* IneedtothankCristianoCalcagno,GTZprovincialcoordinatorinKampongThom,forhelpingwiththeinformationinthistable.

The main agency in the education sector is UNICEF, which is providing supportthroughtheProvincialOfficeofEducation(POE)andDistrictOfficesofEducation(DOE)to20clustersin4districtsforatotalof69primaryschools(MoEYS–UNI-CEF2005).ThemainprogrammeistheChildFriendlySchools,whichisacompo-nentofthelargerExpandedBasicEducationProgram(EBEP)2002-2005anditsfol-lowuptheEBEPPhaseII2006–2010.10ThebasicideaoftheChildFriendlySchoolsistoimproveschoolsaroundsixmaincharacteristics(MoEYS–UNICEF2005:28):

• Schoolsincludeallchildrenandpro-activelyseektoenrolallschool-agedchildren;• Effectiveacademicallyandrelevantforchildren’slives;• Healthy,safeandprotectiveofchildren;• Genderresponsive;• Strengthenthesenseofresponsibilityandactionsof familiesandcommunities to-

wardseducatingchildren;• Supportiveandenablingeducationsystem.

ActivitiesimplementedinKampongThomconsistofparticipatoryplanningatthelocallevelandstudyvisitsforschoolstaff.Atotalof774teachershavereceivedtrain-ingduringtheperiod2002-2005ontopicssuchasclassroommanagement,schoolself-assessment,childcentredteachingandlearning,supportivesupervision,andin-clusiveeducation.Inaddition,anumberofactivitieshavealsobeendevelopedunderprogrammessuchas school feedingactivities,eco-clubs, sanitationeducationandwell construction. The positive accomplishments of the programme in KampongThompromptedtheprovincialauthoritytorequesttheexpansionoftheapproachto

10 The programme is implemented with assistance from the Swedish International Develop-mentAgency(SIDA)infiveprovinces:KampongThom,PreyVeng,SvayReang,KampongSpeu,OtdorMeanchey,andStungTreng(MoEYS-UNICEF2005).


118schoolsin29clustersin2005-2006andtoreachcoverageofatleast70percentofthe416primaryschoolsoftheprovinceby2008-2009(MoEYS-UNICEF2005).

6.2 Bonding social ca�ital: c��aracteristics of Sc��ool Associations

Thissectionisconcernedwiththespecificcharacteristicsofassociationssupport-ingschoolsandanalysisofthelinksbetweenthemembersoftheseassociations.AsurveyconductedinKampongThombyNarakSovann(2000)foundtwotypesofSchoolAssociations:

• SchoolAssociations(Samakum Sala Rean)• Parents’Associations(Samakum Meatda Beidasa)

School Associations: according to Narak Sovann, the main objective of these as-sociationsis“toreconstructschoolsinpagodas,promoteeducationandhelppoorpeopletoaccesseducationbyapplyingthetraditionsofthepast”(Narak2000:13).Figure6.4showshowtheseassociationsareusuallyorganised.

TheinitialcapitaloftheSchoolAssociationsiscreatedthroughcashcontributionsbyvillagers,usuallyduringareligiousceremony.Thesizeof theassociationsvar-iesfrom50to200members,withanaverageof120.An‘AssociationCommittee’,formedbytrustedacharsandvillagers,isappointedtomanagetheassociationand

��u�� 6�4� S�h�� A�� u��u�� k��

SCHOOL POOR�AMILIES

SCHOOL/PARENTASSOCIATION

A��C��

Materials Grants

Sc��oolattendance

Contributors/interest

CreditsHOUSEH0LDS

HOUSEH0LDS HOUSE

H0LDS

HOUSEH0LDS


recordcontributions,loans,andtheinterestpayments.TheAssociationCommitteenormallyincludesachairperson,adeputychairperson,asecretary,twopersonsinchargeofthefinances,andtwoadditionalsupervisors(Informants).Anassociation,regardlessofwhetheritislocatedinapagodaorvillage,isnormallylinkedtojustoneschool.Partoftheassociation’scapitalcanbeallocatedtoprovidefinancialsupporttotheschoolthroughtheestablishmentofanad hocsub-committeeinchargeofaspecificactivity.Forexample,in2003,theheadmasterandtheSchoolAssociationofTbongTukprimaryschool(MeanRithcommune,Sandandistrict)requestedGTZsupportfortherepairoftheroofoftheschool.Intherequest,theSchoolAssocia-tionmentioned that itwouldprovidematerialsand labourasa localcontributionandorganisea ‘RepairandMaintenanceCommittee’ forthedurationofthework(Informant).

Themajorityof the30SchoolAssociations interviewed for this researchwith theChecklistquestionnairehavea5memberscommittee,witharangebetweenthreeand12members(Figure6.5).ThemaintaskoftheAssociationCommitteeistodis-cusswithteachersand/ortheheadmaster,usuallyattheendoftheschoolyear,theneedsoftheschoolandtherequiredfinancialsupport.ThemembersoftheAsso-ciation Committees are described as being respected and trusted members of the

��u�� 6�5� D��u�� *

* UnlessotherwisestatedinthepresentandthefollowingchartsofthischapterNisthenumberofvalidanswersgivenbytheinformantstoaspecificquestionoftheSchoolAssociationchecklist.Questionsinthechecklistallowforsingleand/ormultipleanswers.Therefore,N=30meansthatallinformantsanswered.N=26,asintableabove,meansthatfourinformantsdidnotprovideananswer.N=132,asinfigure6.8,meansthattheinformantshadthepossibilitytoprovidemorethatoneanswertoaspecificquestion.

3 members 4 members 5 members

7 members 8 members 12 members

61,5 %

15,4 %

3,8 %

3,8 %

7,7 %

7,7 %

N=�6


community.Onerespondent, forexample,mentioned that theSchoolAssociationofSangkor(KampongSvaydistrict)hadbeencreatedfollowinganideabyMr.ChooLi,“apopularandrespectedmaninthevillagewhoownedmostproperties,andtheelderlypeopleof thevillagewithoutthehelpofanyexternalorganisation”(Infor-mant).

Parents’ Associations:thesecondtypeofassociationsidentifiedbyNarakSovann(2000),theParents’Associations,areorganisedinasimilarwaytotheSchoolAsso-ciations.Thedifference is thattheassociation’smembersareparentswhosupporttheschoolthattheirchildrenattend.Inadditiontofinancialcontributionsforschoolrepairs,Parents’Associationsalsoprovidesmallgrantstopoorfamilieswhosechil-dren would otherwise drop out of school. These associations have a close contactwith the local Pagoda Committee, the school director, and the education depart-ment.AccordingtoNarakSovann(ibid.),thereisevidenceinKampongThomthatsomeoftheseassociationsalreadyexistedbeforeWorldWarII.

AccordingtoMoEYSstatistics,about79percentofthe551schoolsintheprov-inceofKampongThomhaveaSchoolAssociation,withahigherpercentageindis-trictswithremoteareasandsparsepopulationsuchasSandan,Stoung,andPrasatBalangkwheretheneedtosupportthelocalschoolseemsgreater(Table6.4).11

T�� 6�4� Nu�� h�� K��p�� Th�� u��

D�� Nu�� h�� W��h S�h�� A��-��

��

B��y 110 83 75,5 %

K��p�� Sv�y 77 63 81,8 %

P�� B��k 38 33 86,8 %

P�� S��u� 56 43 76,8 %

S�� 54 47 87,0 %

S��uk 62 46 74,2 %

S��u�� 89 75 84,3 %

S�u�� S�� 65 47 72,3 %

T�� p��v�� 551 437 79,3 %

Urban Area 65 47 72,3 %

Rural Area 486 390 80,2 %

Source:MoEYS2006.

Slightlylessthanhalfofthechecklistrespondents(43percent)couldnotrememberwhentheirSchoolAssociationwasfirstestablished.Amongthosewhodidremem-

11 Kampong Thom is in the mid range of Cambodian provinces. The highest percentage ofSchoolAssociationsisinKandal(89percent)andthelowestinPhnomPenhandtheprovinceofRatanakiri(bothwith62percent).


ber,inthecaseofSamboandPreyKuyprimaryschools,therespondentsmentioned1979.AsbothschoolsarelocatedinthecommuneofPreyKuy,aboutthreekilome-tresfromKampongThomtown,itmayimplytheareawasprobablysufficientlysafeafter thearrivalofVietnamese troops to re-start theassociations’ activities.Mostoftheprovince,however,continuedtosufferfromcontinuouswarfarebetweenthegovernmentandKhmerRougeguerrillasthatimpededtoresumptionofcommunitybasedactivitiesinsupportofschoolsuntilthesecondhalfofthe1990s.

Theelderlymembersof thecommunityareusually involved in theSchoolAs-sociationCommittee.Theaverageageoftherespondentstothechecklistisinfact54,4yearsformenand54forwomen.Thisisquitehigh,consideringtheaveragelifeexpectancyforCambodiais56years(UNDP2005),anditreaffirmstheimportanceofageintermsofholdingapositionofresponsibilityinthecommunity.InterviewswithSchoolAssociations’membershaveconfirmedthatacharandelderlypeoplearecommonlymentionedasmembersoftheAssociations’Committeesandarenormal-ly‘asked’totakeupthistask.Thepresenceofdevelopmentprojects,suchasCBRDP,haveintroducedcommittees’elections,buttheyarenotyetanestablishedpractice.Asshowninfigure6.6,only30percentoftheassociationsincludedinthechecklistholdelectionsregularly,theothersmostlywhentheneedarisestoreplacememberswhoretireorwithdraw.12

12 Informants23,25,32,38,52,54,56,58,59,and67.

��u�� 6�6� ��qu��y ��u�� S�h�� A��

N=�0

0 %

10 %

20 %

30 %

40 %

50 %

60 %

70 %

80 %

90 %

100 %

Fre�uency of elections

Every 5 years

Every 3 years

Every year


ThemembersoftheAssociationCommitteetendtokeeptheirpositionforlongpe-riodsoftime.Evenwhereelectionsareheld,officebearersarenormallyreconfirmedintheirpositions.Anachar inStoungdistrictmentionedthathehaskeptthepostintheSchoolAssociationCommitteesincethetimeofitsestablishmentinthe1960s.He stated that after the Khmer Rouge period, when the association was re-estab-lished,hewasaskedbythepeopletoagainleadtheassociation(Pellini2005).

TheimportanceattributedtoageandthecombinationofrespectandtrustfortheAssociationCommitteemembersresultsintheirinvolvementinseveralassociationsatatime.Thedatashowalsoacertaincorrelationbetweenageandthenumberofrolesassumedinthecommunity,withthenumberofresponsibilitiesincreasingwithage(Figure6.7).13

Theresults fromthechecklistalsoconfirmthatother leadersatvillageandcom-munelevelareapartoftheAssociations’Committees,withtheVillageChiefbeingthelocalauthoritythatismostofteninvolved(Figure6.8).

Thepresenceoflocalauthoritiesshows,ontheonehand,thattheycannotbeeas-ily‘excluded’fromcommunitybasedgroups.Ontheother,itofferstheopportunitytolinktheassociation’sconcernstovillageandcommunegovernance.Villagersarementionedwitharelativelyhighpercentage.Elderlypeopleandachars arealsoim-portantmembersandformthelargergroupofcommitteemembers,reflectingtheimportanceoftraditionalleadersforcommunityinitiatives.Thisislinkedtotwoele-ments:first,inruralareas,mostindividualsareinvolvedinfarming;second,notalloftheAssociations’Committeesmembersareactiveinthesamewayandsomeactmoreasobserversandexertalimitedinfluenceondecisionmakingprocesses.

13 Thecorrelationreferstomalerespondentsasonlythreewomenwereinterviewedwiththechecklist.

��u�� 6�7� C�� /�u�� h�� u��y

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0 20 40 60 80

A��

Nu�

��

��

��

N = 29


Theextentoftheinvolvementinothercommunityrolesbytherespondentsofthechecklistisshowninfigure6.9.Thirtypercentoftherespondentsmentionedthattheyhavefiverolesinthecommunity,while20percenthavefour.

��u�� 6�9� P�� u�� h�� u�� h�� u��y �y ��’ ��

2 roles3%

1 role3%

7 roles7%

3 roles27%

4 roles20%

5 roles30%

6 roles10%

N = 30

��u�� 6�8� M��h�p �� S�h�� A��

N=132

Village c��ief

Villager

Elder

Ac��ar

Teac��er

Sc��ool �rinci�al

Women grou� leader

Commune Council member

Monk

Ot��ers

0 5 10 15 20

17,4

17,4

13,6

12,1

11,4

10,6

8,3

4,5

3

1,5


Asshowinfigure6.10,theparticipationofcitizensincommunityrolesencompassesbothformalandinformalgroupsandpositions.Therespondentsalsoholdpositionsin credit associations as well as VDC and the Commune Council’s Planning andBudgetingCommittee(PBC).Whatthesepercentagesdonotrevealistheextentofengagementineachofthesepositions.Inotherwords,itisuncleartowhichroleandpositiontheyallocatemostoftheirtime.

Womenparticipateinjust56percentoftheSchoolAssociationsinthesurveywiththemajorityoftheassociationshavingonlyonefemalememberasshownintable6.5.

T�� 6�5� ��qu��y �� h�p �� S�h�� A��

N� ��

��qu��y ��

0 13 43,51 11 36,62 5 16,65 1 3,3

Onlyinonecase,theSchoolAssociationofThnalBekPrimarySchool,thenumberofwomenwashigherthanthenumberofmen.14Aswiththemen,womenalsohave

14 ThnorlBekChuengvillage,TrapeangRuesseicommune,KampongSvaydistrict.TheAsso-ciationCommitteehasatotalofsevenmembers,fiveofwhomarewomen.

Villa

ge N

etwo

rk

Cred

it As

s.

Pare

nt As

s.

VDC

PBC

Villa

ge c��

ief

Elder

lead

er

Villa

ger

Ac��a

r

Busin

essm

en

0

5

10

15

20

25 23,7

17,516,5

12,4 12,4

7,2

5,2

2,1 2,11,0

N=97

��

��u�� 6��0� Cu�u��v�� p�� u��y �� v��


morethanoneroleinthecommunity.15Forexample,asinglewoman,aged52,wholiveswithhertwodaughtersinthevillageofBoTasao,inRongRuengCommune(Stoungdistrict), isamemberofPacoco,wheresherepresentsfivecash,ninerice,andtwoschoolsassociations,andsheistheleaderofthelocalcashandriceassocia-tions(Informant).

Associationshaveastatutethatdefinesthescopeoftheiractivities,andkeepre-cordsoftheiractivitiesthroughregistersthatcontainthenamesofpeoplewhohavemadecontributions,aswellasthenamesoftheborrowersofsmallcredits.InthecaseofSchoolAssociationofBotumBase(Stoung)thestatutementionsthat:

“AccordingtotheassemblymeetingtocreateanassociationtosupportthePri-mary School, the capital was collected on 28th January 1989 at Botum pagoda.To educate and encourage memory and conscience of the Buddha’s disciplinesthatsupportsBotumpagodainordertosupportBotumPrimarySchoolinPreahDamreiCommunetorehabilitatetheexistingmaterialbase.Theassociationre-cordsthecontributionby122memberstosupportBotumPrimarySchoolforato-talof6.448,90KHR:theassociationalsorecordedtheuseof5.400KHRforcredittothemembers,startingfrom28thJanuary1989.Eachcreditisrecordedwiththenameoftheborrowerandtheamountofthecredit”.16

TheSchoolAssociations’linksbetweenmembersandcommitteearebasedontrust,respect,andreligiousnorms.Themainmotivationforindividualstobecomemem-bers of associations and contribute to the starting capital and its activities is, infact,thewillingnesstoearn‘merits’.Onerespondent,whoisalsoanachar,saidthat“people,whentheycontributethemoney,theydonotthinkaboutthecredit,theycontribute the money because they think about ‘merits’ and improvements to theschool” (Informant).TwoPagodaAssociation leadersmentionedthat“the laymenwhoestablishedtheassociationsareawareofthefactthatthemoneycollectedbytheassociationcanhelpthepoor.Thepeoplewhomakecontributions,however,donotthinkaboutit.TheybelieveinBuddhismandthatiftheydosomethinggoodtheywill get something good back” (Informant). The abbot of the pagoda of Don Lao(Stoungdistrict)pointedoutthat“Buddhismteachesthatpeoplehavetobesincerebecauseifwedo‘good’,wegain‘merits’”(Informant).

Whileparticipationofassociations’membersresultsinindividualcontributions,thesamecannotbesaidintermsofthemanagementoftheassociations,whichisconsideredmainlyataskandresponsibilityofthecommitteemembers.17Theresultisaweakdemandbytheassociations’membersforreportingorfeedback.Mostof15 Theanalysisofthechecklistrevealsthattheaveragenumberofrolesformenis4,3(N=27),

whileforwomenitis3,6(N=3).16 TranslationbySarinSamphors.17 Aschmoneitetal.(1996),withregardtothispoint,arguethatassociationsarenormallyman-

agedbybenevolentelitethroughapaternalisticratherthanempoweringway,andthatdeci-sionmakinginvolvesaclosecircleofelderlyandcommitteemembers.ForfurtherdetailsseeSasse1998.


associationsinthechecklist(63percent)holdpublicmeetingsduringtheyear,withthemajorityofthemholdingameetingeverysixmonths(Figure6.11).

TheAssociationCommittee informstheassociations’membersandvillagersdur-ingvillagemeetings(55percent)orreligiousceremonies(19percent)byreportingaboutactivitiesandcontributions(Table6.6).Participantsrarelyaskquestionsduetolowliteracylevelsandthebeliefthatleadersmanagingtheassociationsarethemostappropriatemembersofthecommunitytodoso.This is in linewithSasse(1998)argument thataccording to theAsian traditionsof conflict-avoidance,distrustordisapprovalisrathershownbynotcontributingtoassociation’sactivitiesorbynotshowing-upatmeetings.

Thepersonalitiesoftheindividualsinthecommitteeistheelementthatdefinesthedynamismof theassociation.18Oneassociation leadermentionedthat“if Igotwoorthreetimeseverymonthtovisittheassociations,theybecomemoreactive,buttheoneswhereIgoonlyonceamontharenottooactive”(Informant).ThiscouldbeobservedalsoinamonthlyclusterschoolmeetingattheProvincialOfficeofEdu-cationinKampongThomwhererepresentativesofclustersandSchoolAssociations

18 Informants28,30,32,35,and50.

��u�� 6�� qu��y ��u�� S�h�� A�� p�� y��

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

4036,7

33,3

16,7

6,7

3,3 3,3

No an

swer

Twice

�er y

ear

Once

�er y

ear

Four

tim

es �e

r yea

r

T��re

e tim

es �e

r yea

r

Seve

n tim

es �e

r yea

r

N=30%


meettoreportaboutactivitiesandtopreparenewplans.19Theacharswithstrongerpersonalities were also the ones who had more to report. They are the ones whoknowbetterhowtomobilisethecommunitiesandarelikelytoreceivetrainingfromNGOsanddonors,thusmakingtheirpositioninsidetheassociationsevenstronger.Traditionalleaders,however,canalsolackthenecessaryunderstandingorskillsre-quiredforthetaskstheyneedtoperform(Informant).Inthiscase,asobservedintheyearlyplanningworkshopsinthreeprimaryschoolsintheprovinceofKandal,theassociationandcommunityleaderswhoparticipatedspokeverylittleduringthethreedayworkshopsanddidnotparticipateactivelyintheplanningdiscussions.Ontheotherhand,strongandcommittedleaderstendtobecomeinvolvedintrainingsandworkshopsorganisedbydifferentdevelopmentprojectswiththeresultthattheybecomeoverburdenedbytheseactivities.20

6.3 Bridging social ca�ital: t��e link between traditional associations

Theanalysisof thebonding linkswithinSchoolAssociations indicates that tradi-tionalleaderstendtobeinvolvedinarangeofcommunitybasedinitiatives.Thissec-tiontriestoanswerthequestionwhetherthisextendedinvolvementalsoleadstotheestablishmentofbridgesbetweendifferentassociations.ChapterFourdemonstrated

19 ObservationsandmeetingswithUNICEFstaffatPOEinKampongThom,2003.20 Formoredetailsabouthighdemandsontraditional leaders(intermsoftraining,capacity

building,andplanning)posedbydevelopmentagenciesandNGOsseePellini2004.

T�� 6�6� M�� p�� v��

Village meeting 55 %

T��roug�� community members 19 %

Louds�eaker 3 %

Village C��ief 3 %

Sc��ool ceremony 3 %

Students 3 %

Information board 3 %

Letter 3 %

Don’t know 6 %

N=31


theimportanceofpagodasascentresofcommunitylife,apointthatalsoappliestocommunityparticipation since, asmentionedbyone informant, “inmost schools‘community’meanspagoda”(Informant).

Historically,theBuddhisttemplewastheonlyplacewherepeopleinruralareascould receive some education. This link still exists today. In Kampong Thom, 47schools(or11,3percentofthetotal)arelocatedwithinapagodacompound(MoEYS2005b).Inaddition,itisofteninpagodaswhereassociationsre-startedtheiractivi-tiesafterthefalloftheKhmerRougeregime,asshowninthecasestudyofBotumpagodapresentedinthenextsection.

6.3.1 Case study: Botum �agoda as a s�ace for community action

BotumpagodaislocatedinthevillageofBotumLech,RongReungcommune,Stoungdistrict,KampongThomprovince.ThevillageofBotumLechislocatedalongalat-eriteroad;twelvekilometresfromthenationalroadthatconnectsKampongThomwithSiemReapthroughthetownofStoung.ThepagodaofBotumhassixsupport-ingvillages:BotumKaeut,BotumLech,KantongRong,PrumSrei,BosTaSaumandKantaueb(Figure6.12).

