PUBLIC WORLDS

Dilip Gaonkar and Benjamin Lee, Series Editors

VOLUME 9

Claudio Lomnitz, Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism

VOLUME 8

Greg Urban, Metaadture.- How Culture Moves tbrough the World

VOLUME 7*

Patricia Seed , American Pentimento , Tbe Invention of Indians and the Pursuitof Riches

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Radhika Mohanram , Black Body : Women, Colonialism , and Space

VOLUME 5

May Joseph , Nomadic Identities Tbe Performance of Citizenship

VOLUME 4

Mayfair Mei - hui Yang, Spaces of Their Own. Womens Public Spherein Transnational-China

VOLUME 3

Naoki Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity On 'zapan"and Cultural Nationalism

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Ackbar Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance

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Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization

C L A U D 1 O L, O M N I T Z

De ep Me xico

Si len t Mexi co

An Anthropolog)r

of Nati onal isni

MINNEsoTA

PUBLIC WORLDS VOLUME 9

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA PRESS

MINNEAPOLIS LONDON

ttibí:oteca S^axaleí a csio ra/R cur

-Copyright 2001 by the Regents oí the Llniveisny of A1lnnesota

Every effort was made ro obtain permission lo reproduce rhe illustations in this book. If anyproper acknowledgment has not buen nade, we encourage copyright holders to notify us.

The University of Minnesota Press gra te fulh aeknusrledges permission to reprint thefollowing An earlier version of chapter 1 appeared as Nationalism as a practica] System:A Critique of Benedict Andersons 1 hcory of Natiu nolism from a Spanish AmericanPerspeetive," in The Odre Minor Gmnd Theory tbrou96 Ele Lens of Latin America, edited by.Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando Lúpez-Alves (Princeton, N. 1= Princeton Universiny

Presa, 2000), 329-59; copyright 2000 Princeton University Presa, reprinted by permissionof Princeton University Press An earlier version of chapter 3 appeared as "Mudes oí

Cltizenship in Mexico.° Pab1i1 )apure 1 1no 1 (1999. 209-93; copyright 1999 Duke

University Press. An earlier version of <hapter 4 appeared as "Passion and BanaliryinMexican History : The Presidential Persona1n Tbr (_dlective and lbe Public in Latí, America:Cultural ldnttitirs and Polili¢d Order, edired by Lms Ronigar and Tamar Heaog (Londom SussexAcademic Press, 2000). 238-56; copyright 200(1 Sussex Academlc Press. An cachee versionof chapter5 appeared as "Fissures in Contemporary Mexican Nationalism," Publle Culture 9,no 1 (1997), 55-68; copyright 1997 Duke University Press An earlier version of chapter 7

appeared as "Ritual Rumor, and Corruption in the Cunstitution el Poliry in Mexico," Joumalof Latirt American Anthropology I, no. 1 (1995) 20--47, copyright 1995 American Anthropo-

logical Association, reprinted by permission of American Anthropological Association,

Arlington, Virginia. An cachee version oí chapter 10 appeared as"An Intellectual's Stock iothe Factory ol Mexican Ruins Enrique Kauzcs Blogiaphy oí Power, "American launtal ofSociology 103, no- 4 (1998). 1052-65, copyright 1998 by the University oí Chicago, al]rights reserved.

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Liba, of Congruas Cataloging-In-Puhlmatlon DataLomnitz-Adler, Claudio.

Deep Mexico silent Mexico an anthropology ot nacional ism /Claudio Lomnitz.p cm-(Pubhc wor]ds, v 91

Includes blhliogaphlcal referenees and ,ndexISBN 0-8166-3289-8 (HC zlk- paper) -- ISBN u-8166-3290-1 (PB : alk. pape,)

1 Nationaliana-Mexico 2 Croup identity-Mexico- 3. Mexico-Politics

and government 4- Anderson Benedict R. O'C. Benedict Richard O'Corman),

1936- Imagined eommunities. 5. Inmllectuals-^:lexico-History. 1- Title.II. Series-

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Prinred Iu the United Status ni Amcrlet un ac,d-free paperThe University ut Minnesota is an equa!-opportumpy educator and employer.

This book is dedicated

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Contents

1

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Partí Making the Nation

Nationalism as a Practica) System: Benedict Anderson's

ix

xi

Theory of Nationalism from the Vantage Point of

Spanish America 3

2 Communitarian Ideologies and Nationalism 35

3 Modes of Mexican Citizenship 58

4 Passion and Banality in Mexican History:The Presidential Persona 81

5 Fissures in Contemporary Mexican Nationalism 110

6

Part I1 Geographies of the Public Sphere

Nationalism's Dirty Linen: "Contact Zones" and the

Topography of National Identity 125

7 Ritual, Rumor, and Corruption in the Formation of

Mexican Polities 145

8 Center, Periphery, and the Connections betweenNationalism and Local Discourses of Distinction 165

Part III Knowing the Nation

9 Interpreting the Sentiments oí the Nation. Intellectualsand Governmentality in Mexico 197

]0 An Intellectual's Stock in the Factory oF Mexicos Ruins:Enrique Krauze's Mexico: Biography of Pmuer 212

1 1 Bordering un Anthropology_ Dialectics oí aNational Tradition 228

12 Provincial Intellectuals and the Sociology oí theSo-Called Deep Mexico 263Notes 287

References 317

Index 335

Acknowledgments

To me, this book is like a "cabinet oí curiosities," a showcase for a wholeextended family oí subjects that were first washed upon my shore by thetide oí a previous book, Exits from the Lahyrinth. The essays that 1 have in-cluded here were written between 1993 and 2000, and they were crafted

in an environment oí intellectual engagement and friendship that is too

rich and diverse to acknowledge properly. There are, however, a few en-

going conversations, a few influences and instances oí friends coming tomy aid that 1 cannot omit,

Over the past five years 1 have benefited tremendously from the criti-

cism, example, friendship, and support oí my colleagues and students

in the departments oí History and Anthropology at the University oí

Chicago. As an anthropologist, 1 am drawn to the peripheral, te the cu-riosities and details oí human sociability. Friedrich Katz has brought me

back to the great current oí world events, and in the process has also

taught me much oí what 1 know about Mexican history. He has been myclosest colleague these past years.

The friendship, conversation, and example oí Fernando Escalante,

Robin Derby, Roger Bartra, Beatriz Jaguaribe, Néstor García Canclini,

Andrew Apter, Eric Fassin, Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, Juan Pérez, Liz

Henschell, Marshall Sahlins, Ricardo Pozas, llan Semo, Arjun Appadurai,

Martin Riesebrodt, Tom Cummins, Francisco Valdés, Fred Myers, Annette

Weiner, and Guillermo de la Peña sustained and inspired me more than 1

can say. Some oí the particulars in one or another essay benefited from the

tx =

advicc 0f Jamar Herzo,. Ete 1'tt i , as Carlos Funnent, and Cristóbal

Aliovín - 1 hc late Calo t lúnica mas tic <oriraocous Iricnd who helped mc

alt through srith tic original puhhs auun mn e hapicr 10 in Mexico.

1 em csi ccially iTi dcht,(i tu' 1 )il,p (di kai lor encouiaging inc Lo writc

this book 1 hc R^ic c (uluns , allccuvc sshnsc r, e rings 1 have attendeel

regularly ovcr the pass vears has aleo inspncd me in many ways_ Thc

manuxnpt as a saholc gainccl ioni tic c..cetul and critical engagement ol

Roger Rutne and Enu Van 1"oung 1 am gicdils' in clchr tu riese exemplarv

rcadcrsA numbcr of students who liase \r ,i ked closcly with mc over tic

past years Nave been an intlucncc 1 am especially gratetul Lo Ev Meade,

Chris Boyer, Dimita Doukas, Paul Ross, F leather Levy, Daniel Resendez,

Matthew Karush, and Katherinc Bliss More generally, 1 am indebted Lo

the students oí the Latin American History Workshop at Chicago. Finally,

my editors at Minnesota, Robin .Moir, David Thorstad, and, especially,

Carric Mullen, put up with this incrcasingly grumpy writer and cajoled

him finto writing a bettcr work.

Thc essavs in Chis book viere also wrltten under a very different influ-

ence, a tide that rase and fell with the pull oí the dark moon of my brother

jorge's death, and oí the glowing clelight el my family, and especially oí

my children, Enrique and Elisa, and my wife, Elena Climent. Conversations

with Elena have been formative in the deepest sense, and her work as an

artist is a source oí constant insp im tion.

Introduction

The Balcony of the Republic

There is a class oí intellectuals who have the delightful privilege oí con-

stantly keeping their readers company-writers who take down their im-

pressions oí the significant events oí a communiry and supply it with a

steady stream oí commentary - The role oí these intellectuals is something

like that oí a village priest, consecrating significant events, offering advice

and sympathy, proffering henedictions, and even threatening the un-

believers with excommunicatlon. Their lives are like a book that opens

onto their communit.

Perhaps because it is, at heart, a Catholic and provincial society,

Mexico has always had a special preference for these chronicters, and

they have thrived even in today's mass society. Carlos María Bustamante,

Guillermo Prieto, and Ignacio Manuel Altamirano were figures oí this sort

in the nineteenth century, as was Salvador Novo in the decades following

the Mexican Revolution. Currently, writers such as Carlos Monsiváis,

Héctor Aguilar Camín, Enrique Krauze, and Elena Poniatowska fati finto

this category. Even intellectuals who have kept a greater distante from

the bustle oí the day Lo day, such as the late Octavio Paz, or Carlos

Fuentes, descend from their lofry heights, like bishops going Lo a confir-

mation, when it comes Lo consecrating the truly importara events: the

1968 student movement, the earthquake oí 1985, or the Zapatista revolt

oí 1994. The cronista accompanies the communiry, guides it through its

dilemmas, consoles it in its grief, and shares in its triumph. Mimesis with

s

the people is such that this 'mtellecttual is a natural representative oí thenation.

How different this is from my own sltuation' 1 left a fob at El Colegio

de México in 1988 and carne to work in the United States not as an exile,

but voluntarily Although 1 go back to Mexico constantly, and sometimes

for long periods, and although 1 have access to che comings and goings oí

Mexican politics and its cultural aftairs, iv position is reminiscent oí that

oí an infirm ancle who keeps ro his quarcers, and who only makes an occa-sional appearance

These confusing teelings of access and isolation, oí accompanying the

nation's tribu lations Irom atar, rellect the ci rcumstances and conditions

in which this book was written The position of ehronicler can only be

attained through immersion in the day to day oí that great city that is

Mexico City, the place that Porfirio Díaz recognized long ago as "the bal-

cony oí the republie." In an authoritarian country, public opinion and na-

tional sentiment were both concentrated and represented in the national

capital. The values of the pmvinees and foreign values both were realized

there, and they were made to radiate from there to the entire nation. My

generation is the tirst in which a few mcmbers oí Mexicos intelligentsia

have chosen to forsake Mexico City for another balcony, which is theAmerican academy.

In the past, Mexican intellecnials used the experiences oí Mexicans in

the United States as grist 1nr the nati onalist mili. As the Mexican-

American folklorist losé Limón has shown Mexican intellectuals have de-

cried the conditions of their fcllow countrvtnen in the United States, and

used their condition to further political projects in Mexico. What they

have rarely done is acknowledgc thc Mexican-American vantage point asthe sorrce of new critical perspectives.'

In my years in the United States 1 have often thought of my experi-

ences in relation to those oi Mexican migrant workers, to their ties to

honre villages and to the ways in which rheir lives are lived andjustified in

the United States. 1 do not mean to make too much oí this comparison, as

1 am not especially interested in Mexican-American identity politics, nor

do 1 seek a new group to represen[ now that 1 have "abandones Mexico-

On the contrary, what I share svith many Mexican migrants is their emo-

tional and material investment in Mexico, the sense that the migratory ex-

perience can he used for setting pass situations right, and the ambivalent

realization that the dithculties ol the migratory process have changed os.

The sature oí our investments, the sources ol our frustra tions on the home

front, the spec ific qualities oí our tiansformations in the United States are

different, no doubt. 1 do not mean te use the hardship oí the peasant mi-

grant to make my own cause more noble, nor am 1 about tu raise a class-

action suit on their behalf. 1 cannot speak for them.

1 am, rather, interested in the ways in which immigration to the United

States offers a critical perspective en Mexico and en the United States.

My current position in the American academy and my experience in

Mexico afford, I believe, a vista oí its own, a vantage point that is mount-

ed neither on the balcony oí Mexican public opinion nor en the well-

greased machine of American expertise, though it leans on both. My con-

cern is to understand the social conditions in which national distinctions

emerge.

Depth and Silence

It is common knowledge that nationalism involves an appeal to origins.

The Frontier Society, the Melding oí Two Races, the Chosen People oí

God, the Children oí Revolution-these myths appeal to the historical

"depth" oí nations, a depth that finds material expression in the land itself.

As in Australian aboriginal "dreamings," ties to ancestors are encrusted in

the landscape, and contemporaries inhabit the outer surface of that amal-

gam between a land and a people that is the nation. Stories of origins are

required for spreading feelings of kinship in a heterogeneous and uncon-

nected population.

Images oí a nation's rootedness are also used to displace or ignore par-

ticular claims.2 In nineteenth-century Spanish America, for instante, na-

tional symbols tended to he chosen from nature: the quetzal (bird) oí

Guatemala, the copihue and araucaria (plants) oí Chile, the Argentine

pampa, the Popocatepetl and Ixtaccihuatl (mountains) oí Mexico, and so

en. Alongside the exaltation oí the land carne the idealization oí the

remate indigenous past: oí unconquerable chieftains such as Caupolicán,

Cuauhtémoc, and Túpac Amant, and indigenous achievements in astrono-

my, urban design, and engineering, Both natural and historical images

were mobilized for the exclusion oí the opinions and immediate interests

oí large portions oí the population who, it was felt, needed to be civilized,

educated, racially improved, or even, in some cases, exterminated. Ap-

peals to the "depth" oí the nation have been a staple in the packaging oí

modernizing projects, calling potential dissenters Yo order in the narre oí

a shared trajectory. In national societies, "depth" and "silence" are mutually

implicated.

This relationship between depth and silente reveals a national secret,

1 1 t r o d u c 1 l o n

xiii

which is that denarrcctcy, popular soccn-i,,ntr and a racional governmen-

tal admin:stration are leso lulh guaina blr . 1 hc nacional state is always

involved in the work of shapinr puhl:c opirtum with che aid of rigid sys-

teniso t discipline arad exdu,ion. l hn rs be, ause che eonneetio ns hetween

che,tate che people in(¡ che turuo:p aire am thrng [,lit harmonious and

stable- Scates are shaped in m),,,,, , r,t espansion and conquesr, or else in

processes of deculonizatiun In eiiIiei a,c. diverse people,, sometimes

unrelated te) ea, h uther are suhreeis nl thc ante st,ue

The muvcmcnu involved in elalming popular and territorial sovereign-

cy ti-tus requirc arrangem eras between peuples w^ho do not neeessarily

i dentify with une anothcr, and ,vho may Nave only tenuous and indirect

links. In extreme ssmacions, chis can load tu civil war and territorial frag-

mentation, but oven in milder cases the scgmenration of "the nation' has

profound political and cultural consequences, including che exacerbated

use oí nationalism_ Moreover, che sha pe ot a territory is never perfectly at-

tuned to che tradicional habitat ot a people even in cases when such rela-

tions between a people and a territory can credibly be made. Territories

peed to be claimed, boundaries necd tu be enforced, and so they are

dependent not only un che national community, but also on its neighbors.

In short, neither a people nor its corneenuns to a state and terrimry are

stable facas. Instead, these relationships leed constantly co be shaped and

reshaped.

In Chis, Mexico is not an exception, latir rather an extreme. Like all

other nations, Mexico carne into being as the result oí world-historical

conditions that were beyond che control of its inhabitants and, although

the viahility of Mexico as a polity was common serse for locals and for-

eigners alike at che time of independence, che size of che territory, its lack

oí economic integration, che diversity of its people, and che desirabiliry oí

its resources to foreign powers al¡ conspirad co make nationality a desired

achievement more than a well-established fact.

In che era oí independence, nacional consciousness was uniform nei-

ther in its contencs nor in its extension. [-ven as late as 1950, Octavio Paz

prefaced his book un Mexican national cultura warning that his analysis

did not apply to al] inhahitants oí ,Mexico, but only to that segment oí che

population that was conscious of heing Nlexican, which he saw as a mi-

nority-' Today it may be diflicult co find a Mexican who is not aware oí

being Mexican, but che contexts in which nationality is pertinent, and its

symbolic and practical referents, still vary substantnally. Nationaliry is nel-

ther an accomplished fact nor in established essenee; itis, rather, the

moving horizon that acturs point to when they need to appeal co che con-

nections between che people and che poGty, when they discuss rights and

obligacions, or rey co justify oi r'elect modernization and social change-

Nacional filiation is thcrelore used in order to hanuner out a consensual,

oi hegemonic, a rra ngem ent, ir involves cajoling and purchasing, exhibits

oí strength and eocrcion- Uepth and silente are che Siamese twins oi na-

tional tate formation_

Nacional Distinction Tbeory and History of National Sprices

The nacional ideal of popular sovercignty can rever be fully accom-

plished- Ir is instead like a receding horizon, a point of referente that is

used te) organize relationships between che people and che state in

processes of modernization that can rever be contained by nacional bor-

ders. As a result, che nacional space is constantly changing. Isolated com-

munities are integrated into che national public sphere, while newly pau-

perized classes are marginalized from it; power brokers rise and falla

foreign interesas are successfully reigned in and subsequently escape gov-

ernmental control, In short, che development oí a national space is a his-

torical process. Abstract generalization, theorization with no historical

referent, is difficult given the currenc state oí our comparative knowledge,

and yet theorization is required to make adequate descriptions oí that

great abstraction that is "national space."4 A theoretically inclined history

is thus useful at chis particular junction.

But we need historically sensitive theories just as much. Nations are at

once aspects oí an internacional order and the product oí local processes

oí state formation. As a result, their position in the internacional order it-

self shapes che ways in which theories are written and understood.5 There

is an inherent tendency for standards to emerge between nations. The cul-

ture oí che state, the forro and contencs oí its progranis and oí its organiza-

tion, are often the brainchild oí transnational comniunities of specialists.

However, this does not relieve os from having to understand systems oí

national distinction in their singularity; for social theories as they are de-

veloped and deployed in practice are aspects oí chis system oí distinetion

ton. There is thus a polyphony, a bizarre range oí harmonics, in any social

explanation or body oí theory, because, for che most parí, these explana-

tions resonate differently when they are sounded in che scientific or artis-

tic vanguards than when they are broughc finto national contexts as policy

or as social criticism. History thus helps understand che range oí theories,

as well as their polyphony, slippage, or movementNationalism, which is a way oí framing communitarian relations, itself

1 n i r o d u e t i on

xv =

develops in relation to other communitarian forms, including families, vil-lages, and religious communities. The ways in which nationalism relatesto these various communities depend on the ways in which the nationalterritory is tied together, economically, politically, and culturally. More-over, in order to disseminate nationalism, it has to be shaped into signsand told, it has to be tied to sites oí local memory in effective ways.

Finally, the very uses to which nationalism is put, the projects that it

shapes and prometes, the interna) distinctions that it facilitates, and itsuses in dealing with what is foreign, vary.

This is why students of globalization do not tease to insist en the factthat globalization is not mere homogenization, and that "its" effects arelocally differentiated. Nonetheless making this point in the abstract ismuch easier than showing it ar work-the very persistence oí the dis-claimer en the part oí students of "globalization" attests te this. This is be-cause the study oí the conditions in which nations are produced invohres ahistorical sociology oí state formation; it cannot bypass the particular.

Grounded

Mexican social sciences are as much a part of the international horizon as

any other science. Mexican authors do not hesitate to borrow from the

works oí foreign colleagues, and they participate actively in international

discussions and publications. There is a sense, however, in which they are

entirely enconipassed by national history, for the very justification oí

Mexico's scientific establishment has been tied to national development,

to the formation oí a national consciente, and to addressing the kind oí

issues that Andrés Molina Enríquez called Great National Problems."6 It

is fair to capitalize this expression because ir narres the fetish oí Mexican

social science. Social sciences are supposed to respond to Great National

Problems, when in fact it is the social sciences that have named and given

form to those problems in the collective imagination.

Mexican fetishism oí Great National Problems occupies a position

analogous to the fetishism oí the "Western tradition" and oí "Rationality"

in the United States. Historians oí curricular development in American

universities have shown how and why schools in the United States decid-

ed to incorporate their own tradition within a narrative oí "the West."7

Universities were designed as neoclassical palaces or else as imitations oí

the great English universities, an architecture that proclaimed the desire

to emulate empire while spurring republican pride, to appropriate the

grandeur oí both Greece and Britain. The United States has liked te think

In^ro1 ction

oí itself as the westernmost portion oí "the West," a place that inherited all

that was reasonable and open-minded oí English liberalism, and yet was

unfettered by an aristocracy or by a degraded mass oí "commoners."

Today, in the United States, economics and much oí political science and

sociology are dominated by theories in which the habits oí American con-sumers, oí American voters, and oí foreign-policy makers are presented asparagons oí rationality. The collective habits oí the world's Great Power

can be nothing short oí "rational." Just as Mexican social scientists have

named and shaped Great National Problems, so too have American econo-

mists given form to an allegedly universal rationality.

For those who share in this spirit, the historical sciences are quaint andold-fashioned disciplines that are still devoted to the study of the particu-

lar. No grand theories oí general applicability can come forth from their

stubbornly idiographic methods. They can never add up to anything,

though they may deserve to be modestly supported, since they can readilyprovide those tedious facts that are still needed to avoid entirely confusingBolivia with Brazil.

Consonant with these imperial pulsations, non-Western areas becamea special branch oí knowledge, subordinated to the universalizing inter-

ests oí "the West." Thus, the mores and intellectual traditions oí Latin

America have been called "non-Western," despite the fact that they have

as much oí a claim to Europe as does the United States. Older or weakerempires, as Arjun Appadurai has pointed out, have been associated withintriguing and vastly simplified characteristics that were useful for sharp-ening the self-image oí the West: the Mediterranean stood for honorand shape, India for caste, China for filial piety and minute women'sfootwear . . .8 Latin America provided proud and superstítious men, beau-tiful señoritas, venal tyrants, and whimsical revolutions, How can widelyuseful ideas emerge in arcas that are dominated by particular complexes oítraits that are so clearly bounded in scope and limited in vision? The cate-

gory oí the non-Western is the category oí the particular; it is not a suit-able place from which to think through either human universals or eventsoí world-historical significante.

In Mexico, narratives that identify the habits oí the Mexican people as

paradigma oí rationality, and therefore as universally applicable, have had

little success. The country has been hyperconscious oí its backward con-

dition for at least 150 years. Moreover, it has had to deal with a layered

history oí imperialist depictions: in the nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries, Mexicans could not be made into the paragon oí rationality

because they were racially inferior, later on, the Mexican people were

In tro d u cti on

= xvii

poitraycd as tiaditi onalists, as latalitiis whu.c racional capabil iti es, though

no longer biologically deniahle v, ere no less blinded by superstition.

Todas' Mexico 1, routinely lobeled a [les cl^^ping nation' Because it is al-

Icgedly not vct devclupcd. ii is nr,: in a ituauun to speak for humanity at

large Nut surprisingly, tico Mcsican Liuducs Nave conccnrrated on con-

tributions to che resolution nl tic nations problcnts. These nced to be

dealt with hrst: univcrsallty will ,unir lacreAs in che Anicrican case iNc vchucctuny ui Mexicós principal univer-

sities relleces [hese aspira Go ns. Alodernisln scith its charaeteristic eom-

bination of state-ol-che-art technology, ahrc acted tiaditional rnotifs, and

che subordination of the whole to modero usage, provided che ideal vehicle.

The National Universiry is a paradigmatic instance: research and teaching

facilities are laid out in a plan that is reminiscent of pre-Columbian urban

design, while che whole was developed with che most modero materials

and techniques available.

The definition oí che Great Nacional Problems and oí their resolution

thus involves incorporation ro a "civilizational horizon" that transcends

Mexieo's bordees: the language of scicnce and of che arts is recognized as a

universal language, and so che process of devcloping a national consciente

or oí contributi ng to national devel opment involves building an infra-

structure that is oriented to learning and disserninating works created on

che outside.1(1 Thus, Mexican modernism takes an inward turn, both be-

cause of che effort tú transiate and appropriate foreign innovations and

because of che obsession with making interna) conditions more favorable

for progress.Given Chis self-centeredness, and given che ethnocentrism involved in

imperial universalism, it is not surprlsing ciar diere are considerable diffi-

culties in getting whatever originaliry thcre has been in Mexican social

and scientilic thought recognized as innovative outside oí Mexicós bor-

ders, because whereas the thinking ol American authors is usually in-

scribed in a universalizing language leven in cases when its significante is

parochial), in Mexico contributions that might be oí general utility are

subsumed into the language of the particular, oí the national.

This state ol affairs produces an interesting complex regarding the hid-

den contributions of Mexican culture to universal civilization. Thus,

Mexicans sometimes mutter that che inventor oí color television was

Mexican; that Thomas Edison reas half Mexican; that \Valt Disney stole

characters from Mexican composer i, and that historian Edmundo

O'Gorman's ideas concerning tic invention of America went unaeknowl-

edged by che school devoted tu nventcd ti adi tions." In short, we have

11., ,, 1„,

che whole complex that Kasherine Verdery described among Romanian

intellectua ls as pro tochroni sm,' that is to say che doctrine that struggles

to rescue a series of nacional figures who had prcfigured well-known

'Western" devel opments from an imperial conspiracy that has confined

them to oblivion. 11

The conditions for procochronism are produced by asymmetries of

power between che scientilic establishments of Mexico and Europe or che

United States_ However they are also che result of the way in which

Mexicós knowledge -stablishmcrit has been justified_ In order to engage

public interest in Mexico, in order to attract funds, and so on, one must en-

gage the Great National Problems. This means that thinkers who recycle

works and ideas produced abroad and apply them to the nacional con-

science can enjoy an undeserved (though entirely local) reputation, and it

also means that thinkers who have had a contribution to make to the broad-

er civilizational horizon can go underacknowledged, especially when the

country does not have the capaciry to absorb the work to its full potential.

1 have myself worked for many years under che strain oí [hese tensions,

desiring to contribute to che discussion oí Mexico's particular problems,

while holding to the conviction that any real engagement with particular-

ity requires a degree of critica) thought, a kind oí thought that knows no

national frontiers. My work has therefore tended to inhabit a margin: a bit

toe theoretically inclined for most Mexican social scientists, a bit roo

engaged with Mexican political quandaries for most oí my American col-

leagues. However, this situation, which is not so very singular, also af-

fords, 1 think, a certain kind oí engaged critique, a kind of theoretical par-

ticularism that is well suited to the study of the national form. It is a forra

oí "grounded theory" in both senses oí this term: grounded because it

works through a vast and dense set oí facts, and grounded because it has

to confront, and hopefully to transgress, an order oí confinement.

Road Map

This is a book of essays. It carne to life as a volume when my friend and

colleague Guillermo de la Peña suggested that 1 publish a volume in Mexico

with a collection oí essays that had appeared only in English. 1 followed

Guillermos advice and put together a volume that appeared in 1999 under

che title Modernidad indiana: nación y mediación en México. As 1 prepared that

work, however, 1 realized that my general project oí [hese last years,

which has been to develop a historical sociology oí Mexican national

space, was not far froni completion and 1 spent an additional eighteen

I n 1 r o d u c t i on

= xix =

months writing che essays that werc relj n ved, '1 bis hook reproduces five

of che time essays included in ,bindrn,:J.t.l im{unta (che earliesc was written in

1993), and adds co them seven newer essays that mark che end of a long

project (che las( was completed in clic hrsi months of 2000).

The hook is dividcd roto [bree parís Pare 1, "Making che Nation," is

composed of live essays. Taken togcthci, [hese chapters provide a histori-

cal and theo retical Ira1nework for u n deis tan ding Mexican nacional ism and

nacional identity as a process that hagan vvith colonization. The essays in

Chis section generally cake a very historical broad sweep.

Chapter 1 is a critical appralsal ol Benedict Anderson's theory oí na-

tionalism, wriuen from che vantage point ol Spanish Ame rica. 1 show that

tire relationship lietween nacional ism, secularism, and social hierarchy di-

verges somewhat from Andersons proposition- This leads both to amend-

ments to Anderson's theory and co a discussion oí che political usage oí

nationalism in Mexico and Spanish America. Chapter 2 extends the dis-

cussion oí communitarian ideologies i niiiated in che discussion oí Benedict

Anderson by exploring competing versions of Mexican nationalism, and

also other hiscorically powerful communitarian forms that are pertinent

1or understandi ng che appeal and I'units of any nacional ist project in

Mexico. Both chapters are wide-ranging historical essays that explore chelonyue duréc.

Chapter 3, by contras[, focuses on the transformation ot Mexican

citi zenship during the nineteenth and early twcncieth centuries. Here 1

seek to hiscoricize Roberto Da laua's idea regarding che cultural logic of

hierarchy and ci tizenship in I_atin .America_ As in che essay en Benedict

Anderson's theory, 1 eomplement a cultural reading (in chis case oí citizen-

ship) wich an emphasis on che political f ield in which che cultural con-

struction o( citizenship develops_ In che process, 1 argue against che view

that imagines the development of ci tizenship and democracy in Mexico as

a process that liad an carly and very brief gulden age during che Restored

Republic (1867-76), only to tal] during che porfiriato (especially after1884), and ricen to hegin a heroic recoverv in che alcermath of 1968. 1

show that che prominente of discourses of dtizenship and oí civic virtue

in che first two-thirds oí che nineteenth century is related to che political

instahility oí che country, and that che exaltad language of citizenship chal

was popular in Chis period declinad not so much as a result oí dictatorial

repression as hecause of che alliancea among che political class that mod-

ernizatioa and economic grnwth nade possihle. The history oí Mexican

democratization thus appears in a somewhat less heroic lighc chan in the

criumphal nartatives of eontentpurary democrats_

Chapter 4 complements che discussion of che political consolidation of

che Mexican state by focusing on che development oí che image oí che na-

cional president as a fetish ot sovereignty_ In particular, Chis essay explores

che relationship between religion, race, and images of sovereignty, and it

shows the ways in which power was secularizad, and che law and economic

modernization were indigenized during che nineteenth century and into

che Mexican Revolution (1910-20).

The final chapter of Part 1 is devoted to che contemporary crisis oí

Mexican nationalism, and it can be read as an alternative introduction to

chis hook (as a eomplement tu chis Introduction). In che last two decades,

innovations in che organization oí transnacional capital have provoked

profound changes in Mexico, changes that include a reorientation of che

national economy, che dismemberment oí che revolutionary state, and in-

creasing class polarization. As a result, títere is a chronic crisis concerning

the relationship between nationalism and modernization. This essay ex-

plores Chis changing relationship and discusses che strain en Mexican na-

tionalism in che contemporary moment. It thus spells out the context in

which che essays oí chis hook were written, which is the long period

known as Mexico's "transition to democracy."

Commentators such as Paul Krugman oí che New York Times have

crowed that che historie Mexican election oí July 2, 2000, should be

chalked up to che North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and

globalization, and that che neoliberal presidents who presíded over

chis transition (de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo) were in fact the well-

meaning democrats that they always claimed to be 12 However, it was

Mexican authoritarianism, not Mexican democracy, that led Mexico into

che General Agreemenc en Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and NAFTA in che

first place. The full power oí Mexico's revolutionary state was needed to

preside over che sea change in che economy that finally buried revolution-

ary nationalism, which is why che transition to democracy was so pro-

tracted. Now that che change in economic models was an accomplished

fact. Mexicans were allowed to choose their president freely from among

three candidates who had strikingly similar platforms, and the economists

who imposed their models on Mexico could claim to have given birth to

democracy.' 3

Parí ti, "Geographies oí che Public Sphere," is dedicated to the cultural

geography oí che nacional space, and it is composed of three chapters. The

first, Chapter 6, deals wich che contexts in which nacional identity and

xenophobia emerge It introduces one oí che central monis oí Mexican na-

tionalism, which is that che nation cannot eontain capitalism and eeonomic

1 ,t r o duc

modernizatioii much oí which conics ti, m ahroad The chapter proposes

a rudimentarv topography oi t. ont.ru zones ¡Ti which nacional identiry

emerges as a ciguilicant political resaure,c.

Chapter 7 irgues chas ntual rumor and contiption Nave htstorieally

bcen the ericical mechanism, tor thc eonstitution tal nacional public opin-

ion in Mexico 1 his is because c Iris clieisiuns q ie su significant that broad

sectors of che population are se te ma tic i K eycluded trom che hourgeois

public sphere Lite chapter then deselups elements of a spatial approaeh

to che study ot che public sphere

Chapter 8 is about centrality and uiai ginalicy-" Insread of seeing

these categories as stable piopeitics of places, they are best understood as

metaphors that are used lar che development of interna) idioms oí distinc-

uon that are then deployed to link I actions of communities across the na-

cional space. This essay, like chapter 12, uses che case oí che anthropologi-

cally famous village of Tepoztlán to develop a perspective en this matter.

As a locality, Tepoztlán has usually been constructed by outsiders and

government officials as "peripheral," but local inhabitants have deployed

within their town che same hinary oppositions that they have been sub-

jected to-The essay explores che politics of chese juxtapositions. Thus, the

three ehapters oí Part II study, lirst, the geography oí nacional identiry

production, second, the cultural geography of che public sphere, and final-

]y, the geography oí national distinction-

Part III, "Knowing che Nacion," is about che different ways oí produc-

ing public knowledge within and about the nation. Chapter 9 uses Michel

Foucault's concept oí governmentality to argue that, because oí the tribu-

lations oí Mexico's development as a weak nation in che international

order, intellectuals who sought to speak for che nation on che basis oí sta-

tistics and population studies have liad lintited success. Alongside these

"governmental intellectuals," nacional sentiment has been expressed by

others, who claim to be close to social movements and revolutions.

Chapter 10 is a polemical essay en che effeccs oí che current privati-

zation oí culture, by way of a critique of che work of Enrique Krauze.

This essay, originally published in English in 1998, generated a heated

polemic in Mexico. 1 have included che piece in this volume despite its

polemical eharaccer for two reasons hrst. because it deals with the role

oí history and historians as nation builders and as nationalist intellectuals

and is thus of a piece with che preceding chapter en the interpretation oí

che sentiments of che nation and wich my work on che history oí anthro-

pology and second, because Chis is an instante in which analysis and

polities come together-both the writing of che essay and che reactions

that it generated in Mexico are rclared co clic "balcony" from which Ti

seas written

Chapter 11 complements Chis polemical piece by analyzing che histori-

cal role of anthropology in shaping Mexican nationalism and conversely,

che role that nationalism has liad in shaping .Mexican anrhropology- It is

written as a seholarly piece , sehereas che preceding chapter is written as a

polemical review, but hoth develop aspects of che same argumenc regard-

ing che preponderant role that nationalism has placed in shaping Mexican

social thought

The final chapter of the book is a critique of Guillermo Bonfil 's notion

oí a "deep Mexico," a concept that 1 subscitute with a "silent Mexico." The

chapter proposes a geography oí silente by way of the study of local intel-

lectuals . 1 show that the mechanisms that intellectuals use co justify their

authority to represent their communities provide valuable clues for under-

standing the geography of Mexican democracy , a geography that is

deeply segmented along class and regional lines.

Taken together , the twelve chapters in Chis book are a historical and

cheorecical exploration of Mexican nacional space , by way oí an analysis

oí nationalism , che public sphere , and knowledge production . They are

offered both as cultural criticism and as a scholarly contribution to our

understanding oí these phenomena.

lr 1 r o du c t i on

xxiii =

P A R T 1

1Vla k ing

Nation

1

Nationalism as a Practica ) System:

Benedict Anderson 's Theory of Nationalism from

the Vantage Point of Spanish America

Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities has probably been the single most

influential work en nationalism oí the past two decades. Written with

clarity and flair, Anderson's book explains nationalism as a specific form oí

communitarianism whose cultural conditions of possibility were deter-

mined by the development oí communications media (print capitalism)

and colonial statecraft (especially state ritual and state ethnography-for

instance, bureaucratic "pilgrimages," censuses, and maps).

Seen in this light, nationalisms are historically recent creations, and yet

terribly successful at shaping subjectivity. In fact, it is nationalism's power to

form subjects that truly arrests Anderson's attention: "[patriotic deaths]

bring us abruptly face to face with the central problem posed by national-

ism: what makes the shrunken imaginings of recent history (scarcely more

than two centuries) generate such colossal sacrifices?" (1994; 7). This con-

cern with subject-formation and identity is consonant with Anderson's prin-

cipal innovation, which is to treat nationalism not asan ideology, but rather

as a hegemonic, commonsensical, and tacitly shared cultural construct.

For Anderson, nationalism is a kind oí cultural successor to the univer-

salism oí premodern (European) religion. Thus, although he locates the

birth oí nationalism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,

the preconditions for its emergence occur much earlier, with Europe's

3

expansion in the sixteenth century. In Anderson's view, European expan-

sien created the image of plural and independent unes of civilizational de-velopment, and this pluralism or rclativism was eventually transformedroto a kind of secular historicisin in which individuated collectivities-"nations"-competed with each other.

One oí the most surprising turns in Anderson's brief book is that he

claims that nationalism developed first in the colonial world, and spread

from there back to Europe Despite the íact rhat religious universalism is

first shaken in sixteenth-century Europe the formation of a system oí

equal, independent, secular, and progressive collectivities occurs first in

America, and almost threc centurias alter the decline of religious univer-

salism. This nieve caught Latin Americanist historiaras off balance, for the

- historiography oí independence up to thcn was dominated by treatises ora

the intellectual influences of Europe--uf liberalism, of the Enlightenment-

en American independence. Rarely did the Latin American specialist dare

to claim much original ity for these movements, let alone to suggest that

nationalism itself had been invented in Spanish America and subsequentlyexported to Europe.

For his insistente ora che singularity of colonial conditions abone, Latin

Americanists are collectively in Andcrson's debt. However, despite Chis

boon to a profession that of ten aches to elaim singubarity for itself, devel-

opments in the Latin American field were slow to turra in Anderson's direc-

tion, with significant works using Anderson as a point oí inspiration ap-

pearing practically ten years alter die book was first published.

The slothful reaction to Anderson by Latin American historiaras and

anthropologists has been owing nor only to the usual reaction oí the sub-

fÑeld's antibodies against brash foreign intruders who do not respect the

regnant doxa. It is also the result of considerable difficulty in grappling

with the relationship between the bouk's general thesis ora nationalism

(which is often inspiring) and the fact that Anderson's view oí American

independence is incorrect in a numher of particulars.

My aim in Chis chapter is to carry out a comprehensive critique oí

Imagined Conirnunlties, by which 1 mean a critique that interrogates both Che

conceptual and the historical theses 1 shall do so by way oí a close study

oí nationalism in the Spanish-American republics, and in Mexico particu-

larly. Because this arca is, according to Anderson's formulation, the birth-

place oí modero nationalism, it is a key to bis general thesis. On the other

hand, the fertility oí Anderson's niasterfu1 book is such that criticizing its

central thesis requires developing an alternative perspective, the seeds oíwhich are also presented hete.

Nntionafi . ni i^ ., Pr.., bical Systea

Review of the Historical Tbesis

In order to understand Anderson's account oí the birth oí Spanish-

American nationalism and independence, we must be clear first on what

exactly he is trying to explain:

[The aggressiveness of Madrid and the spirit oí liberalism, while central te

any understanding of the impulse oí resistance in the Spanish Americas, do

not in themselves explain why entibes like Chile, Venezuela, and Mexico

turned out te be emobonally plausible and politically viable, nor why San

Martín should decree that certain aborigines be identified by the neologi-

cal "Peruvians." Nor, ulbmately, do they account for the real sacrifices

made.... This willingness to sacrifice on the part oí comfortable classes is

food for thought. (52)

At stake, then, is the explanation oí what makes a country "emotionally

plausible" and "politically viable" from an internal perspective. In addition,

there are issues concerning identity and sacrifice: why do Indians become

Peruvians, and why do privileged Creoles lay their lives down for national

independence? Anderson's explanation oí why this is so proceeds alongthree separare bines.

First, in Spanish America, colonial administrative practices divided

Creoles from Peninsulars by reserving the highest offices oí the empire for

the latter, thereby fostering a cense oí resentment and identity among the

former. Second, the fact that Creole bureaucrats were constrained to serve

only in their administrative units of origin meant that they collectively

shared an image oí these provinces as their political territory. The bureau-

cratic pilgrimage through colonial administrative space allowed for the

conflation oí Creole national identity with a specific patria, or fatherland.

Anderson recognizes, however, that these two factors were present be-fore the rise oí Spanish-American nationalisms at the end oí the eigh-

teenth century, and he feels that they were insufficient to produce true

nationalism. The third, and indispensable, factor was the rise oí print capi-

talism and, especially, oí newspapers. These papers allowed for the forma-

tion oí an idea oí "empty time' that was to be occupied by the secular pro-

cess oí development between parallel and competing nations:

[W]e Nave seco that the very conception oí the newspaper implies ihe re-

fraction oí even "world events" roto a specific imagined world oí vernacular

readers, and also how importan[ te that imagined community is an idea

oí steady, solid simultaneity through time. Such a simultaneity ihe im-

mense stretch oí the Spanish-American Empire, and the isolation oí its

National,sn, as a Practica] Systern

5 =

compone ni paró , nade ditti e nlt to imagine Mexican creoles inight learn

months luter ut dcveiopmunts in L'ucnr,s A ires, ba r it would be through

Mex ican newspa pees, flor those id thr ILr, de la Plata; and the event would

;tppcar as "si milar to rathcr iban pl.-f .,l' ce.rnts in Meato.

In thls 111111 , the facturo nt ;ne tipannh \rncncan expericnce to gener-

ate a pennanent Spanish -Amunca-sido nationalism rodeos ehe general

Icval ol development ol tapitalnm. and tochnoingy in tire late eighreenth

cenurnv and thc'local" hackwanlnes „t pan.sh eapiralism and technology

in rclanon t0 the a1111111111 tra tivc 1treic1 ol t1 1 c1111 ) Ir L> () 31

Thus, because they emerge so early, Spanish-American nationalisms

exhibit an oddity, which is that linguisrie identification does not coincide

with the territorial consciousness of Creole bureaucrats and newspaper

readers, thus allowing for tire emergente of both a series of individual na-

tionalisms and for Pan-Spanish-American quasi-national identity. In most

later (European and Asian) cases, linguistic identity would play a more

central and defining role-

What the eye is ro the oover-that particular. ordinary eye he or she is boro

with-language-whatever language hist(>rv has made bis or her mother-

tongue-is to the patrios Throsigh rhat language, encountered at mother's

knee and parted with only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are

imagined, and futuros dreamed. í 154)'

In short, Anderson explains the rise of Spanish-American nationalisms

(Chilean, Peruvian, Bolivian) as the result of (a) a general distinction be-

tween Creoles and Peninsulars, (b) a Creole political-territorial imaginary

that was shaped by the provincial character of the careers of Creole offi-

cialdom, and (c) a consciousness of national specificity that was shaped by

newspapers that were at once provincial and conscious of parallel states.

Once these early Creole nationalisms succeeded in forging sovereign

states, they became models for other nations.t

Definitions

In order tu decide whether this theory of rhe rise of nationalism is an ac-

ceptable account , we need tu understand precisely what Anderson means

by nationalism , and whether bis definition corresponds in a useful way to

the historical phenomena that are being explained.

For Anderson , tire nation " is an iniagined political community-and

imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign ( 6) "Nationalism" is the

adherente to and identification with such a community Although the em-

phasis on the "imaginar)'" qualiry oí narional communities is redundant-all

communities are imaginary constructs--Anderson's emphasis on national-

ism's imaginary qualiry is mcant ro signal that nations are not face-to-face

communities, and therefore involve a charactetistic form of abstraction-'

The imaginary quality of thc national community is also underlined for a

political purpose, for Anderson is critica) of nationalism and so is intent on

showing its historical conti ngency and its "invented" nature-

Understanding the "community' hall of Anderson's dehnition is, per-

haps, not as simple a matter, because community has a specific and limited

connotation for the author "[the nation] is imagined as community be-

cause, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail

in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep comradeship. Ultimately

it is this fraternity that makes ir possible, over the past two centuries, for so

many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such

limited meanings" (7; my emphasis).

This association between nationalism and sacrifice is consonant with

Anderson's guiding preoccupation at the time he wrote this book, which

was the troubling fact that socialist countries were fighting nationalist

wars, showing that nationalism could provide a kind of comradery that

ran deeper than the solidarities of shared class interese This led Anderson

to investigate nationalism's secret potency, its capacity to generate per-

sonal sacrifice. Correspondingly, the question of sacrifice is, for Anderson,

the telltale sigo of nationalism, a fact that leads him to view nationalism

as a substitute for religious community. Let us pause to consider this defi-

nition before moving on to Anderson's historical thesis on the genesis of

nationalism.

The first difficulty that must be faced is that Anderson's definition oí

nation does not always coincide with the historical usage of the term,

even in the place and time that Anderson identifies as the Bite of its inven-

tion (i.e., Spanish America, ca. 1760-1830; Anderson 1994, 65).

The subtleties in the usage of the term nación can perhaps be intro-

duced through an example. In 1784, Don Joaquín Velásquez de León, di-

rector of Mexico City's School of Mining, writes in La Gazeta de México that

1 said in my letter of the year 71 that the Machine that is calied of tire was

easy to use and to conserve: but one year later, that is in 72,- the Excellent

mister Don Jorge Juan, honor and ornament of our Nation in all sciences and

mathematics, devoted himself to building that Machine in the Royal

Seminary of Nobles of Madrid- (September 8, p. 13; my emphasis)

N a ^ : o n .i i l s m . , , P r o . l : c : , l S y s t e m Nata as a Practica) System

6 _ 7 =

In chis instance, Velásquez, who is writing to a predominantly Creole

audience in the context oí a debate with Father J. Antonio Alzare, a fa-

mous Creole scientist and proronationalist, writes oí Jorge Juan that he is

"an honor to our nation." The ambiguity of this formulation helps us

understand the process of transformation that the semantic field oí theterm nation was undergoing_

In the early cighteenth century, nación was defined strictu sensu as "the

collection of inhabitants of a province, country, or kingdom."4 This defini-

tion is already quite ambiguous New Spain, for example, was a province

(or several provinces), a country (or several countries), and a kingdom,

just as Castile was a kingdom that encompassed several provinces and

countries Thus, returning tu out example, the Castilian scientist JorgeJuan might not be oí the same nación as most oí the readers oí the Gazeta deMexico- However, two further ambiguities in fact make this identificationpossible.

First, the term nacional referred to "that which is characteristic oí or

originares from a nation." Thus, Mexican Creoles could be oí the Spanish

nation because they had their roots in Spain, were characteristic (propios)oí Spain, and so on_

A second ambiguity of the semantic field oí nación stems from the

movement oí administrative reforms that Spain's enlightened despots set

in motion around the middle oí the cighteenth century (the "Bourbon

Reforms")_ Among other things, there was a concerted effort to streamline

the territorial organization oí the empire, doing away with the idea oí the

Spanish Empire as being composed oí a series oí kingdoms and substitut-

ing this notion with that oí a unified empire-

Thus, from che viewpoint of Spain's colonies oí the late eighteenth

century, the term nación could be used to pit peninsulares against Americans,

as Anderson has suggested. However, ir could also be used to emphasize

the extension oí national identity by way oí lines oí descent and thus bemade into a synonym oí blood or Gaste and thereby provide a rationale for

interna) divisions within colonial societies. Finally, the concept oí nación

could be used as a sign oí panimperial identty.

Moreover, if the referent oí the term nación was ambiguous with respect

to its conneccion to territory and to bloodlines, it also had complex con-

nections to sovereignty, and this was particularly so in the Americas. So,

for instance, if someone took che "hloodline" definition oí nación, they

might point to the varyingluieros inviolable legal privileges) attached to

the Spanish and Indian republics as separate estates_ If, on the other hand,

they identified nación with a kingdom or province, they could cite the

Nnl^ona1 ,1 .,, ['ra.ticnl System

fueros enjoyed by its nobility and its citizens. It is important to note that inboth oí these cases, sovereignty is not absolute -- popular sovereignty, butrather a limited form oí sovereignty comparable to that oí pater potestas orto arenas oí individual sovereignty granted by the doctrine oí free will.5

Thus, whereas Anderson's definition oí nationhood involves a sense oí

the sovereignty oí a state over a territory, the Spanish definition vacillated

between an increasingly unified but nonetheless ambiguous territorial

definition and a definition around descent Both oí these forms involvedspecific fueros, in other words, access to limited forms oí sovereignty.

It is pertinent to note that this notion survived the American inde-

pendence movements, for example, in the usage oí the term Indian nations

to refer to nomadic tribes in northern Mexico, or in the ambiguous refer-ente oí the term república.-

Because oí the ambiguity in the ties between nation and blood, Spanishusage oí the term nación could be distinguished from a second term, patria(or fatherland), in such a way that a single land could be the patria oí morethan one nación. This was, indeed, the case in most oí the Americas, whichwere conceived as plurinational patrias. This tense coexistente betweena discourse oí loyalty to the land and one oí filiation through descent is

visible in colonial political symbolism.' Common loyalty to the land was a

concept that was available in Spanish political discourse at least since the

sixteenth century but it was nonetheless not directly assimilable to the no-

tion oí "nation." This ambiguity is at the basis oí the category oí "Creole"

itself, which, as a number oí historians have shown, emerged in the mid-

sixteenth century, but maintained an ambiguous relationship to Spanishnessthroughout the colonial periods

The move to associate nation with Common subjection to the king was

promoted by Charles III, who sought to diminish differences oí caste in

favor oí a broad and homogenized category oí "subjects." Thus a tenden-

tial identification between nation and sovereignty was being buílt up by abso-

lutist monarchs, a fact that makes San Martín's dictum that so claimed

Anderson's attention ("in the future the aborigines shall not be called

Indians or natives, they are children and citizens oí Pero and they shall be

known as Peruvians" [Anderson 1994: 49-50]) iess oí a Creole invention

than Anderson supposed9

A second significant problem for applying Anderson's definition to the

Latin American case is that belonging to an imagined national community

does not necessarily imply "deep horizontal comradery." The idea oí na-

tion was originally tied to that oí lineage; members oí a nation could be

linked by vertical ties oí loyalty as much as by horizontal ties oí equality.

Na tlonallsm as a Practica1 System

9

Thts is most obviously relevant \1 11111 aimidering the way in which age

and sex elit( r the picwreo¡ nauunal identity V'omen and ehildren eould

and can very much ide ntity widh therr nations oven thotigh they are usual hí

not therr natlons represcnmtivc siihiccn Snnilarly a master and a seivant

cuuld he parí I che lamo nanun sc nhuut having tu construct Chis tic as a

horizontal link based on fraterniwThis is a fundamental pomt lur Spanish-rAmciican nationalism in che

nineteenth century, whcn ourpurations uich as indigenous communities

haciendas inri guilds werc ovcn m,nc salicnt than thcy are today None-

theless, the point also has hruader signiticancc. Jürgcn Habermas (1991]

pointed out that the hourgeois publi( sphere in eighteenth century north-

ern Europe which was tied inextricably to che development of national-

ism) was made up ideally of private cinzens. Nonetheless, the citizen's

"private sphere encompassed his family, making the citizen at once an

equal to other citizens (Andersons fraternal bond") and the head oí a

household in which he might he the only full citizen. It would be a mis-

take, however, tu presuppose that nationalism was embraced only by che

citizen and not by his wife and children.

In more general terms, the horizontal relationship oí comradery that

Anderson wants to make the exclusive trait of the nacional community oc-

curred in societies with corporations, and the symbolism oí encompass-

ment between citizens and these corporations is critica) to understanding

the nation's capacity to generate personal sacrifices. Nationalists have

fought battles to protect "therr" womcn, to gala )and for "therr" villages, to

defend "their" towns, lt is just as true, however, that women, servants,

family members, and, more generally, the members oí corporate commu-

nities or republics could send "therr" cinzens to war. In other words, citi-

zens could represent various corporate bodies to che state, and they could

represent the power of the state in there corporate bodies.

In Spanish America che complexines of these relationships oí encom-

passment (between che national state, cirizen, and various corporations)

have been widely recognized in analyses of conflicts between various lib-

eral and conservative factions in thc nineteenth century, and in the role of

local communities in che wars uf independence themselves.1 1 The rela-

tionship between the modern ideal oí sovereignty and citizenship and the

legitimate claims oí che corporations is indeed a central theme in nine-

teenth and twentieth-century Laun American history.

The third, and final, difliculry with Anderson's definition of national-

ism is his insistente on sacrifice as its quintessential symptom. The image

oí nationalism as causing a lemminglike impulse to sacrifice because oí its

Na t, on., rn , a Pr u, l ca l Sysleni

10 =

appeal to community is as misleading as the idea that nationalism is neces-

sarily a conimunal ideology of "deep horizontal comradery"; for, in order

to comprehend what nationalism is and has heen about, one must place it

in its context of use. The capacity to generate personal sacrifice in the

name of the nation is usually not a simple function ut communitarian

imaginings ot comradery Ideological appeals to nationhood are most

often coupled with the coercive, moral, or economic force oí other social

relationships, including the appeal no che defense of hearth and heme, or

the economic or coercive pressure ol a local community, or the coercive

apparatus of che state itself

Moreover, there are plenty oí examples oí nationalism spreading mosdy

as a currency that allows a local community or subject to interpellate a state

office in order to make claims based on rights oí citizenship.'t It is mislead-

ing to privilege sacrifice in the study oí nationalism, because the spread oí

this ideology is more often associated with the formulation oí various sorts

oí claims vis-á-vis the state or tward actors froni other communities.

In sum, 1 have raised three objections to Anderson's definition oí nation

and nationalism: first, the definition does not always correspond to his-

torical usage; second, Anderson's emphasis on horizontal comradery cov-

ers only certain aspects oí nationalism, ignoring che fact that nationalism

always involves articulating discourses oí fraternity with hierarchical

relationships, a fact that allows for the formulation oí different kinds oí

national imaginarles; third, Anderson makes sacrifice appear as a conse-

quence oí the national communitarian imagining, when it is most often

che result oí the subjecds position in a web oí relationships, some oí which

are characterized by coercion, while others have a moral appeal that is not

directly that oí nationalism.

Toward an Alternative Perspective

in one oí his most brilliant moments, Anderson suggests that nationalism

should not be analyzed as a species oí "ideology" but rather as a cultural

construct that has affinity with "kinship" or "religion" (1994, 5). Anderson's

selection oí `decía horizontal comradery° as the defining element oí na-

tionalism is his attempt to give meaning to this proposition. The essence

oí nationalism for Anderson is that it provides an idiom oí identiry and

brotherhood around a progressive polity ("the nation"). Following Victor

Turner, Anderson looks for the production oí this fraternity in moments

oí communitas such as state pilgrimages. He also explores the conditioris

of possibility oí national identity, arguing that nationalism depends on a

Natio nalisni as a Practica) Syst,.

t1 =

secular understanding oí time as empry" and oí the world as being madeup oí nations whose progress unfolds simultaneously and differentiallythrough Chis empry time

Thus, for Anderson, che compelling aspect oí nationalism is its promise

oí fraternity, and chis is, 1 believe, che most fundamental problem oí thedefinition.

1 suggested earlier that nationalism is an idiom that articulates citizens

to a number oí communities, ranging froni family, to corporate groups, to

villages and towns, to che nacional state. Thc connections between these

communities are often themselves che suhstance oí nationalist discourse

and struggle. It follows that che imagery that is used to build nacional sen-

timent cannot so readily be reduced to che brotherhood among citizens.

In order ro define the nature of nationalist imaginings, we must ask

questions such as: When and how is nationalism invoked in a man's rela-

tionship with his wife7 How is it depleved in the dealings between a

small-cown schoolteacher and his villagers, or between an Indian cacique

and a president7 For, in all of these cases, the ideology oí fraternity in-

voked by Anderson is being used to articulare hierarchies into che polity.

The protection oí che nation then becomes the protection oí che family,

or oí che village, or oí the race.

My first amendment to Anderson's theory is thus that nationalism does

not ideologically form a single fraternal communiry, because it systemati-

cally disti nguishes full citizens from parí citizens or strong citizens from

weak ones children, women, Indians, the ignorant). Because these

distinctions are by nature heterogeneous, we cannot conclude that nation-

alism's power stems primarily trom the fraternal bond that it promises to

all citizens. The fraternal bond is critical, hut so are what one might cal]che bonds of dependence that are intrinsically a pare oí any nationalism.

This leads to a second, chough mino' and derivative, amendment. The

pride oí place that Anderson gives to sacrilice in his view oí nationalism is

misleading, for if we accept that che national community is not strictly

about equality and fraterniry, but rather about an idiom for articulating

ties oí dependence to the state chrough cicizenship (fraternity), then the

defense of che fraternal bond becomes one possible symptom oí nacional-

ism among severa¡ others.

In other words, che power ol nationalism is as evident in che gesture oía Niño héroe who wraps himself in tire flag and dies for his country as it is inthe gesture oí che peasant who invokes his cicizenship when petitioningfor ¡and, or che small-town notable who claims that his villagers and him-self descend from Aztec ancestors when he petitions for a school. In fact,

Nat^anali.m ns a Yrariira1 System

12 =

nationalism can even be deployed by a peasant who resists induction roto

the army. Finally, the very nature oí patriotic sacrifica is easily miscon-

strued if we do not pay close attention to the bonds oí dependence that

are central to the national communiry-for citizens enlisted to go die in

World War 1 not only because oí their fraternal ties with other volunteersor conscripts, but also because their families might reject them if they did

not, or their communities might reject their families, and so on.

In short, instead oí saying, as Anderson does, that che nation is a com-

munity `because, regardless oí the actual inequality and exploitation that

may prevail in each, che nation is always conceived as a deep comrade-

ship," 1 define the nation as a communiry that is conceived oí as deep com-

radeship among full citizens, each oí whom is a potential broker between

che national state and weak, embryonic, or pare citizens whom he or shecan construe as dependents.

This brings us to a final question concerning the concept oí national-

ism, which regards che relationship between the analytic definition oí na-

tionalism and actual usage oí the tercos nation or nationalism. Although my

revised definition would still exclude any form oí ethnic identification that

did not strive for some degree oí political sovereigncy, 1 helieve that it has a

greater capacity to include and distinguish between historical varieties oí

nationalism. For instante, che ambiguity between a racial and a political-

territorial definition oí nación that 1 cited earlier for the late-eighteenth-

century Spanish world is a refiection oí a specific moment in nation build-

ing that should not simply be called "prenational," because it involves a

territorially finite state and a sovereign people, even though it tolerated

significant differences between stations and even estates. Similarly, the

peasant who has never seen a map or aided a census taker, and who has no

notion oí why, say, "Germana' and "Guadalajara" are incommensurate cate-

gories, can still be a nationalist because he makes an appeal as a Mexican,

or because he comes home to his wife late and drunk on che nght oí

September 15 (Mexican Independence Day).

Revised General Historical Thesis

The fundamental thing about nationalism is that it is a productive dis-

course that allows subjects co rework various connections between social

institutions, including, prominently, the relationship between state insti-

tutions and other social organizacional forms. As such, the power oí na-

tionalism lies not so much in as hold en che souls oí individuals (though

Chis is not insignificant) as in che fact that it provides interactive frames in

Nationalism as a Pract-iba¡ System

13 =

which the relattonship between ctao institnions and various and diverse

social reiationships r family relacion.h;pc. cite organization of work, the

detinition oI lorms of pr(>perty. nnd che regulation ot publie spaee) can he

negotiated Thus one cotild 'erice a history ut nationalism that would

Nave two bookcnds. one in sr hieh suc ,tic. vete not sulficiently dynamic

and states were insulficiendy potent lor nationalism co emerge as a useful

,pace ol negotiation and contention and another in which states are no

longer sullieiently potent and coniplex to he clic key actors ni che process

of regulating what ,Nliehel foueault called biopower.' that is, che power tu

administer a "population° and to regulate ns habits. Capitalism traverses

this history from end to end. It is therefore misleading to begin che history

ot nationalism at the end of che eighreenth century, and not at che begin-

ning of the sixteenth century-

Instead oí positing che notion that nationalism emerged first in the

Americas around the time ot independence, with the rise oí print capital-

ism, and that it is therefore scareely two hundred years old, the Spanish

and Spanish-American cases suggest that nationalism developed in stages,

beginning with European colonization in the sixteenth century or perhaps

in the Reconquista. In fact, nationalisms developed along different, though

interrelated, tracks, such that, as in che analogy between nationalism and

kinship, one might locate diverse nationalist systems.

1 shall outline what Chis alternative perspective reveals for the Spanish-

American case. 1 will argue for several moments in the development oí

nationalism, each oí which involved a distinct interconnection between

fraternity and dependency. This reinterpretation oí the history oí Spanish-

American nationalism leads me identi f theoretical mistakes in Anderson's

general argument, including (1) false conclusions concerning the histori-

cal connections between "racism" and nationalism, as well as between lan-

guage and nationalism; (2) a misleading emphasis on che idiom oí frater-

nity as the only available languagc oI nacional identity; (3) an incorrect or

successional view oí the relationship between religion and nationalism

(nationalism, for Anderson, replaces the universalistic claims oí religion,

yet Spanish nationalism was in fact hased on che national appropriation oí

the true faith)

FirstMoment in Spanish National Fonnation: Colonization

A fundamental error in Anderson's account of che history oí nationalism is

his insistente un associating it with secularization. In the case of Spain,

whose formation as a nation is cercainly one of the earliest, the opposite is

i\'' ,c tionali •,, ,, a P,a.l,ca1 Sys

the case: national consciousness emerges as an offshoot of religious ex-

pansionism_ 1 cite from Anderson once again to elarify what is at stake

In che cocarse of the sixteenth ccntury , Enrope's "discovery' of grandiose

eivllizations hitherto only dimly rumored in China, Japan, Southeast

Asia, and the Indian subcontinent-ur completely unknown-Aztec Mexico

and Incan Peru-suggested an irremediable human pluralism- Most of

these civilizations had developed quite sepaiate from che known history ot

Europe, Chriscendom, Antiquity, indeed man their genealogics ]ay outside

oí and were unassimdable co Eden. ! Only homogeneous, empty time would

offer them aceommodation.) (69)

This point of view is perhaps a true reflection oí the ways in which ex-

pansion was assimilated in England and the Netherlands, but it was not

che cultural form that expansion took in Spain (or in Spain's strongest

early competitor: the Ottoman Empire)." On che contrary, both the

Spanish Reconquista and subsequent expansion into Africa and to America

were narrated very much in the framework oí what Anderson describes in

shorthand as "Eden."It is well known that Columbus and other explorers speculated on their

proximity specifically to Eden, and to other biblical sites, when they

reached che New World. That they attributed their success to God's design

is evident in the ways in which they christened che land: islands and main-

land being named alternatively for roya) and for spiritual sponsors (Isla

Juana, Filipinas, and Fernandina alternating with San Salvador, Veracruz,

Santo Domingo, etc.). Neither was this identity between conquest and the

broader teleology oí Christendom abandoned once colonization set in.

Franciscan missionaries interpreted their evangelizing mission in

Mexico in terms that were consonant with the messianic scholastic phi-

losopher Joachim de Fiore (see Phelan 1970); the priest Mendieta, an

apologist oí Hernán Cortés, derived many a moral from the marvelous

fact that Cortés had been born in the same year as Martin Luther, the one

to work for God in extending che true faith, che other tu work for the

devil.'^ In fact, the whule oí the conquistadoís "discourse oí the mar-

velous" was evenly peppered with elements oí popular literature (Marco

Polo, Mandeville, Virgil, chivalry novels) and with biblical stories. Cine

might argue, contrary to Anderson, that the success oí Charles V gave

new lile and plausibility to a narrative oí Eden that had been much weaker

in che days oí Mandeville and Marco Polo, when the idea oí taking

Jerusalem and oí achieving the Universal Catholic Monarchy was beyond

any realistic expectation.

N a ticnalisn, as a Practica 1 Sysle,n

15 =

But even after Spanish expansionism was waning, by the 1570s, the re-

Iationship between the true faith and the ways oí local heathens was stilltold as parí oí the Christian eschatology, as is obvious both in narratives

oí indigenous intellectuals such as Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala and in

those oí seventeenth-century C:reole patriots, such as Mexico's Carlos

de Sigüenza y Góngora. Both oí these argued (in different ways) that

the Aztecs and the Incas had been evangelized before the arrival oí the

Spaniards, and had subsequently been led astray by the devil, only to be

brought back into the fold by an alliance between the remaining loyalIndians (such as the Texcocans or rhe Tlaxcalans in Mexico, or Guamán

Poma's own family in Peru) and the Spaniards. The significance oí this

point for the history oí Creole patriotism has been extensively argued by

both David Brading andjacques Lafaye.

Not only was Spanish expansion told as part oí Christian eschatology,

but the social organization oí the state that was being built during thisexpansion innovatively identified the church and church history with a

national idea. The earliest formulation oí this occurred in the days oí the

Spanish Reconquista, with the legal codification oí so-called blood purity(limpieza de sangre). Certificares oí blood purity, guaranteeing that the holderwas an old Christian, were necessary in order ro hold office, to enter thechurch, or to enter certain guilds. Although the holders oí these certifi-cates were not identified as "Spaniards," but rather as "Old Christians,"

they were thought oí as a communiry oí blood and oí belief that had privi-leged access to the state.

This nationalization oí the church became much more significant withexpansion to America. The whole oí the first chapter oí the Laws of the Indiesis in fact devoted to justifying Spanish expansion to the Indies as a divine

grace extended to the king so that he might bring the trae faith to thoselands. Moreover, holding political office or belonging to the privilegedclasses is also seen in relation to faithfulness to the church, as is evident ina law that threatens any nobleman or holder oí office with the loss oí allprivileges if he takes the narre oí God in vain (libro 1, título 1, ley 25).

Leaning heavily on these formulas, the concept oí "Spanish" was creat-ed as a legal category oí identity in order to organize political lile in the

Indies. Spanish authority involved moral and religious tutelage over othersocial caregories oí persons, including "Indians," "blacks," "mulattos," and"mestizos," and also served as a category differentiated from other European"foreigners" (extranjeros). For example, law 60, chapter 3, book 3 oí the Lawsof the Indies (first written in 1558) grants "the Viceroys oí Peru the faculty toentrust (encomendar ) any Indians rhat may be unoccupied [indios que hubiere

Na1,onalism as a Prac t,c at Sys lem

16 =

vacos] during their time oí arrival to those provinces, or any that may be-come unoccupied, to the Spaniards [ españoles] living in them ... so thatthey may have them, enjoy their tribute, and give them the good treat-ment that is mandated in our laws."

Similarly, another law (1608) orders that "Oí the people in aid that the

Viceroy might send from New Spain to the Philippines, he not allow in

any way that mestizos or mulattos go or be admitted, because oí the in-

conveniences that have occurred" (book 3, title 4, law 15). Law 14, title 5,

book 3 orders that arms builders cannot teach their art to Indians ; title 10,law 7 oí the same book prohibits military captains from naming slaves asstandard-bearers in the army, while law 12 (1643) oí the same book andtitle orders army officials not to give " mulattos, dark ones [morenos], mesti-zos" the job oí soldier. Book 3, title 15, law 33 orders that the wives oí the

members oí the Audiencia (high court) hear Mass in a specific part oí the

chapel in the company oí their families, civil authorities , or women oírank "and not Indian women, black women, or mulatas ." On the otherhand, the king ordered that when viceroys and judges named a "protectoroí Indians" (a kind oí free lawyer for Indians), "they should not elect

mestizos, because this is importan[ for their defense, and otherwise theIndians can suffer injuries and prejudice" (book 6, title 6, law 7); in otherwords, Spaniards, not mestizos, are the best and most appropriate defend-ers oí Indians. Examples can be multiplied.15

In short, a concept oí "Spanish" emerged quickly for the colonization

oí the Americas, and Spaniards were expected to take up a position oíspiritual , civil, and military leadership, The notion of Spanishness was for-mally and legally understood as a question oí descent, and it therefore in-

cluded "Creoles," even though contexts oí differentiation and discrimina-

tion between American-boro Spaniards and Peninsulars did exist from the

mid-sixteenth century onward.16 This process oí differentiation was predi-cated not en blood, but rather on ideas concerning the influence oí the

land en the character, makeup, and physionomy oí those borra in the

Indies.17 The term criollo had, in fact, a derogatory slant, in that it tended

to assimilate American-born Spaniards with other American-born castes,

such as slaves or mestizos (Lavallé 1993, 20). Thus patriotism (in the sense

oí exaltation oí the land oí birth) became central te the Creoles, because it

was through a vindication oí the true worth oí the land that they could

fully claim the inheritance of their blood.18 This tension between a na-

tionalism based en communiry oí descent, and a patriotism based on a

clear, delimited idea oí "Spain' (as opposed both to the Indies and to other

N a t i o n a I i s m a s a P r a c t i c a l S y s t e m

= 17 =

Lampean holdings nl thc Spanish monarcli srould iemain important in

Spain and in che Anaeucrs even altri indepen deneu

The degrce to which Spaniards Spanish ncu and che Spanish language

viere identiticd widt lile crac lailh and si ith inlizatton comes through ¡e

lile test ul lile lollov, ing las' 1 -0

Having malle a dese examinaron U inccniiTl schethcr thc mysteries of our

Holy Catholic Faith can be prohcrlc asplained in cvcn in che post perfect

language n1 thc Indians it has ñeco r,, ng nizect thet chis is not possible

witlrout i,icurring great dissonances and impenccuons - - So, having re-

solved that it would he huir to inruducc lile Gostil,an language, we order

that tcachers he nade available to Indians s, Iio wish volu n taxi ly to ¡caro,

and we have thought that diese may he lile e,icristrines.

In short, the Spanish language was not leen in the colonies as merely a

convenient and profane vernacular, hut rather as a language that was closer

lo Godao Language thusreflected lile process oí nationalization ojtbe charca,

which líes at the center oí the history of Spanish (and Spanish-American)

nationalisms, a point oí depai-wre that is at che opposite end oí the spec-

trum posited by Anderson, who inaagined that secularization was in every

case at che root oí nacional ism.

The civil Ieadership of Spaniards over Indians and others is laid out in a

number oí laws and practices, including in laws concerning the layout oí

Spanish towns and streets; in tire superiority oí Spanish courts to Indian

courts (Indian magistrates ceuld )al] mestizos or blacks, but not Spaniards);

and, more fundamentally, in that the laws oí Castile served as the blue-

print for those oí che Indies and for every other realm in che Spanish

domain (book 2, title 1, law 2 115301 , "That che Laws oí Castile be kept

in any matter not decided in those of che Indies"). In sum, che concept oí

español, as a community oí blood, asseciared wlth a religion, a language, a

civilization, and a territory, emerged rather quickly in tire course oí che

sixteenth century.

Second Moment of Spanish Nalionalisni Decline in the European Theater

The first moment oí Spanish national construction was, tiren, quite differ-

ent in spirit and content from that posited by Anderson; Spanishness was

built out oí an idea oí a privileged connection te the church, Spaniards

were a chosen peeple, led by monarchs that had been singled out by che

pope with the tale of "Catholic" As Old Christians, they were the true

keepers of lile faith and theretore lile only viable polirical, moral, and

li1t ,s , r.,.:^ca, System

lh

Figure 1.1. Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, patrona de la Nueva España, anonymous

eighteenth-century painting. Collection oí the Museum of che Basilica of

Guadalupe. In chis painting, Guadalupe, patroness of Mexico, is bridging Europe

and New Spain. For Hidalgo, that bridge crumbled with tse Napoleonic inva-

sien of Spain, and divine grave, embodied in this apparition, is rooted entirely

in Mexican sesil.

J aL A

A, n:.. ..

Figure 12_ La virgen de Guadalupe escudo de oilud coruva la epidetn(a del Matlazahuail de

1716-1738, a nonymous engraving , 1743. Col¡ ccti on uf the Museum oí the Basilica

oí Guadalupe - Here che patroness ot iSMcxico is protecting the city's inhabi tants

against the plague.

economic elite .2' The conquistadores were thus instantly a kind oí nobility

in the Indies and "Spaniards" were che dominant caste. In short, Spanish

nationality was built on religious militancy: descent and language al¡

rolled into a notion oí a nacional calling to spiritual tutelage in theAmericas and throughout che world.

The Spanish language in che Indies was not simply an arbitrary tongue

among others, it was the suitable language in which to communicate che

mysteries oí che Catholic faith. Even today in Mexico, hablaren cristiano ("to

speak in Christian") is synonymous with speaking in Spanish. Similarly,

che Spanish bloodline-for Spanishness usually included American-born

Spaniards-had a special destiny with regard to che true faith. Relativism

was not at the origin oí Spanish nationalism, nor did che discovery oí the

Indies dislocate Christian eschatology in any fundamental way. "Eden," as

Anderson calls it, was maintained as the framework for histories that ex-

plained and situated Aztecs, Incas, and the rest of them.22

Spain's precocious consolidation as a state allowed for the rise oí a

form oí national consciousness that was distinct from the relativist voca-

tion oí Britain and the Netherlands, whose entry to che game oí (early)

modero state and empire as underdogs made them fertile ground for the

development oí liberalism and, eventually, oí truly modero forms oí na-

tionalism that are more akin to those described by Anderson.23

On che other hand, Spain's rapid decadence in the European theater

both consolidated and exacerbated national consciousness in peculiar

ways. Horst Pietschmann (1996, 18-24) has summarized the development

oí Spanish economic thinking oí the ¡ate sixteenth and seventeenth cen-

turies, arguing that thc administrative reforms oí the Bourbons in che eigh-

teenth century were not a simple importation oí French administrative

ideas, but rather that they combined che latter with a native body oí

economic and administrative theories and projects devoted to finding

remedies for che economic decline oí Spain. Aniong these, Pietschmann's

summary and discussion oí che influential work oí Luis Ortiz (1558) is per-tinent for my argument here

Ortiz argued that Spain was poor because it only exported raw materi-

als and then reimported rhem in che form oí manufactured goods. The

Spaniards' disdain for manual labor contributed to the underdevelopment

of industry, as did che progressive depopulation oí che countryside. As a

partial remedy, Ortiz urged that laws enhance ehe prestige of manual

labor: "these should he extended even to che extreme that the state force

al] young men (including che nobles) to learn a trade, with che penalty

that they would otherwise lose their nationality" (Pietschmann 1996, 19).

Na tionalism as a Practica! System

21

Thesc rcconimcndations and othurs like them, hecome a staple of

seventeenth-century econonnc prt,iccts and studies, call loe the strength-

ening el the Crown for the pcopling ,,l thc country and for leveling sume

differences bctv, een the variou, ,tations.',uch recommen da ti ons are con-

cived as a matter ol natioiial lit, t_,1 and in Urtizs case, proposed pena¡

[Les for tailure tu comply induje lo,s uf nationality-

Three points concernimg thi, intd lectual tradinon are pertinent for

understanding the history ot nationalism Ti the Spanish world: hrst, a na-

tional consciou,ness seas exaccrhatcd hv thc pcrccption of Spain's me cas-

ing backwardness vis-) vis rts cunq>etltors econd, the solutions that were

proposed l policies concerning track populaticn. education, work, admin-

istrative rationalization, etc. i also callad systcntatically [oí a diminution oí

regional differences and policy reforms that involved conceptualizing a

people in a finite territory, under a more streamlined and tendentially

more equal izi ng admi nistrati on, third, the idea of re lative decline and oí

competition involved a keen sense of °empty time" (that is, of secular com-

petition between states progressing through time) before the advent oí

"print capitalism," a fact that is obvious not only in the economic litera-

ture, but in al] manner oí military and contra e reial policy.

There is in fact sonie confusion in Andersons analysis oí empty time.

Following Walter Benjamín, Anderson defines homogeneous or empty

time as "an idea ... in which simultanelty is, as it were, transverse, cross-

time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal coinci-

dence" (1991, 24). The novel and the newspaper are artifacts that popular-

re this conception oí time, in that their protagonista can act independently

oí one another and still have a meaningful relationship to each other only

because the characters belong to the lame sodety and are being connect-

cd in the mind oí the same reader

Thc question that this analysls poses to a historian oí the Iberian

world is whether the novel and the newspaper were the first cultural arti-

facts that frame events and ates in "empty time-" The answer is that they

were not.

Government policy making in the Spanish world was running en

empty time long before the industrialization of print media, and elites,

Creole and Spanish, were well aware oí this. Plans and programs for

streamlining administration, disciplining thc workforce, rationalizing tar-

iffs, and improving transportation systems were discussed and predicated

un the recognition of the parallel and sinwltancous development oí the

great European powers- titorcovcr there discussions were widely known

and debared, as Pietschmann reminds us: "[1 deas concerning the economic

N a t ' o ' , a l i s m a , „ P , . ', t' al Sys1rrn

trouhles of the country had a truly wide audience [ in the late sixteenth and

seventeenth centurias j . since thc majority of thcir projects were printed,

and we even find their ideas repearedly in the works oí writers like

Cervantes" (1996, 23 Thus , competition betwccn states , and a con-

sciousncss of relative decline were required tu promote and justtty pro-

grams of economic and admi nistrative reform . As a resulr, this mode oí

imagining time liad long been available tu the cures , and cannot oí i tselt

explain the risa oí Spanish-American nationalism , although it does suggcst

an earlier son oí Spanish collectivc c onsciousncss"

A final citation from Pietsehmann who is my principal authority in this

matter, summarizes my point concerning Chis second phase : "[T]ogether

with the affirmation oí the Catholic religion (the Spanish Enlighten-

ment was qualified as being specifically Christian , and it had its reformist

current in Jansenism), we find also the patriotism oí the Enlightened

thinkers, a fact that differentiates them from the cosmopolitanism oí

Enlightenment thinkers in France and other European countries. This

patriotism , that gave the Spanish Enlightenment a strongly political char-

acter, was expressed in the desire that Spain reconquer its earlier eco-

nomic florescence and its política] position as a power oí the first order"

(1996, 25).

In the eighteenth century , under the Bourbons , the discussions oí the

prior century and a half were reanimated , and they generated a series oí

administrative reforms. These reforms were , once again , built on the patri-

otic and national consciente that had developed since the Conquest, aconsciente that simultaneously produced a clearly delimited image oí

"Spaió" as a land , and oí "Spaniards " as a nation (even though there was no

isomorphism between the nation and Spain).'sAs an example oí the Spanish imagined community that was being

constructed through these reforms , 1 offer the following vignette, taken

from the Careta de México ( November 3, 1784 ), describing the celebrationoí the birth oí royal twins and the signing oí a peace treaty with France

and the United States in Madrid : "Rarely shall there be a motive for

greater complacency , nor more worthy oí the jubilation oí the Spaniards,

than the happy birth oí the two twin infantes, and the conclusion oí apeace so advantageous to the national interests " ( my emphasis).

Having identified both the subjects oí the ritual as Spaniards and the

interests being served by the twin birth and by the peace treaty as "na-

tional ," the Gazeta de México goas on to narrare the public festivities that

marked the event , especially the content oí a series of allegorical floats

(carros alegóricos):

Nati on d liara as a Practica1 System

23 =

1 st Floao Adanes Holding die Sky

The first float is preceded by drums, trumpets, pages, heralds, and eight

couples oí both sexes, six oí artisans, one of farmers [hortelanos], and one oí

field hands [labradores], each with che instrument oí its profession. They are

followed by che orchestra and irnmediacely thereafter by a super float,

pulled like che rest by six horses, in which the stacue oí Atlantis, character.

ized with severa) mottos, holds che sky. Our August Monarch Charles 111

holds with his heroic virtues and happy government che Spanish Monarchy.

The love o[ che Spaniards venerares in os glorious Monarch che Princes and

the Royal Family, so worthy also of che )ove that is bestowed to chem by tbe

Nation.

Here we have, in an officially sanctioned bulletin published in Mexico

City, the portrayal oí a Spanish nation-a nation, represented by farmers,

agricultura] workers, and artisans, protected by a nacional monarch, who

holds up the sky over their heads like Atlas. Both che monarchy and the

people are called "Spanish" here, and che publication oí this in Mexico is

clearly meant te make this national celebration inclusive at the very least

co a Creole audience. Yet che terricory of "Spain is clearly limited in che

ritual, in a way that diverges from the inclusive term nación:

5th Floao Spain Jubilan[ because of che Birth oí che Infantes

The las[ float . is preceded by eight couples on horseback, armed with

lance and shleld. Then two pagos, and vine couples that indicare the differ-

ent provinces oí Spain, whose costumes they wear. They are accompanied

by an orchestra, to which they respond with dances of their respectiveprovinces.

The description oí a series oí allegories portraying Spain goes en in detailand is summed up in che following analysis:

The interpretation of chis float is easy. Spain is represented in che greatestsurge oí its happiness as a resulr oí che birth ol the two SERENE INFANTES, by

[newly signed peace], by its producrs, by its main rivers, by its Sciences,

Arts, Navy, Commerce, and Agriarlture, all of which e; fomented by our

august sovereign, facilitating for Chis Illuscrious Nation che abundante and

opulence that is promised by its fernlc soi] and che constancy oí ics loyal

and energetic inhabitants.

In short, a clear image oí Spain, represented by a modero idea oí the

public good (wich great prominence given co arts and industry, natural re-sources, and the customs oí che various folk), is present in this state ritual.

Naiionalism as a Praci ical System

24 =

At the same time, che inclusiveness oí che category oí "Nation" appears to

be a bit broader ehan che Spanish terricory that is so clearly delimited, be-

cause it includes the readers oí che Gazeta de México, who are fully expected

co share in the joy oí the occasion. Around the time oí this festivity,

Charles 111 would try te implement administrative reforms that would

more clearly make the territorial image oí Spain inclusive oí the Indies in a

way that paralleled the inclusive potencial oí the concept oí the Spanishnation.

Third Moment: Bourbon Reforms and Independence

The high point oí chis reformist movement, in the late eighteenth century

under Charles III, involved trying to make Spain and its colonies into aclosed economic space, with a relatively streamlined administration, anactive financial and economic policy, a decentralized administration andarmy. This imperial unity was known as the Cuerpo unido de Nación (Unifiedbody oí nation; Pietschmann 1996, 302), and its administrative organiza-tion was clearly the precursor oí the state organizations that were generat-ed with independence,

Interestingly, however, these reforms were promoted not only as aresponse lo a feeling oí backwardness and oí nostalgia for past nacionalglories, but also te face che political threats posed both by the British navyand che American Revolution. The former threat in particular made the

decentralization oí administration an importan[ strategy for the fortifica-

tion oí the empire. This system oí decentralization and administrative ra-tionalization also involved promoting a view oí industry and oí public in-terest that is significant in the formation oí a modern form oí nationalism,based en individual property, a skilled and well-policed workforce, and abourgeois public sphere.

Two divergent tendencies are produced with these administrative, reli-gious, and educacional reforms. On the one hand, the formation oí the ideaoí a Gran España, made up oí Iberia and the Indies together, with a popu-lation oí subjects Lending toward greater internal homogenization under

increasingly bourgeois forms of political identity, en che other, the con-

solidation oí the various administrative units-the viceroyalties and the

new "intendancies"_as viable state units, each with its own internal finan-cia] administration and permanenc army.

These contradictory tendencies are in fact incimately related: en the

one hand, the administrative consolidation oí transatlantic political units

was che only logical means te shape a strong Gran España; en the other,

Natioualism as a Practica1 System

=25=

political crisis Froni the seventeenth century on, the armada from Spain

liad to struggle to ntake successful voyages to the Americas, and there

were moments when the armada was entirely incapable oí managing

Spanish-American trade Creater administrative and military autonomy

would provide another line ol imperial detense.

Thus, at the lame time that the "political viability" and the "emotional

plausibility" oí the viceroyalties were strengthened pollncally by the new

system oí intendancies and deologically through a new emphasis on the

public good through industiy and education, so too was the notion oí a

truly panimperial idenriry closer at hand than ever hefore.

These contradictory tendencies are in evidente at the time oí indepen-

dence: first, in the parallels between tire American War oí Independence

and the "war of independence" oí Spain against the French invaders; sec-

ond, in the fact that the liberal Constitution oí Cádiz (1812) defined

"Spaniards" as all oí the people who were born in the Spanish territories,

with no differences made between Iberia and the Indies.

Figure 1. . Ex-oolo gining Ibanks lo tbe oi rg is: of Cuadal upe f o r a successful medica¡ opera tion,

anonymous, 1960. Re¡ornier of the c[ghLeen th century were convinced that divine

protection and Interjecti on were not i n conlbct aith modernizat, t i a and modern

technologies. This has been a persutent [heme in Mexican nationalism In this

ex-voto of 1960, the Virgin of Cuadalupes llght shines in the operating room.

the very process oí consolidating their viability made independence al]

the easier to imagine . Alexandcr von Humboldt's voyage and writings en

Spanish America are a good example of this conundrum. Whereas in the

Laves of tbe Indies, which is a compilation made in 1680, printed materials

about the Indies were banned frota [hose lands , and foreigners were out-

lawed from going beyond the ports of the Indies, Humboldt received

a roya) commission to travel thcre, and authorities were asked to give

him all oí their statistics and any in formation he might find useful.

Humboldt's publications on the political economy oí the Indies followed

the spirit oí the Bourbon reforms, as well as Cerman cameralist adminis-

trative theory, by treating each principal administrative unit (mainly

viceroyalties) as a coherent whole, with a population, an economy, a

map, and so on.

The administrative consolidation of viceroyalties, intendancies, and

other political units was occurring not as a ploy to keep Creoles boxed

into their administrative unas, but ratheu to strengthen the general state oí

the empire, and tu give each segment a greater capacity to respond to a

Fourtb Moment. The Rocky Road to Modera Nationalism (Mexico 181o-29)

In Latin America, the road ter national modernity was particularly cumber-

some. This was owing to the early date of independence movements, afact that resulted not so much from the force oí nationalist feeling in theregion as from the decadente oí Spain in the European forum.36 As a resultoí this, the new countries faced stiff interna¡ and foreign- relations prob-lems, and it is in the context oí [hese problems that a functioning national-

ism developed.

The fourth moment in the evolution oí Spanish-American nationalismcan best be understood as one in which the dynamics of independentpostcolonial statehood forced deep ideological changes, including a sharp

change in who was considered a national and who a foreigner, a redefini-

tion oí the extension oí the fraternal bond through the idea oí citizenship,

and of the relationship between religion and nationality and between race

and nation.

This process oí radical transformation occurred alongside the emer-

gence oí a new form oí popular politics, in which social movements

cut across the boundaries oí villages and castes, regions and guilds.

The Spanish-American revolutions may seem "socially thin" to some

contemporary observers (Anderson 1991, 49), but they were by far the

most "dense" social and political movements that Spanish America had

had since the Conquest. In this section, 1 explore the dynamics of [hese

N a t i o n a l i s m gis e p roo i ,cal S y s t e m

26 =

Nationalism as a e-ractica1 System

Figure 1 4_Sa1or Reina de la Arnérrc, L? ion hy Gonzalo Carrasco (1859-1936), n. d.

Collection oí die Muscum of thc Basílica of Guadalupe. Guadalupe here is the

patroness of Spanish-American sovercignty Th, image also underscores Mexicos

presumptive role at the head ol the Spanish-Anierican con federati on.

transformations through a discussion of certain key events in early inde-

pendent Mexico (18 10-29). As Andiony Pagden has shown, Creole patri-

otism was predicated on Spanish political philosophy. In the Iberian

world, sovereignry was granted by ((>d to the people, who in furo ceded

it to thc monarch. It is therefore nos surprising that the early fathers of

Narionn lien^ .i^ Pear..al Sys tea

28

Mexican independence, Hidalgo and Morelos, who were secular priests,

claimed to be fighting for the sake of religion. Here, for instante, is a for-mulation by Morelos:

Know that when kings go missing Sovereignry resides only in the Nation,7

know also that every nation is free and is authorized ro form the class of

government that ir chooses and not te be the slave oí anothcr; know also

(for you undoubtedly have hcard rell of rhis) that we are so far from heresy

that our srruggle comes down to defending and protecring in all oí its

rights our holy religion, whlch is rhe aim of our sights, and ro extend the

culr of Our Lady the Virgin Islary. (Morelos 1812, 199)

Morelos and Hidalgo accused rhe Spaniards oí betraying their trae

Christian mission and using Chrisrianity as a subterfuge for the exploita-

tion of the Americans.27 To uphold the true Christian faith was also to

drive out al] Spaniards who had milked the Mexicans of their native

wealth and who had driven rhem to abjection.

These early movements failed. Morelos and Hidalgo were executed,

and alrhough their followers continued rhe fight, independence was not to

be achieved under the leadership of this particular ideological wing_

Instead, an alliance was captained by Agustín Iturbide, who had been a

loyalist army officer and who enjoyed the backing of a sizable fraction oí

New Spain's elite. lturbide's Plan de Iguala gave Spaniards ample guaran-tees of full inclusion in the new republic. _

The backers oí Morelos (including pardos, Indian village communlties,local artisans and merchants) were led by Vicente Guerrero and backed a

political program that would eventually gel roto what Peter Guardino has

called "popular federalism" (1996, 120-27; 179-86). The popular radicals

oí the 1 820s were interested in lowering taxes and broad electoral enfran-

chisement. They favored the formation oí municipal boundaries and insti-tutions that would help villagers defend their lands, gave free rein to anti-

Spanish sentiment, and sought to implement a liberal system modeled en

that of the United States. The elite of this group carne to be associated

with rhe Freemasons of the rite of York, and they supported a movementto expel the Spaniards from Mexico_

In 1828 a yorquino-backed coup led ro the looting oí the market oí the

Parián in Mexico Ciry, where wealthy Spanish merchants had their shops,

and the expulsion of the Spaniards from Mexico followed shortly afrer.21

Thus Mexican nationalism went from excluding Spaniards in rhe early in-

dependence movement, to including rhem at independence, to excluding

rhem again, all in a very short lapso of time.

Natioriui 5,n ,rn a Iractlcal Systea29

Thc very viulence Di the iti, ologieal transionn a ti ora of early Mexican

nationalism suggests that a general Ti absti,ict "nationalism" does not help

in undcrstanding thc speciiio ot tts eontcnu or as dynamics of propaga-

tion In fact jusc as che noticio of kinshils s in abstraction of such a gen-

eral leve) that it can obtuscate clic natura d thc practicas that are being

summed up ¡Ti the ealegory, so tus, can see say that Anderso«s cultural ist

reading oí nationalism is to such a (legrar general and abstract thar it fails

to clarify che polities ot cono uunitt przxluecion.

lile speciiio fonnulations ut thc natura ol clic nation and of who was

included and who was excluded undcnvent dramatic. shifts that cannot be

attributed ro changes in conaciousness gained by new naaps or censuses

(Humboldt was still the maro scuice chal people drew en in this period).

Nor do these shifts respond lo ara intensification oí travel or oí che

strength oí bureaucratic networks acioss che territory. The formation oí

Mexican nationalism can be understood in rciation to the political condi-

tions oí its production_ These condi Horas mere determined as muela by the

new nation's position in an international order as by the fact that it did not

have a national ruling class-

This latter point requires elaboration. At che time oí independence,

Spanish-Ameriean countries did not hace a Creole bourgeoisie that could

serve as a nacional dominant class. Domestic regional economies were not

well articulated Yo each other; much of che transatlantic merchant elite

was Spanish; mining capital often required foreign partnerships. Thus che

Creole elite was a regional elite, and not a national bourgeoisie. Only two

institutions could conceivably serve co articulare the national space: the

church and che military. The milicary, however, was not a unified body, be-

cause it was led precisely by regional caudillos, many oí whom controlled

their own milicias. The church, on che other hand, articulated the national

space in ternas oí credit to some extent, and also ideologically, but it could

not serve as a national dominant class

In Chis context, uniting regional leaders inco national factions was neces-

sary. In che early years after Mexico's independence, Freemasonry had Chis

role.co It was through Masonry that regional elites forged interregional net-

works that con Id prefigure the national burcaucracy after independence.