��u�� 6�� M�p �� h�� S��u�� w��h B��u� p��6�� M�p �� h�� S��u�� w��h B��u� p�� M�p �� h�� S��u�� w��h B��u� p�� M�p �� h�� S��u�� w��h B��u� p�� M�p �� h�� S��u�� w��h B��u� p��


TheoriginofthecommunitydevelopmentactivitiesofthePagodaofBotum,asre-memberedbyMs.BuonNormandMr.HangToy(Informant),goesbacktothebe-ginningofthe1950s.Theabbotofthattime,VenerableThengGna,afteraperiodofstudyinPhnomPenh,organisedin1952,oneyearbeforeCambodiagainedinde-pendencefromFrance,thePagodaAssociation(Samakum Vat)withthehelpof12achars.

Initspreamble,theoriginalstatutereads:

“WehavethehonourtocreateanassociationforthesakeofourBuddhistreligion,becausewethoughtthatthePagodaofBotumisashelterformonksandnoviceswhoendeavourtostudytheTripitaka[holyBuddhistscriptures,Buddhistcanonofscriptures].Thesestudieswillbecarriedoutwellwhentherewillbesatisfactorybuildings,asthesayinggoes‘theJoyoftheHabitat’.Todaythebuildingsofthepa-godaaredilapidated.WeBuddhistshavetheintentiontoconstructabuilding,butourmeansarequitelimited;wecouldonlycontribute‘onethousandRiel’.There-fore,wehavethehonourtoinviteallourfriendsofthecommunitybelongingtothePagodaofBotum,toconquertheirstinginessandtogiveacontribution,smallorbig,accordingtothepersonnelconvictiontobuildupcapitalforcredit.Wearecallingthisendeavour‘BuddhistAid’whichismeant,firstofall,toconstructtheVihear [sanctuary,sermonhall]ofthePagodaofBotum.Themeritsofthisreli-giouscontributionwillcertainlybeourfuturetreasurewhichwillaccompanyustopassthe‘cycleofreincarnations’towardsNirvana”.21

ThemainpurposeofthePagodaAssociationwastocontributetotheimprovementof the building in the pagoda compound. The original statute of the Pagoda As-sociationhas17articlesthatdescribethestructureoftheassociation,itsobjectives,andactivities.TheAssociationCommitteewascomprisedofapresidentandelevenadvisers,allacharsfromthepagodaandsurroundingvillages.Followingtradition,Venerable Theng Gna did not hold any position of responsibility. The associationworkedasacashassociation,providingcredit tocontributingmembers.Article3statesthat“thecapitalmustbegivenascredit,withinterest,andbealwaysinperma-nentcirculation”.Inordertoguaranteetheloans,Article6statesthat“intheactofgivingcredit,twowitnessesmustsignthedocument”andArticle7that“incaseofeventualrisks,thetwowitnessesmustreimbursetheamountborrowed”.

In1959, thePagodaAssociationhadsufficientcapital tostart theconstructionofaprimaryschoolnearthepagodacompound.Additionalfundswereprovidedbyvillagersthroughcontributionsincashandinkind.TheProvincialOfficeofEduca-tiondidnotprovideanycontribution.TheschoolinBotumpagodawasoneofonlythreeprimaryschoolsinthedistrictofStoung.22In1970,thewarreachedBotum,andby1972,theareacameunderKhmerRougecontrol.Peoplestoppedrepayingtheirloansandmakingcontributions,sotheassociationhadtosuspenditsactivities.

21 ForthefulltranslatedstatuterefertoAnnex5.22 TheotherswereinthevillagesofSamproachandKampongChanChun.


Atsomepoint,after1975,VenerableThengGnaandothermonkswerebroughttoKampongThomandhadtodisrobe,dressincivilianclothes,andworkedatcollec-tivefarmswiththeothervillagers.MoreoversincetheKhmerRougehadoutlawedallformsofassociations,theacharsofBotumpagodatooktheimportantdocumentsand statutes of the association and hid them in sealed bamboo sticks which wereburiedundertheirhouses.TheydugthemoutonlyaftertheendoftheKhmerRougerégimein1979.

AtthebeginningoftheVietnamesepresencein1979,ThengGnawentbacktothepagodaofBotumandbecamethechiefachar.Inthoseinitialyears,itproveddif-ficulttorestarttheassociationforthreemainreasons:thegovernmentdraftedalawthatestablishedsolidaritygroups(krom samaki)inchargeofcommunityactivitiesandreconstructionineveryvillage;peoplehadnomoneyandpaymentsweremadewithrice;fightingcontinuedandmadetheareaunsafeuntilthebeginningof1996.ThengGnaandtheachars managedtore-establishthePagodaAssociationon24thDecember1988.TheSchoolAssociationofBotumwasinauguratedonemonthlater,on28th January1989.Onthatday,aSchoolAssociationCommitteecomposedbysevenmemberswasnominatedand122peoplecontributedanaverageof53KHR(0,2USD)eachforatotalof6.449KHR(29,5USD)tosupportthecreationoftheini-tialcapital.AsecondcollectionofcontributionstookplacefourmonthslaterduringKhmerNewYearceremonies.Onthatoccasion,96peopleprovidedatotalof1.732KHR(8USD),whichwasaddedtotheassociation’scapital.Othercontributionswererecordeduntil1992,foratotalof13.940KHR(16USD).AsecondschoolAssociationlinkedtothepagodaofBotumwascreatedinthenearbyvillageofKantongRongon19thJanuary1992withaninitialcapitalof9.900KHR(11USD).Table6.7showstheincreaseintheassociations’capitalandinthenumberoffamiliesthathavereceivedloanssince1989.Thenumberofmembers/clientsofthetwoassociationsincreasedconsiderably in recent years to reach, in 2006, 678 individual members (with 369female)inBotumand462(with239female)inKantongRong.


T�� 6�7� C�p�� y ��upp�� h�� S�h�� A�� B��u� �� K�� R��*

Y�� C�p�� Av��

B��u� S�h��A��

�9896.449 KH�(29,5 USD)

8 -

�0045.678.100 KH�

(1.420 USD)80

70.976 KH�(18 USD)

�0066.663.800 KH�

(1.666 USD)136

48.998 KH�(12,25 USD)

K�� R�� S�h�� A��

�9899.900 KH�(11 USD)

10 -

�0043.222.000 KH�

(805 USD)26

123.923 KH�(31 USD)

�0064.137.300 KH�

(1.304 USD)96

43.097 KH�(13,58 USD)

Source:Pacococommittee(Personalcommunication).* In1989,theofficialinterbankexchangeratewas1USD=218KHR;in19921USD=895KHR.In

theperiod2003-2005theexchangeratehasbeenrelativelystableat1USD=4.000KHR(Source:Chinese University of Hong Kong, available at http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/exchange_rate_re-gime/index.php?cid=13).

TheoriginalstatuteoftheSchoolAssociationofBotumstatesthatthe“AssociationisestablishedtoeducateandencouragethememoryandconscienceoftheBuddha[and] strengthen the national culture and society in Botum and ensure sufficientschooling for our children”. In its Article 1, the association states that credits areprovidedforaperiodoffourmonthswithamonthlyinterestrateofsixpercent.TheAssociationprovidesloansinlinewiththecapacityofthedebtorstorepaythem(Ar-ticle2),anddecisionsconcerningloansarediscussedbytheAssociationCommittee(Article7).Articles3and4clarifythatonlypeoplelivinginBotumareentitledtorequestaloanandthattheyrequirethesignatureoftwowitnessestoguaranteeit.Committeemembersarenotentitledtousetheassociationmoneyforpersonalrea-sons(Article6).Althoughtheloansprovidedbytheassociationsarenormallyverysmall, their repayment with interest has allowed the associations’ capital to growduringtheseyears.Asshownintable6.8,thishasalsoallowedincreasingthenum-beroffamiliesthatreceiveloans.Inaddition,theSchoolAssociationofBotumhasbeenabletosupporttheprimaryschoolinbuyingnewtablesandchairsforstudentsandrepairingwallsandbookshelves(Informant).

Currently,inadditiontothetwoSchoolAssociations,inthepagodaofBotumarealsoactiveacashassociationandariceassociation.ThisistheresultoftheassistanceprovidedbyGTZsince1995.


6.3.2 Strong or weak bridges?

The experience of Botum confirms that under a committed leadership, pagodasrepresentthespacewherecommunityselfhelpinitiativescanstartanddevelop.Inthisrespect,astudyofcommunityinitiativeslinkedtopagodasinKampongThomconductedbyNarakSovann(2000)found29differenttypesofassociationsinthe203pagodasoftheprovince.23Thereseems,therefore,tobeastronglinkbetweenpagodasandassociations.If theabbotis involvedinsocialdevelopmentactivities,thenthelinkbecomesevenstronger.TheleadingroleofVenerableThengGnabeforeandafterthewarisstillvividinthememoriesofvillagersaroundthepagodaofBo-tum.AnotherexamplecomesfromthedistrictofKampongSvay,whereVenerableLyKom,abbotofthepagodaofVoyYev,mentionedthathehasbeendirectlyinvolvedinthefundraisingofcommunitycontributionsfortheconstructionofthepagodapri-maryschool.Communitycontributionshavetotalled4.000.000KHR(1.000USD),representing10percentofthetotalbudget.Heremembersthatmostvillagers,eventheoneswithoutchildrenintheschool,contributedbetween500KHR(0,10USD)and5.000KHR(1,20USD)(Pellini2005a).24

AfurtherexamplecomesfromthepagodaofDonLaoinStoungdistrict.HereVenerableSeikChhengNgorn,whois46yearsoldandactsasabbot,saidthathisdecisiontostartsocialdevelopmentactivities inhispagodacameafterhe learnedthatbeforethebeginningofthecivilwarin1970,therewasagroupsimilartoacashassociationactive in thepagoda.Todayanumberofassociationsareactive in thepagoda.

SangkorPrimarySchool,inthecommuneofSangkor,districtofKampongSvay,representsanotherexampleofthelinkbetweenpagodaandcommunityinitiatives.25SomeoftheelderlymembersoftheAssociationCommitteementionedthataSchoolAssociations providing small cash credits was already active during the Sangkumperiod(i.e.1960s)(Informant).Today,outofthenineschoolsoftheSangkorcluster(onecore+eightsatellites),sixhaveaSchoolAssociation.TheSangkorSchoolAs-sociation,basedatthecluster’scoreschool,startedtosupportconstructionactivitiesintheschool.TheAssociationCommitteeiscomprisedofsevenmemberswhoco-ordinatethepeople’scontributionsandcreditsactivities.Thecommitteealsoadvo-catesontheuseoftheassociation’scapitaltosupporttheimprovementoftheschoolthroughrepairoftheschoolfence,thegardenandenvironment,andtheacquisition

23 Forafulllistoftheassociations,seeAnnex624 VenerableLyKomdisrobed in2005andreturnedtocivilian life.Hecontinues toworkas

directorofalocalCNGO,BuddhistforDevelopmentKampongThom(BFDK)whichhees-tablishedinthepagodaofVoyYev,wherehewastheheadmonk.

25 SangkorPrimarySchoolislocatedinthedistrictofKampongSvay,andisthecoreschooloftheclusterthesamenameandcompriseseightsatelliteschoolsforatotalof2.881students.Twoschoolsoftheclusterareinapagodacompound(MoEYS2005b).


ofpaperortablesandchairs.Onehundredandsixteenfamiliesaremembersoftheassociationandprovidetheircontributionstotheassociation’sactivities.Oneprob-lem inSangkor is thehighdropout rateof children frompoor families.For thisreason,aPoorStudentAssociationhasbeenestablishedin2003.Thestatuteofthissecondassociationstatesthat:

“ThechiefofKampongSvaydistrictandthemonkandchiefofSangkorPagoda,thenuns’associationcommitteeofSangkorPagodaandtheSchoolAssociationcooperatedwiththedirectorofSangkorSchoolandhaveestablishedanassocia-tionnamed:Poor Children and Orphans Saving Association.Theaimof theas-sociationistoprovidecreditstoovercomethedifficultiesofpoorstudents,chil-drenwithnosourcesofassistance,suchasorphanswhocannotgotoschoolortheycangobutaresopoorthattheylackclothes,studyingmaterials,etc.andtoencourageparentstourgealloftheirchildrentogotoschoolandtoparticipateagainstmoreilliteracyintheircommunity”.26

Whenaskedthereasonoftheestablishmentofanewassociationwhileonewasal-readyinplace,thecommitteemembersansweredthatasecondassociationwascon-sidered necessary as the capital of the School Association was not sufficient. Theestablishmentof anewassociationalsogave theopportunity toorganiseapublicceremonyinthepagodaofSangkorthatresultedinthecollectionof800.000KHR(200USD)inadditionto400.000KHR(100USD)fromthePagodaCommittee.In2004,13studentsreceivedsupporttobuyuniforms,books,pens,andothermateri-als.Theaimoftheassociationistoincreasethisnumberto20.

Theseexamplesshowthatassociationsaresetupwithaspecifictaskandobjec-tive.Mostofthemareactiveinprovidingsmallcreditsanddonotshowagreatde-greeofcooperationwithotherassociations.Theexperiencesfromthepagodasshowalsothat,withtime,thenumberofassociationscanincrease.Buttowhatextentaretheylikedwitheachother?

InthecaseofthepagodaofDonLao,theassociationmapshowsthatlinkshavedifferentlevelofstrength.27ParticularlystrongarethelinksbetweenassociationsthatfulfilreligiousfunctionsunderthePagodaCommitteesuchastheNunsAssociationortheElderlyAssociation.CashandRiceAssociationsarealsoquiteactiveduetothepresenceandsupportfromCBRDP.MorelooseisthelinkwithotherkindsofassociationssuchastheDishandPotsAssociations.28NotableforitsabsenceinthemapistheSchoolAssociationwhich,asconfirmedbyVenerableSeikChhengNgorn,

26 TranslationbySarinSamphors.27 SeesocialmapinAnnex7.28 DishandPotAssociationslenddishesandpotstovillagerswhoorganiseaceremony.Theas-

sociationhasnormallyonecommitteememberresponsibleformanaginglending,verifyingthatalldishesandpotsarereturned,requestmoneyfromtheborrowertorepaybrokenitems(NarakSovann2000).


existsandsupportstheprimaryschoolofthepagoda,buthasnolinkswiththeotherassociations.

Thedatacollectedthroughthechecklistprovidesamixedpictureaboutexchang-esbetweenSchoolAssociationsandother traditional associations.Though,meet-ingsofSchoolAssociationcommitteesareopentothepublicfor63,3percentoftherespondents, one third (or 36,7 per cent) of them consider these meetings closed.Meetings,asshowninthetable6.8,areannouncedtothecommunityinanumberofways.ThepreferredchannelsarethroughtheVillageChief(20,5percent)orbywordofmouthinthecommunityorvillage(20,5percent).

T�� 6�8� A��u�� S�h�� A�� h�� u��y

ANNOUNCEMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Village C��ief 20,5 % Village meeting 2,6 %

T��roug�� community members 20,5 % Announcement during ceremony 2,6 %

Students 10,3 % Sc��ool Su��ort Committee 2,6 %

Louds�eaker 7,7 % Teac��er 2,6 %

Invitation letter 7,7 % Don’t know 23,1 %

N=39

Itisnotclearfromtheanswerstothechecklistwhetherothercommunitymemberstake part in the meetings. Fifty-three per cent of the respondents mentioned thatothercommunitymembersattendthemeetings,while47percentrepliednegativelyorthattheydonotknow.Thisisalsoasignthattheexchangewithotherassociationsissomewhatlimited.ThiswasconfirmedbyobservationsinKampongThom,whereitwasevidentthatacharsandmembersofthePagodaCommitteemeetoftenandinformallyinthepagodaandthatatofficialorpublicmeetings,theytendtowearonehat,representingoneassociationoroneroleatatime.

InKampongThom,GTZhasworkedsince1995toestablishstrongerbridgesbe-tweentheassociations.Between1995and1997,GTZhadcontributed50percentofthestart-upcapitalof22newassociationsin10pagodasforatotalof9.200USDand81,300kgofrice(Sasse1998,Aschmoneitetal.1996).Therapidincreaseinthenum-berofassociationsledtherepresentativesfrom17pagodastomeet,in1997,atPreahNeang pagoda in Stoung to establish Pacoco (see also the description on ChapterFive,section5.1).29

29 Pagodaassociationcoordinationcommittee.InKhmer,Kanakammakar Somropsomroul Sa-makom Svayuphatham.


TheobjectiveofPacocoisclearlystatedinitsstatute:

“tofacilitate/coordinatetheworkofclusterassociations,relationshipstothevil-lagers,andrelationshipsamongeachother,andtolinktooutsidesupportingor-ganizations/institutionsand/orpersons”(Pacoco1997).

In2003,Pacocorepresentedatotalof94associations,includingcash,riceandSchoolAssociationsinthedistrictofStoung(Table6.9),foratotalof7.026householdsassmallcreditsbeneficiariesasshownintable6.10.Pacocowasinitiallyformedbysev-enelectedmembers.In2004thenumberwasincreasedto11tobetterlinkwiththe13CommuneCouncilsinthedistrictofStoung.Electionsareheldeverytwoyears,butsince1997littlehaschangedasthecommitteemembersareusuallyreconfirmed,inlinewithCambodiantraditions,intheirpositions.

AstudybyWarthon(2003)concludedthatPacocomembers“haveastrongfeel-ingforabottom-upapproachtolocalgovernanceanddevelopmentandoftheirrightandresponsibilitytoparticipate”(p.4).Atthesametimeitisimportanttohighlightthemainweaknessesofthecommittee,whichincludelimitedcooperationbetweenassociations, limited dissemination of information to associations they represent(cash, rice, andschool), and limitedawarenessabout thebenefitsof linkingmorecloselytodifferentassociationsandbreakingtheperceptionthatallassociationscanonlycontributematerialstolocaldevelopment.

Theselimitationsarelinkedtothecapacityandeducationallevelofthemembersandtotraditionalnormsthatshapeleadership.Ageandexperienceareparamount,

��u�� 6�� P�� w��h �w� �� GT�� PDRD6�� P�� w��h �w� �� GT�� PDRD�� P�� w��h �w� �� GT�� PDRD�� P�� w��h �w� �� GT�� PDRD� P�� w��h �w� �� GT�� PDRD


whichcanresult ina lowerperceptionof the importanceof transparencyandac-countabilityandthebenefitsfromincreasingnetworkingandthetransferofknowl-edgetoyoungerpeople(Warthon2003).Nevertheless,PagodaCommitteesandAs-sociationsarepowerfulinstrumentstoreachcommunities(Aschmoneitetal.1997,Sasse1998).Theirsustainabilityislinkedtothefactthat“theirownpurpose,man-agementandfundingarebasedinthecommunity,and[therefore]thesegroupsareoftenmoretrustedandmorereliablethannewlycreatedgroupsduetothefactthatcommitteemembersworkprimarilyformeritandnotforprofit”(p.118).Thetradi-tionalstructuresareprobably“thelargestandmostsolidcomponentofCambodiancivilsociety”(Gyallay-Pap2003:34),yettheyhavereceivedlittleornorecognitionbystateagenciesandinternationalorganisationsinCambodia,whooftenconsiderthehundredsofCNGOstheysupportasbeingthelegitimaterepresentativesofcivilsociety(ibid.).

T�� 6�9� A�� p�� y P�� 00�

C��h A�� N�In �agoda 29In villages 25

54R�� N�

In �agoda 14In villages 24

�8S�h�� A�� N�

In Pagoda 2GRAND TOTAL 94

Source:CBRDPmonitoringdata,Pellini2004.

T�� 6��0� A��’ �� 00�

RICE C�p�� (K�) H�u��h��38 343.148 2.154

Avg. ca�ital 9.030CASH C�p�� (KHR) H�u��h��

54 367.022.631 4.766Avg. ca�ital 6.796.715

SCHOOL C�p�� (KHR) H�u��h��2 8.900.100 106

Avg. ca�ital 4.450.050

Source:CBRDPmonitoringdata,Pellini2004.


6.4 Institutional social ca�ital: links between communities, sc��ools and �ublic institutions

Thethirdsocialcapitaldimensiontobeexploredis‘institutionalsocialcapital’,thatistheverticallinksbetweenschoolsandassociationsand,aftertheelectionofFeb-ruary2002,CommuneCouncils.Indoingso,thissectionfocusesonthreepoints:thesupportprovidedbytheassociationstoschools,thenatureofdecisionmakingprocesses,andtheroleofCommuneCouncils.

6.4.1 C��aracteristics of associations’ su��ort to sc��ools

TheMoEYSClusterSchools’Guidelinesdescribeclustersas“openanddemocraticforums[that]allowalsoadeeperinvolvementofcommunitiesasimportantpartyasteacherandschoolprincipals”(MoEYS2000a:5).TheMoEYSthenaddsthat“overthepastyeartheRoyalGovernmentofCambodiahastrieditsutmosttoachievethegoalofguaranteeingtoeverychildaccesstoeducationandqualitylearning.How-everhardtheGovernmenthastried,ithasnotbeenabletoreachthissetgoal.Thisisduetotheinadequateparticipationofthecommunity”(ibid.).

Thisemphasisonpoorcommunityparticipation is surprising for tworeasons.Firstofall,itseemstoignorethefactthathouseholdsprovidemostoftheresourcesforeducation.AstudyconductedbyBrayin1999foundthatinvariousforms,fami-lies provide 77 per cent of the combined resources of household and governmentexpendituresforprimaryeducation.Althoughthepercentageisnowdownto56percent, therelianceofeducationonprivatefundsfromfamiliesandcommunities isstillhigh(Bray1999,BrayandSengBunly2005).Secondly,asnotedbytworespon-dents,whileitistruethatcommunityparticipationcouldbestronger,thestatementfrom the Ministry “puts too much responsibility on community themselves” and“callstoclarifywhatcommunityinvolvementmeans”(Informant).

TheinformantstotheSchoolAssociationschecklistrankedthefollowingthreefunctionsastheirmainprioritiesinsupportingschools:

1. Collectandmanagecommunityfundsforschoolimprovement,repair,andmainte-nance

2. Discuss with teachers about problems such as repetition, drop outs, children withlearningdifficulties

3. Monitortheuseofschoolbudgetandcommunitycontributions

Materialcontributionsarethereforethemainformofsupportprovidedbyassocia-tions to schools. This was also confirmed by a numberof informants.30 A school

30 Severalinformantspointedoutthisissue,N.23,25,26,28,31,32,33,34,51,54,55,and57.


teacher,forexample,mentionedthat“SchoolAssociationsandschoolsmeettwoorthreetimesayear toplantheconstructionandrepairof theschool”(Informant).InterviewsinKandalprovincealsoshowedthatmaterialcontributionsarethemainissuesinthedialoguebetweenassociationsandschoolsandthatthediscussionaboutchildrenwhoareatriskofdroppingoutcomesnext.31Otherstudieshavealsocon-firmedthis.Asanexample,KampucheaActionforPrimaryEducation(KAPE),aCNGO,conductedasurveyin14clustersinKampongChamprovince,concludingwasthatmaterialcontributionsconstitutethemainsupportthatcommunitiespro-videtoschools(ÓLoisingh2001).

ThechecklistusedinKampongThomincludedamultiplechoicequestiononthekindofcontributionsprovidedtoschoolwhichincludedmoney,theorganizationofschoolceremoniestocollectfunds,labour,materials,andideas.32Mostoftheasso-ciationsprovidedallfivekindsofcontributions,whileonlythreepercentprovidedjustone(Figure6.14).

31 InformantsN.23,25,26,28,31,32,33,34,51,54,55,and57.32 ThislastpointwasbroughttomyattentionbyMr.SarinSamphor,thetranslatorhiredtocon-

ductthechecklist.Informantssuggestedincludingitinthequestionnaire,thoughafurtheranalysisshoulddeterminewhichideasaresuggestedbyassociationsandifthesearetakenupbyschoolsandputintopractice.

��u�� 6��4� D��u�� u�� u�� p��v�� y S�h�� A��

1 ty�e ofcontribution

3 % 2 ty�es ofcontributions

14 %

3 ty�es ofcontributions

24 %


31 %


28 %

N=�9


Thisindicatesthatwhenassociationsareactive,theytendtosupporttheschoolinanumberofways.Money,labour,andtheorganizationofceremonies,arethemainformsofcontributions(Figure6.15).

Among material contributions, teaching aid materials (i.e. rulers, compass, paper,etc.–Personalcommunication),arethemostfrequentlyprovidedsupporttoschools.Moneyandtheprovisionoflandfollowinthelist(Figure6.16).

Althoughsupportforteachingmaterialsisprovided,teachingitselfisnotatopicofdiscussionbetweenassociationsandschools.Ateachermentionedthat“thereisnotadiscussionaboutteachingbetweenthepeopleandteachers.Parentsjustsendthekidstoschoolandasktheteachertotakecareofthem”(Informant).Thisatti-tude,asmentionedbyaninternationaladvisor,isconsistentwithCambodiantradi-tions and is also present in Cambodian communities leaving abroad: “Cambodiaparentsdonotgetinvolvedatallbecausetheyhavetheperceptionthattheteachersknoweverything”(Informant).TheleadersoftheSchoolAssociationofBotumandKontroungconfirmedthatbesidescontributions,thereisverylittlecommunicationbetweenparentsandteachers(Informants).Occasionallytherearemeetingstodis-cussthecaseofchildrenwhoareatriskofdropout,whichindicatestheimportanceattributedtotheproblemofpoorfamilieswhocannotsendtheirchildrentoschool(ibid.).33 The results from the checklist support information from the interviews,

33 Ontheawarenessoftheimportancethateducationhasfortheirchildrenandthereluctancetogetinvolvedindiscussionsthatareperceivedtobethemainresponsibilityoftheteachers,seealsoOvensenetal.(1996)andO’LearyandMeanNee(2001).

��u�� 6��5� Typ�� u��y ��u�� h��

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

No No No

No

No

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Money Labour Sc��oolceremony

Material IdeasN = 30


showingthatschool infrastructureandstudentsare themaintopicsofdiscussionbetweenassociationsandschoolstaff(Figure6.17).

WhileSchoolAssociationsandschoolstaffdomeet.Theresultsfromthecheck-listinfigure6.18,showthatjust30percentofinformantsmentionedthattheyhavemonthlymeetingswithschoolstaff,followedbya26percentwhomentionthattheirpreferredoptionistwiceperyears.

This suggests that the dialogue between associations and schools is driven byschooldemandsformaterialsupport,apatternthat,accordingtoBredenberg(2002),hasbeenpresentsincetheearlystagesofclusterschooldevelopmentwhencommuni-tiesweresuccessfullyinvolvedasasourceoflocalcontributionsforconstructionandmaintenanceof schoolbuildings.However, “the relationshipbetween schools andcommunitiesremainsloose”(Informant).Thislimitsopportunitiesformoreinclu-siveparticipationandisperceivedasaconstraintbythechecklistrespondentswhoindicatedthatparents’limitedinvolvementinstudents’learningisthemostimpor-tantproblemforcommunityparticipation,followedbylimitedinteractionbetweenparentsandteachers(Table6.11).34

34 Astudyontheperceptionofparticipation,conductedin2004byRTIInternationalin4prov-incesandPhnomPenhforatotalof247interviews,foundthat60percentofthemneverat-tendedameetingwithschoolstaff.However,95percentoftheparentswhodidattendmeet-ings“thoughtthattheirparticipationinschoolmeetingshasimprovedtheirchild’seducationorhelpedmaketheireducationmorerelevant(CBEP2004:21).

��u�� 6��6� Typ�� u�� p��v�� w��

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Ot��e

rs

Build

ing

Furn

iture

Sc��o

ol fen

ce

Land

Mon

ey

Teac

��ing m

ater

ial

%

30,3

20,218,2

17,2

6,1 6,1

2,0

N=99


��u�� 6��7� D��u�� p�� w�� S�h�� A�� h��

N=7�

Students40 %

Sc��ool�lanning andmonitoring

8 %

Teac��er andteac��ing

5 % Associationmanagement

7 %

Sc��oolinfrastructures

40 %

��u�� 6��8� ��qu��y �� w�� S�h�� A�� h��

��

N=30

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Mon

t��ly

Twice

�er y

ear

Four

tim

es �e

r yea

r

Once

�er y

ear

Six ti

mes

�er y

ear

T��re

e tim

es �e

r yea

r

W��e

n nee

ded

Ofte

n

30,0

26,6

13,3

10,0

6,7 6,7

3,3 3,3


T�� 6�� P�� u��y p��p�� h�� v��

��Parent’s are not involved in c��ild learning 33,3No regular meetings between �arents and teac��ers 30,0Community is �oor 16,7Too many committees at village level and no time for �artici�ation 10,0Low education in families 6,7Community does not �artici�ate in sc��ool construction 3,3

N=30

Atthepolicylevel,MoEYSofficialsareawarethatcommunitiescanplayarolebuthavenotyetclarifiedsufficientlythepossiblerolesofcommunitiesintheeducationsystem.Theministerialguidelinestrytoimprovethissituationprescribing,forex-ample,outreachactivities todisseminate informationabout schoolplans (MoEYS2000a).Furthermore,therenationalguidelinesprovidealsoinstructiononthefor-mationofcommitteesandsubcommitteesthataimatimprovingschoolgovernancebyencouragingteachers toperformtheir jobwellor tomobilizecommunities forconstructionandschoolrepairs.35Neverthelessitisnotcertainwhetherthesecom-mitteesareoperational(Informant).

There are, however, some examples of more inclusive participation that wereencounteredduringtheresearchperiod.Theseareexamplesofalternativeanddy-namicspacesforparticipationcreatedbypilotprojectsintroducedbyinternationalNGOs and CNGOs in Kampong Thom and other provinces. The School EcoclubestablishedintheprovincesofKampongSpeuandKampongThombytheCNGOMlupBaitong,representsanexampleofthepossiblelinkbetweencommunitiesandschoolthroughextracurriculaactivities.Theobjectiveoftheprojectistoimprovetheschooleco-systemandtoincreasetheenvironmentalawarenessofthecommuni-tyandotherstakeholders.SchoolEcoclubsarestudentsgroups(about30)thatmeetatleastonceaweektolearnaboutenvironmentalconservationandtoaddressenvi-ronmentalproblemsinandaroundtheirschoolwithactivitiessuchas:treeplanting,composting,wastecollection,etc.(InformantinPellini2005).

AnotherexampleistheLifeSkillsProgramme implementedinselectedclustersinKampongChamprovincebytheCNGOKAPE,withfundingfromUNICEF/SIDA.Theprogramme“seekstoempowerchildrentochoosewhattheywishtolearnwiththeobjectivetoprovideanopportunityforthecommunitytoparticipateinthelearn-ingofchildren”(KAPE2002:1).Theprojecthelpsthechildrentoselectaskillthey

35 Asseeninsection6.2.1,theMoEYSguidelinesdefineforeachclustervariouscommittees:Lo-calClusterSchollCommittee,ClusterSchoolCouncil,AdministrativeSubcommittee,Tech-nical subcommittee, Community subcommittee, Cluster School Resource Centre, DistrictClusterSchoolCouncil,DistrictClusterSchoolCommittee,andProvincialClusterSchoolCouncil(MoEYS2000a).


wanttolearnfromamongalistofavailableskillsinthecommunity,andtonomi-nate a ‘community teacher’ they wish to teach them. Skills include bicycle repair,vegetablegrowing,markettrading,bakingbreadandcakes,make-upforweddingguests, sugar-making, teaching, first aid, tailoring, playing music, chicken rising,andhair-dressing(KAPE2002,Pellini2005).KAPEexperiencewiththeLifeSkillsProgrammehasattractedtheattentionofotherdonorsandisnowbeingfundedbytheUSAid(Personalcommunication).KAPE’sLifeSkillsProgrammehasalsobeenthebasisfortheNationalLifeSkillsPolicywhichtheCambodiangovernmenthasadoptedintheeducationsector.Lifeskillsarenowincludedinthenationalcurricu-lum,althoughtheMoEYSitselfasyettodemonstrated,besidesencouragingdonorsandNGOsinputtingresources,onhowtoactivelysupporttheprovisionatschoollevel (ibid.). An additional example from KAPE refers to the School Associationsthathavebeenstartedin2003.TheseSchoolAssociationsareformedby15childrenelectedamongthestudentsofaschool,who,underthesupervisionofavolunteerteacherandacommunitymember,willtrytomaketheschoolmorechildrenfriend-ly(InformantinPellini2005).

Kosonen(2005), inhisstudyofvernacular literacyforbasiceducationinthreeSoutheastAsiancountries,withregardtoCambodiadescribesthesuccessfulexpe-rience of the introduction of vernacular as the language of literacy and media ofinstructionintheEasternhighlandsprovincesofMondulkiriandRatanakiri.36PilotprojectsinitiatedbysomeinternationalNGOshaveshownthatthesuccessfuladop-tionofvernacularsisalsoduetothemajorroleplayedbyindigenousminoritycom-munities.Languagecommittees’havebeencrucialinlanguagedevelopment,curric-ulumdevelopment,theproductionoflearningmaterialsinthevernaculars,aswellasprovidingvolunteersteachers.Additionalelementsarecommunitygovernanceofprojectschools,theemploymentofindigenousstaffwhospeakthevernacular,andactiveparticipationofthelocalcommunitiesincurriculumdevelopment.Thisexpe-rienceshowsthatcommunitiescanhaveanactiveroleineducationalmatters.

6.4.2 Decision making and trust

“Wedonottrusttheteacher;theassociations’memberstrustmorePacocoandthe[pagoda]committee”(Informant).Thesewordsbyacommunityleaderinvolvedinseveralassociationssummarisedthefeelingaswellasthegapthatcanseparatecom-munitiesandschools.Themainreasonforthetensionseemstobethelackoftrans-parencyintheuseoffunds:“theuseoflocalcontributionsisnormallymonitoredbyteachersandassociationsmembers,butlastyear[i.e.2004]theteacherrequestedsupporttobuymaterialtobuildafencearoundtheschool.Untilnow,nofencehas

36 VernacularssuchasBrao,Krung,MnongandTampuanspokenbyethnicminorities.


beenbuilt.Therefore,wewillnowinvolvetheCommuneChieftoasktheteachertoclarifyabouttheuseofthemoneyweprovided”(ibid.).

This individual testimony,althoughit isbasedonapersonalexperience,high-lightstworelevantpoints:theimportanceoftrustforthelinkbetweenassociationsandschoolsandtherolethatCommuneCouncilsmaybeaskedtoplayineducation.Thissectiondealswiththefirstpoint,whilethesecondisaddressedin6.4.3.

One respondent mentioned that the link between school and community ismarkedbya“generalisedfeelingofdistrustpartlylinkedtothelimitedtransparencyintheuseoffundsbytheschool”(Informant).Thedisseminationofideasofdecen-tralisationandgoodgovernancehave increasedtheawarenessatcommunity levelabouttransparencyandaccountability.Thisisparticularlyrelevant,sinceeducationturnedouttobeconsideredthemostcorruptsectorafterthejudiciaryinastudybytheCentreforSocialDevelopment(Nissen2005).37Accordingtothisstudy,53percentofthetotalyearlyamountspentonbribesbyhouseholdsgoestoeducation.38Thestudyarguedthattheimpactofbribesisnotonlyfinancial; italsoaffectsthewaypeopleperceiveeducation,thedecisionaboutwhetherornottosendchildrentoschool,andthewillingnessofindividualtomakecontributionstoSchoolAsso-ciations.Ironically,astudybyTheAsiaFoundation(2003)foundthatteachersarethemosttrustedpublicofficials.39Seventypercentofthechecklistrespondentsalsoexpressedtheirtrustforteachersandschoolmasters.

Official meetings are spaces where transparency and accountability are tested.Seventy-threepercentoftheassociationsconfirmtheirparticipationintheannualPAP planning meetings (though still 27 per cent of the respondents do not or donotknowwhatthesemeetingsare).ThreequartersoftherespondentshaveattendedmeetingsoftheLocalClusterSchoolCommitteewheretheydidaskquestionsandmoreoftenthannotreceivedanswers(63percent).Whileassociationsareawareoftheimportanceoftransparencyandrequireitfromschools,theirownaccountabilityandtransparencycouldbestronger.Fiftypercentofthechecklistrespondentssaythattheirassociationdoesnotprepareandactivityreport.

37 ThesurveycoveredallprovincesofCambodiawithatotalnumberof2.000questionnairerespondents,60semi-structuredinterviewinformants,fieldobservationsandtwopublicfo-rumswithatotalof251participants.

38 Paymentsaremadeforenrolment,examinationsandtests,snacksanddrinks,privateclassesinthesameschoolwiththesameteacher.Thetotalannualsumofofficialpayments:RemoteRuralAreas:34USD,AccessibleRuralAreas:46USD,UrbanAreas178USD.Totalsumofbribes:RemoteRuralAreas:3USD,AccessibleRuralAreas6USD,UrbanAreas44,5USD.Itisimportanttonotethat85percentofthepopulationlivesinruralareasandthat9/10ofthe36percentofthepopulationthatlivesunderthenationalpovertyline(0.50USD/day)isintheruralareas(Nissen2005).

39 Followed by national assembly representatives, Commune Chief, and doctors in hospitals.Prosecutorsandjudgesareatthebottomofthelistofsixprofessionalcategories.Thetrusttowardsteachermaybeexplainedbythefactthatfamiliesrecognisethattheextremelylowsalariesofteachers(25USDpermonth)maketherequestsforbribesalmostinevitable.


6.4.3 Commune Councils

AccordingtoTurner(2002a),Cambodiaisanexampleofa‘piecemealapproach’ todecentralisation, with different decentralisation reforms taking place at the sametime in different sectors. Chapter Four showed that deconcentration of educationstartedin1993withschoolclustersandcontinuestodaywiththePAP.Atthesametime,CommuneCouncilswereelectedforthefirsttimein2002andrepresenttheheartoftheRoyalGovernmentofCambodia’sdecentralisationreforms.

AccordingtotheLAMC(RGC2001),Communesareresponsibleforlocaldevel-opmentandlocaldevelopmentplanningbutnothingspecificissaidabouteducation.Schools, in fact,prepare theirownplans followingPAPand/orclusterguidelines.Bothplanningprocesses(Communesandschools)havetoinvolvecommunitypar-ticipation,andcommunityandassociationleaders,whoarelikelytoparticipateinboth.

Onerespondentrecalledaninter-ministerialmeetingheldinPhnomPenhin2001todiscuss,amongotherissues,howtoinvolveMoEYSinthemaindecentralisationreform.ThepositionofMoEYSatthattimewasclear.TheMinistryhadnointentiontodevolveany responsibility toCommunesbecause they though thatCommunescouldnotdobetterthantheycoulddoandbecausetheeducationsectoralreadyhadsystemsinplace(i.e.schoolclusters)(Informant).ThepositionofMoEYSistodaymoreopenandreflectstherealityatthelocallevel.ThedatafromKampongThomontheannualCommuneInvestmentPlanningprocessshowsthatCommunesdeal,atleastintheplanning,withsomeaspectsofeducationandschoolingandthatedu-cationisperceivedbyvillagersaspartofoveralllocaldevelopment.

Asanexample,the2004CommuneInvestmentPlansforKampongThomrelatedto1.816projectsprioritisedinthe81Communesoftheprovince.40Sevenpercentoftheseprojectswererelatedtoeducationandrepresented21percentofallsocialdevelopmentprojectsforthatyear(120outof563)(PRDC2004).Construction,notsurprisingly,representsthemainfocusforprojectsinthefieldofeducation(Figure6.19).

40 TheCommuneInvestmentPlanning(CIP)isayearlyplanningexercisethatstartsatthevil-lageswithanassessmentofthecurrentlevelofdevelopmentandofthemostpressingeco-nomic,environmental, institutional,andsocialdevelopment issues.Iteventuallyresults intheformulationofaCommuneDevelopmentPlan(RGC2002a).


Thisreflectsnotonlythepreferenceforinfrastructureprojectsintheearlystagesofdecentralisationreforms(Manor1999),butalso isconsistentwith theresultspre-sentedinsection6.4.1andthepreferenceformaterialsupportprovidedtoschools.Meetingsbetweenschools,Communemembersandassociationsdotakeplace.41OnerespondentfromKandalprovincementioned,forexample,thattheyearlyplanninginclustersnormallyinvolvestheCommuneChief,VillageChief,andacommunityrepresentative,whoisoftenanelderlymemberofthePagodaCommitteeoraSchoolAssociation(Informant).However,asnotedbytworespondents,thisparticipationisnotalwaysproactiveandcommunitymembersseemtoattendtheplanningmeetingsmostlybecausetheyaretoldtodoso(Informant).

An additional opportunity for community members to link with CommuneCouncilsontheissueofeducationisthemonthlypublicmeetingthateachCouncilisrequiredtoholdbylaw.Thoughparticipationatthesemeetingsisfarfromideal,therespondentsfromKampongThomrepliedthatthemaintopicofdiscussionisre-queststotheCommuneCounciltosupportchildrenatriskofdroppingoutofschool.Aprimaryschoolteacher,forexample,mentionedthatthe“CommuneCouncilhelpstomobilizepeopletosendthekidstoschoolbymeetingtheVillageChiefandtellinghimorhertomeetwiththefamilieswhoarefacingdifficultiesorkeeptheirkidsathome”(Informant).

41 ObservationsN.10,11,12,13,and14.

��u�� 6��9� D��u�� u��-�� p��j�� C��u�� P��y A��v��y ��x6��9� D��u�� u��-�� p��j�� C��u�� P��y A��v��y ��x��9� D��u�� u��-�� p��j�� C��u�� P��y A��v��y ��x�9� D��u�� u��-�� p��j�� C��u�� P��y A��v��y ��x� D��u�� u��-�� p��j�� C��u�� P��y A��v��y ��x K��p�� Th�� 004 (P�DC 2004)

Studentassistance

11 %

Training28 %

Construction61 %

N=120


TheCambodianGovernmentisawareofthechangingrealityandhasconductedsomeinitialstudiestoexploretheopportunitiesaswellastheconstraintsforgreaterinvolvementofCommuneCouncilsineducation.42Moreover,aftertheCommuneCouncilelections,CommuneChiefsbecamemembersoftheLocalClusterSchoolCouncilsand,atthesametime,membersoftheCommuneEducationforAllCom-mittees.AccordingtoLosertandCoren(2004),thetwocommitteesseemtosharesimilarobjectives,butnocooperationisapparentlyplannedbetweenthem.Inaddi-tion,thesecommitteesseemtoexistmoreonpaperthaninreality(Informant).Anadditionalproblem,intermsofattributingresponsibilities,isthatthepublicadmin-istrationsystemandeducationdonotmatchwithclustersandcommuneshavingdifferentbordersandclustersbeingsituated inbetween thedistrictand thecom-munelevel(seefigure4.3insection4.2.1).

In Kampong Thom, the Village Networks experience of CBRDP represents anexample for building bridges between associations and, at the same time, linkingthemwithCommuneCouncils.AsmentionedinChapterFive(Section5.1),themainrationaleoftheVillageNetworksistoidentifyactiveindividualsorgroupsatthevil-lagelevel,bringingthemtogetherinaninformalgrouptolinkthemwiththeCom-muneCouncilwhile,atthesametime,identifyingwaysfortheCommuneCouncilstosupportthedifferentgroups(Figure6.20).

VillageNetworksareformed,onaverage,byfiveelectedmembers.Onceelect-ed,themembersareprovidedwithtrainingwhichfamiliarisesthemwiththebasicconceptofdecentralisation,theroleandfunctionsoftheCommuneCouncils,par-ticipation incommunemeetings, theannualplanningprocess,andconflictman-agement. Reflection workshops, during the second year of operation, provide theNetworkmemberswiththeopportunitytodiscusstheirexperiencesinparticipatingin Commune Councils activities, the problems they have faced, and ideas for thefuture. (ibid.).43 Initially, training toVillageNetworkmembershasbeenprovidedbythestaffoffourCNGOsfromKampongThomcooperatingwithCBRDP,whilethecommunitydevelopmentfacilitatorsofPDRDbegantoconductthesecapacitydevelopmentalactivitiesonlyin2005.