When independence was anained, nnich oí Mexico's political elite

helonged to Masonic lodges organized in the Scottish rice. These elites

were well disposed co Britain and, indeed, Great Britain was che first great

power to recognize Mexico Not surprisingly, George Ward, who was

Britain's first anthassador co ixlexico was able to reap nunaerous economic

and political concessions Froni (lit govcrnnaent of Mexico's first presi-

.A4^ ,0ra clic., Sys trm

311

dent, Guadalupe Victoria --so much so that when US. ambassador Joel

Poinsett arrived can che sccnc in 1825 , he saw gaining some oí the terrain

that tire United States liad already ceded to che British as his most formi-

dable cask."' Poinsett naakcs a sustained cffort to huild a pro-Ameriean

party to councer British intluence in Mexico Part ol Poinsetts well-

calibered strategy included aid in che organization of Masonic lodges co

counter those affiliated ro che Scottish rite, arad he attached these Masons

co che rite oí York (chartercd by che lodge in Philadelphia). These two

Masonic organizations t, ould funccion as political parciies" in Chis early

period.'

Both che Scottish and che Yorkish Masons tried to monopolize as many

government posts as they could. As the competition between the escoceses

and the yorquinos became embittered, che Ameriean causé' (oí York) be-

gins to identify the Masons oí the Scottish rite with imperialist European

interests, especially with Spanish interests. This allowed the yorquinos to

distract attention from tire US-British rivalry, and it promised co yield

juicy dividends co yorquinos in che form oí Spanish property, because the

Spaniards were still che most prosperous sector oí Mexico's population.

The escoseses, for their pare, because they were losing che contest for

national power, denounced the role of Joel Poinsett as a foreigner creatingche parry oí yorquinos and the very existente oí "secret societies."

Thus, it is in che competition between two secret societies for full con-

trol over che apparatus of che state that two critical aspects oí Mexican na-

tionalism get consolidated: nationalism as an excluding ideology (even as

a xenophobic ideology)-seen both in che move co expel the Spaniards

and in che move to expel Poinsett; and nationalism as an ideology that

makes public access to the state bureaucracy a cornerstone oí its ideology.

These aspects oí nationalism reinforce one another because neither of che

two Masonic parties can afford the luxury oí identifying entirely with for-

eign interests (because each needs to attack a different foreign power-

the yorquinos want to attack British and Spanish interests, che escoseses are

opposed to U.S. interests), and neither can openly admit that it merely

wishes to control the bureaucratic apparatus.

Finally, the links between religion and nationalism should not be taken

as constant. Although early Mexican patriotism was identified with a su-

perior loyalty to che Catholic faith, arad Mexican nationalists vehemently

excluded other faiths from che national order, both the British and the

Americans coincide in their interest in propagating freedom oí religion.

Consequently, some degree oí religious tolerance was necessary to main-

tain trade with England and che United States, and che polarization oí the

N a t i o,t a l i s m a s a Pra ctica 1 S y s t e m

31 =

political spectrum ended up producing a jacobin camp that was absent inthe early postindependent period.

Eventually, church properties would be to jacobins what Spanish prop-

erties had been to yorquinos in 1829: a source oí wealth that could be the

spoils for political expansion in a period oí little economic growth.

In chis fashion, Mexico consolidated a nacional state with a nationalism

built on three principies: che defense against foreigners, the defense oí

open political parties instead of secret societies (and oí an understanding

oí the state as a normative order rather than as a governing caaes), and the

(uneven) extension oí the beneflts oí nationalism to popular levels

(whether througb the abolition oí tribute, oí guild restrictions, oí church

tithes, oí distribution oí nacional lands, che distribution oí spoils from the

Spaniards, the distribution oí goods oí new technologies). These three

pillars are in part rhe unintended result ol the contest oí the secret so-

cieties, supported by two imperialist states, for control over the state ap-

paratus. These secret societies, in turn, functioned thanks to the cleavages

oí economic and political interests that cut across nacional lines or that did

not reach "up" to the nacional leve) at all. In short, the bases oí communi-

tarian feeling, criteria oí inclusion and exclusion in the nation, the imagi-

nation oí a territory, and the very conceptualization oí nacional fraternirywere shaped in the political fray.

Conclusion

The cultural density oí the phenomenon oí nationalism líes in the politics

oí its production and deployment Nationalism combines the use of

transnationally generated formulas, ranging from legal formulations to

state pageantry, with a politics that is inextricably local. A dense or thick

description oí nationalism is therefore a necessary step for understanding

its cultural characteristics.

The Spanish-American and Mexican cases present a significant histori-cal problem for Anderson's conceptualization because in Spain nacionalconstruction began with an appropriation oí the church, and not with arelativization of "Eden." Spanish was seen as a modern form oí Latin, andtherefore was more appropriate for communicating the faith than indige-nous languages. In a related vein, "yace" was central to early modern

Spanish nationalism, insofar as descent from Old Christians was seen as asigo oí a historical tie to the faith, a sigo that gave its owners control overthe bureaucratic apparatus of both church and state.

Moreover, the concept oí "empty time" was present in the Spanish

Nat,Onallsm n,: a Prac^,cal System

world long before print capitalism, beginning with the decline oí empire

and Spains failure to attain a universal monarchy. Thus, Spanish economic

thought formulated the notion oí a national economy beginning in the

mid-sixteenth century. The administrative constructs that allowed for the

imaginings oí a people tied to a territory can be dated back to the six-

teenth century, when both colonial expansion and the defense oí the em-

pire against European powers led to the consolidation oí the notion oí

"Spain' and oí "Spanards." As Spain continued to decline in the European

forum, state reforms tended to target political middlemen in an attempt to

substitute regional political classes with a bureaucracy, to consolidare an

idea oí a nacional territory, and to shape a Greater Spanish Nation made

up oí subjects that tended increasingly toward an internal uniformity vis-ó-vis the Crown.

Finally, independence itself, as Anderson recognized, was not the

product oí cultural nationalism, but rather oí the decline oí Spain's ca-pacity to run its overseas territories. As a result, much oí the specific con-

tent oí modern nationalist ideology, such as the notion that politics

should be public, or that religion should not be a criterion for choosing atrading partner, or that a Spaniard is not a Mexican even if he sympathizes

with the Mexican cause, was the cultural product oí independence, andnot its precondition.

On the theoretical front, the Latin American case leads me to modify

Anderson's definition oí nationalism in order to stress botín fraternal tres

and bonds oí dependence in the imagined community. It is in the articula-

tion between citizenship and nationality that various nationalisms derive

their power. As a result, sacrifice is not the quintessential feature oí nation-

alism, but rather one oí a number oí possible signs and manifestations.

In addition, because Anderson's ideas concerning the necessiry oí cul-

tural relativism as a precondition for nationalism are incorrect, it followsthat his theoretical emphasis on the centrality oí language over race in

nationalism can also be questioned. In the case oí Spain, at least, "racial"

identity (in the dense oí a bloodline) was coupled with linguistic identity

for the formation oí an opposition between "Spaniards" and "lndians," and

it was descent from Oid Christians who had fought holy wars that madeSpaniards a chosen people.

Like kínship and religion, nationalism has come in various strands. In

the early modern period, we must distinguish between the nationalism oí

a chosen people, such as that oí Spain, and the defensive nationalism oí

the British or the Dutch, who created nationalist ideals in order to affirm

their right to maintain and sanctify their own traditions. Both oí these

Nat,onai,sm as a Practical System

33 =

fornis contia, t with the highly unsiablc nati unalist tomula ti ons of early

postcolonial Spanish America AdUtmallants tamily free reaches baek to

the very birth of the modem w01 ¡TI and ideas cl political community that

lave emerged sincc then are buth muro and Icss than a cultural suecessor

ot che rellgious community

N a l i o n a l i, ni ., , e P r,, , i i c a l S y s t e ^

2

Communitarian Ideologies and Nationalism

This chapter, first published in 1993, is the earliest of the essays in this book. It iras written

for a wide audience, with the aim of províding very general historical parameters for the

study of Mexican communitarian ideologies.

The territory now known as Mexico has always been occupied by diverse

human groups that speak different languages and have significant varia-

tions in belief and customs. Mexican nationality is not a historically tran-

scendent entity. On the contrary, it is the historical product of the peoples

who have inhabited those lands. The goal of this chapter is to identify

communitarian ideologies that have played salient roles in the formation

and transformation of national ideology in Mexico.

Today it is common to assert that nationalism is a communitarian fic-

tion. However, the nation is a kind of community that coexists with oth-

ers, either as a complementary form oras a competing form of community,

and strategies for identifying the communitarian ideologies that are perti-

nent for the study of nationality are a matter that requires attention. Max

Weber defined communal relations as a type of social relationship wherein

action is'based on the subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual

or traditional, that they belong together."i Thus al] communal relations,

35 =

including family relations, are hased on subjective feeling and en fictionsregarding the social whole, and who "we" are

In this chapter, 1 analyze communitarian ideologies by identifying the

goods that each community marks as inalienable- This strategy is based en

Annette Weiner's discussion oí exchange- In contrast to classical (Maussian)

models of exchange, which inspected the role of the reciprocal exchange

oí goods for building ties of solidarity, Weiner focused en the goods that

people decide that they cannot exchange: inalienable goods.2 In so doing,

she showed that reciprocal exchanges not only assert solidarity; they also

chape systems oí social differentiation. The objects that are exchanged in

relations oí reciprocity also underline by omission or by implication the

resources that will not be exchanged. The relationship between the vari-

ous things that each exchange partner withholds and keeps out oí circula-

tion objectifies a system oí social differentiation.

This idea is useful for describing how communitarian ideologies are

constructed. The totalizing visions that underlie communitarian relation-

ships are always based en definitions of goods or rights that are common

and inalienable te al]. The relationships oí differentiation that are later

constructed within and between communities are defined with referenceto the series of goods that are inalienable ro the group.

In out case, examining the nation's inalienable goods clarifies how

Mexicanness has been formed. National feelings are presented as inherited

"primordial loyalties." One is burn and dies with them and they are passed

un: children must also inherit them- This characteristic oí nationaliry-its

ideology oí transcendence-can be grasped by studying the communitar-

ian goods and rights that are considered inalienable because they embody

the material transcendence Oí the community. My aim in this chapter is to

use che inalienable communitarian possessions to identify the principal

types of communitarian ideologies that facilitated or blocked the forma-tion of the feeling oí Mexican nationaliry .

The Aztecs

The Aztecs are notan obligatory starting point for the analysis oí Mexican

communitarian ideologies. 1 begin with them for four reasons: (1) under-

standing the communitarian ideologies of pre-Hispanic states helps us to

visualize the full gamut oí ideological sources oí modern Mexican nation-

alism; (2) some features oí pre-Hispanic communitarian ideologies have

persisted, albeit in a very transformed way, (3) many Mexican nationalist

movements have tried to take up the polirical forros oí ancient Mexico;

C o m m u n i ! o r a n 1 d o l o g i e s

= 36 =

and (4) ancient Nahua notions correspond at many points with those oí

other Mesoamerican groups. My aim in considering the Aztecs is not to

affirm the precepts oí traditional Mexican nationalism, which always saw

the grandeur oí the Aztec city as the founding moment oí Mexican na-

tionality. Rather, it is to understand the nature oí Aztec communitarianism

so that we may better identify its potential for modern nationalist thought.

When discussing Aztec notions oí community, it is necessary to con-

sider kinship, territory, cultural formulations oí subordination and domi-nation, and ideas about civilization and barbarism.

In the Aztec period, indigenous states' areas oí influence did not corre-

spond to the limits oí a single linguistic or territorial community. The

great cities oí Tenochtitlán, Texcoco, and Azcapotzalco housed migrants

from many areas, including speakers oí various languages. The great

tlatoani oí Tenochtitlán was the lord not only oí the Nahuatl speakers oí

Tenochtitlán, but also oí Otomis, Mazahuas, Zapotecs, and many others,

some oí whom had been forcibly brought to the city as slaves, while oth-

ers were migrants, members of guilds, and merchants. Pre-Hispanic states

were thus not meant to represent a cultural community in the contempo-

rary sense oí the term, although communitarian ideas certainly existed.

These notions developed around a discourse el kinship (that is, oí alliance

and descent) between living and dead people, as well as between kin

groups and land.

The cornerstone oí the sense oí community in the Aztec period was

the institution oí the calpulli- The communitarian ideology of the calpulli

was manifested in a series oí inalienable goods and rights: (1) the land el

the calpulli belonged to a lineage, not an individual, so individuals could

even sell themselves as slaves but they could not freely dispose oí calpulli

lands; (2) the lineage and land were sponsored by a deity (calpulteotl), and

the link with that deity could not be broken by individual will; (3) the

calpulli's links with other calpultin were manifested and symbolized in kin-

ship links among their chiefs and among the gods in the cycle oí suns, a

myth that legitimated the preeminente oí a single people (the Aztecs) and

their tutelary god over en entire era.3 This series of kinship relationships

was also used to claim Aztec filiation with the Toltec line, which was the

source oí civilization, and was also seen asan inalienable legacy.

In Chis sense, in the pre-Hispanic period the "national" question did not

depend en "ethnicity" as we understand iq nationaliry did not depend en

membership in the same Iinguistic, racial, or cultural group. The impor-

tant thing was to belong to one oí a set oí landed communities. Belonging

to these communities determined a relationship to a series of inalienable

Coromu,o arias Ideologies

= 37 =

,,oods summcd up in tire dilterent dinx nsic, ns ot tire caipulli comnion land

'Lid a kinship idiom tying all maniera ol a..iÍpuiG togethet; filiati on with a

local deiq^ ca ipu!leoil;. and a reccrved set ol ilb,nces between calpultin (ex-

pressed in genealogical forn) hctwc^n tamiheso t chi eis and between their

tutelary gods These relationsh, s t,crc ^spressed very powertuliy in che

words that according to Fray lfui nardi no de Sahagúm) Aztec priests di-

rected to che Franciscana whu cure to convert them

They out progen noi e,ak]ri ue

all thcir 'caes of wo^+hip,

their ways of reveriog l che goda

Thus, before them we bn ng carde to our mou ths ]we swear],

so do we bleed,

we pay our debts,

we burn incense,

we offer sacrifices

Ttey [our progenitora] said

that they, the gods, are for whom one leves,

that they deserved us

How? Wherer When it was still night

And they [our ancestors raid,

that they give os

our sustenance, our food.

everything one drinks, one eats,

that which is our flesh, maize, beans,

amaranth, chía.

They are who we ask for

water, ramo,

which is why che things of dte land are produeed.'

This vision oí community also hclps Lis Lo understand certain features

of che Aztecs' characteristic sense ol honran hfe. These features are ex-

pressed in che ideologies oí sacrifico and slavery. When an individual was

captured in war, he was taken by the hair on the crown oí his head. This

act represented che appropriation of his tonalli, his vital force, and the sepa-

ration oí that vital force from che captive's original community.s

Thus, sacrifice and slavery were one naton's or community's way oí lib-

erating and expending the human energy and vitality that had been sepa-

rated from anorher nation or community_ This strengthened che alliance

between the appropriating nation and che different gods that shaped its

Communii ir, ,n Id,olo

38

political licld- Sacrifice and slavery were interpreted as an affirmation of

the greater cosmology-tic period or reigning son in which it was thought

that they were livinig--through che expansion of sorne communities at che

expense oí others

In tima sense, although the aalpnlli was the primordial communitarian

unir, riere was also a leve) of social identi fication related Lo the Aztec

state. The feclings of belonging to this greater political unir were built on

a numher ol relationshi ps. Wc have already mentioned tbe importance of

the system of kinship alliance between nobles. Marriage between nobles

was so important in che ideological construction of the empire that is al-

most impossible to imagine chis system without polygamy, because Aztec

lords formed alliances with subordinated peoples by accepting their noble-

women in marriage6

These kinship networks among allied, subordinated communities and

imperial centers also had an ideological counterpart in religion. Here, the

Aztecs' tutelary god, Huitzilopochtli, ruled the era-the'Pifth Sud'-as a

whole. Thus, che calpultin's communitarian worship could also find a subor-

dinate place in a religious cosmology that included and favored the empire,

with the Aztecs' Huitzilopochtli presiding over che whole era.

Imperial society also had mechanisms for attracting individuals who

did not come as slaves or victims. Aztec expansion depended en military

and commercial domination. In turn, Chis domination required powerful

armies, and the Aztecs permitted non-Aztecs to join them and rise in rank

through battlefield accomplishments. In this way, the Aztec empire devel-

oped mechanisms for absorbing and assimilating individuals even though

they did not belong to their primordial community oí origin.7

In conclusion , one can say that in pre-Hispanic society there was a vi-

sion oí the human individual as an energy that had a value in itself. This

energy (figured in the tonalli) had Lo be linked to a series of inalienable

possessions that every qualified individual inherited. He or she had to be

linked to a piece of land, Lo a kin group, to a configuration oí tutelary

gods, and to the political acate. The Aztecs' imperial policies were to some

degree oriented Lo channeling these various communal loyalties toward

them through a complex system oí alliances and threats. They also had

the capacity to absorb individuals into the group in return for services ren-

dered, especially on the battlefield. Basically, one can say that, in the

Aztec period, belonging to a landed community that was figured as a kin-

dred was the only truly honored way oí life, and to be separated from that

state oí community, the ancient Nahua was destined Lo serve orto dic.

Con,sunita rian Idealagies

39=

The Colonial Period

Notions of communiry in colonial society, can also be explored through an

analysis oí the inalienable possessions that each attributed to itself. New

Spain was a caste society that recognized different types oí communities

that maintained hierarchical relationships with each other. I shall briefly

review indigenous, Spanish and mestizo communitarian ideologies.

Indigenous communities partially maintained some oí the calpulli's

communal attributes: the communiry remained legally and officially land-

ed through its "primordial titles," which were decrees from a Spanish

monarch that granted a series of lands and goods to a village, sometimes

in recognition oí tribute paid or to confirm lands that had belonged to

those villages in antiquity.

Clearly, one oí the colonial indigenous communitys inalienable goods

was land, despite the fact that communal lands could be rented for long

periods or lose through illicit sales. Correspondingly, the primordial titles

were converted into almost sacred documenis guarded by the most vener-

able elders and displayed only in special occasions. Knowledge oí the

content oí those titles was a central theme oí local oral traditions.

As in pre-Columbian times, this collective relationship with the land

was reflected ar the ritual, religious, and political levels. Thus, indigenous

communities instituted their own ofhces-alcaldes, jueces, gobernadores, man-

dones, and alguaciles-that circulated, in theory at least, among the village

principales, the descendants oí the old indigenous nobility. This political

organization oí the indigenous communiry had the double purpose oí

guarding village intereses, imparting local justice, and responding to

Spanish demands on the community, including tribute, the organization

oí labor groups, and the enforcement oí Christian worship.

A good part oí the territorial, political, and religious organization oí in-

digenous communities also tended to coincide with kin groups in the modeoí the calpulli, but in general the indigenous quarters and communities of

the colonial period were not direct continuations oí the calpultin. In the first

decades after the Conquest, many ot the indigenous quarters (barrios) that

were organized were in fact calpultin However, this correspondence often

broke down because oí the enormous Indian mortality throughout the six-

teenth century and the population movements that responded to new

Spanish economic demands. Moreover, to resolve the difficulties in con-

trolling the dispersed indigenous population the Spanish "concentrated" it

in larger population centers (aboye all in the late sixteenth and eariy seven-

teenth centuries). Still, although thc physical continuity between calpulli

1drologies

40 =

and indigenous barrio was generally imperfect, it did reproduce the ten-

dency te organize kinship relationships en the leve) oí the barrio and the

community. The indigenous barrios oí the colonial period were generally

composed oí two or three great patrilineages_ Even more important, as

James Lockhart has shown, colonial indigenous jurisdictions tended to

coincide with the pre-Columbian units (altepetl), in such a way that the

combination oí barrios formed a single political community.

On the ritual plane, each village adopted one or several saints, and the

Christian tradition oí revelation articulated with the shamanism oí pre-

Columbian peoples. This permitted personalized relationships between

saints and individuals (and, by association, between saints and the groups

to which individuals belonged). Thus, the indigenous communitarian spirit

maintained inalienable links with land, family, and gods, albeit in a trans-formed way.

In addition to al] this, colonial indigenous communities were nations in

a racial sense, and this radically differentiated colonial indigenous nation-ality from pre-Columbian nationalities. Like the calpulli, each communityidentified its limits on the basis oí a relationship with a series oí inalienableobjects-the land, an oral tradition about the land, a series oí political re-

lationships within comniunities, and a series oí relationships between

communities and deities. However, it is also clear that in the colonial peri-

od this form oí constituting communiry was exclusive to Indians and that

Indian was a "racial" and a legal category oí persons: legally, Indians werethose people who could aspire tu belong to an Indian republic and who

were obligated to vender tribute, labor, and obediente to the Spaniards.Racially, they were descendants oí the original settlers.a

Thus, although the indigenous colonial community's interna] worldpartially resembled and perpetuated the calpulli's characteristics, the colo-nial criteria oí inclusion diverged widely from those oí the pre-Hispanicperiod. This is because, instead oí belonging to a world composed oí

dominating and dominated peoples (who remained connected through re-

lationships oí kinship, political alliance, and social mobility), all indige-

nous communities found themselves subordinated to a caste with which

they could not easily meld; that is, as a group, indigenous communities

formed a caste or subordinated nationality in a social hierarchy that

sought to maintain stable distinctions, however unsuccessfully.

On the other hand, the relationship between indigenous individuals

and their community also changed. After evangelization, Indians were

thought to be subjects with free will, who would be judged by the moral

choices made by each person. In part because oí this, Indians who separated

Com »''hita rian 1deologies

41

thcroselve, Iront their conununities acre ns, [coger simply a nmss ot ener-

gy that could be appropiated he anothei group through sacrifice or servi-

tude On dic contrary, Indians sep.u nted tn,m thcir primordial ti ti es, therr

chiets and tlicii village palom ,Lino conld ronOnue having al] individual-

izad rel a ti onship with die saini, and c aire In s;,th their lives in a world of

ineipient social daacs In that aro r ld, indio ,dual energy mas libera sed in

forming une s iamily and in ,carch, n;; tor svagcs, leisure, vices, and cere-

monics ot social gruups that had no inalienable possessions acide from

their smil, and [he color ot L[)( 11 ,kin,.

For there dislocated Indians thr orle asailablc sources ot collective

identity were those creoted by thc racial or racist 1 organization oí the

regime and by the experienee ot sharcd living in an urban quarter, mining

community, hacienda houschold, nr in a lactory or port. On the other

hand, the inalienability oí the soul allowed these Indians to receive the

sacramenta of the church and to choose tlicir spo ices without strict racial

determination. The ideology of free matrinionial choice was especially re-

spected by the clergy ¡Ti the first hall of ihe colonial period (see Seed

1988), but even in the late colonial period, the only serious obstacle to

interracial marriage was paternal opp(>sitton. For Chis reason, marriages

between members of the sane c lass leven though not of tire same lineage

or color) or between prosperous people of color and poor whites were

common.'

Among títere new mestizo groups, two new factors in the process oí

social identification began to assert themselves, money and Hispanic ac-

culturation. These were interrelated in tercos oí their role in constructing

ideas about community, so 1 treat them jointly. The Spaniards oí the colo-

nial period had a genealogical concept of tire nation_ its members were de-

scended from tire same blood. The ideological role oí "blood" in Spain is

subtle and at the same time crucial for understanding how Mexican na-

tionality seas formed.

The importance oí "blood ,n the Spanish regime dates co the Recon-

quista oí Spain (immediately hefore the discovery oí America), when there

were movements to separate "Old Christians' from Jewish and Moorish

converts. This was parí of a broader tendency in Spain to nationalize the

Catholic church and to make Spaniards the delending knights oí the faith

(as well as the principal beneficiaries oí the taith's expansion). Thus, be-

ginning in the fourteenth century "eertificates of blood purity" were re-

quired forjoining the clergy, holding publlc office, or belonging to certain

guilds. These certificates were intended to show that a individual descend-

ed from many generations of Christians_ The concept is ofspecial anthro-

Co n, ni„n^ta^i..n I.,,olodas

12

pological interest becausc ir liiiked two important leaatres oí "honor'

(1 i the individual's r<habilily aboye all with regard to religion, hur it was

assumed that this loyalw extended to otlier spheres loyalty to friends

and bravcry in defen di ng the group the fa n>ily, and o nes own honor), and

(2! the cbasüty of the women ot the group Be, ause honor was mcasured

through the blood, bi ologi cal paterniry and ma tern i ty were c ri ti cal, thus

reinforcing thc links between honor, control over virginiry, and women's

sexual lidelity alter marriage.

The notion that "hlood prcdicted and redactad an individual', relia-

bility became the hasis bar the Spanish idea of nation," understood as a

people that emanated from the lame blood Bclonging to a similar lineage

or ro a common nation was important in a numher of contexts; however,

Spanish ideas of character, honor, and right also admitted the possibility

oí assimilation, and sometimes emphasized the effects oí che milieu on

inheritance.

The idea oí patria, or "homeland," recognized the importance oí the

place where one was boro and raised. This is the original sense oí theword Creole, which comes from the verb criar, torear or raise. When a black

slave was boro in Veracruz, it was said that he or she was a "Veracruz

Creole." For this reason, people of Spanish nationality boro in Mexico

were sometimes known as "Creoles' (oí Mexico).

The importance given to land complicates the scheme oí identity

through blood and honor. Being boro and growing up in a certain place

influenced the development of the individual. Thus, for example, there

were Spaniards who commented on the "degeneration" oí heredity that

took place in America: after two generations a green pepper became achili pepper, and a Spanish worker had Creole sons who became lazy

bums.'o This New World influence was not always conceived in terms oí

acculturation (i.e., learning); aboye all, it was thought oí in terms oí the

physical influences that emanated from different places' climatic and

chemical qualities. Air, humidity, heat, cold, and drinking water all affect-

ed the development oí human qualities just as one's heredity did. Con-

sequently, there were widely opposed appreciations oí che nature or ef-

fects oí any particular land: one oí the important points in the dispute

between Creoles and Iberians was the relative nobility or ignominy oí

American versus Iberian lands. In sum, land and blood were central com-

ponente oí the person and, by extension, oí the nation in Spanish ideology-

The third important factor in the conception oí the social group was

acculturation through learning. Here the word ladino provides a useful key.

This word was used to denote a person oí a barbarous or pagan nation that

Con, n, u ni Carian Ideologies

43 =

had been at ¡casi parthr civilized Por example, it was said that an Indian

was ladino when he or she had a good grasp of Spanish- The same usage

applied te slaves: recently arrived Alricans were bozales, bozales torpes (clumsy

bozales), or bozalones, but those who now spoke Spanish and knew local cus-

toms were ladinos-" A ladino slave was worth more money than a bozal, and

a ladino Indian was considerad more qualihed to assume public office in a

república de indios tiran a nonaccul turated one A ladino slave was also more

dangerous than a bozal, because the tenn was most often used to refer te

Moorish slaves."

On tire other hand, it is indispensable to note the ambivalente felt

toward acculturation or "ladinization', Jews and Muslims were considered

members oí especially dangerous nations because they were ladinas; that is,

they could imítate Spaniards and subvert their order froni within. This was

why Jews and Moors were prohibited from entering the New World-

even if they were converts. The meaning of ladino as an able but truculent,

two-faced person has survived into our times. It is the main meaning that

this word has today, but in thc past it was part oí a far more complex se-mantic field.

With these considerations iri mirad we can now reconsider the Indians

who separated themselves from their communities and whose only in-

alienable possessions were their souls and skin color. We have said that

these individuals could aspire te a place within a new community through

money and skills. In light oí the concepts oí free will, blood, homeland,

and ladinization, we can better understand these people's strategies and

alternarives.

First, although Indian émigrés no longer had inalienable tres to land

through primordial titles, oral traditnons, and so on, they did have ties to a

more abstract "homeland", thev were "Indians." Second, through their par-

ticipation in the market economy, sorne oí these migrants could learn

Spanish ways. Thus they had certain advantages over the monolingual

village Indian (alrhough here it is crucial to remember the ambivalente

toward ladinization. these Indians were at once superior to and more dan-

gerous than those still tied te their villages). Third, if a man managed te

make a little money, he could invest in the transgenerational path oí

honor, for example, by marrying a mestiza or Creole ("improving the

race") and by acquiring possessions with which he could assert a certain

honor. Successful Indians who separated from their local communities

could begin te identify with a larger homeland and aspire to win a small

measure oí honor and progress

The problems of Creole collective identities were simpler in some

sense. When Creoles identifled or were identified as a group (which they

often did not), they were distinguished from Peninsulars not by "national-

ity," but rather by the influences oí their respective homelands. This occa-

sionally served to discriminate against some oí them in the fields oí busi-

ness, matrimony, religion, the army, and the bureaucracy. Because oí this,

one cannot speak oí Creole nationalism (against the Spaniards), but oí

Creole patriotism: an ideology that extolled the benign influence Mexico,

Pero, and other countries. On the other hand, beyond European nationals

boro in Mexico, this Creole patriotism also found support among ladi-

noized Indians who no longer belonged te an indigenous community and

for whom a highly valued homeland could be important.

Finally, it is interesting to note African slaves' position with respect

te these issues oí homeland, nationality, and community. Unlike Indians,

slaves had no inalienable possessions; al¡ their goods were alienated.

Moreover, the very legitimation for slavery was to undo peoples who re-

sisted evangelization. In principie, slaves were captives oí "just wars"

against unbelievers who refused even to listen te the missionaries. In Chiscontext, it was-legitimare te take slaves and oblige them to receiveChristian instruction in hopes that they would go en to a better world

after passing through all the sufferings oí a life dedicated to servitude.

Thus, unlike the Indians, slaves were not redeemable as a nation, but only

as individuals, and this only aher the bitterness oí slavery. Because oí this,

black communities were regularly watched or flatly banned: the as$ocia-

tion of more than two blacks and all corporate bodies except the military

companies of Pardos y Morenos oí the eighteenth century and religious

sodalities were prohibited, and even sodalities were Ilegal at times be-cause oí their subversive potential.'3

However, there was an important contradiction with respect to the

collective nature oí slaves: despite all the efforts against the formation oí a

slave society parallel to indigenous society, slaves were brought from

Africa and nowhere else precisely because they could not be confused

with either Europeans or Indians. Undoubtedly, this confluence oí factors

heles us understand the fear that the idea oí Afro-American kingdoms in-

spired in Spaniards. However, the tendency to form Afro-Mexican collec-

tivities was limited to the groups oí maroons who succeeded in establish-

ing themselves in coastal arcas. Meanwhile, most slaves were marrying

free people and contributing te the formation oí the colonial plebe that

constituted the popular classes in cities, mines, and ports.

These considerations about indigenous, Creole, and black nationality

and patriotism are fundamental for understanding the development oí

C o,, rn u u' 1 a r l., n 1Jro logresIIomn!uuiln rían Ideologías

44=45=

Mexican nationality properly spcal.ing. Pelote passing to that topie, how-

ever it is lmportant co mention lene tino t i-itional pohtical etfect of the

colonial regimc ti is c leal from all thc evidente that Pie predominant ideo -

logical, legal. and eeonomie se,l,... in th, eulnnial period helped forge a

multinational society in which d,tlcrc nt national groups could share in-

terests in their homelands Uno must add to this, however, that the colo-

nial pollucal system in itsclt helpecl lo produce images of politieal sover-

eignty that pcople werc trylnp lo entulate alter independence_ in the

colonial period:.Mexico nv sea, the seas ot a c iceroyalq, presided oven

by a viceroy. sebo conccived ol himselt as Pie kings alter ego. His court

seas composed of nobles, the high clergy. Icarned men, merehants, and

miners. The viceroy vas ultimately responsible for all branches oí govern-

ment-admjnistrative, ecclesiastical, and mihtary . The existente oí this

pinnacle oí state power in Neve Spain undoubtedly helped the Créeles

and their various alijes to imagine a new state with its capital ni Mexico

City, ruled by Mexican patriots and not by Iberians.

Nationality affer Independenc

One oí the central ideological problems olí the independence period was

how to transfonn Creole patriotism roto a new nationalism ehat could in-

clude social groups that had beca horn in Mexico but did not belong to

the "Hispano-Mexican lace."This was a practical question even belore ll became a theoretical one:

how to give the homeland enough stature so that patriotic concerns

would eclipse class and cante questions At a purely logical leve) there

were only two solutions ti) this problem. the first was to redefine the ideas

oí nation and nationality so that belonging to a common homeland deter-

mjned and dcfined belonging lo che nation; tire second was to maintain

the multinational system with a kuropean elite, but in a context where

everyone benefited from the fact that Chis elite was as attached and loyal

to the same homeland as the lndians and blacks. On a practical level, there

were obviously different, extremely complex ways oí blending these two

options, which need to be expía roed. Regardless oí which option was

adopted, any independence ideology had to nave a common patriotic

oasis; it seas much simpler co share a love for the homeland than to agree

en the characteristics of the nation.

Because of this, the írst fornuilations of Mexicos sacred and inalien-

able goods werc very direccly linked wldh symbols of tire (home)land: jis

"sacred sojl." tire central mesa', Jeep bine skies, die Aztec eagle, the vol-

canos. thc silvei extracted from the homelands "belly," and the pyramids

and other grandeurs of the pie-Hispanic indigenotis cultures, the material

remains ol which now tornad part of Pie land and gave che landscape its

osen narre: Mexico. not New Spain_

This set of symbols, which werc of the homeland and not strictly na-

tional, had first been developed by Creole patriots beginning in the late

sixteenth centuey By the time oí independence, these symbols had al-

ready become part oí a well-known repertoire, ,he artworks that extolled

the producís and landscopes of che New World, Pie presentation of pre-

Columbian civilizations as panllel to those ol Greek and Reman classical

antiquity, the assertion oí Mexican Christianity's legitimacy and autonomy

through the cult oí the Virgin oí Guadalupe, the search for a pre-Hispanic

Christianity in such figures as Quetzalcoatl, and so en. i4

The novelty oí independence patriotism in the face of this Creole tra-

dition was that, given the Mexican state, ene could proceed to grant offi-

cial status to these symbols. Thus, Hidalgo flew the standard oí the Virgjn

oí Guadalupe; José María Morelos used a flag with an eagle on a nopal

cactus and the inscription "VVM" (IViva la Virgen María[); Iturbide also

adopted the Aztec eagle (albeit with a crown), and in 1821 he formed the

Order oí Guadalupe for soldiers, insurgents, teachers, and distinguished

clergymen. The first coros were minted with figures oí the Aztec eagle.

From 1821 to 1 853, various national anthems were composed until the pa-

triotic song oí González Bocanegra was adopted. One cannot say that it is

nationalistic. it is almost exclusively about the importante oí sacrificing

for the homeland, and its most representative stanza is the one that pro-

claims, "No longer shall the blood oí your sons / be spilled in contention

between brothers / only may he who insults your sacred name / encounter

the steel in your hands."

However, the speed with which the sacred signs and objects oí the

homeland were formed did not nave such a simple counterpart in the way

the nation was defined. In fato, the national question properly speaking

has been polemical ever sincc

The ways in which the homeland was identified with the nation were

evolving in interesting ways. In tire first years oí jndependence, one oí the

legacies uniformly claimed for the nation was the Catholic religion. This

nationalization oí the church can be partially understood as an extension

oí the appropriation oí the faith that was the ideological cornerstone oí

Spanish imperialism. The church was considered a fundamental and in-

alienable legacy oí the Mexican nation in all the principal laws and docu-

nients oí the early independence period, from the appropiation oí the

t a x i i ,i I d e o i o j i e s

= 47=

Virgin of Guadalupe by Father Hidalgo to che political programs of

Morelos, Iturbide, and che 1824 constitution. The Seven Laws (1835) stipu-

lated that Mexicans had che obligation to profess the Catholic religion,

and not even the anticlerical laws proanoted by José María Luis Mora in

1833 undermined che official status of Catholicism. The essennalized link

between che nation and religion was not broken until che 1857 constitu-

tion, and che process of denanonalizing religion was never fully achieved.

On che other hand, regardless of clic support that nationality eould

find in religion, che difficulty in detining che nation was reflectad in che

fluctuating ways in which citizenship was defined. Although there was a

more or less uniform movement to make tics co che homeland che defini-

tive criterion of nationality, che definition of which individuais were citi-

zens properly speaking was much more restricted. Thus, for example, in

che Seven Laws-which were valid from 1835 until che Reform laws-

only men of legal age with an annual income more than one hundred

pesos could vote. In 1846, these men were also required lo know how to

read and write. In order to be a congressional deputy, one needed a mío¡-

mal annual income of 1,500 pesos, to he a senator, 2,000, and to be presi-

dent, 4,000.

Thus nationalist ideology in che firsr hallof che nineteenth century per-

mitted che de facto retention of colonial social hierarchies: distinction

through money could strengthen systems of discrimination by "race" given

the fact that che majority oí Indians and other people of color were poor.

However, there were also great differences between che system estab-

lished alter independence, which lavored che rich, and che explicitly

caste-based system of che colonial period. One of che central differences is

that supposedly bclonging to a contmon nation (defined on the basis of a

common homeland) made it possible for peasant villages and other poor

contingents to make their political claims in terms of citizens' rights and

not in terms of che subordinated complementarity of caste. But chis trans-

formation could also mean the loss of certain special rights for subaltern

groups, aboye al] Indians. The ideological, legal, and physical assault en

communal village lands and other indigenous community instiitutions such

as hospitals, public political offices, schools, and che management of com-

munity chests began in che tirst years of independence. The counterparts

lo chis assault were che indigenisr movements that sought co identify che

nation with che indigenous race_ Thesc carly indigenista movements ex-

pressed themselves in nacional political spheres through such figures as

che congressional deputy Rodríguez Puebla, who in che first congresses

fought co keep indigenous community institutions (except tribute) intact.

This political position was contrary lo che central precept of liberal-

ism, however, which was becoming the dominant ideology of the inde-

pendence movement. An indigenismo that attempted to maintain and

strengthen indigenous communities within a pluriracial national order

threatened to divide che nation. Don José María Luis Mora summed upche liberal stance toward Chis indigenismo:

The real reason for Chis opposition was that che new arrangement of public

instruction was in open conflict with Mr. Rodríguez Puebla's desires, goals,

and objectives with respect to che destiny oí che remains of che Aztec cace

that still exist in Mexico- This gentleman, who pretends to belong to che

said race, is one of che country's notables because oí his good moral and

política] qualities, in theory, his is che parry of progress and personally he is a

yorkino; but, unlike the men who labor in Chis together, Mr. Rodríguez does

not limit his scope to winning liberty, but extends it to exalting che Aztec

race, and therefore his first objective is to maintain it in society with its

own existente. To that end he has supported and continues to support che

Indians' ancient civil and religious privileges, che status quo oí che goods

that they possessed in community, che poorhouses intended to attend co

them, and che coilege in which they exclusively received their education;

in a word, without an explicit confession, his principies, goals, and objec-

tives tend te visibly establish a purely Lidian system.

The Farías administration, like all che ones that preceded it, thought

differently; it was persuaded that che existente of different races in che

lame society was and had to be an eternal principie of discord. Not only

did he [Farías] ignore these distinctions oí past years that were proscribed

in constitucional law, but he applied aH his efforts toward forcing the fusion

oí che Aztec race with che general masses; thus he did not recognize che

distinction between Indians and non-Indians in government acts, but instead

he replaced it with that between che poor and che rich, extending to al] che

benefits of society)'

The conflict over che place of indigenous communities in the new

national society did not end with these squabbles in the country's high

political spheres: aboye all, it translated floto regional conflicts in which

indigenous groups sought to construct their own nacional autonomies.

These movements were called "caste wars" by the nation's political classes,

but they must also be understood as nacional movements in the sense that

they sought congruency among indigenous nations, management of terri-

tory, and appropiation of religion.

Many Indians' nostalgia for their own states, a land with one blood

Co a m un: i a r: a n 1.iro logi es Co,n m uniiarian Ideo)ogies

48 49 =

undcr thc role of their oven w ,e roen and thc mande of an indigenous

Christianity, translated Inl„ vn ial movcmcnts di various points in the

eightecndt. ninetecnih and evcn tcrcnticth ec intries For example, during

che lamous coste iras" ot Yucacin lhv Indians liad their capital in Chan-

Santa Cruz and euostruc sed thcir leadership around a cross that spoke di-

reedy to che priests ficho direcicel che ichellious odian movement. Among

other structurally similar. mcii einents wc re those that took place in the

Chiapas highlands 1865.. thc haqui (lcxrt et Sonora 1885-1909), the

Huasrcca 01 San Luis I'otosí 1588 and thl enasta] Misteea region i- 1911 U.

There weic also a numher of nimviuIent niovcnients oí chis type, some of

theni allied with note urbanized clases. In thc very capital oí che country,

diere are currently pro-Nahua[I groups ol mlxed social origins that seek

the return of Moctezumas heacidress and che installation oí a new indige-

nous empire

On the other hand, given che tact that nineteenth-century liberalism

was against upholding a "multiracial nation, racist ideas that had existed

since che colonial period could persist and hecome increasingly pernicious.

The ideologist who most intluenced educated racist thought in Mexico

was Herheri Spencer, who beGeved in che fundamental importance of so-

cial evolution and in che inheritance oí acquired characteristies. This com-

bination of doctrines, applied to Mexico, led to the conclusion that che

Indians had been suhsidized by che colonial state for centuries, and that

che negative characteristics that had been acquired would continue to

plague national evolution if the proportion oí fit individuals (Europeans)

did not increase.16

On the ocho hand, Spanish forros still dominated racist thought in

Mexico even alter the imporcation of northern European ideas. According

to the dominant ideologies of che colonial period, the indigenous race was

inferior to che Spanish race, but it was also redeemable through Christian

faith and procreation with Spaniards. There salas a well-known formula ac-

cording to which the child of a Spaniard and an Incitan was a mestizo, the

child of a mestizo and a Spaniard was a castizo; and the child oí a castizo and

a Spaniard was a Spaniard; that is, an individual's indigenous origins could

be "erased" through a couple gcnerations oí intermarriage with Europeans.

This is why, in che colonial period, racial identity was manipulated:

birth certificares were altered so that children could he classified as Creoles

and not as some inferior casto; mestizos bought access to indigenous com-

munities; rights to dress as Spaniards vide horses, and bear arms were con-

ceded ro certain Indians. With independence, che definitions and legal

guarantees of caste were abandonad, thc claves were freed, and indigenous

C o 111 11. 11 1.. I d i i.1

tribute as well as racial classificati ons in baptismal certillcates were prohib-

ited. However thc manipulation of racial identity continuad, aboye all in

che struggle for status Only in this way can we understand why Porfirio

Díaz powdered his lace svhite and why politicians and rich men with dark

skin liad an exaggerated preferente for white wives-

On che other hand, alter independence, che ideas oí granting the

mestizo a certain racial digoiiv and of making the mestizo into a national

mace pegan to gain currcncy In the beginning, this tendency was limited

simply to recognizing che greatness of hoth che indigenous and the

Spanish sources of nationality. However, this recognition of the central

importante oí mestizaje for Mexican nationality could not be easily translat-

ed finto an ideology in which the mestizo was equal to che Mexican, for

two reasons, liberalisms attempt to rid che definition oí nation of any links

with yace and the ever-greater influence of pseudoscientific racist thought.

Thus, che liberalism oí Juárez and his generation-which had great po-

litical and intellectual figures oí indigenous origin-was completely dis-

tinct from che indigenismo oí Rodríguez Puebla. Whereas Rodríguez sought

to maintain indigenous communities within a pluralistic nacional frame-

work, Juárez showed that Indians were perfectly capable oí "ascending" to

che Europeans' cultural leve] if given che opportunity and resources.

Juárez's generation oí liberals sought to redeem che Indians by giving

them access to the goods of citizenship: education, universal rights, and

equality.

Juárez sought to forro a nationality composed of a citizenry (defined

by common birth in a homelanci) that had a truer equality of access to

state protection and representation. One can say that, in che 1857 consti-

tution, che nation had three inalienable legacies: national territory, state

sovereignry, and a set oí inviolable individual rights. This is also why lib-

erals of chis generation broke che privileged link that che church had

maintained with Mexican nationality until then: they no longer needed a

national church to legitimize the country because che freedom and equality

of Mexicans under che rulo of law and in the framework oí the homeland

were sufficient. On che other hand, the dark-skinnedJuárez was himself

living proof that these ideals were attainable.

It was easier to denationalize che church, however, than it was to con-

struct a national citizenry The laws promoted by Juárez helped erode che

indigenous communities that had mantained the calpulli's transformed

communitarian legacy, but the proletarianized masses continued to be

principally dark-skinned and under the economic yoke of foreigners.

The majority of Mexico's poor continued to be excluded from che

Comnia,ifariao [ drologies

51 =

henefits oí nationality (citizens equality, public education, and the right

oí representation in the state) because che nacional bureaucracy's resources

were meager and, worse yes, those resources were primarily utilized for

paving che way for capitalist investmenc Fnr Chis reason, in the nineteenth

century che term Indian gained a new acceptance, fusing racial and class

factors: for che urban middle ancf uppen classes any poor peasant was an

"lndian", that is, che category "Indian" carne to mean those who were nos

complete citizens.

This also explains why Spencer's racist thought gained some influence

in offfcial cireles. Social Darwinism permiued certain official groups to

blame the victims for the negative results et post independence social de-

velopmenc Mexico had not attained che social leve] oí the United States

because oí che Indians' negative intluencc [-he only way to achieve politi-

cal evolution was by importing E unopcans and dominating Indians through

education or, in more recalcitrant cases, cmeler disciplinary forms. in this

period, indigenous slavery was revived and massacres of Indians were per-

petrated in Sonora and Yucatán.

The power and class strtxggles of chis period also became a nacional

struggle in some seccors because che progress achieved by Porfirio Díaz

was largely based on concessions co foreign capital, and the social sectors

chat were negatively affected by those concessions allied themselves with

political groups that had been excluded Irom che monopoly that Don

Porfiriós group exercised oven the bureaucratic apparatus. These alliances

gave rise to che revolution.

Tbe Redefinilion of Mationality in che Revolution

From che point oí view of nationality, the Mexican Revolution was a

watershed at least as imporrant as che luáruz reforms. Here 1 focos en two

features, che reval uati on of che mestizo a^ qui ntessentially nacional and

che redefinition of the inalienable goods oí che nation. As already men-

tioned, che placement oí che mestizo as a central personage has a history

that began with independence, but che revolution broke tics with two

doctrines that liad inhibited che adoption oí che mestizo as che nacional

yace. On che one hand, Juárez's classical liberalism was complemented

with a procectionist state cha[ was seilling to cake special measures and dis-

positions for speciflc national groups sucli as Indians, peasants, and workers.

On che other hand, che racist ideas of social Darwinism were overturned.

These two ruptures were complententary and went hand in hand. The

most important figure in clic balde against pscudoscientific racism was

Comen nn., aii.in dl

52

Manuel Gamio, who is frequently considered che "father" oí Mexican an-

thropology because oí his role in che construction oí revolutionary na-

tionalism. Gamio relied on che authority oí bis teacher, Franz Boas, in

claiming both the equality of al] races and the validity oí all cultures.

Based en chis, Gamio developed an indigenismo that dignified Mexican

Indian features and blood, thereby paving the way for che mestizo to

emerge as che protagonist of nacional history.

The principal ideologists of Mexican nationalism (Luis Cabrera,

Andrés Molina Enríquez, Manuel Gamio) imagined che mestizo as che

product oí a Spanish father andan indigenous mochen- This very particular

formula had a twofold importante. First, it made che Spanish Conquesc

che origin oí che nacional yace and culture. This point oí origin was fertile

for the production oí a national mythology, a task that captured the atten-

tion oí prominent artists and intellectuals, including Diego Rivera, Samuel

Ramos, and Octavio Paz. Second, and even more important, che identifi-

cation oí che European with che male and che feminization oí che Indian fit

well with che formulation oí a nacionalism that was at once modernizing

and procectionist.

We can better understand Chis by analyzing Andrés Molina Enríquez's

cose discussion oí the master (1909), which was influential in che formu-

lation oí revolutionary nationalism. According to Molina, who leaned en

Darwin, and en Mexican luminaries such as Vicente Riva Palacio and

Francisco Pimentel, for crucial aspects oí his argument, "[t]he mestizo ele-

ment, formed by che cross oí che Spanish element and che indigenous

element, is nos a new yace, it is che indigenous yace, defined as che totality

oí indigenous yaces oí our land, modified by Spanish blood."17 Mestizos

were thus a fortified version oí che indigenous race,'a and the modifica-

tions brought about by Chis mixture oí Spanish and Indian races would,

eventually, creare a population chas would finally be capable of holding its

own against che United States. 'y

In Molina, as in practically every pro-mestizo nationalist, che Spanish

race carne to Mexico through men, and che indigenous element was asso-

ciated with che feminine- This was true both literally (che mestizo was

imagined, in his origin, as che child oí a Spanish man and an Indian

wornan) and more abstractly, in che characteristics of each yace. "lf che

white yaces can be considered superior to che Indian yaces because oí the

greater efficacy oí their action (which is a logical consequence oí their su-

perior evolution), che indigenous yaces can be considered superior to che

white caces because of their greater resistance (which is a consequence oí

their higher degree of selection)"10 Action, which is highly masculine in

C o,,,'non,Harian Ideologies

53 =

Chis contevt and o si,tanee chic ti is Icniinine. arc ti, erebv embodied in

che Spaniard and thc I n d i a n . reshcc t n v c l y -1 i i c onthina ti on of action and

resictancc in thc hodv ol the is I,uvccrlul. lot it combines che besa

q tialities ol cac1, racc. but with che I odian i Icntent. that is. che maternal

clement, preduminating. Thc resina arc dc,ttned to lead che nation to

;uccess aga'uut origen aggression and ncoct,Ionial cxploitation.

Mestizo nationalism dws implicitiv snpportcd che creation ol a protec-

tionist and modernizing statu. It ,ra, io hc a nindernizing tate because thc

mestizo, like bis Furopean lathei 11,111 a hropcn,ity for action. lor hi torv.

It seas protectionist because thc mestizo si'ught tu protect bis maternal

legacy from exploitabon by Europcan,, Sebo tela no loyalty whatsoever to

che land orto che Indian, and whoni Molina Enríquez saw as che dominant

class that needed to be assimilated or pushed out.

The nationalization oí che mestizo also rcpresented a break with some

features of laissez-faire liberalism and introduced a new version oí che na-

cional patrimony. There was no longer che notion that progress and mo-

dernity emanated simply from freemarket (orces and respect for che

rights of man, instead, there emerged che idea that progress could only

occur under che jealous protectlon ot a nationalist state.

Thus, in acidition to guaranteeing citizens rights, che sanctity oí demo-

cratie institutions, and nacional sovercignty, the 1917 constitution claims

che states right to permit oí prohibir the free action oí foreigners in the

country and to watch over che public interesa The latter includes public

education, labor conditions, che right co expropiare any land for reasons

oí public utility, che regulation of foreign investment and oí the amount oí

land that can be legally possessed, preferencial contracting oí Mexicans

over foreigners, and so on. This consutulion explicitly siaces that all the

land oí Mexico is an inalienable possession oí che nation that may be

bought and sold but can always be returned ro public use when so needed-

Under che watchful eye of che postrevolutionary state, a regime that

fostered class-based corporacions as an integral portion oí a ore-party

system, Mexico went from being predominandy rural and agrieultural to

having an urban majority, and the population grew from about 20 million

in 1950 to about 80 million in 1990. This urbanization and che generally

growing complexity oí national soeiety besan co complicate che manage-

ment of state representation through che sectors" oí che ruling party and

the policies oí che one-party state_ At che same time, the mechanisms oí

state bureaucratic administration could not avoid che country's bankrupt-

cy in 1982, which meant that foreign economic deniands liad to be at-

tended to.

A chain of reforms tliat besan under President Miguel de la Madrid has

tended co revive some fcacures oí che nineteenth-ccntury liberal niode1,

including che redehnition of what constitutes che inalienable wealth of che

nation a decline oí che so-called social rights of (he revolution and greater

emphasis on individual iight,. Foi this reason, nationalists of the old

school have compared che sale of scate enterprises and che privatization of

the ejido with che sale ol che family jewels. The legal and economic

clianges carried out since 1 982 represent a profound trae stormat ion in che

very definicion of che nation and of che things and rclationships that be-

long to ir.

The contemporary nationalist discourse appears co be reverting to che

patriotic formulas of che nineteenth century: it is long on praising che

patria and past glories oí our "millennial cultura," but it is very short on

defining what the nation and its legacy currently are. There have only

been two historical moments when the relationship between homeland

and nation has been congruently and explicitly defined. The first was the

universalist liberalism promoted by Benito Juárez, when the nation was

separated from its bonds with yace and the church, This was tremendously

influential in nacional history, although it was never realized as a practical

project. The second moment was revolutionary nationalism, which is in-

ternally more contradictory than Juárez's formula because it adopted some

elements oí democratic liberalism at the same time that it constructed a

corporativist and protectionist scate, This model tied nationality to race

and "mestizo" culture, and it adopted a modernizing, protectionist, corpo-

rativist, one-party regime.

The current regime has been abandoning the now rusty or fossilized

precepts oí revolutionary nationalism, but it has been slow to embrace

Juárez's universalist liberalism because unpopular economic reforms have

required a strong, authoritarian state like those that arose from the revolu-

tion. On the other hand, universalist liberalism was a more potent ideology

in che hands oí Juárez because he was proving with his own flesh that

Indians could gaita access to che benefits oí civilization that were in the

hands oí ata economic elite that did not identify with che bulk oí che popu-

lation. For all these reasons, che current regime has needed revolutionary

nationalism even to destroy che regime that created it.

Current tastes reflect weariness with the epic visions oí revolutionary

nationalism: today the intimare world oí Frida Kahlo is oí greater interese

than the epic grandiloquence oí Diego Rivera; even when they distill na-

tionalism, as with the narratives oí Poniatowska or Monsiváis, intimate

chronicles are consumed with more interest than che comprehensive

('ora n . un ita ri an Id eol ogies

55 =

1

national epics oí a Carlos Fuentes. This situation is symptomatic oí thecrisis oí old nationalism: the longing for community and an inheritancecontinues, but the state definitions oí those communities are almost asweak as they were in the nineteenth century.

Conclusion

The development oí the communitai ian ideologies that 1 have tracked in

this chapter permits us to systematize certain considerations with respect

to the future. As this is a moment of profound changes in the national

question, it appears to me to be pertinent to conclude with some ideas in

this regard, even if they are not necessarily novel. 1 hope at least that the

foregoing discussion permits us to understand the known options withgreater clarity.

Currently there are at least thrre logical alternatives for national ide-

ology insofar as it is manifested in the definition oí inalienable goods: The

first option is to consolidate democracy in the way desired by Juárez's gen-

eration. This option would mean giving priority to the inalienable rights

defended by Juárez, including human rights and democratic represen-

tation. The second option is to reanímate revolutionary nationalism. This

option would mean maintaining the "tutelage oí the state" over some

goods considered central to nationality and the public interest, such as

]and, the subsoil, the communications industries, and educational and cul-

tura] services, and industries This option could keep mestizo nationalism

unscathed but it has the problem oí being championed principally by the

leftist opposition, which also needs tu sustain che value oí democracy "in

the style of Juárez" to win power. For that reason, it would have to design

a kind oí state that does not fall into the same antidemocratic vices that

revolutionary nationalism fe]] into when it was in power. The concrete

way in which revolutionary nationalism mixes with liberal ideals has

always been a central probieni for Chis kind oí nationalism, and, if this ide-

ology returns te power, ir: will again have to confront this problem.

The third option is less clearly delineated but would have to try Lobuild a social dernocracy based on a recodification of human rights. Thisformula would diffcr from the second because it would not depend on a

racial metaphor ("the mestizo") io define nationality, but would center itsefforts in defining the rights of pcrsons ir would not put "the nation"

ahead oí the rights oí persons, and therefore it would distante itself fromrhe populist and authoritarian formulas that have predominated in

Mexico. On the other hand, Chis option separates itself from liberalism

and "neoliberalism" because it seeks to broaden the definition oí the

human right to defend certain general social interests against the "natural"

tendencies oí the market (for example, defending child nutrition or theright to inhabit unpolluted spaces).

This direction also entails a recodification oí civil society. This new

civil society would rid itself oí the sectorial organization that developed

under revolutionary statism, and it would create new forms oí state pro-

tection for the new human rights. The principal ideological adversary oí

this option will be the current nationalist mythology. This mythology

tends to demand a state with tutelage over the entire national interest and

includes many oí the prior bases for the definition oí national communi-

ties, such as the reification oí nationality in racial terms, Also, behind this

líes the proposition that the state's central role is to direct the "moderniz-

ing" process. It will be necessary to impose limits on the reign oí the ideol-ogy oí modernization, to avoid modernizing at any cost.

It appears to me that the third path is the only really desirable and

viable one in the long run_ But to move in that direction, one must be ready

to question both revolutionary nationalism and neoliberalism. It will also

be necessary to create images oí nationality and modernity that are sepa-rate from the teleology oí the muralista and the "Fathers oí the Country."

C o m n: u ... ^:.: e n ! d e o l 0 9 f e

56 =Communiiarian Ideolog,es

= 57

3

Modes of Mexican Citizenship

One oí the frsi cultural accounts of citizenship in Latin America was

Roberto DaMatta's effort to understand the specificity oí Brazilian nacional

culture. DaMatta identified the coexistente oí two broad discourses in

Brazilian urban society, and he called theta the discourse oí the home and

the discourse oí the street.' According to bis description, the discourse

that he called "oí the honré' is a hierarchical and familia) register, where the

subjects are "persons" in the Maussian sensc, that is, they assume specific,

differentiared, and complementary social roles. The discourse "oí the

street," by contrast, is the discourse of liberal citizenship: subjects are indi-

viduals who are meant to be equal to one another and equal before the law.

The interesting twist in DaMatta's analysis regards the relationship be-

tween these two discourses, a relationship that he synthesizes with the

Brazilian adage'Por my friends, everything, for my enemies, the law."z For

DaMatta, Brazilian society can be describcd as having "citizenship" as a

degraded baseline, or zero degree, of relationship, a fact that is visible in

the day-to-day management of social relations.

Specifically, DaMatta focuses en an Liban ritual that he called the

"Voge sabe coro queni esta talando' (Do you know who you are talking

tu?), a phrase that is used tu intcrropt the universal application oí a role,

that is, tu interrupt what he calls tire discourse oí the street, in order to

?A =

gain exceptional status and tu rice aboye die degradation reserved for all

nobodies Thus, for instante a lady cuts in fiont ol a inc to enter a park-

ing lot; che attcndant prottst5 ancl points to che lino but she says "Do you

know sebo you are talkino to- 1 am the wile of so and so, member of thc

eabinet.' and so on_

A similar dynamic has characterized modera iNiexican citizenship For

instance, it has long beca noted that in ;Mexico much of the censorship of

thc press has boga ''sellcensorship,' and not direct govern mental censor -

ship.' Spcaking tu a journalist about chis phenomenon, hc remarked that

much el chis se]¡-censorship resulted frota the fact that journalists, like all

members oí Mexican middle classes, depend to an unpredictable degree

en their social relations. Reliance on personal relations generates a kind oí

sociability that avoids open attacks, except when corporate interests are

involved. Thus, the censorship of che press is in part also a product oí the

overall dynamics oí DaMatta's degraded citizenship_

The logic that DaMarta outlined for understanding the degradation oí

Brazilian citizenship could easily be used to guide an ethnography oí civic

culture and sociability in Mexico. The ease oí application stems from simi-

larities at both che cultural and structural levels familia) idioms used to

shape a "discourse of the honré' have common Iberian elements in these

two countries, the result not only of related concepts and ideas oí family

and friendship, but also similar colonial discourses for the social whole.

In chis chapter, I develop a historical discussion oí the cultural dynam-

ics oí Mexican citizenship. 1 begin with a series of vignettes that explore

what the application oí DaMatta's perspective to Mexico might revea). 1

argue that the notion that citizenship is the baseline, or zero degree, oí re-

lationship needs to be complemented by a historical view oí changes in

the definition and political salience oí citizenship. Without such a per-

spective en the changing definition oí citizenship, a critica) aspect oí the

politics oí citizenship is lost The bulk oí chis chapter is devoted to inter-

preting the dynamics oí citizenship in modern Mexico, as it developed in

the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and argues against narratives oí

Mexican modernity that tell contemporary history as a simple "transition

to democracy."

Cultural Logic and Hsstory

Mexico City is a place of elaborate politeness, a quality that is epitomized

by the people whose job is to mediate (for instante, secretaries and wait-

ers), but that is generally visible in che socializaron of children and in the

Modos of Al exiean Cit;zen sh;p

59

existente of elaborare registeis of ohscquiousness, attentiveness, and re-

spect_ AII of [hese registers tiisappcar in tire anonymity of the crowd, how-

ever, where people will push pulí, shove, pinch, cut in front oí you, and so

un_ There is no social connact tor che crosvd; there are only gentleman's

pacts antong persons Drivers in iylcsico ( itv, lor instante, tend tu drive

with thcir evos pointed straight ahcad and casi slightly downward, much

like a waiter's. This way they need no( make concessions and can drive

with presocial Hobhesian rules dona give awap an inch. If, however, the

driver's eye wanders even juct a 1irti, ir ntav catch another driver's eye,

who gently and smilingly asks to Inc let into the flow of traftlc At this

point, the world of personal relations Often takes huid of the driver who

had been trving to keep things anunymous and he may gallantly let the

other car th rou gil.

This dynamic contrasta wilh ncc culturc of socieries that have strong

civic traditions, in which citizenship is che place where the social pact is

manifested (making a queue being a sac rosanct rite of citizenship in a

place like Fngland, for instaures but where personal relationships do not

extend as lar out_ Thus, a British traer-lcr to iMexlco may be scandalized at

lhe greedy and impolitic attwde ot ncc people en the street, whereas a

Mexican tvill complain that no pica or personal interjection was ever able

to move al] Englisi' bureaucrat to sv mpathy

What are the mechanisms ot sucralization finto Chis forro oí courtesy7

Access ro in alleged right, or lo a p overn nt e otal service, in Mexico is very

ofeen no( universal. Education, Inr instante is mean[ to be available lo ale,

but it is oteen dllücult tu register a eh1ld 111 a nearby school, orto get finto a

school at ale, public medicine exista. bite it is alwavs insufhcienq moving

through Mexico C:ity, trafiie in an ordene fashion is oteen niade difficult by

ncotoveruse ol public space_ ln short ilexicn has never had a state that was

strong enough to provide servios tll IVCrsally_ In this context, corruption

and other ntarket mechanisnn casily emerge as selecriun en tersa: if you pay

money, the bureaucrat will scc vou tirst_ The systeni has also generated

forros oí sociability that help shape a pracural oricntation that is well suit-

ed to tire discretionmy power that s( arcity ygives tu bureaucrats and other

gatekce pers. One notable examp le ot ibis is summed up in the very

Mexican proverb "Whoever gets mad lirst, loses" i`El que se enoja, pierde").

According tu this priori pie, a [,ne person shall never explode out oí

exasperation, because he or she can oil, lose by such an outburst. A ser-

vice provider will only claro up tebeo Paced with an angry user and, since

nce service is a scarcc resource. he or she \s 111 use politeness as a selection

criterion.

Socialization into politeness, pariente, and self-censorship thus has at

least two significant social conditions. The first is a strong reliance on per-

sonal relations in order to activare, operate, and rely on any bureaucratic

apparatus, che second is the reliance on personal relations lo achieve po-

sitions in society_ Both of [hese conditions would appear lo support

DaMatta's claim that citizenship is the zero degree of relationship,

There is, however, a difhculty in the argumenr that can be exposed by

focusing closely on the implications oí the saving "For my friends, every-

thing; for my enemies, the law." The saying is clearly a model for political

action, yet it contains significant ambiguities in the proponed categories

("friends," "enemies,"'law," and "everything"), partieularly if the saying is a

recipe for a bureaucrat or a nieniber oí the political class, In many, if not

most, situations, a bureaucrat will be dealing with neither personal friends

nor personal enemies, but principally with people to whom he or she is

unrelated and initially indifferent_ The saying is useful, however, because

sume of these people will not receive the full service that the gatekeeper

controls, whereas others will. Thus, an initially undifferentiated public

needs to be shaped luto "frtends" and "enemies_" Money (bribes) and prior

personal connections are two routes tu receiving excepcional treatment (as

"friends"), but patience and politeness may at least keep you in che game,

whereas a breach oí politeness or an outburst oí anger will in ale likelihood

place you in the "enemy" camp_ The application oí "the law" as a criterion

oí exclusion in each oí these cases is simply the use of bureaucratic proce-

dure as a fundamental mechanism oí exclusion.

We have, then, a logre that favors the development oí personal rela-

tions, the elaboration oí fonos oí obsequiousness and politeness, the cul-

tural routinization oí briberv, and che use of bureaucratic rules and proce-

dure as mechanisms oí exclusion. This logic is undergirded by structural

conditions, oí which 1 have stressed two: a relatively weak state, and a

large poor population. Because [hese conditions have existed throughout

Mexican history, one might expect that bribery, politeness, and a highly

developed system oí informal relationships have been equally constant

practices, and that they have been elaborated according to cultural idioms

that apply a "discourse of the honre" in order to create distinetions be-

tween potential users of a service. This is true at a general level.

However, although the cultural logic that we have outlined shows that

citizenship is a degraded category, ir also gives a false sense oí continuity

and constancy. We noted that the category oí "friends" and "enemies" can

be constructed in che very process oí applying a bureaucratic role, and

that most oí che population that is being classified in this way is initially

Mojes o f hleslcnr,ho =

= 61

indiflercnt tu the bureaucrat R1,1 thc de!initiun of the pool that che bu-

rcaucrai is aeting on o not dctermincd h^ ihc cultural logie of social dis-

cance from che barrauarat oi ;;atek eche i. fo ribo words the gatekeeper is

not aetually ruling oven e pre cc i - 1 t roaj' „t 1 nentls and enemies, but 'u

inste ad culturally construc ti, in tnends and cnemie5 out of a pool of

Acople who are presclceced not hv h;;n but by theii thcoretícal relation-

ship lo a right.As a result. i1thuugli it is corlee t„ sas that-- ,ivcn a bureaucral, a set

ul rulos. and a pool ot citisns-uti:-.cnship 111311 be che zero degree of

rel ationship that needs to he complemen ted by a prior personal claim, by

a bribe, or bv sympathy, tic haselme of utizenship is not determined

by this cultural logic, and it valles historically in important ways- These

variations are not trivial, for thcy define che potencial pool of users oí a

service that is heing offered, an issue that also has critica) significante for a

longue-durée history of cultural forms of sociability in connection to citizen-

ship. A comprehensive view of modero Mexican citizenship therefore re-

quires an interpretation of the cclationship between legal and institutional

definitions of citizenship and its cultural claboiauon in social intetaction. 1

,hall atrempt to sketch key elemcnts ti¡ such a com pre hensive view.

Farly Republieanisnt and che Risc of ibe ideal Uitizen

The debates of Mexico's Junta Instituyente between independence (1821)

and the publication oí the first federal constitution (1824) gave little sus-

tained attention to citizenship. (.ates about who was a Mexican national

and who was a Mexican citizen were vaguely inclusive, with attention lav-

ished only on the question oí patiiotic inclusion or exclusion and very

little said about che qualiues and ciaractensties oí che citizen. Neverthe-

less, the process of independence hall a critical role in shaping a field for a

politics oí citizenship_For instante, Miguel Hidalgo, tathcr ot Mexican independence, pro-

claimed che emancipation of slaves, thc end to al] forms oí tribute and

taxation that were targeted to Indians and castes;' and the end oí certain

guilds monopolies over specihc activities 4 Of course, Hidalgo's revolt

failed, but his nieve to create a broad base for citizenship and to leve)

differences between castes was preserved by leaders oí subsequent move-

ments- For exaniple Ignacio López Rayún's falso failed) project oí a

Mexican constitution (1811) also abolished slavery )article 24) and stated

that "[w]hoever is to he boro alter thc happy independence oí our nation

will find no ohstacle other than bis personal defects- No opposition can

stem from che class of bis lineage; thc sane shall he observed with regard

to those who represent che rank of captain and aboye, or who render any

special service to the countiv" (article 25, The only fundamental exclu-

sionary clause in tliis constitution, as in all early Mexican eonstitutions

until that of 1857, regards the role oí religion, '1 he Catholic religion shall

be the only one, with no toleratice for any other" (article 1)

In addition to a comnion movement to broaden che base oí citizenship

such that lineage and race were abolished as (explicit) criteria of inclusion

or exclusion, early procl ama ti ons and eonstitutions did tend to speeify

that only Mexicans-and otten only .Mexicans who had not betrayed the

nation-could hold public positions (articles 27 and 28 oí López Rayón's

constitutional project).5 Thus, from che very beginning, che idea was to

create an ample citizenry and a social hierarchy based on merit: "The

American people, forgotten by some, pitied by others, and disdained by

the majority, shall appear with che splendor and dignity that it has earned

through the unique fashion in which it has broken the chains oí despot-

ism. Cowardice and slothfulness shall be che only causes oí infamy for the

citizen, and the temple oí honor shall open its doors indiscriminately to

merit and virtue` (article 38) 6

Despite che general identification between early Mexican nationalism

and the extension oí citizenship rights in such a way as to include (forme[)

slaves, Indians, and castes, there were a number oí ambiguities and differ-

ences regarding the meaning of this extension. Article 16 oí the Mexican

empire's first provisional legal code, for instante, states, tellingly, that

"[t]he various classes oí che state shall be preserved with their respective

distinction, but without piejudice to public employment, which is com-

mon to all citizens. Virtues, services, talents, and capability are the only

medium for achieving public employment oí any kind".7 On the other

hand, the federal constitution oí 1824 does not oven specify who is to be

considered a citizen. Instead, it leaves to the individual states oí che fed-

eration the definition oí who shall be allowed to vote for their representa-

tives in Congress (article 9), and the selection oí the president and vice

president was Ieft to Congress. Thus citizenship was to be determined by

regional elites in conjunction with whomsoever they felt they needed to

pay attention to, and access to federal power was mediated by a Congress

that represented these citizens.

It is worth noting that most oí the distinctions between who was a

Mexican citizen and who was merely a Mexican national are similar to

the formulation found in the Spanish liberal constitution that was prom-

ulgated in Cádiz in 1812. Some oí the early independent constitutions are

Mudes oJ AA exilan Ci1izensbip

63 == o2=

a bit harsher than that oí Cádiz on matters oí religion (e.g., Father

Morelos's Apatzingán constitution sanctioned the Holy Office-that is,

the Inquisition-and it upheld heresy and apostasy as crimes that led to

los oí citizenship). In one matter, however, the constitution oí Cádiz nar-

rows citizenship beyond what is explicit in the earliest Mexican constitu-

tions: debtors, domestic servants, vagrants, the unemployed, and the illit-

erate al] forfeited their rights as citizcns (article 25). This move was not

explieltly embraced in the first Mexican constitutional projects, but nei-

ther was it entirely avoided: Iturbides Plan de Iguala, which was the first

effective political charter oí independent Mexico, specified that until a

constitution was formed, Mexico would operate according to the laws oí

tire Spanish Cortes- The federal constitution of 1824 left the dotar open

for these mechanisms oí exclusion by delegating the decision regarding

who would be a citizen to thc individual states- Finally, the centralist and

conservative legal code oí 1836 rcasserted the points of exclusion oí

Cádiz and added much greater restrictions, the rights oí citizenship were

suspended for al] minors, domestic servants, criminals, and illiterates, they

were lost definitively to al] traitors and debtors ro the public coffers. All

citizens had to have an annual income of one hundred pesos, and substan-

tially more if they wanted to be elected to offlce.

In short, early Mexican constittnions displayed tensions between the

elimination oí criteria oí casto and oí slavery in order to create a broadly

based nationality and the restriction of access to public office and to the

public sphere to independent malo property holders who could read and

write. The category "citizen" was (and still is) not identical to that oí

"national" in legal discourse, though tiro two were tellingly conflated in

political discourse: in fact, the relationship between the two was one oí

hierarchical encompassment. The Mexican citizen had the capaeity to en-

compass Mexican nationals and te) represent the whole oí the nation in

public.

Inclusion and Exclusion in the Era of Nalional Vulnerability

At first glance , these early citizenship laws developed in a contested fieldin which the pressure to broaden the basis of citizenship coexisted withpressures to maintain political control in tiro hands oí local notables.

Historian Frangois Xavier Guerra has argued that the urban patricianswho had controlled the bureaucratic apparatus during the colonial peri-od usually kept control over government despite these changes, relyingun their power to materially control local election processes.s How-

Alodes of Nicv,cnn C'1'zensbip

64 =

ever, Florencia Mallon has shown that in the unstable context oí mid-

nineteenth-century Mexico, the need to mobilize popular constituencies,

and the space that was available for spontaneous popular mobilization, led

to the development oí forras of liberalism that catered to popular groups.s

It was in part the challenge that universal citizenship at times posed to

these local patricians and chieftains that fanned the development oí a nega-

tive discourse about "tire masses" in nineteenth-century Mexico: la chusma,el populacho, la canalla, la plebe, and other epithets portrayed masses as both

dangerous and insufficiently civilized to manage political life.

Alongside damning imagen of the plebe, a series oí positive words re-

ferred to popular classes who were seco as ordered and civilized: el pueblo,

los ciudadanos, la gente buena. To a large degree, the difference between posi-

tive and negative portrayals oí the pueblo corresponded to whether the

people in question were acting as dependents or whether they were diffi-

cult to control, Like the difference between the lumpenproletariat and the

proletariat, the distinction between a canalla and a ciudadano was that

the latter was a notable, or at least depended on the same system as the

notables who made the distinction, whereas the fornter had only loose

connections oí dependency to "good society." In political speeches oí the

nineteenth century, for instance, there are differences drawn between a

lower class that might be described as "abject" and as an obstacle to

progress, but that is also perceived as unthreatening and in need oí state

proteccion, and a lower class rhat is potentially or in fact violent and dan-

gerous to civilization.

In a chronicle oí his voyage tú the United States, published in 1834,

Lorenzo de Zavala, a liberal from Yucatán who had been governor of tiro

state oí Mexico, congressman, and apologist for the U.S. colonization oí

Texas, asks his readers to

[c]ompare the moral condition oí tiro people oí the United States with that

oí one or two os our [federated states and you will undcrstand the true rea-

son why it is impossible for us to raise our institutions to the leve) oí our

neighbor's, especially in ceriain states In the orate oí Mexico and in that oí

Yucatán, which are tiro ones that 1 know best, of rhe 1,200,000 inhabitants

oí tiro former and thc seven hundred thousand inhabitants oí tiro latter,

there is a proportion of, at tiro most, one in twenty f who know how te read

and write]. [Oí these,] two-fifths do not know arithmetic, three-fifths do

not even know che meaning ot thc words geography, history, astronomy, etc.,

and four-fifths do not know what tiro Bible is . To this we must add that at

least one-third oí the inhabitants oí Yucatán do not speak Spanish, and

M odes of ;Mexican Ci lizenybip

65 =

une-lifth of 11)e star, ul Nesita, ' in tbt sano tondino n. I hose who do not

take finto atoount tic d, i,, „I sic ill;_at,on o1 dite mnsses whcn thcy make

'Tus tito natlve population ir pa rtit_dar m•as ac rhe bottom of rhe

hcap , and In need ut eles ation .A simil;u sentimelit is echoed three

dotados lato , alter tito brench intcrc entiun. s, ben rhe 1857 constitution

seas reinstated There in a sessit'n iii ( iiigress . representative Julio Zárate

presented a propusal to proh.bi1 privaic ia,is in haciendas and, more

generally del uiitlase all punishmcnt that sr:s meted unt in [hese private in-

stitutions He described the cunditiom ul the Indian ni the following

tercos.

In rhe states of Mexico, Puebla. Tlaxcala, Guerrero, and Querétaro, where

the bulk el the indigenous population is t oncentrated, there is slavery,

there is abjection, riere is misci v susiaincd by rhe great landowners. And

this abject conditlon coni prises clos e to 4 ni,ilion roen

It has been eleven years sincc tire constitution was ratificd. private trials

were prohibited; flogging and other degrading punishments were abol-

ished,; and authorities were given die right ro establish jails for crimes .. .

nonetheiess, there are jails in rhe haciendas and stocks where the workers

are sunk, and rhe foreman gives lashes to tic Indians, and debts are passed

from father to son, ereating slavery, a succession of sold generations

(February 15, 1868). ''

This view of the proto-cirizen who needed to be elevated to true citi-

zenship through state protection, miscegenation, or education, and whose

condition was abject but not direetly threatening to truca nd effective citi-

zens, contrasts with other portrayals of popular tolk who are more difficult

to redeem and more menacing 1 will oler two examples from the same

congressional sessions that 1 havc fusr cired-

On January 9, 1868, representativo Jesús López brought tu Congress a

proposed law to banish bulllighting This iniriative was one of severa) at-

tempts to locate the causes of incivility and to transforni the habits of a

people who would not conform m tic ideal of dtizenship that the consti-

tution granted them

The benelits of a democratic constitution, which raise the Mexican from

rhe conditiou of slavery to tic rank of the cir!zen, aunounce that Mexico

marches tnward greatness under rhe auspices o1 liberty. In contrast ro this,

asan obstarle that block, Mexie,,s match tosvard prosperity, there exists in

each eommunity a place dsat svinhol,0e barbansiii

Al ' ,3''u l Al us.

Moreos el

II we desceud, sir. from riese philosophieal and moral considerations to

search for material transcendt-ntal ev,ls m socieiy. we sha11 be confronted

by die degradation oi that dase thai heeaux ol its ignorante. is called the

lowl,est class ¿dese 5ifrou i. aud that has been indelibly inoculated with a

propensity te bl oody iris 1 li s elass. which has beeo sus' o bented from

die benchts ot enligh tenm ent. does not know tbc guodncss of vinue exeept

bv tito harnt it recervcs lor being criminal; in it tic noble sentiments that

inhere in tire human hect[ degenerme, beceusc die government and rhe

clergy, publicists and speakers tny to show th an in abstntct tire matrers of

religion and of polities that thei r unenltivated intel1 igence cannot compre-

hend. AII rhe while, the attmctlons of vice and tito emotions that are pro-

duced by certain spectacles excite and move their passions- Since it is not

possible to establish schools everywhere where this class can be well

taught, remove at leas[ [hose other [schools] where they learn evil, where

the sight of blood easily fosrers rhe savage instincts to which they have, by

nature, a propensity - If we want good citizens, if we wanr brave soldiers

who are animared in combat and humane in triumph, prohibir specrades

thar inflare sentiments and that dull [embrutecen] reason."

Readers would be incorrect, roo, to rhink that rhe dangerous'lowliest"

classes referred to itere are strictly urban and that all rural Indians were

thought to be sale for state or hacendado patronage. Rebellious Indians,

usually labeled "savages," were known to be highly dangerous. Thus, for

instante, in his campaign against Indian rebels and a few remaining pro-

Hapsburg imperialists in Yucatán (1868), Presiden Juárez asked Congress

to suspend a series of individual guarantees in Yucatán in order to carry

out a military campaign riere. One of the suspended rights was article 5 of

rhe constitution, which reads: No one can be forced to render personal

services without a fair retribution and without their full consent. The law

cannot authorize any contract rhat has as its object the loss or irrevocable

sacrifice of a man's liberty-" In other words, slavery and corvée labor were

authorized for rhe duration of the Yucatecan campaign, which was fought

principally against the Indians."

Thus, a discourse of the sort that DaMatta called "discourse of the

street,' thar is, an egalitarian and universalistic discourse of citizenship,

could be applied to rhe "good pueblo-" At the same time, the fact that in

some nineteenth-century constitunons servants were not allowed to vote

because they were dependents,and therefore did not have control over

their will, was indicative of the fact rhat most of the good pueblo was made

M o ci e s o l A l e x i c a n C i t, z e n s 1, i p

67 =

up oí a kind of citizenry that veas guarded not so much by the constitu-

cional rights of individuals as by thc clainis that loyalty and dependency

liad on clic consciente oí Christian patriardis-

Nevertheless , che image ot a good pueblo veas not simply that oí the de-penden[ masses either, because [hese could bc figured as a harmonious and

progressive co] lecriviry or !as we have seco as abject slaves . In order tocomprehend ideological dynamies withln chis field better , two further ele-ments need no be introduced: the nations position in a world oí compet-ing predatory powers , and che question of national unity.

A sharp consciousness oí national decline and oí uncontrollable dan-

gers for che nation can he found among .Mexican political men almostfrom che time of the toppling ol Iturbide 1822 ). Referentes to decline

and to danger abound both in clic press and in discussions in Congress.For instante , Depury Hernández Chico elauned that thc nations situationwas "deplorable" because of lack of public funds (Juno 14 , 1824).14 Onune 12 oí that sin-te yeai , Deputy Cañedo svarned oí che need to guard

against a In]] civil war, in light of seecssionist movements in che state oí

Jalisco. The image oí che republic being split apara by rival factions is al-

most always seen as the cause oí chis decline or imminent disaster, as in

the case of a speech read in Con-,res, by che minister of war against a pro-Iturbide uprising in Jalisco on June 8, 1824

Yes, sir , there are vehement indicatiuns that ibese two generals are plotting

against che repuhlie that thev des re irs ruin , that it is they who move chose

implacable assassins that aflljet thc staies al Puebla and Mexieo , they who

propagate that dcadly division that ron hnnta oon berween parties, they

who are behind Clic conspirators 'e llo cause our unease and who make life

so difficult

This feeling oí pending or actual disnstcr caused bv lack oí union in-

creased and became pervasive in political discourse as che country indeed

became unsrable, eeonomically ruinous and suhjected to humiliations by

foreign powers

In a remarkahly irank, but not entirely extraordinary, "civic oration"

proffered on che anniversarv ol independence in the city of Durango in

1841, Licenciado Jestis Arellano reeapped che history oí political divisions

and fraternal struggle in che lollowing tenor.

Lets go hack in time to Sepecmber 27, 1x21 That day, my fellow

cicizens che very day of our greatest Iortune. also initiates che era oí our

greatest wocs_ It is Irom that dar that a hon-Ible discord began tú exert as

1 i _,ii' bip

deadly influence. Unleashed from che abysmal depths where it resides, it

flung itself furiously in che midst of our newly boro sociery and destroyed it

in ics crib .. There in che shadows oí that frighcful darkness we can hear

che ruar oí the monster that spilled in Padilla che blood oí General Iturbide:

che blood oí che pero who hnished che work oí Hidalgo and Morelos.

There, roo, you can hear che horrible cry oí that maGdous and treacherous

spirit chat sold the life oí che great (benemérito] and innocenc General Guerrero

to che firing squad.15

The heroes who had iniriated the revolution (Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama,

Morelos) liad al] been marryred by Spaniards, but che two who actually

achieved independence (Iturbide and Guerrero) were both murdered by

fractious Mexicans. This was to stand symbolically in a position analogous

to original sin: Mexicans are denied their entry to national happiness be-

cause oí their internal vices and divisions:

Woe is you, unfortunate Mexicot Woe is you because, not having yet fully

entered the age oí infancy, you decline in a precocious decrepitude chau

brings you close to che grave! Woe is you because you are like che female of

[hose venomous insects that thrive in our dimate, and oí whom it is said

thar it gives birch to its children only to be caten by theml16

Decline was caused by personal ambition and foily among leaders and

would-be leaders oí government, so much so that Arellano begins his re-

markable speech distancing himself from any sort oí political activity:

1 have not yet traveled-and God spare me from ever raking-che murky

paths of che poliucs that dominare us, oí that science whose principies are

che whim of [hose who protess it, where che most obvious truths are put in

doubt, and where he who is bes[ at cheating and who is bes[ at disguising

his deceptions is considered wise_iz

The ultimare results oí vice selfishness, and ambition have been the ru-

ination oí Mexico, irs decline, irs inability to reap the benefits oí freedom

and independence. For sonie speakers, [hese vices were typical oí one

parcy: monarchical interesas of conservatives, for instante; or Catholic fa-

naticism that led to blocking che doors to colonization from northern

Europe and che United States, or to federalist folly in delegating too

much power and autonomy to states. For all, they reflected a lack oí virtue

and che fall oí public morality. To quote again froni Arellano: "We must

acknowledge that our vices have grown and that public morality is every

day extenuated, that our country has been a constan[ prey oí ambition, oí

Madr, nf hlexi can Ci lizesship

= 69=

tealousy. il Írrtncidel tuulc nclcs ^,I aiti)ct vis ve nde tras ol insatiable

usuty Ol lamttcism and up rstti nn ol incptiuide and pe vetsity. and ol

chimsy and inhumano mandarins

In sum it is nnstaken tu imagine 1 1.11 in rts ongi ns. tito discourse ol citi-

^enship vas in am simple clac nbl t.[i se'.tl ine. a zero degrec oí relation-

ship" ()n thc cotlitar v carls epc ocies had quite signiticant strictures re-

garding who could bc a citizen l liese restrictions rcadily allowed for the

t-inergence ol une spedlic dise nurse about tito gooci and ihe had pueblo:

,>00d va, thc prctla that cr_n Icecheeii tito porcion of Mexican ca-

tionals svho allowed thcnuchcs p( aselullq to be represenred by tNiexican

citizens; had pueblo was thc [uebi-.> thar seas not governed by the class of

local notables, and this included rchellious Indians (like those cited in

Yucatán or in Durango) as much as the feared dcaes 6vitnas that were notas -

siniilable through puhlic education.

At ihe same time, che ten de nev to con tia te vatio nalíty arad citizenship,

at least as a utopian idea, existed hom (he very beginning, and this al-

lowed for another kind of distinction between good and bad citizens. This

distinction focused on "petty tyrants" Some ni three were perceived, par-

ticularly alter rhe constitution of 1857, as local caciques or hacendados

who kept 1odians in a siavelilee position and separated from their rights as

Mexicans, as was rhe case in tito spccch, cited carlier, against jails in ha-

ciendas. Others, and this was particularly prevalent in the earlier period,

were tyrants in their selfish appropriation of what was public.

This latter forro oí dividing between virtuous and vicious elites readily

allowed for rhe consolidation of a discourse oí messianism around a virtu-

ous caudillo, as is illustrated in another patrioric speech, pronounced en

September 1 1, 1842 (anniversary of rhe triuntph against rhe Spanish inva-

sion of 1829) in the city oí Orizaba,

The political regeneration ci Anahuac [.mexico] seas rescrved ab initio to a

singular Vctacruzano_ an encrepreneurial gcnius an animated soldier, a

keen statesmart a profound poli tician, or, in sum, to Santa Anna tito great,

who, llke another Alcides and Tesco, wi II purtiy ihe precious ground of the

Aztecs and tid it oí that disgusting and criminal riftraff [canalla] oí tyrants

of all species and conditions-19

In short, ihe political field around ihe delinition oí citizenship involved

three kinds of distinetions- one hetween a pueblo that would be encom-

passed by a group of notables anda pueblo that would not; another be-

tween selfish and falso citizens who suught private gana from their public

position as citizens and thosc who cquamd citizenship with public service

and sacrifice; and a thtrd hetween citizens who strived to open the way for

the extension of citizenship nghrs and those who blocked them in order

to cnhancc their own tyrannical authority.

In some con tesas, th ese vi, ws could be arti Gula ted to one another; for

example, the situation of thu bad puehlo was compared to citar of a young

woman who was not under ihe tutelage of a roan, it was fodder for "sedue-

tion" by bandits or by iactious aspiring politicians. In other words, ihe bad

pueblo was fodder ¡oí rhe vicious po hi tici an, as much as it was ihe principal

challenge ¡oí enlightened li bcral governments sello sought te) expand pub-

lic education, eliminare ihe obscurantist intluence of tire church, prohibir

bullfights, cockfights, and other forms oí barbarie diversions, and so on

The description olí citizenship as a zero degree oí relationship is mis-leading , then, because it emphasizes only one aspect oí tito phenomenon,which is the fact that familial discourses have always been used to super-sede tito universalism oí tito legal order. Moreover, ihe notion oí ihe citi-zen as tito baseline of all political relationships is historically incorrect, be-cause in tito early national period it was clearly a sigo oí distinction no be acitizen, and even alter ihe constitution oí 1857 and tito revolutionary con-stitution oí 1917, it still excluded minors and women. Having establishedthis general point, let us return to our evolutionary panorama oí rhe devel-opment oí citizenship in Mexico.

The Demise ofEarly Liberal Cítizenship -

The first truly liberal constitution of Mexico (1857) develops an inclusive

and relatively unproblematic identification between citizenship and nation-

ality: in order to be a citizen, al] that one needed was to be a Mexican over

eighteen (if one was married, over twenty-one if one was not), and to caenan honest living (article 34). Simplicity, however, is sometimes misleading.

Because in theory everyone was a citizen if they were oí age (the article

does not even specify that one needed to be male to be a citizen, though

this apparently went without saying, because female suffrage was not to

be allowed for another hundred years), the constitution and the congresses

that met aher its ratification were very much concerned with giving moral

shape to the citizen.

Fernando Escalante ends his pathbreaking book on politics and citi-

zenship in Mexico in ihe nineteenth century arguing that "[t]here were

no citizens because diere were no individuals. Security, business, and poli-

tics were collective affairs. But never, or only very rarely, could they be re-

solved by a general formula that seas at once efficacious, convincing, and

,Ate les o] ,ü s,_,i 1 i.. „ish il' Modrs of Adcxi c an C.fizeeship

0 = 71

presentable ' ' [lis book demonstrates lhar diere was a high degree of

pragmatic accord berween liberals asid conservatives on che matter of laws

and institutions not beir.g applicable in a systematic fashion because con-

solidating state power was more tundaniental and urgent, and neither

group couId adequately resolve che contradicriun between creating an ef-

fective and exclusive group oí citizens and tlie actual politics oí inclusion

and exclusion demanded by che sor iety numerous corporations

Despire this pragmatic agrecment regarding the priority that consoli-dating state power had over citizenship rights, the ideal of citizenship wasabout as obsessively pervasive in Mexican political discourse as was che re-

jection oí politics as a site of vice. Part of this obsession was a result oí the

fact thar, until Juárez's triumph over t`9aximilian in 1867, political instability

and economic decline raised fears that Mexico could be swallowed up by

foreign powers or split apart by interna¡ rifts. Collective mobilization

seemed che only way forward, and diere is a sense in which Mexican his-

tory between independence and die French intervention (1821-67) can

be seen as a process oí increasing polarizarion. In che end, it was this pro-

cess, in conjunction with emerging capitalist development and the con-

struction of che first railroads in che 1 870s that allowed the first successful

centralized governments of Juárez and, especially, oí Díaz, to operate.

Escalante has argued convincingly thar the old idea, championed by

Cosío Villegas, that Juárez's restored repuhlic was a genuine experiment in

liberal democracy is simply wrttng, and rhat che consolidation oí the cen-

tral state unde-Juárez and Lerdo needed to sidestep che legal order and te

create informal networks of power as much as che Díaz dictatorship thatfollowed it.

I have no space here to go finto detail coneerning che evolution of citi-

zenship under che Díaz regime ( 1876-1910), but a few remarks are nec-

essary_ First, che achievement of governmental stability and material

progress pushed earlier recurrent obsession over citizenship into the back-

ground. A plausible hypothesis is that a strong unified state and the con-

comitant process of economic growth led hy foreign investment was a

more valued goal for the political ciasses than citizenship. In fact, the ear-

lier fixation on citizenship was in large parí che resulr oí the fact that re-

gional elites needed ro appcal to altruistic patriotism in order to try to

hold che state together; once thc state could hold its own, this motivation

disappeared21 A discourse on "order and progress" quickly superseded ear-

lier emphasis on citizenship and che universal application oí laws as the

only way to progress, and a strong state tbat could guarantee foreign in-

vestment was [he key to rhat progress.

A111d s oJ Ales. , , ( i iiz en sl,ip

72 =

Thus, during che Porfirian dictatorship, it was the state, and its power

to arrange space and to regiment an order, that was the subject oí political

ritual and myth; the masses, it was hoped, might eventually catch up to

progress or-if they opposed che nacional state, as the Yaqui, Apache, and

Maya Indians did-be eliminated. In short, whereas the law and the citi-

zen were the ultimate fetishes of the era oí national instability," progress,

urban boulevards, railroads, and the mounted police (rurales) were the keyfetishes oí a Porfirian era that upheld the state as the promoter oí that

progress, and che vehicle for [he ultimate improvement of Mexico's abjectrural masses."