42 AnexampleofstudiesconductedbyMoEYS,whichincludealsoananalysisoftheroleoftheCommuneCouncils, isBredenbergandRatcliffe (2002).TheMinistryof InteriorhasalsoconductedastudywithsupportfromGTZonthistopic(LosertandCoren2004).ItshouldalsobenotedthattheOrganicLaw,tobevotedin2007,isexpectedtoincreasetheinvolve-mentofsectorministriesinthedecentralisationprocess.

43 The first53VillageNetworks (228members)wereestablished in2003with facilitationbyfour local CNGOs. In 2004 and 2005, the approach was expanded to 43 and 92 new Vil-lageNetworksrespectively(about675members).CooperationbetweenCNGOsandPDRDalso improved. For more detailed description and analysis on Village Networks see Ayres(2003),Knightetal.(2005),PelliniandAyres(2005),Ayresetal.(2006),andPelliniandAyres(2007).


CBRDPmonitoringdatashowsthatinMarch2005,outofatotalof217VillageNet-workmembers,25wereteachers.TheirparticipationincapacitybuildingandVillageNetworkworkshopsprovidestwokindsofopportunities.First,ithelpstofamiliarisethemwithtraditionalassociationsandstrengthenscooperationaswellastrust.Sec-ond,itcreatestheconditionstoparticipatetogetherwithassociations’membersinannualplanningandincludeschoolneedsintheannualCommuneInvestmentPlan.DataabouttheattitudeofNetworkmemberstowardsCommuneCouncilsisposi-tive.Outofatotalof702VillageNetworkmembersinterviewedbetween2003and2005,68percentexpresssatisfactionwiththeworkoftheirCommuneCouncils.44Moreover,in2005,66percentoftheVillageNetworkmembers(outof233)agreedthat the projects implemented by the Communeswhere the Village Networks areestablishedreflecttheneedsoftheirvillages.

44 CBRPDmonitoringdata2005.

��u�� 6��0� V�� N��w��k �pp��h (Pellini and Ayres 2005)

COMMUNE COUNCIL

Planning andBudgeting Sub-

Committee

ProcurementSub-Committee Ot��ers …

VILLAGE NETWORK

VILLAGEA�� S��-h��p G��up�� VDC�� …

Publ

ic se

rvice

s

Flow

of in

form

ation

�e�r

esen

tatio

n Contributions



Thischapterhaspresentedtheresultsoftheanalysisoftheempiricaldatacollectedfor theresearch, inaddition todata forprojectmonitoringpurposes inKampongThom.TheexperienceofKampongThomshowsthedifficultyforcommunitiesandschools tobridgethegapthatdividesthem,especially intermsofmoreactive in-volvement in school activities.This isduepartly to the reluctancebycommunitymembersandassociationleaderstogetinvolvedinmattersthatareperceivedtobetheresponsibilityofteachers;andpartlytothelimitedeffortsbytheschoolstopro-vide greater room for participation in school activities. In the next chapter, theseconclusionswillbelinkedtothemainresearchquestionsaswellasthetheoreticalframeworkofthethesis.

151Conclusions

7 Conclusions

GeorgeOrwellinhisnovel1984offersatellingsentence:“ahierarchicalsocietyinthelongrunisonlypossibleonabasisofpovertyandignorance”(1983:191).Whetheritisthesocialhierarchythatproducespovertyandignoranceortheotherwayround,itishardtosay.However,societieswithgreaterequalityusuallyshowlowerpovertyandhigherliteracyrates,whilethepromotionofeducationcreatestheconditionsforincreaseddemandforchangestosocialhierarchies(Sen1999).Educationisatthecentreofthepresentresearchandisconsideredofcriticalimportanceforthedevel-opmentofademocraticsociety(ibid.).

This studydemonstrated thathierarchy,povertyand illiteracyareall elementsthatcharacteriseCambodiatoday.BorrowingfromJaneJacobs(2000),theyrepre-sentco-developmentsthatinfluencetotheoverallchangeofsocietyandthereforetheinstitutionalreformsthatarebeingimplementedbythegovernment.Whilepovertyandeducationareatthecentreofthemaingovernmentpolicydocumentssincetheearly1990s,duringthelastfivetotenyears,thegovernmenthasattributedgreateremphasistogoodgovernance,accountability,andtransparency.Decentralisationisthestrategyadoptedtopromotegoodgovernanceand,withitsemphasisoncitizenparticipation in decision-making processes, it challenges established political andpowerstructures.

Thisthesishasfocusedontherelationshipsbetweendecentralisationandeduca-tionthroughtheanalysisoftheelementsthatfavourorhindercommunityparticipa-tioninschoolsinCambodia’sruralareas.Thisconcludingchaptersummarisestheresearchfindingsandofferssomepolicyoptions.


7.1 Summary of findings

HistorianDavidChandler,writingafterthemilitaryclashesinPhnomPenhofJuly1997,sawlittlereasonforoptimismaboutthefutureofCambodia(1998a).Lessthantenyearslater,Cambodiahasbeendescribedasbeingata‘crossroad’(WorldBank2004), with room for some optimism. The country is experiencing relative politi-calstabilityandhasembracedamarketeconomy.Sincethebeginningofthe1990s,theCambodiangovernmenthasstartedinstitutionalreformsandhasadoptedde-centralisationasoneof itsmainstrategies.Severalstudiespresentedinthis thesishaverevealedthesubstantialcontributionby familiesandcommunities in there-constructionofschoolsandeducationalfacilitiesduringthe1980sand1990s,tosuchanextentthatCambodiaisconsideredaspecialcaseinSoutheastAsia(Bray1996,Bray1999,Duggan1996,Ayres2000,BrayandBunly2005).Thedecentralisationofeducationhasthepotentialtoprovidecitizenswithspacesofparticipationthatcouldextendbeyondtheeducationsectorandmergewithotherpartsofsocial life.Thestate,whileretainingsomecorefunctionsintheadministrationofeducation,hasanadditionalfunctionasfacilitatorforthecreationofdemocraticspacesofparticipa-tion.ThecaseofCambodiaisinterestingbecause,whilethedecentralisationreformsbringwiththemtheideaofpeopleparticipationindecision-makingprocesses,Cam-bodiancultureandsocialrelationshipsaremodelledonthehierarchicalorderofthepast(Ovensenetal.1996,Ayres2000,BluntandTurner2005).Thefindingsofthisstudyarepresentedinthesectionsbelow.

7.1.1 Decentralisation of education

Oneofthethreekeyquestionsofthisstudyconcernsthecharacteristicsofthedecen-tralisationreformsinCambodiaandinparticular,intheeducationsector.ChapterFourdescribedthecharacteristicsofthepoliticaldecentralisationthatbeganwiththeelectionofCommuneCouncilsinFebruary2002byadoptingRondinellietal’s(1983)definitionpresentedinsection2.2.TheChapteralsodescribedthetwomaindecentralisationprogrammesintheeducationsector.ThefirstistheClustersSchoolapproachwhichstartedin1992withtheaimofsharingscarceresourcesbyasmallgroupofschools.ThesecondisthePAPwhichstartedin2002andaimsatimprovingplanningandresourceallocationtoindividualschools.Inbothcases,themainratio-naleistoimprovetheallocationofscarceresources,whilecommunityparticipationisemphasisedintermsofthefinancialandmaterialcontributionsthatcommunitiescanprovide(astheyhavedonebefore)toschools.Additionalconclusionsintermsofthespacesofparticipationavailabletocommunitymembersarethefollowing:

• ThedifferentdecentralisationscurrentlyunderwayinCambodiaarecharacter-isticofthe‘piecemealapproach’describedbyTurner(2002).ThoughCommune

153Conclusions

Councilshavebeenelected tenyearsafter thebeginningof theClusterSchoolpolicy,thelegislativeprocessthatprecededtheirelectiondidnotleadtotheadop-tionofanOrganicLawthatwouldcoordinatedifferentapproachesandreducethefragmentationinthespacesofparticipation.

• TheClusterSchoolapproachandPAParebothnationalpolicieswhichusediffer-entfundingmechanisms.Inthecaseofclustersbudgetarepreparedinthecoreschoolwiththeparticipationofcommunityrepresentatives;inthecaseofPAP,budgetsareallocatedtoindividualschoolsandbypasstheclustersystem.WhilePAPseemstobethepolicythatthegovernmentwillpursueinthefuture,itisar-guedherethatitalsomissestheopportunitiesforstrengtheningsocialcohesionandtrustthroughnetworkingandexchangeinbuiltintheclusterapproach.

• AlthoughClusterSchoolsremainanationalpolicy,oneofthemainweaknessesoftheapproachisthatthatthegovernmentlacksthehumanandfinancialresourcestosupportitsimplementationandexpansion.Therefore,astheevidenceshows,clustershavebeenactivemainlywithexternalsupportfromdonorsorprojects.

• Thereformintheeducationsectorhassofarbeenconsistentwiththeprinciplesofdeconcentrationwhere,asinManor’s(1999)definition,responsibilitiesaredis-persedfromhigherlevelofgovernmenttolowerlevelagencieswhilethegovern-mentretainspoliticalauthorityandcontrol.Inotherwords,thereformhassofarfailedtorealiseagreaterdelegationofdecisionmakingandfinancialautonomyimplicitindemocraticdecentralisation.Theresultisalimitedpromotionofcom-munityparticipationinschoolbasedmanagementandlocalgovernance.

AsnotedbyManor(1999),decentralisationaloneisnot‘the’solutiontodevelopmentproblems,butrather‘a’solution.Therefore,iftheobjectiveofdecentralisationistopromotedemocraticparticipation,itisimportanttounderstandwhicharethenormsandvaluesthatcharacterisecommunities.Onekeyconclusionofthisthesisisthatthe promotion of participation in education through the creation of ‘institutionalspaces’ of participation has not been successful because committees and councilsdesignedbythereformhavefailedtogainasufficientlegitimacyatvillageandcom-munitylevel.

7.1.2 T��e meaning of ‘community’

Onepre-conditionforthepromotionofcommunityparticipationineducation,asshowninChapterTwo(seeGovinda1997,Manor1999),istotakeintoaccounttradi-tionalformsofsocialcapitalanddefinespaceswherethesecanactivelylinkwithlo-calinstitutionsandcontributetoimprovethegovernanceofpublicservices.Thishasbeenthebasisforthesecondkeyquestionofthestudy:themeaningof‘community’intheculturalandsocialcontextofCambodia.


RuralareasinCambodiahavetraditionallybeenseparatedfromthecentrebyaneconomic,socialandculturalgap.PoliticaldecisionmakingprocessesinCambodiaare traditionallydeterminedby the interestsof therulingeliteandhave thereforeovershadowedopportunitiesforactiveparticipation.Neverthelesstherearealsoclearsignsoflong-standingsocialcapitalassociatedwithtraditionalassociationsinruralareassupportingschoolsasshowninthisstudy.Therefore,theclaimthatCambo-diancivilsocietyislimitedtoNGOs,tradeunions,etc.ismisleadingandperpetuatestheideathattraditionalassociationslackthelegitimacytocontributetoinstitutionalchange.Thedatapresentedinthisstudyconfirmsthattraditionalassociationsundertheumbrellaofthepagodawereamongthefirstinstitutionstore-activateaftertheendoftheKhmerRougeperiod,orassoonasthepoliticalsituationallowedthemtorestart theircommunityactivities.InthecaseofSchoolAssociationsdescribedinthisthesis,theyrepresent‘transientspaces’ofparticipationwiththeirstrengthsinthehighvalueattributedtoeducationandthecommitmenttosupportschools.Threesocialcapitaldimensionshavebeenusedtoanalyzethem:bondingandbridg-ingsocialcapital forthecharacteristicsof theassociationsandinstitutionalsocialcapitalforthelinkwithschoolsandlocalgovernmentbodies:

• Bonding social capital:thesolidaritythatunderlinesextendedfamilynetworksandtheimportanceattributedtoBuddhismdefinethecharacterandtheactivitiesofthetraditionalassociations.Furthermore,leadershiptogetherwithtrustforre-spectedcommunitymemberssuchasacharsand,insomecasemonks,isthedriv-ingforcebehindcommunitymobilizationwhichresultsintheestablishmentofassociationsandad hoccommitteesinvolvedinspecificcommunity-basedactivi-ties.Thecapacityoftheseleadersinmobilizinglocalcontributionsandtheirlinkwithreligiousnormssupporttheprocess.Theirauthorityisrarelyquestionedandtheytendtokeeptheirpositionforalongtime.ThisaccordswithAschmoneitetal’s(1996)conclusionthatassociationsaremanagedbyabenevolentelitethrougha paternalistic rather than empowering way since decision-making usually in-volvestheclosecircleofelderlyandcommitteemembers.Associations’members,ontheotherhand,usuallydonotdemandagreaterinvolvement.Theassociatedriskisalowerperceptionoftheimportanceoftransparencyandaccountabilitybycommittees’membersandlimitedgeneralimprovementofknowledgeandskillsintermsofparticipationandmanagement.Additionallimitationsofthisleader-shipstyleare that the increasedcapacityandskillsof thecommitteemembersarenottransferreddownwardstomemberssothatvillagerscontinuetorelyondecisionstakenbyothers.InlinewiththeconclusionsbyAschmoneitetal.(1996)andO’LearyandMeasNee(2001),thedatapresentedinthisstudydemonstratesthattheinternalorganisationandmanagementoftheSchoolAssociationsfollowsthevaluesattributedtoage,gender,knowledge,reputation,andreligiouspiety.Association’smembershaveacloseconnectionwiththeirgroups,suggestingthestrengthofbondingsocialcapital isbasedonsolidarity, respect for leadership,andtrust.

155Conclusions

• Bridging social capital: the linksbetween schoolassociationsandother tradi-tional community-based groups involved in socialdevelopmentareweak, sug-gestinga fragmentationofcivilsocietyat the local level.Whilepagodasrepre-sent thecentresofcommunal lifeandthespaceswheregroupsandtraditionalleadersmeet,thecooperationandexchangebetweenthemislimited.TheSchoolAssociations explored in this thesis are characterised by the volunteerism thatdefinescivilsocietyespeciallyinitsbeginning,butshowalimitedperceptionoftheimportanceofnetworkingforinfluencingpolicydecisionsandassistingde-centralizedauthoritiesandserviceproviders.Inaddition,lowincomelevelslimittheinvolvementofyoungerindividualsalreadybusywithworkinthefieldandsecuringthelivelihoodsoftheirfamilies.

7.1.3 Community �artici�ation in sc��ools

Thethirdkeyresearchquestionreferred to thecharacteristicsofcommunitypar-ticipationinschools.Theconceptofinstitutionalsocialcapitalhasbeenusedastheconceptualbackdroptothisquestion:

• Institutional social capital: theconclusionderivedfromthepresentanalysis isthatthelinkbetweenassociationsandschoolsisweakinthesensethatthedia-logue is limited to the topicof financialandmaterial contributions to supportschoolimprovementand/orchildrenthatareatriskofdroppingoutfromschool.Thisweaklinkispartlyduetomistrustandtensionrelatedtothedegreeoftrans-parencyintheuseoffundsprovidedbythecommunity.Anadditionalelementisparents’reluctancetobecomeinvolvedintheirchildren’seducationwhichresultsina low interactionwith teachers.The linksbetweenSchoolAssociationsandgovernmentinstitutions(e.g.CommuneCouncils)seemtobeevenweakerand,iftheyexistatall,arelimitedtoreportingofassociations’activities.Thereasonsarethatlineagenciesatprovincialanddistrictlevelresponsibleforeducationareunderpressuretofollownationalguidelinesandboundtoupwardaccountability;atthesametime,afeelingofmistrusttowardspublicinstitutionslimitstheasso-ciations’willingnesstostartamorefruitfuldialoguewithschools.Assomeoftheexamplespresentedinthisthesisdemonstrate,thereareexamplesofcommunityinvolvement ineducationthatgobeyondmaterialsupport.Apromisingspace,inthisrespect,isrepresentedbytheelectedCommuneCouncils,whichthroughannualplanningexercisesandmonthlymeetingscouldprovideopportunitiesforgreaterexchangeandbringissuesrelatedtoschoolingandeducationwithinthegenerallocalgovernanceenvironment.

To summarize, trust and religious norms characterize the bonding, and to someextentthebridgingsocialcapital,whileverticallinkswithschoolsandinstitutionsarestillweak.Anequitableandsustainabledevelopmentprocessneedsabalancedcombinationofallsocialcapitaldimensions.Stronghorizontallinksbasedontrust


are important and necessary as they have the potential tomobilise resources andorganisecollectiveaction.Theyarehowevernot sufficient.There isalso theneedtostrengthentheverticalrelationshipbetweencivilsocietygroupsandgovernmentinstitutions,which,inthecaseofCambodia,iscloselylinkedtorebuildingcitizens’trust in the state and recognizing, as remarked by Gyallay-Pap (2004), that theseassociations represent “indigenous formsof social capital that arenotonlyapartofCambodiancivilsociety,butperhapsitslargestandmostsolidpart”(p.36).Thecasespresentedinthisstudysuggestthat,atthelocallevel,thepotentialispresent.

7.2 Situating t��e Cambodian ex�erience and �olicy suggestions

Successfuldecentralisationrequiresacontextinwhichdominantvaluesaresupport-iveofgenuinedecentralisationandcircumstancesaresuitabletocollectivedecisions(Manor1995,BluntandTurner2005).ReturningtothecategorisationofdifferentformsofdecentralisationpresentedinChapterTwo(section2.2),itisfairtosaythattheCambodia’sdecentralisationofeducationisa‘deconcentration’withaspectsofthe‘managementbyobjectives’,describedbyLauglo(1995),associatedwiththean-nualactivityplansdrawnatschoolorclusterlevel.Atthesametime,thestated‘polit-icalrationale’of‘participatorydemocracy’hassofarresultedinalimiteddelegationofdecisionmakingauthorityandaninadequateconsiderationfortheopportunitiesprovidedbygreaterspacesofparticipationfortraditionalassociationsmembers.

Cambodia’s experience with community support to schools is not unique. AsshowninChapterTwo,otherdevelopingcountrieshaveatraditionofcommunityfi-nancingderivedfromastrongdemandforschoolingwhichwasnotmetbyadequategovernmentfunds(Bray1996).Differentsocietieshavedifferentwaysofengagingwithschoolsandeducation,thereforesimilaritiesordifferencesbetweentheCam-bodianexperienceandthoseofothercountriesresideintheinstitutionalisationoftheseformsofcommunitysupportinthedecentralisationprocess.

TheexamplefromfourFrancophonecountriesinWestAfricapresentedbyLugazetal.(2006)showsanimportantdifferencewithCambodiainthatwhenadminis-trative and education decentralisation go hand in hand, local government bodiescanbegivenresponsibilitiesforbasiceducation.Thisavoidsduplicationofrolesandtaskswhile,at thesametime,requiresanadequatecapacitybuildingprogramme.Althoughthereform’sobjectivesinthefourcountriesare,similarlywithCambodia,to access community resources to fund education, an organic and comprehensivedecentralisationpolicyhelpstopromotegreatercommunityinvolvementandtoin-cludeeducationintheoveralllocaldevelopmentprocess.Malawi,asshownbyRose(2003),hasasimilarexperiencetoCambodiaintermsoftraditionalcommunitysup-porttoschools.Theinstitutionalisationofparticipationhasbeenmainlyextractive

157Conclusions

andlimitedtocontributionsincashorinkindforschoolconstruction.Thishasbeentheresultoftheattempttobridgethe‘participationgap’betweencommunitiesandschoolsthroughtheestablishmentofad hocschoolcommitteesthathavefailedtogainlegitimacyinthecommunities.ThecaseofGhanashowsthatcommunities,inordertoachieveanactiveparticipationinschoolgovernance,needalsotobegiventhe capacity and skills required foractiveparticipation in schoolgovernance thatgoesbeyondthelimitsofmaterialcontributions.ThisissimilartoCambodia’sexpe-rience,wherecommunitymembers,basedonthedatapresentedhere,areaskedtojoinplanningexerciseswithoutadequatepreparation.Theresultisoften‘etiquetteparticipation’. One positive lesson, as shown from the case of the Sangkor SchoolAssociation in Kampong Thom, is that community participation benefits when ateacherisalsoinvolvedintheSchoolAssociationsasthishelpstoincludetheteach-ers’perspectivetoassociationactivities.

TheexamplesfromLatinAmericaarenoteasytocomparewithCambodia.Someofthecountries,suchasElSalvador,havealsosufferedfromyearsofcivilwarandhavethereforeatraditionofcommunitysupporttoschool ‘bydefault’astheonlyalternative.Furthermore,thestateandcivilsocietyrelationshipshavebeen,asPoggiandNeirotti(2004)putit,ofindifferenceorcooptation.Whatisconsiderablydiffer-ent,however,istheinfluenceofFreireian‘conscientisation’theoriesandthecrucialimportanceoflocalalliancesinstrengtheningcommunityparticipationinlocalgov-ernance.Thesehaveledtotheadoptionofdecentralisationasalongtermstrategythatinfluencesthechangeofbothdesignandmanagementoftheeducationsystemaswellascitizensparticipationinthepoliticalarena(UNESCO2005).TheEDUCOprogrammeinElSalvadorisanexampleofthedifferentperceptionoftheroleandfunctionsofcommunitysupporttoschools.Thoughvariousevaluationsofthepro-grammeshowthateducationalstandardsinEDUCOschoolsaresimilartothoseofregularschools,oneadditionalandverysignificantcontributionhasbeeninrebuild-ingsocialcohesion.Thegrowthofcommunitysocialcapitalincommunitieswhereparents’empowermenthasstrengthenedservestopromotetrustanddemocracy.