Contemporary Transformations

If chis were the end of che story, however, how could we come to terms

with che fact that in the 1 930s Samuel Ramos, the famous founder of aphilosophy about che Mexican as a social subject, identified che pelado, thatis, the subject who had been considered beyond the pale of citizenship

since independence, as che quintessential Mexicana Ramos argued that

Mexican national character was marked by a collective inferiority com-

plex, This inferiority complex was exemplified in the attitude of the pelado

(urban scoundrel), who is so wounded by the other's gaze that he replies

to it aggressively with che challenge of "¿Qué me ves?" (What are you

looking at?).24 Thus, where che driver oí our earlier Mexico City example

seeks anonymity in order te act like a wolf, but becomes a gentleman witheye contact, the pelado rejects eye contact with a threat oí violence. Butwhereas the nineteenth-century politician would not have hesitated in

identifying the trae citizen with che (unconstantly) amiable driver and the

pelado asan enemy oí al] good society andan individual lacking in ¡ove and

respect for his patria, postrevolutionary intellectuals such as Ramos madethe urban rabble foto che Ur-Mexicans, Why che change?

Before che revolutionary constitution of 1917, Mexican citizens had

individual rights, but very few social rights. The right oí education existed

in theory but, as historical studies oí education have shown (Vaughan

1994), public education during che porfiriato was controlled to a large ex-tent by urban notables, a fact that was reflectad in extremely low literacy

rates. Moreover, as 1 mentioned carlier, che right to vote was often nulli-

fied by che machinery of local bosses, who controlled voting as a matter oíroutine.

The 1917 constitution and che regimes following the revolution

changed chis in severa) significant ways. First, under che leadership oí José

Modas of Mexican Ci ti zen sbip

73

Cl OS ¡n che 920s arel in an cllon u, wrench che tormation of eiti -

zens from the hands of che chute h h.iblic cdueation ,test on a crusade to

reaeh out us che popular clases Tito etioit successful to a significan[

degrce and sc houls wcrc built cn ir rrmi,tc agrarias communities

tiecond che 1` 17 constituínm cstaislichcd che iight ot access to land tor

agricultura) workers_ The )and, ,,,or,ling t, th¡s constitution, belonged to

che nation, as did che subsoil and territorial waters Cirizens had rights to

poitions of that national wcaltb incie] cenain concht¡ons Third, che 1917

constitution spee¡lied a series ^,1 „' ,rkci s rights. ¡nduding minimum

,caces, che prr,liib¡cion ot chilcl labor thu prohibioon ot debt peonage.

maxTmum working hours, and clic filie. Thus, bcing a citizen promised

ñghts of access to certain forros oí protection against che predatory prac-

tices of capitalists, who, signihcantly, werc often identihed as foreign in

constitucional debates.

ldentifying members oí che urban rabble as the prototypical Mexicans

was, in this context, consonant with die state's expansive project. The

modal citizen should, indeed, be clic a!lahlc and reasonable member oí the

middle classes-and Ramoss portraval oí Ihe pelado was in no way lauda-

tory; however, Mexicos backwardness and che challenge of its present made

it useful to identify the typical subjccr as bcing off center from that ideal.

At the same time, the revolutiionary stare, like the Porfirian state, did

not concern itself so much with producing citizens. Instead, the goal was

to creare and to harness corporate groups and sectors finto the state appa-

ratus. Although presidents Obregón and Calles upheld the ideal oí the

privare farmer in the 1920s and thought it a much more desirable goal

rhan thar oí che communitarian peasant, the task oí building up the state

was more important to them rhan building up the citizen-The principal shift between thc Portirian and che postrevolutionary

state is that che latter consolidated a political idiom oí inclusive corpora-

tivism that could be used to con, plemenc che Porfirian (but still current

and useful) [heme of the enliglitened and progressive state. By che time

President Cárdenas nationalized che oil industry (1938), political dis-

course in the Mexican press by and large lacked any referente to the ideal

citizen and portrayed,instead,a harmoniousinterconnection between

popular classes under che protection of the revolutionary state.

In short, early republican obsession wirh citizeriship was primarily

owing to che extreme vulnerabilicy of .Mexicds central state. It was not

produced by an existing equality among citizens, bur rather by existing di-

visions among che elites and by clic pressure of popular groups. As soon as

a central state was consolidated. citizenship went from being sean as an

urgent and supremo ideal to being a long terco goal that con Id be achieved

only alter che enlighte sed, scientific state liad done its job. This perspec-

tive was, in its turn, transformad by clic postrevolutionary state, which

co nc ple roen ted ir with the o rganiza t ion of che pueblo ¡Tito corporati o ns that

wcrc regulated and protec tt d bv che tate

These broad shifts have liad their correspondi ng counterparts in (he

history of the privare sphe re1 be priva te sphere of citizens in Mexico has

rever been very fully guaranteed. In clic early republican period, liberals

identiticd corporate toinis of property as a central obsiacle co citizenship_

specifically, they targeted Clic property of Indian communities and of the

church. However, che expropriation of both communal and ecclesiastieal

corporate holdings in 1856 did not lead to the desired end, which was

to creare a propertied citizenry, but instead to even greater concencration

oí landed wealth in che hands of an oligarchy. As a result, wide layers oí

the population lacked a secure base oí privacy and lived either as depend-

ents or as members oí communities whose rights could only be defended

collectively.

Alter the 1910 revolution, the state sought to protect individuals from

slavelike dependence on the oligarchy, but che relations oí production

that it fostered were equally problematic from the point oí view oí the

consolidation oí a private sphere. Agrarian reform failed to build a Lockean

citizenry in the countryside because ejidatarios (land grantees) are not legalowners oí their land, Moreover, they depend on local governmental sup-

port for many aspects of production, and so are feeble participants in the

construction oí a bourgeois public sphere. Similarly, the numerous in-digent peoples oí Mexico lack a secure private sphere, as ethnographies oíche "informal economy" have amply attested: people working in the infor-

mal sector lead lives that are largely outside oí che law. As a result, they

need to negotiate with state institutions in order to keep tapping into 11le-gal sources oí electricity, to keep vending in restricted zones, to keep liv-

ing in property that is not formally theirs, and so on.2'

Thus, although incorporation into a modern sector was one oí the criti-

cal goals oí postrevolutionary governments, che modalities oí incorpora-

tion retained significan[ sectors oí the population that not only did not

benefit from access to a privase sphere that was immune froni governmen-

tal intervention, but in fact depended on governmental intervention in

order to eke out a living in a legally insecure environment. Oí che three

sectors that made up Mexico's state parry, two-the peasant sector and the

popular sector-had no sacrosanct privare sphere from which to criticize

che state, and therefore no protected basis for liberal citizenship.

xi., n t i.. z, nslrip Malles o f ,A9exi,.i.. Ci i ize,isbi p

74 =75=

This situation complicates the vision ofcitizenship asa debased catego-

ry, for it is through claims of citizenship that the peasantry and the infor-

mal sector have negotiated with the postrcvolutionary state-exchanging

votes and participation in revolutionary national discourse for access to

lands, credirs, electricity, or urban services At the same time, Chis citizen-

ship belongs to a faceless mass, not to a collection oí private individualsThe pelado who, in Ramos's account felt wounded by the mere gaze oí the

erstwhile modal citizen, and who asserted his right tu nationality by his

involvement in revolutionary violence, is harnessed back into nationality

not through patron-client tics tu privare elites, but through a series oí ex-

changos with state agencies through which he receives the status oí mas-

sified citizen.

Let me illustrate what the shape of official citizenry was like in the era

oí single-party rule- In the 1988 presidencial campaign oí che Partido Revo-

lucionario Institucional (PRI), which was in many respects che last tradi-

tional PRI campaign, public rallies and events were divided into severa]

types.s` There were, tirst, events targered tu specific portions oí the party's

tripartite sectorial organization peasarit sector; labor sector, and popular

sector), second, there were meetings with regional and national groups oí

experts, who organized problem-focused discussions with the candidate

and an audience (CEPES [Centros de Estudios Políticos y Sociales] and

IEPES [Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Sociales], both oí the PRI), third,

there were massive public rallies that were meant to show the party's

muscle by uniting the whole pueblo in a single square; and finally (chis was

an innovation for che 1988 campaign), there were talk-show-like events

where the candidate lielded questions from callers who were not identified

as members of a party sector.

The image oí the nation as it was generated in the massive public ral-

lies was thar of a corporate organism. Iike public displays oí che social

whole since che colonial period, che public oí these rallies was divided in-

ternally by sectors, each of which signaled its corporate presence with

electoral paraphernalia (sheets painted with the candidate's name and the

name oí the supporting sector: flags, T-shirts, tags, or hats that had the

candidate's initials and those oí che party or sector), but also with a certain

uniformity of look, peasants in their hats and sandals, railroad workers in

their bloc hats schoolteachers in their modest, lower-middle-class garb,

and so on.

Alongside this hierarchical and organic image of che nation as being

made up of complementary, uncqual, and interdependent masses, however,

campaign rituals also presented certain modal images oí the citizenry.

AAod,, oJ AI, , r: : (:I:zenslip

This is apparent in the use oí dress in the various rallies, for although the

presidential candidate dressed up as member oí the sector that he was vis-

iting (as a rancher when in a rally oí the peasant sector, as a well-dressed

worker in a rally oí the labor sector, or in a suit in a discussion with ex-

perts), the relationship between "the suit" and other costumes is not one oí

equality. Rather, the suit is the highest formal garb, the one that the candi-

date will use on a daily basis when he is in the presidency, and the one that

he has daily used as a government official prior to becoming a presidential

candidate. The suit is the modal uniform oí the public sphere. Public ses-

sions devoted to the discussion oí regional and national problems are

attended almost exclusively by suits, even when their inhabitants are rep-resenting interests associated with labor or agriculture. Thus, the image oí

the citizen with a voice stands in contrast to the massified citizen.This situation has been identified by Mexican democrats as a lack oí a

civil society, and [hese same democrats have been building a narrative oí

Mexican democracy that has the heyday oí the corporate party (the 1940s

and 1950s) as che historical low point in Mexican citizenship. According

to this view, che corporate state effectively funneled Mexican society into

its mass party until the 1960s, when certain groups, especially middle-

class groups-but also some peasants and urban poor-no longer found a

comfortable spot in the state's mechanisms oí representation and resource

management, producing the 1968 student movement.27

The violent suppression of this movement, and che expansion oí state

intervention in the economy in the 1970s, gave a second wind to the cor-

poratist state. However, an unencompassable civil society would keep

growing during chis period and would reemerge politically in the mid-

1980s, when the state's fiscal crisis weakened its hold on society. This situa-

tion has been leading inexorably to the end oí the one-party system and

che rise oí Mexican democracy

During the period oí state party pile, political classes in Mexico had a

pretty clear mission, which was to tap into resources by mediating be-

tween state institutions and local constituencies. It was in this period that

a clever politician coined che phrase "vivir fuera del presupuesto es vivir en

el error" (to live outside oí the state budget is to live in error). The expan-

sion oí che state for severa] decades was a process oí always incorporating

political middlemen as new social movements emerged- Thus, in the 1970s

and 1980s, positions were created for leaders oí squatters' movements, for

leaders oí urban gangs, for student movement leaders, for teachers' move-ment leaders, and others.

The fiscal crisis oí che state that began in 1982 severely limited its

M o d o s o f M e x i c a n C i t i z e n s b t p

possibility ol cngaging in thn , , -uptivc stratcgy, and so rhe numbers oí

nongovernmental organizations in artive service roce dramadeally, as did

oppositioti pa r'ties l here has undoubtc(1h buen an intensification ot eiti-

zen activity in Chis period s. ith sast numhcrs ol people rejecting massífied

corporate forros oi political )ar tiupatton that are no longer providing real

beneflts, and ctrong voten partir ipation as well as a huge increase in partici-

pation in political rallies, dem onsoatiom. and rhe like The press roo, has

broken with rhe unspoken rulo ol prescning rhe figure of rhe national

presiden[ irom direct attack and ts crit11 '5m of government has become

much loe der.

Ar the sane time, howevcr, rhe lact that many political leaders and me-

diators are now living outside of the fiscal budget may also mean that a

new forro of massified citizenship is beiog constructed. The economic

costs oí democracy and democranzation are so far very high in Mexico,

and a lot oí money is going to al¡ political parties, as well as to running

electoral processes Elections and electoral processes have become a

source oí revenue in their own right, and the jockeying between party

leaderships could beeome divorced irom rhe ever-growing needs oí rhe

country's poorest, particularly because the middle and proletarian classes

are now large enough to sustaln such an apparatus. This situation is illus-

trated in Are fact that today, although there is undoubtedly more democ-

racy in Mexico than at any time in recent memory, rhe extent oí urban in-

security, the numbers of fences and walls, and the presente oí the military

and oí privare security guards are also rhe highest in recent memory.

At this juncture, as in rhe posrrevolutionary years in which Ramos was

writing, there is an increasing number oí pcople who are tinprotected by

relations oí privare patronage, unprotected by rhe state, and who have in-

sufficient private possessions to participare as reliable citizens. On the

other hand, as in the unstable years oí rhe early and mid-nineteenth cen-

tury, there is an increasingly large class ot lumpenpohticians who seek

to funnel die "bad pueblo" finto "factious movements. And the passage

from unruly anonymity to amicable personal contact may beeome more

strained as the capacity to claint that "whoever gets mad first, loses" itself

loses credibility

Conclus-ion

DaMaua's analysis of thc relationship hetween liberal and Catholic-

hierarchical discourses in the negotiation of citizenship is a useful entry

point for rhe descriprion oí debased torno of citizenship as they have ex-

isted in Iberoamerica However, bis strategy is hest suited to highlight rhe

micropolitics of access to state institutions and does not elarify rhe specihe

ways in which citizenship is filled and emptied ol contents. It therefore

misses in important dimension of rhe eulture ot atizenship, including

how, when, and by whorn it is politicized.

In Chis chapter, 1 have presented a rough outline oí rhe politics sur-

rounding citizenship in modern Mexico. 1 argued that there have been

two periods when discussions of citizenship Nave been truly central to

political discourse The first period which 1 analyzed in sume detail, is rhe

era oí political instabibty and economic decline that followed Mexican in-

dependence; the second is the contemporary, post- I982 debt crisis period

oí privatization and rhe end of single-party hegemony The view that 1 de-

veloped suggests that the intensity oí discussions surrounding citizenship

in the first five decades alter independence reflected both the complex

politics oí including or excluding popular classes from the political field

and the fact that national unity seemed unattainable by any means other

than through unity among citizens, and violence against traitors (be these

indigenous groups or fractious "tyrants" with their clientele of canallas). In

other words, citizenship was continually invoked as the foremost need oí

the nation ata time when rhe country had no effective central state, a de-

clining economy, and was threatened both by imperial powers and by in-

ternal regional dissidents.

Beginning with Preside n[ Juárez, but especially under Díaz, the nation-

al state was consolidated and a national economy was shaped thanks to

the state's capacity to guarantee foreign investment and national sover-

eignty. As a result, the "bad pueblo" was slowly neutralized and substituted

only by rhe growth and expansion oí what 1 have called the "abject pueblo,"

or the people who were not fit for citizenship (not knowing how to read

or write, not speaking Spanish, or living in conditions oí servitude that ef-

fectively precluded full participation as independent citizens). In rhe pro-

cess, rhe national obsession with citizenship diminished even as the cele-

bration and fetishization oí the state as the depositary oí rationality, order,

and progress grew. The combination oí national consolidation, rapid

modernization, and rhe extension oí a degraded form oí citizenship to the

vast majority is par[ oí the backdrop oí rhe Mexican Revolution oí 1910.

The constitutional order that emerged from rhe revolution allowed

Mexicans access to a series of benefits, including land and protection

against employers. Nevertheless, the postrevolutionary orden did not

achieve rhe liberal goal oí turning rhe majority oí the population into

property holders. In fact, the fragility oí rhe privare sphere for large sections

Modes of Mex ican Citrzensf

79

D

oí the population has been one of the constante in modcrn Mexican history.

As a result, the revolutionary state combined the Porfirian cult oí enlight-

ened, state-led progress with an organicist construction oí the people.

This revolution gave citizenship another kind oí valence. Inscead oí at-

tacking communal lands and trying to transtorm every Mexican into a prí-

vate owner, postrevolutionary governments gave out land and protection

as forms of citizenship, out they retained ultimate control over those re-

sources. As a result, citizenship in the postrevolutionary era (up to the

mid- or late 1 980s) can be thought of in parí as massified and sectorial-

ized, because peasants and workers of the so-called informal sector re-

ceived beneHts en the force of their citizenship, and yet lacked indepen-

dence froni the state. Thus, the debased citizen that DaMatta speaks of is

different in the prerevolutionary and the postrevolutionary periods, be-

cause, in the latter, "nobodies" coulcl make daims for state beneHts on the

oasis oí their collective identity as part oí a revolutionary pueblo, whereasin the former they could not.

Part of the current difficulty in MMexican citizenship is that social critics

acknowledge that state paternalism and control over production led to un-

acceptably undemocratic forros oí rule and, indeed, lo policies that led to

the bankruptcy of the country. However, at least the 1917 constitution

envisaged parceling out some benefrts tu people by virtue oí the fact that

they were citizens. The contraction oí che state has produced massive so-

cial movements and a very strong push aruund democratizaban and the

category oí che citizen, out the current emphasis on electoral rights risks

emptying the category oí iis social ccntents once again, and, given the fact

that Mexico still has a large mass of poor people with little legal private

property or stable and legally sanctioned work, and given too that Mexico's

state is still incapable oí extending rights universally, we may yet see thereemergence a pernicious dialectic between the good pueblo and the badpueblo.

Moler of Mrx, :.r,, Cirrzevsbi Jr

4

Passion and Banality in Mexican History:

The Presidential Persona

In Mexico, theories about nacional destiny have often eclipsed broaderconcerns with human history. Development in Mexico has been nationaldevelopment, history has been national history, and theories of historyhave been theories oí national history. This phenomenon is not caused byisolation. It is instead the result oí a pervasive peripheral cosmopolitanism,of an acute conscience oí wanting to catch up, to reach "the level" oí thegreat world powers,

The need to explain the dynamics oí national history stems from thenacional project's failure to deliver its promise, its failure to free Mexico

from subservience and to make the nation an equal oí every great nation.

Curiously, however, theories oí Mexican history do not usually begin by

inspecting the impact oí national independence en the sense of disjointed-

ness that generates national self-obsession. Instead, they always want to

reach further back in an attempt to force a national subject who can thenbe liberated through the sovereignty oí a national community.

My argument in this chapter takes an alternative route. Ideally, sover-

eignty may indeed coincide with the liberation oí the nacional subject, out

this has never been a realistic expectation. Instead, real sovereignty, in-

dependence as it has actually existed, has generated a dynamic oí cultural

production that shapes Mexican obsessions with national teleology because

81 =

it creares a systanatic divide ben,cen nati],cal ideolugy and actual power

relatiuns 1-his chasm is espcdalls cvident In Clic states tense relationship

io modernizati on and to che ],roed prole, t „I cultural modernity.

Al] nacional state, can be th,caccned b, modcrnlzation. After al], eapi-

talist development has thnved mi clic inahility ot srates fully to encompass

che economies of their peoplc lhe tcchmcal social organizacional, and

cultural Innovacions that are linkcd io indu,tnal growth (i e, moderniza -

tion) can thrcaren boch che interests and che teehnical hasis of state

power. Cultural modernity tor: is en esl,ansive projeer thac has chal-

lenged specihc state instiitu tions hv shaping and upholding a series of

rights aiound che category oí che citlzcn, by insisting on a degree of au-

tonomy fui artistic and scientilic production, and by fostering a "public

sphere" froni which state policiies and institutions can be evaluated and

criticized.

In Mexico, che scates active role in propitialing and channeling devel-

opment and modernization has depended en institucional forms that often

contradice democratic ideals of dnzenship, freedom of expression, artistic

and scientiflc autonomy, and other ideals of cultural modernity. This fact

is manifested in che resilience o1 che category ancien régime' in Mexican

political and historical texts Eighleenth- century modernizing reforms

introduced by the Bourbons are correctly casi against a classical ancien

régime, which is described as corporatist and premodern, but corporatism,

che ownership oí political office, and the primary importance of personal

negotiation with a sovereign did not die with these reforms. Historian

Frangois Xavier Guerra discusses che 1910 Mexican Revolution against the

backdrop oí a still-crumbling "ancien régime," despite che fact that Porfirio

Díaz was indisputably a modernizing dictator and that Mexico had been

independent for nearly ninety yeais when che revolution broke out.' Even

today, political writers have resurrected che ancien régime label, but Chis

time to refer to the postrevolutionarv one- party system that is in the pro-

cess oí collapsing.

The persistente oí che epithet ancien régime' is a manifestation of the

perceived divide between che nacional ideal wherein che law has universal

extension and application, and real state power, which is seco as making

decisions on a self-serving and ad hoc basis. This chasm has been che de-

clared cause of revolutions and reforms. However, reforms have failed to

redress che gulf between che real and che normacive order, modern and tra-

dicional "hybrids" proliferare, and chis process usually ends up being inter-

preted as a manifestation of che resihence of a nacional culture- The cycle

of nationalist angst is therehy closed, because the failure of modernizing

P,:,, ion and Bi,:nliiv in Al r:!; ca,: Hi, ,ory

projects is i cself used to construct che nacional subject that is meant to be

liberated by the nacional scatc, and by che next set oí reforms.

1 Nave argued that che limitations oí various modero projects in

Mexico Nave reflected che highly segmented quality of che public spherc

there. This segmentation can be properly understood through a geog-

raphy of mediations. My rescarch agenda has been to develop such a ge-

ography by focusing boch on agents oí mediation, such as intellectuals

and politicians, and en che public enactment of nacional unity and artncu-

lation in political ritual In Chis chapter 1 will focos on che secular process

through which che ideal oí nacional sovereignty was incarnated; 1 mean

che shaping oí che public persona oí che president of the republic. 1 will

argue that the rocky process by which presidential power became rou-

tinized affords a glimpse of che way in which the state has brokered

Mexico's modernity.

First Time as Farce?

Disturbed perceptions oí che disjunction between the central tenets of na-

cional ideology and actual political practice are visible in Mexico as early

as the independence movement itself. For instante, José María Luis Mora,

a man who worked tirelessly and to a large extent unsuccessfully at creat-

ing the persona of the liberal citizen, complained that his contemporaries

believed that "[t[he constitution and che laws are here to place limits en a

power that already existed and was invested with omnimodal power, and

not that they are here to create and form that power."' In other words, the

presidency alter independence saw its power as preceding the roles and

laws of the constitution, which might limit it in some ways, but not shape

it ex nihilo. State power was not boro of a formal social contract, but the

nation allegedly was.

Despite the persistente oí chis ideological disjunction, liberal theories

regarding social contract, political representation, and citizenship flotar-.

ished. This fact can be understood in part as a mimetic strategy for che

state's survival: che adoption oí the great powers' own idiom of statehood

was necessary for navigating a weak state in international waters. The

temptation to cloak local struggles for national power in a language that

enjoyed a degree of international prestige, a temptation that was pro-

voked at once by imperial pressures and by che strategic utility of foreign

ideas for internal self-legicimation, produced political habits that Nave been

described since che early moments oí Mexican nacional independence and

up until che present day as a grotesque penchant for imitation-imitation

Yassian nnd Banality in Al rxiran History

83 =

flor only oí liberal idcals, hut of everv kind of glorious foreign practice. 1

quote again froni Mora,

The raen who arroganlly chist '],al 'comtimnons are sheets of paper that

Nave no value other than ihar wlnch die governmcnt wishes tú give them"

are deludcd That expression vhidt seas in some v.ay tolerable coming

from thc hero oI Marring of jcna aod ol Austcrlitz, ro ni the inan who

saved Franco a thuusand timos and Icd its armies vietoriously 111 YO Russia,

has been repeated not lar hnm mis bv pygmics without mera, service, or

presti ge s

Here, Mexican politicians are tiny AGicans, aping Europeans in their

banana repuhlic. But, as historian Fernando Escalante has demonstrated,

the citizen that was meant to monlmr these politicians was an equally fie-

titious character, hecause the power oI die 'tate was never sufficient to de-

lend the property and the rights of Mexlcans who enjoyed formal citizen-

ship.° ln this context the office ol ihe presidency became a vehicle for

imagining sovcrcignty, and presidente built ibeir authoriry by shaping andembodying these images.

Excommunication ani) Primary Piocess"iiice Jodependence

Once Miguel Hidalgos (1810) movement lar independence had ravaged

severa) towns oí the Bajío regios, thc bishop oí Michoacán and erstwhile

Iriend of Hidalgo, Manuel Abad y Queipo, decreed the excommunication

of the priest and oí his followers.' This act, and some oí the insurgent

clergy's reactlons, set the tope for l ater meraphors of national unity and

apostasy.

The bishop began his edict with a citation from Luke-"Every king-

tlom that is divided finto factions c11,11 he dcstruycd and ruined"-and then

proceeded tu review ihe ravagcs of die wars in French Saint-Domingue

JHaiti), which were caused, he reminded bis dock, by the revolution in

the metropole. The result of that revolt was not only the assassination of

all Euro pean' and Creoles, but also the des truction of four-fifths of the

island's black and mulatto population and a legacy oí perpetua] hatred

between blacks and mulattos. No good could come from a falce division

between Europeans and Americans.

Abad then expressed particular chagrin regarding the fact that the cal]

of disloya]ry and arras carne from a priest, ^tiligucl Hidalgo of the parish oí

Dolores, who not only killed and injured Europeans and used his robes to

'seduce a portion oí innocent laborcrs,' but aleo,

[i]nsulting the faith and our sovereign, Ferdinand VII, painted en his han-

ner (he image of our august patroness, our Lady of Guadalupe, and wrote

the following inscriptiom. "Long Live the Faith. Long Live Our Holiest

Mother of Guadalupe- Long Live Ferdinand VII_ Long Live America, and

Death to I3ad Government.'o

Abad y Queipo subsequendy excommunicated Hidalgo and threatened to

do the lame to any person who persisted in fighting on Hidalgos side or

in aiding him in any way.

This edict, which was soon endorsed by the archbishop oí Mexico,

caused great indignation and rape with Hidalgo, Morelos, and other mem-

bers oí the insurgent clergy. Hidalgo made a formal reply, in which he

swore his loyalty to the Catholic faith: "1 have never doubted any oí its

truths, I have always been intimarely convinced oí the infallibility oí its

dogmas.`7 Hidalgo then vehemently deplored his excommunication as

a partisan act: "Open your eyes, Americans. Do not allow yourselves to be

seduced by our enemies: they are not Catholics, except tú politici their

god is money, and their acts have our oppression as their only object." s He

then called for ehe establishment oí a representative parliament that,

saving as its principal object la maintain our boly religion, will promete benign laws

[leyes suaves], useful and well suited to the circumstances oí each pueblo. They

shall then govern with the tenderness oí parents, they shall treat os as

brothers, banish poverty, moderare the devastation oí ihe kingdom and the

extraction oí its moneys, fonient the arts, liven up industry , . _ and, after a

few years, our inhabitants shall enjoy al¡ of the delicacies that the

Sovereign Author oí nature has spilled en this vast continente

In sum, Hidalgo warns against tire use oí the trae faith for the enrich-

ment oí foreign oppressors. He identifies national sovereignty with rule oí

the Catholic faith, a rule that is to be paternalistic fin that it shall recognize

the specific needs and circumstances oí each pueblo, and he imagines a

nation guided by a single true faith that will quickly become a kind oí

Christian paradise in which poverty is eradicated by the fraternal senti-

ment and benign intentions that exist between true coreligionists. Thus

Hidalgo performed a kind of counterexcommunication oí European im-

perialista who used Catholicism in order lo "seduce" those whom they

sought to oppress and exploit.

Hidalgo's position found concrete jurídica] expression in the edicts oí

bus follower, the priest José María Morelos. In his first edict abolishing

slavery and Indian tribute (1810), Morelos proclaimed that "[a]ny American

P.+s=ion and Bnn.iy r ,. Jlex,can Hisiory Pas 'ion nnd 13ruia1ily in Mexican liistory8.l = 85

who owes monee Lo a European is not oblit;ed Lo pav it- It, on the con-

ti-are, it is thc 1 uropean who owes. hc shall rigonxisly pay his debt Lo the

.Ameriean" Moreover ¡e vete lanwner sha bc set ¡ice wlth che knowl-

dge tirar il he eomni its thc satine dime nt air c othei that eontradicts a

mans honeste, lic- '11,111 be mmh, ti

These Iaws portrayed Turopeans as uuirious'y living oí¡ oí "Amen ca os

such that there was no possihle Anacrican debt to the Europeans that liad

not been hanclsomeIv paid lor bcl„rehand and that the judgment oí

e rimes unid el thc Spa¡lis h reginn rs a. ses tematically unlair. In sum, che

c ountcrexcommunieation ot INC Spanish clergy by Hidalgo and Morelos

tuses the nacional ideal with a Christian utopia. Paternalistic beneficence

and brotherhood would be achieved in an independent Mexico ruled by

true Catholics, instead of by oppressors who used Catholicism to pursue

their unchristian aims: the cxtraction oí money and che oppression oí a

nation.

Morelos's political spirit would perdure because che defense oí nation-

als against foreign extortion and the dispensation oí Christian justice

proved impossible to achieve after independence. Thus, Hidalgo s image

al sovereignty as the Christian adm i n ist ration of plenty remained a

utopia, and Mexican governments alter independence were just as subject

to the polities oí religious appropriation/excommunication as their

Spanish predecessors.

A similar formulation oí national ideals can be found a hundred years

aker Hidalgos cry in Dolores, issuing from the pen oí that foremost ideo-

logue oí the Mexican Revolution, Luis Cabrera, who blasted the official

celebration oí the centenary oí independence just two months prior to che

first revolutionary outburst oí November 20, 1910:

The celebration of our glories and the commemoration of our heroes is a

cult, but those who suffer and work cannot arrive togerher at the altar oí

che fatherland with [hose who dominare and benefit because they do not

share the lame religion- Just as the Ch ristian's plea to pardon all debts can-

not fit in the same prayer as the lew s plea tor daily bread exacted from

profits, neither can títere be a unilied hnmage te our fathers by those with

an insaciable thirst for power and hy the noble desire for justice that moves

che hearts of the pueblo that suffers and wnrks11

This significant, indeed foundational, strain of,Mexican nationalism there-

fore lees the national state as the ideal medium for achieving a Christian

community- In fact, however, the standards lar sovereignty that were set

by Hidalgo, wherebv poverty would be bar'shed "in just a few years," or

Ya ssi o n und Ira n „l r d.l. , nn n 1listo ty

80 =

by Morelos's declaration oí a elean siate for all, would be impossible to up-

hold. They were ill suited to serve as the hasis for consolidating a huge

territory peopled by a weakly integrated nation that gained its indepen-

dence at a montent oí iotense imperial competition.

Dead Presidents

The consolidation oí a central authority has been a eomplex problem in

Mexican history, for although such an authority existed during the colo-

nial era in the figure of the king and his surrogate, che viceroy, establish-

ing a central state and authoriry after independence proved to be highly

problematic.

Monarchical solutions to this quandary were consonant with the ideol-

ogy oí Mexican independence, which leaned heavily en traditional

Spanish legal thought to legitimate itself. The dream of a smooth tran-

sition between the colonial and che independent order was simply not to

be. On one side, radical insurgents were not keen to see the precolonial

status quo upheld to such a perfect degree. On another, Spain did not im-

mediately relinquish its claims over the new Mexican empire and attempt-

ed to reestablish a foothold on the continent for ten more years, sufficient

time for an anti-Spanish sentiment that had been growing along with the

construction oí Mexican nationalism to become virulent. Moreover, the

United States was clearly and loudly opposed to che establishment of a

monarchy in Mexico." As a result, monarchists were forced to set theirhearts en acquiring a European monarch with che simultaneous backing oí

al] or most European powers, a solution that was tried and failed in che

1860s. Thus the early fractures among the nascent national elite were con-

nected ab initio to che contest between the United States, France, Spain,

and Britain.

It was not until 1867, after the French departed and Maximilían was

shot, that Mexico finally earned its "right" to exist as a nation. Until that

time, no strong central state had existed, and the country's sovereignty

was severely limited. In the words oí a Porfirian commentator,

[before che wars oí intervention] being a foreigner came to mean being the

natural-born master oí all Mexicans. It was enough, as a few oí the excep-

tionally rare honest diplomats acknowledged, for a foreigner to be impris-

oned for three days en poor behavior or intrigue for that person to become

a creditor for fifty or one hundred thousand pesos to the Mexican national

budget as a result oí a diplomatic agreement. °

Passion u,d Bana1,ty in Mexican History

= 87

The state had become the guarantor oí foreign interests against its own

people. The bullet that killed Maximilian effectively ended the possibility

oí ever establishing a European-backed monarchy, while making a highly

visible international statement about the sovereignty oí Mexico and oí its

laws. Until that time, Mexico had been routinely "Africanized" in foreignoyes.

In the years between 1 821 and 1867, Mexican leaders had tried a series

oí strategies for constructing central power, combining varying forms oí

messianism, aspects of monarchic power, republicanism, and liberalism, in

a large number oí short-lived presidencies Civen the nonexistence oí a

successful hegemonic block among early postindependence elites, and

given a number oí foreign pressuies that were not fully comprehended by

these elites until half the country's territory had been lost, the difficulty in

constructing an image oí national sovereignty and authority in the office

oí the president became a major cultural challenge, for whereas political

ritual and the stability oí office in the colonial period reveal a clear-cut

ideology oí dependency-that is, of a combination oí subordination,

complementarity, and mutual reliance-this cense oí reliance and encom-

passment between the centers oí empire and Mexico was decidedly shaken,

and sometimes completely shattered, alter independence.

The difficulty in shaping presidential power was increased, too, by the

weakness, and at times nonexistence, oí modern political parties. Political

organization around che time oí independence flowed to a large extent

through Masonic lodges. In the early independence period, there was

only one Masonic rite, the Scottish rite, which had been imported byMexico's representativas at che Cortes oí Cádiz in 1812. A second lodge,

oí York, was established in Mexico by the first U.S. ambassador, Joel

Poinsett, with the explicit ami oí consolidacing a federalist, republican,and more Jacobin organization finto Mexico's political arena, In neither

case, however, were these lodges open to public scrutiny, as political par-ties are, and political power was taken in the name oí ideologies, such as

federalism, centralism, liberalism, or conservatism, with no party structuretu back them.

As a result, the construction oí the persona oí the president as the per-

sonification oí sovereignty was both important and highly problematic. It

involved creating an iniage that could risa ahoye and reconcile a regional-

ly fragmented society, an image that could also be manipulated in order to

seduce orto frighten off imperial power-contradictory uses that are sure-

ly parí oí the famous distante hetween the p,?ís real and the país legal. 1 shall

explore three significant strategies in the evolution of the presidential

Passion nnd 13 1'1y ,n t`í CXJC11 11 11 isiory

88

persona: the strategy oí the martyr, the strategy oí the exemplary citizen,

and the strategy of the modernizer. In discussing selected aspects oí these

three presidential repertoires, 1 hope to clarify one aspect oí the distante

between legal forms and actual political practice.

An Arm and a Leg

The saliente oí martyrdom in politics has often been noted in popular

commentary in Mexico. Mexico has a large pantheon oí national leaders

who were shot or martyred, including Hidalgo, Morelos, Allende, Aldama,

Iturbide, Guerrero, Mina, Matamoros, Maximilian, Madero, Villa, Carranza,

Obregón, and Zapata, to name only the most prominent ones. The first

martyrs oí independence were Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and Santa María,

whose heads were severed by Spanish authorities and displayed in the

four corners oí the Alhóndiga de Granaditas, where Hidalgos army had

massacred a number oí Spantards and Creoles. Many other leaders oí in-dependence were also executed in later periods.

When it carne to insurgent priests, Spanish authorities tried to degradethe leaders before and after execution. The subjects were defrocked in ec-

clesiastical courts and then turned over to the civil authorities, who dictat-

ed their sentences. In cases where military officers had to take justice into

their own hands, some officers "reconciled their duties as Christians with

their obligations as soldiers" by undressing the rebel priest, shooting him,

and then redressing him with his robes for burial.10. Despite these andother degradations, [hese dead became the martyred "fathers" oí the nation.

The use oí messianic imagery was significant en two levels: it was away oí identifying the presidential body with the land, and it cast the

people as being collectively in debí to the caudillo for his sacrifices. Therelationship to kingly ideology is clear. Because Mexico was unable to en-

shrine its own king, in whom a positiva relationship between personalwelfare and national welfare could be state dogma ("The King and the

Land are One"), its national leaders had to create this relationship nega-

tively, through sacrifice. Thus, it was through personal sacrifice that the

president could attempt to convince people oí his capacity to representthe entire nation.

The most successful example oí a president who relied primarily en

this strategy for fashioning his persona was Antonio López de Santa Anna,

who dominated Mexican politics during the first half oí the nineteenth

century Santa Anna was called to the presidency eleven times, alterna-

tively as a liberal, a conservative, and a moderate. Ideological purity was

Passion and Banality in Mexiean HisIory89

clearly not che way to estahlish onesdl as a durable alternatve for the

presidencv in carly nineceentli ,, ntury ,Vlcxico_ Instead, historian John

Lynch observes chat Santa Anua sale El ini e l as a preserven of order, not as

an ideologically Inconsisccnt opporuinist 1 -he fault !,aceording to Santa

Anua] las with the political par ti,, ss bici, dlvidcd Mexico and created a

need for reconciliation" : 1992, 3s6

Aboye the political fray hetwee n nothing remained in the rheto-

iic of the period but the fachciland ,p.nna. itsell, and so Santa Anna culti-

vated bis repuiation as a war heru He led clic defense against the Spanish

in 1829, bis leg was amputated alter wounds acquired in cine "Pastry War

against the French in 1839 (offsetting, somewhat, bis humiliating defeat in

Texas), and he organized the defense against the U.S. invasion ata time oí

political disarray.

In 1842, Santa Anna was once again called to power, and at that point

he attempted co build the rudiments oí a political geography that would

have him at its center. He had a luxurious municipal theater built (the

Teatro Santa Anna), with a statue of himself in front oí it. A solemn and

much-actended ceremony was cnacted to inaugurare a third monument,

which was a mausoleum in which bis left leg was reinterred.

The significante oí Santa Anna's Icg-a limb that linked him to Hidalgo,

Morelos, and all the dead heroes whose ]ove for the patria at that point was

the only ideology capable of unifying the country-is best appreciated in

Santa Anna's own words:

The infamous words the messenger read me are repeated hete: "The ma-

jority oí Congress openly favor the Paredes revolution . . The rioters im-

prisoned President Canalizo and extended their aversion to the president,

Santa Anna. They tore down a bronze hust erected in bis honor in the

Plaza del Mercado. They stripped bis narre from the Santa Anna Theater,

substituting for it the National Theater. Furthermore, they have taken bis

amputated foot from the cemetery ot Santa Paula and proceeded to drag it

through the streets to che sounds of savage laughter and regaling ..." 1 in-

terrupted the narrator, exclaiming savagely, Stop' 1 don't wish to hear any

more! Almighty Codi. A member ot my hody, lose in che service of my

country, dragged from the funeral urn, broken into bits to be made sport

of in such a barbarie mannert' In that moment ot grief and frenzy, 1 decid-

ed to leave my native country, objeet of my dreams and oí my disillusions,

for all time 15

Civen Mexico's ideological rifes, the dilflculcies in creating a national

center in the face oí interna] divisions and international pressure, the only

Figure 4.1. Vlceroy don Juan Vicente Guemes Pacheco y Padilla, segundo Conde de Revillagigedo,

anonymous painter, eighteenth century. Oil on canas, 52 x 41. Collection of

Banco Nacional de México. This is a usual representation oí a viceroy's arrival in

New Spain- The viceroy is assisted on one side by the power oí arms, and en

the other by che power of justice, the same two powers that caudillos claimed for

themselves when they claimed to stand aboye all parties.

Pa, sion nnd Daneii1 y .u Xlexican Hirirry

90

1 ieure 4.2 hnagni de iura Len releen de Frmm,nlo VII ;monymous painter, ninereenth

century. Oil cn canvas, 1-40 x 98 cm_ Collcetion ui !Museo Regional de Guadalajara.

1-he message on the painCing reads. leluved Fernando, Spain and the Indies placed

on your head this [imago oí the croes n 1 the bottom reads,'This ¡ion, which is

the Spanish nation, will rever lel gu Ironu i¢ lit,hes rhe teso worlds of Ferdinand

VII" The representation of the king oo Str ikinglq ,imitar ti) portraits of Iturhide

and Santa Anna_ 1 igure 4.3. Santa Anna as presiden[-

,,ood president could be a seltkss one The dead insurgents beeame ex

acoples ol this ideal, and the ea' licsi viable examples oí the presidential

persona wcre built around the ligare ot the martyr-presidents who did

not reecive salaries, whu saeriheecl theii iniilics who abandoned their

lamily l'artene. who gavc [Ti' their health iris tbctr country.

Santa Anna lost his leg and it beeame the focus oí contention. Alvaro

Obregón caudillo of the Mexican Revolution, president from 1920 te

1924, reelected for office in 1928. and murdered on the day of his elee -

tion, lost an arni in the battle el (elava against Pancho Villa- This arre was

preserved in alcohol and it hecame tlie centcrpicce of a monument built in

his trame by the man who created thc Partido Revolucionario Institucional

that ruled the country for seventy-one ycars. Obregón's martyrdom was

thus used to funnel charisma finto a hureaucracy that has insistently called

itself revolutionary.

Two less well known and curious stories are the ends met by the bodies

oí Guadalupe Victoria and of General Francisco (Pancho) Villa. Guadalupe

Victoria, Mexico's first president, died in 1842. During the U.S. invasion

of Mexico in 1848, American soldiers violated the tomb where his mummy

and preserved innards were kept. According to one hagiographer, two

U.S. soldiers drank the alcohol in which Victorias innards were preserved

and died-the remains oí Guadalupe Victoria were still powerful in the

struggle for sovereignty. In 1862, just before the French invasion, Victoria's

remains were transferred to Puebla by General Alejandro García, and they

were placed at the foot oí the Angel oí Independence in Mexico City by

President Calles in the 1920s.16

U.S. patriots apparently also had a bone to pick (so to speak) with

Pancho Villa, whose tonib was desecrated and whose head allegedly

ended up in the Skull and Bones Society at Yale University, a secret society

oí which George Bush was a member-1' It would appear that Villa, who

was initially portrayed by the U.S media as a great popular hero and then

demonized as the bandit who had the gall oí invading Columbus, New

Mexico, and getting away with it, beeame die object oí "scientific interest"

by patriots in the United States, whlle Villas invasion oí Columbus is still

a source oí pleasure for Mexican revnncbis les.

The politics around these remains reveals the degree to which the

nation's inalienable possessions llave been vulnerable to foreign appropria-

tien, as well as to interna] desecration- It suggests that martyrdom has

been fundamentally linked to an elten unworkable ideal oí sovereignty in

modern Mexico Sovereignty, that ideal locatien where al! Mexicans are

1,e1 1 1 as 1 11 .1 B .1 â .I!. ', Vrxrcan His1ory

v4

created equal, has been a place that only the dead can inhabit, which is

why we sometimes fight over their remainsls

Unconventional Conventionalists, or the Fetishism of the Lau,

It fell to Benito Juárez to create the first strong image oí the presidency as

an institution oí power that seas truly aboye the fray, and his strategy was to

present himself as a complex embodiment oí rhe meeting between the na-

tion and the law. As an Indian, Juárez could stand for rhe nation; as an im-

penetrable magistrate and keeper of the law, he attempted to create an

image oí the presidency as being aboye ambitious self-aggrandizement.19

Francisco Bulnes provides a biting creole perspective on Juárez 's distinct

public image:

Juárez had a distinctively Indian temperameny he had the calm oí an

obelisk-that reserved nature that slavery promotes to the state oí co-

matoseness in the coldly resigned races. He was characterized by the secu-

lar silente oí the vanquished who know that every word that is not themiasma oí degradation is punished, by that indifference that apparently al-lows no seduction but that exasperates .. Juárez did not make speeches;

he did not write books, use the press, or write letters; he did not have inti-

mate conversation , nor did he have esprit, an element that makes thoughtpenetrating , like perfume . Nor was he subtle or expressive in his gestures,his movement, or his gaze. His only language was official, severe , sober,irreproachable, fastidious , unbearable. His only posture that oí a judgehearing a case . His only expression the absence oí all expression . The physi-

cal and moral appearance of Juárez was not that oí the apostle , or the martyr,or the statesman ; it was instead that oí a god in a teocalli, inexpressive en thehumid and reddish rock oí sacrifices.30

Juárez created a lasting image oí what the relationship oí the president

to the nation should be: he had no need oí the kind oí martyrdom that

Santa Anna utilized because his yace already proved his links to the land.Nor, as Bulnes says, was he an apostle , in that his role was to remind Mexicansand foreigners oí the role oí the law. The result appears at first as an im-possible combination: the legalistic bureaucrat as national fetish.

Juárez's construction oí the presidential persona as the embodiment oíthe law depended on a racial element for its success. Mexican presidents

who belonged to the local aristocracy could only achieve full identifica-

tion with the land through the theater oí messianism and martyrdom.

Juárez, on the other hand, relied on the mythology oí the Aztec past that

P a s s o n a n d B a n a 1 i 1 y i ,i M e x i c a n H , t , ,

= 95 =

was important in Mexican nationalism as a way of establishing a crediblerelationship to the land without relying on messianism . When he relied onhiblical imagery, Juárez usually turned to Moses, the lawgiver and libera-tor, and not to Jesus and the martyrs . This was because Juárez's challengewas not to demonstrate loyalty to the land, but rather to show that hecould 'rise aboye his yace." The law resolved this problem to some extent.The Indian, who indisputably was connected to the land , could identify sofully with the law that he would become faceless: a national Fetish of thelaw, an idol in a teocalli, as Bulnes says . This contrasts with the role of thelaw in the persona of the messianic president , whose actitudes in this re-gard were usually inspired by Napoleon.

Juárez was aided in this project by the fact that he presided over thedefinitive defeat of European powers , the execution of a prestigiousEuropean monarch, the defeat of the clergy, and an alliance with theUnited States . He succeeded in identifying himself with the land notthrough the greatness of his individual acts (as Bulnes would have liked),but rather through his sober image as the inexorable instrument of the law.

After Juárez , two alternative images of that national fetish that is thepresident had been rudimentarily established : the presiden [ as messianicleader-overflowing with personality , ideologically inconsistent, andabandoning his fortune for the sake of the nation-and the expressionlessleader who claims the rule of law in the narre of the nation . The fact thatthe two could not easily be combined is evident in a satirical verse direct-ed to León de la Barra , interim president of Mexico alter General Dfaz'sfall in 1910:

El gobernar con el frac Governing with a tuxedo

y ser presidente blanco Being a white president

es tan sólo un pasaporte Is only just a passport

de destierro limpio y franco 21 7o certain banishment.

One could use a tuxedo like Juárez if it underlined a fusion between the

Indian and the law, but if one were white and sought to be president, one

could not cake on the persona of the bourgeois or the bureaucrat; instead,one needed the force of arms and a messianic language.

After Juárez, the image of saving che law in che narre of the nation be-

carne a powerful way of claiming the presidency and of shaping the presi-

dencial persona, and this despite che fact that Juárez's self-serving use of the

law was no different from either his predecessors nor his successors.22

During ehe Mexican Revolution, Madero revolted against Díaz in the name

Figure 4.4. Tlahuicole, by Manucl Vilar. Collection of Museo Nacional de Arte;

photograph by Agustín Estrada. This exemplar of indigenista art from che time of

Juárez has the Indian embody the classical ideal of strength and beauty. The dis-

crepancy between che potential of the Indian race in its moments of sovereignty

and its degeneration, caused by foreign subjugation, was implicit in the represen-

tation itself.

P ,S510n and B,nnlity in Alrx,can Hisfory

96

Figure 4.5 I,idios carboneros y labradores de Li vecindad de México, lithograph by Carlos

Nebel (1850)- This re presentati o o ol eoniempoi ary Indians is characteristic of the

period and contrasta wlrh the ideal cmbodied in Tlabnicole-

of the 1857 constitution and he was punctilious in setting himself up as a

law-abiding citizen. In fact, Madero combined the messianic image with

that oí the law provider in his "apostle oí democracy" persona. Carranza's

army called itself the "Constitutionalist Army" when it organized against

the usurper Huerta; Villa and Zapata called themselves "Conventionalists"

and claimed to be fighting Carranza out of respect for the resolutions oí the

Aguascalientes Convention- Finally, and perhaps most important, Mexico's

dominant party, established in 1929, saw itself as the institutionalized heir

of the revolution, which was interpreted as the fount oí nacional comunitas

whose spirit was embodied in tire constitution oí 1917. In each oí these

cases, including juárez's, the nationalization oí che law was a way to con-

struct a viable presidential authority whose actual policies often had no

more than a casual or after-the-facr relationship tu the law.

Inventos del hombre blanco: Modernizalion and Presidencial Fetishism

1 have outlined two ways in which thc presidenr's persona was shaped: che

messianic strategy and che indigenized-legalist strategy. These alterna-

tives were developed at difterent moments. though hoth are components

Figure 4.6- President Juárez, anonymous engraving autographed by Presiden[ Juárez.

Juárez, the Indian who studied law and who made Europe pay for its intervention

by ordering Maximilian's execution in conformiry with that law, is the modero

reconciliation between che idealized pre-Hispanic Indian and che promise held

out by national sovereignry- Juárezs identity as a civilian demonstrates the po-

rential of Mexican society ro back this ideal, while simultaneously affirming that

national liberation would not be attained by "caste wars "

P.iseion and Oa salii> ,, ;blexicnn Hislory

v8

IGNACIO M. ALTAMIRANO.

Figure 4.7. Allanurano, lhe Indian Gmlor, anonymoiu engraving published in Evans

(1870)_ Ignacio Manuel Altamirano seas, on che cultural plane, a symbol quite

similar co Juárez. The Indian body elothed in European high culture was a recla-

mation oí what had been due te che Indiati yace. It was a consequence of sover-

cignry and hecame its fitting symbol_

of contemporary Mexican "presidentialism The messianic strategy was

che first successful option because [here was no way that the presidency

could feign ideological consistency in che first half oí che nineteenth cen-

tury. The fetishization oí che law occurred in coniunction with the consoli-

dation oí Mexico's position in the international system and as a result oí

the polarization oí che country to a degree that only one party could con-

ceivably emerge as che victor_

The third strategy that 1 will discuss concerns che nationalization oímodernization as a presidencial stracegy. According co historian EdmundoO'Gormam

) i i. A:,'xi:nn History

100

Figure 4.8. Presidente Benito Juárez, by Hermenegildo Bulstos. Collection of che

Senado de la República (Mexico). This contemporary portrait oí a green-eyed

Juárez hangs today in Mexico's Senate. The mestizaje of Juárez is here embodied

in che whitening of his face, a strategy that made sense while Juárez lived.

[In che early and mid-nineteenth century] [w]e have two theses correspon-

ding to two tendencies [che liberal and che conservative tendency], which

struggle against each ocher because oí their respective aims and because

they are founded on two different visions of che direction oí history. How-

ever, [hese two theses end up postulating the same thing, co wit, they both

wish to acquire che prospedty of che United States without abandoning

Passion and Bnnulity in Mexican History

101 =

u'aditional ways of being, because these were judged tu be the very essence

of the nation. Both comenta wanted thc benehts oí moderniry, but neither

wanted modernity itsclf"

figrtre 4.9a. Caballero Águila. Sculpturc

lrom the Mexican pavilion of the

Exposición Iberoamericana de Sevilla

1929)- These twin statues, adorning

Mexico's con tribu(ion te che Ibero

american Exhibition in Seville, makc

the Spanish and Indian nobles equis a

ents- Mestizo power is die logisal

consequence of this vision

Figure 49b Un caballero español del siglo

XVI Sculpture from the Mexican pavil-

ion et the Exposición Iberoamericana

de Ser dla ! 1929)

In other words, the contest ter nm oderniza tion (niaterial and techno-

logical progress) asas a high aim of the national struggle that was

claimed by all factions, while cultural modernity was, in different ways,

rejected This tendency was clearly expressed at the muro oí the twen-

tieth century-when the contest herween liberals and co nserva tives

had been transcended-in irielisnm, an ideology that posited the spiritual

supcriority of Latin America over the United States and envisioned mod-

ernizing Latin American countries without absorbing the spiritual de-

basement created by the all-pervasive materialism that was attributed to

U.S. society.

Although Enrique Rodó's Ariel ties Latin spirituality to a Hellenic inheri-

tance, the fundamental tenet oí arielismo (greater spirituality that is none-

theless compatible with selective modernization) has multiple manifesta-

tions, some oí which are present even today in the forro of indigenismo, and

in nationalistic forms of socialism. Taken at this leve) of generality, arielismo

presupposed a certain cosmopolitanism and a high degree of education (at

least at the leve) oí the elites), combined with the maintenance oí hier-

archical and paternalistic relationships within society. The cosmopolitanism

and spiritual education oí the elite were required, in fact, in order to guar-

antee a well-reasoned selection oí modere implementa and practices to

import. In other words, arielismo was an ideology that was well adapted to

the circumstances oí Mexican political and intellectual elites from the end

of the nineteenth century to the end oí the era oí impon substitution in-

dustrialization ( 1982), because it cast Mexicans as consumers oí modern

products that retained an unaltered "spiritual" essence, an essence that was

embodied in specific-unmodern-relations at the leve) oí family organi-

zation, clientelism, corporate organization, and so on.

Moreover, arielismo, indigenismo, and other avatars oí this posture implic-

itly fostered a defensive cultural role for the state and its statesmen_ to

guard Latin societies against the base materialism oí U.S. society. Given

this mediating position, the state was meant to be savvy about the con-

sumption oí modern produces. Its knowledge was derived from the hu-

manistic education of its leaders and the spirituality of communal relations

in Latin America. This mediating position allowed the appropriation of

modernization as part oí the presidential manna. "Los inventos del hombre

blanco' (the white man's inventions) were a third critica) prop in creating

Pns sian arad E)aueliiy ir. Mexican His to ry

103 =

a stable view of sovereignty and of presidential power in the history oíideological uncertainty.

In the cal ¡y nineteenth century, there are relatively few examples oíthis political usage oí modernization by the presidential figure. One par-

cial exception is the use of statistics, to show that, morally, Mexico City

was the equal of Paris, with lower percentages oí prostitutes, higher edu-cational levels, and other illusionsr' Early efforts were usually culturalrather than technological-Santa Auras choice to build a theater as his

most public work is an example. However, rhese never had the nationalistpower oí the later technological imports.

The image oí the state presiding over or introducing some major tech-

nological innovation or material henefit has been critica) to the con-

struction oí the persona oí the presidenr since Porfirio Díaz's regime

(1876-1910), whose introduction of the railroad did much to lend

verisimilitude ro Díaz's studied resemblance of Kaiser Wilhelm. Recentexamples oí the nationalization of modernization include the constructionoí the Mexico City subway under President Díaz Ordaz (1964-70), Che

construction of the National University's modernist campus and the de-velopment oí Acapulco under Miguel Alemán (1946-52), the developmentoí Cuernavaca under Calles (1929-34), the construction oí the Pan

American Highway and the naUOnalization oí the oil industry under

Cárdenas (1934-40), and the electrification oí the Mexican countrysideunder Echeverría (1970-76)_

The identification oí the president with modernization has at timesbeen used against the more racialist imagen of the presidency as the em-bodiment oí national law and oí the nation's martyrs. This has especially

been the case in times oí great economic growth, when presidenta usuallyshow ideological eclecticism . The father oí this eclectic style is PorfirioDíaz, who nonetheless concentrated in his persona much oí the two earlier

coniponents oí Mexican presidentialism (idenrity as racially Mexican, and

idenrity as war hero)_ Dfazs unparallcled personal success in combining allrhree strands of thc presidential persona seems to have received divine

sanction: the day of his namesake, San Porfirio, coincided with Mexican

Independence Day; the birth oí the pero and of the nation were thus cele-brated on the same day.

This almost ideal overlap between a modernizing image (gained onlyby presiding over the country in a moment of economic growth) and an

image of personal sacrifice and racial legitimacy has only rarely coincided

lince. To a cenan degree, Alvaro Obregón (1920-24) had it: his pickled

arm, which was bluwn off at the I3attle of Celaya, linked him to the earth,

Pas^ioe ^^nd 13anniii^ .^. Alrxisan His^ory

104 =

Figure 4.10 . Excursión al puente de Metlac, photograph by C. B. Waite (early 1900s).Feats of engineering , such as the bridge over the ravine oí Metlac, became em-

blematic of Porfirio Díaz and his accomplishments as president.

while his modernizing policies eventually gave him popularity with

Mexico's industrial classes. Arguably Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) also had

a credible mix of these ingredients. At any rate, since World War II, with

peace in the land and sustained economic growth for a couple of decades,the image oí the modernizing president became more and more significant.

Moreover, with the exhaustion of models oí industrialization orga-nized around the national market through import substitution industrali-zation, variants oí arielismo as an official ideology have become increas-ingly untenable . Therefore, modernizing presidents lince the 1982 debtcrisis have gambled everything on a successful bid to be like the UnitedStates-materialism and all. As a result, the Mexican presidential imagehas suffered greatly, especially to the extent that presidents have failed toachieve the promised goal.

Conclusion

The idea oí sovereignty was firmly entrenched in New Spain before in-dependence, but it became an elusive ideal afterwards. The source oí this

insecurity was the weakness oí Mexico's position in the contest between

imperial powers and Mexicos internal economic and cultural fragmenta-tion, a situation that made the construction of a central power difficult.

Passion and BanaIlty n Mexican fíistory

105 =

Although tli e unccrtaingV ot o,eic pntr vaa, mast keenly telt in the peri-

ods bctwccn 1821 and 18c and h,-neern 1910 and 1939, the cultural dy-

camics ehat wcrc unleash ed hv thca: tuxemirGes h ave bcen releva nt for

tire whol,> nl ,slexicos independent pistan

The thrcc strategics lar utn stnicct n:; thc presldcnt.al figure chas 1

have discussed originare and culminare in ditferent moments-all three

were routinlzed roto the presidencial otlice in che postrevolutionary era

Figure 4.11. General Porfirio Díaz presideole de la República para el período 1877-1880,

Gustavo Casasola Collection. Díaz as n war pero--a representaron reminiscent

of Santa Arenas self-fashioning strategy.

UNA LECCION DE PINTURA.EL BUEN MODELO.

1 - I il I'll Ili'llll'llllili^Pl]Lhl^ ^' ll „.:.^Ii11I!1llf

-E. erta eec proteXO enmendar mi esftlo.

Figure 4 .12. A Painting Lesson, El hijo del Ahuizote, July 31, 1887; Benson Collection,

University of Texas. A newspaper portrays the young President Díaz modeling

himself after Juárez . The virtues associated with Juárez are civilian (constitutional-

ism, civism , respect for che law , firm principies , intelligence , patriotism) and

Indian ( abnegation, modesty, constancy, discretion, and honesty). Díaz the war

hero had co copy some of these.

,,,\1,,,,a, History

Figure 4.13. Arc of Triumpb Erected in Honor of Porfirio Díaz Here miliitarism, indigenism,

and modernization are rolled into one. the construction of the are is a feat of engi-neering and architecture, a sign of rhe wealth produced by modernization, a nod

toward Europe, andan identifcation of Díaz as a savior, a soldier, and an Indian.

Nonetheless, representing the nation internally while maintaining an ade-quate externa) facade has been a chronic difficulty. The importante oí thenation's self-presentation to the externa] world, and the conflicts betweenche states needs in this regard and its connections to interna ) socialgroups, led to the invention oí a state theatcr that was often divorced fromthe quotidian practices of state rulo.

As a result oí this structural prob]em, moments oí governmental self-

presentation before foreign powers have buen vulnerable targets oí public

protest, as occurred during Díaz's centenary independence eelebrations in1910, before che Olympic Carnes in 1968, and on the day oí the inaugura-tion oí che North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enJanuary 1,

1994. Clashes between communitarian revivas oí che idea] oí sovereignty

and stiff and self-serving international presentations oí the state have

often been understood by analysts as manifestations oí what Victor Turner

Pnssion oid 13ana.ily in iltesican History

108 =

(1974) called "primary process" in his classical essay on Hidalgo's revolt.

These are moments in which the original idea oí sovereignty as a momentin which the Mexican nation would be free to construct its own destinyand to ]¡ve in fraternal bliss are revived. Nevertheless, these moments oícommunitarianism are always betrayed because the popular ideal oí sover-eignty has been a structural impossibility for Mexico. As a result, Mexican

history generates a characteristic combination oí passion and banality,

with long periods oí modernizing innovation being perceived, despitetheir novelty, as facade or farce, and short bursts oí unrealizable communi-

tarian nationalísms as the manifestations oí the true feelings oí the nation.

The martyrs that are generated in these moments oí primary process are

subsequently harnessed and appeals to their image are routinely made by

aspiring presidents and used as che blueprint by which to build a morestable political geography.

At the same time, this very strategy oí constructing a national center

by brokering modernity through the presidential office, and by nationaliz-

ing it through the cult oí martyrs and through the racialization oí the law,

is what has helped generate a national self-obsession. This obsession was

fostered to a large degree by che aspiration oí liberals and conservatives,

oí arielistas and indigenistas, to modernize selectively and to attain the prom-

ised modernity within a national framework. Arielista cosmopolitanism, thecosmopolitanism oí che statesman as the nations official internacionaltaster. is at the heart oí the preponderante oí the nation as an intellectualobject in Mexico. This cosmopolitanism, which sometimes conceives of

itself as provincial, has forged sagas oí national history that reach to che

Aztecs or to the Conquest for an understanding oí che qualities and prop-

erties oí the Mexican nation, but it is Mexico's persistent dismodernity

that generates this form oí self-knowledge.

Pa ssion and Baxality in Mexican History

109 =

5

Fissures in Contemporary Mexican Nationalism

Mexicans have been tormented with recurring modernizing fantasies and

aspirations ever since independence Dreanis of the nation wrestling with

the angel of progress have been especially haunting in moments oí pro-

found social change, such as those that are transpiring in Mexico today.

Worrisome symptoms of epochal cultural and social transformation

first carne to the attention oí the reading public in the mid-1980s. At that

tinte, many a social diagnostician thought that Mexico had contracted

"posttnodernity" and that its twisted historical trajecrory might at last have

hrought it to that vanguard that ends all vanguards (albeit in a disheveled

state). Nevertheless, Chis notion was soon corrected by Roger Bartra

(1987) who, having carefully analyzed Mexio's symptoms, came to the

sohering conclusion that, although indeed strange things were happening

regarding modernity in Mexico, diese might more aptly be described as

a particular form of dismodernity or, more playfully, as "dis-mothernism":

a mixture of a quite postmodern drsn odre (chaos) and continuing aspira-

tions to an unachieved modernity.

Unsatisfied with this state ot aflairs, M(xicos political parties and the

press soon nade the issue of modernity finto their central theme- In the

political realm, lor instante, democracy has received obsessive attention. It

has become a hegentonie idealogy. bringing rogether all parties, including

such unlikely democrais as iMexico's longtinte state party (the PRI) and

Mexicos traditional left. In the sphere of scientiflc and aeademie produc-

tion, the government has !mil, m cnted e1rae onian measures for nioderni-

zation, doggedly promoting standards o1 production and productivity

that are mcant to put Mexican science in liase with an international stan-

dard." Finally, in the economic realm, the idea of competing in global mar-

kets has gained enormous autliority, and it has ser-ved to justify the trans-

formation ot state en terp ri set that were run on a red istti butive ideology of

''national interest' and "social justice" into privately owned, competitive,

and, yes, "modern" businesses-

The confluente oí al] oí these changes and themes of public discussion

reflects, undoubtedly, the fact that Mexico entered yet a new phase of dis-

modernity in the past two decades. The 1982 debt crisis dealt a terrible

blow to the regime oí state-fostered national development, and the eco-

nomic arrangement that has emerged provoked an intense struggle for su-

premacy between diverse modernizing formulas. Those involved in this

contest continuously make appeals to various idealized national audi-

ences, but those audiences have themselves changed-In this chapter, 1 explore one aspect oí this transformation, which is the

relationship between national culture and modernity. Specifically, 1 dis-

cuss the ways in which national identity has changed from being a tool for

achieving modernity to being a marker of dismodernity and a form oí pro-

test against the most recent reorganization oí capitalist production. In the

process, both the substance and the social implications oí nationalism

have been deeply transformed.

The Telltale Naco

One phenomenon that helps to capture the changed relationship between

nationality, cultural modernity and modernization is the way in which the

connotations oí the term naco have changed in the past decades. Until

sometime in the mid-1970s, the terco naco, which is allegedly a contrac-

tion oí Totonaco, was used as a slur against Indians or, more generally,

against peasants or anyone who stood for the provincial backwardness

that Mexico was trying so hard to emerge out of. In the 1950s, Carlos

Fuentes described the nacos counterparts as "little Mexican girls .. -

blonde, sheathed in black and sure they were giving international tono to

the saddest unhappiest flea-bitten land in the world."' The naco, then, was

the uncultured and uncouth Indian who could only be redeemed through

an international culture

FI Sf U ICS i n ,tl osica n Na ti on a i,

110 = = 111 =

In the past twenty years, however, the connotations oí naco beganbreaking out oí their rustic conhnement to such a degree that naquismo

carne to be recognized as a characteristically urban aesthetic. Similar

processes have occurred elsewhere in Latin America, with tercos such ascholo in Peru and Bolivia, and mono in Ecuador. Resonating with the imag-ery oí colonial castas, che aestheiics of the uaco denote impurity, hybridity,and bricolage, but, aboye all, the more recent usage oí naco designates aspecial kind of kitsch.

The naco's kitsch is consideren vulgar because it incorporates aspira-

tions te progress and the material culture of modernity in imperfect and

partial ways. We recognize a form oí kitsch here because the naco is sup-

posed te feel moved by his own modernized image. So, for example, the

Haca is moved by the sopas in her living room and she seeks to preserve

their modernizing impact by coating them with plastic.

It is worth noting, however, that in defining naco in this new sense, the

category can no longer be confined or reduced to a single social sector or

class, because the kitsch oí modernization affects upper classes quite no-

ticeably, and 1 have in mind not only such outstanding naco monuments as

former Mexico City Chief oí Police Arturo Durazo's weekend house that

is known as "The Parthenon," but also many of the attitudes oí Mexico's

bourgeoisie, whose self-conscious fantasies are easily perceived in the do-

mestic architecture oí any rich post-[ 960 neighborhood.

The category of naco as modern kitsch is thus directly connected to an

idiom of distinction that appears to have lost its moorings in the indige-

nous and peasant world: it now targets that whole sector oí society that

silently sheds a tear oí delight while witnessing its own modernity. And it

is this self-consciousness, this unnaturalness oí the modern, that explains

the persistence oí a (derogatory) Indian brand, for, like the colonial

Indians, today's nacos have not fully internalized their redemption; they

are therefore unreliable moderns in the same way that Indians were un-

reliable Christians, and so the whole country is dyed with Indianness.

In addition to marking a kind oí kitsch, che epithet naco also connotes acertain lack oí distinction, or at least a lack oí hierarchy, between "high

culture" and its popular imitations. Specifically, naco can be used te desig-

nate an overassimilation oí television and oí the world oí capitalist com-

modities. It is an assimilation oí the imitation with no special regard for

the original. For example, forcign-sounding names such as "Velvet,"

"Christianson," and "Yuri" have proliferated in the past decades. One un-

usual but telling example is 'Madeinusa,' a name that was inspired by the

label "Made in USA" and that is used in Panama. Broadly speaking, these

Fissu res in Alex,can ;Valionaiism

112

names come from comic books, magazines , and soap operas, and they arerejected by anti-naco sectors, who are increasingly inclined to use namesfrom the Spanish Siglo de Oro (e.g., Rodrigo, María Fernanda) or from

the Aztec and Maya pantheons (e.g., Cuauhtémoc, Itzamnah, Xicoténcatl).This latter group sees the former as nacos, but one could also argue that

the distinction is rather one between closet nacos (modernizers who are

nevertheless worried about erasing historical distinctions between high

and low, foreign and national culture) and open or "popular" nacos, who

couldn't care less. This is recognized playfully by some in the distinction

between "Art-Naqueau," which is a more elite naco, and "Nac-Art," which

is based en commercial North American culture, a distinction that flags anelitization oí history. Whereas the popular naco hreaks with the weight oítradition (the mother is called Petra, the daughter is named Velvet), tradi-

tionalists try to appropriate History with its Rodrigos and Cuauhtémocs.

Thus we can distinguish between nacos who try to affiliate to the modern

vía the great national or Western narratives, and those who erase historyand simply luxuriate in modernization.

The popular nacos move toward the diminution oí the weight oí na-tional and Western history brings some problems to those non- or closet

nacos who depend to some degree on those histories. For example, in poli-tics certain new populist styles have debunked long-standing política¡

forms in Latín America, In La Paz, Bolivia, a highly "cholified" city, "Elcompadre Mendoza" and his sidekick, "La Cholita Remedios," DJs ofa popular radio station, have won important political posts. In Ecuador,former president Abdala Bucaram identified simultaneously with Batman,Jesus, and Hitler, while in Brasília, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, andLima presidents and ministers have protagonized intense melodramas-confrontations between spouses, rivalries between brothers, leve affairs

between cabinet members-that generate sympathies and antipathies thatthreaten to overshadow the significance oí the great narratives oí nationalpower. Thus the new vulgarity is at times a threat to traditional politicalforms, just as it can threaten traditional mechanisms oí class distinction,reducing the old elite to ever-narrower and culturally obsolete circles oí"oligarchs."

These threats to civilization are complemented by a growing horror

toward the masses, a situation that is attributable to the combined effects

of the lack oí respect for "distinction" involved in the new naquismo and the

tremendous growth oí urban unemployment and crime. The fear oí loot-

ing and oí armed robbery has a counterpoint at the leve] oí distinction:fear oí proletarianization and oí blending in with the "vulgar classes."

F,s,ures in Mexican Nationai,sm

113 =

Political seientists are scan<lalizcd hy e caes "IumpenpoliGes, eloset nacos

are scandalizcd by upen llrlios. and che gheist ut che Indian haunts America

once more not as e redeemed Indian hut a, al) incdeemahie Indian.

The emergente cal neto- tones ol chstinction that are evident in che

crarsformatun of che tate ory oi r n in 1ts e llange from a diseriminatoty

terco almed at peasants to a Iow-status aesthctics ot modernity that is

arguablv applicahle to che vast maionty of che urban population, is symp-

tomatie of a proeess of deep cultural cham;,e in Nlexican national spaee.

Until recently, nationality liad lucen e nicehanism lar modernization-

I his identification emerged as early as clic wats ol independence, when

ideologues such as Carlos María Bustamante placed che blame for the eco-

nomie backwardness of Mexico at che leer of Spanish colonialism, and

progress was neatly associated with nacional sovereignty and freedom.

Moreover, che idenfilication between nationality and cultural modernity

was strongly fortified in the aftermath of che 1910-20 revolution, when

the state intervened actively to chape a lay, modero citizenry out oí

Mexico's agravian classes. This proeess was to be achieved through educa-

tion and economie redistribution, through land and books," as one agrarista

from Michoacán put it.'' The result of chis would he, according to presi-

dent Lázaro Cárdenas's well-known formulation, not to Indianize Mexico,

but to transfonn Indians finto Mcxicans.

Accordingly, the old usage of nrtco marked peasants and other tradi-

tional peoples and practicas as Indian," that is, as not yet fully Mexican.

The new usage, contrarily, marks Mcxicans on the whole as not fully at

home in modernity. Nationality and national culture are no longer che

vehicle oí modernity; they are che lingering mark oí dismodernity.

Understanding the Background. i''vlodentily and Citrzenship onderlmport

Substitution Lcdustrializatíon and in ihe Neoliberal Era

The crisis of nationalism iir che current era has to be understood against

che backdrop oí Mexico's regime of import suhstitution industrialization

(ISI), which lasted roughly from 1940 m 1982 That era oí intense mod-

ernization developed under the aegis oí a one-party system that was ideo-

logically founded en revolutionary nationalism. The public sphere was

largely centered in Mexico City, where institutional spaces were carved

out for intellectuals to interpret "national sentiment" on che basis oí highly

ritualized political manifestations hy social groups that had little direct ac-

cess to che media of national representa tion and debate 3

Fr ssurrs t u. ',IeL ,.t,. v'e dona 1'1m

114 =

1

This whole system ol ritualized mobilizations, segmented spheres oí

political discussion, and intellectuals with privileged access to clic media

was complemented by the once ntested power of arbitration and interven-

tion oí the nacional iresident who became a much-sanctified figure

[ti Chis respect, clic ene percy regime that was ir che hcight oí power

during ISI can be seco as a retashioning of the colonial system oí political

representation, when the viceroy was the highcst arbitrator and political

expressi ocas were channelcd roto che ritual life ol various corporations

Ocae major difference hctween the two systems, however, was that diere

was only a very incipient public sphcre in che colonial period: the press

was stringently controlled and void of all political commentary, the uni-

versity had no autonomy, there was no national parliament, and the

Inquisition still stood as a symbol oí state vigilante over belief and expres-

sion. Moreover, the colonial system was premodern in that it was dogged-

ly determined to prevent the separation between public morality, science,

and art.On che other hand, neither can it be said that national society in the

postrevolutionary era was unflinchingly modern, for although there was a

public sphere in the Habermasian sense, che forums for discussion and

che citizens that they included were a very restricted proportion oí the

population.Moreover, although Mexico had effectively achieved a separation be-

tween church and state by 1930, it had not achieved a separation between

politics, science, and art. Instead, both art and science were fostered under

the patriarchal umbrella oí the protectionist state, and were ultimately

confined by it. Scientific production in Mexico has thrived disproportion-

ately at its public universities, especially the national university, which

until recently produced about 70 percent oí Mexico's scientific output.

On the other hand, policy making in Mexican state institutions has not al-

ways held scientific production at che forefront oí its preoccupations: edu-

cation has been too deeply associated with state-fostered mobility, and

sound scientific policies have at times been eschewed in favor oí using the

educational apparatus as a mechanism oí redistribution. A similar sort oí

argument can be made for state policies in financing che arts. Few Mexican

intellectuals have escaped che ensuing ambivalente toward the revolution-

ary state.

At the regional level, until che 1970s Mexican culture was constituted

out oí a dialectic between che capital, which was both the center oí na-

tional power and che paradigmatic center of modernity, and various sorts

oí provinces. Incorporation to modernity meant incorporation to state

Flssu res In Mexican Natiocaulisrn

= 115

institutions, especially schools, and knowledge and culture found their clí-

max in Mexico City. This led to a simplilied view oí the provinces as a

homogeneous bedrock of tradition and backwardness, a feeling that is

summed up in the famous maxim: Fuera de México, todo es Cuauhtitlán"(Outside of Mexico City, there is nothing but Cuauhtitláns),

In fact, however, Mexican regions were spatially fragmented into a

complex system oí localities and classes with concomitantly rich idioms oí

distinction between them-I have called the ways of lile oí these spatially

fragmented classes "intimare tintures-" Abstractly stated, regional cultures

were made up oí combinations oí agrarian and industrial classes. The

agrarian classes comprised peasant villagers, day laborees, cowboys, and

ranchers, and each oí these had regional peculiarities and various degrees

oí prominente in each region. On the other hand, the period oí ISI was

also a time of accelerated urban growth and oí migration from rural set-

tings to cities, giving cities a strong presente oí peasant folk, many oí

whom returned to their villages at least for fiesta days and became activetransformers of village social lile as weIl

The entry into a new phase in social and cultural history can be traced

to severa] sources, including (1) urbanization and new industrial poles oí

development outside oí Mexico City-most notably on or near the U.S.

border; (2) the consolidation of television and the telephone in the na-

tional space (which can be dated tu around 1970); and (3) the 1982 debt

crisis and the corresponding end oí the regime oí import substitution in-

dustrialization and oí models for self-sustained growth. These changes

radically altered the regional organization oí production-including cul-

tural production-as well as the government's place in the modernizingproject.

The reduction oí the role of the state in the economy led to govern-

mental attempts to divest from its tormer role in science, education, and

art: public universities found thcir budgets strangled; Televisa, the prívate

television giant, stepped up its role in "high culture," filling part oí the

void that the government was leaving behind by building a major modern-

art museum, consolidating its cultural TV channel, and creating strong

links with one oí Mexicu's two main "intellectual groups."s

On the other hand, because oí the government's will to maintain party

hegemony and the social system's acknowledged reliance on both higher

education and research, the government tound that it could not afford

simply tu abandon its ties to intellectuals, and so it developed new forms oí

patronage For restricted groups oí artists and scientists. Thus, state divest-

ment left most intellectuals dependent on Televisa and other corporate

Fissurrs in Aleen.' " N's dona l i sm

= 116 =

investors, or on highly exclusive and specially targeted governmental

scholarship programs. The status of scientists and artists as social groups

was undermined. In chis way, intellectuals benefited from some decen-

tralization and a bit more autonomy oí cultural production from the state,

at the cost oí impoverishment and reduction oí the size oí the community

of cultural producers, and a significant takeover oí this arca by privatemonopolies.

At the level oí regional cultures, rural localities became less tied to

their historical regions. Increasing dependence on industrial commodities,

and agite modes oí communication (the telephone and TV), have substan-

tially simplified what had until now been spatially quite intricate nested

hierarchies oí productively and commercially interdependent localities,and television plus the urban experience have served to instate a more

standardized idiom oí distinction in the regions. This latter aspect some-times provokes a feeling of homogenization and oí cultural loss: the in-

creased social role oí industrialized commodities, standardized and publi-cized by a monopolized medium (TV).

In sum, in the era oí ISI, Mexico was made up oí a complex and differ-entiated set oí cultural regions. The state had a pivotal role in fostering in-dustrialization and in creating che institutional framework for a nationalcitizenry, and these two processes were intimately reeated. The state as

educator, as employer, as provider oí social security, oí agricultural credits,

or oí housing subsidies was the main modernizing agent. Becoming a fully

fledged citizen, unencumbered by conflicting loyalties to native commu-nities, was thus a sigo oí modernity.

In the past few decades, however, the mass media has created forms oí

transregional communication that circumvent governmental institutionsand that transcend their unifying power. For example, since Carlos Salinas's

presidential campaign (1988), television stars were used as a main draw to

attain public attendance at his rallies. On the other hand, the withdrawal

oí the state as a primary employer, and its constrained sponsorship oí intel-

lectuals, artists, and journalists, serve to sever the identity that had existed

hetween citizenship and modernity. More recently, opposition parties

such as the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) have used tele-

vision and movie stars as successful candidates for congress.

Consumption , Recycling, and the Resilience of National Identity

Given this general context , forms oí consumption have become perhapsthe single most important signs oí the modern, and recycling is one oí the

Fi ssu res u Alex,can Na tlonalfsm

= 117 =

maro signs 11111 dion]s ot distincti un It is usehd tu distinguiste between

stracegics ot staggered dise ibution that are designed co underline degrees

of separation ron] the holy (rail ol che sr,-c alled international standard or

tashion and recve Ing propei st h,eh involves cranstorming the use of a

standardized iteni 1aperopriatiun resistan[ e (>r atfirmation ot ditterence).

In che first category we hace as examples the distribution oí films,

which is spatially ordered in sueh a way that the hlms chat mark higher

status are sereened in che Uniteri States lirst then in lancier Mexico City

theaters and ni a lew provincial capitals and ttnally in thc popular cine-

mas. It is also evident in che phenomenon of dumping' in the tashion

industry -where prestigious brand, are mimlcked with cheap imitations-

or in software, where piracy prevalls and few people own manuals co their

(often slightly outdated or virus-intected) programs. On the whole, the

distribution oí brand names and goods places Mexicans slightly off the

cutting edge oí international consumption.

In contrast co this form oí staggered distribution recycling involves

improvisation: using generic instruments lar fixing the big brand names or,

more drastically, using produces for entirely different aims [han they were

designed for: plastic bags as plant pots, a hroken-down refrigerator as a

trunk for storage, and so on The prevalence oí both oí these forros of dis-

tribution and recycling invades the whole country with a sense oí second-

classness. This feeling is menacing to most political elites, including as-

piring oppositional groups, and they correspondingly develop forms oí

distinction that stand against Americanization and turn either to Europe

or inward (to the hacendado, to che urban notable, to the Aztec lord) for

inspiration. In Chis way, various local and nacional elites can obviate a des-

tiny oí becoming a middle-class periphery of Houston.

In Spanish, there is a saying, "Más vale cabeza de ratón que cola de

león" (I'd rather be the head oí a mouse than the tail oí a lion). People who

are interested in asserting leadership need co construct themselves as

being at the head oí a community wich a degree oí sovereignty; they can-

not simply be the lower-middle cog in a system oí distinction that has its

capital ¡Ti some corporate headquarcers in Atlanta, and this situation re-

inforces the legitimacy of state-protected monopolies and political pre-

rogatives that Mexican elites, and lo some extent Mexican citizens, hace

always had in therr country, thereby pitting nationalism against a globaliz-

ing forro oí modernization.

This lame problem can also be gleaned kom another anglo. One char-acteristic oí Mexico's modernity has been the persiscent reproduccion oívast social classes that are not fully incorporated into modero forms oí

work the resilienee oí che pcasantry the ubiquitous presence oí personal

servants for che middle and upper classes, the vas[ urban class of semi

employed." political control over [hese seccors. whose direct dependence

on specific capitalists has o!ten been unstable, was until recently achieved

through corruption.Corruption worked in two importan[ ways: first, specific state institu-

rions were appropriated bv nidividuals who took charge oí dispensing re-

sources and repressing dissenters: second. corruption tended to reinforce

or creare a corporate structure both beeause it involved consolidating ae-

eess co work via the mediauon of a politiiea! leader, and because policiical

leaders legitimated their position to superiors and subordinates by way oí

various political rituals that involved come redistribution. Thus, modern

Mexico prolonged the haroque tradition oí popular representation in a

spatially intricate fiesta system.

In the current moment, however, Chis system has undergone serious

strains. The retrenchment oí government has hegun to erode the commu-

nitarian framework that was ultimately the referent oí these various rituals.

For example, local village factions used to strive for gaining the PRI nomi-

nation to therr municipal presidencies. The fact that the struggle occurred

within a single party signified that local village factions acknowledged the

encompassment of the village as a whole by both the state governor and

the national presiden[ (both oí whom always belonged to the PRI). This

tacit recognition oí encompassment helped consolidare an idiom oí vil-

lage unity that was expressed in the inclusiveness oí village fiestas.

The contraction oí national government has meant giving up some

party control over Chis hierarchy, and it will certainly mean giving most oí

it up in the near future. Village factions today are often funneled into sepa-

rare political parties This multipartisanship may well strain some oí the

communitarian ideologies and rituals in national space. For example,

when che late Fidel Velázquez, perennial leader oí the officialist con-

federation oí unions called the CTM (Confederación de Trabajadores

Mexicanos), announced that, for the first time, the CTM would not carry

out a Labor Day parade en May 1, 1995, unions and people sympathizing

with the opposition participated in a-now uncontrolled-demonstration,

that was widely interpreted as a rift between state and nation.

Thus the incapacity oí the new state to funnel employment, and its

concomitant difficulty in securing key ritual spaces, added to the severity oí

the current economic crisis, creating an image oí a state that is controlled

by and used for the benefit of a [hin and unpopular Americanizing elite that

is overlain on a popular, Mexican nation. This image is unquestionably

F . ....... A I e , . e : A a b o n a l i s o , F , s s a res ,, mcx,c an Nnbonalrsm

= 118 = = 119 =

new (although it has historical precedenes) and threatening. Corruption

today appears as a more individualistic phenomenon than it was in the

past: instead oí being a system that had che president at its apex and

worked smoothly down from there, today higher officials are seen as plun-

derers who do not share with a broad base oí supporters. The connection

between corruption and corporate ritual is not as pervasive now as it was

in che ¡SI period, leading to an image oí a schism between people and

state, Whereas the image oí the pyramid was a root metaphor for Mexican

society in the period oí ISI, today the elite is often portrayed as a techno-cratic crust that is increasingly out oí touch with society.'

In sum, the two logics oí distribution-staggered distribution and re-

cycling-both tend to reaffirm che incorporation oí Mexico into a system

oí distinction that has its capital in the United States. However, this same

fact generates two forms oí nationalism to counter it; one comes from the

recyclers and the other from al] manner of political leaders. Recyclers af-

firm difference from the international market simply by existing. Politicians

need to affirm nacional difference in order to place themselves at the apex

oí the various levels oí an imagined national community.

On che other hand, the capacity of political leaders to portray them-

selves as sitting at the apex oí a cultural and political community has been

seriously eroded by transformation in the economic system, whose con-

traction has led to democratization and to a reduction oí state sponsorship

oí communitartan rituals. As a result, the pyramidal imagery that was typi-

cal oí revolutionary nationalism has heen replaced by various images oí

che political elite as a free-floating crust of predators This makes theiridentification with the nation problematic.

Nationalísm and the International Standard

So far 1 have described a situation in which demands for che extension oí

che benefits oí modernization and modernity have expanded to all levels

oí the regional system, while contradictions have emerged between these

decires (whose pulsating vitality is evident in the ebullience oí naco aes-

thetics) and the very limited response froni state institutions that have

heen retreating from their roles as providers. In this context, there is much

ambivalente regarding che so-called international standard: free trade

means producing for an international market and competing inter-

nationally, so that any Mexican product, sports hero, artist, or scientist

who can compete internationally risks being transformed into a metonym

oí Mexico's idealized place in a commoditized world oí equals. Thus che

Fis su res in Mrxlcan Nniionalism

120 =

"international standard" achieves a status akin to that oí truth for scíence'competing internationally is the ultimate legitimation7

On the other hand, much oí che country's population, which grew and

developed under the systemic logic oí import substitution cannot easily

reach this standard, and this population seeks che protection oí the stateagainst the global market, while it asserts che value oí local cultural forms,traditions, and producís. There is thus a cultural dialectic between accep-tance and rejection oí globalization that is obvious in che ambivalent posi-

tion oí naquismo: enthusiasm for modernity and a (sometimes involuntary)assertion oí the individuals eccentricity.

From a spatial perspective, this dialectic implies a change in the places

and contexts in which nationalism is deployed. Whereas nationalism under

ISI was the hegemonic idiom oí the state, an idiom that was appealed to innegotiating local political demands but that was less relevant in the day-to-day reality oí production and consumption, nationalism emerges today asa quotidian question that is deployed in connection to issues oí work and

of consumption Whereas under ISI there was only one dominant form oí

nationalism, and it was predicated en the teachings oí the Mexican Revo-

lution and had the national state, personified in che president oí the repub-

lic, as its ultimate locus, today there are two forms oí nationalism, one that

sees reaching full modernization and che rule oí the international standard

as the ultimate patriotic end, and another that insists en the intrinsic superi-ority oí local products and traditions and that sees che neoliberal state ashaving traded its patriotic legacy for a bowl oí U.S.-made porridge.

The first form of nationalism requires a credible bid to enter a North

American economic community in order to survive. The feasibility oí thistoday is questionable because oí both Mexico's economic crisis and a na-tionalist backlash against NAFTA and against Mexican migrants in theUnited States, The second form oí nationalism has not yet devised a politi-cal formula that can simultaneously work in a contested democratic fieldand provide the kind oí state protection that revolutionary nationalismonce offered.

Conclusion

The transformation in che logic oí capital accumulation and in the role of

the state in the economy has had a counterpoint at the level oí cultural pro-

duction in national space. Changes at this level include (1) a reduction of

the cultural independence oí provincial and Mexico City upper classes and

a standardization oí idioms oí distinction through mass consumption; (2) a

Fistures in Mexican Nationalis

121

eontraction oí state sponsois hlp ol scicnec and art and a concomitant

growth in the control ()ver those seo tors br a untple ot industrial groups,

i 31 a relative decline oí NIccico (io as the uncontested center of national

modernit . 'i a neo- bardo ovci thr- runtcnis ot nationah s ni that spills in lo

the ways in w h ieh tia nsfonna ti uns in the se tete ot production a nd in coi) -

sumption hahits are embraced oi rejcctcd, 51 a breakdown in the regional

ehain oí corruption and controllcd poltieal ritual that has transfonned the

imagos with which tic governnncnt is portraycd from a pyramidal meta-

phoi lo vatious imagos oí pa ras i tism. ani(¡ i tr, a divisiun between those who

recyele witbotrt regard ro the status detinitions of mass consum ption and

those who do their utmost lo be in the hrst cycles oí consumption.

AII oí this adds up to a serious crisis in the politics oí nationalism.

Under the protectionist revolutionary state, nationalism and modernity

carne in the same package, today nationalism can serve as a counter to

globalization. However, the hopes of using the state effectively as an

alternative route to modernity llave not bcen renovated with ideas that

make it seem more viable than the model that was already tried and ex-

hausted or than failed attempts to foster socialism in one (dismodern)

state. On the other hand, neolibcral politicians have not succeeded in re-

formulating Mexican nationalism in a way that preserves the sense that

the nation has its own interna) system of value production. As a result, the

opposition between state and nation, between a "deep Mexico" and a com-

mercial, international, and super6eially modernizing elite, emerges as a

common image oí the national situatiion.

Politically, these dialectics of nationalism and national culture do not

hold positive promise. Mexico is currently condemned to continue being

a nation-state for a while, given the United States' ever more militant

resolve to patrol its borders and control intmtgration. As long as current

aspirations to modernity go unquestioned and unanalyzed, and as long as

new formulas for state intervention in a modernizing project are not in-

vented, the future looms darkly, one oí economic decline and unresolvable

political divisions.

The spatial analysis oí the cultural dialectics oí modernity/dismodernity

that 1 have presented here is a necessary stop for envisioning alternatives,

and could be particularly usef ul en two levels- in the elaboration oí possible

alternative narratives for the nation that are in line with its best real pos-

sibilities; and in understanding che cultural implications oí the geography

of modernity, thereby helping to specify the sorts of social and political

demands that are truly relevant in the refonnulation oí political programs,

beyond ourcurrentideologicalhankruptcy

P A R T 1 1

G e o g r a phies of

the Public Sph ere

122

6

Natíonalism 's Dirty Linen:

"Contact Zones" and the Topography

ot National Identity

The production of knowledge, the narrative strategies, and the psychology

of colonial and postcolonial relations have been the topic of a body of writ-

ing that has come to be known in the anglophone world as "postcolonial

theory." Within this broad field, there is an arca of sociological inquiry that

is of central importance, which is the systemic aspect of national identity

production. Until recently, nationalist narratives were predominant, and

they portrayed national identity and national consciousness as processes

of "self-awakening " National identity was portrayed as emerging out of a

dialectic that was interna) to the national community.

In the past couple oí decades, this approach has itself been shown to

be an instrument of national identity production. Instead of looking for

the secret of national identity within the "soul" or "spirit" of each nation,

contemporary analysts have looked at the history of nationalism as an as-

pect of transnational relations. Local innovations to nationalist imagery,

discourse, and technique are communicated between politicians, experts,

and intellectuals the world over, in a complex history that leads to the

standardization of various strands of nationalism. This history implicates

scientific theories and measurements, narrative strategies in fiction and

nonfiction, and aesthetic solutions to shaping the national image in art, ar-chitecture, and urban planning. 1

= 125 =

National identity has thus hcrn Tishowto he fashioned in transnational

nctworks cal specialists, intelleeuials and pulitieians. many of whom pro-

veed to eover thcir tracks and te cell ihcir tales as it they were strictly local

nventions 1lorcover che denial ut interdci^cndency hetween nations has

been shows to have a varíete c't pu,írtiea] ises Thtu. intelleetuals from

colonized arcas have criticized che unes in which their countries material

and intellectual contri butions have lacen appropriated bv the great pow-

ers, whose nationalism js thus casii\ icientilied with rationality" and °eivi-

Iizanoll l'he nationalism ui we ak nations e as a result, in eonstant need

of self-assertion, arad it tends to mino, che nationalism of che great powers

by claiming independent or prior invention ol c ivilization for i tself 2

The shift Irom interna¡ accounts of che origins of national identity to

accounts that understand nationalism as a cultural product that is generat-

ed in a web oí transnational connections is thus oí great consequence.