TheClusterSchoolapproachtothedecentralisationofeducationinCambodiahasbeenastrategyappliedinothercountriesasshownbyBray(1987).Thereasonsthathaveledtoadoptionoftheclusterapproachhavedifferedindifferentregions.InthecaseofLatinAmerica, the ‘conscietisation’objectivewas important.At thesametimeinsomeAsiancountries(e.g.India,SriLankaandThailand),themainobjectivehasbeenadministrativeefficiency.ThishasalsobeenthemainobjectiveinCambodia,wheretheneedtorebuildaneducationsystemhasbeencoupledwithscarceresources,whileparticipationwasasecondaryaim.ThoughtheexperienceofCambodiacanbecomparedwithotherAsiancountries,itmustbenotedherethatthecurrentorientationoftheMoEYStowardsthePAPwillreducetherelevanceoftheclustersystem.Aspointedoutintheprevioussection,thismissiestheopportu-nityforincreasedsocialcohesionthroughthealliancesandnetworkingthatclusters


canproduce.OtherAsiancountriesshowthatcommunityparticipationcanbelim-itedtomaterialcontributionsbypreventingteachersbecominginvolvedinparents’associations,asinthecaseofIndonesia.InthecaseofCambodia,theresearchdatashowagreaterformalandinformalinteractionbetweenassociationsandteachers,althoughthemaintopicofdiscussionismaterialcontributions.

It isusuallymoredifficult tooffer suggestions than it is todescribeproblems.Duringtheresearchprocess,theperceptionfrominterviewsandprojectactivitiesatthelocallevelhasbeenoneofoptimismfortheopportunitiescreatedbytheelectionofCommuneCouncils,incontrastswiththeconclusionbyBluntandTurner(2005)that “the broad historical, cultural and governance settings of decentralisation inCambodiaarenotconducivetostrongformsofdecentralisation”(p.85).Thisisalong term process requiring long term strategies which, with regard to participa-tion, require a clear understanding of Cambodian social capital. The conclusionsof this thesis therefore reinforce the claim by Collins (1998) that “any discussionaboutdemocracybuildingatthegrassrootsisgoingtohavetoconsidertheimpactofanycontemplatedinterventionsontherelationshipsbetweengovernmentandruralCambodia,therelationshipbetweenolderandyoungergenerationsofvillagers,andtherelationshipbetweenmoreorlessaffluentmembersofthesocialandmoralcom-munitycentredonthevat–inatimeofrapidsocialchange”(pp.20-21).

Thepolicysuggestionspresentedbelowincludeproposalsforthefurtherdevel-opmentofcommunityparticipationinschoolsandlocalgovernance.Theaimistoidentifywaystostrengthentheweakdimensionsofsocialcapital(i.e.bridgingandinstitutionalsocialcapital)throughpolicymeasuresandinitiativesatnationalandlocallevel.

7.2.1 Suggestions for t��e national level

• Thedraftingof theOrganicLaw(due in2007) should includean institutionalandregulatoryframeworkforspacesofparticipationby,forexample,defininga‘TraditionalAssociation’sCouncil’atcommunelevelthatwouldbringtogetherexistingcommunitygroupsactiveindifferentsectorsandcontributestrengthen-inglocalcivilsociety.

• Inordertostrengthenbridgingandinstitutionalsocialcapital,thegovernment,with donors’ assistance, should design clear and simple capacity building andawareness rising trainings on the principles of democratic governance to lineagenciesstaff,teachersandheadmasters,andcommunityrepresentatives.Inor-dertostrengthenthecooperationbetweenlineagenciesandCNGOs,trainingscouldbefacilitatedbygovernmentstaffincooperationwithCNGOfacilitators.

• Donoragenciesshouldassistthegovernmentindeepeningtheknowledgeaboutthecharacteristicsoftraditionalformsofcollectiveactionsand,atthesametime,

159Conclusions

avoida rigid institutionalisationof spacesofparticipationby, forexample,de-signingad hoccommitteesthatrisktoduplicateexistingformscommunitymo-bilisation.Inotherwords,schoolsmustopentocommunitiesandfluentlyengagewiththemasequalpartnersinmanagementdecisions.

• Traditionalassociationscanplayavital role in theprocessofpromotingcom-munityparticipationandrepresentingcommunityinterests inschools.Policiesto promote participation should start from the bottom, from ‘existing’ activecommunitygroupsthatarealreadysupportingschoolswithmaterialcontribu-tionsandinvolvethemininstructionalactivities.Theyshouldthenbesupported(together with the school cluster staff) through capacity building initiatives tostrengthentheirunderstandingoftheprinciplesofactiveparticipation,account-ability,transparencyaswellaseducationalpolicies.KAPE’sLifeSkillProgramme hasshownthatcommunityinvolvementineducationalandinstructionalactivi-tiescanbesuccessful.Nowthat‘LifeSkills’arepartofthenationalcurriculum,thegovernmenthastotaketheleadinpromotingthisprogramme,graduallyre-ducingtherelianceondonors’fundingandinitiative.

• Thegovernmentmustdemonstrateamoreseriousefforttoovercomecorruptionandbadgovernanceandpromotemoretransparentandaccountablemanagementmechanismsinlocaldepartmentsaswellasschools.

7.2.2 Suggestions for t��e local level

• Traditional associations usually work on ad hoc basis or are linked to a singleschool.Thisdiminishestheirstrength.Basedontheresearch’sconclusions,do-nors,NGOsandCNGOscouldadopt,incooperationwithlineagencies,measurestostrengthenbridgingsocialcapitalbynetworkingSchoolAssociationswithoth-ercommunitybasedorganisationsthroughtrainings,workshops,anddiscussionforums.Thiswouldcontributereducingthefragmentationofcivilsociety,helpthedisseminationinformationtothevillagelevel,andproduceagreaterinflu-enceonlocalgovernancedecision-makingprocesses.TheVillageNetworkinitia-tiveinKampongThominanexampleinthisdirection.

• WhilerecognisingSchoolAssociations’limitationsintermsofmanagementca-pacity, internal transparency, and dissemination of information, they have thelegitimacythatcomesfromrepresentingaconsiderableshareofthepopulationlivinginruralareas.Donoragenciescouldstrengtheninstitutionalsocialcapitalbysupportingthedialoguebetweencommunities,schools,andlocalgovernment,assistingtheminorganisingregularmeetings,workshops,andstudyvisitswhere,withthehelpofsimpleparticipatorytoolslikesocialmapping,theparticipantscould discuss opportunities for greater cooperation and exchange of informa-tion.


• Greaterparticipationinschoolgovernancerequiresadequateskills.Communitymembers need to be provided with these skills through capacity building andtraining organised by line agencies and/or donors’ projects. Associations needthecapacity to jointly implementactivitieswithschoolsandCommuneCoun-cils,thusincreasingtheiractiveparticipationinlocalgovernanceprocesses,andthenreflectingontheirexperiencesandtheimplicationsoflocalgovernancefortheir livelihoods.Capacitybuildingand trainingsshould thereforeconcentrateonbasicissuessuchasparticipationinmeetings,facilitationskills,andtheuseofsimpletrainingandeducationmaterialssuchasposters.

• Communes can offer, through their annual planning and the public monthlymeetings,a spacewhere this interactioncanslowlystartandhopefully lead tosomeresults.Communespossessdetailedinformationaboutthepovertysitua-tionofvillagesandevenhouseholdsandcanthereforeofferreferralservicesre-latedtoeducationandsupporttofamilieswhosechildrenareatdropoutriskduetopoverty.

7.3 Directions for furt��er researc�� and concluding remarks

This study has shown that, despite a history characterised by top-down decisionmakingprocessesbyalllevelsofgovernment,participatorylocalgovernancecanbedevelopedinCambodia.SocialcapitalhassurvivedtheyearsofwarandtheKhmerRougeandhasshownthatbytakingintoaccountvaluesandnormsassociatedwithtraditionalformsofcollectiveaction,itispossibletocreatecommunitybasedgroupswhicharesustainable,i.e.areperceivedaslegitimateandhavethecapacitytoadapttochange.

GiventhelimitednumberofstudiesonCambodiansocialcapitalandtraditionalformsofcollectiveaction,moreneedstobewrittenonthehistoryoftheseassocia-tions,theiractivitiesacrosstheprovincesofthecountry,theirinvolvementinlocaldevelopment processes and their links with local government institutions such asCommuneCouncils.Moreover,moreneedstobelearnedaboutthecriticalelementsandthemesthatcharacterizeCambodiancommunitiesandthatcanhaveadirectin-fluenceofdevelopmentprojects.Moreevidenceisalsoneededonthecontributionofdecentralisationtothedevelopmentofeducationandimprovementofthewelfareofpeople.Morecomparativeresearchhastobecarriedouttodefinethecharacteristicsofa‘good’decentralisationprogrammeforthepromotionofparticipationinschoolbasedmanagementaswellaslocalgovernance.AssuggestedbyEasterly(2006),itisimportanttoexperiment,evaluate,anddocumentspecificexperienceswithdecen-tralisationindifferentlocalgovernanceenvironments.Thesereformscannotbecon-sideredascure-allpolicies,andinordertopromotedemocraticparticipation,gov-

161Conclusions

ernmentaswellasdonorsupportshouldalwaysconsideriftargetsandapproachesareappropriateandsensitiveenoughtolocalconstraintsandviews(Kuløy1996).

Thetraditionalformsofsocialcapitalexploredinthisthesisrepresentapointofdeparturetoachieveoneofthestatedobjectivesofthedecentralisationreform-thatis, togiveordinarypeoplegreateropportunities todetermine their future (NCSC2005).Thediversityoftraditionalformsofcollectiveactionwhichexistinruralareascanbestrengthenedfurtherandcontributetoachangethatseescitizen’sparticipa-tionasacriticalelementofthedevelopmentprocessanddemocratisation.Theseex-perienceswillhelpCambodiancommunitiestobemoreinvolvedinthe‘substance’ofeducationand,paraphrasingGandhi,1tomakedemocracyinCambodianotonlyawayofgovernance,butalsoawayoflife.

1 InSing(2006).


�eferences

Abu-Duhou,I.(1999).School-based Management,Paris:IIEPUNESCO.ADB[AsianDevelopmentBank](2005).Kingdom of Cambodia. Country Strategy and Pro-

gram 2005–2009, Manila, available at www.adb.org/Documents/CSPs/CAM/2004/default.asp

Addison,T.(2005).Development Policy. An Introduction for Students,DiscussionPaperN.9,Helsinki:WIDER[WorldInstituteforDevelopmentEconomicsResearch].

Adelman,I.(2000).Theroleofgovernmentineconomicdevelopment,inF.Tarp(ed.),For-eign Aid and Development. Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future, London:Routledge,pp.48–79.

Agrawal,A.(1999).Decentralization in Nepal. A comparative Analysis,Oakland(Ca):Inter-nationalCenterforSelf-GovernancePress.

Amin,S.(1977).Imperialism and Unequal Development,Brighton:HarvesterPress.Anderson,A.(1966).Themodernizationofeducation,inM.Weiner(ed.),Modernization:

the Dynamics of Growth,NewYork:BayBooks,pp.68–79.Arndt,H.W.(1987).Economic Development. History of an Idea(Italianedition,translation

GiovanniPanzeri),Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress.Aschmoneit,W.(1994).Kambodscha, Provinz Kampong Thom Prübericht der GTZ-mission

Januar–Februar 1994 für ein Selbsthilfefionds-projekt,KampongThom:GTZ.Aschmoneit,W.(1998).Traditional Self-Help Associations in Cambodia. How to Identify and

Cooperate with Them,Eschborn:GTZ.Aschmoneit,W.,ChanSotehavy,ChhinYe,KaoKalyan,NarakSovann,TopaThat,andYort

Nang(1996).Short Experiences with Rice Banks and Pagoda Committees in Kampong Thom Province Cambodia,contributiontotheThirdNationalSeminarofBuddhismforDevelopmentinWatAlongvil,Battambang17–21.December,GTZProvincialDe-velopmentProgram.

Aschmoneit,W.,ChanSotheavy,KaoKalyan,LeanKunlam,NarakSovann,TopThat(1995).Cambodian Pagoda Committees and Community Work,contributiontotheTradition-alSelf-helpOrganisationsandDevelopmentWorkshop,SriLanka,26–29February,GTZ.

163References

Aschmoneit,W.,ChanSotheavy,KaoKalyan,LeanKunlam,NarakSovann,TopThat(1997).Pagoda Committees and Community Life in Kampong Thom Province Cambodia,KampongThom:GTZ.

AsiaFoundation,The(2003).Public Opinion Poll on Citizens Perception of the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the Cambodian Court System, PhnomPenh:TheAsiaFoundationandCAS[CentreforAdvancedStudies](unpublishedreport).

Astiz,M.F.andWiseman,A.(2005).Slouchingtowardaglobalideology.Thedevolutionineducationgovernance,inD.P.BakerandG.K.Letendre(eds.),National Differences, Global Similarities. World Culture and the Future of Schooling,Stanford(Ca):StanfordUniversitypress,pp.134–149.

Ayres,D.M.(1997).Tradition and Modernity Enmeshed: the Educational Crisis in Cambodia 1953–1997,PhDdissertation,Sydney:SchoolofSocialandPolicyStudiesinEduca-tion,TheUniversityofSydney.

Ayres,D.M.(1999).TheKhmerRougeandeducation:beyondthediscourseofdestruction,History of Education,Vol.23,No.2,pp.205–218.

Ayres,D.M.(2000).Anatomy of a Crisis. Education, Development, and the State in Cambo-dia, 1953–1998,Honolulu:UniversityofHawai’iPress.

Ayres,D.M.(2000a).Tradition,modernityandthedevelopmentofeducationinCambodia,Comparative Education Review,Vol.44,No.4,pp.440–463.

Ayres,D.M.(2003).Assessment of the Role of Local NGOs in Local Governance in Kampong Thom Province,KampongThom:GTZRuralDevelopmentProgramKampongThomandKampot.

Ayres,D.M.,Pellini,A.andPerez-Leroux,A.(2006).Promotingparticipatorylocalgover-nancethroughVillageNetworksinKampongThomandKampot:acasestudy”,inSourcebook on Asian Civil Society Organisations Best Practices in Enhancing the Sus-tainability of Rural Poor Organizations,Manila:ANGOC[AsianNGOCoalitionforAgrarianReformandAgriculturalDevelopment].

Azfar, O., Kähkönen, S., Anthony Lanyi, A., Meagher, P., and Rutherford, D. (1999). De-centralization, Governance and Public Services. The Impact of Institutional Arrange-ments. A Review of the Literature,UniversityofMaryland:IRISCenterandWashing-ton,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Bebbington,A. (1997).Social capital and rural intensification: localorganisationsand is-landsofsustainabilityintheruralAndes,Geographical Journal,Vol.163,No.2,pp.189–197.

Bernard,H.R.(1994).Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Ap-proaches,London:SagePublications.

Biddulph,R.(1997).Independent Monitoring and Evaluation of the Local Planning Process – Final Report,PhnomPenh:Seila.

Biddulph,R.(2000).Decentralisation and Commune Councils Reforms: Immediate Opportu-nities for Cambodia NGOs,PhnomPenh:OxfamGB.

Biddulph, R. (2003). PAT [Permanent Advisory Team] Empowerment Study. Final Report,Phnom Penh: Seila PLG [Partnership for Local Governance] with support fromUNDP.

Bijker,M.andHenke,R.(2007).Social Capital in Cambodia: Mapping of the Relevant Lit-erature, Phnom Penh: CAS [Centre for Advanced Studies] and ICCO [InterchurchOrganisationforDevelopmentCo-operation].


Bilodeau,C.(1954).CompulsoryeducationinCambodia,inC.Bilodeau,S.Pathammavong,andL.Q.Hong(eds.),Compulsory Education in Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos,Paris:UNESCO.

Bith,P.(2004).AIDSinCambodia,The Lancet. Infectious Diseases,Vol.4,August,p.482.Blunt,P.andTurner,M. (2005).Decentralisation,democracyanddevelopment inapost-

conflictsociety:CommuneCouncilsinCambodia,Public Administration and Devel-opment,Vol.25,No.1,pp.75–87.

Bonnal,J.(1997).A History of Decentralisation,FAOTechnicalConsultationonDecentralisa-tion,Rome16–18,December,FAO,availableatwww.fao.org/SD/ROdirect/ROfo0003.htm

Bonnal,J.(1998).Relating Social Capital, Traditional Community Institutions and Decentral-isation Processes,OnlineSourcebook on Decentralizationand Local Development,availableatwww.ciesin.org/decentralization/English/Issues/relating.html

Bray,M.(1987).School Clusters in the Third World: Making Them Work,DigestNo.23,Paris:UNESCO/UNICEFCooperativeProgramme.

Bray,M.(1996).Decentralization of Education: Community Financing,WashingtonD.C.:TheWorldBank.

Bray,M.(1999).The Private Costs of Public Schooling: Household and Community Financing of Primary Education in Cambodia,Paris:IIEPUNESCO.

Bray, M. (2000). Government-community partnership in education: lessons from experi-ences,Education and Communities,Vol.3,Issue3,October,UNICEF.

Bray,M.(2001).Community Partnerships in Education: Dimensions, Variations and Implica-tions,Paris:UNESCO.

Bray,M.(2003).Communityinitiativesineducation,Compare,Vol.33,No.1,pp.31–45.Bray,M.andMukundan,M.V.(2003).Management and Governance for EFA: Is Decentrali-

sation Really the Answer?,HongKong:CERC[ComparativeEducationResearchCen-tre],theUniversityofHongKong.

Bray,M.andSengBunly(2005).Balancing the Books: Household Financing of Basic Educa-tion in Cambodia,MonographSeries,No.4,HongKong:CERC[ComparativeEduca-tionResearchCentre],theUniversityofHongKong.

Bredenberg, K. (2002). Cluster School Development in Cambodia: Analysis of Process and Outcomes,PhnomPenh:UNICEF/SIDA.

Bredenberg,K.andDahal,N.(2000).Can School Clustering Enhance Educational Effective-ness? Promises and Pitfalls,PhnomPenh(unpublishedreport).

Bredenberg,K.andRacliffe,M.(2002).Education Decentralisation and Cluster Review Study. Final Report,PhnomPenh:UNICEF/SIDA.

Burki,S.J.,Perry,G.E.andDillinger,W.R.(1999).Beyond the Center: Decentralizing the State,WashingtonD.C.:TheWorldBank

Caldwell,B.J.(1994).School-basedmanagement,inT.HunsénandT.N.Postlewhaite(eds.),The International Encyclopaedia of Education, 2nd edition, Vol. 9, Oxford: ElsevierScience,pp.5302–5308.

Cariño, I. and Dumlao Valisno, M. (1994). The Parent Learning Support System (PLSS):school and community collaboration for raising pupil achievements in the Philip-pines,inS.Shaeffer(ed.),Partnership and Participation in Basic Education,Case2,Paris:IIEPUNESCO.

165References

CAS [Centre forAdvancedStudies] andTheWorldBank (2006). Justice for the Poor? An Exploratory Study of Collective Grievances over Land and Local Governance in Cam-bodia,PhnomPenh.

CBEP[CambodiaBasicEducationProject](2004).Report on the Collection of Baseline and Performance Data for the Cambodian Basic Education Project,PhnomPenh:USAid,RTIInternationalandMoEYS.

CDRI[CambodiaDevelopmentResourceInstitute](2003).Policy Orientation Research Pro-gramme on Decentralisation. Inception Report,PhnomPenh.

Chandler,D.P.(1991).The Tragedy of Cambodian History. Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945,Bangkok:SilkwormBooks.

Chandler,D.P.(1998).A History of Cambodia,Bangkok:SilkwormBook.Chandler,D.P.(1998a).TheburdenofCambodia’spast,inF.Z.BrownandD.G.Timber-

man(eds.),Cambodia and the International Community. The Quest for Peace, Devel-opment, and Democracy,Singapore:InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies,pp.33–47.

Chandler,D.P.(1999).Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot,Boulder(Colo-rado):WestviewPress.

Chapman, D.,Barcikowski, E., Sowah,M.,Gyamera, E., andWoode,G. (2002).Docom-munitiesknowbest?Testingthepremiseofeducationaldecentralization:communitymembers’perceptionsoftheirlocalschoolsinGhana,International Journal of Educa-tional Development,Vol.22,No.2,pp.181–189.

Chapman, D.W. (2000). Trends in educational administration in developing Asia, Educa-tional Administration Quarterly,Vol.36,No.2,pp.283–309.

Clayton,T. (2000).Education and the Politics of Language: Hegemony and Pragmatism in Cambodia, 1979–1989,HongKong:CERC[ComparativeEducationResearchCentre],UniversityofHongKong.

Cleaver, F. (2001). Institutions, agency, and the limitations of participatory approaches todevelopment,inB.CookeandU.Kohtari(eds.),Participation, the New Tyranny?, Lon-don:ZedBooks,pp.36–55.

Coleman,J.(1988).Socialcapitalinthecreationofhumancapital,American Journal of Soci-ology,N.94(supplement),pp.95–120.

Coletta,N.J.andCullen,M.L.(2000).Violent Conflicts and the Transformation of Social Capital. Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia, Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Collins,W.(1998).Grassroots Civil Society in Cambodia,PhnomPenh:ForumSydandDia-konia.

Cooke,B.andKohtari,U.(2001).Thecaseforparticipationastyranny,inB.CookeandU.Kohtari(eds.),Participation, the New Tyranny?, London:ZedBooks,pp.1–15.

Coombs,P.H.(1985).The World Crisis in Education. The View from the Eighties,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Corfield,J.andSummers,L.(2003).Historical Dictionary of Cambodia,Laham(Meryland):ScarecrowPress.

Cornwall,A.(2002).Makingspaces,changingplaces:situatingparticipationindevelopment,IDS Working Paper,N.170,Brighton:IDS[InstituteofDevelopmentStudies].

Cornwall,A.(2002a).Locatingcitizenparticipation,IDS Bulletin,Vol.33,No.2,pp.49–58.


Cornwall,A.andJewkes,R.(1995).Whatisparticipatoryresearch?,Social Science and Medi-cine,Vol.41,No.12,pp.1667–1676.

Coyne,G.(2001).BookReviews,Compare,Vol.31,No.1,pp.129–135.CSD[Council forSocialDevelopment] (2002).National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003–

2005,PhnomPenh.Cuéllar-Marchelli, H. (2003). Decentralization and privatization in El Salvador: assessing

theexperience,International Journal of Educational Development,Vol.23No.2,pp.145–166.

Cummings,W.K.(1997).Thelimitsofmoderneducation,inH.D.NielsenandW.K.Cum-mings(eds.),Quality Education for All. Community-Oriented Approaches,NewYork:GarlandPublishingInc.,pp.5–24.