Nevertheless, this development has nos yet provided all oí the elements

that are required for a systematic account ol che contexts in which nation-

al identity actually emerges. Nacionalism, as Benedict Anderson argued,

is not a coherent ideology, hut rather a broad cultural frame in which a

variety oí contradictory claims are made' We know that states put forth

their proposais for a national image and inaplement them in schools, muse-

ums, and public squares, but ay which points, in which social relations, is

national identity pertinent, underlincd, or referred to by other actors?

It is quite easy to produce lists of disparate contexts and relationships

in which nacional identity "naturally" emerges: in the exclusion oí an up-

wardly mobile urban Aymara teenager from an afternoon social by her

"white" Bolivian classmates; in the negotiation oí a business deal in broken

English; or in the film that features an exotic woman who is made to repre-

sent the bounties oí her country to potencial foreign investors ... The list

oí identity-productog social relationships Is limidess, and placing its di-

verse items in the Trame oí a broader política¡ economy is a challenge. 1

seek here to put order in the various sorts of contexts in which national

identity "naturally" emerges. The master is of some importante to the gen-

eral project of this book, which js to understand the conditions for the

production oí "Mexico" as a polity, as national identity, and as national

culture.

These conditions have often been precarious.^ Like many peripheral

nations, Mexico emerged as the result of che collapse oí an empire more

than because oí an overwhelming popular desjre for national indepen-

dence. Nationaljsm was thus nos widely shared at che time oí che national

revolutions. Moreover, like most Spanlsh-Amerjcan countries, Mexico

Na bona li, m '. D!riy Liten

126 =

achieved statehood long before as territory was bound together in a "na-

tional marker" or by a "national bourgeoisie." As a result, the territorial

consolidation of the country mas a long, eonflict-ridden process involving

secessions, annexations. civil wats, and forcign jnterventions. National

consolidation carne hall a centup alter independenc e. and was still called

roto question on severa¡ late, occasioos- As a result, understandi ng the

process of identity formation in Mexico is both a historical and a socio-

logical challenge_ It is a historical challenge because jt has been such an

uneven and differentiared process. Ir is sodologically demanding because

identjdes are always relational; che specihication of che relationships that

generate national identity ¡mphies a sociology of national identity.

The case is thus a paradigmatic context for what 1 have called "ground-

ed theory": the confrontation oí a historical and a political problem that

requires sociological innovation The theoretical requirement here is con-

strained by che historical object (Mexico), an object that is generally be-

lieved to be provincial. The knowledge that stems from that which is

provincial is usually thought to be parochial and prosaic. As opposed to

England, France, Germany, or the United States, the Latín American

countries have generally not been held up to be che cradle oí anything in

particular that is oí world-historical significance.s Moreover, even Latín

Americás status as "Western" or "non-Western" is ambiguous, and it thus

falls short in providing a radical sense oí alterity for Europeans. Thus, the

continent has not usually been cast in the role that "the Orient," Africa, or

Oceania have played in che Western imaginary-at least it has not often

done so for the past couple oí centuries. Mexico and Latín America have

much more often been portrayed by Europeans and Americans as "back-

ward" than as radically different.6On a theoretical plane che, continent would thus appear to be destined

to play Sancho Panza to the North Atlantic's Don Quixote: not a radical

other, but rather a common, backward, and yet pragmatic and resourceful

companion. An inferior with a point oí view. A repository oí customs and

relations past, where universalizing theories that were built Lo explain

world-historical phenomena are constantly applied, and yet are often too

high and disengaged from ininiediate interese Even now, when the very

notion oí a historical vanguard has been so thoroughly questioned, the so-

cial thought emerging from these provinces is soniewhat cumbersome

when it is put to work elsewhere, usually requiring further extension and

translation. "Grounded theory" is a kind oí theory that fijes more like a

chicken than a hawk.

My aim in this chapter is to propose a simple generative principie for

Na i ie r : a Í i, n Ls Dirty Linen

= 127 =

national identity production in peripheral postcolonial societies. From

this general principie 1 derive four classes of social dynamics that generate

particular frames oí identity production. Each oí these is discussed and il-lustrated with historical examples from Mexico.

National Identity in tbe World System (Sand)o's Lersion)

Weak national communities adrift in the international system constantly

run the risk oí indecent exposure, of involuntarily revealing the tenuousconnections between national imagery and everyday practice. Quite

simply, a country's weakness in the internacional system undermines the

basic tenets oí modero nationalism and thereby calls national identity intoquestion_ These basic principies are, first, that the nacional state is a vehicle

for the modernization oí a people that shares a set oí values and traditions;

second, that this process of modernization chiefly serves the interests oí

national community and not those of foreigners; and thed, that national-ism is a sign oí progressive modernity and not oí backwardness. The pe-

ripheral postcolonial condition poses constanr chalienges to the most fun-

damental dogmas oí nationalism. This is my general structural principie.Te this we should add one general historical principie, which is that

peripheral nations generally develop in a forcefield that is shaped by two

contradictory impulses: che desire to appropriate for the nation the power

and might oí the empires that they have broken away from, and the im-

pulse to shape modero national comnwniues based en an idealized bond

oí fraternity between citizens. These two impulses can be thought oí as a

tension between liberalism and ("internar:' colonialism, a tension that isheightened by weakness in che international arena. Maintaining the sys-

rem oí interna) differences inherited froni the colonial world, the hier-

archical differences oí race, sex, and ethniciry that are used to organize ex-ploitation can he seco as antagonistic to the ideal of the nation- a chargethat can be levied not only by the lower classes oí the country, but also

by foreigners, who can use the charge to raise their own claims. It is in

relation to these principies that one can develop a sociology and a topog-

raphy of the frames of identity production in which national identity isgenerated.

National Identity

Our subject is the interactions that generate an awareness of differences oíascription among actors, contacts between actors who identify as "nation-

Nn ti"un l^sre ', Diriy Linera

= 128 =

al" in contrast to others who are portrayed as "foreign_" This specification

is necessary because many contacts between persons, or between persons

and objects that represent other persons, are not marked in this way, evenwhen differences in nationality exist,

The ongoing implementation oí "neoliberal" policies in Mexico, for ex-

ample, has led some people to "foreignize" the government officials who

have furthered these policies. From their point oí view, neoliberal officials

are serving the interests oí U.S.-controlled institutions such as the

International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and they are following

teachings oí their equally American professors at Harvard, Chicago,

Stanford, or MIT When this powerful movement oí reform began, how-

ever, there were a number oí intellectuals and politicians who had been

calling for a "return" te the liberal policies oí Benito Juárez and Sebastián

Lerdo de Tejada, Mexican nacional heroes oí the nineteenth century The

same set oí policies and relationships were "indigenized" by sume and

marked "foreign" by others_ Thus "neoiiberalism" in Mexico is an ideologi-

cal tendency that involves questions oí national identity for some, and not

for others. For a cultural contact to be considered under the definition that

interests us here, it must serve to construct a difference in national identitybetween actors.

Frames of Contact

The concept oí "contact frame" refers tu the relational contexts in which

national identity production occurs. We can identify classes or types oí

such contexts from the dynamics oí nation building and transnational

interactions that can be isolated en the analytic plane. Contact trames

are thus the minimal analytic units oí a vast topography oí national

identity. For example, there is an entire class oí contact frames that is

produced by the logic oí commodity production and consumption

under capitalism, which is an international system that national commu-

nities can never completely encompass or regulate: a shop that sells for-

eign goods in La Paz, Bolivia, is called "Miamicito" (and so provides a

frame that marks both the foreignness of its wares and the nationality oí

its customers); during the 1970s, the Latin American left referred to

Coca-Cola as "the sewage" (las aguas negras) oí Yankee imperialism, and

thereby framed its distribution and consumption as so many episodes in

the national struggle. We shall identify severa) such classes oí contactframes.

Nai,onnlism's Dirty Linera

= 129 =

"(onfacf ZonrC ve d tbe Ti^pog n^pi>y ol ;Valiou,il Id rntily

¡Ti traditional gu>gnpha diem is n diste nr tittn hetteeen the coneept oí

"zone ° ian 1nternal ly huno eeiie us sp le e a,el 7egion " thc functional in-

tegradot of chtterenc kinds'' -1 1nt1 - hall cal] ara iTi te rnal ly homo-

geneous class of contact franxs a Id, 1 -.J1 C unmct iones are integrated

finto a broadcr "regiod' ol national identity production that includes a

zone ol state institutions that delirae r^ghts vid obligations tor citizens and

produce intagcs and narratives tal n:^tionali-c and iones oí local and class

identity production ihat are egoalle t r [ti,_! 1 bus contact iones are parí

of the region uf nacional identity production which is che national space,

complete with che cultural production ol clic state and the interna ] idioms

oí distinction that give shape co national culture. These national spaces

are, in therr curn , part of a global system of identity production. A ty-

pology oí zones oí contact hice the one see are proposing here thus forms

part oí a hroader project , which can be conceived oí as a topography oí

national identity.

In Chis chapter 1 distinguish among loen classes of trames oí contact in

che topography oí national identity . Thev are generated by (1) che mate-

rial culture of capitalism ; ( 2) che ideologica1 tension between tradition and

modernity that is necessary to che tounding oí nation-states ; ( 3) the en-

tropy of moderni zacion , which is intrinsie to che development process;

and (4) che ínternational field of ideas and models oí civilization , science,

and development that forros parí oí what could be called the civilizing

horizon oí nation - states 1 now describe each oí these trames oí contact

using Mexican examples in order to understand how che contact frame

challenges the stability oí national regimes

International Business and Intjorted Material Culto re

The tour types oí contact zones that 1 discuss are abstractly related to an

intrinsic quality ot nation-states. they are political communities within a

world system ot communities , but they are part of in economy that can-

not be contained by national boiders This quality of nation-states means

that economic modernization ( and ics agents ) can generate spaces oí

national identification and confronration . This is especially che case in

1 peripheral " nations , for which technol ogical innovation and capital often

come from abroad- In these contexts espeeially, consuming commodities

or adopting productive techniques ol foreign origin can be understood in

relation to nacional identity

1 D: r ly

130 =

Por example , ir wc look at che history of Mexico, a number oí anti-

foreign manitestacions hace eentered on commerce- anti-Spanish senti-

ment in che first repuhlic id to the sacking of Mexico City 's Parián

Market in 1828 This in turra preceded che expulsion of che Spaniards,

who only eight years earlicr liad been proclaimcd to be fellow Mexieans

by the triumphant leaders of independence Sonic oí the most acutely

xenophobic movements in Mexican history associate foreigners' suppos-

edly pernicious influence with thcir position as husi ncssmen . This was true

of che anti-Chinese movements in Sonora during che revolucion and of

lournalists complaints againsr itinerant commerce hy lews and Arabs in

Mexico City during the 1930s Morcover , there are numerous occasions

when che products themselves have been seen as transporting a pernicious

foreign influence . Thus, much oí che activity oí the interior ministry's cen-

sorship commissions in che 1950s and 1960s was geared to chis. For years

tírese commissions were in charge oí censoring comics, films, and other

products oí mass culture when it was judged that they conspired against

basic Mexican values . In other words , anti-Spanish , anti-Semitic, anti-

Chinese, and anti-American discourses have been constructed around the

space oí comnierce and iniported material culture."

This is significan [ because the causes oí cach oí [hese xenophobic

movements were in fact different from each other The anti - Spanish

movement at che dawn oí the republican era was related to the competi-

tion between England and che United States for political hegemony in

Mexico and to power struggles between local parties ; che anti-Chinese

riots were spurred en by menibers oí regional political elites who saw the

Chinese as easy cargets; the identification oí itinerant commerce as "for-

eign" in che 1920s and 1930s was a strategy to diminish an activity that

affected established businesses . Despite these different motivations, how-

ever , the identification oí foreign businessmen and products as a danger to

national integrity is a viable political argument because they do not con-

form co Mexican national customs and interests.

In the 1920s and 1930s , che Mexican press emphasized that the trade

in narcotics in Mexico's northern states was in che hands oí foreign-

ers: Chinese , Americans , and Russians . Vice was being brought in from

abroad. During the Díaz Ordaz presidency in the 1960s , an attempt was

made to restrict che importation oí films and records that promoted the

hippies ' "effeminate decadence ." Díaz Ordaz 's crusade against American

pop culture went hand in hand with his repression oí a number oí middle-

class social movements . More recently , a proposal before Congress sought

to bao the carteen show Beavis and Butthead from Mexican television

Na iion a ls Dirty Linera

131

because it perverted the nations values, especially as regards proper ado-Iescent behavior.»

International business constantly produces national identity because

businessmen can be credihly portrayed as furthering foreign or private

interesas at the expense of the national community. Also, the exogenous

material culture oí modernization can be perceived as corrupting morais

or subverting che ruling forms of cultural distinction that can easily be

nationalized. Thus, the fact that national communities do not successfully

encompass and control the national economy generates a zone oí contact

that is manifested in an open-ended number of contact frames. In each oí

these frames, a social actor identifies a producr oran agent as foreign" and

as opposed to the "national" collective interest This way oí framing the

national interest usually advances more particular interests that are un-

named and fused into the national collective

Tbe Tension between Tradition and Moderniiy

The second type oí contact zone arises From the very logic oí nationalismas an ideological construct It is known that , in different ways , nationalismdepends en ideological constructs that tic tradition" to " modernity." Thisdependency is necessary because modero nation - states are supposed to bevehicles for che modernization oí collectivities ( nations ) that are, in theirturn , defined in a genealogical relation to a "tradition ." 10 This ideal rela-tionship can be precarious , however, especially in the case oí weakernations . When national tradition is perceived to be divorced from or op-posed to modernization , a contact zone emerges.

In Mexico, postindependence nationalism appropriated the pre-

Hispanic world in a way analogous to che Furopean appropriation oí clas-sical antiquity , but with a twist . The Aztccs were the forerunners oí in-dependent Mexico ; the colonial period was a parenthesis that served tobring Christianity and certain traits oí civilization , but it also barbarouslydegraded the condition oí the indigenous peoples . Therefore , in principie,the glorification of che pre-Hispanic past did not imply claims en behalf

oí che contemporaneous Indians because their habits and condition were

seen to be the result oí colonial degradation Thus, in the early postinde-pendent era , modernization could readily be made tu trample over indige-

nous traditions without challenging national identity , The same was nottrue , however , with respect to che preservation oí Catholicism and oí anumber oí che mores oí the Spanish colonial worid.

Thus, modernization in che tirst half oi che nineteenth century pro-

Na tiona 1i s rn s L),r iy Line

132=

duced deep rifts between national versions, une oí which sought to pre-

serve the Catholic and Hispanicist traditions, while the other sought to

found nationality squarely on liberal principies, and was fervently anti-

Spanish and anticlerical. These two nacional versions even honored two

distinct heroes oí independence and two different dates for national in-

dependence." Each side accused the other oí lack oí patriotism and oícollusion with foreign interests.

This situation changed with che end oí the civil wars that followed the

French intervention (1867), a peace that involved a pragmatic arrange-

ment between liberal and conservative factions under a universally ac-

knowledged liberal hegemony. The peace also allowed Mexico to make a

concerted effort to galo international respect and to attract foreign invest-

ment. This involved dispiaying the individuality oí its culture to foreign-

ers, an aim that was more readily achieved with tequila than with whiskey

and with indigenous buipils before manufactured shirts. Since that time,

the official construction oí tradition necessarily visited certain features oí

Mexico's rural and artisan life, not only the pre-Columbian past.

At the same time, the relationship that the state was trying to createbetween tradition and modernity continued to hold. In some cases, the

existence oí a "Mexican tradition" made it possible for Mexico to claim a

particular modernity, but it never denied the nation-state's fundamental

and eternal aspiration: modernity and modernization.12 Therefore, the

great official points oí pride couid not and still cannot reside principally in

the world called "traditional": the modern must be granted a privileged

place in the national utopia. Thus, some oí the crown jewels oí Mexican

state nationalism have been President Santa Anna's theater, Emperor

Maximilian's boulevards, Don Porfirio's trains, Lázaro Cárdenas's national-ized petroleum industry, Miguel Alemán's Acapulco and the NationalUniversity campus, López Mateos's National Museum oí Anthropology,

Díaz Ordaz's subway and Olympics, and Echeverría's highways, Cancún,

and nationalized industries. Oí these examples, the National Museum oí

Anthropology is exemplary in that it combines traditional aesthetics with

an avant-garde architecture that relies heavily on state-of-the-art tech-

nology. In this formulation, tradition is like the country's spiritual dimen-

sien, which is incorporated as an aesthetic into a unique modernity that isthe country's present and, aboye all, its future.

However, Mexico's position as a relativeiy peor country in the inter-

national order threatened the ideal relationship that nationalism con-

structs between tradition and modernity, making it into a fissure whereiones oí transnational contact could endanger that very nationalism.

Na tton a lism 's Dirty Line,,

= 133=

Touris ts, ti av elers. ucientists and othci inyuuitive foreigners llave gen-

erally tended to roen rowarci thc triditiona111,11 sector, and ver rhe states ca-

pacity tu get visitors to apprcc rat, che allegeel conneetion hetween che

tradicional and che niodern has a lseavs bcen lim,tu el . For example El te

Lolov describes thc history c,l iht hippie movement in Mexico as a case ol

cultural producrion in thu curnt, i ot transnational communication.

Antong his sources Zolov cites tire PI ¡[r> Guiáe to Alexico travel guide,

which llegan to be publishcd in che 19(,0, espeeielly for eountereultural

tourists. In its hcvdav, Chis hool: served t, oricnt die hippie ro counter-

cultural pilgi image centers and to nvaid Indico with otficial Mexico. In a

passage dedicated to the problems that hippies suffer when they cross the

border, for example, the guide points out thar, tu beat che system, "we

look like sniall town teachers or collcge students from che early Sixties

[when we cross] - . The bordee ofhcials lave it""

In Chis case, che foreign visiror is disguising herself as rhe Mexican gov-

ernments ideal of an American visitoi a clean-cut student or teacher eager

ro visir the Mexico that the government was interested in exhibiting.

Once Chis tourist crossed rhe bordee, however, she presumably removed

her bra, put che beads back un. and ibera moved across the national terri-

rory with greater interest in Mexic is "hackward" arcas and more suspicion

oí as "progressive" sector than was desirable.

The contact frames that tomism and scienrific srudy open up between

che traditional and modero worlds had their first problematic moments

long before thc hippie movement. The U.S. and European travelers who

carne to Mexico in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s frequently felt more at-

tracted to che rural, indigenous world than ro che modern, urban one,

which generally was less modern than their own cides. However, at that

time che attraction that rhe foreign intellectual felt for the indigenous

world went hand in hand with rhe states own renewed interest in identify-

ing with that world- rhe Mexican Revolution had reconfigured the ties be-

tween che indigenous and modern worlds in some respects. Also, even

many ofhcial Mexican indigenistas ot rhe penad trequently sought inspira-

tren for che modern in the indigenous. '' On che other hand, as che revolu-

tionary order hecame more routinized and Mexico entered a modernizing

era with ever more tenuous tres tu rhe agrarian and popular world oí the

revolution, the relationship with che traditional world became more pro-

pagandistic, and foreign visitors' and intellectuals' lack oí interest in mod-

crn Mexico could become irritating.

The counterculrural hippie movement was rhe niost conflictive mo-ment in tire recent history of chis contad zone because it coincided with a

phase of national development spurred by a strong, closed state that want-

ed ro transform che country's position on rhe international scene While

President Díaz Ordaz sought tu show che world a Mexico that was ca-

pable oi hosting che Olympics-a Mexico with a recently inaugurated

subway system, an Olympic village built expressly tor rhe event. and an

architecturally impressive new gym, pool, and sradium-a number of

people who rejected the labor and very idea of progress looked for mush-

rooms in Huauda, walked aromad in peasant sandals and changed che

very image oí Mexican youth

The contact zone that inverts che hierarchy oí tradiniion and modernity

also touches the history of anrhropology. This discipline's fieldwork

methodology made middle- and upper-class Mexicans and foreigners privi-

lege che peasant over che local schoolteacher or the village merchant.

Anchropological fieldwork gave cultural authority lo people who in their

own regions had been disdained or even silenced for their supposed back-

wardness, a practice that world be repeated and reinforced by travelers

who were attracted to Mexico's indigenous people and peasantry.

The search for the aurhentic, in both science and travel, sometimes in-

verted che scale oí prestige; by showing little interest in Mexicos modero

sector, travelers interested in authenticity exposed its lack oí distinctive-

ness. The sector that was paraded internally as che vanguard and latest cry

oí modernity was oid hat to che foreigner. By revealing rhat the country

was not on the cutting edge oí modernity and by nonetheless exalting its

traditional sector, foreign visitors and scientists could destabilize the ideal

relationship between tradition and modernity that is so essential to all na-

tionalism. Thus foreigners in che traditional world generare a contact zone

that produces nationalist reactions.

The famous educator José Vasconcelos discussed the politics oí chis

contact zone in his autobiography, in which he describes his childhood on

che Mexico-U.S. bordee. Vasconcelos recounts that, as a Mexican child

who crossed roto che United States every day to go lo school, he was im-

pressed by the fact that che U.S. school textbooks shared his sympathy

with Mexican Indians and rejected che Spaniards. As an adult, however,

Vasconcelos viewed che love that Americans professed for the Mexican

Indian as a thinly veiled desire to replace che Mexican Creole with an

American. By denying che ties between Mexico's modernizing elite and its

indigenous traditions, che country was defenseless against U.S. imperial-

ism." Other active agents in this contact zone do not necessarily seek tu

strengthen an imperial center against Mexico's government and officiai

. A ' D L ri en Na clon e l sm'c Di riy Lineo

13-1 = 135 =

culture. However, these agents can create doubts about che government'seffleaey or even che legitimacy of its modernizing goals.

The Disorder of Modernization

Modernization as we have seen repeacedly. is critica) to che legitimation oí

che nacional state. When modernizarion desrroys an aspect oí the status quo

that can be claimed as a nacional tradition, a contact zone emerges in which

che modernizing agent is assimilated wirh foreignness." When traditional

sectors oí the country are portrayed by foreigners as more accomplished

than the modern sector, or as being in an unhealthy competition with it, a

contact zone emerges- There is yet a third related source oí nacional iden-

tity production, which is the entropy of modernization. Our third type oí

contaet zone is generated by the difficulties that nationalists face when the

disorder that is produced by modernization is exposed. In order to under-

stand che contours oí chis contaet zone, wc need to review che place that

modernizing projeccs have in che cultural production oí che state.

The culture that states produce has diverse purposes. On one hand is

what Arjun Appadurai has called the "ethnographic state."1e This is che

form oí state cultural production that describes che national population-

which is che alleged subject oí che state--by manufacturing censuses,

questionnaires, histories, and statstics. Alongside the ethnographic state

is che "modernizing state"-the form of nificial cultural production that

seeks to ]ay out the task oí development Once "che population" is de-

scribed, che ethnographic state's scales and measures serve to define lacks

or scarcities such as "poverty,"'illiteracy," and "unhealthy conditions," as

well as a series of growth- and progress-oriented measures that define theefficacy oí governments.'7

Together wirh these two aspeccs of state cultural production is a third,

which is che production oí che councrys image for both international and

domestic consumption. This includes cultural production for attracting

tourism, internacional sports events, international congresses, national

museums, television scations, and schools- All institutions that are present-

ad as national dedicate at leas[ come effort to shaping or conforming to

che national image. A fundamental difficulty for Chis third aspect oí state

cultural production is that the national image is not at al] easy to manage.

Erving Goffman's cheacrical mecaphor of ' front stage" and `backstage`describes che relationship between a subject's public presentation andwhat he or she wants to hiele or proteet_18 -1-he state production of nation-alism seeks to construct spaces where che official image oí che national

N a t i o n a L: m U: r y L i n e e

13Fi =

takes material form and can be displayed to insiders and outsiders; that is,

states seek to create a "front stage" (public) image characterized by an

ideal combination oí modero and traditional components. They usually

seek to show a booming country that marches inexorably toward progressand modernity.

However, the very creation oí this public image leaves disorder in its

wake: che history of tourism is che supreme example oí chis. In Mexico,

Cuernavaca was probably che first modero tourist destination, developed

during che 1920s and 1930s. Cuernavaca's main attraction was its stupen-

dous climate, its proximity to Mexico City, and che fact that both the na-tion's jefe supremo, Don Plutarco Elías Calles, and the U.S. ambassador,

Dwight Morrow, built residentes there. This attracted both che Mexican

political class and an important contingent oí American retirees. In addi-

tion to che climate was che Casino de la Selva, which offered distractions

to tourists who might otherwise get bored by che quaint and che pictur-

esque. However, che casino was also seen as a bad influence en che popu-

lation, presenting an undesirable image oí Mexico as a place where for-

eigners could shed che moral strictures they faced in their own countries.

Reflecting on chis, Presiden[ Lázaro Cárdenas judged that che casino cre-

ated undesirable frames oí contaet a form oí tourism based on che promo-tion oí public vices.

The "ugly" side of tourism is not easy to mor out, however, and around

tourist centers che differences between foreign tourists and national work-

ers in terms oí their consumption and purchasing power became apparent.

Therefore, beginning wirh Acapulco and continuing wirh Cancún, Ixtapa,

and others, che cides constructed for tourism are "twin cities": a "front

stage" coas[ and hotel zone is exposed to rhe tourist, and "backstage"

zones combine poverty, prostitution, and so on. This relationship be-

tween che presentable side and its hidden consequences makes a number

oí politically volatile frames oí contact possible. For example, in her work

on prostitution in Mexico City during che 1920s and 1930s, Katherine

Bliss describes che discussion that took place in che capital eity govern-

ment about che creation oí a red-light district near the La Merced market.

The neighbors organized to protest against che project. Among their ar-

guments was that the red-light district should not be authorized because it

would be located on che mute between the Mexico City internacional air-

port and downtown, and so would be one oí che first images that visitorswould have oí che city.'v

In the lame way that a housewife fries to make sure that her visitors

stay in che parlor and do not see che mess in che bedrooms or kitchen, che

National ; s nl 's Dirty Linera137 =

goventnrent. tuurist adoso \. and a yund number ol patriots seek tu dis-

play an mergo of urdo and clc:uil.ness to lcrvigncrs, and the strain in -

volved in riese etlorts easilV turras ini, a peliucal iiahiliiv. In a 191(1 essay

orlad I.os dos patriousmns 1ic i r') patnoti>msi. Luis Cabrera, who

svould he one c,d the principal idcr...,gucs ^l tic ,Mexican Revolution, de-

scribed bote tic Purlirian elite ccrganized a spcctaeular celebiation of the

independence centennial tor tire bunetit mainly oí toreign investors. The

tesdvities wcrc so concemad w.th managin tic national image thai when

a ragged group o( women s.orkeis orgamzed ihcirown eelebratory mareh,

it was brutally dispersad be the police. fhc natumal image is diftlcult ro

control, not only because it is difficult to keep the ragged workers from

the view oí the investors, but also because rhe very occasion of a national

show is a tempting occasion for union leaders tu display them. A better-

known exampie oí a similar polirical conrext is the violente oí the Mexican

'68, which was ried to upholding rhe national image during rhe Olympics.

Indeed, President Díaz Ordaz and ihe antisrudent social sectors spoke in-

sistently of evil foreign infiuences that goaded rhe innocent Mexican stu-

dent: only a foreigner would seek to sully Nlexicos public image before

rhe worldOther cases, such as the bordee cides oi norrhern Mexico, present the

lame probleni in a more toutinc fashion- These cities are all part of

bicephalous urban sets often calied "twins," though if they are twins they

are clearly of rhe fraternal kind, because, even though they develop in tan-

dem with one another, they are not ideorical one parí oí the urban zone is

located in the United States and rhe other in Mexico. The relationship be-

tween rhe Mexican and U5. parts of the urban border zone has not been

symmetrical, but rather symbioric and in many senses rhe cides en the

Mexican side have generally been a "backstage" for rhe U.S. cides. The

Mexican border town's prosperity has depended en abortion clinies, di-

vorce lawyers, judges, bars, prostitutas, sweatshops, garbage dumps, and

so ora. The fact that Mexican cides constirute the backstage oí U.S. cities

threatens nationalism's fou idational credo: nioderniry is for the nation's

own benefit and not for foreign outsiders.

The Trames of contact created he the entropy of modernization can

generare extreme nationalist reacrions. 'l la was rhe case in Cuba, whererhe image of Havana as a brothd seas ara important morivation for manyrevoludonaries to risa against die Batista regime. In rhe case oí Mexico's

northern border, rhe very conLept u( a °border zone," whieh for manyyears occupied a marginal position tr'ith res peer to the rest oí rhe country,

was supposed to resolve the contradictions of this contact zonc. The in-

habitants of that liminal zonc wcrc said tu have a dubious sense oí belong-

ing or even ot loyalty to tic country, a faer that was reflected in their

impuro pocho language zoor- suit clothing, and other marks of cultural ini-

purity Controlling rhe "border zone" proved to he impossible for rhe

.Mexican govern ni ent. however and the incorpora tico ot ever-greater pro-

portions ot Mexico into rhe backstage" of US economic interests has

been an inexorable process. Peasant villages from al] over the country

have been turned into rhe seasonal equivalent of dormitory com mun ities

whose inhahitants traed to work in inferior conditions. as 'illegal mi-

grants,' in the United States, while rnagtiiladora assembly plants can now

set up shop un any porrion ol rhe territory Cultural impurity can no

longer be contained at tic border, and the dark sido of modernization is

harderto hide than ever.

The Scientific Horizon as a Contad Frante

The final type oí contact exists because nation-states are supposed to

march togetber toward progress Without this ideal, there would be no ob-

session with national history, because modero history as we know it is

only understood in tercos of rhe dogma oí progress. The universal impor-

tance that al] nation-states atcribute to progress implies that there is al-

ways a civilizing horizon or vanguard oí progress on the international

level. This civilizing horizon is identified in tercos oí technological devel-

opment, scientific advances, and rhe techniques used to govern the popu-

lation. The civilizing horizon serves tu measure a country's individual

progress as well as different countries' relative progress The parameters

used tend to be produced in countries with robust cultural and scientific

infrastructures. Therefore, science, art, and fashion can destabilize the na-

tion's dominant models.

The recent work oí Alexandra Stern en Mexican eugenics provides a

good example oí the ways in which scientific development constitutes

a zone oí contact.20 Between 1920 and 1950, a number oí medical doctors

and anthropologists participated in international eugenics congresses,

read international journals in that discipline, and formulated ideas about

the Mexican racial and genetic inheritance. Their work served two ends:

un rhe one hand, it strengthened the "mestizophilic" Mexican Revolution's

antiracist argumenta; ora rhe other hand, it tended to characterize Mexico's

various poor populations (from rural Indians to urban workers) as compara-

tively dehcient. Eugenics' racial relativism (each race was supposed to be

adapted to a specific environment and so was in some respects superior,

N a l i o , i a li> ni , Uir1y Linen

139 =

and in others inferior, to the restl and its simultaneous characterization of

the Mexican majority in terms of a series of relative lacks offered hope for

eventual equality between Mexico and European peoples. It also offered

ample justification for a kind oí "interna] colonialism" Eugenics offered a

way to objecrify and quantify dilterences between poor Mexicans and

ideal nornis represented by clic elite This in turra permitted the state's de-

velopment mission to be detined, while clic peor national majority could

remain scientifically deva]ued. Ar rhe same time, the potential uses oí race

science to undercut che imagined potential of Mexico's "halfbreed" race is

well known and was always a potential liabi]ity for the nationalists.

The introduction oí new ideas and theories ahvays presents challenges

and opportunities to governments and Yo processes oí national identity

formation. The ideas oí "scientihc socialism" allowed opposition move-

ments like the guerrilla movenient led by Genaro Vázquez in southern

Mexico in clic 1960s to refer ro die Mexican governnient as the "dis-

government' and to propose a series of demands to che state in name not

on]y oí Marx and Lenin, but also in that oí thc heroes oí national indepen-

dence. The monetarist ideas oí clic Chicago school oí economics allowed

a group oí technicians ro take control of che Mexican state, accuse the

previous governing elite oí backwardness, and describe the Mexican state

as "obese." The scientific ideas of Darwin Freud, and Marx were at the

center oí a schism in the Mexican educacional establishment in che 1920s

and 1930s, and they were used tu rethink nationality. The Lamarckian

notion that acquired characrerisrics are inherited Ied some members oí the

Porfirian elite ro advoeate an aggressive policy of European immigration

before reforming che Indian rhrough education.

Each oí these movements has liad implications for national identity

and the precepts of nationalism_ The scientific contact frame produced by

the international civilizing horizon destabilizes dominant formulas oí

nationality and good government, it presents growth opportunities for

certain sectors and threatens others.

Reflections ora the Four Types of Coni acl Zoiies

1 have identified four types oí contact zones AII are related to the nexosbetween modernization and nationalism as it develops in weak or periph-eral nations . In che first case, there is a contact zone created by the in-stances in which foreign business concerns or imports unsettle local ar-rangements or mores , This is a zone that may appear whenever there aretechnological innovations , changes in che inrensity of foreign investment,

A'a ti ona l., m , Di r;y Li raen

140

or interna] political facuonalism that can profit from assimilating economic

competitors to foreignness.

The second and third types of contact zones are produced by the diffi-

culties that weak nations Nave in managing the national image. The sec-

ond emerges as a result oí the comparative weakness oí these nation's

modern sector. This situation al]ows foreigners or opponents to the domi-

nant nationalist scheme to attribute greater value to the "backward" than

to che "modern" sector, and even to portray che modero sector as antago-

nistic to tradition, and therefore as failing to develop a trae or successful

nationalism. The third type oí contact zones emerges as a result oí the dif-

ficulty that these same governments face in controlling clic modernization

process, and in successfully sweeping the adverse aspects oí moderniza-tion under the carpet.

The fourth type oí contact zone is produced by the instability that is

generated by che (international) civilizing horizon. This contact zone,

which is produced through che mediation oí scientists, professionals, and

artists, can destabilize the national image by portraying it as old-fashioned

and out oí tune with modernization. Conversely, nationalists can try to re-

ject a deve]opment in these fields by portraying it as alien to che national

interest, to che national aesthetic, or to custom, Like each oí the other

contact zones, this fourth type lends itself to shrewd political usage and

can respond equally to interna] factionalism and to important changes

emerging from abroad.

1 have extended Mary Louise Pratt's term contact zone to refer to trans-

nacional spaces oí national identity formation." As we have seen, however,

the concept oí "zone" implies a geography oí regions: a zone is a kind oí

place within a system oí functionally related places. What position do

these contact zones occupy in a broader geographyz The Trames oí con-

tact that we have analyzed are relationships that emerge from che tension

between che nation-state as a certain type oí political and cultural commu-

nity and the fact that modernization neither begins nor ends in such a

community. This fact is problematic for nationalism because nation-states

are erected as forms oí social organization for coordinating moderniza-

tion: zones oí contact with che rransnational dimension oí capitalism and

progress can therefore cali roto question sorne oí che basic precepts oí any

particular nationalism. Moreover, che very process oí shaping and extend-

ing nationalism opens a country up to foreign interesas and forms oí con-

sumption that can undermine che nationalism that made room for them.

This is the case with frames oí contact that open up because oí the rela-

tionship that nationalism postulares between tradition and modernity. This

Na t,o,a1,sm 's Dirty Line

141 =

rel aci onship rxisted becau,c co, h t ountrv tones part of in interna ti onal

avstem antl sn must inain a sensc ('1 ,pccilit it, tAlorcover, in che case ot

poste olonial ur b q ckwartI c ountrics nacional mingo)ante is ni ore readily

builc out of their tndittonai „^ tuna thar their modera sector,. In che

Mexican case it has proved ca,ier ttu t unstn.ct a nacional singularity on the

oasis of pulque ¡ol k dancing wov en or;tpc. and bce1 tacos than on the hasis oí

whiskey, rock rol], tuxedos and French aiisine even when the latter may

alto be local producís At the sanie ti;ne thc dencificatlon of che nations

sutil with che traditional world and its bode seith che macicen world is an un-

stable formularon because cho seorld callctl traditional" persists as under-

devclopment and in a series of relationships of domination that are gener-

ally understood te) be continuotis with colonial domination. Foreigners

pursue their own relationships witIi those modcrn and traditional worlds,

creating a zone of contact that can challenge nationalist narratives.

In addition, 1 showed that the scenic prescntation oí national achieve-

nients mobilizes resources that can ¡Ti tara spoil the presentation. Just as

Brasilia, the model city of Brazilian modernity, provided the material con-

ditions for che growth of shantytowns that could never enibody che

supreme rationality of nationality, so were al] che great tourist projects and

grand international macroprojccts boro with their own dirty twins, On

che other hand, even che most avant-gardc example oí national modernity

ages , thus creating new challenges to national identity and the state.22

In each oí tírese cases, contact tones frame relationships in which che

logic of national development clashes with che transttational logic oí mod-

ernization, and they exist because che production and consumption oí

commodities is a transnational process, because people can cross national

borders for work or recreation, and because there is an international hori-

zon oí scientific and technological progress. Therefore, contact zones are

border arcas between the logic oí the nation-state and capitalist progress

that exist within che national space.

Condusion

1 conclude with some thoughts on che iniplications that diese Trames oí

contact have for che construction of interna] frontiers between social

groups in che national framework. It is clear enough that frames oí contact

created by commercial and tourist relationships, labor migration, and sci-

entific and artistic production produce instabiIity in che interna] forms oí

social distincrion. This instability is rcilecccd both in fashion cycles and in

the reeonfiguration and reproduction of social classes.

Nntiun.i Ii t Si I)uity Lite,;

142 =

For example, when che Mexican state assigned iisclf clic task oí mod-

cinizing, national elites unniediately took on thc cosinopolitan role par

excellence they were clic Quicial agcnts oí forcign contact hecause their

patriotism, their resourccs and their educated tate gave them greater

access te thc civilizing honzun. 11111, clic comprador elites" oí Mexicos

nineteenth ccntury inhabited a contact zone that ideally served to dis-

criminare hetween the aspccts oí modernity that were desirable and those

that were undesirable co che naton_ l heir maturity and special role gave

them license to fashions and affectations that thcy would then try to bar

from general consumptton in their countries C )nly a strong cultural elite

could design the ticket that a weak and backward country needed to be

allowed into the "concert of nations"

However, Mexican elites have not aIways been able to maintain a privi-

leged position in the arca oí foreign contacts. The migrant who manages

to become the owner oí an auto-repair shop in Los Angeles can return to

bis village with more money, prestige, and knowIedge oí the modero than

che old political boss there. An Indian from Zinacantán, Chiapas, may

converse more extensively and gain more information from an American

anthropologist than the mestizo rancher who oppresses him. Moreover,

the spectacular growth oí the middle class in che second half oí the twen-

tieth century also made che political brokerage oí the "civilizing horizon"

increasingly difficult to sustain. Thus, neither che government nor the po-

litical claes has full control over the national image.

Here, it seems to me, is a key to understanding the interna) dynamic oí

the frontiers oí social distinction, and even oí violente. A social move-

ment that can cast doubts en che national image may become the object

oí state violence. At times, violente explodes when a group whose mem-

bers had been designated as part oí che nation's traditional residue prefers

to shape its own separate political community and paths to progress.

Violente also erupts when che state insists on controlling spaces where

there is little possibility of establishing the ideal order in a permanent

fashion but where the ideal order must nonetheless be asserted. This is the

case oí violence against itinerant commerce or against Ilegal housing set-

tlements. It is also occasionally deployed against social movements that

governments cannot assimilate as properly national because they conspire

against the country's public image. This is the case oí much oí che repres-

sion against youth subcultures.

We cannot conclude from these examples, however, that patrolling the

national image is only che contera oí the government, oí political classes,

or oí other elites, for these sanre contact zones are also used to denounce

Nn oci a alisen ', 1)irty Linera

143 =

sectors oí these very elites as strangers to the national community. Thus,

elite-directed attempts to change mores and social practice can be targeted

and ridiculed as Americanized, Francophile, Jewish, or Oriental. Attempts

to professionalize che state bureaucracy have ar times been portrayed as

"technocratic" reforms, and therefore as Aniericanizing. Criticism oí new

forms of consumption, such as lasr-food chains or brand fetishism, areother common examples.

On the political plane, rhe Porfirian cultural elite, the científicos who had

such a key historical role in shaping Mexico's nacional image, was por-

trayed by Mexico's revolutionaries as foreign. Marxist parties during the

Cold War portrayed the Mexican government as a pawn oí US. interests,

Harvard-trained President Carlos Salinas was often compared to the

national traitor Santa Anna alter che tal¡ oí che peso in 1995. These denun-

ciations are thus used both in che construction oí difference and in theorganization of political opposition_

Nation builders try to fashion che national image the same way that

people build a house. Starting with che most modero materials and designs

at their disposal, they want to have diverse, functionally and hierarchical-

ly organized interior spaces, including spaces for exhibition to whoever

comes in from outside AII this is ideally governed by the political equiva-

lent oí a paterfamilias who seeks rhe entire lamily's orderly modernization

and regulares contacts between his home and the outside world, However,

national architecture and space do not have che stability oí a house and

che government lacks a patriarch's security because the nation's internal

order is always warped by transfcrmations in the conditions oí pro-

duction, consumption, and communication Therefore, nationalism's dirty

finen can be exposed by the exploited stepdaughter, the disinherited son,

or che affronted mother if there is a window-a contact frame-that per-

mits them to do so. This relative openness and permeability oí national

space becomes a dynamic facror in che production oí fashions and distinc-

tions, but iris also the roor oí xenophuhia and violente.

Naiionnli^u , Diriy Line

144 =

7

Ritual , Rumor, and Corruption

in the Formation of Mexican Polities

This chapter provides a perspective en the connections between ritual and

polity in Mexico. Evidently, constructing even the roughest map oí this

relationship is a daunting task, both empirically and conceptually. Never-

theless, as che number oí historical and anthropological studies oí ritual

and politics grows, so roo does the peed to construct various organizingperspectives.' 1 shall propuse such a vantage point here by exploring the

historical connections between various sorts oí rituals and che devel-

opment oí a nationally articulated public sphere. My ultimate goal is to

clarify the connection between political ritual and che constitution of po-litical communities in che national space.

In order to carry out chis aim, 1 propuse a fine oí historical and spatial

inquiry that is driven by a set oí methodological and theoretical innova-

tions that may be summarized as follows, First, 1 hypothesize a complex

relationship between che existente oí aneas oí free political discussion and

the centrality oí political ritual as an arena where political decisions are

negotiated and enacted. At any given local level, the relationship between

public discussion and ritual is negative: ritual substitutes for discussion and

vice versa. However, when une sees the relationship in an integrated

national space, che relationship can be complementary: localized political

rituals become che stuff from which a (restricted) nationally relevant public

145 =

sphere dcnves t6 legitimar ^ Sea ond. 1 p i ipocc a few chava, teristi es of the

gcographs ot public sphcies 'in tht plural cmphasizing thc fact that

ci vic discussion in Mesico has br cu sepincntcd along class and regional

mes. and that thc sonso idation 'a: national puhlic opinion has always

hcen an pruhlcmati<- aran r. fhiid 1 post ibat thc ucaoon ot a nacional

puhlic sphcrc in dhis spatially scgmcnied liuld ot opinion and discussion

nvnlvcs creating mechanisms ior piivilcgcd iiucipretations ot a dtffuse

popular v ill 1 therciorc cxplorc thr relatr'nship hetwecn political ritual,

rumor and thc di amati_ation ui :ntcrests 1inally, 1 argue that

there is a general iclationship betsrcc n politieal ritual and localized appro-

priations ol state institutions (cunruptiuii Che expansion oí state institu-

tions is historically linked to thc contlicting dcmands oí antagonistic local

groups, a factor that strengthens the importanee of ritual, oí festivities,

and of the redistrihutive actions that are associated with them. As a result,

there is a connection between loo ring the bill of these rituals and the ways

in which state instl tutions are appropriated The ineeption and growth oí

state institutions involves the production uf ritual, so the patrons oí these

rituals have a degree oí control over thc local branches of those institutions,

Locating Public Spberes

Fran4ois Xavier Guerra has painred a portrait of Mexico's nineteenth cen-

rury in which he maintains that Mexico's tradicional political and social or-

ganization was leh without a political ideology and program to support it

alter independence- Without the monarchy, the nation's regions, its politi-

cal bosses and clients, its corporate indigenous communities, hacendados,

and retainers had to create or accommodate to a system oí political repre-

sentation that was in theory based on equal individual rights.2

Thus an idealized national community was shaped by an elite made up

oí military leaders, hacendados, miners, merchants, and intellectuals whose

discussions occurred in insti tutional forums provided by Freemasonry, by

che development oí a commercial press, by a few urban literary and scien-

tific institutes, and in salons and social gatherings (tertulias)- This elite was

the national public opinion that mattered, and its ideas and ideals were

formally nationalized in institutions such as Congress, the supreme court,

and the national presidency

As a resulr, there was considerable distante betwecn what oceurred in

the national public sphere that was shaped by the opinion oí these men oí

substance and the way in which popular intereso were actually interpreted

and dealt with by thc government. For example, Porhrio Díaz maintained

Ri we1, I^u mc a 3J t or, upiion

.tó =

a remarkable , continuous , prívate correspondence with all of Iris governors

and some jefes políticas and local notables In this corres pondenee, regional

issues were frankly discussed , instructions were received, and suggestions

were provided _ Governo rs would in their tu rn , ineet with representatives

of what Guerra calls the principal collective actors of their regions rep-

resentatives of villages , jefes poi lícos, heads oí elite families of hacendados,

merchants , and miners , and they would engage in closed - door discussions

that paralleled those that had been carried out with Díaz . Finally, these

leaders would institute the new policies-

Thus, public opinion seas constructed almost exclusively by elites, and

there was no open nacional or regional forum for civic discussion during

the porfiriato (or, a fortiori , in any oí the previous regimes ). On the other

hand, the various collective actors whose leaders were hrought together in

closed-door discussions also had their own local forms and forums oí com-

munication , some oí which involved free public discussion and some oí

which did not , and the criterio oí inclusion in these foroms were also di-

verse and not always hased en citizenship . This is why it is necessary to

speak oí public spberes ( in the plural).

Overview of Mexican Public Spberes

Mexican cities in the preindustrial age had as their main collective actors

local urban elites (merchants, miners, hacendados, church authorities,

civil and military authorities), artisanal guilds, and petty merchants, Indian

community members, andan urban rabble that at times acted collectively

but had no official corporate status , In rural arcas , major relevant collec-

tive actors for Chis early period included textile workers and miners, in-

habitants oí haciendas and oí ranches, and inhabitants of peasant commu-

nities. Most oí these collectivities were organized in the religious plane in

cofradías (sodalities for the cult oí saints) and were also visible as collectivi-

ties in the period's best-attended events, such as bullfights, the entrada oí a

viceroy, archbishop, alcalde mayor, or priest, or major religious festivities.3

Participation in these cofradías provided occasions to discuss the inter-

nar affairs oí the collective actors. This is probably the cause of the occa-

sional conflicts that emerged between local authorities and slave and black

cofradías, and oí colonial regulations regarding the place and time when

these brotherhoods could meet-4 The organization around the cult oí each

collective actor's patron saint also allowed discussion and expression oí

collective interests within each of those groups.

Colonial society offered no political arena in which discussions could

Ritual, Rumor , and Corrup lion

147

be publicized and broadened, so each group depended on the crown's jus-

tice. Direct arbitration, added to investiigative political reporting (climax-

ing in the famous visitas), was crucial- Newspapers, which were introduced

in the 1720s, did not become a Iorum for public discussion until the late

eighteenth century, and then discussions were limited to scientific and

technical questions. For the most parí, newspapers provided short infor-

mation briefs en the ritual life of che city, glorifying the political life of the

colony (for years, each issue of the Gaceta de México began with a short

biographical note on a past viccroy or archbishop), and occasionally an-

nouncing major international events (battles won in Europe, ships coming

in and out of Veracruz and Acapulco) -

In short, collectivities were represented in the ritual life of the king-

dom but their problems were not examined in a national forum of public

opinion. Instead, collectivities relied on the crown's justice and en its re-

spect for acquired and traditional rights and prerogatives (usos y costumbres)or, at best, on some discussion and debate of these rights in the towncouncil.

Each of these corporate groups was nade up of networks of families,

friends, neighbors, patrons, clienu, and allies. These networks have gen-

erally not been characterized in communicative terms by free dialogue

and discussion.

Elite families, for example, have been known to gather hundreds of

members in family rituals and to construct complex webs of communiea-

tion within these large groups. Yet, most uf these familia) decisions and

debates could not be raid to occur democratically because members do

not confer in an unrestricted fashion. lnstead, discussion occurs in a hier-

archical framework: women and men argue in different ways and places,

and there are rules of seniority and significant status differentials between

major power holders and weaker family members, who are systematically

inhibited from participating in discussion. Thus there is a rich ritual lile in

elite families, where che results ot complex negotiations, alliances, and de-

cisions are displayed, but these do not add up to an "open" forum of public

discussion, Instead, familia) ritual and communicative practice are more

akin as a decision-making process to what Habermas called "representa-

tive publicity," that is, public representation of the whole en the basis of

hierarchical status, and not as the result of free internal discussions

The same conclusion applies to the typically smaller kindred of peas-

ants, workers, artisans, and small merchants: we see significant familia)

rituals, strong channels of information, and opinions coming from all mem-

bers of the family, but only 1imited intrafamil ial discussion by members as

Rl i,,ai, Rumor. and Lovupiian

1.18 =

equals. Instead, information and opinions are weighed by powerful family

members who make up their minds and impose their decisions.°

Of the main agrarian collective actors (hacienda and ranch dwellers,mine and obraje textile workers, and peasant communities), only peasantvillages developed institutionalized local public spheres. Unions were

prohibited in haciendas, factories, and mines, and the fact that hacienda

workers often lived en the land of the owners limited upen discussion be-

tween members of those collectivities. Instead, discussion was informal,with no forum to focos collectively en a single issue and to sound out a

collective will. Dsscussion among equals operated as rumor, while public

lile was dominated by ritual and by centrally controlled forms of publicity.

In most peasant communities, in contrast, we have both a ritualized

display of community and a public sphere based en discussion and delib-

eration. This public sphere has had various forms, with institutions such as

town meetings, meetings of thejuntas de mejoras, the Lion's Club, or the aso-ciaciones de padres de familia serving as forums of discussion. Discrimination

by sex in these forums varíes and has received little systematic attention

from either anthropologists or historians7 Although my impression is that

they are usually dominated by men, there is also plenty of female partici-

pation, and many key instantes where women are the central players.s But

it must be noted that, in addition to the various community-wide fomms,

there are sex-specific forums of discussion and debate, including paradig-

matic forums such as the cantina (bar) for men and the water well or thewashing arca (lavadero) for wornen, and these should alert us to the need to

describe the gendered spaces of discussion and their interconnections invarious local contexts,

In sum, the institutional spaces that stand out as having been arenas of

discussion among equals are associated with village or urban life. The bar,the well, the village or school association, the cofradía, the Rotaries, or thetown meeting allow for some public discussion that may have been some-what less limited by the strictures of family authority on one side, andstate authority en the other.

The articulation of various local forums finto a national public sphere

developed in distinct historical moments: (1) after independence, with the

constitution of a national public sphere, (2) with the birth of modero in-dustry during the porfiriato, (3) with the incorporation of a workers' sectorinto the reigning party after the revolution, (4) with the emergence of

middle-class professional groups in the mid-twentieth century, (5) with

the emergence el an independent union movement (1970s), (6) with the

emergence of social movements that do not explicitly represent class

R i t u a l Rumor , and C o r r u p t o r

149 =

nterests but focos rather on sclcc t, (i ["Lo s such as housing, women,s

rights dctense against developmeni prolects and so un.

Although 1 do not wish to go Inn, cach ^,1 these developments here, a

tew considcratiuns on the tran,f t,nnation of tic public sphere are needed.

1-irst, with ndcpendence, a natiunnlls articulated public sphere emerged

tor the tirst time wnh the commcrcial pies and Congiess as its two maro

torums. This ttansition meant that arbitration troni rhe political center

was no longer rhe only or even ncces,arily the principal, way of arguing

lor rhe rights uf a colle( tive actor In,tead ol mercly eepressing rhe collec-

tivitys inclusion in rhe realm by rcay uf tic malo liestas, riese collectivi-

ties sometimes found their usos y wslinuhres ^ traditional rights) being debat-

cd and changed in rhe new national public sphere, and this without any

local imput_ This was notahly the case of indigenous communities, whose

traditional instirutions carne under aitack almost immediately alter in-

dependence, and who lost most of lucir legal protection in just a few

decades.

Moreover, most oí the social actors of rhe period were illiterate and

lacked properry and other chanctcristics liar were deemed central to

being a citizen. Because oí this, tic ritualized representation oí a national

order continued to be oí significance, although liberal governments fought

hard to wrench this system oí representation out of the hands oí the

church and into those of civil authorities. This process was politieally

painful and was never achieved in its entirety. The difficulty was in part

owing tu rhe fact that the civil framework set up by liberals had no room

for formally recognizing rhe collective actors that were on the scene,

whereas these had previously been acknowledged in rhe organization oí

cofradías, in the commemoration of patron saints, and in major religious fi-

estas such as Corpus Christi and Easter.

In other wurds, rhe creation ot a national public sphere, "fictitious"

and highly iniperfect though it was, was a real threat to the traditional

status oí collective actors, because it set up an arena where new rules

could be made that affected rhe very toundations of the collectivities in

question. In this respect, the struggle against the clergy in rhe nineteenth

and twentierh centuries takes on special significante, for rhe conflicts

were not only connected to the power of the church as it has usually

been considered (land, wealth, induence through schooling), but they is-

sued, much more subtly, because rhe church had provided spaces oí rep-

resentation and political mediation for a series oí collectivities. This tan

headlong against the liberal project of creating a national citizenry that

was shaped by individual opinion The ultiniate results oí this clash in the

Ritoai. R , .' n d p t

150 =

nineteenth century are we1i knowm a de jure separation oí church and

state, and a convulsivo history ol struggle over local rights between vari-

ous classes and communities

The second sign1Ocant c oii idt ratiun on tic tra nslormat ion of rhe pub-

lic sphere concerns ihe toi ination ol a modern proletariat and its historical

connections to the public sphere_ In the mirial phascs of modernization,

the Mexican proletariat found little room for eepression or representation

in government. A proletarian public sphere did emerge, however, around

trade unions and with tic hclp of tic pcnny press, and it produced two

of Mexico's most noteworthy intellectuals, rhe anarchist revolutionary

Ricardo Flores Maltón and rhe artist fosé Guadalupe Posada.

In other words, the early srages oí modernization-especially in min-

ing and in textiles-saw die constitution oí proletarian collective actors

and the articulation oí rhe proletariat to the national public sphere, al-

though both oí these processes were hindered by state repression, as well

as by low literacy rates and by the many social ties that Mexican workers

Nave with nonproletarian kinsmen and friends.

After the 1910 revolution, such proletarian organizations and voices

found much support from government, which took a leading role in orga-

nizing and coordinating union confederations-first the Confederación

Regional de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM) and later the Confederación de

Trabajadores de México (CTM), which still hobbles along today. This

process, however, also led to the formal inclusion oí unions in the official

party apparatus, a simation that ultimately weakened that class's interna)

forums oí discussion and compromised proletarian inclusion in civic, non-

governmental forums. A comparable process occurred with peasants who,

thanks to the political strings that were attached to land reform, were ef-

fectively incorporated in the state's "masses." Thus we get relatively weak

presente oí these two classes in the nationally articulated public sphere.

This meant that riese collectivities maintained arbitrated and ritualized

relationships with rhe state that were in some respects comparable to

those that existed in rhe colonial era, except for rhe fact that rhe state-

through a particularly rich development of nationalist mythology-was

able to wrench most oí these ritual functions away from the church.

Among rhe first collective actors to ron headlong against this "neo-

baroque" system were rhe new middle classes. Ricardo Pozas Horcasitas

has described this process in his study oí the medical doctors' movement

oí early 1960s. These doctors cared little for revolutionary rhetoric. They

had already been trained in a fully modern era, and expected rhe benefits

oí modernity without rhe forros oí state tutelage that had been imposed

R i t u a l R u r n a r a n d Co r rup tia n

151

on most peasant and working-class collectivities. They also expected to

control their own discussions and to have free access to the press,9

The government showed a distinct unwillingness to open up to these

new political actors, either by conceding liberties for self-organization or

by allowing greater freedom oí access to media and policymaking. Repres-

sion oí the emerging middle classes continued throughout the 1960s and

into the early 1970s, after which point the government began to embark

on a series oí political reforms that are collectively known as "the tran-

sition to democracy."

Middle-class pressures on the Mexican corporate state (movements oí

doctors, schoolteachers, students, parents' associations, etc.) grew in tan-

dem with the development of the new social movements," which were no

longer strictly class-based and were not directed toward the control or

redistribution oí the benefits oí production, but rather centered on the

conditions oí reproduction: housing, urban services, pollution control,schooling, parks, transportation costs, women's rights, and so on.

It is important to note, with regard to tírese movements, that many oí

them were not new in a strict sense: Castells has described the renters'

strike in Veracruz in 1915 as a case in point, and urban riots in the colonial

and early national period were concerned with issues such as grain priees,

conflicts between church and state, and abuses by priests.10 What is new

about the movements beginning in the 1970s is their scale, which reflects

rhe vertiginous growth oí cities, and particularly oí Mexico City, the di-

versification oí demands on government asan institution responsible for

providing an ever-expanding set oí services and forms oí social protection,

and the fact that, being goal-oriented, these movements sometimes lacked

mechanisms for defining participants as stable members oí collectivities.

This final point means that movements usually jell around leaders and

issues and can then decline to such an extent that they define ageneration

rather than a collectivity that reproduces through time

AII oí these conditions meant that the "new" social movements had

enormous potential for widening the base of discussion that made up na-

tional public opinion, and that they were not easy to incorporate to the

sectorial apparatus oí the official party and the state. The combination oí

these variegated pressures, including those from professional and proto-

professional middle classes and nonincorporated unions and peasant

communities, forced the state to develop new strategies oí encompass-

ment and inclusion, as well as to expand forms of access to national public

opinion.

1 have provided a historical overview of Mexico's main "collective ac-

Ritual, Rumor . nnd Corruption

152 =

tors" and have pointed to their internal forums oí discussion and their con-

nections to the state through ritual, closed-door discussion and decision

making, and to the national public sphere. In addition, 1 have given some

elements with which to imagine these various collectivities in their re-

gional locations. It is in connection to these factors that a profitable dis-

cussion oí the place and role oí political rituals can take place.

Political Ritual in National and Regional Space

A poignant introduction to the role oí ritual in consolidating Mexican

political communities can be found in the early contact period, which was

a time when the capacity for dialogue between Spaniards and Indians

was minimal, and powerful interests were vested in maintaining some mis-communication between them.' 1

At that time, a Franciscan friar, Jacobo de Testera, sought to create an

atmosphere that was propitious for the rapid conversion oí Indians, an

atmosphere that would not require extensive communication between

Indians and priests. To this end he used a form oí pictographic writing in

which icons were to be spoken out in indigenous tongues, while the

rounds that were thereby emitted approximated those oí the Latin ora-

tions oí the Mass. Through a mock form oí reading, Testera put Christian

orations in the Indians' mouths: they read out "flag" and "prickly pear"(pantli, noxtli), he heard something quite like "Pater noster,"'2 and this mis-

understanding allowed both parties to participate in a critical communi-

tarian ritual: the Mass. Thus, ata time when there was no bourgeois public

sphere in Mexico, before the existence oí a national language or even oí a

coherent project for a national language, rituals were a fundamental arena

for constructing political boundaries and relations oí domination and sub-ordination within the polity,

Gruzinski has written extensively on the crucial significance oí non-

discursive forms oí communication in the conquest and colonization oí

the Indians. He has shown the centrality oí icons in this communicative

process, and has even spoken oí a "war oí images" in lieu oí public debate.

At the level oí images, and especially in ritual, pragmatic accommodations

between participants may occur without any corresponding accom-

modation at the leve) oí formally stated policy or discourse. This sort oí

politics-pragmatic accommodation while formally adhering to a discursive

orthodoxy-has been insistently remarked upon by observers oí Mexico,

some oí whom trace its beginnings to Hernán Cortés, whose dictum to

King Charles-"I obey, but 1 do not comply"-has become famous.13

Ritual, Rumar and Corruptio

= 153 =

In fact historian Irving 1 ' onan) tclt tila[ Chis was a debning character-

,stic ol the dominan[ aesthetic se nsthihtp ol the soalled Baroque era

roughly 15RU-I?SU,, which wm bascd on regid adhcrencc to a iew basic

principies of Catholic dogma ano to tilo apphcation ot wit to embroider-

ing around thcni" L.ikcwisc, Gntsinsk, argues that clic transition finto the

Baroquc era ot represemation was eceompanled by an attack en [odiar,

Icarning, by che decline of che boak among the popular elasses, and its

utbstirution bv Imagcs that wcrc conventional_"

This protoundly antidialogic t,, [1,1 did nnt dic along with lile Counter-

Retormation_ Nlexicus Fnlightenment and 1'ositivist eras were also eharae-

terized by tilo use of modernity as a rhetoric that departs from everyday

practico in civic life.10 Generally spcaking, anthropologists and historians

have recognized that Mexico has a Icgalistic, formulaie tradition that is

combined with keen political pragmatism, a pragmatism that has often

been compared co Machiavellianism." The flexibility that Mexicans may

lack at the leve) oí formal political discourse and discussion they have in

political practice, and these accommodations are enacted in ritual and

its imagery. Correspondingly, the study oí ritual allows us to witness the

ideological articulations of a sociery that has always been both highly seg-

mented and systematically misrepresented in formal discourse.

In sum, ritual is a critica) arena for che construction oí pragmatic politi-

cal accommodations where few open, dialogic forms of communication

and decision making exist. In other words, there is an inverse correlation

between the social importante oí political ritual and that oí the public

sphere. Moreover, one could add a cultmalist argument to this sociologi-

cal one. once the Spaniards abandoned al] serious attempts truly to con-

vince and assimilate Indians into their sociery, certain aesthetic forms were

developed (the colonial versions ol "baroque sensibility"), and these be-

came values that permeated tire socicty deeply, affecting family relations,

forms oí etiquette, and other social forms in al] social strata. Thus Mexican

ritual and ritualism would have both sociolugical and cultural roots.

This very general appreciation is merely a starting point, however, for

in order te organize the variegated literature un political ritual and, further-

more, to propuse an agenda for futuro research, we need te arrive ata more

precise formulation of the specific soits oí political work that ritual does

and has done in different regional and historical contexts. 1 focos en three

majo poincs here: First, 1 argue that political ritual reflects the dialectics oí

opposition and appropriation hctween sute agencies and collectivities.

This point leads os away froni a simple opposition between popular and

state ritual- Second, 1 discuss sume of the intcrconnections between ritual

Ritual, Rumor . ., n,i i onruption

154 =

and rumor. Specifically , 1 argue that both ritual and rumor can be seen as

occupying spaces of expression that cannot find other ways into the pub-

lic sphere . Ritual can serve as a way of constntcting a high leve ) of region-

al integra tion with unly a nunimum substratum oí common culture and,

especial ly , of discussion _ This view leads away Iron' looking at Mexican

history as a simple secular process toward democracy and modernity-

Third, 1 discuss the connections between ritual and corruption . This puint

helps te) clarify che ways in which tire state is locally appropriated and in

which a hegemonie order is constiituted-

Ritual and tbe Expansion of Siate Institutions

A good starting point is to explore the relationship between Foucauldian

institutions (with their techniques oí bodily discipline) and rituais that aim

to construct an image oí consensus around a notion oí "the people" (el

pueblo). In a study oí the history of patriotic festivals in the state el Puebla

(1900-46), Mary Kay Vaughn shows that tilo interconnection between

schools and festivals passed through two stages: during the porfiriato, festi-

vals were organized by the local jefe político with the aid oí the local elite oí

hacendados, ranchers, and notables. Civic fiestas emphasized the patriotic

participation oí Pueblans especially (May 5-the battle oí Puebla-was

the main celebration). At the sane time, schools catered mainly to the no-

table families and, te a lesser extent, to inhabitants oí the main cabeceras

(municipal seats), but they decidedly excluded the rural and poor majo rity.'a

After the revolution, tilo strength oí schools was undermined concomi-

tantly with the strengthening oí the agrarian community and the weaken-

ing oí the regional elites. Schoolteachers did not have the coercive power

that prerevolutionary jefes políticos once had, so they could not organize

local work parties in support oí the school and federal funds were insuffici-

cient, This situation began to turre around in che 1930s through the reviva)

oí the patriotic fiesta by the teachers, who now used competitive sports to

draw in a wide constituency. These sporting competitions became a venue

for local social lile as well as for traditional forms of competition and so-

ciability between villages and barrios. As a result, local agrarian communi-

ties vied in getting schools built and provided the badly needed support

for their sustenance.

Hence, perhaps the most fundamental modern institution oí discipline

and uniformity, the school, spread not so much as a result oí state imposi-

tion as by its capacity to bridge and reconcile state piares with various

forms oí local politics. The school became, in fact, an alternative arena for

Ritual, Rumor , a,,d corruption

155

giving materiality and visibility to local communities in a way that is analo-

gous to che role that the church had played in che colonial period, and

ritual (the patriotic festival with its attractive sports features) played a

central role in che expansion oí schoolsjust as che religious fiesta, with its

secular and spiritual attractions, had been central to che earlier expansionoí che church.

Vaughn provides a valuable clue for understanding che ways in which

che revolutionary state succeeded in taking representational functions

over from che church. In che Porfirian arrangement, schools and patriotic

festivals were mainly organized by and for regional elites, and che church

still provided che broadest arena for che political assertion of eollective

force in its fiestas. It is only alter che revolution, with che decline in the co-

ercive power oí local politicians and che introduction oí competitive

sports, thar che civic fiesta became a forum in any way comparable to the

church fiesta, and, interescingly it is only at chis point that oral school-

teaehers mustered the local supporr they needed to really expand che

school system with the tight budgets that they have always had.'o

In other words, state institutions cxpand in a fashion that is dependent

on che local, regional, and nacional politics oí culture. The institutions

that creare an idea oí simulcaneous nacional development are also con-

strained by che various local cultural and political (orces.

The results oí this situacion have varied historically as che force oí

modero institutions has grown, but ovcrall they may be synthesized as fol-

lows: in Mexico, public opinion and nacional sentiment still have public

popular ritual as a critica[ forum, and che leveling media oí che bourgeois

public sphere (newspapers, television, Congress) have generally been

used as a cool for providing a discursive interpretation and solution to theritual manifestations oí "popular wilL"

Evidently, Chis situation had been intermingled with che lack oí a for-

mal democracy in Mexico, but it would be a mistake to attribute Chis lack

oí democracy exclusively to a dictatorial imposition from che presidency:

authoricarianism is the product of complex interconnections between

various local, national, and international forces. Moreover, there devel-

oped a culture oí accommodation to [hese circumstances, including well-

established forms for expressing political demands, for interpreting them,and for resolving them

This does nor mean, however, that che role oí political ritual has re-mained constan[ in Mexico since che Baroque era, Nor does it imply asimple substitvtion oí church ritual by state ritual The extension oí schoolshas long-term effeces on che local community that are distincc from chose

Riturt 1, liu mor, a,i Corruptfon

156=

oí che church, because schooling Bases movement across che nacionalspace in search for work, and therefore ultimately contributes to weaken-ing che agrarian community. 1 merely suggest that che system oí politicaland cultural representation oí the Baroque needs to be taken seriously as a

preceden[ in order to understand che role oí political ritual to chis day, andthat Chis is because religious and civic ritual is a key to understanding theexpansion oí state institutions in Mexico.

Rumor, Ritual, and the Puhlic Sphere

l have argued that throughout Mexican history there have been varioussocial organizacional forms and collective actors that have nor developedthe sor[ oí open discussion of che classical bourgeois public sphere. Thisdoes not imply, oí course, that communication does nor exist within thesegroups, or that they are incapable oí arriving at eollective agreements oroí representing [hese agreements in public. It means simply that publicsentiment is formed in communicative contexts other [han [hose oí anopen dialogue between equal citizens.

Hierarchical organizations such as landholding families, haciendas, orfactories do nor have free interna) discussion, nor can their individual

members always participare in che formation oí national public opinion

because they have usually had restricred access to the media. For che

members oí these subaltern groups, opinion is formed in che sor[ oí con-

cext that Erving Goffman has called a "backstage": in che kitchen, io the

washroom, while bending down to plant or pick, in che marketplace, or inche anonymity oí a crowd.

These are the spaces where information flows. Because they are "back-stage," they are typically seco as subversive oí official truths as well as oíthe national public sphere, and they are correspondingly feminized. Thus,in Mexico, "frank," "open" talk at public meetings is often contrasted to"washerwoman's gossip" (chismes de lavadero o de asotea), and political dialogueis characterized as "manly" (direct, open, rational ), whereas rumor is cow-ardly (it occurs behind one's back), it is 'women's talk" (chisme de viejas).

This form oí mapping gender onto che frontstage/backstage relation-ship between public spheres and che multistranded currents of rumor can

be understood as a ploy for undermining che validity oí rumor and it

should not be taken as a de facto correspondence between a feminine/masculine dichotomy and public sphere/rumor. The same rumors that arefeminized and called "washerwomen's gossip" one day can be hailed as che

egregious "sentiments oí che nation" che next day. Moreover, backstage

Ritunl, Rumor, and C orruption

157

c ommunication i s 1111[ a prer'ogative nt wumen. just as niany women en-

gage in public speaking-

It is useful to think oí rumor a, Inllnwing rhe negativo mold of rhe vari-

uus public spheres that hace (10011 dostusscd AVherevei civic discussion

and open argument are precludcd bv thc a,ymmetries oí power, alterna-

tive communicativc relationships 0merge and rumor predominates. In

Mexico, rhe nationaily articulated puhlic sphere has never achieved wide-

spread credeneu-roo many coitos aro excluded from it. Because of this,

people usually pretor a personal marco ot inlnrmation gossip'1 to a merely

official one 'This situation leads lo Mexicos classical legicimacy crisis. how to inter-

pret, conform, or channel whatJosé Marca Morelos called "the sentiments

oí the nation" As we have seco, intellectuals have had a leading role in fill-

Ing this communicational void, just as newspapers became a privileged

media for the interpretation of national sentiment.

Nevertheless, intellectuals, like rhe oracles oí old, need signs. Going

out and asking citizens in a systematic fashion was always seen as prob-

lematic, and has only gained ground in reccnt years-21 This is because the

poli involves making the backstage front stage; in other words, it involves

constructing a free-flowing, confessional relationship between citizens

and the state, a relationship that involves a corresponding notion oí gov-

crnmental accountability. Because chis accounrability did not exist under

authoritarian forms of corporativism, neither could a candid relationship

be built except in cases where "dtizens" felt that they had little to lose,

and perhaps something to gain.

The signs that intellectuals and politicians read are therefore complex,

for political manifestations are interpreted mainly in their expressive and

symptomatic dimensions. Hence che work oí interpreting national senti-

ment does not end with che gathering oí opinions, for opinions chat are

unlinked to action, opinions that have no practical consequence, are easily

discounted as 'women's gossip" or "talk." -1 he true national sentiment is

only meaningful in connection to puhlic action, to political ritual. 1 say

"ritual" because the weakness oí Mexico's national public sphere guaran-

tees that political events will be interpreted symbolically, with expressive

dimensions counting at least as much as instrumental ones 22

Moreover, significant differences emerge between political manifesta-

tions that are geared to the media and events that are oriented to direct

action in smaller-scale collectiviries_ Inreresting in chis respect is che use oí

masks in two recent cases, that of' Superbarrio" in Mexico City and that oí

the neo-Zapatistas in Chiapas. The use oí masks allows for a more abstraer

k ,,unl, x",,,-, ,,nd ('o,r,, pii oe

identi fication of a movement with "the people," and as such its demands

can he put forward in a clearer way to che public and che specter oí co-

optatiou of a specific leader ur of a small co nsti tuency dimi nishes. The use

of niasks is a Brechtian son ol strategy, ellacing rhe individual and stress-

ing che social persona by rclyi ng >ir imagos denved from the mass media

This is entnely difterent from ritualized social movements that are not

directed to che media ihat represen[ national public opinion, for example,

in small towns, In [hose cases, che people" are represented directly by

known people, and it is che prescnce of particular individuals that convinces

others to join in_ Consequentl y, [hese movements are not mediated by a

national public; they are direct expressions oí local opinion and, although

at times they seek support from national inedia and public opinion, they

do not usually entertain high hopes for che efficacy oí these mediations.

Also interesting is the use oí inversions of public and domestic realms

in mediated versus face-to-cace movements. Whereas in local movements

these sorts of inversions are direct appeals to revolt, in mediated move-

ments they serve as poented appeals to public opinion and are thus gestures

oí revolt Thus, middle- and upper-class women take to the streets oí

Mexico City to protest che construction oí a highway or to protest the

high costs oí a devaluation. This provides powerful "photo opportunities"

for an urban movement. Similarly, ranchers from the Altos de jalisco fill

Guadalajara's central square with tractors to protest new agricultural poli-

cies. The inversions oí public and domestic spheres are usually more

sharply subversive in smaller communities, where local opinion can im-

mediately be swayed. For example, when women took to che streets in

Tepoztlán in 1978, che men backed them and took over the municipal

presidency. In che mediated urban context (which is an ever-growing field,

given the current expansion oí che national public sphere into ever-deeper

levels oí the regional system), inversions are used as appeals to a public

opinion that will then exert pressure on government by nonviolent means.

In sum, whereas niany collectivities are routinely recognized and re-

constituted in rituals that can substitute opon interna) discussion, there are

also political manifestations oí public sentiment that are created in back-

stage contexts, socialized through rumor, and converted into specific

movements that can be analyzed as political ritual because their signifi-

cance depends on their modo oí insertion in a body oí public opinion that

is not smoothly created out oí discussions in che public sphere. The the-

atrical element is therefore oí special importance.

The centrality oí ritual in che constitution oí polity can therefore beunderstood in two dimensions_ en che one hand, rituals can be expressions

Ri tua i, Ru,ll or, ,,,,d Co rrup 1 io

= 159 =

of collective vitality and interests within the sanctioned political order; enche other hand, public political manifestations are understood as expres-sions oí a public sentiment that is construcied in the backstage, and thathas therefore not (yet) been harnessed by che state. This second dimen-sión means that political movements are heavily ritualized. They are infact the maro signs that political interpreters read.

Corruption and Ritual

1 Nave suggested three important roles that ritual has in the constitution oí

political communities in Mexico First, on the most general level, ritual iscrucial because social segmentation and power relations undermine dia-

logue in the nacional community. Second, ritual has been used to build al-liances between local collectivities and state and church. The dialectics oí

this process involves competition or struggle between collectivities or

classes, and alliances with state or church are used to further local interests

In those struggles. Third, ritual is critical to the constitution oí national

public opinion in an authoritarian state because it is the principal sigo that

interpreters read, occupying a role that is analogous to that oí the poli

(and that is no less manipulable); ritual substitutes for a bourgeois public

sphere. In this section, 1 inspect the relationship between ritual and cor-ruption in the Mexican system.

The problem oí corruption can be understood en three levels: first, on

a functional leve] (what it does for government, what it does for individual

participants and victims); second, at the leve! oí aceusations oí corruption

(what a discourse oí corruption does in the world oí politics); and third, at

the leve] oí the moral sensibility of a people (how discourses and practices

oí corruption affect personal attitudes and definitions oí self).

Throughout Mexican history, corruption has consisted oí appropriat-

ing portions oí state or church machinery for private benefit (arguably), to

the detriment of the state's interesr as well as that oí the public. However,

these appropriations serve various functions and have varying implications

during different periods. For example, throughout the colonial period, of-

ficial governmental posts were seen as prizes that the crown handed down

in recognition either oí social proximity or oí past favors, or else in ex-

change for money. Correspondingly, officials were expected to profit from

their posts they were not civil servants, but rather royal servants. Com-

parable situations have existed well inca the modero period.

Because the church was the fundamental arena for collective expres-sien, and because it had its own independent sources oí taxation, corrup-

R i ^ u n 1, Rumor , ., u d C o r r u p

160

tion in the church was also important. Local constituencies could at times

play these two sets oí ambitions off against each other. Villagers partici-

pated fervently in their fiestas in parí as a show of alliance with the

church, which might then intervene in their favor against the abuse oí

landowners or officials, whereas suits against priests could be brought to

civil authorities. Local ritual could also stand as an affirmation oí local

rights against both church and state, both oí which could easily conspire

against the subaltern classes. Ritual had a mediating role in the colonial

period, where the boundaries, strength, and rights oí a collectivity could

be expressed at the same time that alliances were forged with the churchor the state.

In this context oí negotiation, corruption was reflected in what might

be called an extended "cargo system." Anthropologists have been prone to

take a narrow view oí what religious cargos are about, stressing their sig-

nificance in indigenous communities and their links to forms oí prestige

that are allotted only within the limits of traditional communities. In fact,

variations oí "cargo systems" exist and Nave existed throughout the nation-

al space, and the burden oí paying for celebrations has usually reflected

the expected distribution oí the benefits oí reigning. For example, Mexico

City notables and officers had to come up with money for all sorts oí com-

memorations oí the roya] family's affairs, as well as those oí the viceroy.

Smaller towns and villages had to incur parallel expenditures to commem-

orate their saint's day. But it was these very forms oí public festival that

also gave political recognition to these places and allowed for the funnel-ing oí resources to the community leadership.

This same logic survived finto the national period. In Tepoztlán, for in-

stance, carnival became the most expensive fiesta and was bankrolled to a

large degree by the local notables. This contrasted with the humble barrio

fiesta, which was paid for by collective contributions. Local notables fun-neled their money reto comparsas (dance organizations) that representedtheir barrio oí origina thus notables created solidarity with poorer mcm-

bers oí their barrios and subsequently depended en this local basis oí

support to successfully control municipal offices during the nineteenth

century and most oí the twentieth century.

In the Morelos highlands, de la Peña has described how hacienda own-

ers increased their popularity and that oí the municipal notables by con-

tributing resources to the local fiesta 23 Finally, in Zinacantán, the classic

and much-debated instante oí the traditional "cargo system," Cancian has

shown that financing local fiestas was a crucial item oí prestige and local

power for many years, and that the system only carne into crisis when the

Ritual, Rumor , and Corrupi,on

161 =

local economv di vcrsihed and thc population greca, creating a spbt be-

tween che oldcr peasant notable, and 1,)LI, e capnalist en t repreneurs. 21

Che elders hace kepí Clic voung genci auon Irom sponsoring che Gestas, and

che cargo svsicm has therctoie declinad .1, a locos of political expression.

The correlauon between iinanc ¡Ti,,;Icov inca and real) 1118 che benehts

of che state for oí appropriating local branc bes of che state) has parallels in

che ways in which che PRIs poliurtl cam pait; ns are financed- Until che

demociatic refxms of che 1Oleas. calculatmg costa ol olticial parcy can -

paigns seas imposible, becau,c hisioad ol ,corking ,,ah a cencialized eof-

Icr and budget amipaign c osi, wc 1, dillused among supporcers, all of

whom expected co bencht 1ront ihc tate in cxchange for diese expendi-

tures. Governors and municipal presidenu usad up che ir budgets to show

their personal support ot a presidencial candidate and, through that per-

sonal support, the support oí che collectivities co which they were linked.

Union leadership that had privileged support from che government used

union funds and working hours co support che candidate_ As in the fiesta,

participants in campaign events were also nieant to gain things for them-

selves: a day off work, free food, and a fiesta, or at least a renewed rela-

rionship with cheir immediate patron_

Thus, political ritual has been cied to corrupton beeause che finaneing

oí ritual reflecta che actual or expected ways in which local leaders and

communities appropriate porcions of che state apparatus-these rituals are

enactments both oí a persorialized style of state redistribution and oí che

power oí the whole constituency vis-h-vis che more abstract nacional state.

The connection between fiesta and corruption does not end here,

however, for mosc fiestas combine a concrolled and an unrestracned aspect.

Solemn Masses are followed by turkey in nicle sauce, drinking, and danc-

ing; carnival ends with the High Mass of Ash Wednesday; political rallíes

rypically are followed by free-flowing strcams oí alcohol. Even che most

Apollonian rituals, such as che once popular oratory contests, were pep-

pered with occasional comic or lyric moments, and secular festive events

such as the bullfight or che cocklighc tended co reccive some governmen-

tal supervision, wich formal moments wherc supervision was asserted.

This combination oí political control and unrestrained popular expres-

sion made the fiestas occasions where a certain complex hegemony was

enacted, for popular expression was at once unrestrained and encom-

passed by the authorities. This is che mosc surte sense in which political

ritual can be said to he tied to che history of corruption: fiestas assert the

significante of a collectivity vis 5-vis che state and chus they have been

used to jockey for position on che nacional map. On che other hand, once

l, i u a I k u ni c .. , i n .I C o r r u p t i o n

162 =

a collectivity is receiving sorne benefits froni che state once it has a leader

or a class that appropriates che state and representa it locally, [hese leaders

are expected to foot thc hill of much political ritual for che ritual will

se:-ve as a manifestation ol clic colleccivitys continuad vitalicy to higher

officials. Thus fiestas are usually signa of che vitalicy of both "che people

and che state." "Corruption underwrites Chis whole rclationship because

che state is only extended inm ch(se col l ecti vicies on che condition chat it

be locally appropriated'usually by local elites) and that some oí che bene-

tits of chis appropriation spill ayer to tire test ol che local population

Finally, rituals presenc popular moral standards regarding corruption_

Ungenerous leaders are shunned, as are leaders who do not finance fiestas

or do not recognize or acknowledge their own people.2 1 In general, an

ethics oí respect, generosity, and comtnunion is enacted, and chese values

provide che rudiments oí a technology that is used for articulating che na-

cional polity. In this respect, che Catholic ritual is a standard that continu-

ally haunts che politician.

These pervasive connections between ritual and corruption, both in re-

lation to local appropriations of state machinery and in che construction

oí an ethics oí xhose appropriations, demonstrate che critical significante

oí che study oí ritual for understanding hegemony in che Mexican nation-al space.

Conclusion

1 have explored che connection between ritual and political communities

by looking at public spheres developmentally. In the process, 1 have sug-

gested relationships between rumor, ritual, and corruption. Thís analysis

leads us away from three trends in che study oí political ritual. The first ische one that divides rituals finto state versus popular ritual- The second

is che trend that fries to construct a secular progress between premodern

ritual and modero democracy. Against che first trend, che perspective de-

veloped here stresses the dialectics oí opposition and appropriation be-

tween state agencies and various collectivities. This dialectic affects both

che constitution oí subjectivities by the state and che ways in which state

institutions are locally appropriated. Against che second trend, our per-

spective stresses che persisten[ obstacles to che creation oí a bourgeois

public sphere in Mexico. Mexican modernicy continues to segment and

exclude large numbers from che promised benefits oí citizenship and mod-

ernization, and Chis has allowed for a continuous reconstitution of a ritual

]¡fe that has ics origins in che Baroque era.

Ritual. K iim co and Corruption

= 163 =

For these reasons, the specter ot an `ancien régime" seems never te die

in Mexico: ir survived the 1857 colis ti tution, it survived che revolution,and it may oven survive che current transition to democracy. The regional

study of ritual offers a way of specifying these relationships, of under-

standing their historical evolution, and of clarifying the nature of socialchange in che polity.

Finally, a third trend that must be modified is the one that seeks to syn-

thesize national culture by way of che study of national rituals. Our con-

tribution to chis perspective is to show nce significante of developing an

overall geography of ritual as a necessary prior step. Once this is done

(and chis chapter is only a heginning of such a geography), che social and

political referents oí rituals can be clarified and placed in their proper per-

spective. Because our fundamental thesis is that political ritual is substi-

tuting for arenas oí` discussion and argumentation-creating hegemonic

idioms oí agreement between various and diverse points of view (cultura]

and political)-the study of these rituals can serve as an entry to under-

standing hegemony geographically, but rituals cannot be used to homoge-

nize the culture of their participants in any simple way.

8

Center, Periphery , and the Connections between

Nationalism and Local Discourses of Distinction

b

Ritual. Rumar, a":i Corruption

164 =

It is now commonplace to recognize that centers and peripheries have his-

torically constituted each other: "the Orient" was as critica] for the forma-

tion of a narrative about "che West" as European colonialism was to theformation of Asían nationalisms, che Americas and Spain mutually consti-

tuted each other, and, much more generally, ideas regarding cultural andeconomic modernity and modernization rely on constructions of "tradi-tion" and therefore on producing peripheries. -

A somewhat less understood dimension of center-periphery relation-

ships is how peripheralization and centralization are practices that can

help us to understand the ways in which localized idioms of distinctionand political language are created This point is often overlooked because

of the strong temptation to portray centers and peripheries as stable and

homogeneous and then to make these categories into vast abstractions:"the West" is central, "the Rest" is peripheral; "the First World" is central,

"che Third World" is peripheral. If prompted for greater detail, then a

speaker may say, within the Third World, metropolises are central, rural

areas are peripheral, or formal sectors are central, informal sectors are pe-

ripheral. Such attempts to classify places as central versus as peripheral tend

to bracket the fact that center and periphery are always coexisting as ele-

ments in idioms oí power and oí distinction throughout che social system,

165

hecause center--periphery tropel are hiera rclucal in Louh Durrmoti LS sense,

that is, they involvc complenxntants and encnmpassment' Thus, al-

thciugh one may igree that in lile late mneteclith celLUrv Britain could, on

thr rvhole be s_lassllied as central tu lile rer n'Id sestent, while India eould

hv counted as a periphery. we can alpe, rutunni_c that ccnter-periphery

discuurses viere equally rclevnnt tur lile dcr clopment ot distinetion in

both placesIn Chis chapterl explore lile histnricnl tnmtrlr mation ul centel, Periphery

luc-lacten svctem rt or^anlzm sial cpaee_ [Ti ti,, anthropoIogicaliyas a valamuus village ()j Tepoztlán, iNiexlt o blq purp use u tu show historien.]

clianges in ti,, ways in which the Lento, has buen locally construeted- 1

also aim to demonstrate a few of Lile competing strategies for centraliza-

tion and marginalizarlon as they base playeel out in local pulules of dis-

tinction and in che enunciation of local demands to state agencies or for

rational public opinion.By focusing on center/periphery as a key metaphor in the dialectics of

distinetion within Tepoztlán, 1 wish to ]cave a nagging paradox behind.

When analysts rely en center-periphery metaphors in order to under-

stand what Redfeld called °folk soceties they tend either to exoticize

lile marginal society by analyzing it as it it viere culturally coherent, or to

deny the existente of a collectively g,enerated "eulturé' and to substitute

that notion with a more atomized, indlviduallstic culture of multiple adap-

tations. In other words, they tend either to "orientalizé' a reified local cul-

ture or to dispense with the notion of a locally generated collective cul-

ture in favor of sumething like 'adaptation' or even "rational choice." In

the case oí Tepoztlán, Robert Redfield fell finto the orientalizing trap by

overdrawing the separation hetween 'folk and "urban societies, while

Oscar Lewis dissolved Tepoztccan "eulturé' finto a set oí pragmatic adapta-

tions to an environment that was shaped by nationally dominant classes

and políticos.This theoretical bind emerges in numerous forms throughout the an-

thropological and historical literauue_ Olten, differences map opto theopposition that Marshall Salilins called "culture versus practical reason,"

where the culturalist will emphasize lile internal coherence oí local cul-

ture (and thereby construct a sharp break hetween the culture of periph-

erfies and that of centers), while lile economic reductionist will emphasize

rational adaptations that generate statistically verifiable differences within

and between localities that do not add up tu a holistic local culture.Nevertheless, lile conceptual origins of this muddle are not restricted to

che (by now largely transcended ^ opposition hetween a Saussurean-inspired

p ¡ , d: .i 111 11 1e1 11a1 1 s

= 166 =

notion of "eulturé' and practica] reason. Part oí thc conceptual diffieulty

stems also from lack o1 attention to rhe analysts oí spatial systems, and

speci fically tu the disti ncti un hetween various uses of center/periphery as

an organizational scheme The contlation ot a center-periphery scheme

ur the organization ot produaion with a ccnter-periphery scheme tor

political domination and a center-periphery logic ot cultural distinction

leads inevitably to the sort ot abscracted and idealized cores and periph-

cries that we seck to reject. It is thc muddle in lile spatial model-a confu-

sion that can be shared by cultuialists and pragmatists-that sets the stage

tor Chis ethnogra p hic paradox

Consciousness of a Peripheral Status

Tepoztlán is located about seventy kilometers south oí Mexico City, in

what was until recently lile agricultura) periphery oí the state oí Morelos,

whose capital is Cuernavaca Until the early 1960s, chis meant that vil-

lagers were primarily peasants, many of whom were called "Indians" by

city folk. The town as we know it was created between 1550 and 1605 in

response to Spanish authorities, who concentrated the more scattered in-

digenous inhabitants of the jurisdiction called Tepoztlán luto a nucleated

settlement, Thus, the very constitution oí this agricultural village was to

sume degree orchestrated from without. Later, investors and power hold-

ers organized the region that is today called Morelos in such a way that

irrigated sugar fields in the lowlands would benefit from cheap seasonal

labor, firewood, and grazing lands provided by an impoverished highland

peasantry that was concentrated in villages such as Tepoztlán. This deci-

sion was renewed from lile time oí the formation of Spanish landed estates

in the late 1500s to the moment oí industrialization, beginning in the

19505.3

In short, Tepoztlán occupied a peripheral position from the time of its

colonial reconstruction. Economically, it was to serve as a source of trib-

ute, of revenue through commercial exploitation, and oí cheap seasonal

labor in lowland plantations. Politically, it was defined as an indigenous

jurisdiction that was to be controlled from a distante by a Spanish alcalde

mayor who was, in turn, named by the heirs to Hernán Cortés's estate, lile

Marquesado del Valle.

"The center" has tilos been "in the periphery" for most oí Tepoztlán's

post-Conquest history, both in the sense that it has had a critical role

in fashioning the place, and directly through specific institutions and indi-

viduals that have been charged with administering this peripheral status,

C e n t e r , P e r i p 1 , y , a n d C

167 =

ineluding evangelizing priests, indigenous nilers, merchants, schoolteachers,

policemen, and municipal officers. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that

hoth centrality and marginality have been elaborated in Tepoztecanmythology.

One revealing set oí stories that deal with these aspects oí Tepoztecan

society are about El Tepoztécatl, the mythical "man-god" oí Tepoztlán

who was meant to be both the local ruler in the pre-Conquest period andthe first Indian to become evangclized in the region (en September 8, day

oí the Virgin oí the Nativity, who is said to he his mother and who is alsothe patroness oí Tepoztlán).^

The story of El Tepoztécarl has two niain portions. One occurs before

and at the time oí Conquest when El Tepoztécatl vanquishes the lords oí

major surrounding towns, thereby gaining centrality for Tepoztlán. A

second refers tú the period shortly alter Conquest, and it runs roughly asfollows:

Tepozrécatl's lile was exemplarv He helped and protected al¡ of bis sub-

jects and Tepoztlán thrived more during his reign than ever before. One

day Tepoztécatl wcnt to visir Mexicn City and he found thar people were

having great difficulties in raising rte maro bell to the tower oí Mexico's

cathedral. Since Tepoztécatl was a friend oí rhe god oí wind, he enlisted his

hele and the wind god blew a srrong whirlwind thar blinded everyone

white it raised Tepoztécatl finto the air, brll and all When the people

looked around, Tepoztécatl was already in rhe church tower sounding the

bell, much m cveryone's amazement.