Dasgupta,P.(2000).Economicprogressandthe ideaofsocialcapital, inP.DasguptaandI.Serageldin(eds.),Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective,WashingtonD.C:TheWorldBank,pp.325–424.

De Grauwe, A. (2005). School-based Management (SBM): Does it Improve Quality?, the-maticpapertotheEFAGlobalMonitoringReport2005,Paris:UNESCO,availableat http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=36184&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

deJongJ.T.,Komproe,I.H.,VanOmmeren,M.,ElMasri,M.,Araya,M.,Khaled,N.,vandePut,W.andSomasundaram,D.(2001).LifetimeeventsandPostTraumaticStressDisorderinfourpostconflictsettings,The Journal of the American Medical Associa-tion,Vol.286,No.5,pp.555–562.

deJong,K.,Loquai,C.,andSoiri,I.(1999).Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction. Explor-ing the Linkages,PolicyPapersNo.1,Helsinki:InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,Uni-versityofHelsinki.

Di Gropello, E. (2006). A Comparative Analysis of School-based Management in Central America,WorldBankWorkingPaperNo.72,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Diepart,J.-C.(2007).Gestion des Ressources Naturelles au Cambodge: Entre Nouvelles Gou-vernances et Réalités Paysannes. Le Cas de la Province de Kampong Thom,PhDdis-sertation,Gembloux,(Belgium):FacultéUniversitairedesSciencesAgronomiquesdeGembloux.

Duggan, S. J. (1996). Education, teacher training and prospects for economic recovery inCambodia,Comparative Education,Vol.32,No.3,pp.361–376.

Dyer, C. and Rose, P. (2005). Decentralisation for educational development? An editorialintroduction,Compare,Vol.35,No.2,pp.105–113.

Easterly,W.(2002).The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics,Cambridge(Mass.):MITPress.

Easterly,W.(2006).The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good,London:Penguin.

Ebihara,M.(1968).Svay, a Khmer Village in Cambodia,Ph.D.dissertation,NewYork:Co-lumbiaUniversity.

Ebihara,M.(2002).MemoriesofthePolPotera,inJ.Ledgerwood(ed.),Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays,DeKalb:CentreforSouthEastAsianStudies,NorthernIllinoisUniversity,pp.91–108.

167References

Etcheson,C. (1984).The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea,Boulder (Colorado):WestviewPress.

Feyerabend,P.K.(1999).Conquest of Abundance,B.Terpstra(ed.),Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress.

Fine,B.(2001).Social Capital Versus Social Theory. Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of the Millennium,London:Routdledge.

Fiske,E.B.(1996).Decentralization of Education. Politics and Consensus,WashingtonD.C.:TheWorldBank.

Flam,S.;Putzig,E.;Davenport,D.;andSekSan.(2002).The Law on the Administration and Management of the Communes,SanFrancisco:CommunityLegalEducationCentre/CambodiaLawandDemocracyProject,UniversityofSanFrancisco.

Florestal,K.andCooper,R.(1997).Decentralization of Education: Legal Issues,WashingtonD.C.:TheWorldBank.

Ford,J.(1999).Constitutional,legal,regulatoryframeworkfordecentralization,inJ.Litvack,andJ.Seddon(eds.),Decentralization Briefing Notes,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank,pp.11–14.

Franci,G.R.(2004).Il buddhismo,Bologna:IlMulino.Galasso,E.(1990).Education in Cambodia. Notes and Suggestions,PhnomPenh:ReddBarna

(SavetheChildrenNorway).Gaynor,C.(1998).Decentralization of Education: Teacher Management,WashingtonD.C.:

TheWorldBank.GDPWG(2004).Practices and Lessons Learned in the Management of Development Coopera-

tion: Case Studies in Cambodia,Sub-WorkingGroupNo.3,PhnomPenh:CDC,avail-ableat:www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/practices_chapter6.htm

Geertz,C.(1968).Thinkingasamoralact:ethicaldimensionsofanthropologicalfieldworkinthenewstates,The Antioch Review,Vol.28,N.2,pp.139–158.

Geeves,R.(2002).KeynotespeechtotheVSO[VolunteerServiceOverseas]AnnualPlanningConference,Sihanhoukville,Cambodia.

Geeves,R.,KuoyPharin,LySereyrith,SongHeng,andTranPancharun(2002).Evaluation of the Impact of the Education Quality Improvement Project (EQIP) of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of the Royal Government of Cambodia,PhnomPenh:WorldEducation.

Giddens,A.(1998).The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy(Italianedition,trans-lationLucaFontana),Cambridge:PolityPress.

Giddens,A.(ed.)(2005).The Global Third Way Debate,Cambridge:PolityPress.Glesne,C.andPeshkin,A.(1992).Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction,New

York:Longman.Gottesman,E.(2002).Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation-build-

ing,NewHaven:YaleUniversity.Gould,J.,Takala,T.,andNokkala,M.(1998).How Sectoral Programs Work. An Analysis of

Education and Agriculture Sector programs in Zambia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nepal,PolicyPapersNo.1,Helsinki:InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofHelsinki.

Govinda,R. (1997).Decentralization of Educational Management. Experiences from South Asia,Paris:IIEPUNESCO.


Grootaert,C.(1998).Social Capital: the Missing Link,SocialCapitalInitiativeWorkingPaperNo.3, Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Grootaert,C.andvanBastelaer,T.(eds.)(2002).The Role of Social Capital in Development,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

GTZ,MRD[MinistryofRuralDevelopment],andMoP[MinistryofPlanning](2005).Iden-tification of Poor Households. Most Vulnerable Households Lists,KampongThomandKampot:CBRDP,availableatwww.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-cambodia-poor-house-holds.pdf

GuardianWeekly(2006).Banking of Mr. Ban,13–19.October.Gyallay-Pap,P.(2004).CivilsocietyandreligioninSoutheastAsia,inCivil in Society in South

East Asia Conference June 7– 8. Phnom Penh. Final Report,Munich:MunichInstituteforSocialSciences,pp.35–36.

Hailey, J. (2001).Beyond the formulaic:processandpractice inSouthAsianNGOs, inB.CookeandU.Kohtari(eds.),Participation, the New Tyranny?, London:ZedBooks,pp.88–101.

Hall, B.L. and Kassam, Y. (1988). Participatory research, in J.P. Keeves (ed.), Educational Research, Methodologies, and Measurements. An International Handbook, Oxford:PergamonPress,pp.150–154.

Harris,R.L.(1983).CentralizationanddecentralizationinLatinAmerica,inG.S.CheemaandD.A.Rondinelli(eds.),Decentralisation and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries,BeverlyHills:Sage,pp.183–202.

Hickey,S.andMohan,G.(2004).Towardsparticipationandtransformation:criticalthemesand challenges, in S. Hickey and G. Mohan (eds.), Participation. From Tyranny to Transformation?,London:ZedBooks,pp.3–24.

Hinton,A.L.(2002).PurityandcontaminationintheCambodiangenocide,inJ.Ledger-wood(ed.),Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays,DeKalb:CentreforSouthEastAsianStudies,NorthernIllinoisUniversity,pp.60–90.

HorChanRotha (2004).Assessment of the Role and Status of VDC in Selected Villages in Kampong,PhnomPenh:GTZRuralDevelopmentProjectKampongThomandKam-potandMRD[MinistryofRuralDevelopment].

Huizer,G.(1997).Participatory Action Research and People’s Participation: Introduction and Case Studies,TechnicalConsultationGrouponDecentralisation,Rome:FAO,avail-ableatwww.fao.org/sd/PPdirect/PPre0021.htm

Husén, T. (1994). Research paradigms in education, in T. Husén and T. N. Postlethwaite(eds.),The International Encyclopaedia of Education,2ndedition,Vol.9,Oxford:Else-vierScience,pp.5051–5056.

IFAD[InternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment](2004).Community-Based Rural Development Project in Kampong Thom and Kampot. Mid-Term Review Report,Rome:ProgrammeManagementDepartment,AsiaandthePacificDivision.

Jacobs,J.(2000).The Nature of Economies,NewYork:ModernLibrary.Jennar, R. M. (2006). The Cambodian Constitutions 1953–1993: Democratic Kampuchea

(1975–1979),PhnomPenh:DocumentationCenterofCambodia,availableatwww.dccam.org/Archives/Documents/DK_Policy/DK_Policy_DK_Constitution.htm

169References

Jimenez,E.andYasuyukiSawada(1998).Do Community-Managed Schools Work? An Evalu-ation of El Salvador’s EDUCO Program,inWorldBank,DevelopmentResearchGroupWorkingPaperSeriesonImpactEvaluationofEducationReforms,No.8,February,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank

Kälin, W. (1999). Decentralization – Why and how?, in Swiss Development Cooperation(SDC)(ed.),Decentralization and Development,Bern,pp.46–69.

KaoKimHourn(1999).Grassroots Democracy in Cambodia. Opportunities, Challenges and Prospects,PhnomPenh:CICP[CambodianInstituteforCooperationandPeace]withsupportfromForumSyd.

KAPE[KampucheaActionforPrimaryEducation](2002).Life Skills Program: Guidelines to Establish the Program and Session Plan to Facilitate an Initial Orientation,KampongCham(Cambodia).

Kato,Τ.,Κaplan,J.A.,Chan,S.,andReal,S.(2000).Cambodia. Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development,Manila:ADB[AsianDevelopmentBank],availableatwww.adb.org/Documents/Books/Cambodia_Enhancing_Governance/default.asp

Kaufmann,D.,Kraay,A.,andZoido-Lobatón,P.(1990).Governance Matters,WashingtonD.C.:TheWorldBank.

Keeves,J.P.(1988).Towardsaunifiedapproach,inJ.P.Keeves(ed.),Educational Research, Methodologies, and Measurements. An International Handbook,Oxford:PergamonPresspp.3–8.

Keeves,J.P.(1988a).Theunityofeducationalresearch,Interchange,Vol.19,No.1,pp.14–30.

Kemmerer,F.(1994).Decentralizationofschoolingindevelopingnations,inT.Husén,andT. N. Postlewaite (eds.), The International Encyclopaedia of Education, 2nd edition,Vol.3,Oxford:ElsevierScience,pp.1412–1416.

Kent,A.(2003).Recovery of the Collective Spirit? The Role of the Revival of Buddhism in Cam-bodia,WorkingPaperNo.8,TheLegacyofWarandViolence:ReconstructionandReconciliationinBosnia,PalestineandCambodiaResearchProgramme,Göteborg:SchoolofGlobalStudies,GöteborgUniversity.

Keynes,J.M.(1936).The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,London:Mac-millan.

Kiernan,B.(1996).The Pol Pot Régime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979, NewHeaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Kiernan,B.(2004).ComingtotermswiththepastCambodia,History Today,September,pp.16–19.

KimNinhandHenke,R.(2005).Commune Councils in Cambodia: a National Survey on their Functions and Performance, with a Special Focus on Conflict Resolution,PhnomPenh:TheAsiaFoundationincollaborationwithCAS[CentreforAdvancedStudies].

KimSedara(2001).Reciprocity: Informal Patterns of Social Interactions in a Cambodian Vil-lage Near Angkor Park,Ma.thesis,Dekalb:NorthernIllinoisUniversity.

Knight,K.,Douk,N.,Hing,S.,Phay,S.,andBenoy,A.(2005).Evaluation of the Participation of Village Network and Traditional Associations in the Commune Investment Planning Process in Kampong Thom,InternalPaper13,PhnomPenh:GTZRuralDevelopmentProjectKampongThomandKampot.

Kosonen, K. (2005). Vernaculars in literacy and basic education in Cambodia, Laos andThailand,Current Issues in Language Planning,Vol.6,No.2,pp.122–142.


Krishna,A.(2000).Creatingandharnessingsocialcapital,inP.DasguptaandI.Serageldin(eds.),Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank,pp.71–93.

Krishnamurthy,V.(1999).The Impact of Armed Conflicts on Social Capital. A Study of Two Villages in Cambodia,PhnomPenh:SocialServicesofCambodiawithsupportfromTheWorldBank.

Kuløy,H.K.(1996).Report on an Evaluation of the Cambodia Education Project 1994–1996,Oslo:ReddBarna.

Kusakabe, K., Sugiarti, S., Bao Vuthy, Sopha Phal, Chey Tech (2002). Emergence and De-velopment of Associations in Cambodia,PhnomPenh:JICA[JapaneseInternationalCooperationAgency].

Lamichhane,S.,Pradhan,G.S.,andThapa,B.K.(1994).Decentralisedmanagementpoli-ciesandpracticesintheprimaryeducationsectorinNepal,inR.Govinda(ed.),De-centralization of Educational Management. Experiences from South Asia,Paris:IIEPUNESCO,pp.167–202.

Lauglo,J.(1995).Formsofdecentralisationandtheirimplicationforeducation,Comparative Education,Vol.31,No.1,pp.5–25.

Ledgerwood,J.andVijghen,J.(2002).DecisionmakinginruralKhmervillages,inJ.Ledger-wood(ed.),Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays,DeKalb:CentreforSouthEastAsianStudies,NorthernIllinoisUniversity,pp.109–150.

Lewin,K.M.(1999).Thecostsofculture.SomedilemmasofeducationinvestmentsinMau-ritius,inF.E.LeachandA.W.Little(eds.),Education. Cultures and Economics. Dilem-mas for Development,NewYork:FalmerPress,pp.159–182.

Lister,S.andBetley,M.(1999).Approaches to Decentralization in Developing Countries,pa-perpresentedattheMEFM/DFIDworkshoponGoodPracticesinPublicExpendi-tureManagement,Capetown,June1999.

Little,A.W.(1997).Developmentandeducation,inF.E.LeachandA.W.Little(eds.),Educa-tion. Cultures and Economics. Dilemmas for Development,NewYork:FalmerPress,pp.3–32.

Litvack, J. andSeddon J. (eds.) (1999).Decentralization Briefing Notes,Washington,D.C.:WorldBankInstitute,TheWorldBank.

Litvack,J.,Ahmad,J.,andBird,R.(1998).Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Coun-tries,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Locard, H. (2002). A brief overview of the history of Commune elections. From ‘missioncivilisatrice’ to ‘mission démocratisatrice’?, Phnom Penh Post, 1–14. February, pp.9–12.

López,R.,Thomas,V.,andYanWang(1998).Addressing the Education Puzzle. The Distribu-tion of Education and Economic Reforms,WorkingPaper2031,WashingtonD.C.:TheWorld Bank , available at www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2031/wps2031.pdf

Losert,L.andCoren,M.(2004).Analysis of Commune/Sangkat Powers and Functions. Sector Education,PhnomPenh:MinistryofInteriorandGTZAdministrativeReformsandDecentralisationProject.

Lugaz,C.,DeGrauwe,A.,Baldé,D.,Diakhaté,C.,Dougnon,D.,Moustapha,M,andOdu-shina,D.(2006).ÉcoleetDécentralisation,Paris:IIEPUNESCO.

171References

Manor,J.(1995).DemocraticdecentralizationinAfricaandAsia,IDS Bulletin,Vol.26,No.2,pp.81–88.

Manor,J.(1999).The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

McGinn,N.andStreet,S.(1986).Educationaldecentralization:weakstateorstrongstate?,Comparative Education Review,Vol.30,No.4,pp.471–490.

McGinn, N. and Welch, T. (1999). Decentralization of Education: Why, When, What and How?,Paris:IIEPUNESCO.

McLean,K.andKing,E.(1999).Decentralizationoftheeducationsector,inJ.LitvackandJ.Seddon(eds.),Decentralizations Briefing Notes,Washington,D.C.:WorldBankInsti-tute,TheWorldBank,pp.52–57.

McLean,M.(1983).Educationaldependency:acritique, Compare,Vol.13,No.1,pp.25–42.MeasNee(1999).The Concept of Community,paperpresentedattheconference‘TheMean-

ingofCommunityinCambodia’,7–8June1999,PhnomPenh:WorkingGrouponSocialOrganizationinCambodia.

MeasNeeandHealy,J.(1995).Towards restoring Life in Cambodian Villages,PhnomPenh:JSRCandAusAID.

Meenakshisundaram, S. S. (1994). Decentralisation in Developing Countries, New Delhi:ConceptPublishing.

Mills,C.W.(1959).The Sociological Imagination,London:PenguinBooks.Moegiadi,J.,HarisMudjiman,SutarnoIskandarAgung,KarmidahTedjawati,PhilipSupra-

stowo(1994).Parentassociations inIndonesia, inS.Shaeffer(ed.),Partnership and Participation in Basic Education,Case1,Paris:IIEPUNESCO.

MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSport]andUNICEF(2005).Expanded Basic Edu-cation Programme (EBEP) Phase II 2006–2010. A Joint MoEYS/UNICEF Proposal Sub-mitted to SIDA,PhnomPenh.Availableat:www.moeys.gov.kh/en/education/ebep06-10/ebep06-10.pdf

MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSports] (2000).Education Strategic Plan 2001–2005,PhnomPenh,availableatwww.moeys.gov.kh/en/index.htm

MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSports](2000a).Cluster School Guidelines (PhnomPenh).

MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSports](2000b).The Report of the Assessment of the Functional Literacy Level of the Adult Population in Cambodia,PhnomPenh:De-partmentofNon-FormalEducationwithsupportfromUNESCO.

MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSports](2001).Education Sector Support Program 2001–5,PhnomPenh,availableatwww.moeys.gov.kh/en/index.htm

MoEYS [Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports] (2001a). Priority Action Programme of Improving the Quality and Effectiveness of Basic: Strategic Plan, Schedule of Activities and Budget Allocation,PhnomPenh.

MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSports](2002).Education Decentralisation and Cluster Review Study,PhnomPenh,supportedbyUNICEF/SIDA.

MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSports](2003).Education Sector Performance Re-port: ESSP Review 2003,PhnomPenh.


MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSports](2003a).Education For All National Plan 2003–2015, Phnom Penh, available at www.moeys.gov.kh/en/education/efa/index.htm

MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSports](2005).Education Strategic Plan 2006–2010,PhnomPenh,availableatwww.moeys.gov.kh/en/index.htm

MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSports](2005a).Education Sector Support Pro-gramme 2006–2010,PhnomPenh,availableatwww.moeys.gov.kh/en/index.htm

Mohan,G.andStokke,K.(2000).Participatorydevelopmentandempowerment:thedangersoflocalism,Third World Quarterly,Vol.21,No.2,pp.247–268.

MRD[MinistryforRuralDevelopment](1999).The Circular of Guidance 02 for the Estab-lishment of the Provincial Rural Development Committee,PhnomPenh.

Muijs,D.(2004).Doing Quantitative Research in Education using SPSS,London:SagePub-lication.

Myrdal,G.(1969).Objectivity in Social Research,NewYork:Pantheon.Mysliwiec,E.(1988).Punishing the Poor. The International Isolation of Kampuchea,Oxford:

Oxfam.Mysliwiec,E.L.(1993).Cambodia: NGOs in Transition,paperwrittenfortheworkshop‘The

SocialConsequencesofthePeaceProcessinCambodia’,29–30April,Geneva.NarakSovann(2000).Historically Rooted Organisations in the Traditional Rural Community,

GTZSelf-HelpTeam,KampongThom.Narayan,D.(1999).Social Capital and the State: Complementarity and Substitution,Policy

ResearchWorkingPaper2167,Washington,D.C.:PovertyReductionandManage-mentNetwork.

NCSC[NationalCommitteeforSupporttoCommunes/Sangkats](2005).Review of Decen-tralization Reforms in Cambodia: Policy and Practices,PhnomPenh,availableatwww.ncsc.gov.kh/infomaterials.html

NethTop,Nobuya,Mizoue,SatoshiIto,ShigetakaKai,ToshioNakao,SokhunTy(2006).Re-assessmentofwoodfuelsupplyanddemandrelationshipsinKampongThomProv-ince,Cambodia,Biomass and Bioenergy,Vol.30,pp.134–143.

NGOForum(2001).Results of NGO Discussion on the Draft Socio-Economic Development Plan, Phnom Penh, available at www.ngoforum.org.kh/Development/Docs/sedp_ngo_%20position.htm

Nissen,C.J.(2005).Living Under the Rule of Corruption. An Analysis of Everyday Forms of Corrupt Practices in Cambodia,PhnomPenh:CentreforSocialDevelopment.

North,D.(1990).Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Nurske,R.(1953).Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries,Delhi:Ox-fordUniversityPress.

ÓLoisingh,F.(2001).Cluster School Survey in Kampong Cham Province. A Study of 14 Clus-ters in Terms of Their Potential to Use Resources Effectively.KampongCham:KAPE[KampucheanActionforPrimaryEducation].

O’Leary,M.andMeasNee(2001).Learning for Transformation,PhnomPenh:KromAphi-vuoatPhum.

173References

Oberndorf, J.B. (2004).Law Harmonisation in Relation to the Decentralisation Process in Cambodia, Working Paper No. 31, Phnom Penh: CDRI [Cambodian DevelopmentResourceInstitute].

OECD(2004).Lessons Learned on Donor Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance,DAC Evaluation Series, Paris, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/60/30395116.pdf

Olsen,M.(1982).The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidity,NewHaven(Conn.):YaleUniversityPress.

Orwell,G.(1983).Nineteen Eighty-four,BurntMill(UK):Longman.Ovensen,J., Trankell,I.,andÖjendal,J.(1996).When Every Household is an Island. Social

Organisation and Power Structures in Rural Cambodia,Uppsala:UppsalaResearchReportinCulturalAnthropologyNo.5,UppsalaUniversity.

Pacoco[PagodaAssociationsCoordinationCommittee](1997).Statute of the Coordinating Committee,KampongThom:VatPreahNeang,Stoungdistrict.

PakKimchoeun(2006).ThePriorityActionProgrammeinprimaryeducationinCambodia,Cambodia Development Review,Vol.10,Issues1,pp.1–4.

Parker, A. (1995). Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development?, Policy Re-searchWorkingPaper1475,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Pateman,C.(1970).Participation and Democratic Theory,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Patrinos,H.A.andAsiasingam,D.L. (1997).Decentralization of Education: Demand-Side Financing,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Pellini,A.(2004).TraditionalpagodaassociationsandtheemergenceofcivilsocietyinCam-bodia,Cambodia Development Review,Vol.4,Issue3,pp.5–8.

Pellini,A.(2005).DecentralisationofeducationinCambodia:searchingforspacesofpar-ticipationbetweentraditionsandmodernity,Compare,Vol.35,No.2,pp.205–216.

Pellini,A.(2005a).TraditionalformsofsocialcapitalinCambodiaandthelinkagewithlocaldevelopmentprocesses,Cambodia Development Review,Vol.9,Issue3,pp.8–11.

Pellini,A. (2007).Decentralizationandcommunityparticipation:schoolclustersinCambo-dia,inH.Daun(ed.),Globalized Governance and Grassroots Participation in School Decentralization,TheNetherlands:Springer/Kluwer,pp.189–209.

Pellini,A.andAyres,D.(2005).Social Capital and Village Governance: Experiences with Vil-lage Networks. A Discussion Paper,PhnomPenh:CBRDPandGTZAdministrativeReformProject.

Pellini,A.andAyres,D.(2007).CommunityparticipationinlocalgovernanceinCambodia:learningfromtheVillageNetworksapproach,Development in Practice,Vol.17,No.3,pp.404–409.

Pheng,D.,Savonn,H.&Soly,Y.(2001).Educational Financing and Budgeting in Cambodia.Paris:IIEPUNESCO.

Picq,L.(1989).Beyond the Horizon: Five Years with the Khmer Rouge,NewYork:St.Marttin’sPress.

Poggi,M.andNeirotti,N.(2004).Alianzas e Innovaciones en Proyectos de Desarrollo Local,BuenosAires:IIEPUNESCO.

Prud’homme,R.(1994).On the Danger of Decentralization,PolicyResearchWorkingPaper1252,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.


Pryor, J. (2005).Cancommunityparticipationmobilizesocialcapital for improvementofruralschooling?AcasestudyfromGhana,Compare,Vol.35,No.2,pp.193–203.

Psacharopoulos,G.,Rojas,C.,andVelez,E. (1992).Achievement Evaluation of Colombia’s Escuela Nueva. Is Multigrade the Answer?, PolicyResearchWorkingPaper896,Wash-ington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Putnam,R.(1996).WhokilledcivicAmerica?,Prospect,March,pp.66–72.Putnam,R.(2000).Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community,New

York:SimonandSchuster.Putnam,R.,Leonardi,R.,andNanetti,R.Y.(1993).Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradi-

tions in Modern Italy (Italianedition,translationNoemiMessora),Princeton(N.J.):PrincetonUniversityPress.

Pye,L.(1999).Civility,socialcapitalandcivilsociety:threepowerfulconceptsforexplainingAsia,Journal of Interdisciplinary History,Vol.29,No.4,pp.762–782.

Rao,V.andWalton,M.(2004).Cultureandpublicaction:rationality,equalityofagency,anddevelopment, inV.Raoand M.Walton (eds.),Culture and Public Action, Stanford(Ca):StanfordUniversityPress,pp.3–36.

RGC [Royal Government of Cambodia] – CIP (2002). Commune Development Plans and Commune Investment Programs,PhnomPenh:Rural InvestmentandLocalGover-nanceProject.

RGC[RoyalGovernmentofCambodia](1993).The Constitution of Cambodia,availableat:www.constitution.org/cons/cambodia.htm

RGC[RoyalGovernmentofCambodia](2000).Seila Program Document 2001–2005,PhnomPenh:STF[SeilaTaskForce],availableatwww.seila.gov.kh/english/detPuben.asp?action=PD&language=en&pgid=8&tCont=Project%20Documents

RGC[RoyalGovernmentofCambodia](2001).The Law on Administration and Management of Commune Councils,PhnomPenh,availableatwww.ncsc.gov.kh/laws.html

RGC[RoyalGovernmentofCambodia](2001a).The Law for the Election of Commune Coun-cils,PhnomPenh,availableatwww.ncsc.gov.kh/laws.html

RGC[RoyalGovernmentofCambodia](2002).Sub-decree N. 22 on Decentralization of Pow-ers, Roles and Duties to Commune/Sangkat Councils,PhnomPenh,availableatwww.ncsc.gov.kh/laws.html

RGC[RoyalGovernmentofCambodia](2002a).Inter-Ministerial Prakas No. 098 on Com-mune/Sangkat Development Planning, Phnom Penh, available at www.ncsc.gov.kh/laws.html

RGC[RoyalGovernmentofCambodia](2004).The Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Em-ployment, Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia,PrimeMinisterSamdechHunSenandtheThirdLegislatureoftheNationalAssembly,attheOfficeoftheCouncilofMin-isters,PhnomPenh,16.July2004.Availableat:www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/7cg_meet-ing/position_paper_eng2004/7cg_03.htm

RiddelRubin,A.(1997).Reformsofthegovernanceofeducation:centralizationanddecen-tralization, in W. C. Cummings and N. F. McGinn (eds.), International Handbook of Education and Development: Preparing Schools, Students and Nations for the XXI Century,Oxford:PergamonPress,pp.185–196.

Rondinelli,D.(1983).Development Projects as Policy Experiments. An Adaptive Approach to Development Administration,London:Methuen&Co.

175References

Rondinelli,D.A.(1999).Whatisdecentralization?,inJ.Litvack,andJ.Seddon(eds.),Decen-tralization Briefing Notes,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank,pp.2–5.

Rondinelli,D.A.,McCullogh,J.S.,andJohnson,R.W.(1989).Analyzingdecentralizationpolicies Indevelopingcountries:apolitical-economyframework,Development and Change,Vol.20,No.1,pp.57–87.

Rondinelli, D. A., Nellis, J. R., and Cheema, G. S. (1983). Decentralization in Developing Countries. A Review of Recent Experiences, World Bank Staff Working paper 581,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Rose,P.(2003).CommunityparticipationinschoolpolicyandpracticeinMalawi,Compare,Vol.33,No.1,pp.47–63.

Rose,P.(2005).PrivatisationanddecentralisationofschoolinginMalawi:defaultordesign?,Compare,Vol.35,No.2,pp.153–165.

Rosenstein-Rodan,P.N.(1961).NotesonthetheoryoftheBigPush,inH.S.Ellis(ed.),Eco-nomic Development for Latin America,London:Macmillan.

Rossi,M.(1999).Decentralization–InitialexperiencesandexpectationsoftheSDC,inSDC[SwissDevelopmentCooperation](ed.),Decentralization and Development,Bern,pp.14–25.

Rostow,W.W.(1960).The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cam-bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Rusten,C.,KimSedara,EngNetra,andPakKimchoeun(2004).The Challenges of Decen-tralisation Design in Cambodia,PhnomPenh:CDRI[CambodianDevelopmentRe-searchInstitute].

Sachs,J.(2005).The End of Poverty,London:Penguin.Sack,R.,Cross,M.,andMoulton,J.(2004).Evaluation of Finnish Education Sector Develop-

ment Cooperation,Helsinki:DepartmentforDevelopmentPolicy,MinistryforFor-eignAffairsofFinland.

SangkumReastrNiyum(1994).Camboge: Education Nationale 1955-1969,PhnomPenh(re-printed).

SarNak,Jongsma,D.,Ratcliffe,M.(2002).Evolving Sector-wide Approach to Education in Cambodia and the Role of Strategic Planning Processes,paperpresentedat theIIEPSeminar,IIEPUNESCO,Paris4–6December2002.

Sasse,R.(1998).GTZ-Provincial Development Program Kampong Thom, Self-Help Compo-nent. Report of an Internal Evaluation,KampongThom:GTZProvincialDevelop-mentProgramKampongThom.

Schuller,T.,Baron,S.,andField,J.(2000).Socialcapital:areviewandcritique,inS.Baron,J.Field, andT.Schuller (eds.),Social Capital: Critical Perspectives,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.1–38.

Schultz,W.T.(1962).Investmentinhumancapital,inE.S.Phelps(eds.),The Goal of Eco-nomic Growth,NewYork:W.W.Norton&CompanyInc,pp.106–120.

SDC[SwissDevelopmentCooperation](2001).Guide to Decentralization,Bern.Seddon,J.(1999).Participation,civilsocietyanddecentralization,inJ.LitvackandJ.Seddon

(eds.),Decentralization Briefing Notes,Washington,D.C.:WorldBankInstitute,TheWorldBank,pp.15–18.

Sen,A.(1988).Theconceptofdevelopment,inH.CheneryandT.N.Srinivasan(eds.), Hand-book of Development Economics,VolumeI,Amsterdam:NorthHolland,pp.9–26.


Sen,A.(1999).Development as Freedom (Italianedition,translationGianniRigamonti),Ox-ford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Sen,A.(2004).Howdoesculturematter?,inV.RaoandM.Walton(eds.),Culture and Public Action,Stanford(Ca):StanfordUniversityPress,pp.37–58.

Shaeffer,S.(1994).Developingparentsandcommunityorganizationaspartnersineduca-tionalplanning,Partnership and Participation in Basic Education,Module3,Paris:IIEPUNESCO.

Shah,A.(1998).Balance, Accountability, and Responsiveness: Lessons about Decentralization,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Shawcross,W.(1993).Sideshow. Kissinger Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia.London:HogarthPress.

SIDA[SwedishInternationalDevelopmentAgency](1998).Second Report of the SIDA Advi-sory Team to CARERE II,StockholmandPhnomPenh.

SIDA [Swedish International Development Agency] (2000). Cambodia Area Rehabilita-tion and Regeneration Project – Report of the Joint Evaluation Mission,PhnomPenh:UNDPandSIDA.

Singer,H.W.(1961).Educationandeconomicdevelopment,inH.W.Singer(ed.),Interna-tional Development: Growth and Change,NewYork:McGraw-Hill.

Singer,H.W.(1979).Poverty,incomedistributionandlevelsofliving:thirtyyearsofchang-ingthoughtsondevelopmentproblems,inReflections on Economic Development and Social Change: Essays in Honor of V.K.B.V. Rao,Oxford:MartinRobertson.

Singh,R.P.B.(2006).Mohandas(Mahatma)Gandhi, inD.Simon(ed.),Fifty Thinkers in Development,London:Routledge,pp.106–110.

Slocomb,M.(2003).The People’s Republic of Kampuchea 1979–1989. The Revolution after Pol Pot,Bangkok:SilkwormBooks.

Sloper,D.(ed.)(1999).Higher Education in Cambodia: the Social and Educational Context for Reconstruction, Bangkok: UNESCO Principal Regional Office for Asia and thePacific.

Smith,B.C.(1985).Decentralisation: The Territorial Dimension of the State,London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin.

Smith,B.C.(1988).Bureaucracy and Political Power,Sussex:WheatsheafBooks.Smith,B.C. (2003).Understanding Third World Politics. Theories of Political Change and

Development,Basingstoke:Palgrave–Macmillan.Smith,W.O.L.(1957).Education. An Introductory Survey,Harmondsworth(UK):PenguinSoChunnandSupotePrasestri(2000).Literacyratesmuchlowerthanestimated,Cambo-

dian Development Review,Vol.4,Issue2,pp.1–4.Soubbotina,T.P.(2004).Beyond Economic Growth An Introduction to Sustainable Develop-

ment,2ndedition,WashingtonD.C.:TheWorldBank,availableatwww.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/index.html

STF [Seila Task Force] (2003). Seila Programme Annual Work Plan and Budget, PhnomPenh.

Sutcliffe,B.(2001).100 Ways of Seeing an Unequal World,NewYork:ZedBooks.

177References

Takala,T.(1998).Theevolutionofaconsensusoneducationsectorpolicy, inJ.Gould,T.Takala,M.Nokkala,How Sectoral Programs Work. An Analysis of Education and Ag-riculture Sector Programs in Zambia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nepal,PolicyPapersNo.1,Helsinki:InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofHelsinki,pp.37–38.

Takala,T.andTapaninen,S.(1995).Justification for an Priorities of Development Assistance to Education – Finnish Development Cooperation in International Perspectives,Tam-pere:DepartmentofEducation,UniversityofTempere.

Terzani,T.(1998).A Fortune-Teller Told Me. Eastbound Travels in the Far East,London:Fla-mingo.

Thida C. Kus (2000). Country Study of Non-Governmental Organisations in Cambodia,PhnomPenh:Silaka.

Thion,S.(1993).Watching Cambodia. Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle,Bangkok:WhiteLotus.

Thion,S.(1999).Whatisthemeaningofcommunity?,Cambodia Development Review,Vol.3,Issue3,pp.12–13.

Thomas,V.(1991).Lessonsfromeconomicdevelopment,Finance & Development,Septem-ber,pp.7–9.

Thorbecke,E.(2000).Thedevelopmentdoctrineandforeignaid1950–2000,inF.Tarp(ed.),Foreign Aid and Development. Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future,London:Routledge,p.17–47.

Tiihonen,S.(2004).From Governing to Governance: a Process of Change,Tampere:TampereUniversityPress.

Turner,M.(1999).Philippines:fromcentralismtolocalism,inM.Turner(ed.),Central-Local Relations in Asia-Pacific,Houdsmills:MacmillanPress,p.97–122.

Turner,M. (2002).Decentralization Facilitation. A Study of Decentralization in Cambodia with Specific Reference to Education, Phnom Penh: MoEYS [Ministry of EducationYouthandSports].

Turner, M. (2002a). What happened to deconcentration? Recent initiatives in Cambodia,Public Administration and Development,Volume22,Issue4,pp.353–364.

Turner,M.andHulme,D.(1997).Governance, Administration & Development. Making the State Work,Houndsmills:MacmillanPress.

UNDP(2002).Report on the Elections of the Commune Councils,PhnomPenh.UNDP(2004).Human Development Report 2004. Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World,

NewYork.UNESCO(2005).Decentralization in Education: National Policies and Practices,Paris,avail-

ableathttp://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001412/141221e.pdfUNICEF(1996).Towards a Better Future: An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Wom-

en in Cambodia,PhnomPenh.United Nations (2006). United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, available at

www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untac.htmUphoff,N.(2000).Understandingsocialcapital:learningfromtheanalysisandexperience

ofparticipation,inP.DasguptaandI.Serageldin(eds.),Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective,Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank,pp.215–252.

VanderWeyden,P.(2000).ParliamentaryelectionsinCambodia1998,Electoral Studies,No.19,pp.615–646.


Vasko,V.,Kjisik,H.,andSalo-Lee,L.(1998).Culture in Finnish Development Cooperation,Helsinki:DepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandCooperation,MinistryforForeignAffairs.

Vickery,M.(1984).Cambodia: 1975–1982:Bangkok:SilkwormBooks.Vickery,M.(1986).Kampuchea. Politics, Economics and Society,London:FrancesPinter.Vickery,M.(1993).Cambodia1981:backgroundandissues,inS.Thion(ed.),Watching Cam-

bodia. Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle,Bangkok:WhiteLotus,pp.95–118.Watts,E.M. (1999).The Meaning of Community in Cambodia. English Literature Review,

paperpresentedattheconferencethe‘MeaningofCommunityinCambodia’,PhnomPenh,7–8June,WorkingGrouponSocialOrganizationinCambodia,PhnomPenh.

WCEFA[WorldConferenceonEducationforAll](1990).World Declaration on Education For All: Meeting Basic Learning Needs, Paris: UNESCO, available at: www.unesco.org/education/efa/ed_for_all/background/jomtien_declaration.shtml

WCEFA[WorldConferenceonEducationforAll](1990a).Framework for Action: Meeting Basic Learning Needs, Paris:UNESCO,availableat:www.unesco.org/education/efa/ed_for_all/background/07Bpubl.shtml

WEF[WorldEducationForum](2000).The Dakar Framework for Action – Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments.Paris:UNESCO,availableat:http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001211/121147e.pdf

Weick,K.E. (1976).Educationorganizationsand looselycoupled systems,Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.20,pp.1–19.

Wharton,D.(2003).Assessment of the Role and Potential of the Pagoda Coordination Com-mittee (Pacoco) on Issues related to Local Governance and Cooperation with Commune Councils, Kampong Thom: GTZ Rural Development Project Kampong Thom andKampot.

Wheelan,C.(2002).Naked Economics. Undressing the Dismal Science,NewYork:W.W.Nor-ton&Company.

Wheeler, C., Chuaratanaphong, J., and Kunarak, P. (1994). Improving basic educationthrough collaboration and cooperation: school clusters in Thailand, in S. Shaeffer(ed.),Partnership and Participation in Basic Education,Case2,Paris:IIEPUNESCO.

Whitacre,P.(1997).Education Decentralization in Africa: As Viewed through the Literature and USAid Projects,Washington,D.C.:SupportforAnalysisandResearchinAfrica(SARA)Project.

Williams, J.H. (1997). Improving school-community relations in the periphery, in H.D.NielsenandW.K.Cummings(eds.),Quality Education for All. Community-Oriented Approaches,NewYork:GarlandPublishing,pp.37–71.

Williamson,J.(2004).The Washington Consensus as a Policy Prescription for Development,Washington,D.C.:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,availableatwww.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf

Winkler,D.R.(1989).Decentralization of Education: An Economic Perspective,WorkingPa-per143,WashingtonD.C.:TheWorldBank.

Woolcock,M.(1998).Socialcapitalandeconomicdevelopment:towardatheoreticalsynthe-sisandpolicyframework,Theory and Society,Vol.27,No.2,pp.151–208.

179References

Work,R.(2002).Overview of Decentralisation Worldwide: A Stepping Stone to Improved Gov-ernance and Human Development,paperpresentedattheUNDPconference‘Federal-ism:TheFutureofDecentralizingStates?’,25–27July,Manila:Philippines.

WorldBank,The(1997).World Development Report 1997. The State in a Changing World,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,availableathttp://econ.worldbank.org/wdr?

WorldBank,The(1999).What is Social Capital?,availableatwww.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm.

WorldBank,The(1999).World Development Report 1999–2000. Entering the 21st Century,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,availableathttp://econ.worldbank.org/wdr?

WorldBank,The(2004).Cambodia at the Crossroad: Strengthening Accountability to Reduce Poverty,WashingtonD.C.:TheWorldBank.

WorldBank,The(2005).Cambodia. Quality Basic Education for All,WashingtonD.C.WorldBank,The(2006).Cambodia: Halving Poverty by 2015?,PhnomPenh.WorldBank,The(2006).From Schooling Access to Learning Outcomes: an Unfinished Agen-

da. An Evaluation of World Bank Support to Primary Education,WashingtonD.C.:IndependentEvaluationGroup–TheWorldBank.

WorldBank,TheandADB[AsianDevelopmentBank](2003).Cambodia: Enhancing Service Delivery through Improved Allocation and Institutional Reforms – Integrated Fidu-ciary Assessment and Public Expenditures,WashingtonD.C.andManila.


CambodiaRedCross(2003).Cambodia Total Victim Information System (CMVIS),PhnomPenh,withsupportfromHandicapInternationalBelgium.

DeAgostini(2003).Calendario Atlante De Agostini.100º Anno,Novara(Italy):IstitutoGeo-graficoDeAgostini.

FAO(2004).FAO Statistical Database (FAOSTAT),availableathttp://faostat.fao.org/GTZ(1998).Poverty and Nutritional Baseline Survey,KampongThom:GTZRuralDevelop-

mentProgram.ICBL[InternationalCampaigntoBanLandmines](2005).Landmine Monitor Report 2005:

Toward a Mine-Free World,NewYork:HumanRightsWatch.KeskinenM.(2003).Socio-economic Survey of the Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia,MasterofSci-

enceThesis,Helsinki:HelsinkiUniversityofTechnology.MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSport](2005b).Education Statistics & Indicators

for Clusters 2003–2004, Kampong Thom,PhnomPenh:EMIS-Centre,PlanningDe-partmentwithsupportfromUNICEF/SIDA.

MoEYS[MinistryofEducation,YouthandSport](2006).Education Statistics & Indicators 2004/2005, Kampong Thom Province,PhnomPenh:EMIS-Centre,PlanningDepart-mentwithsupportfromUNICEF/SIDA.

MoH [Ministry of Health] (1998). National Health Survey, Phnom Penh: Department ofPlanningandHealthInformation.

MoH[MinistryofHealth](2002).HIV Sentinel Surveillance,PhnomPenh:NationalCentreforHIV/AIDS,DermatologyandSTDs,MinistryofHealth.

MoP[MinistryofPlanning](1998).Population Census of Cambodia 1998,PhnomPenh:Na-tionalInstituteofStatistics,availableatwww.nis.gov.kh

MoP[MinistryofPlanning](1999).Socio-economicSurvey,PhnomPenh:NationalInstituteofStatistics.

MoP[MinistryofPlanning](2000).Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey 2000,PhnomPenh:NationalInstituteofStatistics.

MoP [Ministry of Planning] (2000). Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey, PhnomPenh:NationalInstituteofStatistics.

Data sources

181References

MoP[MinistryofPlanning](2004).Cambodia Inter-Censual Population Survey 2004,PhnomPenh:NationalInstituteforStatistics.

MoP [Ministry of Planning] (2004). Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey, Phnom Penh: Na-tionalInstituteofStatistics.

MRD[MinistryofRuralDevelopment]andGTZ(1995).Regional Framework Plan of Kam-pong Thom Province,PhnomPenhandKampongThom.

PRDC[ProvincialRuralDevelopmentCommittee](2004).Commune Priority Activity Ma-trix 2004,KampongThom:ExCOM[ExecutiveCommittee].