In order to thank Tepoztécatl for his hele they gave him a box and told

him to bury it in rhe maro square of his village Tepoztécatl received it with

joy and walked back to Tepoztlán When he arrived there, people asked

him what was in the box He answered thar thcy had given him the box

and thar he could not open ir, but rather liad to bury it, which is what he

did. However, people's curiosity was roo great and they dug the box up

that night and oponed tt rhe next morning When they oponed ir, four

white doves flew out in different direetions. Onc posed itself en the church

tower, another on the tower of Mcxicos cathedral, a rhird en the hill where

Tepoztécarl lives, and rho fourrh in the town af Tlayacapan. That is why no

one discovered what Tepoztécatl had been given, hut allegedly tt was a

greattreasure -

Upon receiving rhe news oí what rhe curiosity oí the keepers oí the

treasure had brought them to, Tcpoztécad said- "The doves that flew out oí

rhe village were fortune, but thcy new went tu enrlch other towns, and our

C en ter, Per,pbrry. and Conneetians

108 =

village shall always be poor. There shall be intelligent people, but they

shall leave the place just as the doves thar you freed lefa "s

As a whole, the story provides a genealogy oí Tepoztlán's poverty and

oí ¡es destiny always to lose its brightest lights to other towns. More sub-

tly, the story also notes the role oí Tepoztecans in the construction oí

the center. In point oí fact, a number oí Tepoztecans did work in corvée

labor to build Mexico City's cathedral during the colonial period,6 but

Tepoztécatl's role with rhe cathedral's bell is also potent symbolically be-

cause the bell was the principal marker oí time in the period, and, ulti-

mately, oí the dominion oí the Spanish faith. Finally, the story makes

Tepoztécatl a staunch ally oí rhe church (Tepoztécatl as rhe first convert,

Tepoztécatl as ido¡ basher, Tepoztécatl as son oí the Virgin oí the Nativity),

thereby representing Tepoztlán as a voluntary subordinare to the colonial

regime, despite the fact that die village was burned no the ground by

Cortés during his campaign against the Aztecs in 1521 because its lordwould not become his ally.7

In sum, the legend oí Tepoztécatl is a story about Tepoztlán's terms oí

submission. These terms, which are performed yearly on the day oí the

Virgin oí the Nativity, include, first, public acknowledgment oí hierarchi-

cal encompassment oí the village by a larger political society centered in

Mexico City and identified with the church; second, a recognition oí what

Tepoztlán has brought to the center; third, an emphasis en voluntary sub-

ordination to and adoption oí this order; fourth, a proud affirmation oí the

continuity oí local tradition, a continuity that is enunciated in the very act

oí recalling Tepoztécatl as man-god, as ally oí the wind god, as lord oí the

mountain and guardian oí the village. The story oí El Tepoztécatl thereby

reflects, to a significant degree, the prolonged vitality oí a colonial dis-course oí hierarchy and marginality.

It would be mistaken, however, to imagine that this colonial discourseoí encompassment is the only way in which center-periphery relations

have been constructed by Tepoztecan ideologues. In fact, there are sever-

al center-periphery discourses operating simultaneously, and their signs

and artifacts are constantly manipulated in local jockeying for status,

wealth, and power. By way oí illustration, 1 shall consider one example oí a

more modero formulation of Tepoztlán's peripheral status, beginning witha story written by Joaquín Callo titled "The Intruder."

`The Intruder" is an allegory. A group oí blond foreigners whose char-

acteristics make them a composite oí communist spies, evangelista, and

anthropologists has come to Mexico with the mission oí "study[ing] the

Comer, Perlpbery, nnd Conneetians

169

customs, the psychology ot che people ol che vdlages. their ways oí lile,

their thought their degree of c olture and. above all, their religiosity

They believed that it was c.uier <o e nrvince simple and poor villagers and

to attract them to their own pOint ol t iew" Che leader oí the group (who

has been nanted Ivan°i goes to Ccpoztlán He asks v illagers all sorts of

questions that are intended t o Libvert the dominan[ order by iinplying

that Tepoztecans are being exploitcd be caplralists, by government, and

by priests-

After his inicial inquines. v,.n loes to ( ucrnavaca ro cable a message

thar reads °Trentendous soeces It is case to attract these sandal-wearers

(huaranbudosJ: rhev can'[ rcad They only cat tortillas, beans, and their

explosive mole." Nonetheless, this impression of Tepoztecan ignorance and

pliability proves deceitful, because, with their kindness, the purity oí their

faith, the beauty oí their ways, and, predictably, their women, the

Tepoztecos succeed in converting [van to their persuasion:

He became convinced rhat people are happier in liberty, in peace and tran-

quillity. He found that although [he, is poverty [in Tepoztlán], conditions

are not wretched and that people's convictions are worth more, much

more, than promises oí equaliny rhat are ncver kept because those that

manage the party rule the lives and goods of others.

Ivan takes a job in a nearby hacienda and courts Catalina, "a pretty

dark girl with large eyes," but he is mmdered by the men from his parta.

This story is not especially popular or well known in Tepoztlán, but it

rehearses a number of themes that are popular among romantic enthusi-

asts oí the place, who stress both che ignorante and humility oí the people

and their greater purity and simplicity. The story also usefully summarizes

a discourse that has been deployed by Tepoztecans themselves in their

political dealings with outsiders, a srrategy that involves mimicry oí the

idealized "Indian' oí Mexican narionalist discourse.

One early instance oí this mimctic srrategy occurred in 1864 when

"Tepoztecan Indians' went ro pledge allegiance to Maximilian oí Hapsburg

and simultaneously petitioned hico to solve a land dispute with neighbor-

ing haciendas. These "Tepoztecan Indians' were led by members oí che

local elite .9

The portrayal oí Tepoztlán as "Indian" is central in the cultural con-

struction oí a class oí notables during che porfiriaato, whose members fled to

Mexico City during the revolution and tounded a Tepoztecan colony that

was active in Tepoztecan politics and cultural affairs during the 1920s and

1930s, reviving local indigenismo An idealized Indianness was deployed

again in thc carly days of Tepoztecan tourism, beginning in che 1940s,

when prominent artists and intellectuals settled in Tepoztlán and found in

che place a kind of prototype ol the true Mexico More recently, in the

1960s, local movements against hippies" deployed a similar discourse oí

mustie purity and tradltionali sm a purity that has also been mobilized at

times against Protestan[ missionizing, in discourse highlighting che value

oí lile in Tepoztlán as against che migratory experience in the United

States and in che 1990s, for niustering local and external allies in massive

mobilizations against two modernizing projeets a suburban train that was

ro link Mexico City with Tepoztlán and a development project that was to

build a golf course and an urhan development on communal lands.

This most recent social movement has been of such proportions that it

led, among other many things, to che overthrow oí the municipal council

and to the promotion oí a "popular council" in in; stead. The ceremony in

which the new council was sworn in makes powerftil usage oí the ideologi-

cal mechanisms discussed here:

Before a crowd oí three thousand in a popular assembly [asamblea popular],

Lázaro Rodríguez Castañeda took office today as che first mayor oí che

"free, constitutional and popular municipio oí Tepoztlán" In a symbolic

act, che Lord oí che Wind, El Tepoztécatl, gave Rodríguez the red oí ruler-

ship [bastón de mando] as Che new tlatoani of the community - The new popular

municipal presiden[, who shall load Tepoztláds destiny, swore that en no

account shall he allow che Club de Golf El Tepozteco to be built, nor shall

che municipio become "che parrimony oí any oligarchy"1°

Although "the intruder" oí Joaquín Gallo's story is ambiguously por-

trayed as communist agent, U.S. evangelist, and foreign anthropologist/

psychologist, and the story is true to some oí che political usage to which

the discourse oí Tepoztecan "simplicity" has been put, one must add key

agencies oí the Mexican government itself as critica¡ targets oí this dis-

course oí cultural purity. This distinctly modero peripheralizing discourse

involves the double move oí portraying ordinary Tepoztecans as Indians

and as true representatives oí the nacional ("popular") soul, thereby legiti-

mating polirical mobilizations that can serve to negotiate che terms oí the

Iaw and oí state policy. The discourse is also for aspiring politicians, inso-

far as it does not deny che ignorante oí the villager, and thereby provides

political leaders with acople room for negotiation or manipulation. It is an

ideology that can be deployed both to defend the village against actions

oí an "external agent" and to cal] for progress.

In short, Tepoztlán's position asan agricultural periphery, as a source oí

ry and Counec tions Center , Periphery , and Connections

170 = = 171 =

migran[ workers for the United States , Mexico City, and Cuernavaca, as apoor municipio within the state system, and as tourist site-is recognizedculturally in complex discourses oí marginaliry . Nevertheless , it would bemistaken to take this as justification for labeling Tepoztlán simply as "a

periphery," a simplification that obscures more than it reveals. Instead,

the complexity of even rhe two peripheralizing discourses that we exam-

ined thus far signals that Tepoztlán has occupied severa ) peripheral situa-tions, often simultaneously , corresponding to varying ways oí organiz-

ing economic and political space As a result, one symptom oí economicmarginaliry-for instante , peasant production-can serve to claim cen-trality in political discourse in rhe shape oí "Indianness ." In the sectionsthat follow , 1 shall review rhe relarionship between center-periphery ide-ologies and the dynamics oí distinction in Tepoztlán.

Indio, de razón, and notable m rhe Organization of Llrban Space

One key element oí Spanish colonialism was the equation oí urbanity

with civilization. The extreme opposire oí rhe urbane and civilized per-

son was, oí course, rhe uncivilizable barbarian who, following Aristotle,

was thought oí as a "natural clave," that is, as a creature entirely devoid

oí reason whose bes[ hopo was to be ruled by a rational person and

harnessed to civil society (see Pagden 1982). The barbarían was an en-

tirely physical begng, oí brutish force, ruled by his own emotions-a

wild man alone in nature. Between rhe wild man and the cultivated aris-

tocrat there were, of course, gradations of civility and coarseness. A logi-

cal corollary o( Chis view was that signs of urbanity became a factor in

local and regional politics of distinction. the construction oí churches,

oí squares, and oí public offices are an example, but there are others, in-

cluding the official status awarded to a town (be it ciudad, villa, or pueblo,cabecera or sujeto, etc.), the proximity of hotises to the central square and

church, the durability oí materials with which houses were built, the lay-

out oí streets, rhe layout oí a graveyard, and, not least, the general bear-

ing oí rhe inhabitants.

In Tepoztlán [hese elements and others have been deployed in varying

ways and for diverse purposes and, athough we do not yet have continu-

ous evidente for rhe history of diese uses, there is sufficient documenta-

tion to sketch a general outline oí rhe role of urbanity (and thus "centrality")in local politics of distinction.

The hrst major colonial census oí Tepoztlán was carried out around

1540 and has been translated from Nahuatl into Spanish by Ismael Díaz

Center , Prri pire,y . an.i Connections

172 =

Cadena." Although the interpretation oí this document is demanding, a

few interesting elements emerge with clarity. First, "Tepoztlán' was, at that

time, the name oí a jurisdiction roughly equivalent to todays municipio oí

Tepoztlán, but perhaps not the name oí a nucleated village." The jurisdic-

tion was made up of fine calpulli. In other words, Tepoztecans of this peri-

od did not yet cal) their primary neighborhood units barrios (a term that is

in use in the 1580 "Relación de Tepoztlán"), but still used the Nahuatl

term that designated a social organizational unit that was conceived as a

patrilineage with an attached territory. Oí [hese nine calpulli, Ateneo was

that oí the local tlatoani, and thus rhe highest-ranking calpulli. By the time

oí the 1540 census, a number oí Tepoztecans had already been baptized,

presumably by the Dominican Fray Domingo de la Asunción, who al-

legedly baptized El Tepoztécatl oí the story narrated earlier, and who

brought down and shattered rhe main ido) dedicated tu the tutelary god

Ome Tochtli, building a provisional church at rhe foot oí the steps leading

to Ome Tochtli's hilltop temple.'

The census shows, too, that rhe households oí nobles included mayeque

serfs or slaves, and that not all oí rhe local population were ethnic Tlahuica

Nahuas (Carrasco 1964, 1976). Thus, chis first census suggests a class

structure in which the principal divisions were those between the nobility,

macehuales (conimoners), and mayeque serfs or slaves. The village was further

divided finto Christianized and pagan people, a social fact that was marked

in the villagers' names, which appear as either Christian or indigenous inrhe census.

Around 1550, rhe Dominicans began construction oí a convent and

church with a spacious open-air chape!- Although we know little regarding

the specific location oí each of the vine calpulli prior to [his time, it is clear

that these units begin to be identified as barrios around this time, keeping

both the name of the calpulli and adopting a patron saint. The noble calpulli

oí Atento thus became Santo Domingo Ateneo, taking rhe name oí the

mendicant order that dominated the village unti! the parish was secular-

ized in the mid-eighteenth century)4 Three other calpulli became the bar-

rios oí San Miguel, La Santísima Trinidad (calpulli Tlalnepantla), and Santa

Cruz (calpulli Teycapa). The other five calpulli became the outlying hamlets

oí Santa Catalina, Santa María, Santo Domingo, San Juanico, and San

Andrés. Thus, four calpulli were aggregated into the nucleated Villa de

Tepoztlán as barrios, while rhe other five became sujetos oí that villa. The

difference between the villa and its sujetos was subsequently marked in

terms oí urbanity. the villa (which 1 shall henceforth cal¡ "Tepoztlán") had

Center, Peripbery, and Connections

173 =

the ntain church and monastees It sc as alst^ rhe seat ot rhe government of

tic repúb6cu1 estahl¡sil cd according tu tic New 1 aws o1 1542.

The idcntity ot Santo Ih nningn as a bario rd nobles may slowly Nave

icen tlndcrmined bcginning ss ith tic csils- Spanish prohihition against

Indian nobles kceping claves. ( )n tic saholc dre internal structure oí the

barrios tended toward structural equival ent e, cach barrio be ing 1nhabited

by a series of noble prindpr,ic, ano ala. risudi s ommoners while the wholeju-

risdietion seas under tic political dntninion ol une or two majar noble

lamilics that took up Spanish la.t Che most lamous and eontinu-

ously impon taus ot riese lamilics sr as tic Rojas tamily, whose members

held thc principal political offices wrth great frequency from che seven-

teenth to the nventieth ce n tu tics."

Thus, centrality and marginality werc slowly redefined during the six-

teenth century A city center, with rhe church, a square, and government

buildings was establ ished, and rhe most worthy subjects lived clase to it.

On the other hand, hierarchy hetwecn barrios tended to dissolve and was

substituted by a relationship ot structural equality and competition be-

tween them. This relationship ol competition is expressed in each barrios

efforts tu build its own chape].

Thus, centrality was indexed by urbanity, and cultural distinction was

arranged in some consonance with this idiom of centrality. Correspond-

ingly, Tepoztecan elites (including a few Spaniards) tended to occupy the

village center They also were bilingual Spanish and Nahuatl speakers,

dressed in the Spanish mode, rode horses, and so en, thereby occupying a

nodal position in a political organizarion of space that had Spanish towns

as coros and ¡odian jurisdictions as peripheries. Moreover, although for

severa] centones the outlying sujetos oí rhe jurisdiction oí Tepoztlán were

in positions almost entirely analogous to those oí the villa's own barrios,

Chis began to change slowly, as some inhabirants of the central barrios

oí Tepoztlán hecame Hispanicizcd and identified more closely with

Tepoztlán's urban institutions

The whole process can be imagined as a shiit froni an initial hierarchi-

cal relationship between calpulli, to a tendency for structural equivalente

between barrios (and hierarchy between rhe villa's Hispanicized center

and rhe barrios), to a tendency lor some inhabirants oí barrios around the

center oí Tepoztlán to see themsclvcs as more urbano and less "Indian"

than inhabitants from outlying barrios and hamlcts This third phase

gained momenwm alter 1ndependence, wirh die introduction oí an ideal

oí democratic politics.

r. P.iipi., a-i Cono eclions

174

Tino Local Strategies for Reworkinq "centrality°

Center-periphery dialectiics in Tepoztlán have usually peen experienced

as a set oí local disti nctions, and not as a mere replica of a system oí dis-

tinction that has its center in Cuernavaca or Mexico City. One oí Robert

Redfield's firmest convictions when he observed Tepoztlán in 1926 was

that Chis was a "folk society, that is, a place that was lis own cultural cen-

ter, where information and cultural artifacts from outside the village were

reprocessed and assimilated in a highly discriminating way. Although

Oscar Lewis was more concerned with rhe impact of national conditions

and events en local society than was Redfield, he did not question the fact

that these conditions were reworked locally.1fi Both authors perceived that

rhe connections between rhe interests oí regionally dominant classes and

local dynamics oí distinction were actively mediated by Tepoztecans. In

this respect, rhe indiscriminate application oí rhe term subaltern for local

Tepoztecans and for Tepoztecan culture would present some difficulties,

because Tepoztecans have often combined wage labor with more inde-

pendent forms of work, such as subsistente farming, artesanal production,

and petty commerce. They have therefore preserved political and cultural

spaces that have been limited-but not necessarily occupied-by region-

ally dominant classes.

Correspondingly, rhe constructs oí centrality that we have reviewed

were contested since their inception in rhe early colonial period and well

into rhe second half oí rhe twentieth century, when the very definition oí

centrality began to shift significantly. In this section, 1 wish briefly to iden-

tify two local strategies for manipulating centrality. The first is a form oí

asserting a disjunction between political centrality and social - moral cen-

trality; rhe second is a way oí appropriating the center for discretionary

local usage . 1 review riese two forms here in order to demonstrate that

ideological mechanisms oí contention and appropriation are well estab-

lished. In later sections , 1 will review the transformation of center-periphery

dialectics in modero Tepoztecan history.The first strategy is to reject professional politics and political dis-

course entirely.17 By relying on traditional ideas about the nature oí sick-

ness and health, about rhe necessary complementarity within the peasant

family and rhe central importante oí reciprocity for social and cultural

reproduction, this strategy convincingly casts peasant agriculture as an

inherently "clear" activity and politics as a necessarily "dirty" one. Peasant

production is "clean" because its goal is to fulfill an entire cycle oí produc-

tion and consumption within the household, exploiting no one, and relying

Center, Peripbery , and Connecllons

= 175 =

instead un a "natural" complementarity hetween the sexes, between young

and old within the household, and on reciprocity between households.'"

These relations oí complementarity and eyuality resonate in a powerful

way with local ideas concerning health, nutrition, and the body.19

Politics, on the other hand, is inherently "dirty" because the politician's

livelihood is based on producing and mcdiating confiict. As a result, po-

litical speech is to be systematically distrusted because it is always mask-

ing the politiciads interest. The popular apliorism "A río revuelto, ganancia

de pescadores" (roughly, Muddied waters benefit the fisherman) is used to

describe the politician: his job is to generare confusion and then exploitsocietal conflict for his own benefit.

On the whole, these ideas reinforce a habitus that has local society as

Its center, insofar as they orient peoples actions toward strengthening rela-

rions oí complementarity and reciprocity within and hetween households

and provide, in the process, a view oi the meaning and goals oí h fe that is

not brokered or mediated either by the city or by the state. Moreover, the

state, its representatives, and its activity ("politicians" and "politics") and

capitalist merchants and produccrs are seen as living off oí the contradic-

tions oí clean people, contradiciions that are tire unlucky result either oí

necessity (as when an individual is landless) or oí foolish disregard for the

precepts oí local wisdom_ This ideology does not deny the power oí thestate and (he market, but ratlier sees its power as an evil that must perhaps

he endured, sometimes resisted, but never emulated. The relation oí local

society to state agents is casi not as a relation oí complementarity, but

rather as a relation of exploitation. As a result, regional loci oí power are

not seen as the center of local society, but ratheras externa) to ¡t.

The second strategy for reworking the ndationship between Tepoztlán

and the centers of power that encompass it 1 cal¡ the "artificial flowers strate-

gy," in honor oí an episode in the local school during the 1860s, when a

community member was dispatched on the long walk to Mexico City to

purchase artificial flowers that wou¡d serve as (loor prizes for student con-

restants The strategy consists of enshrining urbanized or industrialized

objects that represent ítems that are tound profusely in a natural state in

the local environment (such as Howers)_ This is tren used to link local socie-

ty ro the national community or to elite culturc in a highly discretionary

rashion, both to malee claims on powerful individuals or state agencies and

ro hector the local population toward more involvement in state institu-

Gons or in idioms oí distinction that come from dominant centers.

Por instante, the self-identification of Tepoztecans as "Indians" beforeemperor Maximilian of Hapsburg was a form of enshrining an urban cate-

Cenier, Peri,ohrry, and Con,, eci,ons

16

gory (''Indian") that refashioned elements oí the local life-world. In identi-

fying with the romanticized Indian oí national mythology, Tepoztecans

could stake a claim for special treatment within the national state. At the

same time, however, utilizing this strategy also meant learning nationalist

discourse and exhibiting this learning in public. It is not coincidental,

then, that Tepoztecans who used this strategy since the 1 860s promoted

schooling actively, while insisting simultaneously on activities such as

learning the Mexican national anthem in Nahuatl, or performing localfolklore in schools or political rallies.

This strategy has also been used to market local products for outsiders

and to protect selected resources from unleashed market forces. The

adoption oí urban discourses regarding the value oí pure air, oí the pictur-

esque beauties oí the village, or even oí the "vibrations" oí the mountains

and the pyramid have served simultaneously to defend local resources

against the intrusion oí unwanted corporate investors and to commodifylocal resources.

The very same discourse that is used to sell an agriculturally worthless

piece oí land with a good view at an exorbitant price is used to bar the

construction oí a building that will block that view. The same discourse

that is used to convince fellow villagers to "work for progress" is used to

bar unwanted forms oí investment or state intervention from the village.

Thus, although a center-periphery dialectic has been at the core

oí local cultural history since the early colonial period, and although

Tepoztlán as a whole can plausibly be described as "a periphery" because

its centers are outposts oí more significant centers, and because local con-

ditions oí production have been dictated by dominant groups who have

privileged other spaces, we must also recognize che existente of local ide-

ologies and practices that rework dominant center-periphery ideas in sig-nificant ways, ranging froni a rejection of centers oí power as legitimate

centers oí value, to a discretionary refashioning oí center-periphery rela-

tionships that serves to transform and to reposition local society vis-á-vis

the state and the market

Class Strife and Redefinitions of Centrality

1 have argued that, although it is legitimate to classify Tepoztlán asan eco-nomic and political periphery , power centers have always been presentthere both indirectly ( shaping the contours oí Tepoztlán as a productivespace ) and directly (in the form oí agents and agencies and in local ideologyand cultural production )_ 1 have also singled out two alternative strategies

Center , Perip bery , and Connecl,ons

177 =

rhat are deploved ro reforme ni manipulatc center-periphery relationships

local ly In this section. 1 wish to danta the social impon of these straregies

hy inspecting the svay in which ccntia]ity ,vas contestad in a ti especial ¡y

conllicted moment [Ti the altermath al the Vlexican Revolution-

Class contóct n otten a latero thanc in iepoziecan political history - It

has usually bcen subsumed ¡nio pe,litical baulcs that cut across classes,

making che language ol class sirife roto the son ol discourse that James

Scott has callad a hidden tianscript re lerriiig to the faet shas most forms

nl class struggle involving peasaot are nos articulated openly or explieitly,

lavoring instead more oblique torno ol enunaation through resistanee_

One significant historical exception to this role did occur, however, in the

years immediately following the Zapatista revolt of 1910-19.

Tepoztecans suffered rerribly during the Mexican Revolution. The vil-

lage was burned down on severa] occasions, many were abducted by the

federal army, others fought alongside Zapata- Peaceful villagers were forced

lo ]ive in the mountains for months al a time, where they suffered famineand plagues , while others fled to Mexico City, Cuernavaca, and Yautepec.20

In many ways, the revolutionary process destroyed the central insti-

tutions oí the porfiriato. In 1911. local Zapatista commanders burned the

municipal archives, where land records were kept. The houses oí local

caciques and oí the church fathers, even the church building itself, were

periodically turned roto barracks, and the region' s main haciendas went up

in smoke. Nevertheless, the destruction oí the region did not lead to a

simple collective takeover. Instead, Zapatistas were divided among them-

selves and much oí Tepoztlán's local leadership was killed in interna] frays.

Moreover, the unpredictabiliry of the outcome oí the war between

Zapatistas and Federales was such that villagers had to learn to live with

both factions. Although most of the town's pacificas sympathized with

Zapata, they usually portrayed hoth Federales and Zapatistas as a menace.

By the time the pacification of the village came in 1918, local Zapatistas

did not contest the command of a relatively benign federal army officer.

Instead, his main opposition carne from elites who wanted to regain con-

trol oí local government. Thcy expected to be reinstated now that Che de-

feat oí Zapata was certain. Moreover, most Tepoztecans who fought with

Zapata lefr the village to do so, and ofren came back lo Tepoztlán almost

as srrangers , hnding that many of their possessions had been taken by

those who had stayed, and fearing overt política¡ identification as rebels

both because oí the military defear of their movement and because most

local Zapatistas had dispersed in various armed hands and did not return

to the village as organized units."

Per ipbrry ar,d C. or n r c tions

178 =

However, the military defcat of Zapatismo did nos lead to the recon-

struction oí the Porfiriao settem_ The seizure of the nauonal presideney

by general Alvaro Obregón in 1920 i nstared the remaining ZapaUStas ¡Ti

the Morelos siare governmcnt. Zapatista general Genovevo de la O be-

came military commander ot die region, all oí which allowed Tepoztecan

Zapatistas lo express their convictions and hopes for land reform and po-

Htical change openly.

The village's notable families had emigrated to Mexico City at the stars

of rhe revolution and lived in the neighborhood of Tacuhaya, where

a Tepoztecan colony oí exiles was established- These exiles, including

not only the town's main caciques, bus also tes principal intellectuals and

many people oí more humble origin, formed an association, the "Colonia

Tepozteca," which was simultaneously a historical society, a philanthropic

society, and a political group. The Colonia took an active role in reacti-

vating local education, and it published a newspaper on Tepoztlán using

rhetorical formulas that were reminiscent oí the prerevolutionary intelli-

gentsia's indfgenismo.

However, nos even the intellectuals and politically active individuals oí

the Colonia Tepozteca were united under the banner oí an old-style caci-

cazgo. On the contrary, at least two prominent ones were affiliated with

the socialist and Obregonista labor confederacy that dominated Mexico

City politics in the early 1920s, the Confederación Regional de Obreros

Mexicanos (CROM). This combination oí factors allowed for the confor-

mation oí a sort oí local Zapatista politics that had never emerged in a co-

herent fashion during the highly uncertain years oí armed insurrection.Local Zapatistas allied themselves lo the Mexico City CROM leader-

ship, raised the red-and-hlack banner oí Mexican anarcho -syndicalism,

and created a CROM-affiliated' Unión de Campesinos Tepoztecos" (UCT)

that gained the support oí the Zapatista state governor and oí President

Obregón himself. Moreover, there was a family oí Tepoztecan peasants,

the Hernández brothers, who had been officers in Genovevo de la O's

army and who quickly became the armed branch oí this movement. 1 do

not have space to detail the ways in which these political relationships un-

folded in the highly turbulent 1 920s, and shall turn instead ro the ways in

which social space and centraGty were reconfigured during Chis decade.22

We have sean that representations oí civilization relied on symbols oí

urbanity, symbols rhat were concentrated in the center oí the town, which

is where state, church, and niarket had their seat and where the most sub-

stancial citizens resided. This view oí civilization had the potential oí ex-

panding outward from that center, a tendency that was manifested in the

Center. Perip hery, and Connecii"ns

179 =

urban iza tion oí barrios, che improve ni erito¡ barrio chapels , che expansionoí education , and che adoption of urban ways , including shoes and dress,and tire adoption oí certain pieces of furnicure ( mainly beds , in che earlytwentieth century , hin also solas , cables , and later radios , television, etc-).

"Che adoption of modero status symbols occurred principally at theindividual leve) , through education language practicas , and forms oí con-

Psumpcron tht pitt Ind ans i

agai tsc proper folk ," "sandal-wearers"( ) a mainst da -s1, and users of rhe fork , che bed, andche table against users oí tortillas as eacing implements , mats (petates) forsleeping , and scools around che hearth for eacing . However, che move-ment oí "progress " was also visualized in aggregate form, making someplaces more civilized and modero than others , according to whether theyhad roaos , houses built with solid macerials and so on

In che Tepozdán oí the porfi riato and of che 1920s and 1930s, progresswas correspondingly expressed in barrio competition . The fact that localelites lived in the three " lower barrios " that are adjacent to the plaza al-lowed those barrios to be identified as scronger , wealthier , and more civi-lized, despite che fact-demonstrated by Lewis-that there were numer-ous poor residing in chem 21 It is not surprisi ng , chen , that postrevolutionaryconflicts oven che definicion oí centers and of their place in local society

were manifested in che very conception of local urban space.

The political situation oí che 1920s produced intense conflict between

che old Porfirian elite and che members of che new Unión de CampesinosTepoztecos , a conflict that revolved around control over che municipalpresidency , over che local milicia, and oven che exploitation oí the commu-nal forests.

Members of che Unión de Campesinos Tepoztecos felt that local peas-ant demands could articulare wich a nacional and regional movement,represented by che CROM and Zapacismo ( respeccively ). RadicalizedTepoztecan peasants imagined a comcnunity without a local landholding

elite but ehat could still be parí of national politics. As a result, they tried

to marginalize tire old class of caciques that had traditionally representedche national center in che village . Acnvists called for che death or expul-sien oí local caciques as they rallied under che red-and -black banner.Significantly, these caciques were also referred to in Chis period as "los

centrales," that is, as che people froni tire towns center.

In their turn , che centrales defined supporters of che UCT as "Bolsheviks"and, in a stunning strategic move as ` los de ancha," that is , as inhabitants ofche tour upper barrios that were removed from che plaza and could notcompete successfully in expressions oí urbanity such as the expensive car-

11, .,".i 111 n,r bono

nival celebrations. In doing so, che centrales sought to maintain the older

core-periphery ideology that saw "che party oí progress" as a movement

that expanded from che center outwards and successfully encompassed a

portion of che local poor, at che very least those who inhabited che lamebarrios as che rich.

In other words, che centrales strongly resisted being identified either asrich or as che old caciques. Instead, they wished to be seen as progressives

who were interested only in improving local conditions. They tried very

hard not to appear hostile to che local poor. In a characteristic example oí

what 1 earlier called che "artificial flowers strategy," for instante, a writer

who used the pseudonym oí El Tepoztécatl, and who routinely addressed

Tepoztecans from the pages of El Tepozteco-a paper put out by che

cacique-dominated Colonia Tepozteca-wrote: "Even out most humble

neighbors-once they have been invested with the representation oí pub-

lic functions-are owed unconditional obediente, not only because oí che

representation of authority that they wield, but because chey wield Chis

authority because of che morality oí their public actions and because oítheir good personal habits" (El Tepozteco, December 1, 1921).

Taking on che voice oí El Tepoztécatl to address his compatriota, Chis

political writer apparently favors peasant political power, but is in fact

subtly stressing the critica) importante of "progressive" behavior in politi-cal posts:

What can be expected of a town that is mled by authorities plagued with

vice that, forgetting che investiture oí which they are unworthy, and having

lost all dignity ... instead of making public show of their morality and

good conduct creare public scandals in such a drunken state that, because

of their indecent accs, they deserve not only immediate demotion but also

exemplary punishment?

This apparently neutral cal) for civilized behavior subtly reasserted a pre-

revolutionary politics oí distinction, by calling for reinstating religion'24public morality, the significante of education and oí literacy.25

The care with which che old elite dealt with this issue, never discount-

ing local leadership out oí hand because oí their class origins, but judging

them instead en their distinction, reflecta che power oí the movement pit-

ted against them. ft is not coincidental that almost all political articles in ElTepozteco are signed with pseudonyms (mainly "El Tepoztécatl" and "Alexis'-

che Aztec and the Hellenic) and that they take en an impersonal and al-

legedly impartial voice. By presenting their faction as che party of educa-

tion, the centrales mapped che factionalism oí the period onto a distinction

Center. Peripbery, and Conneclians

81 =

between Che backward' upper bar nos and Che ° progressivc lower ones,

and rejccted thc map thot pttted pca,ant' ron, all barrio, against inhabi -

tants o l the ccntee

This illustrate, Che vulnciahil,ts ol ni,[,n ihe periphery, as well

as Che czistencc ol altcrnatisc e Hiena lor inarp inahzati on and inelusion

in a system ol distinction lor ssheruas sr ntpathizers of the Unión de

Campesinos lepozte,os streesed ns therr criterion ol inclusion or ex-

clusion 'Che acople versus thc cacique,' 'the acople versus ¡os cen-

aks, therr oppone-nt, invokcci o dl.tinc[ion based on urbanity that was

then mapped onto thc lower versus Che upper barrios inhabitants of upper

barrios were portrayed as ignorant, poor Indians"'0 In Chis way, an appar-

ently innocuous cal[ fui progress in lact vas used to reconfigure urban

space against the peasant coro-periphery model that was based en class.

A significan[ innovation of 1920s politics is that there was a concerted

attempt by soma poor villagers ti, control ocal government, and thereby

to disentangle the connections between the power oí the state and the

power of money Redfield unwittingly rctlecred Chis novelty when he in-

genuously classihed politics as a imito occupation (that is, as uncouth or

Indian).27 Although Chis may nave beca truc in 1926, it was entirely false

in the prerevolutionary era. In fact, the idea oí making the village as a

whole roto a peasant outpost within a broadly based workers' union whose

main source of governmental support was in the national presidency was a

deep change from the prerevolutionary spatial model, when the Morelos

state governor, who carne from Che region's hacienda-owning elite, named

Che subregional jefes políticos and dominated Che municipal presidency in an

alliance with local economic elites. Thus, Clac terms and Che very nature oí

che presente oí state and market poseer were the object oí a local politics

that was manifested in a struggle over local categories of centrality and

ntarginality

RecentReconfi'guratíovis of Centmlity avd Maej¡nolíty

In an carlier work, 1 suggested that Che analysis oí regional culture can pro-

ceed by looking at Che ways in which residual, dominant, and emergent

forms oí organizing economic and administraiive space are interwoven in a

specific place 28 In Che case oí Morelos, [lacre clearly was a long-lasting eco-

nomic organization oí regional space hased on interdependencies between

lowland segar and rice plantations and poorly irrigated highland villages.

This organization entered a critical state during Che final decades oí the

nineteenrh century when a series of tactors-ranging from Che intensifica-

Per

[ion oí production in sugar haciendas to incrcased pressure on land resulting

from population growth and Clac rise of a small-town agrarian bourgeoisie-

steadily increased tensions between villages and haciendas. It was at Chis

junction that Che revolution broke out, destroying Che regioris haciendas

and initiating a new stage in the organization of economic space.

Although some aspects ol Che old economic system were revitalized

alter Che revolution (see Warman 1976), Che economic organization of

Morelos never regained thc clear-cut features oí carlier periods. Industriali-

zation oí selected arcas began in Clac 1950s. Tourism, construction, and

real estate have picked up steadily, crops have shifted, seasonal migration

to the United States has ebbed and flowed These and other factors have

contributed to a much more diversified set oí economic relations, which in

turn translate into a multiplication oí economic "centers."

On Che whole, these twentieth-century transformations have altered Che

hierarchical order that once existed between localities, moving progressive-

ly away from a system that was characterized by a neat overlap between

economic and political space to a system with important disjunctures be-

tween various economic interests and che hierarchy oí political administra-

tion. In some cases, these changes in Che spatial organization oí economic

production have been overlaid on Che old agrarian core-periphery organi-

zation oí the region. Such was the case, for instante, oí industrialization,

which proceeded in such a way as to Cake advantage both oí the preexisting

infrastructure oí Che region's main towns and oí the cheap labor that could

be gotten from peasant peripheries. Other activities, such as tourism and

construction oí weekend hemos for people from Mexico City, operate ac-

cording to a logic that is largely independent oí Che principies used to orga-

nize space in Che agrarian era.

In this section, 1 shall review aspects of the reconfiguration oí center-

periphery dialectics in Tepoztlán since the 1950s. 1 shall argue that al-

though Che old dialectics oí distinction successfully spread the ideals oí

progress throughout the village, transcending the oid divisions between

Che center and Che barrios and even between los de arriba and los de abajo, the

result has not been a simple incorporation oí Tepoztlán and oí Tepoztecans

roto a standardized idiom oí distinction (if, indeed, such a standardized

form can be raid to exist). Instead, Che space that was historically shaped

in the struggle over local power and distinction has left room for forms oí

subjectivity that are not shaped in a simple fashion by state discourses and

institutions.

1 have argued that since independence there has been a progressive

civilizational movement in Tepoztlán This movement was spurred through

C e n t e r , P e r i p b e r y, and C o n n e c t i o n s

183

competition between individuals and by comperition between villages and

barrios. "Progress" also involved attaching local culture and history to na-

tional mythology, a move that served multiple, and not always commensu-

rable, purposes, including enhancing tire position oí the local intelli-

gentsia and political elite, marketing local resources for outsiders, and

defending Tepoztlán against specitically targeted state and prívate devel-

opment projects. I have also noted the existence oí an antipolitical, and to

some extent "antiprogressive," discourse that upholds the autarkic commu-

nity composed oí independent households as its ideal. This discourse can

be allied to that oí the progressive nationalist's, since the very existence oí

a traditional culture is a significant instrument for claiming positions vis-á-

vis the state, but it can and has also stood against "progress," opposing no-

merous state and prívate schernes leading up to rhe massive protests againsta golf course.

When rumors first circulated regarding plans to build a road linking

Tepoztlán Lo Cuernavaca, they were received with much enthusiasm: "If

this [project] comes to fruition, it will be of great importance, because

Tepoztlán will be visited by foreign and domestic excursionistas."29 The

image that Tepoztecans had then was oi tourists who would come te

spend the day (excursionistas), visit the pyramid, and ¡cave a few pesos be-

hind in local food stalls or perhaps in an inn. Matters developed quite dif-ferently, however.

The road connecting Tepoztlán and Cuernavaca was finished in 1936,and Tepoztlán did receive some excursionistas in the 1940s and 1950s, aswell as a small mimber oí promincnt artists and intellectuals, some oí

whom helped bring state resources Lo ti e village.30 Beginning in the

1960s, however, the nature and scale of tourism and colonization changeddramatically.

In 1965, a direct freeway to Mcxico City was built, leaving Tepoztlánless than an hour away from the ciry. As a result, weekend homes prolifer-

ated, and the price of land began tu rise- L.arge portions oí the Valley oí

Atongo, just east oí the village, had been bought up by three investors in

the 1940s and they resold plors slowly, favoring settlement by families who

maintain a relatively rustic look hut who are wealthy by village standards.

Beginning in the 1980s, and especially aker the devastating 1985 earth-

quake in Mexico Ciry, a number of middle- Lo upper-class people moved

permanently to Tepoztlán, forming schools for their children and engag-

ing in varying degrees with local Tcpoztecan society. By the early 1990s,

)and prices in Tepoztlán were among the highest in the country, and the

village had a number oí famous homeowners in its midst, including intel-

Cen trr, Ver,póe,v an,l Counectio ns

184

lectuals, artists, financiers, and politicians. At the same time, the large num-

ber oí daily visitors that come to the pyramid and the market have been a

boon for local commerce, especially in the market and around the plaza,

and for several hotels, restaurants, discos, and video stores. Tourism and

colonization produced changes in the center-periphery dialectic.

First, the colonists and homeowners have acquired a collective identity

that is separate from the village. Although a number oí these individuals

have good tres in the village, when tensions arise, people in the valley are

spoken of as "foreigners" or as "Tepoztizos" (false Tepoztecos). At the

same time, social and cultural differentiation by the traditional eight bar-

rios has been erased thanks to this same process, because barrios are all

roughly equally urbanized and land value is roughly equal throughout.

The premium placed on scenic beauty no longer makes living close to the

plaza particularly desirable, and the wealth oí the local elite is overshad-

owed by that oí the new inhabitants. As a result, the last severa¡ decades

have brought the traditional divide between the city center and the bar-

rios to a close. In its stead there are now divisions between the village and

the valley, as well as between the traditional old barrios and some oí the

new settlements on the margins oí the village, which are poorer, have

fewer urban services, and include significant numbers oí migrants fromoutside the village.

Second, the growth oí the real-estate market has made agricultura¡

value a secondary consideration in the organization oí space. This has

combined with long-term shifts in family economies to almost completely

sever Tepoztlán's identity as a periphery oí a lowland agricultural core.

Growth in the local construction industry, in petty commerce for tourists,

and in services for weekend homes began making Tepoztlán into a recep-

tor oí migrant workers, and wage labor in lowland agriculture has all but

disappeared. This process did not occur without conflict or resentments-

for instance, in connection to water usage by weekenders for lawns and

pools while local agriculture lacked irrigation-but it has continued in-

exorably, making agriculture finto a complementary economic activity.

Third, tourism and colonization also involve the adoption oí a series

oí values that come along with commodificatiom the construction oí

Tepoztlán as a "natural," "traditional," and "picturesque" place has had its

truth-value confirmed in the market. So has the idea oí the place as a cite

for an alternative lifestyle te) that oí the modern ciry, a process that opened

a market for earrings, incense, crystals, tarot reading, and tai chi lessons,

as well as for crafts that are made elsewhere but sold to tourists locally.

From the perspective oí center-periphery relations, this process gave a

Centre, P „¡pi,ery , und Con nec tío ns

185

new twist tu lile earlicr nativism, whiclt liad inainly scrved to tic the vil-

lage lo a national mythology and wa, used in appeals te) the state The

cCmmodificatian ol lepoztl,in a, a ,c Mn,' ul scenic bcauty and oí an

al terna ti ve cultural traditiion operas the place up to a kind of multicultura] -

ism whose paraphernalia ,ncludes (,uatem,lan k, t,, incense, masks

from Guerrero, herbal medicine, Kun;; Fu (,aen Mai, and su ora. The con-

struetion ot place nos, combine' rhe nativist idcntilication of Tepoztlán

as a center o¡ Mexicanness seith constructs emerging ¡ruin the hippie

movement, and espeaally that mixture of ,piritual rraditions known as

New Age "In sum, tourism and colonization nave dramatically reshaped the dy-

namics oí distinction in Tepoztlán Although tourism does not employ the

whole village by any means, it has aflccted land erices, patterns oí urbani-

zation, and the definition of what constitutes a local resource. From the

perspective oí economic cores, the town has gone from being a place

where agricultura) labor was cheaply produced lo a place where city folk

can find reprieve and alternatives tu their lives As such, Tepoztlán has

moved from being a periphery of Morelos's irrigated lowlands to being a

posh periphery oí Mexico Ciry; it has also gone from providing labor,

grazing lands, and wood lo lowland haciendas lo providing scenic beauty,

goods, and cervices for tourists and colonists. These processes have

helped to expand urban services in Tepoztlán at a quick rate and, as a re-

sult, economic differences hetwcen the village center and the barrios, or

between upper and lower barrios, have practically disappeared. New divi-sions, however, have emerged between colonists oí the valley, who are

sometimes portrayed as "foreign," as rich, or as eccentric or sexually pro-

miscuous, and "real' Tepoztecos These divisions between trae locals and

new arrivals ar times also spill into antagonlsm against migrant workers,

who come mostly from Guerrero, but can come from as far away as Oaxaca

or even Guatemala. Finally, peasant agrictdture has diminished in impor-

tance (not only because oí tourisin), although it does remain as a comple-

mentary activity for families.

Another shift that accounts for a modihcation in local core-periphery

dialectics has been the rise of wage labor and oí professionalism. Begin-

ning in the 1930s, villagers invested in the education oí their young. This

process, which was aided by connections with politically influential visi-

tors, gave Tepoztlán an educacional edge over tire vast majority oí Morelos.

In the 1970s, there was a relatively largc number of Tepoztecan school-

teachers,- today there are also many Tepoztecan professionals in a host oí

helds. The growth in local education was tirst bnanced by the sale oí char-

Ceurer, Pr, ery ,nA connec t,ou^

186 =

cual and wood from the comnrunal forests but, beginning in the 1950s, it

received support from income coming from local construction and from

work in tbe burgeoning new industries around Cuernavaca-

This process did nor however lead lo lile full assimilation oí Tepozre-

cans finto formal-sector svhite- and blue -callarjobs because the biggest

growth in high school and college graduates-heginning in the late

1970scoincided with thc siome in employment frrr these sectors. As a

result, reliance on self-employment and/or on trying tu control local

sources of employment has grown, making these educated sectors highly

oriented lo communiry lile and te) Tepoztlán as a place that can provide a

crucial space for reproduction This is reflected in the fact that some,

though by no means all, oí lile leadership and militancy against projects

such as the golf course and lile fast train has come from these educated

Tepoztecos.

This apparent paradox can be better understood if we acknowledge

that professionalization and skilled industrial wage labor presentTepoztlán

with yet another alternative core-periphery structure, wherein the so-

called formal-sectorjobs that are controlled by the state and industries are

a core to an "unemployed," "underemployed," "self-employed," or "infor-

mally employed" periphery . In this context, Tepoztlán is a home in the pe-

riphery that deserves to be defended against intruders who not only will

change the Pace oí Tepoztlán, but will also not employ skilled Tepoztecos

and ruin a valued community and lifestyle by Booding the town with edu-

cated and higher-income colonists who will impact further on scarce local

resources, including water and land, and eventually squeeze local inhabi-

tants out of their homes. The expansion oí education in a period of eco-

nomic uncertainties has strengthened many an educated Tepozteco's re-

solve to re-create a local tradition.

The cense of a new investment in the locality has also been strength-

ened by migrants who spend months working in the United States and

Cavada. A significant proportion of migrant dollars are invested in better-

ing homes, buying furniture, and in domestic infrastructure in lile village,

thereby reaffirming the value oí Tepoztlán as locus oí cultural and social

reproduction, and once again casting Tepoztlán as a periphery to new

centers, this time in the United States and Cavada, while retaining the

place's desired and cherished value as the Bite oí reproduction, as the end

oí their investments.

These three elements-tourism, the rise oí ara underemployed educat-

ed class, and migratory labor to the United States-have transformed the

center-periphery logic in significant ways. Internally, the spatial layout oí

Cera ter, Pule bery, and connectioin s

= 187 =

the village is no longer part of an idiom of centrality, except in the distine-

tion between vil ley and con ter and, Da more subtle tone, between neigh-

borhoods oí poor niigrants from Guerrero and the rest oí the barrios.

Centrality is, however, assertcd in the wav in which Tepoztlán' s status as a"puré' place gets reconstituted, and here we see a confluence between the

symbols that attract tourists to Tepoztlán and che ways in which profes-

sionals and migrants invesr themsclves in the place- 1 next illustrate the na-

cure of this confluence with changes that Nave transpired in the ways in

which the local carnival is celebrated-

Carnival

In earlier sections, we saw that neighborhood and village have been social

organizational units that embodicd distinctions such as those that separate

Indianness from urbanity, wealth froni povcrty, and so en. These dynam-

ics generated competition between barrios, a competition that tended to

make them homologous with one another. cach barrio had (and has) its

chapel with its patron saint; cach barrio was meant to have its own charac-

ter, reflected in an animal nickname (specifically, toads, lizards, ants, opos-

sums, badgers, and maguey wonns); cach barrio organized its own fiesta;

and barrios organized collective work parties for various purposes. In ad-

dition to chis tendency toward homology between barrios, we noted that

center-periphery dialectics were once expressed in an opposition between

the lower barrios around the plaza and the poorer upper barrios. This op-

position found ritual expression in carnival because the biggest expendi-

ture for that fiesta, the fabrication of <bfrtelo, (elaborate carnival costumes)

and paying for prestigious bands, was hankrolled by barrios and not by

the village as a whole. Only the dirce lower barrios had sufficient re-

sourees to organizo successful dance cornparas-

Anthropologist Phillip Bock did a Lévi-Straussian analysis oí barrio

symbolism in Tepoztlán." He argued that tbe sigas oí barrio identity, in-

cluding animal nicknames, barrios saints' names, barrio fiestas, and carni-

val comparsas, were part of a "tradicional Tepoztecan cosmovision" that was

alive and well when he studied it in the early 1970s. According to such aview, the distinctions between barrio animal names and the separation oí

the village roto an upper and a lower poition are al] parí oí an elaborate

symbolic code that representa che organization oí Tepoztlán asan indige-

nous agrarian village. If we pay attention to the dates oí the fiestas and

organize barrio symbols along an axis of symmetry that corresponds with

the above/helow division, chen these symbols suggest distinctions be-

gente , 'eripó ,ry. .,r.d C,,,.r, ec ttons

188 -:

tween night and day, between wet and rainy seasons, between rich andpoor, and between ¡odian and mestizo- However, the symmetry that is so

crucial to the kind of coherent worldviews that are posited by structuralanalyses such as Bock's prove to be historically precarious when we try toarticulate them te the history oí distinetion. Instead oí trying to fiad sucha transcendental symmetry, we can look to the carnival, to the barrio fies-ta, and to the symbolism associated with place in Tepoztlán as arenas inwhich the changing relations between places are manifested.

In recent years, for instance, the barrio oí Los Reyes changed its carni-

val sigo from a badger (a nocturnal animal associated with the mountains

and with the dry season) te a little king (representing the Theee Magi

whom the barrio is named alter). San Sebastián, who once shared the

opossum with the barrio oí Santa Cruz, has since changed to a scorpion,

and San José adopted a leal instead oí sharing Santo Domingos frog. Al-

though these changes alter the apparent symmetry and neat intertextuality

oí the previous arrangement, they are not a reflection oí the decline oí

carnival or oí barrio fiestas- Quite che contrary, these fiestas are perhapseven better attended today than they were a couple of decades ago.

lf we inspect recent changes in the carnival carefully, we note three sig-

nificant ítems: flrst, carnival comparsas now incorporate all eight barrios of

the village and no longer exclude the upper barrios; second, today's bar-

rios never share their nicknames in carnival (it used to be that San José and

Santo Domingo shared che frog, and Santa Cruz and San Sebastián shared

the opossum); therd, some barrios have taken up symbols that are simply

indices oí the barrios name, relinquishing the obscuro symbolism oí ani-

mal names: San José is a neighborhood that was always known as "La

Hoja" (the leal), and it is no longer represented by a toad but by a leal; Los

Reyes is no longer represented by a badger but by the Magi; and San

Pedro abandoned its maguey worms for a representation oí its chapel.

These shifts reflect several facts that relate to our discussion oí centers

and peripheries. Barrios are no longer an índex oí differential urbanity.

There is no longer an opposition between che central and the upper bar-rios, a fact that is reflected not only in that comparsas now bring togetherupper and lower barrios, but also in the fact that barrio symbolism is used

strictly as a form of individuation, and noc as a way oí expressing alliances,

as was the case when San José and Santo Domingo, two lower barrios,

shared the toad, or when Santa Cruz and San Sebastián, two upper barrios,

shared the opossum. Also, the new version oí carnival reflects a loosening

oí the ties between the ritual cycle and the agricultura) cycle, a fact that is

manifested in the current discomfiture in handling and understanding the

Comer, periphery, o„a Connect,ons

189 =

tradicional animal nicknames I he signilieance or even the range of asso-

ciations of soma ol [hese animal, n lost un nurst local peoplc, and so they

triad ro wced out dilficult or unplc.oant svmbols. such as San Pedro''

maguey wormc, that could set theii upe Ii ir ndieule. Instead ol being in the

hands ot barrio cldcrs, nim 1i otnual barro, symbolism today has fallen

finto the hands of schooltcac hers who ser thc carnival symbolism nor as a

reflecrion of traditional prochietive teehniqucs and social organization, bur

racher as parí ol a timeless local tradition cdebrating the village

¡Ti short, harrio symbolism ir. , ii nivai ntanilests sevenl of the changes

we have been discussing Urbanity is no longer the principal sigo of een-

trality [Ti local idioms ni distinction .Nci ther is there a clean-cut spatial

division between the party of progress and the party of tradition. The

enormous vitality oí "tradition" masks the fact that agriculture has been

steadily receding as a defining activity for Tepoztecans. The key position

taken by educated Tepoztecans in reshaping barrio symbolism makes the

fiesta a celebration of an idealized tradition whose links to older forms oí

production and social organization are increasi ngly tenuous.

This picture, however, does non reflect the vitality oí local sociery even

as it can be gleaned from fiestas such as carnival, for alongwith the decline

oí the core-periphery dialectic that was hased on an agrarian political

economy, we find new personal investments in the place and its signifi-

cance vis-á-vis "the outside worid." These pulsations are obvious not only

in the huge crowds oí tourists and locals who are present, who are danc-

ing, who are drinking and eatnng, but also in sope of the symbolism oí the

carnival itself, particularly in the cosuimes.

Lavish expenditure en elaborare carnival costumes (chinelos) is a com-

mon investment among Tepoztecos who work as migrant laborers in the

United States and Canada. Their savings allow them not only to improve

their houses and to buy consumer products, but also to participate lavishly

in Chis expensive fiesta. Many other Tepoztecans, educated and nonedu-

cated, wage earners and petty merchants, also invest in these expensive

costumes.

In 1993, chinela carnival costtnnes were embroidered mainly with four

kinds oí motifs: (1) stereotypical (calendarike) images oí Aztec prinees,

princesses, and pyramids that reallirm the village's lineage in the dominan[

nationalist discourse, (2) figures irom cartoons such as Donald Duck,

Tweety, and so un, (3) voluptuous women either in the sexy Indian or in

the Barbie-doll modos; and 14) hect caos, tequila bordes, or Coke, These

images play with the diversification ot economic centers that Tepoztecans

deal with, reaffirming an idcalized imago oí the Indian, appropriating

p ice .^u.l CuuuecHani

= 19U =

ready-nade imagen from the media that circulare as widely as Tepoztecans

can hope to circulare playing with consumption, and fantasizing with

exotic sexual affairs All are dreams that are shared while dancing in the

carnival oí Tepozdán

Condusion

Center and periphery are mutually dependen[ terms.More inportant, they

are ni a relationship [fiar is constantly renegotiated This fact is sometimes

forgotten because oí the political dividends that accrue from reifying cen-

ters and peripheries. It was expedient in the 1960s to define the whole oí

Latin America as a periphery to a northern Europe and North America.

But the very ease with which we fall prey to such reification is a sigo oí the

conceptual difficulty involved in spelling out the ways in which center-

periphery relations are intertwined. This difficulty stems in part from the

tendency to collapse economic, political, and cultural core-periphery

structures as if these relationships al¡ mapped onto each other neatly.

They need not do so.

In the case oí Mexico, for one, nationalism was built not en the culture

oí the bourgeoisie or oí the urban proletariat, but rather around the ro-

manticized figure oí the Indian and peasant. As a result, the cultural

core-periphery structure (which can be abstracted out oí an analysis oí

the dynamics oí distinction) is impacted and thus does not follow neatly

from economic considerations. For instante, Tepoztecans have claimed, at

times effectively, a special tic to lo popular in order to negotiate conditions

with the state. Economic marginalization can place a particular group oí

people in a politically advantageous position as potential representatives

oí "national culture."

Theoretical positions that take only economic factors as their criteria

for organizing core-periphery models tend to tender the complex politics

oí center-periphery invisible. Instead oí visualizing a politics oí distinc-

tion that permeates most oí the world system at every level, this strategy

tends to envision regional blocks competing with each other. For instante,

Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) used countries as units in his classification oí

the core-periphery structure oí the capitalist world system. This makes

sense to the degree to which, as Wallerstein argued, the transfer oí capital

between nation-states has been a crucial mechanism for capitalist expan-

sione Following this same logic, analysis who seek to go beyond an inter-

national core-periphery structure and finto peripheralization within a par-

ticular country have been logically drawn to concepts such as "internal

C e n t e r , P r r i p by' and C o n n e c t o n s

191 =

eolonialism," which still allowed arelatively clear-cut division between

centers and peri phcries. Unfortu late y, [hese views tend tu imagine places

as distinctly "central" oi "peripheral," instead of as loci with different kinds

of center-periphery dialectics_

1 hope to have shown here that "clic center" has always been present in

Tepoztlán, but that the processes of claiming centrality and of peripher-

alization have changed hisrorically. In fact. in at least one key moment

during the 1920s, a traditionally defined centra-'s capacity to encompass

and, hence, to successfully peripheralize the whole village was seriously

called finto question-this despite che fact thar, from a macroeconomic

point of view, M-lexico (and Tepoztlán) remained as "peripheral" as ever.

1 also showed that peripheralization in che period following industriali-

zation, especially since che 1960s, has hecome an increasingly complex

phenomenon due tu the coexistente of competing logics and loci of "cen-

trality": che relationsh ip with che nation-state is now strongly influenced

by transnational currents of Tepoztccan migrants, by urban middle- and

upper-class colonists, by educated and wage-earning Tepoztecans, and

by che very process of commodifying local culture and resources. This di-

versification of economic centers and che definitive decline of che old

agrarian core-periphery structure Nave produced significant ideological

alterations, even though some of [hese are niasked by che apparent conti-

nuity of traditions such as che earnival.

Not long ago, local politics of disti nction di fferentiated che uncouth

peasant indio from che urbanized and educated citizen. At the same time,

,orne Tepoztecan intellectuals were invoh'cd in dignifying Indianness

using che "artificial tlowers" srrategy, rhat is, by teaching Nahuatl, literacy,

learning che nacional anthem ín Nahuatl and so on. This strategy allowed

[hese intellectuals simultaneously to reinforce their position as whatRedfield called correctos" and to stake a polihcal claim for che rown vis-á-vis che state_ From a peasant perspective, however, all of [hese strategies

were bese kept at arm's length, separare ron che morality of reciprocity

and of household production rhat was at che center of their lives. In this

period, the terco indio was indeed what Judith Friedlander (1975) called a

"torced identity"; in other words, it was a discrimi natory term used to dis-

count a peasant's authority as a pubhc speaker oras a progressive citizen.

Today it is increasingly difficult ro categoriza Tepoztecans as Indians,

as peasants, or as suhjects in need of civilization. There is no unified local

elite. There is no single encompassing economic center. At che sane time,

che importante of Tepoztlán as a site of social reproduction is as strong as

ir ever was Migrants wanc their (modernizad) honres to come back to.

Peril,br^y ,,nd f o n.eeiio

192 =

Families with construction workers, petty merchants, or skilled laborers in

their midst still like to grow sorne coro for their own consumption, and al]

are worried about having sufficient water or about retaining or acquiring asmall plot for their children to build on.

In Chis context, claiming peripheral status from one angle can serve to

challenge a competing form of peripheralization. Nativism is used co

counter large corporations and large-scale development projects that

threaten Tepoztlán as a Bite for social reproduction, while economic

necessity is used co legitimare commercialization of local culture and

resources. The ideal of personal progress heles spur migrants on their dif-

ficult journey north, and the ideal of coming back to celebrare the fiesta

helps to keep them going. It should not be entirely surprising, then, that

so many Tepoztecans-peasants or wage-earning, educated or not-are

willing publicly to take on an indigenous identity that was described by

Judith Friedlander only three decades ago as "forced identity," for this is

parí of what it takes to reproduce at che margins.

Cenier, periphery and Connectfons

= 193 =

P A R T 11 1

Knowing

the Nation

9

Interpreting the Sentiments of the Nation:

Intellectuals and Governmentality in Mexico

My aim in this chapter is to inspect the sources of legitimation that have

allowed Mexican intellectuals to represent national sentiment or public

opinion, It is common to contrast the role of intellectuals in Mexico with

their role in the United States: Mexican intellectuals are thought to be

more involved in public debate and in political society, while intellectualsin the United States are thought to be cloistered off from that world by a

well-greased academy that makes them into erudites or technicians. This

opposition often leads, in turn, to an argument regarding whether the so-

cial position of the Mexican intelligentsia in fact follows a more European, -

and specifically French, model. These contrasts can be misleading, how-

ever, lince they may be taken to imply that the differences between

Mexico and the United States are simply the result of the application ofdistinct models of knowledge production.

Both French and American examples have been chosen by technicians

and policy makers to model Mexican governmental institutions. The hos-

pitals, educational establishments, and prisons that were created or re-

formed during the porfiriato (1876-1910) were often imaged on French

models. The establishment of El Colegio Nacional, which is a more recent

creation, was inspired by the Collége de France. The influence of the

United States as provider of institutional models has been equally great,

= 197 =

cspeeially sine( \Voild \Var II ami thc new e: univcrsities and rescarch fa-

ulnles Nave oitcn h)llowcd Amercan ryalnple,. I rencli ¡in ti United States

institutional modelé Nave Jiu, cu,, yiSicd n AIcxico since che late nine-

teenth cenulrv and so thev cannLII hc malle tulle lo account lar the srrate-

,gics that Mexican intellec ulah harc Incd t', epll:sent nati:mal sentiment

Instead, a more general analysu ol che hlstoncal connections between

state-furmation and intellectuals w rcquiral In chis chapter, 1 contribute

tn this endeavor by inspcct:ng che rc a.ionsh ii between intellectuals rep-

reacntation ol popular sentiment and thc hisutnV ol what .Aliehel Foueault

called govcnvn cntalit}," that b to sar thc h:stoly ot thc ways in which

che state described and adntinistercd .Muxicos population. My general

contention is thar tlie economic and political circumstances surrounding

Mexican independence produced a long dclay in the effecrive implemen-

tation oí a governmental state1 During chis protracted period, a style of

intellectual representation that gamed its authority from political revolt

complemented che sor[ of scientific representations of the Mexican people

that are associated with governmcntaliry. The representation oí national

sentiment was produced not only by referente to a set of indicators culled

from censures and questionnaires, hui also by giving meaning and direc-

tion to the cacophany oí popular social movements and insurrection.

My general claim is that although statistics were generated and popu-

lations were cared for and managed by Spanish administration since the

sixteenth century, the state and die church kept their information en the

population and deliberations on general policies private. Systematic infor-

mation en towns and provinces reas centralized in offices such as that oí

the roya] cosmographer, or placed in che hands oí high royal officials such

as visitadores or viceroys, but they were not scrutinized by a "public." In the

anclen régirne, public sentiment reas a phenomenon associated with towns

or cities, and títere was no consolidation of opinion at the leve) oí the

realm, much less oí the entire empire. Correspondingly, statistics, maps,

or reports could be controlled by specific communities or corporations,

but not in the narre oí a broader polity °

The notion oí a public that transcended che hounds oí the town or ciryand extended iota the broader realm was consolidated slowly only duringthe late eighteenth century. With this development, statistics became amatter of general interest, because they measured che common good.

However, the tension between che nadan that statistics were privy to theking and his representatives and the idea that they were che niirror in

which the public could measure its oren improvement extended to the endof the colonial period. As late as 1791. the Inquisition barred ViceroyJuan

fn larp rrtinb Ihe ^, ..wt.rlr oi tbe .Alalion

I9H =

Vicente Güemez Pacheco y Padilla from publishing che results oí a Mexico

City census that he had comml,sioned, and freedom of the press was only

granted for a few brief montNs ni 1 812. As a resulta che hrst major publica-

tions presenting the Spanish colonies from the viewpoint of a governmen-

tal state thc works of Alexander von Humboldt, had a powerful effect on

American nabo nal ists.' Hun,bol dts portrayal oí the Spanish-American

realms as functioning wholcs, complete with an aggregate population

(divided into races), maps ol rhe rcabns, and discussions of their com-

poundcd resources helped nationalists imagine their countries as autono-

mous units, and themselves as their would-he administrators. The dia-

logue between scientifcally aggregated knowledge of the population,

public discussion, and state administration thus had only a short, and rather

explosive, colonial history.

This fact is coupled with another, which is oí equal significance. At in-

dependence, most Spanish-American countries were not well integrated

economicaily. The new national elites were usually landowners, and the

commercial and financial concerns that had tied the empire together were

most often controlled by Peninsular Spaniards.Independence therefore

inaugurated processes oí territorial disarticulation and disaggregation, and

nacional consolidation would be won only after a protracted sequence oí

pronunciamientos, caste wars, civil wars, and foreign interventions. As a re-

sult, peaceful administration was encumbered, census taking was irregular,

and the consolidation oí a working scientific establishment was slow.

Mexican independence was won in 1821, but a securely functioning gov-

ernmental state did not exist until the 1880s.

There is thus an extended period in Mexican history when a com-

monly accepted scientific image of the population, oí its desires and its

propensities, was not attainable. Intellectuals' reliance en the instruments

oí governmental administration was thus necessarily mixed with the inter-

pretation oí public sentiments on the basis oí their attachment to revolts,

revolutions, and social movements, and these movements were commonly

endowed with authority to discredit "scientific" representations of public

opinion.

In che Mexican case, chis nineteenth-century phenomenon (which was

common to Spanish America and indeed to portions oí Europe) was ex-

tended far loto the twentieth century thanks to che Mexican Revolution oí

1910-20, and to che fact that che state that was spawned by the revolution

was a one-party regime that was led by an inordinately powerful president.

Thus, regardless oí French or American influences, both oí which have

provided critical instruments for che representation oí national sentiment,

Inlerpretln9 tbe Senliments of lbe Nalion

199 =

Mexican intellectuals have spoken for the people with some autonomy

vis-á-vis the classical instrtaments of governmentaGry. This is my argument

at its most general level.

Populations, States, asid Nationalities

Benedict Anderson argued that New World nationalisms were the first of

the modern era, that nationalisni moved from rhe periphery oí empires to

their very coro. Although this contention is debatable, it is undoubtedly

true that American nationalisms sprang up relatively early on the world

scene. What is less clear is the nature oí (¡le relationship between nation-

alism, sovereignty, and statecraft, hecause rhe domina that nationalism

spawned independence movements can just as easily be inverted, and one

could just as readily claim that it was th( prospect oí severing ties with

Spain that shaped Spanish-American nationalisms_

It is tempting to resolve this question by pointing to a dialectic be-

tween nationalism, the push to independence, and then the further propa-

gation of nationalism as a result oí the contest for independence itself,

However, it is worth considering this matter more closely, because the

specific contents oí "nationalism" vary significantly according to its con-

nections to the various aspects of statecraft, and these variations in turn

afford a perspective on our theme, which is the specific spaces for intellec-

tual production that are characterisde of 1 atin American, and specifically

Mexican, modernity

In the last decades of the eighteenth century, New Spain underwent a

significant shift in the ways in which publicity and "the public" were dis-

cussed, with an emergent class of "reasonable people' (gente sensata) reject-

ing so-called baroque forros ol ceremony and championing enlightened

views oí the common good. They were aided by enlightened monarchs

who shared their suspicion oí the ' obscuiantist church" and oí sectors oí

the old nobility. This shift corresponds to a recomposition and expansion

oí New Spains upper classes, with new individuals entering the Mexican

nobility and the expansion of urban classes of merchants and artisans as

the countrys economy grew.4

Late-eighteenth-century conceptions of "the public" can be culled

from the Gazeta de México, Mexico Citys periodical, which reappeared in

1784 in a novel forro alter a lapso of two decades in which no regular

newspaper was published. The carlier Gazeta oí Mexico City and theGazeta de Lima liad dealt almost exclusively with public ceremony and com-

mercial information, with covcrage of commemorations oí royal births

Iuiee r, tin g ibe Seo 1IVeer; of tba Nnlíon

200 =

and deaths, deaths oí principal inhabitants oí the cides, masses pleading

for the welfare oí the Spanish fleet, and Te Deums oí thanks for being spared

from plagues, but also with lists of the cargo and names oí the ships that

entered Veracruz and other ports. In the second era oí the Mexico City

Gazeta, this genre oí reporting was complemented with discussion con-cerning "the public" and its improvement.s

Perhaps the best way oí capturing this novel concern with the progress

and welfare oí "the public" is a genre oí writing that I am tempted to call

"the scientifically marvelous." We know, today, oí the curious genealogy oí

discourses oí the marvelous in the Americas, oí their deployment as propa-

ganda and as a silencing mechanism in the sixteenth century, and oí their

centrality in the perception oí contemporary Latin America as the Bite oí adisjointed modernity, in the literary movement oí the real maravilloso.ó

In the late eighteenth century, we have a specific subgenre oí writing the

marvelous-which is, oí course, found also outside of the Iberian world-

that exalts the wonders oí nature and oí science. The pages oí the Gazeta, apaper whose dedication te useful things was decreed by the king himself,are replete with examples:

In the measles epidemic, whose remnants still sting this jurisdiction, a child

oí age seven was sickened by it and by smallpox simultaneously, such that

the right side of his body was pocked by measles, while the left side was

hlled with smallpox, with nor one grain of smallpox mixed with one of

measles.(November 17, 1784, 186; my transiation)

In this case, the exact separation oí the infant's body in halves is the

object oí wonder. As in so many instances oí what is judged to be mar-

velous, it is the combination between the infinite and the exact that is

awe-inspiring, the precision that denles randomness and thereby allows

the viewer a glimpse oí a higher order. This repon is an itero from a broad

genre in which natural phenomena are shown co be motivated by a divine

order, and inquiry into the natural world is thereby made compatible withreligion.

Another kind oí example oí rhe "scientifically marvelous" dwells en theunsuspected potency ofthe ordinary:

Don Ángel de Antrello y Bermúdez, inhabitant oí this city (oí Guadalajara)

with a letter dated on the fifteenth of the past month (oí October) notifies

the Supreme Government wirh the goal that Chis news he published, that

the plant called Ajenjo, which in Sonora is called Estafiate, ground and

mixed with water, together with the root oí Palo Blanco, or, if chis root is

Inlerp re^ing ihe Sen( im en ts of tbe Nntion

201 =

laeking, cha[ ot Chamisa, or I:, ri lla. kn^,wn in Sunora whcic it grows in

abundo rato) as yatamote. is highls ci lican iuus, I drunk, co cure iabies-

'ilbid., 193; mv translation

In Che sane H*av that natural llana' m rcecaled hcavenly inrervention, so

too did Che unsuspected potential ot nature iu marvclous uses and the

promise ro heal and to bel p.The gente of tire sLienGfically marvelouc as it is forme¡ in Che Gazeta

combines ara interest in publie weltarc inri contirmation oí the role oí God

and of religion in Che transition ui nurtlcrnicp and toward Che progressive

improvement oí living conditions hhc inrervention of God is manifest in

Che uncanny. Science, in Chis sense, has a double mission: discovering and

proclaiming God's hand in nature and seo ing a publie whose very adop-

rion oí all that is true and useful is a ratification oí a deep and mysterious

rationality. The people who subscrihed to the view that public acclaim

seas the measure and proof oí having discovered a divine rationality were

known as gente sensata, or "reasonable people They opposed the pomp and

ceremony oí the retrograde church with a modernized Catholicism in

which the progressive discovery of God's ways was tied to Che improve-

ment of the living conditions of the public In this respect, Miguel Hidalgo,

leader of the first armed revolt for Mexican independence in 1810, is para-

digmatic, a mystic oí national independence, a priest, and a man impas-

sioned by Che useful sciences. Scientifically Inclined nationalists and na-

tionalistic scientists were commonplace at this time.

This particular form oí validating truth is compatible with Michel

Foucault's ideas concerning governmentality. states define a population,

establish parameters to measure its progress, introduce new productive

techniques, and then legitimize their own existente on the basis oí the

adoption oí [hese improvements. In Chis sense, governmentality creates

characteristic spaces and roles for intellectuals, for the engineer and the

inventor, for Che economist, rhe hygicnist, and Che statistician, and, indeed,

[hese are some oí Che main sorts oí intellectuals who appear in debates

during Che late-eighteenth- and carly-nineteenth-century Gazetas

As if to illustrate the social competition of the lower echelons oí Chis

intelligentsia, ara editorial response te) a teclinical debate that filled entire

issues oí Che Gazeta invents a hypothetical readership in an imaginary

village:

In the town of Cozotlán, abundant in sadness and scarce in amenities, there

resided a curare who combined a satistactory leve¡ of coniprehension with

great diligente because oí which he remained unsatisfied with mere elevo-

In lerp rrling Ibe 5ru,r ",,i,,

202=

[ion to his obligations and sought always co be instructed in Che useful

natural sciences, which were not incompatible with his onice .. - Our

curato gathered 'm his hotue a ver" modest salon ¿ trrlulia made up oí che

vol and the barher thr only lwo champions sebo had any polish ¡n a

country tilled with Choros and rorrghncss Decemher 2> 1784, 2; my

translation1

Thc eountrys intellectuals clearly had Che public welfarc in mirad This

was ro be attained through Che ipplication of sciences and arts that were

compatible with religion he pious tcchnician seas Che personification of

Che useful citizen.

Dialectics between the Tecbnician and tbe Spirit Medium

Certainly these ideas regarding Che public as the cite where truth about

nature is put to its ultimate test were related to the development oí nation-

alism in Mexico, though one might note that they were also broadly com-

patible with Spanish absolutism and, indeed, with any forro oí modero

statecraft. Independence, however, brought with it a dizzying political

instability-an instabiliry, moreover, that led to the dramatic increase in

the relative backwardness oí the new Spanish-American countries, with

respect to Che United States and northern Europe.7 The relative decline oí

Mexico carne along with unmitigated competition for control and appro-

priation oí state institutions, and this contest made the simple adoption oí

material improvements by "che publican insufficient basis for interpreting

national sentiments. The strategy oí governmentality, though centrally

important throughout Che modern era, was insufficient once indepen-

dence destabilized government.It is in this context that a second method for interpreting public sen-

timents became important. This method maintains that popular will is

visible during times of revolution and revolt, but is difficult to ascertain in

times oí apparent peace because systems oí coercion over individual opin-

ion are in place. In peaceful times, Che people were ruled by the existing

powers: political bosses, hacienda owners, mine owners, who each had a

ferrous hold on their workers and dependents The vote merely echoed

the wishes oí chis political class

The establishment oí a state hased on democratic representation was

always a distant goal, never an accomplished fact. Although numerous at-

tempts were made to establish a system of representation based on reliable

ways oí counting the population and on the capacity to guarantee equality

lote rpreting Ibo Srr.limenic of lbe Nalion

203 =

before the law to al] citizens, rhe successful establishment oí credibility

was another matter-s It is arguably thc case for instante, that rhe 1994 and

1997 elections were the firsi fati- elections in Mexican history, Polis and

polling were not being used widely in Mexico before 1988.9

These difficulties stemmed principally from the force oí various corpo-

rate structures in rhe society, ranging from haciendas, to the church, to

the army, to indigenous communities. Underlying their strength was the

weakness oí the privare sphere oí vast numbers oí Mexicans. There have

always been many people who were dependents in Mexico, either because

they were servants, or sharecroppers, or peons living en their master's

property. Dependents have never nade ideal liberal citizens, for the de-

fense oí individual rights is meant tu be hased on secure property and a

competitive labor niarket (servants were explicirly barred from citizenship

in early legal codes). In the twentleth century, rhe "urban informal sector,"

which is enormous, produces other forms oí dependency. The state was

thus incapable of upholding the ideals oí liberal citizenship for the poorer

sectors oí society, and therefoie political representation depended, and

was perceived as depending, on thc muscle oí regional and local elites.lo

An example that clarines the nanlre of rhe problem is rhe case oí Texas

before its secession in 1836. The Mexican constrtution oí 1824 abolished

slavery Nevertheless, as tensions hetween Anglo-American colonists in

Texas and the Mexican government mounted in the late 1820s, the

Mexican government repealed rhe prohihition oí slavery in the case oí

Texas as a way oí appeasing rhe colonists. In short, the Mexican state did

not have rhe power tu guarantec citizenship to its population, but relied

instead on the power oí various local elites who could mobilize or demo-

bilize popular classes to such an extent that in certain instantes they

might even be able to enslave them without effective state restrictions.'1

In a more general way, one might argue that rhe continued presente oí

a vast peasantry and, especially in the twentierh century, oí a populous

urban informal sector has meara that rhe state culture of governmentality,

hased on censuses and en other forms of state ethnography, as well as on

rhe construction oí measures of progress, has never been intellectually

sufficient for founding credible political representation. These standard

mechanisms for measuring popular will are effective only to the extent

that the state has the means for regulating rhe lives oí its people.

What is more, rhe growing concern with backwardness-a concernthat began to develop about ten years alter independence and that be-carne acute alter rhe war with the United Stares in 1 847-meant thatsome of the forms of state CLIture that one associates with governance in

1n trrp reting tbr n 1 i rn 1': 1, of 1be Nal on

204 =

more developed countries became an aspect oí state theater in the morebackward ones.

Early national statistics in Mexico mobilized the study oí variation

around a mean in order to demonstrate that the people oí Mexico City

were as educated as those oí London, that levels oí prostitution in Mexico

were lower than those oí Paris, and that levels oí prosperity were compa-

rable to those oí the same capitals. These statistics were not reliable oruseful for interna ) social engineering , the way that colonial statistics hadbeen. Instead, they were intended to create a mystique oí modernity that

would help secure a place for Mexico in the concert oí nations.

Any bid for being taken seriously in rhe international arena involved

such forms oí state theater. During the porfiríato (1876-1910), which was

rhe first time in which such a credible bid could be sustained, there was

much display oí rhe visible signs oí modernity. Díaz created an elite policecorps, the rurales, whose uniforms and organization gave a semblante oí

order to a country whose association with banditry was legendary. The

first national census was taken in 1895 and then regularly every ten years

beginning in 1900, and the capital city became the cite oí government in-terventions that were oriented to making the city finto a credible capital oí

a modern nation. 1 shall dwell briefly on certain aspects oí this strategy.12

The national state was only lightly inscribed in Mexico's landscape be-

fore the 1 880s. In many oí the most important state capitals , institutes oíscience and arts existed as an educational and intellectual counterpart to

the structure oí state legislarures. These Institutos Científicos y Literarios

tried to recruit students from each municipality every year, thereby creat-

ing a structure oí education that would impact the whole oí each state's

political life. This method oí intellectual representation, which was paral-lel to the ideal oí democratic representation, has not yet received much

attention from historians, and we do not have a good comparative view oí

its operation , but it is clear that it did not achieve a nationally integratedpublic sphere.

This fragmentation oí the public sphere, which corresponds to the lack

oí a national dominant class (that can only be said to have emerged after

rhe construction oí the railroads, beginning in the 1880s), is reflected in

the fragility oí the state's inscription in rhe landscape. According to Carlos

Monsiváis, there were only seven statues oí heroes in the whole oí Mexico's

public squares before 1876.13

With Díaz, however, effective centralization oí the state was achieved,along with the consolidation oí a national bourgeoisie. These achieve-ments coincided neither with a florescence oí democratic institutions nor

T n t e r p r e t i n g t b e S e n t i m e n t s o f t b, N o t i o

= 205 =

with Che universal extensic>n ol civie r nrtue -except, of course, at the leve]

of state thcater The pcrfiri,ilo mac hav e ] ecn the heyday of bondad labor,

but in Mexico City. Díaz presentad iii imap,c ol federal demoeraey by lin-

uig the new Paseo de la Retare,,, bnt,le ard with two busts ol notables

from each ot Che republie statcs The capital city thus became a site

where local leaders were tranvorlacd finto Che nic to nym ic si gris ol an imagi-

nary demoeraey

The strategy ot political representation that was drst consolidated

under Díaz is still usad todav Durinc ethnogrophie work on Che staging of

public ralees during che presidenual campnign ul Carlos Salinas in 1988,

1 noticed that in each state tour. thc presidential candidate delivered

speeches that contained a simple formula: he would begin by acknowledg-

ing the greatness oí Che state in which he mas, by naming prominent his-

torical figures of the state, who were usually political heroes or prominent

artists, intellectuals, and the like- Tiren he would value their contribution

in terms oí what they mean[ for Che nation- For instance, Salinas said that

he was proud to be in Puebla, thc region oí Aquiles Serdán and the birth-

place oí the Mexican Revolurion, Chihuahua was the state that harbored

Benito Juárez during his campaign against Che French invaders, Veracruz

was Che land oí poeta and popular artists who, like Agustín Lara, had

brought international recognition to Mexico. In each speech, the region

was recognized, but its value was only realized at che leve) oí Che nation. 10

This is a legacy oí Díaz's regime, when Mexico City was effectively set up

as the Bite in which national value was realized.

However, although Che centralization of Che state under Díaz allowed

for the development oí a more reliable set of measurements with which to

count, poli, and represent 'Che peoplc,' capital accumulation in Che period

relied en labor repression, and Che stability of the central state itself de-

pended en robust authoritarian practices. As a result, che governmental in-

tellectual whose infancy we have tracked al¡ the way back to the pages oí

Che Canela de México in Che 1 780s liad only limited credibility and was used

as much as an element oí state thcater as the means for actual governmen-

tal administration. The tension between che representation oí the people

by way oí the state's governmental sciences and its representation through

direct and unmediated access to national sentiment thus became a struc-

tural feature of Mexican development

The figure oí Francisco 1. Madero the revolutionary leader who top-

pled Díaz in a vast popular movement, provides a curious instance oí the

intimate and unsolvable concradiction between a governmental intellectu-

al and one who representa popular opinion through a more mystical tia.

f^!i^^pruin ) ^6e , i i,,, Eni' nt it,, Na,,on

200 =

Madero was famously upright, a guardian of impartnality and oí the ra-

tionality oí justice, as is evident in Chis fragment from one of his speeches

pronounced soon after toppling Díaz:

lo Che suffedng and working peoplc. Chis is to soy that 1 expect everything

from your wisdom and prudcnce That you should consider me as your best

friend. that you make moderate and parriotic use oí the liberty that you

have conquered and that you have faith in Che justice of your new gover-

nors - because from Che political point of view your situation has under-

gone radical chango, going from the miserable role oí pariah and slave Lo

Che august heights oí that ol the citizen- Do not expect that your economic

and social situation shall improve sharply, because this cannot be attained

through decrees or laws, but only by Che constant and laborious effort oí al]

social elements . - Know that you shall find happiness in yourselves, in

dominating your passions and repressing your vices, and in developing

your willpower in order to act always according to the dictates of your con-

science and oí your patriotism, and not according Lo the ways oí your pas-

sions. Finally, 1 urge you to seek strengch in uniry and to make the law the

norm oí al] oí your acts.15

However, there were not yet any reliable mechanisms for feeling the

pulse oí Chis new world oí august citizens and impartial judges. Knowing

Che popular will was, in the end, a matter oí faith, it required Che ability to

tap finto the secret reservoirs oí national sentiment. In this respect, the

other, private face oí Madero as a religious man and especially as a spiritu-

alist is not as contradictory as it has been made out to be-16 As a leader

who proved capable oí mobilizing a broadly based nacional movement

in entirely undemocratic conditions, Francisco Madero Che progressive

democrat needed the guidance oí his alter ego, Francisco Madero the spiri-

tualist and medium. The duality oí Che governmental intellectual and oí

the intellectual as spirit medium oí the popular will is here conjoined in a

single, politically explosive figure.

In sum: Whereas an early form oí interpreting national sentiments is

based en the public's adoption oí useful and progressive measures, Mexico's

instability, its increasing backwardness, and the authoritarianism that was

its most readily available remedy al] conspired to produce a second

method oí interpreting the sentiments oí the nation- This method recog-

nizes that political representation in the public sphere is insufficiently de-

veloped, so that popular will is conceived oí as a rumor that can be inter-

preted through exegesis oí popular actions, with revolutions as ultimate

loci oí authenticity.

In te rp re ting Ihr Sen i,m en ts of tbe Nation

= 207 =

In times ot unrest, as during the perioel berween 1821 and 1876 orbe -

tween 1910 and 1940, or again since rhe revolt in Chiapas in 1994, appeal

ro social movements and to revolutions as the privileged sites oí public

opinion is quite extended, while che capacity to build legitimacy on the

productive effects of a state culrure oí governmentality declines, turning

the scientists and technicians of these periods into objects oí ridicule

whose pretense of method is broken by a rcality that will not cede tú posi-

tivist inspection. During momenrs of stahi1ity and progress, however, the

public acceptance oí these technicians grows, hut even then their material

dependence on a state that relies on che mediation oí a political class for

the management oí a largo "dependent" population occasionally under-mines their credibi1 ity

Interpassivity and Governmentality

The concept oí "i nterpassiv i ty" is useful lar understandi ng the dialectic

berween the two forms oí intellectual production and che two kinds oí

spaces for intellectuals that 1 have oudined so far. n Interpassivity is a kind

oí relationship in which the anticipated reaction oí an interlocutor is acted

out by the emissary oí the original message. Zizek gives canned laughteren television asan example

In the Mexican case, both of che techniques for interpreting che sen-

timents of the nation that 1 have oudined ',and that 1 am tempted to cal]

"bureaucratic" and "charismatic") are built en the silente, or at the very

least en che incoherente, of popular expression. The will oí the people is

read either by interpreting silente as complacent appeal oí the govern-

mental state, or according to the interpretarions oí intellectuals, whose

speech is meant tes be the symptom oí the expected reaction oí a publicthat is unable co articulare views in the public sphere.

In this sense, che role of intellectuals in Mexico is not limited to that oí

technicians oí governmentality-which difterentiaces che country to some

degree from the United States. The role of somatizing national sentiments,

the interpassivity oí national intellectuals, is based not so much en the

professional drive for specification, isolation, and classification as on de-

veloping narratives about the progress oí popular will that conform to the

circumscances of social movements and state policies- We thus have as

national intellectuals both the technician and che medium, the bureaucra-

tized professional and the "interpassive" charismatic intellectual.

The state subsidy oí intellectual mediums" or agents entrusted withacting out expected popular sentiments is a historical fact that is worthy oí

note, since many modern states subsidize only che bureaucratic, "govern-

mental" intellectuals. In Mexico, governmental subsidies to che press are

substancial, and there are a number oí institutions, ranging from state-

funded presses to universities, cultural institutes, museums, fellowships,

and scholarships that are routinely used to fund Chis kind oí intellectual.ls

The significante oí these "inrerpassive" intellectuals for the Mexican na-

tion is a function oí the states capacity to creare a working relationshipbetween che countrys diverse corporate sectors.

In this sense, postrevolutionary government investment in interpas-

sive intellectuals can be clarified if we contrast Mexico's situation to

Ortega y Gasset's (1921) famous analysis oí the breakdown and decom-

position oí Spain. Ortega described a situation, which he named "par-

ticularism" and described as a breakdown of the consciousness oí inter-

dependence between che nation's principal segments. This breakdown

was caused by the lack oí an attractive and viable nacional project. In that

context, che various sectors oí society-the army, the proletariat, che

bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia-turned inward and did little to seek inter-

sectorial alliances. This inward turn was led by parochial leaders, each oí

whom imagined a perfect identity berween his own sectorial interests

and those oí che general public. The famous military pronunciamientos oí

the nineteenth century were, for Ortega, paradigmatic oí the phenome-

non oí particularism:

The pronunciados (military rcbels) never believed that it was necessary to

struggle to obtain victory They were sure that almost everyone secretly

held their same opinions, and so they had blind faith in the magical effect

oí "pronouncing" a phrase. They rose, then, not to struggle, but rather to

take possession oí public power.19

Mexico's situation in the postrevolutionary era had both similarities toand differences with che Spanish case. On the one hand, it was, and to

some extent remains, a deeply segmented country. On the other hand, the

revolutionary state was able to put forth a more or less viable and attrac-tive national project. National unity, however, still rested on a culturally

segmented and inwardly oriented set oí sectors, most oí which had weakintellectual representation In Chis context, it is perhaps not so surprisingthat the state took such an interest in fostering an intelligentsia that couldsomatize these various sectorial interesas and place them into a single,though highly restricted, discussion that in Mexico has been called "pub-lic opinion."

In lerpreling tbe Sr„„ n,e n., of e N a l i o nInterpret:ng tbe Sentiments of ibe Nation

208 =209 =

E ondusion

The analysis ot che spaces tor ntellecwals ti, one hackward country allows

us lo look ar the rclationship between pal tics and antipolitics in Latin

A rnerica under a (fi erent light In NI, xican polities ot che past century, a

dialectic between so-called téourm and iio6Lco+ has been widely noted

Similarly, in countries such as Elide Argentina and Brazil, military gov-

ernments developed ela hora te an ti polit:cal discourses_ theirgovern-

ments were cast as technical administra tions. not as properly polltical."'

l his discoerse ot antipolitics is assudaied with a specilic kind of anti-

intellectualism Chilean universittes and culture spheres were dismantied

in all but their most technical wings during rhe military government, and

an appreciation oí the hureaucratic, as against the charismatic, intellectual

has remained there lo this day.

Similarly, during the porfiriato in Mexico, the intellectual-cum-political

elite took on the pretentious narre ot cienlífícos Porfirio's policy would be

founded in a positive science, that is, on the hegemony oí the governmen-

tal state. Even then, however, [hese pretensions were understood lo be at

least in parí an aspect of state theater, and a distante between the país real

and the país legal, between the state's image of the country and the country

itself, seas at times grudgingly acknowledged As a result, charismatic in-

tellectuals, though dangerous lo the regime, were not entirely alien lo it.

The Mexican Revolution, however, provided a new fount and bedrock for

popular will, one that brought back the claims oí all past revolutions, and

revolutionary governments took it upon themselves lo create spaces and

to provide resources for an intelligentsia whose role has been lo function

as an interpassive agent oí popular opinion. These spaces include an

"autonomous," but state-funded, National University, and government-

hacked spaces for relatively free artistic expression and publication. This

contrast might provide a key for understanding why the Mexican state has

fostered a certain sor[ of intellectual and artistic production, whereas

other Spanish-American countries nave invested much fewer resources in

these activities. It also frames the question of the connection between en-

gaged public intellectuals and academics or cechnicians in relation to a set

oí issues that transcend the question of which models-French, British,

German, Spanish, or American-were iniported. All were imponed, and

all were subordinated to the logic outlined liere.

Michel Foucault's idea of governmentaliry is of special pertinente for

understanding the strategies with which intellectuals have represented

national sentiments because Mexicos entry to modernity was highly tur-

tutor pte i ir; 1', S, ..,r: rn1' af t1r Natfon

210 =

hulent_ As a result, the instruments of governmentaliry have usually been

unevenly applied, owing lo che states insufficient resources and the nature

oí capitalist development in the region. Moreover, given Mexicos posi-

tion in the international arena given its need to attract forcign capital and

ro gain a measure of respect trom the great powers, govermnentality itself

became something that needed lo be convincingly exhibited. The sci-

ences oí state administration needed to be presented as developed and

effective, a fact that in itsell has generated the suspicion that they are nei-

ther. This complex history of governmentality in Mexico thereby provid-

ed a relatively secure space for nongovernmental intellectuals.

In te rp rrtrng tlsr Sent,.,,is of tbr Nation

211 =

lo

An Intellectual's Stock in the

Factory of Mexico's Ruins:

Enrique Krauze 's Mexico: Biography of Power

This essay mas fruí published in che American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 4(1998): 1052-65_ ft was subsequently translated asid published in Mexico in the news-niagazine Milenio (May i i, 1998), where it geneated a broadly publicized exchangeivith Enrique Krauze.1 Tbis debate became somethin,/ of a curiosityfor those tobo followIhe affairs and daily practice of intellectuals_ Although it gravitated toward the adbominem remarle more [han lo proper inl ellectual a rq,nnen tation, the episode is itself a per-

formance of che central themes of tbis book ibe role of intellectuals in nation building, tberole of scient c disciplines (in Chis case, of history) in this process, and Ihe significance ofiones of contact as points of tension were all irarnatiaully enacted- Me Krauze counteredIhe elaims tbai 1 malee in Ibis essay by arguing, arnong other things, that bis book couldnot be called a "ruin" because it had sold i n;illion copies, and that my review, which hecbose Co frame as an attack by "an acuden,ic o; "a public 6rtellectual,"was motivated bya serse of personal frustration untó tbe Alexicun milieu 1 was portrayed as baving accept-ed a position in tbe American academy becas se 1 lacked viable alternatives in Mexicosuniversity system and, finally, as Múter Lomnitz tbat is, as a foreigner or, u,bat ismuch worse, as a Mexican who had choca; tire Llnited States overMexico

Tbis chapter is thus itse f an exaniple of Ihe telationsbip between contact tones and cheproduction of ihe nation lts publica ti on nlso generoted sorne debate around the category of'oficial history" Ir bis response lo [bis essay, AIr Krauze declared hirnsef to be amusedby my argumenta in ibis rojard, Hato eaula he, lado had denounced che 196s student

212

massacre and been a champion of democracy since the s 9sos, be accused of writing offi-cial historya In an interview with Milenio regarding Chis debate, historian LorenzoMeyer went furtber and argued that in Mexico there has never been an official historyaAnd yet, I would argue, it moves.

1 call the history that is written lo provide the pedigree, Co identify tbe imagínary sub-ject, and lo províde che governmental horizon of che state "official history." In MicbelFoucault"s tercos, this is a °history from che present,"as opposed Co a "history of the pres-ent." Its function is Co give the state its pro per cerófcation, and Co shape and dírect a na-tional community. Enrique Krauze's criticism of Mexican presidents and presidentialismhas tefe the revolutionary regime's nacional mythology intact in its most important points;invigorated in its central dogmas, it is now readyfor its new tenants,

This chapter concerns Che practice and use of history in Mexicos great epochal transí-tion. It is about the relationsbip between intellectuals, the state, and che market, and espe-eially about che privatization of Mexicos cultural apparatus. As sucb, this essay and chedebate tbat it provoked are one of che early episodes of what has become a battle over checultural policies of che Mexican state. I reproduce bere my original text with no modifica-tions, though I Nave added tipo neto footnotes Co call attention Co mistakes in my originaltext that were pointed out by Mr Krauze in bis responses. Tbey are of little consequence.

At the end of every presidential term (sexenio), Mexican presidents become

involved in a frenetic yace oí inaugurations; their posterity depends on it.

Hospitals, museums, universities, dams, highways, subways-all of the

signs of modernization and progress that every president promises-must

be inaugurated, along with a large bronze plaque giving credit to the

president, whether the building is finished or not. My brother, a scientist,

once witnessed the inauguration of a research facility by outgoing presi-

dent López Portillo in 1981. The inauguration occurred in a building that

was made to look finished, complete with lawns, potted plants, and the

rest of it, As soon as the president left, a presidential team came in, rolled

up che grass, picked up che potted plants and took them to the site of the

next inauguration.

This practice, which betrays so much about the economy and legiti-

macy of Mexican presidentialism, is certainly one of the sources of what

Brazilian literary critic Beatriz Jaguaribe has called "modernist ruins." The

rush to legitimize a presidency or a governorship is enmeshed with the

economy of public expenditure, and both conspire to produce veritable

monuments to the grandiloquence and corruption of the governing elites

that are, at the same time, inhospitable and alienating for ehe intended user

(°the public"). The fascinating thing about these modernist ruins is that

they betray Che gestural quality of much of Mexico's state-led modernity.

An ln relleclual's Stock

= 213 =

1 he central tenet of archltectu ral modernism ti til1ts practicality) serves

as a sereen tor a second rationale-. w11( 11 u 1cilit ieal . the story of Mexicos

progressive state vede an enormous pork barrcl.

hhis aspcct cf Mexicos nü)dcl 111 1\ t:as n•at pUCtiC II ly captured by the

Seottish eecentrlc and surrealist AII I dwaH lames, wbo built ntajestic ce-

ment ruins lo¡ die jungles ot thc Huasteca to swallow up When he was

asked why he pude Chis cosdy extraca;-ance. Edwards elaimed that it was

to confuse tic al-chaeclogists ..f thc )atare.

Like Mr lactess ruin,, Ncxicos nodernist mies llave very personal

signaturas, which are oteen tiose ol Clic prrsidcnt'vilo sponsored them-

So, whereas archaeologists of Che c-Columpian past use site names to

label historical epochs (e-g, Monte Albán 1. II, 111, or Tlatilco IV, V, and

VI), archaeologists of Mexicos modcrnist ruins would be wise to rely en

Che names of thc presidents who sponsored them, for example, Alemán 1

and II, or López Portillo I, II, and III.

Although Che discussion of modernist ruins usually brings to mind

housing projects, hospitals, bridges, and basketball courts, Mexicos cul-

tural world is also littered with [hese ruin,. The central axis of cultural

modernity-which is a productive relationship between science, art, and

the constant improvement of che quality of lile ("progress")-was histori-

cally so feeble in Mexico that, beginning in the 1920s, the state took a

proactive role in strengthening it- This role has been as open to demagogy

and corruption as any other modernizing project.

Until the 1900s, the states hmction as patron of the sciences and the

arts had met with relanve success-the National Autonomous University

was built, as was the National Polytechnical Institute. The arts flourished

under state patronage, and Mexico began to make a credible bid for a

place among modere nations. The revolutionary prestige of government

and the accelerated modernization chas began around 1940 fostered a rela-

tively snug relationship between middle-class ideals of mobility and the

state's self-image as the prime engine of modernization.

Mexican sociologist Ricardo Pozas has shown how Chis relationship

first cracked in 1964, when medical students and young doctors rejected

the state's authoritarian forms of decision making and embarked on a series

o[ strikes that were violently suppressed.' 1 he seque) and culmination of

this conflict occurred in the student movement of 1968, which ended with

the massacre of hundreds of students at Tlatelolco square, in Mexico City.

The killings at Tlatelolco provoked a new spurt of construction of

modernist ruins. Under President Echeverría the whole of Mexico's uni-

versity system expanded was' beyond che countrys capacities, which

An 1n:r l 1 T, lile l's 1!ork

214 =

meant filling the universiry with a staff Chal was not always well qualified-

Although the results of Chis huge expansion ot the educational system in

the 1970s were mixed, criticisms of its perverse effects were particularly

harsh, because he formula ot state-driven expansion was no longer sus-

tainable alter Che states fiscal crisis in 1982.

The National University and other public institutions carne under se-

vere scrutiny, and their ruinous aspect was widely puhlicized as the de la

Madrid administration slashed its support of Mexican public institutions

of higher learning. This was Che dawn of a new era in Mexican cultural

life, an era marked by privatization and by growing differences between

an increasingly proletarianized mass of low-prestige teachers, a somewhat

fancier stratum of publishing academice, and a new cultural elite that fases

writing with business.

Changes in Mexicos cultural world have been so deep that the analysis

of their impact on the quality of cultural production has been suspended

to a surprising degree. There is so much that is new in the institutional

arrangement of Mexican cultural life since the 1980s: changes in training

programs and in the profile that is expected for entering a university

career, growth of privare and public universities, and Che emergente of

cultural groups with wide media access.

There are signs, however, that the time is ripe for a critical look at

today's cultural milieu , for the eras first monumental modernist ruins are

now becoming clearly visible. This year it seems that Mexico City's main

private art museum may Glose its doors.4 It is also clear that most Mexican

private universities are not funding research. However, in Che world of cul-

ture, Che most significant ruins are always the cultural works themselves.

The appearance of Enrique Krauze's Mexicos Biography of Power (Harper-

Collins, 1997) is a landmark in this respect, it is a "period piece" that al-

lows us to scrutinize the effects of power on intellectual production in a

sector of Mexico's intelligentsia.

1 propose to do just this. A discussion of Che organization of Krauze's

book, of Che connections between Krauze's intellectual project and pis po-

sition in Mexico's cultural milieu, andan appraisal of the value of this book

as a work of history opens a clear perspective en the use of history as a

gesture in the struggle over who gets to represent Mexico.

Organization

Mexico: Biography of Power is Enrique Krauze's most ambitious book. It com-bines into a single work three hooks in Spanish (Biografías del poder, about

An In1r )lee tual "s Stock

215

the leadership of the Mexican Revolution, Siglo de Caudillos, about the

Mexican presidency in the nineteenth century, and La presidencia imperial,which covers the Mexican presidency from 1940 to the present). In addi-tion, Mexico: Biography of Power ofiers a brief synthesis oí political power

and political culture in che colonial period. This is the only work available,in English or in Spanish, that covers such vast territory -

The complexity oí the subject matter is made manageable by givinghistory a direction and a premise- Both oí these are offered with disarmingsimplicity, For Enrique Krauze, the history of Mexico is the history oí the

struggle for democracy. So much so that, echoing Fukuyama, he ends thisbook by asking Mexicans

tu bury once and forever Cuauhtdmoc with Cortés, Hidalgo and Iturbide,

Morelos and Santa Arana, Juárez with Maxi ni filian, Porhrio with Madero,

Zapata and Carranza, Villa and Obregón, Calles with Cárdenas, al[ oí them

reconciled withm the same tomó But Mexico would hace to be less pious

roward as modero actors. There can Inc no re, onciliation with Tlarelolco.

Krauze feels that the 1968 massacre at Tlatelolco should not be forgot-

ten because that conflict was largely about governmental democracy.

However, the fact rhat the 1968 movemcnt did not involve or affectMexico's peasants nor the majority of os poor does not seem to matterMexico's peasants are asked ro "bury Zapata; who called for land for those

who work it, but never to forget a middle-class movement that demandeddemocracy.

The organization of political history around the story oí democracy

is highly problematic in a country whose fundamental viability was in

question during most oí the nineteenth ccntury. Moreover, although

democracy has been a significant political issue during most oí Mexico's

modero history, it has often not peen the principal political aim or site oícontention.

For instante, the Mexican Revoltition (1910-20) begins as a demo-

cratic revolt under Madero, but it quickly turras finto a broadly based and

rather inchoate social revolution with vatregated demands, ranging fromagrarian reform, to labor laws, to national control over resources, tu radi-

cal state secularism. On the whose it is fair to say that these demands, andthe dynamics oí the struggle for power itself, overshadowed democracy as

the main issue. This fact is confirmed in the political success oí the official

state party (PRI), a party that was decply undemocratic but that left con-

siderable room for social demands. In short, although the organization oíMexieo's political history around the epic of democracy is pleasing for

A n lu t, llrr i ^, n 1. Stock

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American readers, and to some political groups in Mexico, it is notdefen-sible as the key to understanding that history .

The books central premise shares the pleasingsimplicity oí its teleology:

This book threads the lives of the most important leaders during the last

rwo centuries finto a single biography oí power, but 1 am in no way sub-

scribing to an outmoded (and unacceptable) great-man theory oí history.°

Thus, while writers and academice the world over worry about the "death

oí the subject," Krauze is busy anthropomorphizing national history andproviding it with a "biography."

What 1 hopo to convoy is that in Mexico the lives oí these men do more

than represent the complexities and contradiction oí the country they

carne to govern or in which they took center stage for a rime at rhe head oí

armies fighting For chango or for a return to the past (or for both). The

accidents oí their individual lives aleo had an enormous effect on the direc-

tions taken by the nation as a whole- Personal characteristics and events

that in a moderately democratic country might be mere anecdotes-

interesting , amusing , or trivial-can in Mexico acquire unsuspected dimen-

sions and significante. An early psychological frustration, a physical de-

fect, a family drama, a confused prejudice, a tilt one way or the other in aman's religious feelings or his passions, even a local tradition automatically

accepted could literally alter rhe late oí Mexico, for better or for worse7

According to Krauze, then, presidential biographies in Mexico collec-

tively shape what he mystically calls the nations "biography oí power."

However, he does not want this te be identified with a "great-man theoryoí history" but wishes instead to provide the premise with a kind oí cul-

tural specificity. This is because Mexico's historical roots combine "two

traditions oí absolute power-one emanating from the gods and the other

from God [he means the Aztec and the Spanish tradition]-this politicalmestizaje conferred a unique contection with the sacred on Mexico's suc-

cession oí rulers-" s What wer have, then, is a great-man theory oí historywith validity confined to Mexico.

As a result, Mr. Krauze continually asserts that Mexico is unique and

fundamentally different from the rest oí the world. This exceptionalism is

convenient because it allows him to ignore the parallels between Mexican

history and other histories, parallels that would diminish the force oí the

contention that presidential biographies have systematically "altered the

fate oí Mexico-" On the other hand, since Krauze claims exception for

Mexico on the basis oí the peculiarities oí the Aztec and Spanish mixture,

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this leads straight back to Mcxicus oflidal history, which this book dis-

1incdy reproduces: Martín Cortés son ot Hernán Cortés and La Malinche)

was "the hrst Mexican" (p 52, Hernán Cortés was "che spiritual antithesis"

ot Moctezuma ip. 44Moctezuma and Cortes''created a new nationaliry

the instant they met" (p. 47 theiu veas no True ethnic hatred" in Mexico

from the colonial period forward p 491; slavery in Mexico was sweeter

iban in rhe United States (p 50 and so on In short, the fabricated saga

of rhe mestizo as national protagonist is swallowed whose, hook, line, and

sinker. ']-he au thori tative narntion ul Nlcxlco, ¡ate and tortune rehearses

and reaffirms officia1 history, but with a twur. instead of culminating with

rhe progress wrought by rhe Mexican Revolution (which liad been the

End oí History until recendy), it culminares with rhe democracy that

Krauze's 1968 generation is supposed to have engendered.

Krauze: Biography of Power

Krauze's history can be read in two keys: rhe first key is the the saga oí

democracy into which he wants to shoehorn Mexican political history;

the second is rhe saga oí his own intellectual genealogy. This second epic,

which is barely visible to an English-speaking audience, is nonetheless

critical, because Mr. Krauze is in rhe business oí representing che nation to

rhe outside, trying hard to garner credentials with which to construct

himself as rhe kind of privileged interlocutor that other Mexican intellec-

tuals have been: Octavio Paz, Carlos Fuentes, Diego Rivera, Rufino Tamayo.

Enrique Krauze began his careen with a book on what he called "intel-

lectual caudillos" oí rhe Mexican Revolution (the term caudillo originally

referred to military leaders whose charisma allowed them to vie for con-

trol over countries and regions; ir is a political form that was characteristic

oí Spanish America's nineteenth cenmry). Krauze then hitched his wagon

to rhe star oí Daniel Costo Villegas, a prominent liberal historian who di-

rected El Colegio de México and who created a workshop that was known

as rhe "factory oí Mexican history," where much oí the history oí rhe por-

firiato and the Mexican Revolution was written.9 Alter Cosfós death, Mr.

Krauze became the impresario and subdirector oí Vuelta, Octavio Paz's cul-

tural magazine, from which he derived most oí his intellectual cachet.

In an effort te create a voice for himself, and perhaps to emerge fromunder rhe long shadow oí his mentors, Krauze identifies as a member oí

the 1968 generation, a generation that was marked by the student move-ment and by its violent end at the hands oí the Mexican state. Like a num-ber oí others, Krauze relies on this identity to acquire the semblante oí

A: 11 te e, Tu,, l's Stock

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purity He sets himself as a liberal and even as a "heretic,"10 an indepen-

dent intellectual who cr'i ticizes Mexican authoritaria nism from the sanc-

tity ot his private world-

In fact, however, Krauzes prestige and cultural poseer do not come from

1968, nor is he comparable on an intellectual plane ro Cosío Villegas, let

alone to Octavio Paz. Krauze's prominente is, instead, an effect oí a more

recent story. With the debt crisis in 1982: the Mexican government carne

down hard on al[ salary carnets real minimum wages plummeted to hall in

less than tive years (a fact that, like almost every economic consideration,

goes unnoted in Krauze's book) Among rhe wage-earning population,

one of the sectors that was hit hardest was rhe educational sector, and the

universities in particular.

When che debt crisis hit, the government was unwilling to maintain

universiry salaries at in their traditional middle-class levéis, and so it creat-

ed a system oí evaluation that sidestepped university regulations oí pro-

motion and that rewarded only productive academice. 'Publish or perish"

carne to have a very literal meaning in the Mexican academy. However,

rhe process oí internal stratification in the university system did nor come

without a substantial cost both for the prestige oí academic work and

for rhe possibility oí surviving as a beginning scholar. As a result, whole

,;enerations oí potential scholars were either significantly slowed down or

destroyed.At the same time that rhe Mexican state strangled its universities, it did

not abandon its patronage and contact with intellectuals. The de la

Madrid (1982-88) and Salinas (1988-94) governments coupled their tight

policies toward the university with generous contracts and subsidies to

specific intellectual groups. The principal groups gravitated around two

literary/political journals: Vuelta and Nexos. These two groups accumulated

vast cultural power in rhe 1980s and 1990s: Héctor Aguilar Camín, former

director oí Nexos, member oí the '68 generation and erstwhile leftist, was a

close friend to Carlos Salinas de Gortari. He created a publishing house,

Cal y Arena, whose books were widely distributed, publicized by Nexos-

controlled public TV Channel 22.

On his side, Enrique Krauze, rhe principal entrepreneur oí the Vuelta

group, received support from President de la Madrid for his "biographies

oí power" project (comprising rhe porflriato to Cárdenas sections oí Mexico:

Biography of Power), a project that was printed by the government-owned

publishing house Fondo de Cultura Económica, a prestigious press that

sidestepped its traditional role oí publishing scholarly work.

During that same period, Krauze and Vuelta began doing business with

A n ln tellee tu nls Stock

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Televisa, Mexicos television giant that had effectively been a communica-

tions monopoly for decades, thanks to os special ties to government.

Televisa had a largely negative role in Niexicos transition to democracy, a

fact that has been widely recognized by independent political observers

of Mexico, including Che United Nations This did not stop self-styled

democratic pero Enrique Krauze trom becoming one of the company's

partners. Krauze is co-owner oí Clio. a publishing house devoted to popu-

lartzing his version of Mexican history and producer of historical soap

operas that have devoted some effort to rehabilitating Porfirio Díaz

1876-19 10), the liberal dictator and formen archvillain oí official history.

In short, Krauze's power was amassed in a moment in which the gov-

ernment turned its back on pub r, education and research and subsidized a

process of cultural privatization that had similar characteristics to other

privatizations_ enormous concentration of power in very few hands, andthe formation oí a new elite.

Whereas Daniel Cosío Vlllegass facton, of history" was built in a pub-

he institution and whereas his lactory produced books that were signed

by the individuals who did the researeh, Krauzes lactory oí history is pri-

vate, and only he Cakes Che crecía For big rollers in Mexico's cultural en-

terprises, research is a menial task Thus, where most historians work

alune or with one or two assistants, Mr- Krauze lists sixteen in his ac-

knowledgments, two oí whom are as acconiplished as historians as Krauze

himself.'t His heavy reliance on dais privare lactory" is Che reason why

Chis book is such a good mirror ole presiden ti al power. the resources that

Krauze musters have allowed him to write a monumentally ambitious

work, but his rnethods make him unsurc at cvery toro. Mexico: Biography ofPower is a hollow monument.

Krauze as Historian

This books main empirical conrribution is a set oí interviews that the

author or his assistants made with important political figures as well asa much-publicized, but rather disappointing, diary oí President Díaz

Ordaz. Most of the book, however, is based on published documents, as

well as on secondary sources. The use of [hese secondary sources provides

another key for the archacologisi of tNicxicos modernist ruins.

During Che past twenty years or so, US. and British historians havewritten a sizahle proportion oí the most relevant works en Mexican his-tory, yet Che work of historians suela as Jolan Coatsworth, Alan Knight,Eric Van Young, GilbertJoseph Anthony Pagden, John Tutino, Florencia

A u l o t e : : , , iu al'e Sioek

220 =

Mallon, and Stephen Haber is not cited, nor-in most cases-are their

ideas assimilated in Che text, despite their indisputable relevante to the

subjects covered." Like the politicians who have always stressed Mexican

exceptionalism, Krauze roo is interested in Mexico's insularity; by turning

his own coterie oí friends and mentors into the principal thinkers and ac-

tors in Mexican history, he can easily aspire to become Mexicos represen-tative in Che media.

The use el the work oí Mexican scholars is equally problematic. For

instante, in his treatment oí the 1968 movement, a chapter that is meant

to be the high point of Che book, Krauze gives preeminence to two

intellectuals-Cosío Villegas and Octavio Paz-both oí whom were mar-

ginal to the movement and of an older generation, but were nonetheless

central to Krauze's own development Cosío Villegas gets no fewer than

thirty-three mentions in the text oí this book; Mexican historian Edmundo

O'Gorman, who was arguably a more profound thinker, gets none."

Perhaps the oversight is due to the fact that O'Gorman publicly disap-

proved of Krauze's biographies oí power. Citations of significant books

written by members oí a younger generation oí Mexican scholars are an-

other notable absence-they are potential competition.

In addition to the political motives behind these oversights, there is

another Iikely cause for Krauze's sloppy use oí secondary sources: Che fac-

tory This hypothesis comes to mind because there are a number oí in-

stances when a key historical work is indeed cited, but its conclusions are

not assimilated in the analysis. Or else a work is cited in one context (per-

haps being worked on by one oí his research assistants) but then fails to

appear as a source in another part oí the book where it could have done alot of good.

For example, French historian Frangois Xavier Guerra has developed

quite a complex view oí Che modernization oí Che Mexican state in the nine-

teenth century. Guerras view is that between independence (1821) and the

revolution (1910), Mexican political society changed from being made up

of corporations that were built around personal ties in villages, guilds, and

haciendas, to a modero society in which these personal ties could no longer

hold the country together. As a result, Che personal power of Porfirio Díaz

(1876-1910) is, for Guerra, both the culmination and the swan song oí

what Krauze calls a "biography of power." Guerra is cited en a factual mat-

ter, but his general argument is ignored Moreover, Guerra fails to appear in

Krauzes discussion of political theory in independence, where he would

have been very helpful. In sum, the cavalier use of secondary sources is pos-

sibly the only true cense in which Krauze can be called liberal.

An Intellectuul's Stock

221

The Aulhorily of Opinion

Enrique Krauze has had two principal mentors. Daniel Cosía Villegas and

)ocavia Paz. Krauze took Cono Villupass tactorv oí history , privatized tt,

and made It into his own political niachine Prora Paz Krauze has tried to

emulate grandeur, scope, and boldness -I he resale is not always bad-

Alexico: Biog raphy of Poioer is c,itainly a teadable book However, Krauze's

attempts at Paz-like holdnes, al,o llave a , ery perverso effeer, which is

ihat they liberare Chis book trom rhe usual strictures of historical evidenee.

Krauze has made a name loe him,cli in iM, xico by calling for a "democ-

raey without adjectives," but he aeeni, ent,rely incapable oí offering a his-

tory without opinions 14 More of(en [han not, these opinions are stated as

if they were facts. In Mexico, I3iogniphy of Power we are asked to believe, for

instance, that there were only two "trac ethnic wars" in Mexican history

(p. 780), and that Cosío Vlllegas's criticisms oí President Echeverría

1 1970-76) were the bravest thing any Mexican had published in one hun-

dred years (p. 746); we also learn rhat' Juárez the Indian" "was all religion"

(p. 167) and that his invocations of God and Providente were carried out

"without hypocrisy" (p 166) In short, the dictatorship oí what might use-

fully be labeled "the Krauzometer_"

The translator, Hank Heifctz, has done a commendablejob not only in

avoiding the annoying changes in register that characterize Krauze's

Spanish prose, but also in trying m tone down the Krauzometer as much

as possible So, for instance, in La presidencia imperial (the Spanish- language

book that comprises Parts IV and V oí Mexico. Biography of Power, and

which appeared simultaneously with it in the spring oí 1997), Octavio

Paz's Labyrinth of Solitude is "the most importanr book oí the Mexican twen-

tieth century" (100 en the Krauzometer, p. 152), but it is only "one oí the

most important books of rhe ^tilexican tventieth century" in English

p. 364, and an 80 on the Krauzometer) Similarly, in Spanish, Krauze

asserts boldly (100 on the Krauzometer) [hat President Díaz Ordaz

(1964-70) did not lie in his memoirs (p_ 355), but in English he asserts

that "[i]t is unlikely that they are al] líes" (pp. 728-29, and only a 55 en the

Krauzometer). In Spanish, Miguel de la Madrid won his election because

the people voted for him personally, and not for the PRI (p. 402, and 100

on the Krauzometer-president de la Nladrid was a generous patron

ro Krauze); in English, the people voted not for de la Madrid personally,

but rather for bis platform oí moral renovation (p. 763, and 80 en the

Krauzometer). Moreover, in Spanish, de la Madrid won the election with

76 percent ot the vote (p_ 402 ), whereas in English he seems only to have

An Ir,1,1;,,t,,i , Sieck

- 222

h

received 68 percent (p. 763) In this book , opinions are facts , and theyboth change along with rhe intended readership.

Biography and Power

Certainly, Krauze's factory has produced a readable book, with much in-

formation in it, including sume new information and a wealth oí atice-

dotes. Although nono of this information makes a significant mark on rhe

historical interpretation of modero Mexico, it does add richness and legi-

bility to chis facile and ideologically loaded test In Mexico, Krauze's ver-

sion oí history is being massively consumed in soap operas, which is an

appropriate-though perhaps not harmless-venue for it.

There is, in addition, another good selling point for Chis book, which is

che idea that biography is a useful vantage point for political analysis. 1

have already argued that Chis interest in biography led Mr. Krauze to che

great-man view of history that he allegedly rejects, but more attention toKrauze's biographies is warranted.

The first thing to note about [hese presidential biographies is that they

rarely provide che kind oí psychological insight that the author was hop-

ing for. This unevenness is due not only to the space and detall devoted to

various presidents (Miguel Alemán gets seventy-five pages, Manuel Ávila

Camacho gets twenty-seven, Miguel de la Madrid gets eight pages), but

also to the format of the chapters. For instante, whereas we get an attempt

to portray che family history and youth of presidents and caudillos be-

tween Porfirio Díaz and Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1876-1970), there is no

parallel information for che more contemporary presidents (beginning

with Echeverría). Krauze thereby declines any attempt to provide a more

profound portrait oí the three presidents with whom he has had a personalrelationship (de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo).

The irregularity oí rhe quality oí biographical insights is also a product

oí Krauze's rush to represent, which leads inevitably to an imprudent re-

liance on common sense. For instance, Krauze tells os that

[r]evolutions have been organized around ideas or ideals, liberty, equality,

nationalism, socialism. The Mexican Revolution is an exception because,

primordially, it was organized around personages . The local histories

from which they [these personages] began, their family conflicts, their lives

before rising to power, their most intimate passions-all are factors that

might have been merely personal, though perhaps representative, if these

were merely privare livcs But they could not be in Mexico, a country

An In tellectual ', Stock

223 =

where the conccntration of pos+ el finto a single person (tlatoani, monarch,

viceroy, emperor. President, caudillo, jefe, ^, Ledute) had been the historie

norm across the centuries.''

The trouble with this is that no disti ncti nos are made regarding the sig-

nificance oí biographies, say, for a tlatoani and for a president, or for a

caudillo and a monarch_ Instead of attentpting to specify these different

forms oí power, and then seeing their connection to biography, they are

constantly collapsed ¡rito a single cumposite, which is then-sometimes

anachronistically-turned ¡rito che giirnresscnce oí Mexicanness.

Throughour the book terms such as monarch, tlatoani, tbeocratic, andcaudillo are used as metaphors for other forms ol power. The Mexican presi-

dency is "like a monarchy." The president is "like a tlatoani-" Presidential

power is "almost theocratic° Jose Vosconcclos and Daniel Cosío Villegas

were intellectual "caudillos;' and communications magnate Emilio Azcárraga

was a "caudillo of ¡ndustry

These comparrsons and metaphors mas be innocent enough in daily

parlante, but ¡I your thesis ¡s that there is a special connection between

che details of a leader's biography and the counrry's destiny (p. xv), then

the difference between an actual monarchy and something that has simi-

larities to a monarchy, an actual caudillo and someone who is compared to

a caudillo, an actual tlatoani and a president, hecomes critical.

For example, the power of a revolutionary caudillo like Emiliano Zapata

was, especrally in its origins, charismatic People followed him because

they shared his cause, were often ¡n desperate straits, and because they be-

lieved in him_ Zapatas biography ¡s critically important because it is the

source oí che social connections of his inner circle (whose biographies in

turn affect outer circles), and because his persona gave credibility and di-

rection to che movement as a wholc. As a result, che epic oí Zapata's life

takes a messianic turn, similar to what we lind in a number of revolution-

ary caudillos ¡n Mexico, beginning with Miguel Hidalgo, whose political

usage oí the passion play was perceptlvely analyzed by Victor Turner (also

not cited by the author).

Krauze argues that the biography of Zapata and of Hidalgo is critical

for understandi ng their movement, destinies, but one might argue, con-

versely, that the construction of their personas was shaped by che context

¡n which thcy acose as leaders_ It is certainly no biographical accident that

led Zapata, Hidalgo, and even Madero to cake up a messianic, Christian

narrative and construct their persons around it. Specific forms oí power

such as presidencies, monarchies, grassroots leadership, and so en imply

A u I n r , , ,t,,1 l , elock

224

different kinds oí relationships between che leaders biography and the ex-

ercise oí power.

For instante, in European monarchies, the idea oí "the king', two bod-

ies" implied full identity between the king', well-being and the prosperity

oí the land. The king was like an embodiment oí his kingdom. Indeed, in

the case oí Spanish America, Philip 11 decreed the production oí censuses

and maps oí the entire realm (the famous Relaciones geográficas). The maps and

descriptions he received were concentrated in his palace at El Escorial and

in the office oí the royal cosmographer, and the information in those cen-

suses and maps was privy to che king. At the same time as he received the

maps, he sent out portraits oí his person to che four corners oí the realm:

the king concentrated the full image oí the realm in his palace; the realmreceived, in its stead, the bodily image oí the king.16

The relationship between biography and che application oí power in

this case is certainly distinct from that oí Mexico's nineteenth-century

presidenta. The connection between presidencial power and personal

benefit inverted che central dogma oí monarchy_ Nineteenth-century

caudillos like José María Morelos and even Santa Anna wanted to bethought oí as servants, not as lords, oí the nation. As a result, nineteenth-century presidenta ("caudillos") routinely modeled their public personae

alter Cincinnatus-a renouncer (much as George Washington did in che

United States, and Rosas did in Argentina). However, Krauze wrongly re-

duces Santa Annas constant show oí retreating from che presidential chair

to a psychological quirk ("he detested the direct and daily exercise oí

power"), when in fact it was a variation oí a classical theme in the theateroí presidential power in nineteenth-century Spanish America.17 Whereas

the monarch identified his personal welfare and prosperity with that oí

che realm, early presidents and revolutionary caudillos used personal sacri-

fice as a legitimating device_ As the presidency became a stable political

institution, the office began to require less dramatic personal sacrifices and

the image oí che "civil servant" became more prominent-this was the

image thatJuárez adopted for himself, but it was not routinized in Mexicountil well finto the twentieth century.

Krauze ignores all oí this. For him, charismatic power is a constant in

Mexican history, che product oí a mythified fusion oí Aztec and Spanish

"theocracies" As a result, he reduces the differences in the persona oí vari-

ous leaders to che details of their biographies. This error leads to the kind

oí Mexican exceptionalism that 1 objected to earlier (to the proposition

that there ¡s something about Mexico that makes all oí its leaders into

tlatoanis-or did, until the fateful events of 1968, which brought about a

An In tellectual's Stock

225

new generation. led by Krauze, anurng others, who Nave finally hrought

demoeracv co Mexico, thc Fnd ot Histoiy ti aLo Ieads him to eurious at-

tempts to diflerentiate "authentie (ron inauthentic" leaders.

Antonio López de Santa Anna Ii,r Krauze is che epitome of che fake.

lis powei was theatrical, opcratic and worse, tt was divorced from che

nation's roots-never mind that che nation did not yet effectively exist

Thus, commenting che rise of Benito Juaren (who, unlike Santa Anna, is

portrayed hese as being 100 percent authentie--"a puye-blooded Indias '),

Krauze saos that'Tclhe country would now he governed by a group of

young mestizos who were closer tu Mexican soil, closer to indigenous

roots" (p. 151). Which brings us back co che fundamental characteristic oí

Chis ruin: it is little more than a rcenactment of the nacional myth for the

1990s.

In De Critique of ihe Pyramid, a post-1968 reflection en what Fiad gone

awry in Mexico, Octavio Paz wrote a trenchant criticism oí Mexico's

Nacional Museum oí Anthropology. His main complaint was that the ar-

chitecture oí the building and as layout made the museum's Aztec hall

finto the culmination and synthesis of al] pre-Hispanic culture. This con-

struction oí the Aztec enipire as both the centerpiece oí the pre-Hispanic

world and che antecedent oí the independent Mexican nation negated

cultural pluralism, idealized a scrong central state, and falsified the pre-

Columbian past.

Krauze's book is very much like that museum. The fusion and confu-

sion oí tlatoanis, caudillos, viceroys, and presidents, and the thesis that the

course oí Mexican history was dictated by Díaz Ordaz's ugliness, by Santa

Anna's theatricality, and by Juárez's religiosiry and puriry, makes this book

as much of a Mexico City-centered account oí the history oí power in

Mexico as che Museum oí Anthropology ever was. In chis allegedly critical

review oí the Mexican presidency, che presidents are fetishized, and the

social history oí the country is collapsed finto nationalist myth.

The peculiarty oí Krauze's generation of mythmakers is that they arenot builders oí state institurions, but have instead used state patronageto build private niches for themselves- Two Mexican intellectuals oí the1968 generation have been emblematic in Chis transicion, Héctor AguilarCamín (former editor oí Nexos) and Enrique Krauze (former subdirector oí

Vuelta) ,18 These intellectuals have been in che business oí creating their

own "faetones oí culture." They now speak from these niches and ventrilo-quize "Civil Society," much as ',lava priests once interpreted the com-

mands oí a Talking Cross.So far Chis new mude oí cultural production has counted on the support

A,, luir ! I e..u al e,ock

226 =

oí che Mexican state, of some powerful-government-related-business-

men, and, by now, on as own private resources. The systcm also benefhts,

howcver, from che fact that che readership in che United States-and to

some excenc in Europe-has preferred to have a small handful oí author-

ized voices on Mexico rather than co cake che country seriously as a site oí

cultural and intellectual production. It has been economical and conve-

nient for Americans and others to simply tuve ¡Ti to Carlos Puentes,

Octavio Paz, or Enrique Krauze and to take whatever they say as repre-

sentative of whatJosé María Morelos called "che senciments of the nation

However, che power co represent Mexico in Chis way, to embody it in a

single intellectual, is as dead as che autocracic power oí the president.

When he was at the height oí his power, President Miguel Alemán

wanted the Nobel Peace Prize. President Luis Echeverría tried for the

secretary-general oí the UN, and Carlos Salinas wanted to be president oí

the World Trade Organization. These un-kingly desires reflect the natureoí presidencial power and the limits oí presidencial biographies: they are

not the main axis in the history oí Mexico. 1 like to think that this book is

the intellectual counterpart oí these desperate presidential moves: the

concentration oí cultural power in the hands oí a few intellectuals has

been linked to the authoritarian power oí Mexican presidents, and the

current democratization asid debilitation oí che presidential office prom-

ises to end this form oí "intellectual caudillismo."

An In trllec tu al 's Stock

227

11

Bordering on Anthropology:

Dialectics of a National Tradition

The current sense oí crisis in U.S. and European anthropology has been

widely debated Beginning with a series of criticisms oí the connections

between anthropology and imperialism in the 1970s, the critique oí an-

thropology moved no deeper epistemological terrain by interrogating the

riarrative strategies used by ethnographers to build up their scientific

authority and their role in shaping colonial" discourses oí self and other.

The field oí anthropology in the United States and Europe is still rever-

berating from these discussions.'

Less well known and less understood, perhaps, is the quieter sense oí

unease and transformation in anthropological traditions that one might

cal] "national anthropologies." By "national anthropologies" 1 mean an-

thropological traditions that have been fostered by educational and cul-

tural institutions for the development oí studies of their own nation.

These traditions began to be the object oí reflexive interest in the United

States and Europe during the 1970s, alongside vocal criticisms oí colonial-

ism_ Their significante for reshaping anthropological theory was brought

to the fore in the 1980s.'

Noteworthy among these interventions were two short pieces by Arjun

Appadurai arguing againstholism in dominant metropolitan anthropologi-

cal traditions. Holism, for Appadurai, was "a g]aring example oí the making

228 =

oí theoretical virtue oí a range oí infirmities oí practice,"' infirmities that

included the "tendency for places to become showcases for specific issues

over time."^ This tendency was weaker in peripheral anthropological tradi-

tions, because they developed not so much for the production oí a general

account oí "Man" or oí "Culture," but rather to confront social problems in

the ethnographer's own society, a society that was always problematically

integrated to "the West." Thus, in the 1980s, peripheral anthropologies be-

carne part oí a process oí diversification and specification oí anthropology,

a process that countered the grand holistic narratives oí earlier generations

that used India asan excuse to reflect on hierarchy, Africa to reflect on lin-

eage structures, or the Mediterranean to think about honor and shame.

This movement against grand holistic narratives and toward the diversifi-

cation oí the field is perhaps the principal symptom and effect oí globaliza-tion on "metropolitan" anthropological traditions.

However, the effects oí "globalization" on national anthropologies is

not so well understood. Globalization has involved a number of powerful

changes in these places, including transformations in the role oí national

governments in development and educational projects, the demise oí "na-

tional economies" as being even ideally viable, and changing publics for

anthropological works. These general tendencies seem to produce differ-

ing effects in distinct countries. These differences are influenced by fac-

tors such as national language (former English colonies having some com-

parative advantages here), the role oí local anthropologies in managing

national development, and their impact on nationalist narratives. In thischapter, 1 provide a historical interpretation oí the gestation of the currentmalaise in one national tradition, which is Mexican anthropology.s

Peripheral nations with early dates oí national independence, such as

most countries oí Latin America, have had national traditions oí anthro-pology that evolved in tandem with European and American anthropology

from its inception. The histories oí these national anthropologies is still

not very well known, in part because oí the disjunction between the waysthat anthropology is taught in the great metropolitan centers and in na-

tional anthropological traditions. Whereas in Britain, France, or the United

States, anthropological histories are traced back in time within their na-

tive traditions, "national anthropologies" often emphasize tiesto great for-

eign scholars, thereby placing themselves within a civilizational horizon

whose vanguard is abroad. Commenting on this phenomenon, Darcy

Ribeiro once said that his fellow Brazilian anthropologists were cavalos de

santo (spirit mediums who spoke for their mentors in Europe or the United

States). The works oí anthropologists oí the "national traditions" thus

B o r d r r i n g o n An t bro pology

229 =

appear co be discontinuous svith each other lh use a .Mexican illlustrati on,

che influence of Boas on Camk, and ol ( cure on che carlier Chavero

tends to mask che genealogica1 rclations between Camio and Chavero.

It is therctore no( surprising thai althnuuh che existente of chis class oí

national anthrccpologies is wcll knosen it has not buen suffictently theo-

rized. How does a discipline that otees so much to imperial expansion and

globallzation--indeed, a discipline that has otten conccived of itself as

che study of racial or cultural othcrs" thrive when os objects of study

are the anthropologist's co-nation_tls- H,osv are chcories and mechocis

developed in American or European anthropologies deployed in [hese

national traditions; Is there a relati onship between the current transfor-

mations of national anthropologies and che crisis of anthropology" writ

large?

The study oí Mexican anthropology is instructivo for the broader class

of national anthropologies. Mexico developed one oí the earliest, most

successful, and internationally influential national anthropologies.6 The

institutional infrastructure of Mexican anthropology is one oí the world's

largest and its political centrality within the country has been remarkable.

This is linked both to the critical role that Mexico's archaeological patri-

mony has played in Mexican nationalism and to anthropology's prominent

role in shaping national development. However, the success oí Mexican

anthropology in that nation's project of national consolidation is today its

principal weakness.The sense oí crisis in contemporary Mexican anthropology moves be-

tween two related concerns: che high degree oí incorporation oí anthro-

pology and anthropologists into che workings and designs oí the state,

and the isolation and lack oí intellectual cohesiveness of the academy. The

conecto with the co-optation of Mexican anthropology in particular is a

recurrent theme. In addition, there appears to be the sor[ oí disjunetionbetween research, criticism, and useful and positive social action ("rele-

vanee') that has also been the subject of recen[ attention.

This chapter claims that ^Mexican anthropology has reached the point

where it must transcend the limitations imposed by its historical vocation

as a national anthropology. In order to lend credence to chis normative

claim, 1 explore the development of Mexican anthropology from the mid-

nineteenth century to the present by focusing on four dynamic processes:

the historical relationship between the observations oí foreign scientific

travelers and the production of a national irnage (materials used for this

section range from che 1850s to che carly 1900s); che relatiionship between

evolutionary paradigms and the development of an anthropology applied

Ben enng on ,1nih'cpology

230 =

1

1

tu the management oí a backward population and as incorporation finto

"nacional society" (materials from che 1880s to che 1920s); the consoli-

dation of a developmental orthodoxy (materials from the 1940s to thc

1960s); and che attempt to move from an anthropology dedicated co che

study of Indians" co an anthropology devoted to che study oí social class

(materials from the 1970s to che 1990s). 1 begin by contextualizing the

current unease in Mexican anthropology, and move from there to the his-

torical discussion

19x8-95: "Criticism has been excbangedforan officiai post"'

The 1968 student movement produced a generacional rupture in Mexican

anthropology. Its manifesto carried che disdainful title of De eso que llaman

antropología mexicana (Oí that which they call Mexican anthropology), a

book that was penned by a group oí young professors oí the Nacional

School oí Anthropology who were playfully known in those days as 'The

Magnificent Seven." The magníficos had had the daring to criticize that jewel

on the crown of the Mexican Revolution that was indigenista anthropology.

By 1968 the identification oí Mexican anthropology with official na-

tionalism was at its peak. The new Nacional Museum oí Anthropology,

which was widely praised as che world's finest, had been inaugurated in

1964, and the Nacional School oí Anthropology (ENAH) was housed on

its upper floor. The institucional infrastructure oí Mexican anthropology

was firmly linked to che diverse practices oí indigenismo, including bilingual

education, rural and indigenous development programs throughout the

country (concentrated in che Instituto Nacional Indigenista, INI), and a

vast research and conservation apparatus, housed mainly in the Instituto

Nacional de Antropología e Historia (INAH). Mexican anthropology hadprovided Mexico with che theoretical and empirical materials that were

used to shape a modernist aesthetics, embodied in the design oí buildings

such as the National Museum of Anthropology or che new campus oí the

National University. It was charged with the task oí forging Mexican citi-

zenship both by "indigenizing" modernity and by modernizing the Indians,

thus uniting all Mexicans in one mestizo community. In Mexico, Chis is

what was called indigenismo.

According to che magníficos, Mexican anthropology had placed itself

squarely in the service oí che state, and so had abdicated both its critical

vocation and its moral obligation to side with the popular classes. The

1968 generation complained that Mexican indigenismo had as its central

goal the incorporation oí che Indian finto the dominant system, a system

Borderine on Anthropology

231 =

that was called national" and "modern' by rhe indigenistas, but that was bet-

ter conceived as "capitalist' and dependen[." Mexican anthropology was

described as an orchid in the hothouse of e lexico's authoritarian state, co-

opted and entirely saturated by irs needs ami those oí foreign capital.

Moreover, the legitímate actions of early indigenistas, their tres to the

Mexican Revolution, had been exhausted. In the words one oí rhe magníficos,Guillermo Bonfil.

Today we can contrast rhe reality of Mexican society with rhe ideals oí the

revolution and establish che distante between the two . It would be diffi-

eult ro doubr that these days we can no longer do justice to the future by

m a intaining rhe same programs that were levolution ary sixty years ago.

Those programs have either run their nurse or else they have been shown

tú be ineffective, useless, or, worse yet, thcy have produced historically

negative results.°

Thus, the authors oí De eso que llaman nrtropología mexicana called forMexican anthropologists tu keep rheir distante from the state. They

should steer clear oí a policy (indigenismo) that had the incorporation oí the

Indian finto "national society" as as principal aim. "National society," noted

Arturo Warman, was always an undefined category that simply stood for

what Rodolfo Stavenhagen and Pablo González Casanova had called "in-

ternal colonialism" as early as 1963. The aim oí Mexican indigenismo had

been rhe incorporation of the Indian into the capitalist system oí exploita-

tion, and in so doing it had abandoned the scientific and critical potentialoí rhe discipline.°

Not surprisingly, tensions grew strong in the National School oí

Anthropology, and they culminated in rhe expulsion oí Guillermo Bonfil

from the school by director Ignacio Bernal. The fact that a number oí indi-

genistas remained loyal to rhe government during and alter the 1968 move-

ment was sean by rhe sesentayocheros as a final moment oí abjection, and it

marked the end oí that school's dominante in Mexican academic settings.

Twenty years later, however, Arturo Warman, who was rhe most famous

oí the magníficos and author of a number of books that were critical oí

Mexico's agrarian policies, accepted rhe post oí director oí the Instituto

Nacional Indigenista, and later that oí Secrerary oí Agrarian Reform under

President Salinas. From chis position Warman conducted rhe govern-

ment's agrarian policies, which were directed precisely to incorporating

Mexican peasants roto forma of production that are geared to the market.

Thus rhe co-optation oí the anthropological establishment seemed to

repeat itself, complete with as own momeni of drama: in March 1995 the

Mexico City papers reponed that Arturo Warman was charged withpleading with former President Salinas on behalf oí President Zedillo toput an end to a one-day hunger strike.10

Principal Thesis

My contention is that the image of anthropology's history repeating itselfin a never-ending cycle oí state incorporation is misleading. In this chap-

ter, 1 seek to elucidate the origins and historical evolution and current ex-

haustion oí Mexican anthropology as a confined, national, tradition.

The concerns that characterized anthropology in Mexico even before

its institutional consolidation in the late nineteenth century related to the

historical origins oí rhe nation and to rhe characteristics oí its peoples.

The study oí rhe origins and oí the attributes oí the nations "races" was es-

pecially important in Mexico, where independence preceded the forma-

tion oí a bourgeois public sphere. Until very recently, at least, Mexico has

been a country in which public opinion is to a large degree subsidized and

dramatized by rhe state. Anthropological stories oí national origins and oí

racial and cultural difference were therefore useful to governments and

they were routinely projected both onto the nation's interna) frontiers and

abroad, Anthropology has helped to reconfigure the hierarchical relations

that develop between sectors of the population, and it contributed to the

formation and presentation oí a convincing national teleology. However,

in Mexico, as elsewhere, the strategies and role oí rhe state in shaping the

contours oí society have been deeply transformed from the 1980s on. The

crisis in anthropology today is not as much about rhe discipline's absorp-

tion by the state as it is about as uncertain role in rhe marketplace. An en-

lightened vanguard may no longer realistically aspire to fashion and shape

public opinion for interna) purposes, and discourses regarding cultural ori-

gins and social hierarchies are no longer central to the allure oí the coun-

try for foreign governments and capitalista- In this context, there is a realneedforinvention

Anthropology and the Fashioninq of a Modera National Image

Shaping an image oí national stability, oí collective serenity, security, andseriousness oí purpose, has never heen an easy task in Mexico. It was ab-solutely impossible to accomplish in ehe decades following indepen-

dence (1821), when governments had to operare with unstable and insuffi-cient revenue, a foreign deht that was impossible to pay, constant internal

Ro rdrrin4 oi Ani h^opologyBo rderinq on232 Antbropology=

233 =

Figure 11 .1 , The Horsea ni] thr Zapilott, in Evans (1 870), p. 506 The buzzard (here

misspelled) became a regular motiv in travel writing on Mexico during the nine-

teenth century. Buzzards figure in the first Mexican impressions oí both Fanny

Calderón de la Barca and E. B.Tvlor. Here, Colonel Albert Evans uses the image to

end his book on a suitably pessirnistic note: "As wc went down by rail from Paso

del Macho to Veracruz, we lookcd from dhe window oí what had been Maximilian's

imperial car, upon a scene by the roadside which struck me nearer to the heart,

and filled my soul with sadness . a poor old steed-who may have borne Santa

Anna and his fortunes in his day, or hetter seved the world by drawing a dump

cart for a grading party-had been mrned out to die. The zapilotes [sic]-which are

among the insnmtions of the country-watching from afar saw death 's signal in

his glazing eye, and wheeling down froto their airy heights, came trooping from

all directions to the coming feast' (Evans 1873- 505-6),

revolutions, a highly deficient system oí transportation, and frequent for-

eign invasions. The image oí Mexico abroad, an image that had been so

important to Mexican politicians and intellectuals even before Baron von

Humboldt published his positive accounts oí New Spain, had turned very

contrary indeed. Naturalists and ethnographers who followed Humboldt's

steps took a decidedly negative view oí Mexicos present and a pessimistic

view oí its future.11

A useful point oí entry for understanding ehe labors oí early Mexicananthropologists is a discussion oí Edward B Tylor's travel book on Mexico,

Bordcr,n.t o ,. Anfi;ro polo9y

= 234 =

which recapitulates the advenmres and impressions that he and the collec-

tor HenryChristyhad on their trip to Mexico in 1856- To my knowledge,

this book has never been published in Spanish, and it is not widely known

or read in Mexico. This is odd at first glance, given .Mcxico's legitimate

daim to have been the muse that inspired the discipline that in Oxford

was at times referred to as "Tylors science."'t The lack oí attention to

Tylor's Mexican connection seems even stranger given the peed that coun-

tries like Mexico have had to remirad the world that thev have not been

absent in the process of shaping the course of Western civilization.1i

Mexico's failure te) appropriate Tylor's Anabuac seems less perplexing

when we actually read the book. Tylor described a Mexico whose presi-

dency had changed hands once every eight months for the previous ten

years, a country whose fertile coastal regions were badly depopulated, and

whose well-inhabited highlands were bandit infested and difficult to trav-

el. Mexico was also a country that was sharply divided by race, where the

whites and half-castes were hated by the Indians whom they exploited.

Tylor's first vista oí Mexico is the por[ oí Sisal, in the Yucatán, and it

gets the Mexican reader off to an uneasy start, suggesting the fragility oí

Mexico as a polity and its lack oí cohesiveness as a nation:

Cine possible article oí expon we examined as closely as opportunity

would allow, namely, the Indian inhabitants. There they are, in every re-

spect the right article for trace: brown-skinned, incapable oí defending

themselves, strong, healthy, and industrious; and the creeks and mangrove

swamps oí Cuba only three days' sail off. The plantations and mines that

want one hundred thousand men to bring them into full work, and swallow

aborigines, Chinese, and negroes indifferently-anything that has a dark

skin, and can be made to work-would take [hese Yucatecos in any quan-

tity, and pay well for them.14

Tylors first impression was a disturbing reminder oí the fragility of the

links between Mexico's people and its territory. His observation revealed

what is still today something oí a dirty secret, which is that Mayas were

indeed being sold as slaves in Cuba at the time. But if Tylor's first impres-

sions were unsettling, Mexican nationalists would find little solace in his

conclusions:

That [Mexico's] total absorption [finto the United States] must come, sooner

or later, we can hardly doubt_ The chief diffieulty seems to be that the

American constitution will not exacdy suit the case- The Republic laid down

the right oí each citizen to his share in che government oí the country as a

B o r d e r t n g o s A

=235=

1 2. Porter ami Bakerin MMexicu, in Edward B . Tylor, Anabuae ( 1861), p. 54.

universal law .. making, it is true, so me slight exceptions with regard to red

and black men. The Mexicans, or at least the white and half-caste Mexicans,

will be a difficulty. Their claims lo citizenship are unquestionable if Mexico

were made a State oí the Union; and, as everybody knows, they are totally

incapable oí governing themselves ... [Mjoreover, it is certain that

American citizens would never allow even the whitest oí the Mexicans to be

placed on a footing of equality with themselves. Supposing these difficulties

got over by a Protectorate, an armed occupation, or some similar con-trivance , Mexico will undergo a great change . There will be roads and evenrail-roads, some security for lile and property, liberty oí opinion, a flourish-

ing commerce, a rapidly increasing population, and a variety oí good things.

Every intelligent Mexican must wish for an event so greatly to the advan-

tage oí his country ...1$ As for ourselves individually, we may be excused for

cherishing a lurking kindness for the quaint, picturesque manners and cus-

toms oí Mexico, as yet un-Americanized; and for rejoicing that ir was our

fortune to travel there before che coming change, when its most curious

peculiarities and its very language must yield before foreign influence.16

Tylor's Mexicans were in most respects an unenlightened people.

Mexican schooling was dominated by an obscurantist and coirupt church

(Tylor mentions Che case oí a priest who was a highwayman, and discusses

the laxity oí priestly mores) 17 The legal system gave no protection to or-

dinary citizens, who were at a structural disadvantage with respect to sol-

diers and priests. The population avoided paying taxes because the gov-

ernment was ineffective. The country as a whole was in the hands oí

gamblers and adventurers, and Mexican jails offered no prospect oí re-forming prisoners.

Ethnologists and historians oí the period must have been struck by the

Mexican governments incapacity to control the connections between thenation's past and its futuro, a fact that is demonstrated by Tylor andChristy's activities as collectors oí historical trophies, but even more po-tently by Tylor's remarkable description oí Mexico's national museum:

The lower story had been turned into a barrack by the Government, there

being a want of quarters for tire soldiers. As the ground-floor under the

cloisters is used for the heavier pieces oí sculpture, tire scene was somewhat

curious The soldiers had laid several oí the smaller idols down en their

faces, and were sitting en the confortable seat un the small oí their backs,

busy playing at cards. An encerprising soldier liad built up a hutch with

idols and sculptured stones against the statue oí the great war-goddess

Teoyaomiqui herself, and kept rabbits there. The state which the whole

13ordering en Anihropology

= 237

Figure 11.3- 1-lon- Willian, fi- Srto,trd Tranoiiug io klrxico, in Eva lis (1870), p. 18.

A characterisu cal ly uncritical re preseuc^tlon ot American power in che period-

place was in when chas left te che tender mercies oí a Mexican regiment

may he imagined by any one who knows ti liat a dirty and destructive ani-

mal a Mexican soldier is. '"

Mexican anthropology has liad multiple births, the writings oí the

sixteenth-century friars, and especially of Bernardino de Sahagún, are fre-

quently cited, hut so are those ol Cicole patriots and antiquarians writing

in the seventeenth and eightecnth tentarles, or che foundation of the

International School oí American Archaeology and Ethnology in 1911 by

Franz Boas, and the creation oí che tirst department oí anthropology by

his student, Manuel Gamio, in 1917.'" Anahuac represents an unacknowl-

edged, but not a less important, point of origin, for Tylor's first book was

the sort oí travel narrative that anthropologists, including Tylor himself,

tried to trump with che scientihc discipline of anthropology, retaining the

sense oí discovery and of daring of che gente while reaching for systemati-

zacion and eniotional distante -2o For Mexican intellectuals, however,

Anahuac nanied the unspeakahle but omnipresenc nightmare oí racial dis-

memberment, nacional disintegracion, and tire shameful profanation of the

nacion's gnndeur by che state itsclf. Anahuac in other words, is a work that

hoth British and Mexican anthropologists would write against- As in a

Freudian dream, che primal scene has peen carefully hidden, but che devel-

opment of anthropology in Mexico (and, indeed, in Britain) was to a signi-

ficant degree shaped by che negative imprint oí chis book and others like it.

After the publication oí Anahuac, things in Mexico took a different turn

than che one that Tylor had envisioned- Instead oí being invaded by che

United States, Mexico was occupied by France, which made the best oí

che American Civil War to regalo a foothold en che continent; and, al-

though Tylor was not entirely wrong in thinking that a number of Mexicans

would welcome che intervention of a great power, civil strife and resis-

tanee against the French proved stronger than he had anciicipated, and che

curo of world events frowncd upon Mexico's second empire. Alter its "sec-

ond independence," however, Mexico had yet to show that it was a politi-

cally viable country, a country that was capable of attracting foreign in-

vestors, a country that could embrace progress.

Cine important move in Chis direction is a book written by Vicente

Riva Palacio and Manuel Payno, boda of whom would later lead che manu-facture of a new history of Mexico." El libro rojo (The red book) (1870) was

among che first of a series oí lavishly printed and illustrated volumes of the

final third of che nineteenth century. It is a brief history of civil violente inMexico, told by way of an illustrated look at executions and assassina-tions, much as if it were a book of saints. El libro rojo is remarkable for itsecumenical reproach oí civil violence. Illustrated pages are dedícated

equally to Cuauhtémoc and lo Xicotencatl ( Indian kings who fought on

Figure 11.4. Dolcefarniente, unsigned etching from Felix L. Oswald , Summerland

Sketches, or Rambles in the Backwoods of Mexico and Central America (Philadelphia, 1880),

p. 185. The image oí a lazy and obscurantist church was a staple oí anglophone

writing en Mexico from che time oí Thomas Gage's work in che seventeenth cen-

tury to the writings oí Edward B. Tylor and beyond. Here the priest' s siesta illus-

trates Oswald's observations on Mexico in che 1870s.

[ l o r d o r ; n . ; o , A i, ropo logy Bordering en Anthropo logy

= 238 = = 239

Figure 115. Statue of tbe.blexican Godlrss l War (o, oj Denth) Teoyaomiqui ( 1861), inEdward E. Fylor, Anabuac p- 221 Soldicrs used Chis stone to build a rabbit hutch.

opposite sides during the Conquest), to conquistador Pedro de Alvarado

and to Che Aztec emperor Moctezuma, to Jews who were burned by the

Inquisition and to priests who were massacred by Indians, to marooneel

African slaves and to a Spanish archbishop. Even more remarkably, the

pantheon of martyrs includes heroes on alternare sides oí Mexico's civil

struggies oí Che nineteenth century _ Father Hidalgo and Iturbide; the lib-

erals Comonfort and Melchor Ocampo, and the conservatives Mejía and

Miramón. Even Maximilian oí Hapsburg, who had been executed by the

still-reigning president, Benito Juárez, was given equal treatment.

El libro rojo sought te shape a unified Mexico by acknowledging a shared

history of suffering. Ideologically, this was Che course that was later taken

under General Díaz (1884-1910)22 El libro rojo was primarily directed to

unifying elites, as is shown by the book's guiding interest in state execu-

tions, rather than in Che anonymous dead produced by civil strife or ex-

ploitation. The unification oí elites involved taming the nation's war-toro

past and projecting Chis freshly rebuilt past finto the present in order to

shape a modernizing frontier. It is therefore not surprising that the pacifi-

cation and stabilization oí Che country that followed slowly after Che

French intervention required the services oí an enlightened elite, which

carne to be known as the cient(cos, in order to shape Mexicos image.

This is the subject oí derailed work by Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo, in hisbook Mexico at the Worlds Faus and clsewhere. 1 will Ilustrare the kind oí

work that was accomplished by Chis intelligentsia by referring to a book

that was published in English and French by justo Sierra and a team oí il-

lustrious científicos in 1900, Mexico Its Social Evolution. This work is oí special

interest not only because Sierra was such a prominent and influential fig-

ure in Mexican culture and education, but also because it was printed es-

pecially in foreign languages, and its lavishly produced illustrations seem

to answer point by point the negative comments and images oí Mexico of-

fered by Tylor and other travclers.

The hrst, most fundamental strategy followed by Sierra's team was to

make Mexico's evolution compiehensible and parallel to that of France,

Britain, or Che Uniced Statcs (that is, to readers oí French and English).

Thus, Che narres oí the authors and historical personages were anglicized,

trom "Jane Agnes de la Cruz" ro "William Prieto," and parallels hetween

Mexico's evolution and that of Che civilized world were explicitly or implic-

itly established. Carlos ("Charles") de Sigüenza y Góngora is placed along-

side Isaac Newton, Río de la Loza is followed shortly by Auguste Comte,

and photographs oí museums, hospitals, and courthouses built in Victorian

or Che latest Parisian styles were displayed on page alter page- This mimetic

Bardrrii^9 on An tbropala2y

241

strategy was common aniong tMcxic u's elite literary and scientific cireles

of the Belle hpuque, but it is takcn Lip in a punctual manner by Sierra, who

cndeavors to show that cach of cite hallmarks ol progress exists in Mexico.

Tylor complamed uf che state ol ahandon of ^Vlcxican education and its

suhordination tti a retrograde ehureti lusui Sierra piovided diseussions of

che development of Mexican positice scic ice Tvlor smiled ironically at

che lack ot actention citar reas given tu Mcxicu's history and patrimony

Sierra shows che Nacional Musevm ot ^nthropulogy and che ways in

which Nlexicos once contlici toro roces I-mec bcen neacly studied and or-

ganizad in it 1inally, Tylor notcd cite arhitrariness of Mexico's govern-

nient and che lack oí justice and institu tions of social reform. Sierra shows

che rapid and impressive development ol courts of law, of councils, hospi-

tals, schools, museums, and prisons In short, while Tylor spoke oí a coun-

try that had becn ravaged by revolution, Sierra'% book spoke oí evolution.

In chis dialectic between Tylors and Sierras books one can catch a

glimpse oí che central role that anthropology has had in Mexico's history.

In a rather simplified way, one could say ciar the international aspect oí

anthropology has the capaciry tu destabilize nationalist images oí Mexico.

Mexicds nacional anthropology has worked hard to curb these tendencies

by imaging che parallels between Mexico's development and that of the

nations that produce anthropologists who tiavel.

Shaping Narralives of Internal Hierarchy, Organizing Governmental

Intervention in tse Modernizing Process

In addition to shaping and defending the nacional image, Mexico's anthro-

pology had from the beginning a role to play in the criticism and organi-

zation oí interna) hierarchies,

Even before che risa oí any solid institucional framework for che devel-

opment of Mexican anthropology, diseussions and writings en roce and en

che historical origins oí Mexico's Acoples were constantly deployed in

order to orient strategies oí government. The Boletín de la Sociedad Mexicana

de Geografía y Estadística, Mexico's oldest scientific periodical (founded in

1839), has many examples of chis. Statistical and population reports that

viere drafted in che 1 850s and 1860s ofren carried sections on roce, for

instante. Thus, luan Estrada in his repon on che Prefectura del Centro oí

che state oí Guerrero, says that OJf che 25,166 souls in the prefecture,

20,000 are Indians. However, wliat is paintul is that che remaining 5,000

are not educated, nor do they relcaio from uniting with che Indians in their

designs to exterminare che HispanoNlexican rase.°2s

Figure 1 1.6. The Nacional Preparatory Scbool, from justo Sierra, ed., Mexico Its Social

Evolution, tome 1, vol. 2, p. 480. Finely printed photographs of modero hospitals,

laboratorios, libraries, prisons, schools, courcrooms, town halls, and railroad

stations fill che pages oí Sierra's book.

In the lame period (1845), the Constitutional Assembly oí the Depart-

ment oí Querétaro gives a more nuanced account oí che racial question in

its state "The wise regulatory policy oí our government has proscribed for-

ever che odious distinctions between whites, blacks, bronzed, and mixed

races. We no longer have anything but free Mexicans, with no differences

among them except those imposed by aptitude and merit in order to selectche various destinies oí the republic."24 However, the authors go en:

We would abstain from making Chis sort of classification [i.e., racial classifi-

cation] were it nor trae that just as politics prefers to treat citizens as essen-

tial parís of che nation, so does economics prefer to consider their specific

condition, nor in order to worsen it but, en the contrary, to seek ics im-

provement. Without a practical knowledge oí che peoples [los pueblos], we

cannot improve their civilizacion, their morality, their wealth, nor che

wants that affect them.25

The congress then proceeds to discuss che qualities and deficiencies

not only oí Querétaro's three main roces (Indians, mixed-bloods, and

R o n d e r i n g o n A n t h o p o l o g y B o r d e r f r g o n A n t b r o p o l o g y

12 = 243 =

figure 11 J National Museum, Salan of the Alonolitbs, from justo Sierra, Mexico Its SocialEvolution, tome 1, vol. 2, p 488.

Creoles), but also importan[ distinctions within the Creole race accordingto levels oí education. Thus, while the highest class oí Creoles is circum-spect, controlled, and similar to the ancient Spartans, the classes beneaththem can be fractious.

Statistics supplied by the state of Yucatán for the year 1853 include de-tailed discussions oí the relationship between race and criminality, show-

ing that Indians are less likely to commit violent crimes than castas or

Creoles, because the Indian race is belittled (apoc(jda), either naturally or as

a result oí degeneration- Correspondingly, Indians indulge in petty theft,

and they do so systematically, The Indian steals, More [han anyrhing he

is a thief, and Chis he is without exception, and in as many ways as he can

However, because of their petty nature, these thefts escape the action oí

justice, and so are not recorded in tire annals oí crime."26 Statistics from

the department of Soconusco in Chiapas in the lame period divided local

yaces into ladinos, Indians, blacks, and Lacandones.27

It is clear from [hese reports that rhere was not a fixed national sys-

tem of racial composition, but that the races, and even to some extent

the specifics oí rheii character varied substantially by region. Even

1_dward B. Tylor's classification ol Mexican races reflects Chis, for although

he foregrounds the relationship between Indians, hall-castes, and Spanish-

Borde ring o', A n 1 b i o p o l o g y

Mexicans, he also mentions the black population in the Veracruz region,

and divides Mexican Indians into three types: brown Indians, red Indians,

and blue Indians. These "blue Indians," known in Mexico at the time as

pintas, were the troops oí general Juan Álvarez that had overrun Mexico

City shortly before Tylor's visit, and they were "blue" because many of

them had a skin disease that orases pigment in large patches.

One oí the principal tasks oí anthropology as it began to develop in

the 1 880s was to put order into these regional hierarchies oí race and to

tic them into a vision oí national evolution oí the sort that was so success-

fully displayed in Sierra's Mexico: Its Social Evolution. A key strategy for chis

can be found in Alfredo Chavero's work on pre-Columbian history in

Mexico a través de los siglos (1 888), a work that develops an evolutionary

scheme for pre-Columbian history that implicitly organizes hierarchical

relations between the yaces in the present.

Chavero describes Mexico's pre-Columbian past as if it had been wait-

ing underground for his patriotic generation to bring it back to life.

Throughout the ravages oí colonial destruction and the revolutions oí the

nineteenth century, the colossal Mexican past slept under a blanket oí soil:

But our ancient history had been saved, and all that could have perished in

oblivion shall today rige to our hands. Even if [hese hands he guided more

by daring than by knowledge, they are also moved by love oí country, a

love that embraces the desire tu preserve oíd memories and ancient deeds

just as the great hall oí a walled castle keeps the portraits oí each oí its

lords, che sword of the conquistador and the luto oí the noble lady 2a

After claiming the possession of the noble treasures oí the past for his

country, Chavero proponed an evolutionary story for pre-Columbian

Mexico. This story had blacks as the initial inhabitants- However, these

blacks were weaker and less well suited to most oí Mexicos environment

than the race that expelled them from al] but the torrid tropical zones: the

Otomis. For Chavero, ir is the Otomis who can be truly called Mexico's

first inhabitants. However, the Otomis were not much better than the

blacks: they were a population oí troglodytes who spoke a monosyllabic

tongue, a people that was contemporaneous with humanity's infaney:29

Life in [hose days could be nothing but the struggle for sustenance. Fami-

lies were formed only by animal instinct. Intelligence was limited inside the

compressed crania oí those savages ... And just as nothing linked them to

heaven orto an eternal god, so too did they lack any nos tú the earth; there

was no fatherland [patria) for them.30

B o r d e r i n g o n Ant bro p ology

245 =

Despite there unpromising hegininga, che intcriority ol che Otomis did

flor deeply star che natian pri ele Instead 1t actually proved uselul to

uflderstan el ing eontem poiuiv ras ial hit iarchies 1 ortla' Otomis initia ted ara

svoluu oflan nx,vulile lit that culmi naced s, ah che magnilieent Nahoas, a

tate ahuse appearance seas auctnding tu C llavero, e untemporancous wirh

that ot the greate i yilizations ol Lgypt, India, and China Moreover, the

Oro mis otrer a valuable perspectirc iruni svhieh lo comprchcnd the condi-

clan of thc Indians CiLI11TI 11- C haveis s prescnt lar che Otomís acre che

India,i Indians _ thcy were che cunnuu cd peoples ol tliose sello wcre later

in therr turra , conquered Because ol this, thcy allow che Mexican to rela-

-tivize che Spanish Conquest and ro diminish its weighr in nacional history

But did these first peoples acquire any culture ? We are not surprised to find

them degraded and almost brutish lin che historical penad . They were toro

apart by invasions without recciving new lile-blood [savia] from che con-

querors , and inferior peoples desecad and perisla when thcy come finto con-

raer wirh more advaneed people We sroulcl he wrong to judge che state oí

rhe ancient kingdom of Mexico befare che Conquest on che basis of our

prescnt-day Indians'

[Ti one stroke Chavero has established both the grandeur oí the Mexican

past and che kcy to comprehend lis lall, and so has put aside the painful

image that foreigners still projecred of Mexico in Chavero `s day. Mexico's

prehistory and its contemporary momear mapped onto each other, they

conipleted one another The images of the Negro , Otomi , and early Nahoa

races in figures 1 1.8a-c illustrate chis point . whereas Chavero used archaeo-

logical pieces to portray the early Negro and Nahoa races, he relied tan a

drawing oí a contemporary " Indian rype " to portray the ancient Otomi.

The contemporary degenerare ' odian rype maps onto and indeed substi-

tutes for rhe missing image of the early and unevolved Otomi, just as the

ancient grandeur oí che Nahoa completes che image oí Mexico 's future as

it is being shaped by che científico elite-

Moreover , there is a striking similarity berween Chavero 's description

oí the degraded Otomis and contemporaneous descriptions by foreigners

oí che Mexican Indian . For example , U.S historian Hubert Bancroft wrote

a diary oí his travels to Mexico at the tinte sehen México a través de los siglos

seas in preparation , and he makes che following comment regarding the

pervasive fears os U.S annexation aniong Alexicans:

But what che United Stares seants nt iMexico, sellar benefit would accrue

from adding more terntory, whar clic nadan has lo gain from it 1 cannot

rdcris) ..,. .nibi ,^pologJ=lao=

Figure 11.Sa. Cabeza gigantesca de Hueyápan , in México a través de los siglos, vol. 1, p. 63.

fathom ... If there were nothing else in the way, the character oí the

Mexican people would be objection enough . The people are not the nation

here as with us; che politicians are absolute . There is no middle class, but

only the high and the low, and che low are very lose indeed, peor, ignorant,

servile and debased , and wirh neither the heart or the hopo ever to attempt

to better their condition. 1 have traveled in Europe and elsewhere, but

never have 1 before witnessed such squalid misery and so much oí it. Sit at

the door oí your hotel, and ven will see pass by as in some hellish panorama

che withered, the deformed, che lame and che blind, deep in che humility oí

B o r d e r i n g o t A

= 247

Figure 1 I,Sb- Tipo otontí, in México a envés de los siglos, vol. 1, p. 66

Figure 1 1.8c. Cabecita de Teotihuarrín, in México a través de los siglos, vol. 1, p. 69.

debasement, half hidden in their dingy, dirty rainment as if the light oí

heaven and the eyes of man were equally painful to them, hunchbacks and

dwarfs, little filthy mothers with lude filthy babes, grizzly gray headed

tren and women bent douhle and hobbling en canes and crutches.32

In the Pace of these devastating impressions, Chavero and his genera-

tion strived to make Mexico presentable to the patriot, to make it defen-

sible vis-a-vis the foreigner, and especially to attract foreign allies. The

success oí this great concerted effort oí the Porfirian intellectual elite has

been discussed by Tenorio-Trillo, who calls the team oí Mexican intellec-

tuals and politicians who pulled it off "wizards." This is perhaps not much

oí an exaggeration. Fernando Fscalante has reminded us that during most

of the nineteenth century, Veracruz, a town that was so plague-ridden that

it was known as "the city oí death," was nevertheless the favorite city of

the Creoles, because going there was the best way te) get out oí country.

The special role oí Chavero and other early anthropologists was to

suggest a certain isomorphism between the past and the present. By creat-

ing a single racial narrative for the whole country, diese anthropologists

B o r d e r i n g o n An thro pol oyy

249 =

eould shape the invernal tionuers idt mod erniza ti on whilc upholding a

telcology that nade progress and cvulution in integral aspect el Mexican

civilization Moreover, this strategy involved using hístory te moralize

ebout the present. which w;u are inuncnsely popular aetivity in Mexico

that had significant grassrouts appeal ',

The generation of Porhriati anthropologists would use this evolution-

ary theory as a frame for shaping iA'lexicos imago, but rcvolutionary an-

thropologists would use it to interv ene direcdy in native communities.

The key figure in Chis development is Manuel ( amio who was so suceess-

tul that he is generally considerad the "lather" of Mexican anthropology

Because Gamio's story is well known, 1 shall only briefly recapitulate

Manuel Gamio met Franz Boas when the latter founded the International

School of American Archaeology and Ethnology in Mexico City in 1910.

Boas, as Guillermo de la Peña has shown, felt that Gamio was the most

promising of the young Mexican scholars and invited him to do his doc-

toral work at Columbia." Gamio also reccived support from Carranza's

government even before its final triumph over Villa, and in 1917 he creat-

ed the Department of Anthropology of Mexicos agriculture and develop-

ment ministry, From this position, Canijo organized a monumental study

oí the population of the Valley of Teotihuacán

In San Juan Teotihuacán, Camio found a perfect parable for the Mexi-

can nation. The valley of Teotihuacán was rich, but its people were

poor; the ancient city was the sise of astonishing civilizational grandeur,

but the current inhabitants had degenerated as a result of the Spanish

Conquest, exploitation, and the poor fit between Spanish culture and the

racial characteristics of the Indians- Just as important, perhaps, the set-

ting offered up the raw materials for the presentation of a national aes-

thetics, a strategy that had already been implemented by the authors of

México a través de los siglos and the architects of Mexico's exhibit at the Paris

World's Fair of 1889. This work is continued and deepened by Gamio,

who attempts not only to extend the use of an Indian iconography in

Mexican publishing and architecture, but also to adopt an indigenizing

aesthetic for enlightened classes, and to bring a serious engagement with

indigenous culture to bear on modern technologies in architecture and

cinema. 35

The elevation of traditional cultura for the consumption of elite classes

was a matter of some controversy and it was often disdained in the re-

stored Republic and during the por)iriato (it can still be controversia)

today). For example, when a critic ol 1871 described Guillermo Prietos

poetry as "versos chulísimos oliendo a guajolote" (beautiful verses that

Borderiuy ^n An1bro pology

= 25U =

smell of the indigenous terco lar turkey), Chis was taken as an insult.s'

Gamios involvement in the revalorizaron of indigenous culture seas part

of a long-terco civi lizational process for the Mexican elite.

Unlikc his Porffrian predecessors, however, Gamio telt that the role oí

the anthropologist seas not only to present the past as a vision of a pos-

sible future , but also to intervene as the enlightened arco of government,

as the arco of science that was best equipped to deal with the management

of population , with forging social harmony and promoting civilization

Thus, lar Camio, the actions of the anthropologists were the actions of

the nation itself. In a prologue to a booklet that published the inter-

national reactions to La población del valle de Teotihuacán , Gamio explains that

he puts this compendium of flattering comments into print not asan act of

self-promotion , but rather because La población del valle de Teotihuacán "is a

collective work that has national dimensions." Moreover:

The opinions and critica) judgments not only praise the scientific methods

that preside over the research brought together in this work and the social

innovations and practica ) results that were obtained . There is also , in sev-

era) of the most distinguished foreign judgments, the suggestion that a

number of other nations follow Mexico's example in favor of the well-being

and progress of their own people , a judgment that will undoubtedly satisfy

the national consciente,"

On the other hand, the fact that Teotihuacán and the Department of

Anthropology of the Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento were both na-

tional symbols did not make them equal, for whereas Teotihuacán stood

for the nation because of the wealth of its territory, the grandeur of

its past, and its racial and cultural composition (which reflected a four-

hundred-year process of degeneration), the Department of Anthropology

was the head of the nation from which the promotion of civilization was

to come. This is most potently brought honre in the instructions that

Gamio gave to bis researchers before they began fieldwork in Teotihuacán:

We then suggested to out personnel that they shed the prejudices that can

arise in the minds oí civilized and modere men when they come into con-

tact with the spirit, the habits and customs of the Teotihuacanos, whose

civilization has a lag of four hundred years. We advised that they should

follow strict scientific discipline in the course of their actions, but that they

should make every effort to temporarily abandon their modes oí thought,

expression, and sentiments in order to descend in mind and body unti] they

molded to the backward life of the inhabitants 38

B o r d e r i n g o n Anthro p ol ogy

251 =

The pioneering works of Alexandra Stern have shown che connections

that existed between the work oí Canijo and other "mestizophilic" nation-

alises and the eugenics movements" ()ne of the aspects of chis relationship

that is pertinent here is that the view of che current population as degener-

ate, as having been made to depart from che best developmental possibili-

Ues of in; yace, went along with quite a challenging and revolutionary set

of policies. Indeed, as a high government oficial leading an official proj-

ect, Gamio had an interventionist role in local society that was entirely

different froto that of foreign anthropologists. By his recommendation,

the government raised che salary of che arcas tour hundred government

employees (mostly employed in che archaeulogical dig and in che various

development projects that Gamio promoced) in order to nudge up the

salaries that local hacendados paid their peons- Gamio had lands distrib-

uted to peasants. A new road, a railroad station, medical facilities, and

educational facilities were built.

The combined power of an integrative scientific method, embodied in

anthropology, and its practica) use by a revolutionary government was

so dizzying that Gamio compared che mission of the Department of

Anthropology with che Spanish Conqucsr

We believe that uf che aciitude uf governmcnts continues to be of disdain

and pressurc against thc indigenous elcment, as ir has been in rhe past,

their failure will be absolute and i rrevocab Ir. -1owever, if rhe countries of

Central and South America begin, as Mexico has already begun, a new con-quest of the indigenous yace, their failure shall turn inm a tiiumphal suecess.40

Thus, che disconrinuities between Gamio and Porfirian ethnohistorians

or eth noli nguists such as Chavero or Pimentel are as interesting as their

convergences: both believed in che degeneration of Mexican races alter

che Conquesq hoth believed in che grandcur of Mexican antiquities; and

both placed their knowledge in thc service of nacional development.

However, che Portirians did so mainly as parí of an effort tú present

Mexico in che international arena, as a contribution to efforts to bring

foreign migrants, foreign investments, and tourism to Mexico, whereas

Canijo took these theses and applied them not only to shaping the nacional

image, but also to the art of governing.41 By doing field research, by creat-

ing his own, "integral," censuses, and by intervening in a direct and force-

Iul manner in local reality, he could at once particípate in rhe Porfirian im-

aging process and hele fashion internal frunricrs.4r The similarities and

differences between rhe two anthropologicol styles parallel the similarities

and differences between che Porfirian and die revolutionary governments:

Figure 1 19a. Tipo de hombre indígena del

valle de Teotihuacán, froto Manuel Camio,

La población del valle de Teotihuacán, vol. 2,

place 41. These samples froto a series

of niug shots illustrare Manuel Canijos

concern with race and racial types.

Canijo celebrated indigenous culture

and mestizaje, but he shared che scientific

esrablishment's concerns with racial

degeneration_

Figure 11 .9b_ Tipo de hombre

mestizo del valle de Teotihuacán,

from Manuel Gario,

La población del valle de

Teotihuacán, vol, 2, plato 48

Figure 1 1.9c. Tipo de mujer indígena del

valle de Teotihuacán, from Manuel Gamio,

La población del valle de Teotihuacán, vol. 2,

plato 50

EtorAerinq on .lni bro1, ology

252

borh were modernizing regimos that seished tu porrray the republie as

being led by enlightened and scicntitic vanguards. but whereas the Porfirian

regime placed its ht ts mosdy on din,vos posible convenience tu

torcign capital the revolutionarc ¿;o^ernments tried m balance their ef-

torts ro attract loreign investors ansi tupir i onnnrtment tu interna) social

and agrarian rclorm This latter formula seas leen ¡ir the twentieth century

as the more atiractive and desirahle ¡Ti Mexico

Cmtsolidation o^ ,l National Anthn'poÍmly

When the 1968 generation accusud tMexiean indigenistas of shaping a strict-

ly national anthropology, Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán was probably right to

accuse them in turn of not having rcad the indigenistas closely.43 Aguirre

went ahead and named a number of cases of studies that had been done by

Mexican anthropologists abroad; he could also llave usted the active

interest that indigenistas from Gamo and Sainz on showed in exporting

Mexican anthropology lo other locations. Nevertheless, one can still argue

that the 1968 gencration was correo on this point, for the anthropology

that Mexican indigenistas exponed seas a national ant h ropology, geared lo

shaping connections betwecn rho ancient pass, contemporary ethnic or

race relations, and national modernizing projects- As the Mexican govern-

ments moved from the early proactive stages of the revolutionary period

to institutional consolidation in an era of much industrial growth, the

position oí anthropology became at once atore institutionalized and less

capable of challenging the status quo

The period that runs roughly from 1940 into the late 1960s is a time

when a nationalist orthodoxy prevailed This is also the time when most

oí the great state institutions that house Mexico's large professional estab-

lishment were buile the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia

(1939), the Escuela Nacional de Antropología e Historia (1939), the

Instituto Indigenista Interamericano ( 1940), tire Instituto Nacional Indi-

genista (1949), the National Universirys Sección de Antropología (1963),

and the new Musco Nacional de Antropología (1964). The growing

strength oí the Mexican state and the institutional consolidation oí an-

thropology, alongside foreign (principally U.S.) anthropologists' interest

in alterity and the delicate position of American researchers in Mexico

during the Cold War, are al¡ factors that conspired to take the sting off oí

foreign anthropologists as harsh critics44 It is impossible lo imagine the

kind of candid commentary that we read in Tylors book regarding, Por in-

stanee, "what a destructive animal a Mexican soldier is" being published by

IIn rder , nl An i l , ro poiogy

?54

a prominent United States, British, or French anthropologist in chis period

(which has rather revealingly been labeled the "golden age" oí Mexican

anthropology)s

Instead, foreign anthropologists sought mutually bencficial collabora-

tions, or else they were as unobtrusive as possible. They worried about

being able to pursue their research interests and about being able lo send

students to the fleld- Even so, the orthodoxy oí Mexican official anthro-

pology still faced an external challenge, a challenge that is endemie to the

very proposition of a nationalized scientific discipline- In this period oí in-

dustry and progress, the challenge of foreigners was threefold: they could

uncover the dark side of modernization, in the tradition oí John Kenneth

Turner's Barbarous Mexico; they could adhere to the Indian and reject the

moderna or they might further the political interests of their nations at the

expense oí the Mexican government. 1 will briefly exemplify how [hese

dangers were perceived in this period by examining two incidents.

In December 1946, President Miguel Alemán had just taken office.

University oí Chicago anthropologist Robert Redfield and two high offi-

cials oí the Mexican government (Mario Ramón Beteta and Alejandro

Carrillo) were invited to discuss the president's inaugural speech on

Mexican national radio, The event generally went off without a hitch, ex-

cept for a newspaper article attacking Redfield's position that appeared La

Prensa Gráfica.

After reciting Redfield's impressive scientific credentials, Fernando

Jordán focused on a question that Redfield had raised, which was whether

the industrialization oí Mexico would not carry with it a radical change inthe mores oí the Mexican people. Would industrialization not involve the

standardization oí indigenous cultures? Would it not diminish the beauty

oí a people that had well-defined ethnic characteristics, a people who

gave great personality to Mexico? The radio host who was interviewing

Redfield responded quickly that "the traditional moral structure oí the

Mexican people is so strong that not even three centuries oí Spanish domi-

nation were able to change it in the least." However, Fernando Jordán re-

acted less defensively:

If Mr Smith, Mr. Adams, or any other tourist who had spent one month in

our country had raised the lame question, he would have reaffirmed the

conception that we have of many oí them. We would have thought him

superficial and naive.

However, the question was raised by Dr. Redfield, a professional eth-

nologist, a renowned sociologist, and author oí a number of books about

Bordering on Antñro po logy

= 255

Mexico and its aboriginal cultures . his thus impossi ble to believe that

Redfield's question was foolish or i dl,. But in that case what does it mean?

In our vi ese, it mearas severa) things at rhu same time.. that Mexico,

for che scholar, only has a proper ¡o, ni when it is viewed through the

kaleidoscope oí native eosttune, dance, and through the survivals of pre-

Hispanic cultures and the "folklor'ic' misery el indigenous people- But ir

chis is part of Mexico, it is not Mexico i tsell, and it is not what our nation

wishes tú preserve-

Jordán is shocked that a 1amous sociologist could replicare the super-

ficial opinions oí a tourisc, but hc offers an explanation oí Redfield's truemotiven

From annther point oí viese, and given che u-ajeete ry oí American anthropolo-

gists, Redfield's question can be finte rprcted in a differen1 way. We feel that it

expresses the researchcr's fear of losing the living lahoratory that he has

enjoyed since the days oí Frederick Starr [annther University of Chicago

anthropologist]. He fears that he will no longer be able tu vivisect the

Otomi, Tzotzil, Nahua, or Tarahuman cultures. He tremoles at the thought

of seeing the Tehuanae dress, or the 'curious'' i ags of the Huichol, being re-

placed by the overal[ that is necessary ora the shop (loor or the wide pants

needed in agri culture He is expressing his ideal oí stoppi ng our natiods evo-

lution in orden ro preserve the colorful miscrv of our Indians, a misery diat

will provide material for a series oí books-most of which are soporific-in

which the concept of culture will be represented by a set oí isolated and

static "ethnie" attributes that Nave no 'elation to rhu Indiads dynamisni.

The foreign anthropologist is interested in exoticizing Indians, in

maintaining Mexico as a kind oí laboratory or ecological preserve, and not

in solving the countrys pressing social and economie problems. As such,

his opinions and research ideals should be rejected in favor of a more

interventionist approach, an approach that is committed to modernization

and social improvement. Foreigo interest in traditional cultures is wel-

come insolar as it explores the roors and the pocential of the Mexican

people, or insofar as it adds its efforts to the practica] guidelines set by

governmental projects, but when foreigners begin to value the traditional

over che modero, what we have is a pernicious forro oí colonialism.

We should note that Fernando Jordán's osen implicit program for theIndians (and Chis was a journalist seno studied anthropology in the National

School and was favoring President Alemán's modernization program) de-nies anthropology as Redfield understood it The "interna] colonialism" oí

Figure 11.10. Untitled photograph of a Moya woman, by Frances Rhoads Morley, fromRobert Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucaton, 104. This portrait oí indigenous beauty

is the kind of romanticization that Fernando Jordán objected to. It was also a

source oí friction between Robert Redfield and Oscar Lewis in their diverging

portrayals oí Tepoztlán and of poverty.

Mexican anthropology could not uphold diversity over progress, whereas

the postcolonial U.S. or European anthropologist could not intervene di-

rectly in Mexico, and thus had a vested interest in diversity. National an-

thropology and metropolitan anthropological traditions relied on each

other, but they also denied each other. Thus Gamio could not be a tate

cultural relativist Iike his mentor Franz Boas and still retain his brand oí

li o r d e r i n y u n A n t h r e p ogy B o r d e n n y o ra An thro po1ogy256 = =257=

applred anthropology, flor troulcl h<ta, tulle approve of che bewildering

variety oí applicd proiccts that (,armo likecl to iuggle As a result, che de-

grce oí mutual ignorante that is t olera te d bc twcen these t ra di ti ons gener-

ally, and betwcen Mexican and LLS aiithropologies in particular, rests on

cpistemological conditions that run decper than mere patriotic rejection

or language barrters-

For exaniple, afrer the publication of thc Spanich-language edition of

Fi ve Pernil ics in 1961 Oscar 1 c wis rcnarkcti

Some oi thc A1cxica nj tevIew^ c<I 1 11, La m,i:, ,ecm cxcellent to mc and

others very negative But even in tire good unes 1 lee] there is some resent-

ment of che fact il was a North Amercan, a gringo, who has acquainted the

world, and even Mexicans, with a little cl che misery in which so many

families live.

1 regret it very much if I havc offended some Mexicans with my work. It

was never my intention to hurt Mexico or Mexicans because 1 have so

much affection for them .

Many times 1 huye suggested that it would be good if some Mexican an-

thropologists would he willing to Icave tlieir Indians for a while and come

to my country to study che ncighhorhoods ol New York, Chicago or of Che

South. 1 have even offered assistance in getting grano for them.°e

Nevertheless, the project oí Mexicans studying the United States has

not yet come to fruition_ The very idea of a national anthropology runs

against it: what would a book by a Mexican en the United States be used

for? Unless, oí course, it were a book about Mexicans in the United States,

or about American interests in Mexico. There is no public in Mexico, no

institutional backing for this product, which would then be destined to be

either an erudite curiosity, or w(jrsc, a Mexican anthropologist doing the

Americans' job for them47 There was no possible symmetry of che sort

imagined by Lewis in bis welLmcaning but also slightly disingenuous

comment.

Thus, che threat of a scientific indicmient ot Mexican modernization

by foreign scientists remained, and .4exican reactions to che publication

oí Oscar Lewis's Cíldren of Sdecbez ( 1964) were even more severe than they

were to Five Families. In a letter to Vera Rubín. Lewis summarized che attack

that the Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística mounted against

bis book:

1 Thc book was obscene beyond all limits of human decency,

2 The Sánchez family did not exist. 1 had nade it up;

3 Thc book was detaniatory of Mexican institutions and of the

,Mexican way of lile;

4 The book veras subvcrsive and anti - revol ut i otra ry and violated

Article 145 of che \Icxiean Consti tution and was , therefore, pun-

ishable with a twenty- vear jail sentence becausc it incited to social

dissolution;

5 The Fondo de Cultura Económica, che author, and the book were

all cited for action bv che Geography and Statistics Society to the

Mexican Attorney Geneials Ofhce; and

6 Oscar Lewis was an FBI spy attempting to destroy Mexican

institutions^s

Much of che Mexican intelligentsia rallied to the cause oí Oscar Lewis

at this point, including some anthropologists such as Ricardo Pozas, who

had heen highly critical of Five Families, because they saw in the Society's

attack che hand oí the govermnent trying to keep all eyes off oí the de-

structive effects of Mexican modernization, that is, off of urban poverty.

Nevertheless, Arnaldo Orfila, che great Argentine editor and then director

oí the state-owned Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico's most presti-

gious publisher, was Torced to resign from bis post, and Lewis published

the third edition of Tbe Cbildren of Sánchez with a prívate publisher.

The implications oí [hese two cases are clear. The whole set of views

that in Mexico carne to be called "officialist," and which more or less

served to demarcate che limits of mainstream Mexican anthropology, had

a tense relationship both with anthropologists who might romanticize

Indians to the degree oí rejecting modernization, and with those who

studied the wrong end oí che acculturation process, that is, the unhappily

modernized end. If che anthropologists doing the work were American,

then these tendencies were all che more menacing. Moreover, the rejec-

tion oí [hese foreign works was also a way oí reining in work done by

Mexicans, work that could he seen as unpatriotic or as bookish and irrele-

vant. This was, in fact, pretty much what the official attitude to the 1968

movement boiled down to: student unrest was creating a poor image oí

Mexico abroad precisely at che time when the nation was on display, at

the time of the Olympic Games.

Conclusion: The Exhaustion of a National Anthropology?

1 began chis chapter by noting che sense of estrangement, of being con-

demned to eterna] repetition, that has surfaced on occasion in recent

I l o r d r r i u g o ,, A < n 1 b r o p ol o 4 y B o r d r r i n y o ti An ibrop o l o9y

= 258 = = 259

Figure 11 1 I The Sánchez Family, in Oscar Lewis, Fina Families, p. 213. The Sánchez

tamily opens a vista to the underside of modernization crowded living, unhygienic

conditions, promiscuity, and the disaggregation of communities.

years-the sense that anthropology in Mexico is destined te take its place

inside a government office, regulating the population, writing the gover-

nor's speeches, or presenting a dignihied face for the tourist; the sense that

Mexican academic anthropology will always be confined to its preexisting

public, to a national public that carel only about the solution to the "Great

National Problems"; the uneasy feeling that nags the student oí Mexican

anthropology when she realizes that Francisco Pimentel was a high official

in Maximilian's court, that Alfredo Chavero was the president oí the

Sociedad de Amigos de Porfirio Díaz, that Gamio was the founder oí the

Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas, undersecretary oí education, and di-

rector oí the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, that Caso was founding

director oí INAH and ENAH, that Aguirre 13eltrán was director oí INAH,

that Arturo Warman is Minister of Agrarian Reform ..

This atavistic sensation is, nonetheless to some degree a false une.There is a useful corollary of Marx's Eightcenth Brumaire that 1 think can beusefully applied here, which could he something like "moins ca change,moins c'est la méme chose" (the less things change, the less they remainthe same). The pattern oí absorption oí Mexican anthropology by thestate is in some respects quite diffcrent today from the times when anthro-

pology had a central role to play in national consolidation. The multipli-cation oí state-funded anthropological insritutions in the 1970s and 1980s

seemed to respond more to the growth oí the educational apparatus and

1 3 o r d e r i n g

A 260 =

to state relations with certain middle-class sectors than to the need for an-

thropologists as technocrats. The existente oí certain highly visible

anthropologists in government masks the relative decline oí the political

significante oí national anthropology for the Mexican state.