SanSyThanandHasBunton(2003).Inter-Censal Population Survey (CIPS) 2003 and the Next Population Census 2008,PhnomPenh:NationalInstituteofStatistics,MinistryofPlanning,availableatwww.ancsdaap.org/cencon2005/Papers/Cambodia/Cambo-dia.San.and.Has.pdf

SEILA-MoP [Ministry of Planning] (2005). Commune Database (CDB) 5.3, Phnom Penh,availableatwww.seila.gov.kh

UNDP(1998). Human Development Report 1998: Consumption for Human Development,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,availableathttp://hdr.undp.org/

UNDP(1999).Human Development Report 1999. Globalization with a Human Face, Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,availableathttp://hdr.undp.org/

UNDP(2000).Human Development Report 2000. Human Rights and Human Development, Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,availableathttp://hdr.undp.org/

UNDP(2001).Human Development Report 2001. Making new technologies work for human development, Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,http://hdr.undp.org/

UNDP (2002). Human Development Report 2002. Deepening democracy in a fragmented world, Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,availableathttp://hdr.undp.org/

UNDP(2003).Human Development Report 2003. Millennium Development Goals: A compact among nations to end human poverty, Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,availableathttp://hdr.undp.org/

UNDP(2004).Human Development Report 2004. Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World, NewYork,availableathttp://hdr.undp.org/

UNDP(2005).Human Development Report 2005. International Cooperation at a Crossroad: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,avail-ableathttp://hdr.undp.org/

UNDP(2005).Human Development Report 2005. International Cooperation at a Crossroad: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,avail-ableathttp://hdr.undp.org/

UNESCO (2004). Education in Cambodia, Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statis-tics, available at http://www.uis.unesco.org/profiles/EN/EDU/countryProfile_en.aspx?code=4060

UNESCO(2005a).Education for All. Literacy for Life,Paris,availableathttp://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=43283&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SEC-TION=201.html

UNESCO(2006).Education For All: Global Monitoring Report Data,Paris:UIS[UNESCOInstituteofStatistics],availableathttp://gmr.uis.unesco.org

WHO(1995).The World Health Report 1995 – Bridging the Gaps,Geneva,availableatwww.who.int/whr/previous/en/index.html


WHO(1996).The World Health Report 1996 – Fighting Disease, Fostering Development,Ge-neva,availableatwww.who.int/whr/previous/en/index.html

WHO(1997).The World Health Report 1997 – Conquering Suffering, Enriching Humanity,Geneva,availableatwww.who.int/whr/previous/en/index.html

WHO(1998).The World Health Report 1998 – Life in the 21st Century: a Vision For All,Ge-neva,availableatwww.who.int/whr/previous/en/index.html

WHO (1999). The World Health Report 1999 – Making a Difference, Geneva, available atwww.who.int/whr/previous/en/index.html

WHO(2000).The World Health Report 2000 – Health Systems: Improving Performance,Ge-neva,availableatwww.who.int/whr/previous/en/index.html

WHO (2001). The World Health Report 2001 – Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope,Geneva,availableatwww.who.int/whr/previous/en/index.html

WHO(2002).The World Health Report 2002 – Reducing Risks, Promoting Healthy Life,Ge-neva,availableatwww.who.int/whr/previous/en/index.html

WHO(2005).The World Health Report 2005 – Make Every Mother and Child Count,Geneva,availableatwww.who.int/whr/previous/en/index.html

WHO(2005).The World Health Report 2005 – Make Every Mother and Child Count,Geneva,availableatwww.who.int/whr/previous/en/index.html

WHO (2006). Map of Cambodia, available at www.who.int/sysmedia/pdf/countries/khm.pdf

WHO[WorldHealthOrganization](2005).World Health Atlas 2005,Geneva.WorldBank,The(2004a).Cambodia at a Glance,availableathttp://devdata.worldbank.org/

AAG/khm_aag.pdfWorldBank,The(2006a).World Development Indicators,availableathttp://devdata.world-

bank.org/data-query/WorldBank,The(2006b).EdStats,availableathttp://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats

183Annex I

Annex 1 – List of interviews, observations and �ersonal communications

I��v��u�� I��v��w�� (��ph�� )Mr Bun C��an Lyla Project manager, GTZ Kam�ong T��omMr Bun Sat�� Primary sc��ool teac��er and staff of POE Kam�ong T��omMr Bun Tean Prea�� Damrei Primary Sc��ool, Kam�ong T��omMs Buon Norm Pacoco member, Kam�ong T��omMs C��an Sot��eavy Project manager, GTZ Kam�ong T��omMs C��ara �ic��ards Education advisor, VSO/EQIP KandalMr C��eat You Heat Project assistant, KAPE Kam�ong C��amMr C��uon Vut��y Lut��eran World Federation, P��nom Pen��Mr C��un Sim Commune Council C��ief, Kam�ong C��eteal, Kam�ong T��omMr Cristiano Calcagno Provincial coordinator, GTZ Kam�ong T��omMr Daniel Adler Legal S�ecialist, T��e World Bank P��nom Pen��Mr David Ayres ConsultantMr David Wart��on ConsultantMr Ek Tinavut�� Program assistant Set�� Koma �roject, UNICEF P��nom Pen��Mr Elis Karsten Director, Finnconsult Oy Helsinki (Finland)Mr Ernesto Bautista Governance advisor, UNDP P��nom Pen��Mr Fiotán Ó Loinsig�� Education advisor, KAPE Kam�ong C��amMr George Taylor Education advisor, �TI International P��nom Pen��Mr Hang Toy Pacoco member, Kam�ong T��omMr Huon Vannit�� C��ief of Provincial Local Administration Unit, Kam�ong T��omMr Huor Kolvoan Community develo�ment manager, Ministry of �ural Develo�ment P��nom Pen��Mr Ismael Trasmonte Jr. Commune Councils Su��ort Project, P��nom Pen��Mr Jo��n Evans Education advisor, Basic and Primary Education Project Kat��mandu (Ne�al)Mr Keat Bun T��an Project assistant, Mlu� Baitong P��nom Pen��Mr Kurt Bredenberg Education advisor, KAPE Kam�ong C��amMr Lang Seng Horng Project manager, Centre d’Etude et de Dévelo��ement Agricole Cambodgien (CEDAC)

P��nom Pen��Mr Leng Vy Director, De�artment of Local Administration at t��e Ministry of Interior P��nom Pen��Mr Long Nuoeng Village C��ief, Kam�ong C��eteal Kam�ong T��omMr Luc de Mesteer Team leader, GTZ Administrative �eforms and Decentralisation Project P��nom Pen��Ms Lynn Losert Education advisor, USAid P��nom Pen��Mr Mic��el Le Pec��oux Program manager, Set�� Koma �roject UNICEF P��nom Pen��Mr Nam Sot�� Commune Council C��ief, �ong �ueng Commune, Kam�ong T��omMr Nebendra Da��al Education advisor, UNICEF P��nom Pen��Mr Nic��olas Hinde Education advisor, VSO/EQIP TakeoMs Niem Lee District animator, EQIP KandalMr Ouc�� Sorn Project manager, BFDK Kam�ong T��om


Mr Paddy �oome Legal advisor, UNDP P��nom Pen��Mr Pra Pa�� Pacoco member, Kam�ong T��omMr �ic��ard Geeves Director, World Education P��nom Pen��Mr �oger Henke Advisor, Centre for Advanced Studies P��nom Pen��Ms �ut�� Cint��e Project manager, Lut��eran World Federation P��nom Pen��Mr Sam Samnang K��mer language teac��er, DED (German Develo�ment Service) Berlin/BonnMs Sia� Sor�� Sc��ool Association of Botum Pagoda, Kam�ong T��omMr Siev Bot Achar, Kam�ong T��omMr Simon Molendijk Education advisor, VSO/KAPE Kam�ong C��amMr Son Sivet�� Project manager, Lut��eran World Federation P��nom Pen��Mr Song Nguong Director, Teac��er Training Sc��ool Kam�ong T��omMr Srey Kun C��uon Director, CODEC Kam�ong T��omMr To� Ev Pacoco member, Kam�ong T��omMr To� T��at Project manager, GTZ Kam�ong T��omMr Ven. Ly Kom Director, BFDK Kam�ong T��omMr Ven. Seik C��eng Ngorn Abbot of t��e �agoda of Don Lao, Stoung district, Kam�ong T��omMs Yot Norn Pacoco member, Kam�ong T��om

G��up I��v��w�� (��ph�� )

Members of t��e Associations of Sangkor Cluster Sc��ool, Kam�ong T��omMembers of Botum Sc��ool Association, Kam�ong T��omMembers of Tbong Tuk Primary Sc��ool Committee, Kam�ong T��omMembers of Kantorong Sc��ool Association, Kam�ong T��omStaff of t��e local CNGO APA, Kam�ong T��om

L�� v�� (�h�� )

19.07.02 Works��o� on t��e definition of good and bad governance in Cambodia, GTZ �DP advisors in Kam�ong T��om

19.07.02 GTZ staff Kam�ong T��om, mont��ly meeting discussion on governance29.07.02 Meeting between district animators and VSO/EQIP education advisor, Prek Tabenk Village, Kandal01.08.02 Village annual �lanning, L’Ak village, Kam�ong T��om05.08.02 Yearly sc��ool �lanning, Bok Dav cluster sc��ool, Kandal 06.08.02 Yearly sc��ool �lanning, Kbal Ko�� cluster sc��ool, Kandal07.08.02 Yearly sc��ool �lanning, Kbal Ko�� cluster sc��ool, Kandal09.08.02 Yearly sc��ool �lanning, Svay �ameak cluster sc��ool, Kandal26.08.02 Mont��ly meeting and re�orting on association activities, Pacoco members, Kam�ong T��om02.10.02 Notes from a meeting on Natural �esource Management and community develo�ment wit�� GTZ �ural

Develo�ment Project in Kam�ong T��om24.10.02 Key issues on education develo�ment in next few years, �resentation by �ic��ard Geeves at t��e VSO

Cambodia annual meeting, Si��anoukville25.11.02 Meeting cas�� and rice associations, Pacoco, Kam�ong T��om17-18.2.2003 Works��o� on decentralisation and good governance in Cambodia for GTZ �ural Develo�ment Project

staff, P��nom Pen��13.03.03 Discussion on �artici�ation of communities in sc��ools wit�� EQIP district animators, Kandal

185Annex I

07.04.04 Community �artici�ation and traditional association meeting, Ban Dei Pagoda Kam�ong T��om28.04.05 Notes about t��e structure of Pagoda Associations, Ms Da Nary Kam�ong T��om03.08.05 Notes from a filed visit to Commune Councils and Village Networks in Kam�ong T��om by Ministry of

�ural Develo�ment and Ministry of Interiors staff15.09.05 Discussion on civil society and social ca�ital wit�� staff of GTZ Administrative �eforms and Decentralisa-

tion Project and GTZ �ural Develo�ment Project, P��nom Pen��

L�� p�� u�� (�h�� )

25.09.02 Mr Nic��olas Hinde, education advisor VSO/EQIP Takeo01.06.02 Mr Georg Müller, coordinator DED Cambodia28.09.02 Mr Walter Asc��moneit, consultant 09.02.03 Mr Walter Asc��moneit, consultant17.03.03 Mr Nic��olas Hinde, education advisor VSO/EQIP24.07.03 Mr Walter Asc��moneit, consultant03.02.04 Mr Walter Asc��moneit, consultant06.09.04 Mr Mark Turner, Professor at t��e Sc��ool of Business and Government, University of Canberra (Australia)27.09.04 Mr �obin Biddul��, consultant27.05.05 Mr Walter Asc��moneit, consultant12.06.06 Ms C��an Sot��eavy, �roject manager GTZ Kam�ong T��om24.09.06 Mr �oger Henke, advisor Centre for Advanced Studies, P��nom Pen��13.09.06 Mr Sarin Sam��ors, teac��er and translator09.10.06 Mr Walter Asc��moneit, consultant20.11.06 Ms Da Nary, �roject assistant DED Kam�ong T��om25.11.06 Ms Lynn Losert, education advisor USAid P��nom Pen��


Annex 2 – Leading �uestions for interviewsLO

CAL L

EVEL

W��en was t��e Sc��ool Association establis��ed?

W��at is t��e objective of t��e association?

W��at is t��e organizational structure of t��e association?

W��at is total number of members in your association?

Do you ��ave discussion wit�� t��e teac��er about teac��ing and learning activities?

W��at kind of coo�eration does t��e association ��as wit�� t��e sc��ool?

Does t��e association �rovide also su��ort to t��e teac��er?

How does t��e association su��ort t��e �oorest families to send t��eir c��ildren to sc��ool?

How long ��ave you been involved wit�� t��is association?

Does t��e Sc��ool Association re�ort also to t��e Commune Council?

NAT

ION

AL L

EVEL W��at are t��e elements of community �artici�ation in sc��ool w��ic�� are reflected in national �olicies?

W��at could be t��e role of Commune Councils in t��e education sector/sc��ools?

Are t��e sc��ool-community committees establis��ed following t��e national guidelines functioning?

187Annex III

Annex 3 – Sc��ool Association C��ecklist

189Annex III

191Annex III

193Annex III

195Annex III


Annex 4 – Ma� and list of Sc��ool Association c��ecklists

TheChecklistinterviewswereconductedwithmembersof30SchoolAssociations.TheabovemapshowsthevillageswheretheSchoolAssociationsarelocated(seealsolistinthetablebelow).Themaprefersonlytothechecklistsanditdoesnotshowthelocation of interviews,observations, and personal communications.All checklistsinterviewshavebeenconductedbyMr.SarinSamphors.TheselectionoftheSchoolAssociationshasbeendonetakingintoaccounttwoelements.First,theaccessibilityandsafetyofthearea.Second,thepresenceofoneCNGOworkingwithCBRDPwiththeVillageNetworkapproachtohelptoidentifytheSchoolAssociationsmembersandorganisetheinterviewmeetings.Sandanwasthemostdifficultdistricttoaccessduring the surveyperioddue to extremely bad roadconditions and has thereforebeenexcludedfromthechecklistssurvey.ThedistrictofSantukissparselypopu-lated,thereforethechecklistinterviewstookplaceinthevillagesnearbythedistrictcentre.ThedistrictofBarayisneitheraCBRDPtargetareanorhasCNGOslinkedto CBRDP working there and has therefore not been included in the survey. ThedistrictofStounghasalsobeenexcludedsincethisistheareawheretherehasbeen

197Annex IV

thegreatestinvolvementwithpagodaandschoolassociationsthroughthesupportprovidedbyCBRDPtoPacoco.StoungisalsothedistrictwherehavebeenconductedmostindividualandgroupinterviewsaswellasthelocationoftheBotumPagodacasestudy.

N� S�h�� V�� C��u�� D��1 T��nal Bek Primary Sc��ool T��nal Baek Tra�eang �uessei Kam�ong Svay2 Prey Preal Primary Sc��ool Prey Preal Ka Tra�eang �uessei Kam�ong Svay3 Kouk Nguon Primary Sc��ool Tra�eang Prolit Tra�eang �uessei Kam�ong Svay4 Prasat Svay Prey Primary Sc��ool Prasat Tra�eang �uessei Kam�ong Svay5 �omaing Gno�� Tra�eang �uessei Tra�eang �uessei Kam�ong Svay6 Mony �aingsei Primary Sc��ool Snao Tra�eang �uessei Kam�ong Svay7 C��unlos Primary Sc��ool T��nal Tuol Kreul Prasat Balangk8 Mareak Primary Sc��ool Mreak Ka Tuol Kreul Prasat Balangk9 Ta �eam Primary Sc��ool Trac�� Tbaeng Kam�ong Svay

10 Po Primary Sc��ool Pou Tbaeng Kam�ong Svay11 Tro�aing Pring Primary Sc��ool Tra�eang Pring Sa Kream Prasat Balangk12 Veal T��nol Primary Sc��ool Veal T��nal Sa Kream Prasat Balangk13 Tram K��la Primary Sc��ool Tram K��la Tbaeng Kam�ong Svay14 O Sambour Primary Sc��ool Ou Sambuor Kdei Doung Stueng Saen15 Kdei Daung Primary Sc��ool Kdei Doung Kdei Doung Stueng Saen16 Sleng Primary Sc��ool Slaeng Kdei Doung Stueng Saen17 Puk Yuk Primary Sc��ool Puk Yuk Srayov Stueng Saen18 Kam�ong C��en Teal Primary Sc��ool Kam�ong C��eu Teal Sambour Prasat Sambour19 Kam�ong �otes Primary Sc��ool Kam�ong �ote�� Kam�ong �ote�� Stueng Saen20 Kam�ong T��om Village Primary Sc��ool Kam�ong T��um Kam�ong �ote�� Stueng Saen21 Pren Primary Sc��ool Pren Prey Kuy Stueng Saen22 C��eu Loving Primary Sc��ool C��eu Lving Tang Krasang Santuk23 C��ambak K��ang C��eung Primary Sc��ool C��ambak Tang Krasang Santuk24 C��ambak K��ang Tbaung Primary Sc��ool Tuol C��an Tang Krasang Santuk25 T��oamneat�� Primary Sc��ool T��omm Neat�� Tang Krasang Santuk26 Sangkum T��mei Primary Sc��ool Sangkom T��mei Tang Krasang Santuk27 Taing Krasaing Hig�� Sc��ool Sang K��leang Tang Krasang Santuk28 Vaing K��ang C��eung Primary Sc��ool Veang C��eung Tang Krasang Santuk29 Sambour Primary Sc��ool Sambour Prey Kuy Stueng Saen30 Prey Kuy Primary Sc��ool Prey Kuy Prey Kuy Stueng Saen


Annex 5 – Statute of Botum Pagoda Association 1952

SAMAKUM VAT �� BOTUM PAGODA

EstablishedonOctober17,1952inVatBotum,RongRoeungCommune,StoungDis-trict,KampongThomProvince.

“Allbeingsarecalledtodie;onlytheirnameswillstayon.”1

OnOctober17,1952

BounHyandChheavhavedonatedthisbookandasumof1.030Riel(onethousandandthirtyRiel)tothepresidentandthetwelveadvisersforthepurposeofpromotingtheBuddhistreligion.

We,PresidentandAdvisers,havereceivedbothandwillfollowcloselythespiritofthestatuteinthisbook.

WeavailourselvestoinformallourBuddhistfriends:

WehavethehonourtocreateanassociationforthesakeofourBuddhistreligion,becausewethoughtthatVatBotumisashelterformonksandnoviceswhoendeav-ourtostudytheTripitaka[holyBuddhistscriptures,Buddhistcanonofscriptures].Thesestudieswillbecarriedoutwellwhentherewillbesatisfactorybuildings,asthesayinggoes‘theJoyoftheHabitat’.Todaythebuildingsofthepagodaaredilapidated.WeBuddhistshavethe intentiontoconstructabuilding,butourmeansarequitelimited;wecouldonlycontribute‘onethousandRiel’.Therefore,wehavethehon-ourtoinviteallourfriendsofthecommunity.BelongingtoVatBotum,toconquertheirstinginessandtogiveacontribution,smallorbigaccordingtothepersonnelconvictiontobuildupacapitalforcredit.Wearecallingthisendeavour‘BuddhistAid’whichismeantfirstofalltoconstructtheVihear [sanctuary,sermonhall]ofVatBotum.Themeritsofthisreligiouscontributionwillcertainlybeourfuturetreasurewhichwillaccompanyustopassthe‘cycleofreincarnations’towardsNirvana.

Ifwellconstructed,thisbuildingwillbereservedforhospitalityofmonkscomingfromallfourdirectionstoVatBotum.

Oncethisbuildingisfinished,mayitbeallowedtodevotethesemeritsofBuddhistfaithtoallofourcherishedancestorssothattheymaybeinpeaceandwell-being.

1 The name in the book of the association; the capital will continue to create merit for the per-Thenameinthebookoftheassociation;thecapitalwillcontinuetocreatemeritfortheper-sonsevenafterhisdeath.

199Annex V

Ifmylifehasnotyetdefinitelypassedthe‘cycleofreincarnations’,IexpressthewishthatImaybealwaysbe ingoodpeaceandwell-beinguntilreachingNirvana, theworldofabsolutepeace.

Namesofthefirstdonors:

Lay-people:M.Boun-HyandMme.Chheav.

STATUTE

Theregulationstomanagewellthedonationsandcontributionscompriseseventeenpoints,asfollows:

I. TheremustbeonePresidentandelevenAdvisers:

1. Pen Neang 7. So Nou2. Ke C��a�� 8. Kim Oun3. P��ok Som 9. You P��at��4. No� Sao 10. Srei C��un5. K��iev K��ol 11. Por Teng6. K��iev Mao 12. C��um C��uong

II. All forms of information and explication are authorised to invite contribu-tionsfromthepublic.

III. Thecapitalmustbegivenascreditwithinterestsandbealwaysinpermanentcirculation.

IV. The amounts received and spent must be informed to monks and lay-per-sons.

V. Concerning theborrowers, the right todecidewhomayborrow iswith themembers.

VI. Intheactofgivingthecredittwowitnessesmustsignthedocument.

VII. Incaseofeventualrisksthetwowitnessesmustreimbursetheamountbor-rowed.

VIII. Atthedatefixedforreimbursementwhentheborrowerisnotpayingbackthecredit,thewitnessesandthemembershavetherighttoconfiscatemobileandimmobileproperty.

IX. Incasethewitnessdiesordisappearsthemembersmustreimbursetheentireamount.

X. Inoneyeartherearetwocyclesforreimbursement:the15thdayoftherisingmooninthemonthChethandAsathfrom8:00to12:00.InayearwheretherearetwoAsaththedatechosenshouldbeappropriate[asixmonth’speriodandnotmore–addedbytranslator].Capitalandinterestwillberepaidatthesametime.


XI. Thisamountwillbeallocatedtotheconstructionandtherepairofthepagodabuildings.

XII. IfalivinghouseisneededthemonksshouldmakearequesttotheCommitteeofBuddhistAid.

XIII. For theproject toconstruct theVihear [sanctuary, sermonhall]oranotherbuildingameetingmustbeheldtodiscussanddecideupon;aninformationmeetingmustbeheldaftercompletion.

XIV. Inthemeetingthedecisionswillbetakenbymajorityvote.

XV. IfthePresidentoroneofthemembersbecomeaproblem,theymustbere-placed.

XVI. Theborrowerscannotbewitnesses.

XVII.Theentireamountofthisfundmustservetheconstruction[ofthepagoda]andtheaccommodation[ofmonks]untiltheendoftheBuddhistreligion.

Seenandapproved Seenandapproved SeenandapprovedTheAbbot TheAchar TheMekhum

TranslatedbyNarakSovann

201Annex VI

Annex 6 – List of traditional associations in Kam�ong T��om

203Annex VII

Annex 7 – Social Ma� of Don Lao �agoda (Stoung district)