Moreover, in the stages that I have outlined, there is a distinct sense oí

exhaustion oí the possibilities oí the national anthropology paradigm: it

began with the task oí fashioning a credible national image that could do

the work oí harnessing the transnational machinery oí progress. From

there, national anthropology complemented this task with an active role

in the management oí the indigenous population (which in the early

twentieth century could mean a concern with the vast majority oí the na-

tion's rural population). This development oí the anthropological function

gained much prestige from the revolutionary government's capacity te

distribute land and to mediate in labor and land disputes.

The year 1968 marked a watershed for Mexican national anthropologybecause the student movement reflected a shift in the relative importance

oí Mexico's urban population. Correspondingly, the magníficos and others

no longer called for absorbing Indians loto the nation, but argued for a

more theoretically inclined anthropology. In fact, each oí the major mo-

ments oí Mexican anthropology, from the científicos to the revolutionaries,

to the anthropology that blossomed alter 1968, has involved a "theoretical

inclination." Each has looked to the international field for inspiration or

for authority, and intellectual leaders at least have had direct connections

with the most prominent leaders oí the international field. The apparent

paradox, however, is that once theoretical inspiration is channeled into

the national anthropology model, dialogue with the international commu-

nity gets reduced to conversations with arca specialists at best. However,

as 1 have shown in detail, there are causes oí substance that restrict therelationship between national anthropology and its metropolitan counter-

parts, for the relationship between these two sorts oí anthropologies has

more often been one oí mutual conveniente than oí true dialogue, because

anthropologies that are devoted to national development must consistently

choose modernization over cultural variation, and they must balance stud-

ies oí local culture with a national narrative that shapes the institutionalframework oí the fieid.

In 1968 there was momentary awareness oí the conceptual and politi-

cal confinement that was embedded in "national anthropology." However,De eso que llaman antropología mexicana was still, unwittingly perhaps, a version

oí a national anthropology: "Our anthropology has been indigenista in

its themes. Even today it is conceived as a specialization in particular

Border,ng on Antbropology

261

problcros. Lnligenun u is atumizin;; and it t, id, to intcrprct its materials in

an isolated lashion i tu sí núsmos. In.iolo!ion, h,t, rejednl ibe compara tive ntetbod

t n t i lbe global w:alysu o l ti,, roud:n 1 r. .a Ími oro particip rte.`'" By empha-

sizing che comparativa methoct 111050- crtOs s retained che sense oí the na-

tional m-hsdc that was indispcmablc boite to nretropolitan traditions and

m,Mexican nationallst anthropology Thev retained, in otherwords, che

liolistic prentiscs that werc lato c riticized hy Appadurai and others. Not

surprisin Iv tlien che hnl phasc ol Rlcaican nacional anthropology

1'icOs -hOs s,as in exp ttsisc niumcnt 111,1t liad a number oí things ¡Ti

common with the hcad} days ol C atnio. lo¡ che anthropology of those

years liad to rcinvent a nation that no longer liad an indigenous baseline

but was still centered on taking conunand ot projects oí national develop-

ment. The cal] tú develop a holistic and coniparative study oí "che socie-

ties in which Indians participate" was thereforejust as prone to the vices of

bureaucratization, theoretical sterility, parochialism, and co-optation by

che state as indtjenisino liad been Today there is no longer a viable way oí

isolating tire nation as che anthropologist's principal political and intellec-

tual object, and Mexican anthropology has to diversify its communitarian

horizons and rcinvent itself.

12

Provincial Intellectuals and the Sociology

of the So-Called Deep Mexico

In an eloquent book that quickly became Mexico's best-selling anthropo-

logical work, México profundo (1987), Guillermo Bonfil portrayed Mexican

reality as an overlay oí two opposed civilizations: a subordinated civiliza-

tion that stems from the millenarian agrarian culture oí Mesoamerica and

that has a variegated set oí locations and permutations in contemporary

Mexican society, and another, Western and capitalist, civilization. Bonfil

explored the characteristics of che Mesoamerican tradition in the contem-

porary setting, usefully disturbing categories such as Indian and mestizo, and

then proceeded to show how that civilization has been shut out or mar-

ginalized from Mexico's dominant civilizational scheme. His book calls

for che reassertation oí the Mexican tradition in the critical contemporary

moment, and thus his analysis feeds directly into today's political debates.

My argument with Bonfil's book is not merely academic. The image oí

a deep versus an invented Mexico is a key trope in a specific kind oí na-

tionalist language that stems from a justified rejection of the social and

cultural impact that multinational capital has had on Mexican society.

Despite the ample justification for a nationalist reaction to current trends

in Mexico, however, the "deep" versus "artificial" imagery stands on very

shaky sociological ground and therefore is an ineffective political alterna-

tive, despite its obvious ideological appeal.

Bo rletin^ o, An ti2to po lagq

=2i,2= =263 =

There is a sense in which BonhI's civilizational approach is merely a re-

fashioned inversion of Che modero st trope of tradition versus modernity,

sharing premises with formulations such as the Chinese road to socialism"

or "the japanese way to progress." Ir can be read as a cal] for pragmatic

accommodations berween local forros of social organization and grand

strategies for progress and indust vial i zar ion, while it simultaneously claims

the moral preeminence oí rhe local tradition over the grand narratives of

capitalism and socialism. From un analytic perspective, however, Bonfil

does not offer a detailed formulation oí Che dialectics that have existed be-

tween so-called tradition and modernity since rhe inception of a modero

mentaliry in Che late eighteenth centupy or since the inception of capital-

ism in rhe sixteenth century -

One worrisome conseque rice ol Chis shortcoming is that the political

application oí Che "deep versus invented imagery must ultimately rely on

a system uf reflned discrim ina tions wherein certain privileged subjects,

usually nationally recognized intellectuals or pohGcians, are placed in a

position of interpreti ng Che true national sentiment. Because it cannot ex-

tract Mexico from Che world capitalisi system, Che "deep Mexico" image

tends to re-creare or revitalize Che sort of authoritarian nationalism that

was characteristic oí the period of growth ander import substitution, a na-

tionalism rhat had many positivo aspects, io be sure, but that is bankrupt

as a viable political formula roday

However, Che very case widi which 1 Nave formulated this criticism

may obscure Che intuitive appeal of rhe imagery of a deep versus an in-

vented Mexico, an appeal that undoubtedly stems from the ascertainable

fact that large sections of Mexico's population are and Nave historically

been shut out oí the national puhlic sphere. They have been "muted," and

are correspondingly absent from Che dominant forums of political discus-

sion and public debate and Nave little access ro Che media of publicity.

These forms oí exclusion have been denounced both as a rather subtle

form oí racism and as infernal colonialism.

In sum, "deep" and "artificial are images that re-creare an obsolete and

unpromising forro of nationalism, while at rhe same time they are at least

successful in indicating and denouncing profound rifts in Mexican society.

The question is, how can we provide a wcll-grounded sociology oí these

processes oí political and communicative exclusion? Conceptually, the

challenge that we face involves understanding Che ways in which the na-

tional space is articulated, both politically and culturally. che various and

diverse forms of political representation and discussion that exist in differ-

Prooi r.ciel Inirll; ctuals

264 =

ient sorts oí places and the major transformanons that regional and nationalsystems have undergone

1 propose to meet Chis challenge by focusing in Chis chapter on the ge-

ography oí two interconnecred social categories: intellectuals and public

spheres Specifically, 1 wish to exemplify how a fine-grained analysis oí the

dynamics oí cultural distinction in a small region helps us to understand

the ways in which local publics are articulated to a national public.

Intellecruals and forms oí puhlic discussion depend on and reflect the

geography oí cultural distinction, and by studying their nature and con-

texts we can understand why some social groups have no voice in national

public opinion. It is only by specifying these mechanisms that we can at

once criticize tire current political and social systeni and avoid a simple

primordialist nationalism that offers little promise oí efficacy and many

political dangers.

1 shall interrogare Che history oí distinction and community represen-

tation in localities from the municipio oí Tepoztlán, Morelos, that, because

oí their varying size, locarion, economy, and position in tire state's admin-

istrative hierarchy, represent different niches of Morelos's regional politi-cal econorny.

By looking at Che historical development oí ?hose communities' inter-

nal mechanisms of representation, 1 hopo to help develop Che rudiments oí

a geography oí intellectuals in Mexico's national space.' 1 have chosen a

rural and semiperipheral arca to initiate Chis geography, because insuch

regions one can discern Che contexts for Che emergente oí persons who

can articulare local senriment to state discourses and vice versa. In small

towns it is also easy to specify some oí Che difficulties that aspiring intel-lectuals face in that process.

Definitions

I wish to begin by clarifying my usage oí two terms : pubiicspbere and intellec-tuals. For Che first term , 1 quote from an article by Geoff Eley who, follow-ing Habermas, says:

By "Che public sphere " we mean first oí al] a realm of our social life in which

something approaching public opinion can be formed - Access is guaran-

teed ro all cirizens. A portion of the public sphere comes finto being in

every conversation in which privare individuals assemble to form a public

body. They then behave neither like business or professional people trans-

acting privare affairs, not likc members of a constitucional order subject to

Provicrial lnie llrc taats

265 =

the legal cutis train tc ol a s tate buteaut rae, t 1]tzcns behave asa publie

b, ,!v when thee ennfcr in an 11 n1(e)r111, 1 roshum-tira, n, with the guar-

a,,¡,, at freeelom nl ...... 'rv .ind ; sst r 1 nr,n and thc Ircedom to express

and puhlish lhcir opl nio hs -aP=,u1 'tuuc: ol ge ns-ntl inturest. In a large

pldslic liudo 11111 klnd ul 1111nmnti.1uon rc luu as spcu llc nteatu tur trans-

mitting tnlormauon and 1ntl uc lit, ng, thosc whu reeelve ,t Today news-

papcrs and maga-roes. radio a1•.d 1 A are d e ntcd,a of the puhlic sphere.

As for the seconcl terco l have- trnmd May Wchers definition of intel-

lectuals to be the ntost usetul tor nto purposes here. for Weber once de-

fined intellectuals as "a group ol nten vvho by virtue oí their peculiarity

have special access tu certain achicvements considered to be'culture val-

ues,' and who therefore usurp the Icadership of a culture community-'"

Thus we are concerned with two dimensions. the representation oí com-

munities, and the cultural values chal can he suf licientiy difficult to acquire

and sufficien tly iniportant to authorizc one ndividual's representation

while di sauthori zi ng anothers^

Because intellectuals as we define them here are concerned with the

representation oí communities hy virtue. oí specific culture values, an

understanding oí local-leve) intellectuals necessarily requires a look at

local systems oí class and cultural disti ncti un. 1 will discuss localities that

correspond roughly tu two major types of places in the region oí Morelos:

the village oí Tepoztlán, which was until recently a peripheral agricultura)

town and is a seat oí municipal power (cabecern); and the hamlets oí Santo

Domingo, Amatlán, and San Andrés de la Cal (all oí the municipio oí

Tepoztlán), which are small nucleated villages that surround the municipal

cabecera and that were, until recently, occupied almost exclusively by peas-

ants and farro laborers. 1 begin with a discussion of the hamlets, and will

proceed from diere to the municipal seat.

intellectuals and Ibe Representation of (onmtunity in Morelos The Hamlets

For most oí their colonial and modern history, inhabitants oí the hamlets

in the municipio oí Tepoztlán have peen parí of a single class , oí a single

culture. During the whole colonial period, diere were no economic elites

in the hamlets' Inhabitants were peasants, they were also involved in ani-

mal husbandry and in selling wood to nearby haciendas and ranches.

Villagers paid tribute to tire Marquesado del Valle, and for some years also

sent workers to tire mines at Taxco and Cuautla under the repartimiento sys-

tem oí corvée labor. Local latid bases were mcager, villagers were forced to

Pr0vln. rai ii1el

266 =

rent latid froni Spanish hacendados or ranehers, and 1 Nave found not one

Spaniard, or anyone using the tide of "Don" or Doña registered in the

birth, death, and marriage reatrds found in the local parish (starting in tic

carly seventeenth cenrury and continuing wtth come interruptions into

the mid- ntnetecnth ccntuloThere was some basis lor gami ng greater prosperity in those communi-

ties through politics. The post of alcalde carried with it exemption from

tribute payments, and there are documents that sugges t that ,hese alcaldes

ntay occasionally have pocketed son te inoney in their mediations with tire

cabecera and, particularly, in their organization oí cooperative efforts for

the cabeceras church and church lestivities: some alcaldes paid villagers less

,han they in toro charged for candles and wax pi esented to the church, for

example.° However, the most substantial cases oí corruption in Tepoztlán's

history all occur in the Villa of Tepoztlán and not in its dependent hamlets

(sujetos).

In the hamlets, political bosses gained their positions because oí their

centrality in a kinship network: they were elected from and by the local

elders.' They were thus centrally located and deeply identified with local

society, and interna) rifts probably reflected divisions between families

who aspired to those central positions, much as they do today.This situation changed only in certain respects with independence.

Local inhabitants were no longer legally classified as "Indians" then.

Moreover, starting in 1856 with the creation oí the civil registry, people

adopted Spanish last names en masse, and privately controlled plots oí

communal land were registered for the first time in 1857, and then again

in 1909.8 On the other hand, the political equivalent oí the old Indian

alcalde was now named by the municipal presidents to the post oí ayudante

municipal and received no reniuneration.

Although we know little about the expansion oí haciendas in early-

nineteenth-century Morelos since John Womack's view was first contest-ad, in the case oí Tepoztlán there is evidente that haciendas encroached

on the municipio shortly after independence' In fact, the ejido latid that

was given back to Tepoztlán after the revolution in 1927 was a restitution

for this postindependence land invasion. It is possible that hacendados oí

that period either wanted to force more laborers to work for wages or,

quite simply, that they felt that che chaotic political situation at the na-

cional and regional leve) allowed them to get away with invading Indian

communities. Thus, inhabitants of those villages that bordered en hacienda

lands were possibly more latid-hungry in the nineteenth century than they

liad been earlier.

P rorillucrl 1atellectu

267 =

On the other hand , internal community differentiation does not seem

to have grown during this period . The registration oí lands would seem to

point to a tendency for a weakening of communal links in favor oí the for-

mation a " prívate sphere " and its corresponding inhabitant : the "citizen."

This was , in any case , the liberal agenda behind policy changes . However,

it is difficult to ascertain whether or not those changes had a significant

impact either en community or on local society in the nineteenth century,

for thesc villages were al] highly endogarnous , and there seem to have

been communal policies not to se]] local lands to outsiders . 10 Moreover,

the registration oí plowable l ands as private property in fact simply for-

malized the arrangement that existed in die colonial period , while land

that was not arable retained its communal status.

These policies were reinforced alter 1927 , with agrarian reform, when

inhabitants of some oí the hamlets reccived lands in restitution for what

the haciendas had taken a century carlier . Communal tenure was also of-

ficially reinstated , and a new local official, the Representante de Bienes

Comunales, was charged with ovcrsccing in assembly that made all deci-

sions concerning local communal lands- Resistance against selling large

tracts oí private lands to outsiders remains a factor even today , as land de-

velopers have discovered en more than one occasion . 11 In sum, the ham-

lets were socially quite homogeneous during the whole colonial period,

and finto the mid-twentieth century.

In the decades following the introduction of che first industries in

the region, beginning in the mid - 1950,, two new economic groups

have emerged. out-migrants who retain local ties (returning either en

weekends- if they live in Mexico City or Cuernavaca-or seasonally, if

they are working in the United States or Callada ), and political mediators

who acquired new significante in the processes oí connecting the villages

to modero life ( in the construction of the villages road, in bringing

schools and electricity , etc.).

Major political divisions , which in the hamlets have always been

linked to competition between major families , now pitted "conservative'

factions-who sought to maintain communal land, forest , and water re-

sources intact-against progresistas ( or "modernizers"), who justified com-

promising some oí these resources or even consuming them entirely, in

exchange for the advantages and comforts of progress and civilization.

These factions are common both ro the municipal cabecera at Tepoztlán

and to all oí the hamlets . However, the specific connection between con-

servative and progresista factions en the one hand , and the history oí cul-

tural disti nction en the other , was somewhat different in the hamlets than

l ror',,, , ,al i li t, ^nals

268 =

in the municipal seat, and this was reflected in the issue of intellectuals and

the intellectual representation of communities.

There are no known local intellectuals from these villages for the

preindustrial period. Schoolteachers who worked on and off in these

places were hired irregularly by local families and stayed even more irregu-

larly. Starting in the 1950s, the villages began producing a few school-

teachers oí their own. However, the ministry oí education's placement

policy works against hiring nativos in local schools-at least in the early

stages oí a teacher's career. None of the hamlets ever had a resident priest,

and the posts oí ayudante and-after 1927-of communal lands represen-

tative were not particularly associated either with literacy or with intellec-

tual leadership (although reading was always an asset), but rather with

social centrality within the hamlet or with personal ties tu Tepoztlán's mu-

nicipal president.

We can understand a little more about the social spaces that were avail-

able to aspiring intellectuals in these hamlets by looking at recently gen-

erated ethnographic information. In the early 1980s, Santo Domingo

was divided into two factions, one that had sided with a modernizing

Presidente de Bienes Comunales, who had opened the communal forests

to commercial exploitation in order to pay for the road that allowed

motor vehicles and electricity to come up to the town for the first time,

and the faction that opposed him.'° Interestingly, these two factions were

identified in spatial terms with two sides oí the village, and each side was

known by an animal narre: the tecolotes (owls) were en the eastern side, and

the xintetes (lizards) en the western side. The reasons why this factionalism

between conservatives and progresistas could be made to coincide with a

spatial division oí the whole village can be found in the relations oí kin-

ship and patronage around the political leader-whole core oí support

was mainly near his own residente.

Now, up to this point, the category oí "intellectual" would be very

problematically applied in Santo Domingo: local cultural values were not

susceptible to being controlled or monopolized. The people who had

gained the respect oí the entire community had done so en a strictly con-

sensual basis, and they could not lord their knowledge over anyone with-

out losing their capacity to represent that person.

In my own ethnographic work in the municipio in the late 1970s and the

early 1 990s, 1 learned that there is a discourse on "respect" that is often

generated when one interviews a person; for, in interviewing someone,

there is implicit acknowledgment of the other's authority. Many people who

want to reaffirm their right to represent the community to the outsider,

Provincial ( ntellece als

269

arad especially to ara educated outsider hogin or end their parley by saying

somcthing like "In [his tosen es eÍv-one n.pens me That's heeause 1 re-

speet evers one I-veryone knosas mc inri greets inc. and 1 greet everyone

There is no one scho doesn i n.pee t me and so on However it some-

times happens that when somc^,'te c¡si dise uvcrs who vou Nave been talk-

ing to, he orshe proceeds tl) dise edit the individual in question and to

svarn you about taking hico seri,,ueis It ie Indo wonder that Oscar Lewis's

iniormanis told him that kedlields mani i nlormant had a head full of air

1 tu turra Nave been told that 1 Lwi , ;nionnants v,ti pulling his leg, and I

know that it has been said that 1 spoke tt,e, mueh with a mara who is not

even a "real Tepozteco." When authority is based on respeto, it is always

consensual, and if au intellectu al pases his or her authority exclusively on

respeto, he or she will only very oecasi o nally be successful in "usurping the

representation oí a culture communit." An intellectual whose basis is

strictly consensual can never be prof essiona 1 ized.

In the hamlets, positions of l eadership and access to knowledge were

1imited to a certain circle of people. con]posed usually of married men,

and often oí married men with ma ny grown brothers and sisters or chil-

dren. Within those circles, howevec the only roles that involved control-

ling cultural values that were not easily accessible to the whole age group

were those of healer (curandero) and witch (brujo). Since the 1950s, school-

ing has hecome another way of acquiring some scarce cultural values, but

schooling also tends to lead one out oí the communiry and finto skilled

urban jobs or bureaucracies that Nave very few local institutional spaces.

Having good or evil powers over health and the body was traditionally

seen as being available to people by, one of two means: either one is born

with a calling (it is said in Santo Domingo that a child who is born with a

morral, or pouch, under her ami is destined tu hecome a person of knowl-

edge; twins too are believed to be born evith these powers), or one could

acquire power by revelation, either through possession by los aires, by

touching lightning, or by ingesting psychotropic substances near a cave-

where los aires dwell-and finding healing powers there. The knowledge

that healers and witches Nave is thought to he revealed in dreams or in

conversations with plants or spirits In other words, there is no socially

standardized route that leads to this posta on of knowledge.

Moreover, connections between the knowledge of curanderos and politi-

cal power can be quite problcmatic, curanderos often uy tu disengage them-

selves from local iufighting for feas that they may eventually be isolated as

witches. This is probably why it is so con]mon in the Mexican countryside

to fiad people claiming that they have curandera in their village, but witches

270

are almost exclusively found in the town next dooe On the other hand, in

Borne factionalized villages, like Santo Domingo during the 1970s and

early 1980s, curanderos tdentilied closely with local factions, and witchcraft

accusations tlowed between them_

In other words, either curandero power is closely associated with politi-

cal power and can be used as ara instrument oí it, or else the curandero seeks

ro be disassociated from political identification and use bis or her knowl-

edge for the benefft of any taller If the curandero uses his art to gain world-

ly power, he will be called a witch by his political enemies and in chis way

his authority to represent the communiry gets subsumed under the power

oí a political faction. It is only in the second case, when the curandero re-

nounces the active pursuit oí political power for himself, that the curandero

can become a successful local intellectual.

Because oí the fact that curing is seen as a gift that is magically revealed,

the whole organization oí curanderismo as a system of knowledge is spatially

simple and not amenable te) building a bureaucratic or quasi-bureaucratic

hierarchy. localities have one or more curanderos, whose power and effec-

tiveness for both good and ovil purposes are contrasted with those from

nearby villages and hamlets. These curanderos are al] members of the peas-

ant communit and they are usually not devoted exclusively to their cur-

ing powers: the money or species that they get from healing complements

what they caen from farming, wages, or small-scale commerce.

There is a second leve) oí healers who Nave regional, or sometimes

even national and international, reputations. These healers sometimes live

in larger towns, and they can charge very steep prices. A healer oí this

kind who operated in Yautepec in the 1980s, and who was much sought

after by Tepoztecans, earned roughly the equivalent oí three months oí

minimum wages each working day.t'

These professionalized healers or witches have clients from the ham-

lets (people who were not cured by their local healer, or who mistrust the

local healer because oí his or her connections to possible enemies) or from

other healers, as well as from their local cities and elsewhere. The greater

degree of commercialization oí their practices also tends ro separate them

from local politics: they have a clientele they cater to in exchange for

money, and their sustained connections to local communiry factions are

often tenuous.

In sum, the small peasant hamlets oí Morelos traditionally had only

two social roles that could successfully amass knowledge that was not

available to everyone. One was that of the local politician, whose mediat-

ing position in the power network made him privy to information and

Provincial ln tellec tua ls

271 =

news that was not necessarily accessible to all, che other was che healer or

witch, whose powers are not believed to be reproducible at will, and who

is eonfronced with a tough choice: either to subsume his or per powers

under [hose of interna) factional and political divisions, orto withdraw

trom political and factional affairs as much as possible.

Consequently, in these hamlcts there has usually been a large extent of

democracy ti, che forro of town meecings and discussions-a firm basis for

che representation of che col lecrivity-coexisting with a very narrow plat-

form for the formation of profession al intellectuals. Moreover, the values

that need to be cultivated co gain respect within the community involve

a kind of humility that Gmits che capacity of a respected man to serve an

artieulatory function for any extended period of time. Any attempt at mo-

nopolizing such a representation by an average person is susceptible to

mockery and ridicule. Solemnity and respect ac che community leve) are

only achieved by representing group ieclmg in a low-key, unpretentiousmanner, because representation gained through respeto can be taken awayat will.

Thus, che cultural homogeneity of che hamlcts produced a kind oí para-

doxical effeco on one side, nce hamlcts had an inordinately open forum oí

local discussion and debate-as other ethnographers who have worked in

these sorts of places have recognizcd, o ora che other side, there is no local

basis for any privileged intellectual representation oí che community and,

what is much woose, che cultural values chal have been accessible to all in

che village have not been thc ores that allow access co che mediated na-tional pub'lic sphere.

Because of chis, che hamlers were always vulnerable to representationsby individuals who had agendas that were not constructed in local public

discussion This fact, which can be glossed simply by saying that the ham-

lcts had no local intellectuals who could effeccively mediare between the

local community and state or prívate institucions, had two sorts oí effects.

First, it made che inhabitancs of che hamlcts easily available to stereo-

typing by outsiders. Second in che ntost recen[ period, following the in-

dustrialization and urbanization of much of Morelos, it has meant that

newly educated individuals who reside locally can also indulge in chis sortof approprration

For example, the hamlet of Amatlán notr has an intellectual, a school-

teacher who married into [ce village and who has been the most active

Nahuad revivalist in [own. Don Felipe has promoted che idea that the pre-

Columbran prrest-god Quetzalcoatl was boro in Amatlán. There is a happy

eoincrdence between Don Fclipes nativism, rhe regional promotion of

n

tourism, and a local ethnic reviva) that has been produced by intensified

economic dependence en cities and on wages, so his project has met withsuccess.

Recently, Amatlán was officially declared by che state of Morelos

to have been the birthplace oí Quetzalcoatl, renamed "Amatlán de

Quetzalcoatl," and now dons a polychromed cement statue oí che godnextto the town's basketball court. Don Felipe also sold a plot oí land to

an investor who built the village's first hotel and restaurant: "La Posada deQuetzalcoatl," which offers tours to visir a famous local curandera , tradi-cional temaxcal baths, and a naturalist diet.

Not content with these accomplishments, Don Felipe teaches school-

children the Mexican national anthem in Nahuatl, and invented a 'Tiesta

de Quetzalcoatl" celebrating Quetzalcoatl's birthday, held on the las[

Sunday oí May. When a friend of mine asked a young man about his

partieipation in the fiesta, he undermined Don Felipe's legitimacy as a

representacive oí local sociery by saying, "Oh, thats justa fiesta de DonFelipe"' (Don Felipe's fiesta)

In chis example, we perceive che emergente oí a system oí interna] cul-

tural difference in Amatlán-a difference between [hose who are keyed in

to local history as a way oí refashioning the relationship oí the locality to

che national state (and thereby to tourism and other forros oí investment)

and those who are not. However, it is still che case that the local assembly

and public sphere are politically connected to che outside through the

ayudante, through schoolteachers, and through che conimunal lands repre-

sentative, bot they have no reliable quotidian mechanism for having their

voices heard in the nacional or regional public sphere.

Intellectuals and the Representation of Community in the Cabecera

This situation was never che same in agrarian poluta) and market centers

such as the village oí Tepoztlán, which always had greater interna] culturaldistinctions [han its politically dependenthamlets and, consequently, more

oí a platform for generating its own intellectuals. Because Tepoztlán was

che seat oí a pre-Columbran polity, it was made into an administrative cen-

ter in che colonial period. Tepoztlán had an Indian governor, who presided

over che whose jurisdiction (including che hamlers), as well as a convent

that housed at least one prrest and, until che mid-eighteenth century, sever-

al monks. In addition to chis, che population density olí che village and theavailability oí some land r q thejurisdiction attracted Spanish settlers, oíwhom there appear to have been three or four families at any one time. 15

Provincial Intellectuals

273

Thus, in the colonial period 7epoztlin liad two axcs around which

cultural distinctl ons were orgainzeii an echnie axis (fila 1111Y opposing

Spaniards and Indians, and in axis ot wealth and poseer 10 Indian gover-

nors in this arca, m e Isewhcrc in ccnttal ylcxico, tended ro come from a

single family, [Ti tisis case che Ruias lamils' sehie h cante co acquire a sub-

stantial antount oí wealth in )and, cattlc plows, horses, and houses. This

family and a couple oí others rook on many markers oí cultural and ethnic

distinction. clic ncher mcnihcrs nt che Rojas family spoke and wrote

Spanish as cee11 as Nahuatl roda hol,cs. lived [Ti che center oí town, mar-

ried Spaniards, and adopted a Spanisli las[ sume as well as che tales oí Don

and Doña-

The question oí las[ narres is Interest'mg Ion oca purposes here, because

che idea of lineage was crucial to Spanish nonons oí nobility and honor:

being able to trace one's line hack to a knight who warred with che Moors,

who was a conquistador or carly scttler of New Spain, or who had on

sorne occasion served Chrlscendom was o¡ ten critica) for claiming noble

status, and Spanish commoners who cante co the New World sometimes

transformed their place oí origin inio a las[ name that became the inicial

point oí such a inc.I

In contrast to chis, Indians in Tdpoztlán did not bear las[ narres at all,

hut rather were baptized with compouncl first narres, such as José Diego

or María Gertrudis, and these narres were not inherited. Thus, when a

censos taker or a local inhabitant wantcd lo specify which José Diego was

being referred to, the name of che plot en whieh his house was built was

uttered. José Diego Limontitla, for exaniple, oí José Diego Tlalnepantla.

f-iowever these house-sitos could nos funccion strictly as a paternal last

name for the purposes oí honor and lineage because-although the pre-

ferred form oí residente alter marriage is and was patrilocal-there always

has been some neolocal as weil as uxorilocal residence alter marriage. In

other words, the house name could not function as a reliable marker oí lin-

eage; indeed, the image oí a line or lineage among most Indians was diffi-

cult to maintain.

Instead oí chis, chere were large barrio families that were mainly but

not exclusively connected through che paternal line, and communal-

quasi-¡ami lial-identity at che leve) ot che barrio or village was thereby

enforced. Thus, if an Indian commoner leh his or her own village he or

she would have nothing but a given name-no family history, only com-

munal history. The ensuing lack of familial honor was sure to disauthorize

chal person's speech and had che effect oí blending che individual into an

urban mas,- One could not speak publicly if une was a "nobody." The

Prc'p,n i, ,i In:riierluals

2?q

voice oí [hese villagers was therefore anchored sturdily to their posinon

within che community; outside tire village they were merely indios-'-

This issue has been sugisiiicant roto che modern era. for when a peasant

is asked to speak auchoritatlvely by someone of a higher status, the

response will sometimos be something like "1 don'[ know anything, 1 Nave

no education, 1 am foolish" In chis light, Robert Redfield's division oí che

Tepoztecans of 1926 roto two categories, tontos (fools) and correctos (proper

people), is more informative iban Oscar Lewis thought, for tonto in this

contexi is someone who is not authoiized to speak publicly someone who

is incapable of holding a cultivated conversation with an outsider, while

correcto means well-mannered, and referred to people who had a status

from which to converse with representatives oí che state, foreigners, and

so oals In the colonial period, the possession oí a last name often indexed

chis distinction.19In contrast to che namelessness oí the commoners, to their lack oí posi-

tion outside oí che local community, some Indian governors sought to cre-

ate a Iine, a mechanism oí distinction that would allow them to reproduce

their privileges transgenerationally. They thereby took on a last name and

became ladinos, that is, they hecame deft at the ways oí che Spaniards.

Thus, the language oí distinction through blood, honor, and civilization

was also adopted within the indigenous sphere by che Indian governors,

whose representation oí the indigenous community, ironically, was found-

ed on the Spanish notion oí lineage.The cultural values that [hese Indian governors controlled and used in

order to represent the community ¡ay precisely in their bicultural adept-

ness: their constructed Spanishness vis-á-vis che Indians and local Spanish

society, and their constructed rootedness in che Indian community by way

oí the Spanish notion oí lineage. Arij Ouweneel (n.d.), who has studiedIndian governors in the Valley oí Mexico, has found documents certifying

lineage and family Crees for [hese Indian governors.Despite the paucity oí our knowledge oí che question oí intellectual

representation in che eighteenth century, it seems likely that there were

no channeis available for an institutionalized production oí local intellec-

tuals that mnght represent che community by virtue oí their cultural values.

AII mediation was in che hands oí che Indian governor, who was elected by

virtue oí his lineage and wealth and was not che representative oí a "cul-

ture community." The only local intellectuals that could access privileged

cultural values and use them to represent the community were either those

listed in out discussion oí che hamlets (i.e., the "respected mas" and che cu-

randero, with al] oí their intrinsic limitations) or che priest and the teacher-

PronlnC,al Intellectuals

275 =

Howevet; in the colonial period , access to diese Iatter offices was deniedto Indians. Thus , che intellecrual represenmtion oí the community towardrhe outside was monopolized hy (acoles and Spaniards . The rest weremostly tontos.

Given all of chis, ir is easy to understand how and why open contesta-

tren oí che representation of che community could lead to violente.In 1777, Manuel Gamboa , lépozdánc residenr priest , decided to givelimestone that liad been collecred by villagers in communal faenas to thepriest oí nearby Tlayacapan ter his church _ The women oí che village,who felt abused by the priest on many counrs , turned over the lime cart,provoking tic priest roto a rage that he venced by beating one oí thewomen wirh his cave . This prompted Tepoztecan men roto action, andwas the spark ot a rebellion that led to che destruction oí much propertyand to severa) deaths , The lack of a communal voice that could authorita-tively counter that oí che priest madc way for a violent confrontation. Onthe other hand , the presente of a priest ( and oí schoolteachers in some pe-riods ) meant that there was an authoritative voice that could represent the

village, and Chis voice would be heard regardless oí the assessment ofIndian governors and oí the villagers themselves , as is obvious in che trialsthar followed che rebellion . In these trials , Gamboa used his authoritativeportrayal of rhe villagers as parí ot his defense che Indians were idle

drunkards couples lived in sin for tmwo ycars before getting married, theysold their children to pay thcir debts , and so en. Meanwhile , villagerswere not asked or authorized to produce a cuunterrepresentation oí them-

selves and their defense was limited m a series oí accusations against thepriest?Ó

In sum , Tepoztlán had a firm system oí nrcrnal cultural and class dis-tinction that contrasred with that of che hamlets . Tepoztlán also had in-tellectuals from early on , most importantiv , its priests . However, in thecolonial period , riese intellectuals were outsiders , and so we get the samesorr oí cleavage we had in che hamlets between the authority oí villagepublic opinion and the authority of (external ) intellectuals representingche village.

Independence broughr sorne changes ro chis situation . Most impor-tant, che fusion that had been under way between che wealthy members oíche Indian nobility and che local Spaniards seems to have been accom-plished rapidiy . Tepoztlán was socially and culturally divided roto twogroups : che common people ( or "d c vulgar class ") and los notables This Iat-ter term is interesting not only becausc it was che national term for promi-nent citlzens , but also becausc ir eflectively fused che political preemi-

Prooi

= 276

nence oí che old Indian political elite (who used to be known as principales)with che racial-cultural pretensions oí che Spanish ethnic elite (that usedto characterize itself as a class oí gente de razón), The term notable impliesboth che political preeminence oí a principal and cultural distinction oí a derazón. In che 1 860s, Tepoztlán's notables were a group oí about thirty tiren

and their households, al] oí whom belonged to six or seven families thatdescended both from che old Spanish and Indian elites.

These notables monopolized the function oí political representation

(municipal officers and distinguished members oí the militia oí chis period),

as well as at least some oí che intellecrual funetions: local schoolteachers

carne from chis group, as did che one or two Tepoztecan professionais whowere trained during che porfiriato. Furthermore, although priests continuedto come from outside rhe community, which was standard church policy,

the church's policing and representative functions were much diminished

by the Iatter half oí che nineteenth century, and we find the priest acting in

consultation with che notables; he becomes one oí them.

In other words, in che ninteenth century we get for rhe first time a

space for what could be legitimately called small-town intellectuals in

Tepoztlán: the interna) dynamics oí distinction produced cultural values

dar could be controlled and used to "usurp the representation oí che com-

munity." These values were by and large che inherited marks oí civilizationfrom che colonial era (literacy, urbanity), but rhey were now included inan ideology oí progress that opened che way for a dialectic between com-muoity developmenr and nation building.

The maro intellectuals oí nineteenth-century Tepoztlán belonged to

che same Rojas family that had sired Indian governors since che seven-

teenrh century. Shortly alter independence, a Rojas was involved in help-

ing che village organize litigation against neighboring haciendas that had

misappropriated village lands. Literacy, che Spanish language, and mcm-

bership in che local política] class allowed him to represent che village tu

che outside in a move to protect its communal lands.

The second, and best-known, intellecrual oí the family was JoséGuadalupe Rojas, who was che village's main schoolteacher for about forty

years, and who was centrally involved in giving shape to al¡ of rhe "pro-

gressive" social events and organizations oí che new positivist age, includ-

ing educational church missions, cultural societies (usually named after

nacional or state political figures oí che time), and the publication of sever-a¡ short-lived periodicals

José Guadalupes brother, Vicente Rojas, was also a schoolteacher inche village's second school_ His nephew Mariano became a teacher oí

Prooiaciol Inlellectuals

277

Naiuad in Moteo (itvs .Nau..nal !rlcncun. in che 1920s and autiored a

short Nahuatl wordbook tiat is snll in eirc til ati on Anuncer member oí[ che

lamily, Simón Rojas was said te haC u beca pioseni at thc signing of Zapatas

flan de Avala

It is signilica nt tu note thot Clic role ul niany oj these uolal,lrs centered

on che defense ol dtc community aga,nst hacienda cncroachmcnt, as well

q s the defense ot clic comnuinltys p,liti( al s:,ll and vote at the scate leve].

In chis regaré therc is a collapsinp ot clic intcrests ol local intellectuals

and local politianns that conn's a. ith indupenelenee.

This is owing Lo Clic tacs that Clic local nol,ala i, were by no means

wealthy Irom a regional point uf viccr. being vasdy overshadowed by ha-

cienda owners and rich nierchants Moreover, retaining control of the

local political apparatus rema'med crucial for much of the local elite for,

like the Indian governors before them, perks ron control of the new

municipal offices, including che pussibiliry ot appropriating communal

resources, were a significant source of wealih and resources-as, indeed,

they still are today.

The case of che ceacher José Guadalupe Rojas helps to illustrate che dy-

namics of incellectual represencarlon in Chis era for, although his diaries

span a short pcriod (1865-72), an imporcant transformation occurs in his

outlook during chas period. In tic carly portion of che diaries, Rojas is

continually redeeming the people He sees the 'vulgar class" as being

composed basically of peace-loving people who wished co work in peace,

and whose limications (what we today would cal] their culture') could be

remedied through titanic efforts in education. This education was meant

to pul] the lower class out of its lethargy and ignorante: the habits oí che

vulgar class (including their language, which at chis tinte was still Nahuatl)

were markers of ignorance

In 1869, a visiting priest who was on a cultural mission publicly asked

Rojas to make simultaneous translation into Nahuatl for him Rojas says that

he was ashaned te have been put in Chis pusitiun, but that he complied.

However, only one year lacer, Rojas decideci lo teach reading and writing in

Nahuatl in his school, and generally bogan co emphasize che grandeur of

che native culture and its noble position at thc root oí Mexican nationality.

This is an imporcant moment in Clic history o( local intellectuals for,

until 1870, Rojas was still fu nda m en tal ly inspircd by che teachers and

priests of che colonial period: representing che community to the outside,

while trying to destroy its native culture. Stanine witli che movement for

Nahuatl literacy, Rojas-and most local intellectuals who have followed

him-hecame involved in a dialeetic that rooted che local community in

nationalist mythology while it invoked urban values shared in the nacional

public sphere) such as literacy and urbanity, hoth to redeem che community

el its ignorante and to construct the intellectual's own social importance

This strategy is exem plificd in a little event that Rojas recorded oí]

January 29, 1865- The schools board had collected money to pay for

prizes that were to be distrihuted to the students and che teacher at the

end-of-the-year celebration. These collections were a financial burden for

che members of the board. most of whom were poor leven when notable):

the schoolteacher had pone severa] months wirhout pay The board met

to discuss whar prizes to huy, and, alter careful delibcracion (these delibera-

tions being, as they were, taken as signs oí instruction, morality, etc.), sent

Juan José Gómez on a sixteen-hour hike to Mexico City to huy twenty-

nine bouquets oí artificial flowers.

This event epitornizes che cultural relationship between the country

and the city, at least as it was seen from che intellectual's point oí view.

The prizes are flowers, which are very much a local product (Tepoztlán is

full of flowers, all year round), made permanent through specialized work.

Artificial flowers were, in Chis context, an urban commentary on flowers

(and, metonymically, en Tepoztlán): they are worth re-creating, they are

worth enshrining, they are worth cultivating. They are valuable. And this,

more generally, is what local intellectuals set about trying to do to local

traditions and culture. By taking a local productor value and elaborating it

in che city, and by taking a local product that was so valued in the eity that

it was the subject oí elaboration, Rojas was simultaneously building a linkbetween the local and che nacional culture and constructing bis own role

as representative and mediator.Like the villagers who authorize their speech by insisting en how

much they are respected, Rojas too was preoccupied with being taken

seriously. To say that an event had been solemn was, to him, the highest

praise, and yet che fact that he persistently noted whenever solemnity had

been attained suggests that bis capacity to represent was fragile, and that

laughter could shatter all his efforts and expose him to public ridicule-a

fact that reflects the limications oí the authority oí small-town intellectuals

oí chis period.In Morelos, che revolutionary outbreak oí 1910 in come ways produced

a temporary dissolution oí local communities, but it also intensified region-

al intercommunication between what we might cal] che popular public

spheres. This was achieved through inedia such as the corrido ballads that

circulated throughout che region, through the publication oí leaflets whose

contents were shared in che same meetings where corridos were sung, and in

P r o i i , .. I n i , - . i , . i s . H , P r o i , n c i a 1 In tellec tuals

_= 27s 279 =

the installation oí a kind of peasant common law in Zapata's headquarters

and camps that was then transmitted to the villages as common law2'

In the case of Tepoztlán, particlpation in Chis regional peasant publicsphere was consolidated in the immediate aftermath of che revolutionAgrarian reform laws enshrined communal )and tenure and led to the for-mation oí regional peasant confederations iAMoreover, the political legiti-macy that Zapacismo attained in the 1920s and the flight to Mexico Cityof a significant portion oí the old cacique class, also strengthened peasantrepresentation oí their communities

However, ir was still certainly the case that the main tensions sur-

roonding the intellectual representation oí the community were between a

l action oí modernizers and che more humble "conservatives" who sought

to retain communal independence from politics and from the outside

world. In this region, the main novelties ol the period were (1) that thepos trevo luti o na ry progresistas were now niuch more persuaded oí Rojas'snativism than they had been in che past, because the idea of totally ignor-

ing and depreciating the nativo culture was politically much less sound

alter the revolution than it had been carlier and (2) that tire local peasant

assemblies had more power than they had ever had in the past.

1 first encountered the local conservative perspective during field re-

search in 1977. At that time, tire dominant view of politics among the

local peasantry was that there were three tepes oí political actors: politi-

cians (who were exploitative and lived off of other people's work and did

not fully belong to che local commtmity), ci'npesinos (who lived in house-

holds, belonged co barrios and villages, and respected each other), andpendejos, or idiots, who took what politicians said at face value, and there-fore lent themselves to their abuses

In Chis view, the campesino was the only "clean" social persona avail-able to a Tepozteco, for the campesino eats what he produces, minds his

own business, and defends his communal rights_ On che other hand, the

only honest politicians are necessarily risking eheir lives. Marryrdom is the

only ultímate proof of cleanliness in politics. Because oí this, unless and

antil martyrs such as Zapata returned, tire bcst forro oí political participa-

non was believed to be collective icvolt and resistance around the defense

of specific rights.2 Tepoztecans Nave revolted on many occasions against

encroachrnent on communal )and. against tate management oí commu-

nal water, and against severa) urban development projects.23

Contrary to what occurred in most hamlets, the institutional basis for

local Tepoztecan intellectuals grew signilicanc]y as carly as the 1940s .Many peasants svere able te) educare thcir children, and a fair number oí

1'raoi^: ci,iIr ielir-tuels

2HU

Tepoztecan schoolteachers and-beginning in the 1960s-professionals

returned to the village and forged some links oí communication with the

local peasantry, both because they belonged co that social group and by

using the "artificial flowers" technique. Moreover, the decade of the 1930s

was one in which peasant revolutionaries began to lose their grip en the

Morelos state government, and increasing bureaucratization and profes-

sionalization set in. In this contexc, intellectual mediators were required to

communicate between state bureaucratic agencies and local consticuencies.

Beginning in the 1950s, the literati became aspirants to municipal

power, and they effectively edged out peasants from the main municipal

offices. This process was accomplished, no doubt, because university-

trained Tepoztecans had a much better chance oí knowing people in the

governor's inner circle than peasants did, but it was also the result oí pres-

sure exerted by people within government in favor of naming only officialswho were professionals, preparados. Peasants were believed to be incapable

oí managing the paperwork and the legalities oí public administration.

As long as the position oí the educated Tepoztecans prospered, which

was until about 1980, the split between correcto-like local intellectuals and

the peasant public sphere was largely maintained, although coexistente

was usually peaceful, and alliances were often made to defend common

interesas. This vas largely because the power base of the local peasantry-

its control over communal lands and its privileged position in revolution-

ary nationalism-was maintained to a significant degree.

The situation oí the local intelligentsia has changed since that time for

several reasons. On the one hand, che peasantry has been in a trae state oí

siege. Planting has become too expensive. Work options as wage laborers

in Tepoztlán (in the construction industry, in gardening, and in house-

keeping), or in Cuernavaca, Mexico City, the United States, and Canada,

have become increasingly important, even to educated Tepoztecans. Land

prices have skyrocketed along with tourism and with the suburbaniza-

tion oí Tepoztlán, making selling very attractive and buying back almost

impossible, and the legal framework for local communal tenure is nowthreatened.

On the other hand, teachers salaries have plummeted and competition

between local professionals has intensified, so that pressure en the local

and state government from these sectors is increasingly unmet. As a result,

in the 1980s, Tepoztlán got its first f ill-timejournalist, who began writing

a biweekly column en Tepoztlán in a Cuernavaca paper, and who had alocal weekly significantly called El Reto del Tepozteco (the challenge oí ElTepozteco). This name contrasts with the narres oí various previous, very

p ....tia l L+tellectua ls

281 =

short - liveef periodicals such as Cl (, ramo dr Al, 11,1 or El T,pozleco , because

whereas carlier leafleis stresscd rinly that Tpoztlán was a microcosm of

the nation ( likc a grain ol sand i and that it could stand for the nativo roots

<rt the nation El kem Jsi Tepozienr niakcs thesr native roots i. sym bol i zed by

Ll Tepozteco finto a political challenge 'rno

Tepoztlán has today become divided between two political parties.

Conservar i ve pcasants , suela as the Curte al representative of eommunal

lands , eomplain that che people hace bct omc divided , forsaking commu-

nity and peasant livelihood and dignity lar a iactionalism that reflects

national politics and national i nterests

Analysis

By looking at two different types of settlements in the municipio of Tepoztlán

1 have argued that the existente of small-town intellectuals, their nature,

and their connections to both local politics and the national public sphere

can be appreciated by inquiring finto the history of distinction in these lo-

calities, and by connecting the mechanisms of cultural distinetion lo the

policies of the state.The contrast between Tepoztlán and its surrounding hamlets unfolds

in the following manner: Because of its position as the administrative

center oí an indigenous jurisdiction, colonial Tepoztlán had a relatively

powerful ¡odian nobility that was absent in the villages. Tepoztlán also

had a resident priest, severa) Spanish families, andan occasional school-

teacher, all of whom promoted a complex system of interna) cultural dif-

ference, which nonetheless could produce no local intellectuals. This was

because (1) community cultural values were easily accessible lo all adult

men, (2) some cultivated values could not ser-ve as a basis for community

representation because they were banned by the church, and (3) theniches that could be occupied by intellectuals-that of priest and that of

teacher-were off-limits to Indians.The hamlets of the municipio had no such system of interna¡ cultural and

class difference, and, owing lo that very fact, they had no way of generat-

ing intellectuals who could effectively articulate local opinion lo influence

Spanish policy. In both cases, then, one found political mediation, which

relied en state power, serving also as the main form of cultural mediation.

After independence, the situation changed. Tepoztlán's cultural and

politico-economic elite became unitied, and chis allowed for the emer-

gence of the first truly local intellectuals. In the hamlets, the lack of an

internal economic or cultural elite, as well as of local schoolteachers or

Irovioeial l,i ieilrriuals

282 =

priests, meant a prolongation of the rift between local public opinion,

which was in certain respects tormed quite democratically, arad the nation-

al or regional spheres ot diseussion, del iberatio n, and policy formation-

Liberal policies tried tu chango Chis simation by doing away with commu-

nal lands, and the institutron ot surnames and the registration of private

property signal some degrce of success in [hese policies. However, in the

municipio el Tepoztlán, the erosion of the communities was not successfully

cotnpleted by the end ol the porfiriato, and the split described earlier was

strongly reaffirmed with Zapatas revolution and its populist aftermath.

In the village of Tepoztlán, ora the other hand, the nineteenth century

spurred a new development of forms of cultural mediation. Whereas in the

colonial period the priest was the utmost intellectual authority, and

whereas in that era collective religious ritual was the main forum of media-

tion, nineteenth -century schoolteachers used nationalism and progress as

the tools for building ties between the locality and state and private insti-

tutions. This explains why José Guadalupe Rojas, whose acts were initially

comparable lo those of a Spanish schoolteacher or priest, decided to take

a nativistic turra and to identify the local popular culture with the nation's

historical roots. His move has a family resemblance lo the one that insists

en seeing Mexico as divided finto a "deep" and a "moderó' country: in both

cases, cultural and political marginaliry is equated to historical anteced-

ence. Rojas, however, used his outlook as a modernizing device: position

in the nation would strengthen Tepoztecan social lile; Tepoztlán could

claim such a position because of its pre-Hispanic roots, but the whose pur-

pose of the claim was lo modernize. This dialectic guaranteed a position

for local intellectuals , because they could stand between national opinion

and the local community, as indeed they still do.There has been still one important change since the míd-1980s,

though. The abundante of trained Tepoztecans combined with shrinking

state resources and very significant transformations in the overall class

composition of the locality led to factionalism within the professional

classes. At that point, access to media became crucial, and Chis explains

the revitalization of the local press.

Conclusion: Intellectuals and Political Mediation in tbe National Space

The historical analysis of the spatial íragmentation of Mexicos public sphere

can be achieved by studying the ways in which culture communities have

created or failed to create spaces for local intellectuals who can speak in

and lo the national public sphere and who are not themselves simply

Provi=a cial In telteciuats

283 =

power brokers This history is a cor,plex one, bur 1 suggest that there is a

lorm to it, and that Chis forro can bc discrvered if we look closely at the

formation oí regional cultures and hack ofl from che homogenizing image

oí one deep Mexican civilization

The postindependence project of creating a national public sphere,

that is, a "media-scape" whcre civic opinion could be expressed, involved

creating a unified cultural con, niunity ^.-hcre norte existed. This is why

Iturbide, who was Mexicos hrst national sovercign, complained that there

was no Mexican public opinion, out rathr-r a handful of diverse prívate

opinions that claimed che status oí bcing a national opinion. It is also why

Iturbide felt that Mexican national sentiments were only truly expressed

during popular uprisings. In othcr words, the channels for communicating

hetween different local communities werc extremely limited and acces-

sible only to a few. f sople could only express their opinions effectively by

force. The image of a "deep" Mexico, oí a Mexico that finds no expression

in either national political iorums or in che niass inedia, can thus be traced

backtuindependence.

In this chapter, 1 have developcd the nidimcnts of a historical sociology

of the silente that has characteri zed thc relationship oí certain sectors oí

che Mexican population and state institutions. The methodological prem-

ises ot my analysis can be summarized in three points.

1 A geography oí mureness nceds to be developed to give well-

pondered content to the deep versos official" imagery. If such a

geography goes undeveloped the imagery neeessarily devolves

finto che nationalisr miasma that Iturbide and all of his successorswere inextricably caught in -

2 Such a geography can be developcd by analyzing the emergente oí

intellectuals in various typcs of communities or localities. It in-

volves speelfying che systems ot iniernal cultural distinction that

exist in each localized community and then identifying the culture

values that can serve as the oasis for the forniation oí an intelll-

gentsia that can aspire to represcnt che community.

3 The analysis also involvcs ascertaining whether the culture values

in question articulare smoothhy with [hose that prevail among intel-

lectuals in che centers of national power as wcll as with the state's

culturally constituied idioms of rcpresentation.

When appbed to che case of the n onicipal seat of Tepoztlán and to the

hamlets oí that wunicipio, [hese propositions yielded rich resu]ts 1 would

like to cunclude by summarizing a few ol them

1 For long periods, che hamlets could only produce intellectuals by a

kind oí interna] consensos that was formulated around a language oí

respect, whereas the municipal seat had a more sophisticated forro

oí interna] differentiation that fostered an intelligentsia from thevery ear]y colonial period on.

2 During the colonial period, the institutionalized positions for intel-

lectuals in the village oí Tepoztlán were al] in the hands oí Spaniards,

and off-limits to the local population. Because of chis, it is fair to say

that a truly local intelligentsia with an institutional base did not

emerge there uncí] che national period.

3 Identification oí local society with national culture became funda-

mental for the reproduction oí local intellectuals during the nine-

teenth century, and it has remained critica) to this day. The formula

at which Tepoztecan schoolteachers arrived at was simple: local tra-

ditions are at the very root el Mexican nationality, but only the de-

veloped branches can instruct and extract the unpolished province

from its sleepy backwardness. Local intellectuals were the needed

mediators oí chis re]ationship: they rendered the image oí the "deep

Mexicu" back to the urbanites, national intellectuals, and state offi-

cials who so esteemed it, and in return became effective brokers.

The "deep" versus "artificial' imagery is therefore a favored trope oí

intellectual mediators and it is a tool that has been used both to de-

fend local culture and to argue for "progress" and modernization.

4 Despite the persistente of this formula oí mediation, it has always

had limited local appeal. Tepoztecans have at times disidentified

both with che modernizing impulses oí some intellectuals and with

therr insistent nationalist nativism. Don Ángel Zúñiga, a local intel-

lectual who is devoting some efforts to teaching Nahuatl, has found

more interest among middle-c]ass urbanites who have migrated to

Tepoztlán than he has among native Tepoztecos. Similarly, Don

Felipe's ce]ebration oí Quetzalcoatl has received a range oí responses,

including a fair amount oí apathy from many vil]agers. The fluctua-

tions in the acceptance and fervor with which che projects oí these

intellectuals are embraced are a necessary object for future study.

5 The formula oí the intellectual as thc respected man is undoubted]y

the one that has most interna] appeal in peasant communities.

However, it is Chis very democratic appeal, combined with the class

and cultural chasco that divides peasant communities from urban

centers, that guarantees an unstable, contested, and ultimately un-routinizable intellectual leadership.

Y r o n i n ^ i a l 1,t s

285 =

Signilieant portions ot thc pupiifition ul hoth Tepoztlán and its ham-

Icts still have no voicc as citizem. Instead, thev are representcd by poliG-

cal mediators :+nd interllectuals huye nrgnuations with the government

occur in a dlfterent languape nu ,Ti, should hclieve what poIiticians say,

according lo peasant consetvniscs Instead set conversing wlth diem, local

constitueneies have litde choice hui to engage in very pragmatically cal-

allated t ra n sacio ns wheie^ Ches retase ce rtam resourees or co ncessions

in excbange for thcir voicc

The preceding discussion suggesl, 1 thlnk ruar che ternt silent Mexico

is more useful and precise rhan decp Hesito The silent Mexico has no

historical priority over the ram bu nc ticas pa rtici panty in the public sphere-

Nor is it a root oí nationality - It siniply comprases che various populations

that lave beyond che fracturad fault lino of Mexico's nacional public sphere.

This situation does not imply that [hese populations are marginalized

from participation in state instUtutions: it nicans that they have no public

voice. The "silent Mexico" is organized around certain systemic principies

that can be perceived in che organization ot cultural distinction in the na-

tional space.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1 José Limón , American Encounters : Grealer Mexico , tbe United States , and che Erolics of Culture,

52-57.2 A standard philosophical reference for this general point is Oilles Deleuze and Félix

Guattari , A Tbousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia . A detailed anthropological

study that develops this criticism closely around a specific case is Lisa Malkki, Purity

and Exile Violente, Memory, and fltational Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania.

3 Octavio Paz, El laberinto de la soledad, 13.

4 A nation-state is made up oí a sovereign people , its trate, and as territory . However,

"a people" is not a stable entity, and neither are its connections to a state and terri-

tory. ldeally, che nation - state is a territory in which the inhabitants are communi-

cated in such a way that they can concert opinions that give direction to govern-

ment (this is called "che public sphere "). Government , in turn, is organized in such a

way that it can rationally administer the entire population . Both oí [hese imply spa-

tial hierarchies that should, in theory, be isomorphic . Thus, the public should be

smoothly integrated from local levels up tu che national leve¡, with no regard for

class differences , while the national state should have an organized system of ad-

ministration down to local levels requiring no additional mediation for che imple-

mentation oí its authority . Finally , this unit as a whole needs to shape its representa-

tion in an international arena In such a way that foreigners and foreign interests

operating in the national territory can be managed , and that national interests that

reach beyond territorial frontiers are protected. The national space is the intersection be-

tureen che geography of che national public, the spatial organization of gooemment , and tbe nation-

states situation in Je international arena.

5 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, " Provincializing Europe . Postcoloniality and the Critique

oí History," 337-57; and Harry Harootunian , Hismry s Disquiet Modernity, Cultural

Practice, and the Question of Everyday Lije.

P r o n i ' , ' r ' ' 11!'1'''z ,'1'1

286 = 287 =

6 Javier C,arciadiegu summanzes rhe dnvin., arras of tire National University's

foundci Justo Sierra, as lalloccr. "F^r dan Jtntu ihe arco of rhe new institution was

thc integral education of ihe ¢udents a1,11 nos only die advanre oí ,trence, a fact

thai distanccd hico from rhe posilir i,,, ,A1,ruovcr ihe university should devote

much attention in rhe social rcal,(e of clic country" (Rudo, contra técnicos laUnroersided Nacional durante la rrooh,nd„ masrnn.,. - 1 1 my translation) The dehnltion ofthe "Great National Prohlems has varied solista ntial ly since the inauguratiou of chc

National Univcrsiry i n 1 9 1 0 hui chc universuvt nc,corica¡ committnent to study-ing and to solving them is a enastan[. S'c Dzv.d Lorcy, The Unmersity System and rheEeormmic f),,,Icernent nf h1 exiro erra e rn o

7 Lawrerice Lcvi rae, 76e Openirtg of ti, Aniei iron ,bliud Estimas, Cu l tive and History, ehapter8 Arjun Appa dura i, "Thcory in An[h ropology Centcr and Periphcry," 356-61.

9 For a useful eatalog si U 5 st,reo,iypes si¡ L aran America, see John Johnson, LataAmerica i i (-ancature

1o For chc significa nce nf ,trence a, a sigo in a parallel context (India), sec GyanPrakash. Anotber Reinan Serence,nid ibr fic,Jlnat,oti of,N(odern Eedia, ehapter 1

11 Katherine Verdery. National IdeoleT y io,Jer So„altsrrr Identity and Cultural Politics inCeauscscu4 kornania 167-68.

12 Paul Krugman"Mexims New Dea1 .",A4-mYorkTnnrs Op-E,1 July 5, 2000 Kmgman

somewhat disingenuously argues tliat che true purpose of free trade was ro bring

democracy co Mexico. "now we knOW that. whaiever ihe slns of Mr Salinas, the re-formen tic hroughi ro power were sincero--and the reform was real"

1 3 On clic icor la rities between rhe threc t andldares, sec Jorge Castañedas arguments

in "Esta Ti, rs una elección de principios; es un referéndum para el cambioProceso, 10- 13

1 NATIONALISM AS A PRACTICAL SYSTEM

1 Anderson goes even htrther, and denlo, that racial Identity and racism are connect-ed in any cesential way te nationalism ''1 t)hc lact oi che matter is that nationalismrhinks in tercos oí historical destinres whilc cism dreams oí eternal contamina-

tiene The dreams of racism ncrunlly havc their origin in ideologies oí class,

rather tiran Ti, [hose of nanon" ( 1904 149-10 `E. 1 hall argue that Chis assertion is

searching for differences in che social organization oí communieation in various

classes as a key to underscanding nationalism, he incorrectly assumes that some

forms of community are "concrete" while others are "imaginary," Al[ communitarian

relationshi ps are based en an idea of rhe social whole Chas is imaginary,- and "rhe

nobility" oí bis example was much more reliant en systemic "replications" than

Anderson imagines. So, for example, all legitimare descendanrs oí che conquista-

dora and early setders oí tire Indios were officially considered nobles (hilos dalgo)(Las Leyes de Indias, book 4, riclc 6, law 6). Likewise, it was poliey to reeognize and

maintain the status oí chc Indian "nobility" (ibid., book 7, fide 7, law 1) In short,

rhe nobility oí che Spanish colonial era played as systemic a role as the bourgeoisie,

which mean[ that it burgeoned wherever it was needed to maintain a local hierar-chy and state organization. The grandees of Spain were surely as ignorant oí rhe

identities of the descendanes oí first sertlers or oí [odian nobles in Chile as the

menibers of che bourgeoisie of Barcelona were of che identity oí their class counter-parts in rhe Río de la Plata

4 Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la lengua castellana en que se explica el verdaderosentido de las voces . _ Madrid, 1726-39 (1737),

5 For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between anclen régime and mod-

ero, ideas regarding sovereignry in che Spanish and Spanish-American world, see

Frangois-Xavier Guerra, "De la política antigua a la política moderna, la revolución

de la soberanía," in Fran@ois-Xavier Guerra and Annick Lamperiére, eds., Los espaciospúblicos en Iberoamérica ambiquedades y problemas, siglos XVI11-XIX, 109-39. Guerra hasshown that throughout tire nineteenth century, Spanish America combined ele-ments oí an ancien régime and oí a modero polity. A similar point has been madeby Fernando Escalante, Ciudadanos imaginarios. Contemporary Latín America is also

nos without examples of tensions between competing claims between ,rafe sover-

eignty and che traditional rights of corporations and communities

6 See Annick Lamperiére, "República y publicidad a fines del antiguo régimen,"55-60.

7 A good case in point is rhe use oí the cagle eating rhe serpear as rhe symbol for

Mexico Ciry . Enrique Florescano (1996) has studied che evolution oí chis symbol in

che colonial period, and he shows that rhe Aztec symbol was used preferentially

oven rhe coas oí arras that has been assigned to che city lince che early seventeenth

century. The use of chis indigenous symbol as rhe local symbol also buttressed

creole identity This symbol was eventually written into che flag oí Mexico in lieu

oí Hidalgos Virgen oí Guadalupe, or oí Morelos's "Viva la Virgen María."

Rey works en chis master include Brading 1991, Lafaye 1977, and Lavallé 1993.

ladead, rhe Spanish constitucion that was prometed in Cádiz in 1812 defined

Spanish citizenship in such as way as to include in equal tercos those borra in any

parí oí rhe Spanish dominion (article 18; in Tena Ramírez 1957, 62). Aljovín (1997,

2-4) discusses rhe decline of Andean Curacas at rhe end of rhe eighteenth century

in che context oí che Bourbon stare's goal oí eliminating rhe power oí all institu-

tions that brokered che relationship between rhe date and its subjects.

For example, in both che Constiturion of Cádiz (1812) and Mexicos Centralist

Constitution (1836), servanes have nationaliry (Spanish and Mexican, respectively),bus in neither case were servants cirizens.

For che saliente oí individual communities as primary referents oí identity in che

uncenable in clic Ihcrian world

2 "Out of che Americao welter came (hese imogmed reaGties _ nation -states , republican instimGOns , eommon citizcnship , popular sovereignry, nacional flag , and an-thems , etc and rhe Ilquidanon oi [lis Er Conn'ptual opposites, dynastie empires,monarchlcal institution, absrrluu-mi -1111,dnods Inherited neshilitics , serfdoms, 8ghertoes , and so forth In effen h, chc second datada of the nineteenth century, 9if role' T he' a'model ' of'the' independent natiunal tate was availahle for pira ting"(Ibid, 81)

3 At times Anderson appears to heLeve that [heme is such a thing as a "concrete" ver-sus an " imaginal'y " contmuni sy The relatively latan size of traditional aristucracies,their hxed political bases , and rhe person al iza uon of polrtical relatioos implied bysexual i ntercou tse and inherita lee . meant (hae their cohesions as classes were as 10much concrete as imaginad . An ill itenw nobiliro could still actas a nobility. But thebourgeoisie? 1 ¡ere was a class whidt, hguratiyely speaking, come unto being as aclass only in so mana' replications Ihid 7.. Althougli Anderson is shrewd lo 11

Notes t o C h a p t e r ,288 =

= 289

wars nt mdcpcndenc.e set L0c Van 1ocng I 'iSO 11,1 thc ways in which communny

or corpurate idcntitics orterlocked wich nauonalist chscourses. see Florencia Mallon.

Pemm^l and t¿,1 -•n: Ti's \I ,in :l lrec md Prru chopters 5 and 7; alto

1sealantc ( I:dm!o: rr rtrr.v',': `'-- I I ' and 4n carly formulat:on of cite

problum ras set t... 11, bv Ildn...... t) t ...romo uchu argucd that Benito luárcz's tra-

uniph ovar che 1 rench in 186, mtst ur 11 I nuulcred a seeond independencc,'

e0t simply in lita rente that 91c.srr seas (real licor a torcign invades but, much

more fundamontally, botarse it represen tcd che tnumph of liberal republi anism

ovar a classical re pubhcnnlan VA c orino ras then, that d Miguel Hidalgo is the

fuunder ol OUTJ natlonalrte Hl nio l maro e Es tito Inundar ni repubhean natronality.

whreh in nota as we knu w. rt ,ll Ihe srm duo 19('11 , 86:.

i2 See, ter Florencia,Nlallon cls. ussiunnt' popular Lberalrsm ronineteenth -

cenmry Mexleo and Peru (1995, 13w, and Gua¡ dintis discussion oí popular federal-

ism between independence and 1850 i 1996. 179-94)

13 See Fleisher ( 1992) Clearly, early modero nat lona) tsm differed considerably in

England, France, and tire Nethcrlands Stephen Pincus (1998) interprets the

Glorious Revolution as che hrst nacionalist revolntion, rather [han as a religious war.

Englands early separacion of natiunal asir' and rcligion reflects che fact chal it never

hoped te achieve a universal monarchy. as Spain and che Otcomans did; thus, co a

certain degree one could say that a religious nationalism is at che origins oí che

Spanish imperial state, whercas a revolutaonary, secular form nl nationalism elevel-

oped in England.14 "It ought tu be well pondered hoy, wathont any doubt, God chose the valiant

Cortés as has instrumenc for opcning tito door and preparing che way leí che

preachers oí che gospel in tire New World, where che Catholic church might be re-

scored and recompensed by che conversions ot many souls for che greac loss and

damages which che accursed Luther was lo cause at che same time within estab-

lished Chritianiry . Thus it is not without mystery chal in che same year in which

Luther was boro in Eisleben, in Saxonv, Hernando Cortés saw che light oí day in

Medellín, a village in Spain-the formar to upset thc world and bring beneath che

banner of Sacan many oí che fanhful who had buen for generations Catholies,

che latter lo hring oto che bid oí che church an infinita nember oí people who had

for ages been under che dominion uf Sacan in idolatry, vice, and sin" (Mendieta

.1876, 3.174-75, my cranslatiun)

15 Laws distinguishing subjeca oí tire Spanish crown Irom foreigners were equally

precise (e-g book 3, title 13, law 8)-

16 It should be noted, however that [hese pmcesses were by no means a simple con-

stan:, and that che politics oí differentiacion between "Peninsulars" and "Creoles" re-

sponded to varying kinds oí interesa irnclud1ng, for instante, interesas in prolong-

ing encomendero privilege aher che second generaron; interest in keeping Creoles out

oí certain religious orders or away l rom cerrarn political posts). These interesas

waxed and waxed at various times and places, in such a way thac there were places

and times when a "Creolc" was simply a Spaniard, oaher moments when "Créele'

was used pri nci pally as a discriminacury terco, and yet others when American-boro

Spaniards criad m affirm che equalhv, and oven tito superiora ty, oí their land wich re-

spect to Spain, Rome, or odres Furopean locatimrs (see Lavallé 1993).

17 The natura el American lands and ti therr intlucnce on che characcer oí che

h a l e s r o L h a p r u r r

290 =

Amerlcans was a po1emaca1 suhrect in scienti11 crre1us fronc che time of nitral con-

tact to the carly twcntrcth c,ntury Sec Antoncllo (,,e(,,, Nano, in che 01,e, Warld

From Christopher Columtus to (.ora:do Fenlández de ()iriado, and Ti,, 1ispule of lb, New World:

The Hintory of a Polem I o-rvnu18 The literatura cxalrnt_ American lands at times alto refashions che connections be-

tween the American and ideo. 11... has beca scudied ,, detall for Mexico hv

Lafaye ( 1977, chapter 1I and hy David drading (1991, chapters 14 and 16). In che

Andean world, Lavallé ( 1993 1221 notes chal "Many Crtoles believed thac their

patria could be con,pared to tire Flysian 1 ields. wich che Brbles paradise. There was

in chis for sume a mere lirerarv style - Fur othcrs. thcre could be no douht.

Amcnca should not he ,, rnp,rred to paradise it roes the earthly paradise ol che

Sc,,ptwcs(emphasis in che onglnal'..

19 Raphael Semmes, a soldier in ti re U e, army, described che reception thac was given

co US. troops by Mexico City's elites in che following tercos "The Calle de Plateros,

through which we marched to the grand plaza, is che street in which all che principal

shops are found, and although [hese were closed, che gay curtains chat fluttered froto

che balconies aboye ... (almost every house had prepared and hung out a neutral

flag-English, French, Spanish, etc-as a means of protection), and che fashionably

dressed women, who showed chemselves without the leas[ reserve at doorways and

windows gave one che idea rather oí a grand nacional festival, [han oí the entry oí a

conquering army finto an enemy capital" (cited in Luis Fernando Granados, "Sueñan

las piedras: alzamiento ocurrido en la ciudad de México, 14, 15 y 16 de septiembre,

1847,") The "neutral flags" were meant co signal co LI.S. soldiers chal che families in

question were alto foreign nacionals, usually by virtue oí descent-

20 Charles V famously claimed thac whereas German was appropriate for speaking co

horses, and Italian was ideal for courting wornen, Spanish was for speaking co God-

The term ladino alto provides a clue co che sacralization ti Spanish, because it

was used co refer co Jews, Moors, African slaves, or, laces, Indians, who spoke

(neo)Latin, that is, Spanish (Lavallé 1993, 19). A discussion oí che history oí che

citle'Rey Católico" and oí its significante for Spain in its competition wich France

can be found in Pablo Fernández Abadalejo, "Rey Católico: gestación y metamor-

fosis de un título." Jaime Contreras argues chal Spain's persecution oí heresy under

che Reyes Católicos can be understood as a política] appropriation oí the church:

"Concerns with'heresy,' which were initially oí little consequence, became a funda-

mental butiress co roya' law' ("Los primeros años de la inquisición: guerra civil,

monarquía , mesianismo y herejía," 703). On che identification between Christianity

and Spanish civilization in che so-called spiritual conquest oí Mexico, see Peggy K.

Liss, Mexico tender Spain, 1521-1556 Society and the Origins of Nationality, chapter 5, es-

pecially pp. 77-82.21 Antonello Gerbi (1985 267-68) remarks chal Fernandez de Oviedo contrasted che

grandeur oí Spain wich thar of ancient Rome, noting thai Spanish Goths were

Christians and were martyred while resiscing Roman paganism. Thus, in che six-

teenth century, Spains nacional identification with the Christianity was made co

rank higher even [han Rome's22 Anthony Pagden has shown chal talle of a universal nionarchy was never universally

accepted in Spain itself, and chal it war extinguished as an impracticable ideal by

che end oí che seventeenth cenwry. However, he alto argues that Spain's ideological

Notes t o C h a p t e r a

291 =

role as guardias o( universal Chnsrendom Formeci an importan[ part of rhe ideo

logical armacure of what has some Llanos in hong che hrst European nation state'(Spanish Imperialism and the Political lmagnn,tion 5;

23 The Laos of ¡be Indios provide an i nteresong example of how Spain reconciled the si-

multaneous development between enipires though time with a Catholic universal -ism Much of the legistature that was promoved by Philip IV (at a time oí imperial

decay) shows punctilious conecto with public oration and repentence for public

sins, as mechanisms to reanimare ihe empire and, perhaps, also as potencial expla-

nations oí its po1irical shortcomings For example, book 1, titie 1, law 23 (passed

originally in 1626) orders viceroys and church authoddes to celebrate oí Novem-

ber 21 every year with a Mass to che Holy Sacrament, in which priests call on

everyone no reform rheir "vices and public si," in order ro thank God for hisclemeney in allowing Spanish ships to rcach che Indies unharmed.

24 More thorough and convincing iban Andersonc emphasis on che populari zation oí

"emprytime through rhe newspaper and rhe novel is Moishe Posrones discussion of

the vise of "a bstract tose,' a hisrory, that is telated in parí to the development of tech-

nology, in pare to the Newton ian sc ient itic revol cnon, and ul ti mately to the history

of contmodihcarion, and especially to rhe rice ot abstraer labor." At the most gener-

al leve], Postone suggests rhat che emergence ot rime as an "independent variable"

"was related co che commodity torna ni social relacioní" (1996, 211). If we apply

these ideas to Spanish America, we eonclude ihat rhe consolidarnos of "abstraer

rime" has been a long process, thac has only beca unevenly achieved The process

began with devices such as administrativa relorms, was strengehened in various

waves oí modernizing relorms with che rice of a bourgeois public sphere in the late

eighteenth century, and eventually w,th rhe conwltdacion of industrialtsm Spanish-

American independence oecurred somewhere ii. che middle of this process

25 Antonio Domínguez Ortiz i flumi naces chis siwatiom "The social thoughr oí en-

1ightened Spaniards was flor radical It did not ]aim rhe total suppression of barri-

ers between the estafes, because riese wene cruntbling of rheir own accord bastead,

it seemed more urgen[ to struggle againsr economic differences chal condemned a

great portion oí the population to misery This loes flor mean that pride in nobility

had disappeared but thcy no longer used nohiliry Cides as excuses ro refuse com-mon charges, privileges could nnfy be justihed if rhey were employed for the goodof che naciun'' (Carlos 111 y la España dr I„ llustraoón, 120-21). Domínguez discussesthe significante oí stace projects and knowledge producrion in chis period in chap-

ter 5 See alto Sranley Stein and Barhara Stein, "Concepts and Realities oí SpanishEconomic Growth, 1759-1789."

26 The fact that a nazi onalism and a nar]ona1 prograna were nor a conimon denomina-tor even among Mexican insurgencs has been demonstrated by Edc Van Young,

who has shows rhe central,ry hoth of local indigenous revolts whose claims with

regará co state building were in fact the oppositc ol rhose of che crcole directorate

(1986 386, 412), and of an ti nidcological criminal ur brigand element whose par-

ticipacion was entircly opportunnoc 11989, 36-37) The role oí opportunlstic

rogues and the criminal elenaent in indcpcodeoce is also pungently demonstrated

by Archer (1989). On rhe other hand Spanish American independenee was pro

dictable oven hefore indigenous social miwements gor srarred and hefore narionallsts

really heated up As early as 1786, Fhooas Jelfe noo's ,nain preoccupation regarding

No.,s Iv .ba

292 =

Spanish America was that it should nor fall out oí Spanish hands too quickly. The

fact that Spain would eventually lose those territorios was, for Jeffersoo, a foregooeconclusion The United States needed time to gain strength in order to annex as

many Spanish-American ten'irories as possible (cited in Fuentes Mares 1983,34-35).

27 For a descripbon that Ilustrares sume similariries between [hese ideas and those ex-pressed in indigenous messianic revolts oí chis period, seo Eric Van Young 1986,402.

28 Silvia Arrom, "Popular Polis es in Mexico City The Parián Riot, 1828," is an illumi-nating discussion of popular politics and anti - Spanish sentiment in this period.

29 Masons appear to be present in Spanish America since the 1780s, though in the

Mexican case it appears that rhe deputies who were sent ro rhe Cortes oí Cádiz in

1812 were critial in rho (onnation of Mexico's lodges of che Scottish rito

30 Joel Poinsett to Henry Clay, June 4, 1825- Dispatches from US. Miniscers to

Mexico National Archives, Washington, D.C.)-

31 The lodges had achieved such a status, that at che news of the death oí the Duke ofYork, Presiden[ Guadalupe Victoria, who was a yorquino, published an edict orderingthe presiden[, the vice presiden[, rhe members oí rhe Supreme Court, state gover-

nors, district officers, and army ofhcials from the rank oí colonel up to wear a black

hand of mourning (Primera secretaría de Estado Departamento esterior Sección 2,May 19, 1827).

2. COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGIES AND NATIONALISM

This chapter has been translated from Spanish by Paul Liffman.

1 Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1, 40, 41-43-2 Annette Weiner, Inalienable Possessions; Marcel Mauss, The Gifiu Forros and Funrtions of

Exchange in ArchaicSocieties. -3 Alfredo López Austin (TI, Human Body and Ideology, Concepls of rhe Ancient Nahuas, vol

1, 74, 79, and generally 68-83) summarizes the tensions between rhe communirari-en ideology oí the calpulli and che imperial ideology oí rhe Aztecs.

4 Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, Coloquios y doctrina cristiana, 1515 López Austin, Tbe Human Rody arad Ideology, vol. 1, 207 López Austin also mentions

that "the han oí prisoners taken in battle could also be kept as relics for che purposeoí giving Che captive's powers co Che captors" (221).

6 In chis connecrion, it is interesting to note the determination with which Spanishmissionaries combated polygamy. without polygamy, rhe possibility oí construct-ing supracommunitarian alliances in the indigenous world was reduced. Perhaps itwas not accidental, chen, that che first play presented in New Spain was an ejemploagainsr che sin oí higamy and any infringement oí rhe seventh commandment. For adiscussion oí the conrents of chis play, as well as oí its production and impressiveCeehnical effects, see Othón Arróniz. Teatro de la evangelización en Nueva España, 23-30.Ross Hassig (Aztec Warfare Imperial Expansion and Political Control) offers a number oí

examples of the use oí rearriage as a strategy oí alliance among the Aztecs

Following Chis logic, Mocrezuma hiniself tried to marry one oí his daughters to

Cortés, but rhe latter declined che offer on account oí the fact that "he was alreadymarried" (244).

Notes t o C h a p t e r z

293 =

7 In Chis ,,ad thc Aztrc unpirc umtr-nts wM1h huth thc classic .hayan k,ngdoms,

sehere ssar seas can exiles v ac tisis el thc tmtouacy. and a-ith che luotihuaeán

model se e alntmt thc s5) hule s.st i appeals u, bave hico meritoeratlc. Pora

coro Prehe nvcc trcatnAlt ol ssar in IP 1 lislsanic pceod. suc Ross Hassig.

,A lesos ni eu..w 11'vfar

6 However. O,nly nwdcm Spanish u„ s i roca ,ruin dillerute bus, curten[ notions.

Although za was related ti, heredite. che tiro- ,ti,,, had a negadvc slart, hecause

raza seas somcnmes understoud ne a s;vhle dilas t in physlcal appearanee that was a

mark Ilt spietual 111t enontr. Thus th terno siete 111 1 1 readily used co meter co leves,

Meo,, hlzcks u.Indians (1, TI o¡ l nd C.Inn;i,rs sebo had ,.sla. On the other

hand had bluod cnuld he ir:,pci, d s,.mc s'ce by m favorable cnvironmcnt.

9 Sec. sor e,,antple. Edgar Lo ve on m.. lag,, hits: can blaeks and other Gastes Ti,

Mexico Coy: Marnage Patierne ol Pers<sns of (\rfican Descent in a Colonial

Mexico Ciry Parish," 79-91.10 For examples of che latter, sea David .A Bradings discussion ol the ways in which

the Spanish merchanc bequcathed tl:er businesses tu theu daughters' [borran hus-

bands, while their creole sons besa,, can tdle aristocracy (Minera and Mercbants in

Bourbon Mexico , 1763- 1 9 10) .

11 Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán , La pobla,tm: negra de tVléxicu 1519-isnr, 157, 160-61; che

semi bozal is che same as che word lor hridle oc muzzle in Spanish and has the con-

notation of inexperience whcn app]ied to a horse or mole It also may be that che

term referred to the tact that Atrican speech sounded Itke gibbertsh (voz or hoz

referred to vosee, speech, shouting. ntouth, muzzle, etc.).

12 Ibtd., 157.13 Ibtd_, 280-92. See also Coln Palmer, Slunes of tbe Wbita Gol. Blacks in Mexico, ts7o-a650-

14 Jaeques Lafaye Ouetzalceatl y Cuad,a6ipc la formación de la conciencia nacional en México,

and David A. Brading, Piral Amneric,s Ti, Spanish ,'sIonarcby, Creole Patdots and che Liberal

SIate, 1192-1867, chapter 16.

15 José María Luis Mora, Obras sueltas, vol. 1 152-53.

16 For a discussion oí race issucs in Mexico, Almo Knight, " Racism , Revolution and

Indigenismo. Mexico, 1910-1940," in Tbe 11, of Race in Latín Amurica, 1870-1940, ed.

Richard Graham, 71-114.

17 Andrés Molina Enríquez, Los guindes problunas nacionales, 344

18 They were more Indican chao Spanish for several reasons, hrst, hecause che number

oí Spaniards in colonial Mexico was ahvays smal lar [han che number of Indians; sec-

und, hecause che Spanish componen [ ot the mestizo roce was transmttced almost

exclusively by orales , whcreas che indigenous clamen[ was reproduced by both fe-

males and males ; and third, hecause 'mdigenous mees survived in large p erts oí che

country that wh lte caces had heen inca pable ot t nhabi ring In th is latter argumenc,

Molina Enríquez formulares quite explicidy che idea that Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán

developed ondee the ntle of "regions ot rchige ¡bid i

19 "The mestizos will finally absorh the Indians and they wtll conrpletely tuse the

Créeles and che loreigners residing hiere wirh thcir oven race_ As a consequence, che

mestzo race shall develop wirh liherty ( )nee this oso, nos only will ir: tesis[ che in-

evitable clash wirh the North American ras-e, hut tn chis elash, It wtll win" (ibid.,

352).

20 Ibid 343 my emphasis.

N o l e. 1'1

294 =

3. MODES OF MEXICAN CITIZENSHIP

1 Roberto DaMatta. Cnrio,ds. Rognes and Heroes, 137-97, and, lor a lato and more

elaborated version, A casa e u ruu Espi o, cidadania, rnulher e morse no Brasil.

2 The lame saytng exisrs to Me,,,,, aod has heen attributed to non, oth e2- [han

Benito Juárez Mexico's must tamous liberal Fernando Escalante (Ciudadanos imagi-

narios , 293) discusses what come ti) be known o Juárezs day as "La Ley del Caso.

shas is, che dtserettonaty application ol the law as che law3 Thus che relationship hctween che government and die press is most often de-

scdhed as une ot "colluson." rathcr chao of simple represslon (though repression

has a)ways exisced,i A guod summary el che relationshmp hctween che press and che

government o provided m Raynumdo Rrva Palacio. "A Cultura of Collusion- The

Tics That Bind che Presa atol rhe PRI," 21-32

4 "Bando de Hidalgo, Decemher 10, 1810, in Leyes)undamnotales de México, 1808-15)57,

ed. Felipe Tena Ramírez, 22-

5 These strictures are repeaced by Morelos in his Sentimientos de la nación (18 1 3)

"Arride 9. AII [public) jobs shall only be obcained by Amedcans"

6 Rayón's constitution can be found in Tena Ramírez, Leyes fundamentales , 24-27.

7 Ibid, 127.

8 Fran4ois -Xavier Guerra, "The Spanish-American Tradition oí Represencacion and

Its European Roots," 7.

9 Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Post-Colonial Mexico and Peru,

129-33.10 Lorenzo de Zavala, 'Viaje a los Estados Unidos del Norte de América, 1834," 156-

1 1 In Pantaleón Tovar, Historia parlamentaria del cuarto congreso constitucional, vol. 1, 400-401.

12 Ibid., 306-8.

13 The discussion occurs on December 28, 1867 (ibid., 122 ). In a related discussion a

few days later, Depury Zarco justifies che war in Yucatán by explaining shas "From

che days oí Maximilian, it is well known shas there were designs to creare -a viceroy-

alry in Yucatán, an asyluni for reactionaries . These traitors toil to separare that teni-

tory from the republic and to instare it as a principaliry so that they can sell the

Indians off as slaves" (¡bid., 137). Ironically , in order to comba[ [hese reactionaries

and che Maya rebels, Juárez and his liberals provisionally legalized corvée labor

and/or slavery in che peninsula.

14 AII citations oí discussions oí the First Constimtional Congress are from che facsim-

ile edition cided Actas constitucionales mexicanas ( 1821-1824 ). Dates of discussions will

be cited rather [han pagination , which is nos entirely sequential.

15 Lic. Jesús Arellano, "Oración cívica que en el aniversario del grito de independencia

se pronunció en el palacio de govierno de Durango el 16 de septiembre de 1841."

16 Ibid., 11. Curiously, che scorpion would later go tan co become emblematic oí che

state oí Durango.

17 Ibid., 6.I8 Ibtd., 16.19 Francisco Santoyo, "Opúsculo patriótico, que pronunció el ciudadano teniente

coronel graduado Francisco Santoyo, como miembro de la junta patriótica de esta

ciudad [de Orizaba) el día 11 de septiembre de 1842."

20 Escalante, Ciudadanos imaginarios, 290

21 Andrés Reséndez shows how, in che case of Texas and New Mexico, alnuistic appeals

Notes t o C h et p t e r 3

295

to national identity and shared rcllgion seere die principal resouices used by

Mexico te, ti, to keep [hose terrhones in che lpublic ("Caught between Profi[s andRitual; Nacional Contestation in Texas and New Mexico, 1821-1848"

22 On February 7, 1868, Just a lea monchs arar che execurion oí Maxlmillan vol,

Hapsbarg, che project for a lag tryi u, to ritially ensheine che 1357 constitution

was presented ro Congress Tire u tific,oon h,r this proposal is significan[ "it is un-

questionablc that Chis talisrnan i che consntution sil 18571 that Is so loved by the

.Mexican people, was the cause of che prodigi(ms valor that disti ngui shed us in che

bloody war that has just passed" in locar, H;;larva parlamentaria vol 1, 398).

23 Descriptions of Porfirian ;tate theater are plenniul. lar [he boulevards, see Barbara

Tcnen baum, ',treehvise History The I'aserc de la Reforma and the PorÑri an State1876 1910," 127- 0 for che i ,r_, scc Paul 1 Vanderwood, Disorder and ProgressRundir, Pole, and ilrxican Devalol r,, lora general appreeianon oí Porfirian staterheatcr, see Mauricio Tennno-lrillo. Alexicc,d thr Worldb Pairo Crafting a ModeroNo dan.

24 Samuel Ramos, "El perfil del hombre y la culwia en México," 131-35.25 Sec, for example, Larissa Lomnlre. Netmork's m,d \larginalily: Llfe in a Mexican Sbantytown,

Carlos Vélez-Ibáñez. Ritual, ol h1,, ryinnÍ, ry. Potra s Process, and Gdlure Change in CentralUrban Maxica, Ovan-4 1174; Antonio .Azuda, ed La urbanización populary el orden jurídicoen América La l inri.

26 For a fui description oí [hese c-amira,gn nuca];, see Larissa Lomnitz, ClaudioLommitz, and Ilya Acfler, "Punctions ol clic f-orm Power Play and Ritual in che 1988Mexican Presidential Campaign, 357-402.

27 Teday ;his version is common w,,d,,m, but lar a succinct synthesis of chis per-

spective, see Lorenzo Mcyer, libero bsn,o entoril,iria. las carrtmdiccimres del sistema políticomexicano

4. PASSION AND BANALITY IN MEXICAN HISTORY

1 Fran4ois-Xavier Guerra, México del rmóq,m régimr.. n la revolución2 José María Luis Mora, Obras suelta, vol 2, 52-3 Ibid, So -

4 Fernando Escalante, Ciudadanos imayir,arios . 97-109.

5 'Decreto de excomunión de los insurgentes dado por el obispo Abad y Queipo,1810, in ¡listoria documen tal de Mexico, ed. Ernesto de la Torre Villar, Moisés GonzálezNavarro and S[anley Ross, vol 2 30 10Ibid, 37

7 "Maní hesm que cl señor O. Nligucl Hidalgo y Costilla, Generalísimo de las armasamericanas , y electo por la mayor parte de los pueblos del reino para defender susderechos y los de sus conde dada nos hace al pueblo (18l0)," in Torre Villar et al,

Historia doctimenlal de México, vol. 2. 111- 1 3.

8 Ibid., 42.

9 Ibid 43, my cmphasis

10 José María .Morelos, 'Bando de Mordus suprimiendo las castas y aboliendo la es-clavitud, 17 de noviembre de 1817 162563.

11 Luis Cahrcra, "Los dos patdolism; x556.

12 See Angel Delgado España y Alee a -l siglo vol. 2 192, for che views of cheSpanish ambassador Angel Caldcrdn de la Barca ora [hese matcers- Ambassador

N^les i baplr, a

296 rs

Poinsett, che first US. diplomar in Mexico, arrived in che country saluting its in-

dependence and hailing che republic that was "founded on the sovereignty of che

people and en che inalienable righrs oí man" (cited in ibid., vol. 1, 303), which it ar-guably was not.

13 Francisco Bulnes, El verdadero Juárez la verdad sobre la intervención y elimperio, 8 19.14 This occurred to Father Mariano Balleza, a kinsman oí Hidalgo; see Alejandro

Villaseñor y Villaseñor, Biografías de los héroes y caudillos de la independencia, vol 1, 58-15 Antonio López de Santa Anna, The Eagle: An Autobiograpby of Santa Anna, 68-69.16 Villaseñor y Villaseñor, Biografías de los héroes, vol. 2, 267-68.17 Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 789

18 Thus, aceording to Molina Enríquez (1978, 425), "che notion oí patriotism will be

determined and reduced [o the following simple terms, al] will be like brothers in a

family, free [o carry out their own actions, but united by [he fraterni[y oí a common

ideal, and obligated by virtue of that fraternity, on che one hand, co distribute their

common inheritance equally, and, on che other, to [olerate each othet's differences19 Bulnes, El verdadero Juárez, 856-57.

20 Juárez's lndianness was not trumpeted by Juárez himsclf, who only wrote oí chis

matter in a letter dedicated to his children; however, Juárez was identified by others

as [odian. 1 am grateful to Paul Ross for pointing this out to me.21 Agustín Sánchez González, Los mejores chistes sobre presidentes, 6422 Edmundo O'Gorman, Escalante notes that che pervasive belief in Juárez as a law-

abiding presiden[ can be traced back to che porfiriato, and forward to historiaras such

as Daniel Cosío Villegas and Enrique Krauze. He then demonstrates that che repre-

sentation oí Juárez and oí che restored republic as an era governed by the law andthe ideals oí liberal ci[izenship is a false representation (Ciudadanos imaginarios, 233;254¡259-86) .

23 O'Gorman, México, el trauma de su historia, 33.

24 See Mayer-Celis 1995. For a superficial overview oí che history oí Mexican censures,see Claudio Lomnitz, Modernidad indiana: nación y mediación en México, chapter 5.

5. FISSURES IN CONTEMPORARY MEXICAN NATIONALISM1 Carlos Fuentes, Where tie Air ls Clear, 21

2 For an analysis of che work oí Carlos María Bustamante, see David A. Brading, Losorígenes del nacionalismo mexicano, for a synthesis oí che nature of postrevolutionarystate intervention in shaping a modero citizenry, see Alan Knight, "Popular Culture

and che Revolu[ionary State in Mexico," 395-444, and for the specific case oíMichoacán, see Christopher Boyer, "The Cultural Politics oí Agrarismo: AgrarianRevolt, Village Revolu[ionaries, and State-Formation in Michoacán, Mexico."

3 Studies oí che historical relationships between in[elleetuals, poó[ical ritual, and chepublic sphere in Mexico are the focus oí chapters 7, 9, and 10.

4 Claudio Lomnitz, Exits from the Lahyrinth_ Culture and Ideology in Mexican National Space,chapter I.

5 During the 1980s, Mexieo's intelligen[sia experienced two contradictory tenden-

cies: growth in the number oí institucional contexts for intellectual production, on

[he one hand ("decentralization"), and, en [he other, a concenrration oí cultural

power in tuco allegedly stellar and mutually antagonistic "intellectual groups," rep-

resented by che journals Vuelta and Nexos During the Salinas years (1988-94), both

Nates to Chaptee s

297

grtxtps hall Glose relatiuns ss-nh -hc p,crrnnunt. hut Nusos's people received more

concess,ons Irom thc tate. reh,le reieieed more h,s lulevisa.

6 Interestingly tisis imago -cs,tnater ti) che uan,lurmatians that Roger Rouse de-

serihes for U.sí . wcict, in tim 1u„1111 ,,LVU ol r:i b; •,a no. w hereby the U S. alas,

structure s1 ' l1t111 aseae t -u m, a i' 1 1T 1 L,- 1 11 1 c anJ tuseard a dise ributlon that he

ikens to thc chape ol a rnck,t. The,mu lata, es ame not mere eomeidence, teleeting

Instead a tundamental shifr in che c. t,s stn uure ot both countries as well as

changas in thc wavs tate, i in ma1'e ul citizensh,p One signtfieantcon -

trasc ber reen che teso cases . hoyes cris thar in che United States the dominan[

ima.lr ul tire class and poseer stntsturc has 11(11 liceo that of cho pyram,d. The alas,

struccuru in che United States ,s ,,, dly poctrayed isumewhat appropriately) as

diamond -sIbap,d, with a hroad mmddle and narro,, points at che top and che bottom

Thus, whereas in che United States tiro cuncnt tos nslonnation of che iass structure

is decried in mainstream newspapers as rellecting both "corporate greed" and che

"formation of an underclass" (that ir. che tramlonnatnon of a diamond into a pyra-

miel), in Mexico che dorninant imagos are simply of pillage , of taking the jewels

from che temple on top of che pyramid and depositing them in Switzerland. See

Roger Rouse , "Thinking through Transnationalism .. Notes en che Cultural Politics

of Class Relations in che Contemporary United States ,° 353-403.

7 1 have developed chis point in connection ter che varying implications oí multi-

culturalism in Mexico versus che United States and Europe in "Decadente in Times

oí Globalizatioo ," 257-67.

6. NATIONALISM ' S DIRTY LINEN

1 This interest in che international networks of national identiry production has pro-

duced an exciting corpus of works en che hlstory of mapping , of censuses , oí stan-

dardization of sc,entific measurements , of world expositions , oí nationalist srrate-

gies in a number of literary forms and gentes , en architecture , en urbanism, and on

che history of transnational scienrihc and artistic networks Perhaps che finest

methodological exemplar of [ his ine of rescarch is Daniel Rogers , Atlantic Crossings:

Social Politics in a Progressive Age, huí Chis tradition has also produced a number oí

more general and theoredcally inclinad works , such as Arjun Appadurai , Modeniity

at Larga Cultural Dimensions of Globaláation , Homi K . Bhabha , "DissemiNation: Time,

Narracive , and che Margins ol che Modero Nation ," 291-322 , Néstor García

Canclini, Hybrid Cultures= Sirategirs for Entering and Leaving Modernity, Gyan Prakash,

Another Reason, Science and tbe Imagrsacron of Modero India, Doris Sommers , Foundational

Fictions , Tbe Nacional Romances of Lain Anrerica , and Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism,

to name a few prominent examples

2 In che recen [ anglophone literatura Edward Said 's Culture and Imperialism is a wide-

ranging exploration of che ways in whlch che colonial world was both critically im-

portant to che developmenr of "Western civilizatiorí ' and systematically diminished

or denied by it. The peor nations ' reaction te these practices is oudined by

Katherine Verdery ( 1991), who explores what sise calls "protochronism" among

Romanian nationalist intellectuals , whicii es a tendency co assert that key inventions

of civilization were i nvented ches r country r i both of [hese aspects oí nationalism

have long been recognized hy waters and poliucians in che colonial and postcolonial

world- As early as che seventeenth ccnu,ry 1 ndigenous Intel leetuals such as Guaman

Poma and Fernando de Alea Istlilxochitl argued for a kind of "protoehronistñ' with

regard to Christiani ry. ciar ti ng that che Ir ancestors recognized the trae God before

che arriva1 of che Spaniards Th,s tactic underlles much of Latin Americas Ind,genista

thinking unce at leas[ che nmctc-euth century, and was given playfully ironic treat-

ment in earIe 19005 by thc 13,asdian writem 1 sosa Barreo) through che cragieomie na-

tionalist hero Policarp,o k Jaresnta

3 Benedict Anderson, lmagrned Cmnmunrties, 5

4 For example, Roger Bartras most recent book (La sangre y lo Lista Ensayos sobre la condi-

ción postmexicanaj is a colleeIr00 ol essays en "che post-Mexican condition"

s Dipesh Chakrabarry ( 1992' has argued for che peed co "provi nci alize" Europe in che

realm el rheory and history h his rail to arras succeeds rimen perhaps the sor[ ot

"grounded theory" that 1 espouse herc will in somc respeecs he more universal and

social thought may go through a pisase risa[ is parallel te cho one that religion was

raid to have had in antiquity: "Thc various modes of worship, which prevailed in

che Roman world, were a11 considered by che people, as equally tete , by che phi-

losopher, as equally false ; and by che magistrate , as equally useful " (Edward Gibbon,

Tbe History oí the Decline and Fall of che Roman Empine, 35)-

6 European travelers te Mexico usually collected pre -Columbian objects. Contem-

porary producís that attracted their attention were generally seco as curious exem-

plars oí crafts that were distinctly European in origin , made quaint because of their

indigenous twist. Thus, in che 1 850s, a Mexican spur was sent to Britain by Henry

Christy and Edward B. Tylor where , because of in, extravagance and size, ir was ex-

hibited in the medieval section of che museum . See Edward B. Tylor, Anabuac, or

Meneo and tbe Mexicans , Ancient and Modern, 295-96.

7 In an earlier work ( 1992a ), 1 developed sume elements oí [his cultural geography,

aboye al] [hose having to do with che construction oí cultural regions within a na-

tional space . To that end, 1 proposed a series oí concepts ncluding "intimare cul-

tures" (cultural zones forged by social classes in specific interactive contexts) and

"culture oí social relations" (culture generated in the framework oí interactions be-

tween different social clases and identiry groups within che national space). The

topography oí zones of contact , which 1 did not develop in Exits from che Labyrinth, is

an important part of the task of producing a geography of national identiry . This is

because national space is ie itself an aspect oí an international system, so trames oí

contact with the foreign have to be understood as a feature oí production oí national

culture and identiry and not as an element external co nationaliry.

8 For che case oí che censorship commissions , see Anne Rubenstein, Bad Language,

Naked Ladies, and Other Threats to che Nation: A Political History of Comic Baoka in Mexico,

chapter 4. For anti - Semitisen in che movements against itinerant salesmen during

the Great Depression , see Gary Gordon , Peddlers, Pesos and Power , The Political Economy

of Street Vending in Mexico City, 47, and Moisés González Navarro, Los extranjeros en

México y los mexicanos en el extrae ¡ aro, 1821-1970, vol. 2, 133-34. For the case oí che

Chinese, see Juan Puig , Entre el río Perla y el Nazas, la China decimonónica y sus braceros emi-

grantes , la colonia china de Teorreón y la matanza de sea 1, 173-228; for the sacking oí che

Parián Market , see Romeo Flores Caballero, Counterrevolution: The Role of tbe Spaniards

in che Independence of Mexico, 1804-3E, 119-21.

9 For che case of dmgs in che 1 930s, see Luis Astorga, "Trahcanres de drogas , políticos

y policías en el siglo veinte mexicano" The Díaz Ordaz regime 's hostility to the

( -L,tL lar ,; Notes to Cbapter e

298 = i = 299 =

disorder oí Mexican pop tinture is succinctly addressed in Carlos Monsiváis,Mexican Post-Cardo, 23-27 For a more detailed and wide- ranging discussion , see EricZulov, Refried Elvls: Tbe Rise oí che Mexican Cmmterculture The discussion of Beavis andButtbead appeared io the nacional press in 1993

10 This is also the argument that unos rhrougb inciHobsbawm and Terence Ranger,eds., The lnvention of Tradition- Any Herderian view of nationality involves a dialecticbetween rradirion and moderniry .

11 Liberals honored Hidalgo and celebratcd indcpendence on Seprember 15; conser-

vatives honored Iturbide and celebiaccd indcpendence on Seprember 27. A detailedcatalog oí ideas represenri ng both sities of ibis rift can be found in La dominaciónespañola en México.

12 This relar,onship between tradition and moderniry is not exclusively Mexican. Innineteenth-century England, Matthew Arnold argued that the British national spiritwas composed oí three elemento rhe Saxon, which lent it 'rs seriousness and tenaciry;the Roman, which lent it as energy; and rhe Celric, which lent ir lis spirit and senti•mena, "[The English genios] is characierized, 1 Nave repearedly said, byenergywitbbon-esty Take away some of che energy which comes te us, 1 believe, in pan from Celticand Roman sources, instead oí energy soy rather steadiness. and you have the Gennanicgenius steadinrss witb bonesty . - che danger tor a national spirit thus composed is thehunidrum, the plain and ugly, che innoble in a word, das Gemeine , die gemeinbeit, thatcurse of Germany, against which Goethe was all bis lile fighting" (Marrhew Arnold,"On che Study of Celtic Ltterarurc," 341)- In this some essay, Arnoldargues for che fullassimilarion of rhe (_eltic peoples oto British society and for rhe annihilation oíCelric as a living language . The assimilarion oí (hese defeared peoples roto the na-tional genius is rhus an identical move co che orle made by Mexican indigenistas.

13 Zolov, Refried Elvis, 145.

14 Examples oí how government indigenistas sought to reconfigure Chis relationship can

be found in Alexander Dawson, Indigotismo and the Paradox of che Nation in Post-Revolurionary Mexico."

15 "And it was quite singular that (hose Americans who so guarded the privilege oí

their whire cante, when it carne to Mexico always symparhized with the Indians,and never with rhe Spantards' (José Vasconcelos, Ulises criollo, 34).

16 Arjun Appadurat, "The Culture of rhe Srate," lecture notes, University oí Chicago,1997

17 Arturo Eseobads Encounteriug Developmunl Tbe Muking and Unmaking of che Third World, isa critique oí development as tt has breo organized since World War II. The role ofdevelopment discourse (not only at rhe genera I ideological leve], bur, more impor-tandy, asa set oí categories and tneasurements) is central ro Chis story

18 Erving Goffman, The Presenlation oí Self in Everyduy Life, 106-34-19 "We don't think iris necessary to unde,In e che disastrous impression that che arriv-

ng rourist wtll form upon seeing che spectacle of immoraltry thar the brothels, in

upen air and established in an importan[ city arrery an obligatory path, offer" (cired

in Kathcrinc Bliss, "Prostituí ion. Revolu(ion and Social Reform in Mexico Gry,1918-1940"196)-

20 Alexandra Srern, "Eugenlcs beyond Bordees- Science and Medicalizarion in Mexico

and che U.S. West, 1900-1950," and'Buildings, Boundaries, and Blood. Medicaliza-

rion and Nation-Building on che U5 -Mexico Bordee, 1910-1930," 41-81-

Note S t o C 1, a p t e r 6

= 300 =

21 Pratt coros che term contad zona "to refer no the space of colonial encounters, the

space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come roto contact

with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions oí

coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict ...'contact zone' in my discus-

sion is often synonymous with 'colonial frontier- (Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes:Travel Writing and Transculturation, 6). My own usage leaves the question oí domina-

tion and oí che nature oí inequalities in transnacional contact zones open, becausethe relationships oí contact are oí multiple sorts.

22 The case oí architectural modernism's decrepitude in Brazil has been analyzed by

Beatriz Jaguaribe, "Modernist Ruin;." The challenges that Brasília's poor suburbs

pose for che nationalist utopia that the city was meant to embody are treated in

James Holston, "Alternativa Modernities: Statecraft and Religious Imagination inche Val ley oí che Dawn"

7. RITUAL, RUMOR, AND CORRUPTION IN THE FORMATIONOF MEXICAN POLITIES

1 The role oí ritual in che consnuction of a national poliry is a venerable line oí in-quiry, with Eric Wolf,'The Virgin oí Guadalupe A Mexican National Symbol," andVictor Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphars the most prominent founding ancestors.The role oí ritual in the consolidation of local communities has received muchmore attention , notably in arguments over Wolf's typology of peasant communi-ties, as well as in debates ovar che "cargo system" ( for example , Frank Cancian,Economics and Preshge in a Maya Community, Tbe Decline of Community in Zinacaneán; andWaldemar Smith, The Fiesta System and Economic Change and in studies on che connec-tions berween ritual and local politics (for example, Guillermo de la Peña, Herederosde promesas , and Claudio Lomnitz, Evolución de una sociedad rural . Interest in politicalritual has also emerged in ethnographies oí various dimensions oí Mexican urbanlile (for example , Carlos Vélez-Ibafiez, Rituals of Marginality Politics, Proceso, andCultural Change in Central Urban Mexico, 1969-1974; Larissa Lomnitz and Marisol PérezLizaur, A Mexican Elite Family) and in che anthropology oí social movements (for ex-ample , Jorge Alonso, Los movimientos sociales en el Valle de México, and Carlos Monsiváis,Entrada libre. Finally, there is also work en politics as spectacle and on che role oí

myth and ritual in bureaucracy (Alberto Ruy Sánchez, Mitalogia de un cine en crisis,Larissa Lomnitz, Claudio Lomnitz, and ¡ya Adler, "Functions of che Forro: Power

Play and Ritual in the 1988 Mexican Presidencial Campaign") In che past decade orso, interest in these fields has also gatned prominente among historians , who haveattended similar themes in various periodo and regions. See, for example, Juan

Pedro Viqueira Albán, ¿Relajados o reprimidos Diversiones públicas y vida social en la Ciudadde México durante el Siglo de las Luces; William Beezley, Cheryl Martin, and WilliamFrench, eds., Rituals of Rule. Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Cultura inMexico; Serge Gruzinski, La Guerre des imanes De Chriseophe Colomb a ' Blade Runner', andGilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., Everyday Fanos of State Formation. These tulesare only a sample oí che literature

2 Fran4ois-Xavier Guerra, México del antiguo régimen a la revolución, 2 vols3 Viqueira Albán's, ¿Relajados o reprimidos is a description and discussion oí che trans-

formations oí collective participation in public ritual during the eighteenth century.

4 For example, che legislation promoted by Charles III devoted a chapter to che

Notes to Cha p ter 7

301 =

reguladora ul sisee and IrerH bisele .rlr.;.hm Javier Malagón Barecló, C ódigo negro

cerolr '. chaptcr I0. 188-R`r

5 Lunvrnz and Pérez l iza; . ^^ 53..... 1 17-91 describe huso Imnily ritual

is a Inrum lur intraiamll.al c .mnnon c a euro _td dcus.un rr.ak.ing n che twen[ieth

cuinu.rv

This is whv 1-anssa Lomm.u. sah.. h s su .1, el Alexicao ramilles ot various social

strata nvsts on ti,, significa nce ,.I .. rural" ocs .n that social organ,zational lona

"I-as re laceres horr-onmles r've n. c.'o cn li estn.ctnra social urbana de México{

7 The bes[ historical treann^ et u' thn quawon s Steve Sretn, Tire Seoel H;story oJ

Go.der Ll r iAIn:. ar 1 } , t, n...,, `ale o. Ruroncia Nlallon (Peasanl and

Nmiorr 'Or n 1Al,.kn.g o( i'o 1 t -t , . 1 i'nrn -t %6; explores che polit.es ofgen-

der in relation tu citizrnsha and p..ót.cal mohilizaiion in nineteenth-century

agravian conrmunities-

8 Paul Friedrich malees the porot that women are able to publicly articulare opinions

chas would gel their men killed (Primer of Namr.ja) This argument would seem to be

borne out by the historical work on rebellion in Mexico. In the most comprehen-

sive study oí colonial rebellions no date, Williana Taylor notes that "[t]he place oí

women [in village rebellions) is especially striking" (Drinking, Homicide and Rebellion in

Colonial Mexican Villages, 1 16) Alrhough Taylor speculates rhat chis may be owing m

che absence oí men from the villages during agricultura) seasens, Paul Friedrieh's ex-

planation would sccm to account lee thcir behavior more fully, because "[1]n at least

ore fourth of che cases examined, women lcd the attacks and were visibly more ag-

gressive, insulting and rebellions m thcir behavior toward outside authorines [[han

men]" (bid )-

9 Ricardo Pozas Horcas itas, La draotrasia en blancor el movimiento médico en México,

9964-19(5.

lo Manuel Castells, The City aud tbe Gmre;oots.

1 I Stephen Greenblatt argues that che discoursc of che marvelous was used co avoid

transcultural communication in the contad period (Manrelous Possessions, 135-36).

Gruzinski (La Guerre des imagen, 169-71) argucs that attempcs te foster true dialogue

between priescs and Indians were more ar less abandoned in Mexico around 1570. 1

have argued chal ambivalente toward conununication between urban elites and

popular classes lies at che hcart ol thc hisrory oí Mexican anthropology (Claudio

Lomnitz, Modernidad indiana, ehapter 4)-

12 Julie Greer Johnson, The fjoak in Ore Ame ricas. 15

13 See, for example, John Elliott , "Spain and Amcrica in che Sixceenth and Seventeenth

Centurles," 303. The tradition oí pragmatic aceommodations that coexist with a dis-

cursive orthodoxy has been promi nene since thac early period, and its force could be

witncssed in the censorship that was meted out to Fray Bernardino de Sahagún's

ethnographic smdies of sixteenrh-century native society en the grounds that m

name that sociery was m preserve ir- Instead uf favoring dialogue, comprehension,

and conversion through racional convictions, Testeras attitude toward conversion,

which emphasized ritual compliance r ecr nuellectual conviction, triumphed.

14 So, in descr,l ing che contents ol a poetry contest during the era known as "the long

siesta oí che ses,enteer th centuq',' Irving I.eonard states that '[c]he aun [oí che con-

testi was adulation and glorificaron oI che subject matter and it was bes[ achieved

by ingenious conceits, by hold jugghng ot phrases and excessive artífice, together

N o I e+ 1 c ( b .. p i e

302

with a pedantic exhibition oí classical and scholast,c Icarning. Obscurity was a

virtue and a vacuous jumbling o1 allusions a merit With che copie ni no way dis-

putable, exaggerated panegvrics and bombas[ were thc marks oí esthetic excel-

lence' (Baroque Times m 1 3d Mexico 1371.

15 Gmzinski. La Guerrr des imagen. 169-71, 175

16 Sec Guerra, México dei anl.guo regonen a la reooluaón, vol 1 18201 loe Che forfnato

See also the significante ot lila service lo democracy in che PRI's 1988 presidencial

campaign, in Lomnitz, Lomnitz, and Adler, "Functions oí che Form." Fernando

Escalante dcals squarely watn chis inste in Ciudadanos inmginarios.

17 Most prom'mently in Friedrich, Pm;ces of Naranja, and in Fernando Escalante, El ponerpilo

18 Mary Kay Vaughn, "The Construction oí che Patriotic Festival in Teeamaehaleo.

Puebla. 1900-1946," 213-46.19 Vaughn mentions that [hese processes of negociaron between teachers and local

communities also led teachers lo avoid imposing che most anticlerical educational

themes of che "socialist educatiod' oí che 1930s . At che nacional leve) "socialist cdu-

cation" was in no small parí a crusade lo finish off che key role oí the church as cul-

tural integrator; some aspects oí chis initiative found local support and civic festi-

vals thrived along with a transformation in popular culture (che introduction oí

sports). However, chis same success also gave local constituencies che strength co

avoid the most draconian antireligious measures taken by che government.

20 llya Adler's discussion oí che uses oí che press in Mexicos bureaucracy is significant

in chis respect. He describes how bureaucrats conscancly present information that

they have read from che newspapers either as their own personal interpretation

or as coming from a personal source. The backstage has greater claim lo truth than

offfcial, public renderings in Mexico. See Ilya Adler, "Media Uses and Effects in a

Largo Bureaucracy- A Case Study in Mexico"

21 Nuestro País is che first journal devoted te public opinion in Mexico, and polis only

began finding their way into newspapers since che 1988 presidencial campaign. For

accounts oí che rase oí poliing in Mexico, see Federico Reyes Heroles, Sondeara

México, and Roder,c Ai Camp, ed., Polling for Democracy. Public Opinion and Political

Liberalization in Mexico.

22 A fui) study oí chis phenomenon would have to focus on che press and its manage-

ment of public manifestations, a work that is yet to be done. However, examples

and illustrations are easily available lo any reader of che Mexican press. Crucial in-

stances of [hese processes have occurred in che aftermath of che 1985 earchquake

(what was "che meaning" of the popular and che governmental reactions to che dis-

aster?), during che Consejo Estudiantil Universitario (CEU) student movement,

during che 1988 eleccions, alter che imprisonment oí oil workers' union leader "La

Quina," after che assassinations oí Cardinal Posada, Luis Donaldo Colosio, and José

Francisco Ruiz Massieu, during che Zapatista rebellion, and alter che devaluation of

che peso in 1995. Al] [hese events (and an infinite number oí smaller unes) are rhe

foci of poiitical contention through che interpretation oí their "true" nature and

meaning. An ethnographic description oí che dynamics oí political interpretation

during Mexican campaigns can be found in Claudio Lomnitz, "Usage poütique de

Fambigúité: Le cas mexicain"

23 Guillermo de la Peña, A Legary of Promises, Agricullure, Politics and Ritual in che Morelos

Highlands, 58,

N o I r s t o C h a p t e r 7

303 =

24 Caneran, The Decline of Cornrsun ty in Zinaratttán, 151-70.

25 The Mixe of Oaxaca discriminare becwecn good and evil merchants, whose moneyis, respectively good and ovil depending on whether they organize a series oí pre-seribed esto al s and on whether or flor thcy are veto che needs of communitymembers . Set James B Greenberg. Capital, Ritual and Boundaries oí che ClosedCorporate Communiry."

8 C E N T E R , PERJPHERY A N D THE CON N E C T ION5 BETW EEN

NATIONALISM AND LOCAL DISCOURSES OF DISTINCTION

1 Lotus Dumont. Essays en Indrvrdualisrrc: Modem Idaoiogy in Asithropological Perspecesve, 2792 The main an thropological works un Tepozrhn are Robert Redheld, Tepoztlán A

Mexican Village. Oscar Lewis L fe in a Licyean VilLigr and Pedro Martínez, and ClaudioLomnrtz , Evolución de una sociedad rural , but [hect a number of shorter pieces san cheplace, niel.mng Pedro Carrasco, 'The Family Strucmre of XVlth Century Tepozdán,"

and Phillip K Boek, "Tepozdán Remn,idered María Rosas, Tepoztlán, crónica de de-sacatos y resistencia is a journalistie aeeount ot re, ene politieal eonflict in the village.

3 Por discussro ns of che h istory of the re lar iomhip benveen lowlands and highlandsin Morelos, see Arturo Warman, "We (bine ta Ubjecl" Tbe Peasano of Morelos and theNacional Si,¡,, 33-41, and Guillermo de la Peña, 4 Legrey of Promises.. Agricultura Politicsand Ritual in tbrLlorelos Htghlands, 20--37.

4 It rs difficult co discern what che hutoncal bases of che Tepoztécatl myth may Nave

heen Local and regional inrell ectua ls, such as Pedro'. Pho. ) Rojas, El Tepoztécatl legen-dario , and Juan Dubernard, Apuntes para la bistona de 7poztlán, unequivoeally identifyEl Tepozcécad as che reigning tlatoani (i ndigenous ruler ) oí che time oí SpanishConquesr and as che first Tepoztecan co take baptismal rices - Others , includingRedficld and Lewis have assumed chal El Tepozcécad was a mychical , and not a his-torical figure The interpretation is, in any case difficult.

Several early sources refer to lepuzcdead Fray Juan de Torquemada names him

as one ot che lords cha[ Moccezmna dispatched to che Golf Coast with gifcs forCortés (Monarquía indiana , vol 2, 59, Fray Diego Durán (Historia de las Indias de NuevaEspaña e islas de la Tierra Firrne , vol. 2 292) mentiuns Tepuzréead as one oí the godsrhar priests rmpersonated, along wi th Quetzalcoatl Huiczilopochdi, Tlaloc, and

others These god-priescs were charged with the sacrifice oí numerous victms. Inthe instante named by Durán , saenfices were imnated by King Axayacatl (reigned1468-81 ), who, after having had his lill of slaughceri ng, passed che knife over toGeneral Tlacaelel, who in turra was succeeded in chis honor by che various god-priests . Fray Berardino de Sahagdn mentions Tepuztécad as one of che men in-

volved in che discovery oí pulque alter the Mexica departed from Temoanchan intheir pilgrimage co México -Tenoch cidán IFlorentine (e,ex, book 10, 193).

It is possible , cherefore , chal Tepuzrecatl seas simultaneously che name oía godand che tide taken by che datoani - priest ot Tepozdán who was charged with che tareoí che temple to che pulque god Ome Tochtli- It is also possible that a single tlatoaniappropriated chis narre , under the rnodel oí che high priest Ce Acad QuetzalcoatlFinally, Tepoztécatl may have referred generically to nobles from Tepoztlán- In anycase , Tepozcécad appears in several historia mylhical periods, beginning with chemigration froni Azdán , to a god of che Azcec pantheon under King Axayacatl, to alord who met Cortés , ro numerous modo rm day ap pan cions in che figure oí an oíd,

NaIrs lo ('uaptrr e

304 =

wood-carrying peasant who appeared in che mountains and warned his countrymenagainst a road , a fas[ train , a cable car, and a golf course,

5 Joaquín Gallo, Tepoztlán personajes, descripciones y sucedidos, 15r translation and adapta-ron are mine.

6 Silvio Zavala, ed., El servicio personal de los indios en la Nueva España, vol. 1, 294-97.7 Ross Hassig, Aztec Warfere. Imperial Expansion and Political Control, 249.8 Gallo, Tepoztlán, 163.

9 "The indígenas of Tepozdán present themselves before Maxirnilian and Carlota tooffer personally their complete support , and simultaneously thank them for allow -rng'some poor indígenas' to be worthy oí seeing their faces " ( in Periódico Oficial delImperio Mexicano , 28 de junio de 1864, reprinted in Teresa Rojas Rabiela, El indio en laprensa nacional del siglo diecinueve, vol. 1, 22).

10 La Jornada, October 1, 1995-

11 Ismael Díaz Cadena , trans ., Libro de tributos del Marquesado del Valle ( 1540). These con-sus materias have been analyzed by Pedro Carrasco in "The Family Structure oíXVlth Century Tepozdán " and "Estratificación social indígena en Morelos duranteel siglo XVI"

12 Peter Gerhard discusses che chape oí tire pre -Columbran kingdoms in present-dayMorelos in "A Method for Reeonstruccing Precolumbran Política) Boundariesin Central México." Lewis (Lfe in a Mexican Village, 21) shows the cites oí pre-Columbian habitation in Tepoztlán in contras [ with modern- day settlement pat-rerns - Before che Conquesr, and in al¡ probability at che time oí chis census,Tepoztecans lived in a number oí scattered settlements at che feet oí che Sierra deTepoztlán and were not concentrated in a village . This is consonant with JamesLoekhart's diseussion oí che altepeel (The Nabuas alter che Conquesr, 15-20)-

13 See Fray Agustín Dávila Padilla, Historia de la fundación y discurso de la provincia deSantiago de México.

14 Serge Gruzinski provides an accnunt oí che ways in which secularization wasunderstood and resisted in che Altos de Morelos in Man-Codo in the Mexican Highlands,India,, Pomer and Colonial Society, 1 520-f 800, 105-72 .

15 See Robert Haskett, Indtgenous Rulers: An Ethnohistory of Town Government rn ColonialCuernavaca , 153-60 for che colonial history oí chis family.

16 In fact, in Five Frenlies , Oscar Lewis contrasts che mediation oí local eommuniry cuhcure en Tepoztecan family life with the unmediated effects oí capitalism on cheMexico City poor. Lewis felt chat che "culture oí poverty" was an urban phenome-non flor because material conditions in che city were worse [han in Tepoztlán-they were not-bui rather because che urban experience of poverty was not medi-aced by a tradicional collectivity-

17 Fiar a more detailed diseussion oí chis strategy and its deployment in modernTepoztecan history, see Lomnitz, Evolución de una sociedad rural, 292-307.

18 Although 1 have not had the opportunity oí verifying chis in Tepoztlán , 1 believethat these ideas regarding peasant production are easily transferred to some oí theother activities that Tepoztecans now engage in, particularly artisanal work (ma-sonry, self-employed mechanics, bakers, etc.) and petty commerce . Greenberg(1994) provides an example oí chis kind oí transference in his discussion oí dis-tinctions berween "clean" and "dirty" money that are drawn among Oaxacan Mixemerchants . His material suggests che capacity oí chis peasant ideology co expand

Notes t o C h a p t e r e

305 =

beyond agneulture and rolo utb,, h :., ot work II ssentially , a merchants money is

citan" :t he ur shc redist,dnues prohn Into shc local mntmunicy and ti prices and

loans to con: munity ntembcr, are lose.

19 for an expllc ation oi track nona ] ]ti( 1 un hc.dth 1:1 ibis regios, see John Ingham,

"On .Mrxuan Folk Medicine Mn t cl liusap s svell-knuwn tudy oí capitalism In

Colombia : T. U'oiI end (:omn:odif y Frl n i Soutj. 1 rica, develops an analysis with

many parallels co thls Tepozteean idenlogy

20 Lewis Lifi Hexicrm Vi11 a9t 231

21 Lewis, Pedro AOarl(:ez, 119-20

22 Por more Inlnrmation un ibis penco,,. s^ o Lunv.nz Eoohuión de una sociedad rural.

157-74, and Lewa. I.i)e rl:.1 :31,x:..m i.h. 235 -40.

23 Lewis, L:fe:n a Mexinu: ViLLigr, 26. 1 19-23.

24 See , lar instante , post of the arneLes signed hy Alexis" in El Tepozteco during che

19205, in AHT Alexis was che pscudunym of tuther Pedro Rojas.

25 In a revcaling admonicion , the sane wrirer calls on municipal authorities to consult

with che litemte municipal secretary . " If our ignorante blocks the good intentions

chal inspire us, if our unfamil iarity with rulcs and such interferes with our aims, let us

approach our enlightened municipal secretarias , which, in al] goodness , will remove

che veil of ignorante thac overpowers and annihilates us' (El Tepozteco , February 1,

1921, 3)-

26 Redficld , Trpozllmn, 220; Lewis, Lifr in a Maxican Village 26.

27 Redfield, Tepozllán, 68

28 Claudio Lomnitz , Exiis from si,, LabyrmtG Gdturc and ldeology in Mexican Nacional Space,

130-32.

29 El Tepozteco , April 1, 1922, 4

30 Poet Carlos Pellicer donated his privare collection oí pre-Columbian artifacts for a

new archaeological ntuseum in Tepozdán-che villagés carlrer collection had been

destroyed during che revolution - Oscar Lewiss research project brought medical as-

sistance to che village in che 1940s , and help from prominent visitors was enlisted

for getting clectricrty and a junior hrgh school (see Lomnitz , Evolución de una sociedad

rural, chapter 2).

31 Bock, "Tepoztlán Recansrdered

9. I NTERPRETI NG THE SENTI ME NTS OF THE NATION

1 A governmental state will "set up economy at che leve] oí che entire state, which

means exercising towards lis iohabhants. and che wealth and behavror oí al], a form

of surverllance and control as attentive as that of che head of che family over his

household and his good" (Michel Foucault, "Governmentalicy," in The Foucault Effect,

Studies o: Govrrmnentality, 92. The "populacion," which is measured through a variety

oí scatistics and with the hele of a number oí seiences, is thus the central concern oí

administraGOn-

2 On che ways in which "public" and "republie' acere understood in che Spanish colo-

nial world, and on their tramformabon with independence, see Frangois-Xavier

Guerra and Annick Lamperlére, "I ntroducciúnin Los espacios públicos en Iberoamérica-

ambigüedades y problemas, siglos XVIII-XIX, 5-26. For a sketch oí che historv oí

Mexican censures, see Claudio I ounitz, aiodern piad indiana: nación y mediación en

México, chapier5-

N o l e n t u a p

306

3 Theorics of admmist ratios such as Gennan camcralisni . applied by che Baron von

Humboldt to New Spain in 1803. arc classical instruments of governntentality. be -

cause they arc oricuced tn treating cine whole of che poliry as it it were a business

See Albion W. Small TI, (:nn, nl li,IS, ibe Pionccrs of Gemmu'socral Polity-

4 Por a dch d3cussion of shc relationship hetween gente sci,sari and baroque ritual. see

Pamela Voekel, "Scent and Sc nsi kifity Pungency and Picry in che Making of che

Veracruz Gente Sensata." Hugo Nutini provides che only general overview of che his-

tory of Mexicos aristoeracv He argues chal che Mexican aristocracy underwent

three periods of expansion each ol which asas relaced to significanr economie

transtormatron s, une ot diese che mining boom ot che eighceenth eentury (Wages of

(2ogn,,t TheMex:c.lr A nstoo, ny in fine (.,rtexi of Western Arrsfocraciesl

5 For a statistical analysis ot che contents oí che Gazeta de Lima see Tatuar Herzog, "La

gaceta de Lima (1756-1761 i, la restrucmración de la realidad y sus funciones "

6 For che use oí che discurse of che marvelous as a propagandistic device, see

Greenblatt 1992. For eonneecions between colonial discourses oí che marvelous

and che literary movement devoted to the real maravilloso, see Giucci 1992.

7 For contrasting accounts of che origins oí underdevelopment in the nineteenth

century, see John Coatsworth, "Ohstacles to Economic Growth in 19th Century

Mexico," and Jaime O. Rodríguez, Down from Colonialism.

8 In her thesis on scatistics in che early postindependent period, Laura Leticia Mayor

Celis (1995) shows that nacional independence generated a flurry oí scatistics, as

well as an interest in comparative nacional statstics, buc that che scientific basis oí

rhese scatistics lacked credibiliry even in their own time.

9 For an account oí che emergente of polling written by an arden[ proponen[ oí chis

method, see Federico Reyes Heroles, Sondeara México -

10 This point is carefully argued in Fernando Escalante, Ciudadanos imaginamos, and in

Frangois Xavier Guerra, México del antiguo régimen a la revolución

11 Maya Indians were also sold luto slavery in Cuba during the second half of che

nineteenth century.

12 For the image of the rurales , see Paul J. Vanderwood, Disorder and Progress : Bandits, Police,

and Mexican Development. On Porfirian urban intervention, see Barbara Tenenbaum,

"Screetwise History: The Paseo de la Reforma and che Porfirian State, 1876-1910"

The most comprehensive discussion oí che strategies and politics oí nacional pres-

entation in che internacional arena during Chis period is Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo,

Mexico at tbe World's Fairs, Crafting a Modem Nation.

13 Carlos Monsiváis, Los rituales del caos, 141.

14 See Larissa Lomnitz, Claudio Lomnitz, and Ilya Adler, "Functions oí che Form:

Power Play and Ritual in the 1988 Mexican Presidencial Campaign."

15 Francisco 1. Madero, "Manifiesto de Madero al Pueblo, a los capitalistas , a los gob-

ernantes , al ejército libertador, al ejército nacional y a la prensa, México DF, 24 de

junio de 191 I," 237.

16 For a fascinating ficcional account oí Madero as a spiritualisc leader, see Ignacio

Solares, Madero, el otro. Solareis description oí Maderos spiritualist sessions is based

on Maderos diary. Other revolutíonary leaders and presidents, such as Alvaro

Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles, were also spiritualists- Also pertinent to this

question is che phrlosopher Antonio Caso's appeal to che powers oí intuition via

Bergson against che Porfirian científicos' faieh in positivism.

Notes t e C b a p t e r v

307 =

17 For a useful discussion of this cono ept, sce Slavoj Zizek, "Cyberspace, or, How to

Traverse rhe Fantasy in the Age of the Retreat of t h e B i g Othec"

18 On che nature of government Involvcment nnd subsidy oí the press, see RaymundoRiva Palacio, "A Culture oí Collusion The Tics That Bind che Press and the PRI "The best-paid collahorators 01 the Mexican press are political columnists and well-known ntellectuals who have regular columns.

19 José Ortega y Gasset, España invertehrada hosquew di algunos pensamientos históricos, 86.20 On the politice oí antipolitics as a strategy and historical phenomenon , see Ferguson

1994, for the relatnonship between technocracy and democracy in Mexico, seeMiguel Angel Centeno, Democracy wtth,n Reasom lrchnocratir Reoolution in Mexico-

10. AN INTELLECTUAL'S STOCK IN THE FACTORY

OF MEXICO'S RUINS

1 Enrique Krauze, "El mártir de Chicago', Claudio Lomnitz, "Respuesta del Krauzifi-

cado de Chicago ; Enrique Krauze, "Adiós Mfster Lomnitz" An interesting anti-

Semitic coda co the debate occurred in a letter to the editor oí che Mexican daily

Excelsio,' Augusto Hugo Peña, Acerca de la fábrica de mentiras de Enrique Krauze,"and my reply, "Respuesta al señor Augusto Hugo Peña"

2 Lorenzo Meyer, "En ,México nunca se hizo una historia oficial," interview withArturo Mendoza Monciño.

3 Ricardo Pozas Horcasitas, La dn,,ocras nt en bLmco: el movimiento médico en México,1964-1965.

4 The Centro Cultural Arte Contemporáneo was in fact closed down in 1998.

5 Enrique Krauze,Mexico,BiographyofPomer,797

6 Ibid., xv.7 Ibid.8 Ibid.,

9 In fact, che central thesis oí Mexico: 13io ir,i,by of'Power (i e., the preponderance oí thepresident's Biography over Mexican history) n derived from an essay by Costo

Villegas that was written against Luis Echeverría--a president who had an especial-ly strong delusion of omnipoteneetitled El estilo personal de gobernar (1975). Thetheme oí that essay, which was that in Mexico che president's personal whims had

becorne a kind oí raison d'étal, is niagmfied by Krauze finto che key to the whole ofMexican history.

10 See Enrique Krauze, Textos heréticos ( 1992).

1 1 These are Margarita de Orellana and Aurelio de los Reyes

12 In Che debate that followed the publication of chis article, Krauze pointed out that

he does in fact cite John Coatsworth once He cuuld not, however, dispute the fact

that neither Coatsworth nor any oí the others' ideas had any impact en his work.

They did not. The Coatsworth citation in question is for factual information, and

makes no direct or indirecr rcference to cha audtor's ideas, many oí which are in-compatible wíth Krauzes.

13 Enrique Krauze misinterpreted chis lino to mean that tic had not cited O'Gorman in

his notes 1 purposely counred only discusslons in che body oí the text, which iswhere Mr. Krauze deals with ideas ti we turn to the notes oí Mexico: Biography ofPower, O'Gorman is cited rhree times On cacé occadon, the citation is for narrowly

factual evidence and not a discussion ol any of Ati O'Gormans ideas; Mr- Cosío,

Notes to Cbapte, to

308

by contrast, gets discussed thirty-three times in the body oí the text, and then is

frequently cited in the notes for factual information-

14 See Enrique Krauze, Por una democracia sin adjetivos (1986). Not surprisingly, the

phrase "democracy without adjectives" does not belong to Krauze, but is instead

Rafael Segovia's, "La decadencia de la democracia," Razones 24 (March-April 1980).15 Krauze, Mexico, Biography of Power, 243-44.16 See Barbara Mundy, The Mapping of New Spain, Indigenous Cartograpby and tbe Maps of tbe

Relaciones Geográficas, chapter 117 See, for instance, my own book Exits from the Labyrintb Culture and Ideology in Mexican

Nacional Space, part 2, chapter 2. For Argentina, see Jorge Myers, Orden yoirtud: el dis-curso republicano en el régimen roslsta. Other Latin American illustrations can be found inJohn Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800-1850.

18 ABer Octavio Paz's death (and the initial publication oí this essay, which appeared

in print three months prior), Enrique Krauze purchased the shares oí Vuelta andlaunched a new magazine, Letras libres, of which he is editor.

11. BORDERINO ON ANTHROPOLOGY

1 Sherry Ortner reviews recent books on che crisis in anthropology in "Some Futuresoí Anthropology"

2 Notably, Ethnos devored a special issue to peripheral anthropological traditions in1983.

3 Arjun Appadurai, "Is Horno Hierarchicus2" 759.

4 Arjun Appadurai, 'Theory in Anthropology: Center and Periphery," 358. This cri-

tique echoes Johannes Fabian's discussion oí the practice oí constructing anthropo-

logical sites as if they were "culture gardens" that were unconnected to the ethnog-rapher's own society (Time and Ihe Otber: How Anthropology Makes Its Object). Similarly,Jonathan Friedman characterizes Geertzian cultural relativism in the following

terms: "Each arbitrary anthropoplogical construction becomes a unique artifact to

be cherished by its discoverer, a work of art in a gallery oí distinct human species"

("Out Time, Their Time, World Time. The Transformation oí Temporal Modes,"170).

5 The cense that Mexican anthropology is undergoing a difficult transition is re-flected in different ways in a number of works, for example, Luis Vázquez León, "Lahistoriografía antropológica contemporánea en México," and Claudio Lomnitz,

Modernidad indiana: nación y mediación en México, chapter 4. Roger Bartra offers Mexicans

a choice between four "intellectual deaths," one oí which can be summarized as"death by academy" ( La sangre y la tinta- ensayos sobre la condición postmexicana, 43-48).

6 In 1973, Ralph Beals reviewed the field oí Mexican anthropology and concluded

that although it had had a relatively minor impact en anthropological theory,

Mexican anthropology had played a critica) role in the formation oí a national con

science, and that the country had the third-largest number oí anthropology profes-

sionals, after Japan and the United States (cited in Vázquez León, "La historiografía

antropológica contemporánea en México," 139). In fact, however, a number oí na-

tional anthropologies, especially in Latin America, but also elsewhere, have turned

tu Mexico for inspiration during the past century. It should be noted, nevertheless,

that Mexico has never been a "pure model" but, as in che case of Mexico itself,

Mexican-inspired nacional anthropologies shaped networks oí national institutions

N o t e s t o Ch ap ter f 1

309 =

that sucre thcn conoce ted especialle tu LI S. ui ue eas....... 1-.uropean , misione.

Corncll, Haivatd . C.hlcag, Bcrkelav Seintunl. LIIsl SC O and hienda cultural mis-

S,11:11 hace heen some al t1 e 11 ,11 t 1 p a :t... ul i hese national institunons- For

1 1,, i n l l u o , , e ul ysiesicar . . .1 1,> i, ,1 n 1h. ; nd.n,poluec oi the United Sta(,,

receives stlbtle treatmcnt In AIau111 . Ienuti::-Tn110. 'Stereophonie Scienühc11

Modernistas Social Sacnce heiwcot Mexico and thc United States, 1880,-1930s

Immial o l Ar r , Disto-y. nnd i n I :s c 1 n. ,L 1' 1 11 1- F, 1 11 11111111 r1 reater:blexieo Ibe1 1111

Lirulcd] la t, , 1 I bx Erol2r )( llu rc, ltapiel2

7 The reterenee' i s ti) Arturo Warman 1 lux santa todos dilu,r,, "Critieism had

lacen rep1ac.ed 'he an ulfiCin 1, appoimm 1, 1 ul n.an emo' ,Ant hropology had

been rewarded widt lifelong benehts m che Instituto de Seguridad Social y Servicios

a los Trabajadores del Estado (34)

8 Guillermo Bonfi1, 'Del indigenismo de la revolución ala antropología critica,' in Dr

eso que llaman antropología mexicana, 42.

9 Sciencihe research and critica] discourse were subsequcntly (and erroneously, 1

think) counterposed co che practico of iid,q,.,isnm "Che arate doeso t tare about the

development of anthropology as a sdcnce chas Is capable oí analyzing reality and

modi fying ir deeply At most it is in teres red in it as a techo i que to train restorers of

ruins and raxidermists of languages and customs. However, it hnds that che schools

of anthropology . are centers whc-re snldents gather and smdy reality in order to

transform i[, chal thev hght for democrndc libertes, and that ríes, maintain a mili-

tani attitude on the sirle o1 the oppresscd" (Andrés Medina and Carlos García

Mora, ciad in Guadalupe Méndez Laeielle,'La quiebra política [1965-1976],'

362).

lo Proceso, March 13, 1995

11 Foreign negative images of New Spain were the catalyst for some of che most dis-

tinguished eighteenth-century historical and anthropological writings by Mexican

Creoles. For a diseussion, set Antoncllo Cerbi, The Dispute of che New World: The

History of a Polemic, 1 9sn-1 900.

12 The British Museum also calls che eolleccor Henry Chrlsty, who led Tylor to

Mexico, che godfather oí anthropology (l lenry (biesty_ A Pioneer of Anthropolegy, 1).

13 Unveiling these connections is che painslaking subject of much of che scholarship

of recen[ decades, from Latin American "dependency theory" to Edward Said's

Culture and Impenalism, bus it has alto hecn a constant concern since che late nine-

teenth century-

14 Edward B- Tylor, Anahuac, or Mexico and lbr AMexicans, Ancient and Modem, 16-17.

15 It as worth noting that Tylor's vicwpoint here coincides with that of Marx and

Engels, boch of whom saw the incorpontion of iPexico roto che United States as a

desirahle thing Thus, during une lblexican-Aniencan War, Marx wrote, "We must

hope that [the Anaeocans] appropriate most ol Aiexims terrüory and that they use

che country berrer than che Mexicans have" i 1847, in Domingo P de Toledo y J-,

México en la obra de Marx y Engels, 28 i Engcls. in his turn, wrote on January 23, 1848:

"Ve have wltnessed che defeat of hlexrao by the United States with que satisfac-

cion . when a country is forcibly dragged ro historical progress, ice cannot bus

consider chis as a stop tnrward" (ibie1

16 Tylor, Anahuac 329-30.

3d o t r, l o ( I' ,,

31(7 =

17 The laxity of pnestly mores is a theme that was well knuwn tu English readers sincc

thc pubhcation ol Fhomas Cages travcls in seventecnth-century Mexieo

18 Tylor, Anahuac, 222- On che subject oí ihe governm en fs tare for its a n ti qui tics,

Tylor tella how he and Hcnry Christy literally created markets fue antiquities. "At

che top of the pyramid ot (,holula' wc held a market. and got some curious things.

all ol small size however' li bid 275)- Hcnry Christys ethnographic collection be

carne che most important of its time, and more [han half of its registered pitees

were Mexican cace British Museum, Henry (-hrisly, 1 1 )

19 Por a standard reeapitulatlon of chis vision, seo Warman, "Todos santos, todos di-

funtos," and Lomnitz, Modernidad indiana, ehapter 420 Mary Louise Pratt has tracked che con nections becween travel writing and anthro-

pology in Imperial Eyes, Traoel Wri ting and Transeulturalion

21 Tenorio-Trilles Mermo et che World's Fairs- Crafting a Modem Nation as che pathbreaking

book en chis subject.

22 Stacie G. Widdifield, The Embodiment of che Nacional in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexican

Painting, 61-64; Tenorio-Trillo, Mexico at che World"s Fairs, 30-

23 Juan Estrada, "Estado Libre y Soberano de Guerrero; Datos estadísticos de la prefec-

tura del Centro," Boletín de la Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística (hereafter,

BSMCE), vol. 3, 74.24 Asamblea del Departamento de Querétaro, "Notas estadísticas del Departamento

de Querétaro, formadas por la asamblea constitucional del mismo, y remitidas al

supremo gobierno .. ," 13SMGE, vol. 3, 232. In a footnote, che Congress oí

Querétaro contrasts its enlightened view of race with che "horrible anomaly" oí

slavery in the United States.

25 (bid.26 Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística, "Estadística de Yucatán, publicase

por acuerdo de la R. Sociedad de Geografía y Estadística, de 27 de enero de 1853,"

BMSGE 294.27 Emilio Pineda, "Descripción geográfica del departamento de Chiapas y Soconusco,"

BMSGE 341.28 Alfredo Chavero, México a través de los siglos, vol, 1, iv,29 "Language as of great value for explaining ethnographic relations. Otomi is a lan-

guage of an essentially primitive character. The Mexicans cal) it otomitl, but its trae

name is biá-hué. AII of che circumstances of chis language reflect che poverty of

expression of a people chat is concemporaneous co humanity's infancy" (ibid., 65).

In his views of indigenous linguistica, Chavero follows the work of Francisco

Pimentel, ("Discurso sobre la importancia de la lengüística .. . . 370), who argues

that monosyllabic languages, such as Chinese and Otomi, have no grammar and are

che most primitive. Pimentel was also looking for even carlier evolutionary forms

within Mexico, such as languages that combined mtmicry and speech ("Lengua

Pantomímica de Oaxaca .. ," 473) In their disdain for Otomi and Chinese,

Pimentel and Chavero were following racist trends in European romantic linguis-

tics. See Martin Bernal, Black Atheno- The Afrocentric Roots of Classical Civilization, vol. 1,

237-38. For a diseussion of scientific stereotypes of Mexican Indians, see Robert

Buffington , Criminal and Cruzo, in Modem Mexico, 149-55-

30 Chavero, México a través de los siglos, 69.

3 1 Ibid., 67 -

N o t e s te C h a p t e r 1 1

= 311

32 Huberc Bancroft, "Observacions ora .Mexicd' (manuscript), 18-1933 Thus, Bancroft writes that " 1 am, really astonished at che great number of pamphlets

and books for the young relating co the history of this country, almanacs oí history,

catechisms of history rreatises on history , ese Thcse together with the numerous

historical holydays and celebrara ons show as dcep and demonscrative a love oí coun-try as may be found , 1 venere co assert , anywhere elle en che globe There is cer-tamly nothing ¡¡lee it in the literaturc of che United States Today, rhe 27th, onehundred years alter che evenr , in chis com pararively isolated capital [ San LuisPotosí] there are two iactions ora che plaza almost coming to hlows over an lmrbidecelebratlon , the priesrs insisting thar they wliI do honor to his memory, andChe government party swearing thac rhey shall no [' ( ¡bid., 40-41 ) In this instante,the date oí che commemoracion of Mexicd independence becomes the focal point

for con frontati ons between liherals and con serva ti ves It is possible that Mexicanobsessions with history had their esois in (he ovil wars , although there is certainlymuch influence Irom Spanish ideas of lincage and Inheritance

34 Guillermo de la Peña. "Nationals and Furcigners in che History oí Mexican Anthro-

pology," 279 Imporrant sourc es on Camio indude Ángeles González Gamio,

Manuel Gamio. una lucha sin fn,. Marrido Tenorio Trillo, "Scereophonic ScientificModernisms= Social Science between Mexicd and che United States, 1880s-1930s";

Alexandra Stern, "Eugenies beyond Rorders Sdence and Mediealization in Mexieo

and che U.S West, 1900- 1950Aur'elio de los Reyes, Manuel Garujo y el cine,Bufkngron , Crirarnal ama Citizen ni Modent Mexicd, and José Limón , American Encounters,Greater Mexieo, tire United Sta res, and the Erolies of Cultive, ehapter 2

35 For example, for a wedding banquet in honor ol che Gamio marriage , che Departa-mento de Antropología offered clic ir huno red mitosis di shes with cides such as"arroz a la tolteca , mole de guajolote ccutr h unen no ," ' liebres de las pirám idcs," and"frijoles a la indiana." Invi cation te) che banquet is reproduced in González Gamio,Manuel Gatno, otra lucha sin fn-

36 See the debate in Ignacio Manuel Altam i rano , Uierlos 108-4537 Manuel Gamio, Opiniones yjuicios sobre la obra La p,'blanón del valle de Teotihuacán, 23a Ibid 51.

39 Gamio was elecred vate presiden[ of rhe Seeond Ineernational Eugenies Congress inWashington , DC, in 1 920 ( óuffi ngt un . (rrn,innl nnd Cnizen inModern Mexieo, 154). Fora full discussion oí Mexican eugenics, see Alesandra Stern, 'Buildings, Boundaries,and Blood, Mediealization and Nacion - Buildings on che US-Mexieo Border,1910-1930 ' and Eugenio, beyond Ronde,, chapters ' 1 and 5

40 Gamio, Opinevi,s yjuicios sobre la obra La pohlaeión del valle de Teolibuacán, 49; my emphasis1 1 The losest antecedenc co Gamio's synth,,v may Nave hcen the short-lived agrarian

experiment carried out by Maxi milian . See Jean Meyer, " La junta protectora de lasclases menesterosas. indigenismo y agrarismo en e1 segundo imperio"

42 The differenee between [hese two approaches veas felc co be so sharp at che time

that, in che 1917 constitutional conven tino Porlirian eientífees were seco as dubiousMexicans , as can be witnessed from ti,, tollom9ng speech by congressman José

Natividad Matías ov the proposed law oi narionolity. "Would any oí you admit Mr.

José Yves Limanrour [Díaz's finance lninister borra in Mexico oí French descent] as

a Mexican tatuen by birch- Answer h'ankly and with your hand o0 your heart

(Voices, No! No!) Would you rake as a Mexican hv batch Oscar Braniff, Alterco

N o l r s l o C b t p 1 e

312

Braniff, or Tomás Braniff ? ( Voices . No! No, We wouldn 't Cake any cient tos !)" ( in 50Discursos doctrinales en el congreso constituyente de la Revolución Mexicana , 1916-1917, ed-Raul Noriega , 255; my emphasis).

43 Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, Obra polémica, 104.

44 The impact of che Cold War ora Mexican anthropology has not yet been studied.

The recent revelation that a former director oí the Nacional School oí Anthropology,Gilberto López y Rivas , spied for the Soviet Union in the United States suggeststhat this is a significant topie The effects oí Plan Cameloc en che intellectual cli-mate in che region are better known (see Irving Louis Horowitz , The Rise and Fati ofProject Camela). Paul Sullrvan's Urtnished Conversations. Mayas and Forelgners between TwoWats is a sensitive book ora the relacionship between anthropology and diplomacy

in che first half oí the twencieth century . On López y Rivas, see David Wise,Cassidy's Run, The Seeret Spy War ooer Nerve Gas, ehapter 12; Oswaldo Zavala, "Lospasos de López y Rivas como ' espía soviético' en Estados Unidos," Procesa, April 16,2000; and Hornero Campa , "'Asumo mi responsabilidad y no me arrepiento' , dice elahora diputado ," Proceso , April 16, 2000

45 See , for example , Javier Téllez Ortega, "La época de oro (1940-1968)"46 Oscar Lewis to Arnaldo Orfila , October 26 , 1961, in Susan Rigdon, The Culture

Facade: Art, Science, and Politics in tire Work of Oscar Lewis, 288-89

47 Mexican smdies oí Mexicans in che United States have a cradition , dating back toGamio ( 1931). For a discussion of the ways in which [hese smdies were subordinat-ed to Mexican nacional ieterests, often at che expense oí che Mexican - Americanperspeccive , see Limón, American Encounters, ehapter 2.

48 Oscar Lewis to Vera Rubio . November 12, 1965 , in Rigdon, Tire Culture Facade, 289.49 Warman , "Todos santos , todos difuntos," 37.

12. PROVINCIAL INTELLECTUALS AND THE SOCIOLOGY

OF THE SO-CALLED DEEP MEXICO

1 In Chis respect , this ehapter is a prolongation oí che Work that I initiated in Exitsfromche Labyrintb, 221-41-

2 Geoff Eley , "Nations , Publies and Pohrical Cultures- Plaeing Habermas in che 19chCentury," 289.

3 Max Weber, From Max Weber, 176.4 Gramsei's definition of intelleceuals is more habitually used by anthropologists

today ( lee Secano s from che Prison Notrbooks . 5). It is, in many ways , a useful definition,espeeially because it forces analysts co search for conneetions between processes oíelass formation and political discourse, 1 relied no Gramsd's definition in my earlierwork on provincial intellectuals . However, Gramsci's fantous definition says littleabout the nature oí the work of intellectuals and, probably because oí chis, hisfollowers can all roo casily end up labeling anyone who makes an utterance that fo-mento class awareness an "intellectual ," thereby diminishing the utility oí the cate-gory - For a more recent example of chis, see Stephen Feierman , Peasant Intellectuals,Anthropology and History in Tanzania- 1 use Gramsci implicitly here as a useful supple-ment co Weber.

5 This description is based on a smdy oí the documencation rhat is available enTepoztlán in the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), ramos de Tributos, Tierras,General de Parte , Hospital de Jesús, Indios and Criminal, as well as on local parish

Notes 1o Chapter i2

313 =

record,, and on ethnogmphle rescards dono bv niysell in 1977-78 and 1992-93.

and hy othcrs. Horacio Crespo and I.nntlw Vega published time 1909 Public

Property Register o1 che whole ul Morelos ut Tierra y propiedad en el Jin del porfiriato,

vols. 2 and 3 from tima[ censos me can aseenain that in time hamlet of Santo

Domingo w hich svdl conecrr us 1, . cspei 1 .111 . che largest landowner owned a

mere eight hectares and 93 perccnl i , l che village, regisrered prívate agricultura¡

plots were smaller timan one heetnre 1 he villal;es largest holding was 5 9 hectares

There is no reason ti, suppose chal thc Iand-mnure sutuation of Santo Domingo was

any difterent in che colonial period.

6 AGN Criminal, vol. 302, cxp. 4. I 20rv-205

7 In 1775, th aieolde ol San ;Anchís etc la Cal ssas selected by twenty-one elector,.

See AGN, I'lospical de Jesús, vol. y b 1728.

8 The vast majoriry ni time rnunieipio' lantls remained coinmunal even to che end oí the

porfirato- During that time, conununal lantls were classitied finto three rypes- forests,

terral (lava helds), and agostadero (grazing lands) Al] arable land was registered as

private property. Texcal lands were used in a system oí rorating, slash-and-burn

agriculture that has beca described in the detall by Oscar Lewis (Ltfe in a Mexican

Village, 148-54). Crespo and Vega (Tierra y propiedad en el fin del porfiriato, vol. 2, 212)

reproduce tire legal registration of [hese lantls in 1909- Tepoztlán's retention of

communal lands makes the village unusual in che Morelos region-

9 Womack's view was that most of che appropriauon of pueblo lands by haciendas oc-

curred aher 1857 and, especially, during time early years of the sugar boom in che

1880s (Z(jpa[.¡ and tire Mexican RevoluGmt). This position was hrst eonrested by

Horacio Crespo and Herbert Frey ("La diferenciación social del campesinado como

problema en la teoría de la historia"), who argoed that Morelos's haciendas had ex-

panded to thcur fui] extent as early as time seventeenth century. Crespo and Vega

(Tierra y propiedad en el fin del porfiriato) reproduce time raw data from che 1909 property

registrar that fostered these concluso.,- Unlortunately, volume 1 oí [his work,

which was to provide a full interpretation oí chis history, has not come to light.

Florencia Millon (Peasant and Nation Tbe Making of Post-Colonial Mexico and Peru,

137-41) shows that rhe títulos primordiales oí severa¡ Morelos communities, including

both Tepoztlán and Anenecuilco, were stolen during or immediately after che Wars

of Independence, and that haciendas profited from this by invading village lands

during che whole first hall oí the nineteench century. A full synthesis oí the relative

importante of these three waves of Iand concentraoon has yet to be written. In ad-

dition, se need to know more about che history oí changes in other forms oí access

co land, such as renting and sharecropping, although Womack's thesis regarding the

pernicious role timar capitalist intensification oí sirgar production had for traditional

renting arrangeme nts is still helpful in chis regard

l0 Regarding endogamy, a few samples from the parochial archives are illustrative, oí

the 133 marriages that were celebrated in time church oí Tepoztlán becween 1684

and 1686, oníy one was hetween a Tepoztecan and someone from outside time

municipio. Between 1792 and 1807, there were 694 marriages in che parish. Oí these

oníy 3.5 percent were becween a Tepoztecan andan outsider, usually someone from

a neighboring hacienda or village- Endogamy in che hamlets and che cabecera was

also high, although che smaller hamíers cifren tended co marry villagers from another

hamlet widun the municipio Oscar Lewis carried out a census in 1943 in which he

Notes lo Cbapti e 12

314 =

conlirms time con tinueel valcnce of these trends, and Sara Verazaluce, a'Tepoxteca o

physical anthropologist working on [his subject. has orally conlirtned that there is

still a very high leve) o1 villagc and municipal endogamy today (personal eommuni-

cation, tMarch 1993).1 I In 1992. a Cuernavaca real-esiaie urmpany manad to parchase a sizable amount ol

Iand hora peasants from San Andrés and Santa Catarina It ,cut ahout Chis in a se-

cretive way, hiring invders to parchase lands individual ly Irom farmers whom they

knew The ame tactie had beca taken earlier, in 1962, by che Montecastillo golf

club developnient company [Claudio Lomnitz, Evolución de una sociedad rural, 201-4)-

When villagers woke up to [hese [odies, they rebelled and stopped the companys

effons In 1995. attempts to resuscitare che golf-eourse prolect led to intense am-

frontatiuna becween che villagc and rimes tate government, te factional strife within

the village, and even to assassination-

12 Ethnographic inlormation on canto Domingo derives to a large degree from Pedro

Antonio Velázquez Juárez, "Etnozoología y cosmogonía en los Altos de Morelos."

13 Ibid., 209.

14 See Roberto Vareta, Expansión de sistemas y relaciones de poder, 1 11-54. The debates on

Mexican democracy would do well to take such examples oí local democracy into

account. Authoritarianism must be understood as a regional system, and not simply

as a mentaliry.15 Records oí Spaniards in che village extend back to tire mid-sixteenth century.

Martín Cortés built himself a house there (Silvio Zavala, ed., El servicio personal de los

indios in Nueva España, vol. 2, 377-78), and there are other documented cases oí

Spaniards in che village even in Chis early period.

16 There were some periods in which there were mulattos in Tepoztlán. However, che

parish records almost exclusively break the population down into Indian and

Spanish, with a few mestizos and castizos. The 1909 property records show that

whereas 93 percent oí landholdings in Santo Domingo were plots of less [han one

hectare (and 78 percent were smaller than half a hectare), the corresponding figures

for che cabecera are 62 percent and 37 percent. Whereas the three largest landowners

in Santo Domingo owned between six and eight hectares, Tepoztlán had a number

oí proprietors who owned becween twenty and forty hectares,

17 This was che case even roto che porfiriato. One elderly Tepoztecan acquaintance who

had worked on a hacienda before che revolution described the bad working condi-

tions and culminated his story by saying, "And they called -as Tepoztecan Indiansl"

18 Lewis righdy criticized Redficld's reification oí chis distinction, and bis identifica-

tion of [hese categories with social elass, but he was wrong in eschewing Redfield's

observation altogether19 Translators for Spanish ofucials in the colonial period were also regularly from

[hese principales.

20 AGN, Criminal, vol. 203, exp. 4, f. 159-66.

21 For che use oí corridos in regional communication, see Robert Redfield, Tepoztlán. A

Mexican Village, 180-93, and Catherine Heau, "Trova popular e identidad cultural en

Morelos" For peasant common lavo in Zapata's camps, see Salvador Rueda, "La

dinámica interna del zapatismo consideración para el estudio de la cotidianeidad

campesina en el área zapatista'

22 Lomnitz, Evolución de una sociedad rural. 299-307 James B. Greenberg, "Capital,

Notes r o C b a p t e r 1 2

315 =

Ritual , and BoundaAes of thc Closed ( orporale Communlty ," san inreresting dis-cussion oí the way contemporary Mixes huyo developed mechanisms for distin-gti ishing hetween "good " and 'evil " nicrchams on the oasis ol the sature of the,rtics tu local communitarian uersrorks This parallcls good and evil politicians inTopoztán_

23 See Loro"itz , Evolución de una socicdnJ rural. chapter 3, for an account of thesecon fre'nratIOni

Referentes

Archives

AGN Archivo Central de la Nación

AHC Archivo Histórico Condumex

AHT Archivo Histórico de Tepoztlán

Claf Colección Lafragua, Biblioteca Nacional, Mexico City

Registro de la Propiedad del Estado de Morelos, 1909 (published by Crespoand Vega)

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R efe ve nces

333 =

Index

Abad Y Quiepo, Manuel, 84-85

Acapulco, 148

Agravian reform, 268

Aguascalientes Convention, 98

Aguilar Camín, Héctor, xi; and Carlos

Salinas, 219; use oí state patronage, 226

Aguirre Beltran , Gonzalo, 254, 260

Alcalde, 267Alemán, Miguel, 104, 223, 227, 255, 256;

construction oí National University's

modernist campus, 104, 133; develop-

ment oí Acapulco, 104, 133

Alhóndiga de Granaditas, 89

Altamirano, Ignacio Manuel, xi, 100

Altepetl, 41

Altos de Jalisco, 159

Alvarado, Pedro de, 241

Alzate, FatherJ. Antonio, 8

Amatlán, 226, 272-73

American Civil War, 239

Ancien Régime , 82, 164, 198, description

oí, 82; persistente oí, 82

Anderson, Benedict. amendment to theory,

12; analysis oí "empty time;' 22; birth

oí nationalism , 3, 5; critical appraisal of,

xi, 9; critique oí nationalism, 7; cultural-

ist reading oí nationalism , 30; "deep

horizontal comradery;' 11; definition

of community, 7, definition oí nation,

11, definition oí nationalism , 5-7, 9, 11,

33; definition of nationhood, 9; 'Eden;'

15, 21, 32; European expansion and

creation oí nations, 4; fraternity and na-

tionalism, 12 ; Imagíned Communities, 3; and

language, S i and Latin Americanists, 4;

modification oí Anderson's definition,

33, national identity exploration, 11;

nationalism as kinship , or religion, 11;

"nation ' as imaginary , 6-7; objection

to definitions , 11, and print capitalism,

5-6, prohlem with conceptualization,

32; rise oí nationalism , 6; sacrifice, 7,

10, 12, secularization, 14-15, 18; theory

of nationalism , 3, 4, 200; view oí Ameri-

can independence, 4

Anthropology, 254; connection with im-

perialism, 228 ; crisis oí, 233 , critique

oí, 228; formation of national teleology,

233; historical role of, xxiii ; history

of, xxii; national anthropologies, 228,

229; and national image, 233 , national

modernization project , 254;1968 gener-

ation, 254; peripheral anthropologies,

229; Porfirian, 250; role in shaping

= 335 =

narionabsm, xxiii; reaction ro Benedict

Anderson, 4; revol uti o nary, 250 252

,hapi ng of colonial discourses, 228rasks ol, 261

Anti-Spanish senriment, 29, 87 131, 133;

emergente of afrer independence, 87,

expulsion oí Spaniards, 131; sacking ofParián Murker, 131

Antrello y Bermúdez Ángel de, 201

Apatzingán Constitution, 64

Appadurai, Arjun, xvii, 136, 262; detini-

cion of ethnographic orate, 130, hobsm

228-29, self-images of che Wesr, xvilAre of Trlunrph Ern-led in Honor of Por/lelo Utaz

108

Archa no, Jesús. civic oration uf, 68-69;

critique of Mexican vices, 69-70Arte, 103

Arielioro' eosn,opolitanism of, 103-9, i, ,a

defense against US. society, 103; deli-

nition of, 103; ma nl testations of, 103Ario revuelto, ganancia de pescadores, 170

Aristotlc. definiGOn of natural lave, 172

Art under protecti onisc 'tate, 115

"Artificial flowers" technique, 281

Asociaciones de padres de Jamilia, 149

Asunción, Fray Domingo de la, 173

Arenco, 173

Avila Camacho, Manuel, 223Azcapotzalco, 37

Azcárraga, Emilio. 224

Aztecs, 21, 32; afhliation with Toltec I,ne-

agc, 37; Azcapotzalco, 37, battlctield,

39; calpulli, 37, 38, 39 40, 41; calpullin-

37, 38, 39, 40; cnpulteod, 37, 38; chico r4,

37, communitarlan ideology of, 36, 37,

expansion of empire, 39; ideology of

sacrifice, 38; ideology oí sIavery, 38; ini.

portante ol kinship networks, 37, 39;

marriage between nobles, 39, mecha

nisms oí assimilation, 39; and modero

nacional ist thought, 37, priesrs, 38,

sense of human life, 38, slaves, 37,

Tenochtitlán, 37, Texcoco, 37

"Backsrage,' 136; border ci ties, 138.; den'nition of, 157, maintenance ot public

137; as suhversive and feminized,

Backwardness, 203, 207, growing concern

ol '04

Bancruft, Hubert desedption of Mexico,240-47249

Barba ,e, Alexico 255

Baroquc era, 154, 157 163; and ole f

rito,¡. 156

Barrio,, 166, 173, 174, 185, 186; and ani-

mal nick,lan,es, 188, barrio symbolism,

18'9, during colonial period, 41; fiestas,

188 pero istente of communi tarjan spirlt,

4b: i twal plano of, 40; sane as calpullin,

40

Ha roa. Roger, 110

Betdc of C_elaya, 104

13attle of Puebla, 1 55

Beavi, and Butthcad, 131-32

Benjamín, Walter, 22

Vernal Ignacio, 232

Besen Mario Ramón, 255

B,oymJíus del poder- eompositions of,

215-16

Biogr,phy and political znalysis, 223

llieapov el definition of, 14

Block, 16, 42, 44, 46, 147, 246, commu-

mtirs of, 45; comparison with Indians,

45, maroon societies, 45; women, 17;

restrictions against associations, 45, inVeracruz, 245

Pliso, Kathcrine, 137

Blood basic for Spanish idea of nation,

43, genealogical concept oí the nation,

42 and honor, 43, 1deo1ogical role of, 42

Boas, 1ranz, 230, 257, 258; and

1 nterna tional School of American

Archeology and Ethnology, 238Bock Philip, 188, 189Boleliv .le la Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y

Eslmi ls tica, 242, 258

Pon ti] Guillermo critique of, xxiii; defini-tion of México profundo, 263, expulsion

from Nacional School oí Anrhropology,

232 n000n of "deep Mexico," xxiii

Borda cities "border zone," 138; asa cul-tural impurity, 138; prosperiny of, 138;

hvin cities, 138, and U.S economic m-

terests, 139

Bourbon reforms, 21, 23, 82; adminis-

trative ideas, 21; and Alexander von

Humboldt, 8; decentralization, 25, as

enlightened despotism, Si and indepen-

dence, 25, as modernizing, 82; as re-

fearmist movement, 25; asa response te

backwardness, 25, threat to American

Revolution, 25, threat to British Navy, 25Bozales, 44

Brading, David, 16

Bribes, 61, 62

Brujos, 270

Bullfighting, 66, 71, 147, 162; as cause oí

inciviliry, 66, as spectacle that dulls rea-son, 66-67

Bulnes , Francisco, 95, 96; portrayal ofBenito Juárez, 95

Bulstos, Hermenegildo, 101

Bureaucratic procedure, as mechanism oí

exclusion, 61

Bustamante , Carlos María, xi, 114

Caballero Águila' sculpture of, 102

Caballero Español: sculpture of, 102

Cabecita de Teotihuacán, 249

Cabeza gigantesca de Hueyapan, 247Cabrera, Luis, 53, critique oí the cente-

nary of independence, 86, "Los dos pa-triotismos ," 138; as pro-mestizo nation-alist, 53

Calderón de la Barca , Fanny, 233

Calles, Plutarco Ellas, 94, 104; building ofche state , 74; development oí Cuernava-

Carnival, 188, 189, 190, 192

Carranza, Venustiano, 98

Carrasco, Pedro, 73

Carrillo, Alejandro, 255

Caso, Alfonso, founding director of INAH,

260, founding director of ENAH, 260Casrells, Manuel, 152

Caste wars, 49, 199; Chan Santa Cruz,

50; Chiapas Highlands, 50; Huastecaoí San Luis, Potosí, 50; Mixteca region,

50, as nacional movements, 49, Yaquis

oí Sonora, 50; oí Yucatán, 50

Casnlle, 8

Castizo, 50

Carholicism, 23, 47, 63, 85, 86, 133

Catrines, 180

Caupolicán, xiii

Censos, 3; oí 1895, 205; and Viceroy

Juan Güemes Pacheco, 198-99; inTepozrlán, 172, 173

Center-periphery, 177, change to che dia-lectic , 185; eoexistence of, 165, con-flation of scheme , 167; decline in the

dialectic, 190, discourses of, 165-66,

paradox of, 166; and political language,165, problems with, 191-93; shifts in,

186, and Tepozrlán, 165; transformationof, 187-88

Central power, 88, 105

Centralization, 165

CEPES (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Sociales),76

Certificares oí blood purity, 16, 42

Charles 111, 9, 24, 25; subject eategoryof, 9

ca, 104; residente in Cuernavaca, 137 Charles V, 15

Calpulli, 38, 40, 51, 173, 174, calpulteotl, Chavero, Alfredo, 230, 252; creation oí

37; communitarlan ideology of, 37; as racial narrative, 245-50; México a travéscornerstone oí communiry, 37, and kin- de los siglos, 245; Otomis, 245, 246; por-ship relations, 37, and lineage, 37; pri- trayal oí Negro, Otomi, and Nahoa

mordial unir of, 39 rases, 246; similariry with foreign de-Cancian, Frank, 161-62 scriptions, 246

Cantina, 149 Chiapas: neo-Zapatistas, 158Cárdenas, Lázaro, 104, 105, 133, 137, 219; Chicago School oí Eeonomics, 140

construction oí Pan American Highway, Chinelas, 188, 190

104; formula for modernization, 114; Christiam. patriarchs, 68, Tepoztlán cen-nafionalization oí oil industry, 74, 104 sus, 173

lndex336 =

= 337 =

Christianrty. 131

Christy. I lunry 5

C^hurch, 15o, Ion, 172. 17 authnn nos.

147 153: and i urru ptum 101: and

haeobo de lc rera. 153 loas o1 ritual

funaio m. 151, and «preso nta uon it;

and Tepoztlán, 173

(_irnlíf, , 1-14, 21(1, 241, 246

Citi zenship 11.27, 60. 61 62. G0.

163, 204 censornhgt nl che pres.

debates durmg Indepeadencc. 62: dv-

cGning importante al, s8, dclinunon

of, 70-71, as degraded haseline 58-62.

discourscs of, xx; dynamlcs of, 59; and

carly constitutions, 63, carly legal code,,

62, 70, historieal diseusslon of, 59, ideal

oí citizenship rights, 72; importante

oí political discourse, 79; Indians under

Benito Juárez, 51; invoked after indc-

pendence, 79,- and nationalism, I1, 48

politics in modero Mexico, 79; rejection

oí corporate forms, 78, social critics ol.

80; social pact, 60; tied so weakness

oí the state, 74; transformatton of, xx

under postrevolutionary governments,

80

Civilizing horizon, 139

Civil society, 57

Clio, 220

Coatsworth, John, 220

Cockfights, 71, 162

Cofradías, 147, 149, 150

Colegio de México, FI, xii; and Daniel

Cosío Villegas, 218; inspired by

Collége de France, 197

Collective actors and cofradías, 147: defi-

nition of, 147, discussion of agrarian.

149, historical overview, 147-53, pro-

letarian , 151, in rural arcas, 147

Colonia Tepozteca, 179, 181

Colonization, xx, 14, 15, 184, 185, 186.

blamed for economic backwardness,

114; Catholic fanatieism blamed for

lack of colonists, 69

Communitarian ideologies, xx, 35, 36, 56,

and Aztecs, 36-37; considerations for

che future, 56; construction uf, 36 tacll,

muno ot, 36; In torntation of national

n!c„lopy. 35 h>mis, xvi-xx; identifica-

cor. ut 35. i ndigenous , 40, mestizo, 40.

,11,d mtdupartisanship, 119; relations, xv,

psnlsh 40

C.omnntorl. Ignacio. 241

....1, rt.l,lendozn. El, 113

o,¡anr 1) 161, 188, 189

(.nnur Augusto, 230, 241

( npres 150,1553

(1 1rroµlistadores. 21Com. rvauves. 10 , 133, 268, 269, 280;

pragmal e accord w,th 1iberals, 72

Consf,tutional Assembly oí the Depart-

ment ol Quéretaro, 243

Constitution of Cádiz, 27, 63, 64, 88;

artiele 25, 64, definition oí "Spaniards,"

27

Constitution oí Mexico ( 1811), 62-63

Constitution oí Mexico ( 1824), 48, 62,

63, 64; abolition oí slavery , 204; article

9,63, and eitizenship, 62

Constituir n oí Mexico ( 1857), 48, 51,

66 70, 71, 98, 164, citizenship and

nationality, 71, and denationalization

of religion , 48, female suffrage, 71;

Madero s use of , 96, 98, requirements

for citizenship, 71

Constitution oí Mexico (1917), 54, 71,

73, 89, 98; description of, 54; land

rights , 74; protection against foreign

capitallsts , 74; workers rights, 74

Consumptiore fashion industry and

"dumping ," 118; piracy, 118

Contact trames. concept of , 129, and sei-

entitic study, 134, 139-40; and tourism,

134

Contact zones, 125, 132, 136, 143;

definition of , 130; emergente oí na-

tional identity , xxii , first type, 140;

fourth type, 141; history oí anthro-

pology, 135; and nationalism, 1411

second type , 141, third rype, 141;

and transnational process , 142, types

of, 130

Corporate forms of property . as obstarles

to citizenship, 75

In 3 ex

338

C 0rreclos, 192

Corrido. 279

Corruption, 120-22.145213.214

appropnation ofstate machinery.

160 asa "cargo systen;.' 161: and cho

church, 160-61, and liesra 162-63

function of, 1 19, as a market mccho

nism, 60; and politieal control, 119,

and public opinion, xxir asid public

ritual, 146, 155, 162, and redislnbu-

t,on, 119; ,,Tisas indivldualistic 1211.

in Tepoztlán. 267; three leve;; 160

Cortés, Hernán, 15, 153, 167 birthday

shared with Martín Luther, 15, Martín

Cortés, 218; Moctezuma , 218, and

Tepoztlán, 169

Cortés, Martín, 218

Cosío Villegas , Daniel , 218, 219, 221;

criticism oí Luis Echeverría , 222, "fac-

tory oí Mexican history ," 218, 220, as

"intelleetual caudillo ," 224; mentor to

Enrique Krauze, 222

Cosmopolitanism , 103, and Enlighten-

ment thinkers, 23

Counter - Reformation, 154

Creole, 5, 6, 9, 17, 44, 275, discrimina-

tion of, 17 , 45, emergente oí term, 9,

national identity of, 5, and nationalism,

45, patriotism and philosophy , 28, 45,

47; as propios , Si in Quéretaro , 243-44,

from the word criar, 43

Critique of tbe Pyramid, The, 226

CROM (Confederación Regional de Obreros

Mexicanos), 151, 179, 180, and Zapa-

tistas, 179

CTM (Confederación de Trabajadores Mexi-

canos ), 119, 151

Cuahtémoc , xiii, 239

Cuautla, 266

Cuernavaca , 167, 175, 178, 184 , 187, as a

tourist destination, 137

Cuerpo unido de nación, 25

Cult oí the Virgin oí Guadalupe, 47

Cultural modernity , 82; challenge to state

institutions , 82, and corruption, 214

Cultural production, 215; production of

image, 136

Curandero . 270, 273, 275, and politieal

power, 270-7 1, professional healers and

witches 271 ; Yautepec, 270

DaMatta Roberto xx 58, 59, 61, 67, 80:

application for Mexico, 59; "discourse

ot the honre," 58; "discourse ot the

street," 58, usefulness of analysis, 78

Darwin, Charles. and Mexican education,

1,10

Deht crisis (1982`. 105, 116, 215, effect

sin educational sv,tem, 219; elfeets on

national devclopment, 111, reise o1

nongovernmental organizations , 77-78,

reise oí opposition parties, 77-78

Deep Mexico, 122, 286, versus invented,

264, nationalism of, 264

De eso que llaman antropología mexicana, 231,

232, 261

Democracy, xiv, 156, costs of, 78 ; history

of, xx; lack of , 156, representation of,

203-4

Department of Anthropology oí the

Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento,

250, 251, 252; mission of, 252; as na-

tional symbol , 251; promotion oí civi-

lization, 251

Department oí Soconusco in Chiapas:

races of , 244, statistics, 244

Desmadre, 110

Díaz, Por6rio , xii, 51, 223, 241 ; birthday

en Mexican Independence Day, 104;

centralization oí che state , 205-6, con-

cessions to foreign capital , 52; consolida-

tren oí political representation , 206, cor-

respondence of, 146; creation oí rurales,

205; embodiment oí three presidencial

personas , 104; interpretation oí Frantiois

Xavier Guerra, 221; labor repression,

206, legacy oí regime, 206 , portrait of,

106; rehabilirarion of, 220; trains, 133

Díaz Cadena, Ismael , 172-73

Díaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 104, 135, 138, 223,

attempt to censor hippies , 131; con-

struction oí Mexico City subway, 104,

133, diary of, 220; and foreign influ-

ences, 138, maintenance oí national

1r,dex

= 339 =

image , 138; Olympics , 133, 135 138,ugliness of, 226

Discourse of the homo , 58, 59 , 61, ac-cording to DaMatta , 58; applied lo thegood pueblo , 67; familial idioms, 59

Discourse of the street , 58, according tuDaMatta , 58, as discourse of liberal en;zenship. 58

Dismodernity , 110 122

Dolcefar mente ( 1880), 239

Dumont , Louis, 166

Durazo, Arturo, 1 12

Earthquake of1985, xi

Echeverría, Luis, 104, 222, 227; and

Cosío Villegas, 222; electr,hcat,on of

thc counrryside, 104; highways, 133Education, 60, 205

Ejidos; failurc to create propertied citizen-ry, 75

Election of July 2, 2000, xxi

Electiori, as souices of revenue 78

Eley, Geoff. definition oí public sphere,265-66

Elites, 143, 200, construction of public

opinion, 147 , corruption of, 213, Creolc

30, discourse oí messianism , 70; forros

ot discussion, 148, lack oí public torum,

148; Masonie lodge membership, 30,

portrayed as foreign , 144; and public

opinion , 147, Tepoztecan, 174; v;rtuous

and vieious, 70

El pueblo, 155El que se enoja , pierde. 60, 78, meaning ,l,

60

ENAH (Naconal School oí Anthro-

pology and History), 231, 254, expul-

sien oí G. Bonhl, 232

Encomendar, 16

England, 15. 21

Enlightenment, 4, 154

Escalante, Fernando, 84, 249; arguments

on cidzensh,p, 71-72^ hctitious charco-

ter of che ci lizcn, 84; oppositiun lo

Daniel Cavo Villegas, 72

Español, 17 18, 33, 44, 50, 154; dominan[Gaste , 21,-as "Old Christians," 18

Lsrrada, Agustín, 97

I-strasia luan, 242

Ethnographic state definition of, 136

Eugen,cs: and postrevolutionary govern-ment, 139

Eurnpeans, 50

Evans, Colonel Albert, 234

Exansi&, al puente de Mrtlac, 105

Exposición Iberoamericana de Sevilla, 102

Expropr,at,on: failurc lo create propertied

cinzcnry, 75

Ex-,rola giving thank, lo che Virgen of GuadalupeJora a,¢essful med,cal operador, 26

FamiLal idioms, 59

Felipe Don, 272, 273, 285, Fiesta de

Querzaleoatl, 273, and national

Mexican anthem, 273

Fernando VIL portrait of, 92

Fieras 150, 156, 161, 190, and campaign

cuero, 162, and conuption, 162; Fiesta

de Quetzaleoatl, 273, 285; and patriot-

isni, !Si, and use of sports, 155

Filipinas, 15

Film,. 118, 126, dismbution of, 1 18

Flore, Joachim de, 15

Five Fe rr,il;es. reviews of, 258

Flores Magón, Ricardo, 151

Fondo de Cultura Economica, 219, 259

Foucault, Michel, xxii, 202, 210; defini-

tion ol hiopower, 14; definition oí gov-

ernmentaliry, 198, governmentality,

xxii, history from rhe presenta' 2 13

Foreigncrs, 16, 134, 140-41, attraction

to indigenous peoples, 135; business,

1 31 -32, 140, challenge to nationalists,

140-42, destabilization of, 135, Euro-

pean.134,- investments, 140, 252;

nadowlisr reactions to, 135; North

A mcrica n. 134

Francl,can,nissionaries, 15

Freemasonry, 29, 30, 31, 146, masons,

31; Masonic lodges as networks, 30,

Masonic organizations, 31; and Mexi-

can narionalism 31, Joel Poinsett, 31;

as pulitical parties, 31, rite oí York, 30,

31, 32; role following independence,

30-31, as secret societies, 31-32;

Scottish rite, 30, 31

French intervention, 133, 241, increased

polarization, 72

Freud, Sigmund. and Mexican education,140

Friedlander, Judith, 192-93

Front state: maintenance oí public image,137

Fuentes, Carlos, xi, 56, 218, 227, descrip-

tion oí nacos counterpart, 1 11Fueras, 8, 9

Gage , Thomas, 239

Gallo, Joaquín, 169, 171

Gamboa , Manuel, 276Gamio , Manuel , 53, 253 , 254, 257, 258,

262; art oí governing , 252, and FranzBoas, 53 , 250, building oí facilities, 252,

and Chavero, 252, construction oí revo-

lutionary narionalism , 53; developmentoí indigenismo , 53; differences with Por-firians, 252 , 254; director oí INI, 260,doctoral work at Columbia University,250, and eugenics movement , 252, as"father" oí Mexican anthropology, 53,

250, founder oí Departamento de Asun-tos Indígenas , 260; Indigenismo , 53; in-digenous aesthetic , 250; instructions toresearchers, 251-52, and ISAAE, 238,

land distribution lo peasants , 252; L.población del valle de Teotihuacán , 251, andPimentel , 252, as pro -mestizo national-ist, 53 ; and pseudoscientific racism,52-53, role in local society , 25; role oíanrhropology , 251, shaping uf nationalimage , 252; support from VenustianoCarranza , 250; undersecre tary oí edu-caron , 260, vision of anthropology,251

García , General Alejandro, 94GATT ( General Agreement en Tariffs and

Trade), xxi

Gazeta de Lima, 200

Gazeta de México , La, 7, 8 , 23, 25, 148, 200,206, discussion oí "rhe public ," 201, andthe'scientifically marvelous," 201-2

Globalization. effects on "metropolitari'

anthropology, 229, and nacional anthro-

pology, 229

Goffman, Erving, 136, 157

Gómez, Juan José, 279

González Casanova, Pablo, 232

Governmental institutions, 197

Governmental intervention: dependenceon, 75

Governmentality, xxii, 198, 202, 203; im-

portance of idea, 210-11; instrumenta

of, 211; and nongovernmental intellec-

tuals, 211; state culture of, 204

Gran España, 25, 27, 33

Grano de Arena, El, 282

Great Nacional Problems, xvi, xviii, xix,

and civilizational horizon, xviii, defini-

tion of, xviii, fetishism of, xvi, for public

interese, xix

Grounded theory, xix, definition of, 127

Gruzinski, Serge. attack on Indian learn-ing, 154

Guamán Poma de Ayala, Felipe, 16

Guardino, Peter, 29

Güemes Pacheco y Padilla, Viceroy don

Juan Vicente, 91, 198-99

Guerra, Fran4ois Xavier, 64, 82, 221, ar-

gument oí Porhrio Díaz, 221; descrip-

tion oí "collective actora," 147, descrip-

tion oí postindependence Mexico, 146;

discussion oí che Mexican Revolution, 82

Guerrero, Vicente, 29; murdered by frac-

tious Mexicans, 69

Haber, Stephen, 221

Habennas, Jürgen, 10; definition oí repre-

sentativa publicity, 148

Hacendados, 146, 147, 155

Heifetz, Hank, 222

Hernández, Deputy Chico, 68

Hidalgo, Miguel, 29, 47, 48, 62, 84,

241; accusations against Spaniards,

29, appropriation of the Virgen de

Guadalupe, 48, Catholic faith as national

sovereignty 85, counterexcommunica-

tion oí European imperialists, 85-86;

counterexcommunication oí Spanish

1,, ,rxdex

340= 341

clcrgy. 86; destruciiun ol towns. .84,

emancipador ul claves, 62; end u,

tribute, 62 ess,q' by VIUVr Ttll nar,

104 cxcommun¢aUOn endotscd h3

Archbishop ul A1cx,co. 8S. crcornmm1s

canon ol. Ievel dltfcrenres he

tween Gastes . 62, martyred bs

Spaniards, 69. tASexico: Biogrnhby ol Pmi,

224; response u, rxeommumeaaan n

as scicntihcalh ;ndincd. 202

ippie muvcnuu Ii4--75, CI. 16

H ispanicized, 171

1 üstorians Latir Amcrica visto, 4, reac-

tion to Bencdiet Anderson, 4

Holisen: definition nf, 228-29

]la,, - William Setvard Traveling in Adexlco, 238

1 forre and Ibe Zapilotes, Tbe, 234

huerta, Victoriano, 98

Huitzilopochdi, 39

Human rights, 56 57; recodification ot, 56

Iberians, 46

Identity producron, 128

TEPES (Instituto de Estudios Políticas y JocinlrsJ.

76

Illegal immigrants, 139

Imagen de Jura con retrato de Fernando VII,

92

Imagined Communities and Anderson, 3; cri-

tique of, 3. Ser also Benedict Anderson

IMF (Internacional Monetary Fund ), 129

immigratiom. as critica) perspectiva xni

INAH (Instituto Nacional de Antropología

Historia), 231, 254

Inca, 16,21

Independence, xiv, 5, 1 3 , 1 4 , 2 9 , 33, 86

149, 202; and American War of Inde-

pendence, 27; and Bourbon refonns. 25:

and Cathol,cism, 47, and citizenship.

62, Constitution ol Cádiz, 27, Creole

symbols, 47, cuerpo unido de nación, 25;

European influences of, 4, 83-84, failure

to centralize, 87; and governmentality,

198, 203, and governmental state, 198,

199, hlsroriography of, 4, and indige-

nous communities, 48, lack of Creole

bourgeoi sic, 30, lack oi stability, 233-3-1

nd musu_o. 50 , monarch,sts, 87; na-

II,,,u' comauusncss, xiv: national,za-

56,n,t thu chuteh. 47 notions si caste,

+a p ar 1 1 nmcerns ol nationalism,

41, tv,u e.. ol. 62. and public sphcre.

1Su. endica! ,nsurge nts, 87, rehance on

Spanlsh legal thought, 87, role of eom-

numwcs, 10, role ot Frcemasonry, 30;

Spnln a4a,nsr French nvaders. 27;

tate parriot-

ism56 vicw ol Anderson 4

Indian 5 16 33,36.37,44,46.48,50,

52. 55, 63. 153, 191, 263, 267; and citi-

zenship,5l;collectiveidentity of, 42,

communities, 267, conversion of, 153;

descrihed as rencos, 11 I-112, 114; dis-

location of, 42; governors, 274-75;

ladinolzation, 45, 275; legal category

ol. 41; as les, likely m commit crimes,

244; and niarriage, 42, massacres of, 52,

mortalty o1, 40, population movements,

40; in Querétaro, 243; racial category

of, 41, republics, 8, rulers, 168; and

thcft. 244; tribute, 85; women, 17- See

also Aztees, Inca, Mazabuas, Otomt

Indianness, 112, 170, 172, 192

b;digeni;nm, 49, 51, 53, 103, 109, 231, 232,

anos of, 232; as atomizing, 262; a de-

fense against U.S society, 103; deserip-

tion uf, 231, distinct from liberalism,

51; against foreign aggression, 54; in-

corporation oí the Indian, 232; mainte-

nance oí indigenous communities, 49;

against neocolonial exploitation, 54;

and Tepoztán, 170, 179

7ndigerazta, 97, 134, art, 97, expon oí na-

tional anthropology, 254; Rodríguez

Puebla, 48, 51

Indigenous communities, 40, 146, adop'

non uf saints, 41, Christian worship, 40;

as corporate structures, 204, dislocated

Indiano, 41-42; and Benito Juárez, 51;

links with lamily, 40, links with gods,

40, link, wirh land, 40, loso oí legal

protection, 150; organization of labor

groups. 40; organized by race, 41;

342 =

tr

political organizaton of, 40, purpose oí

40, subordination ro Baste, 41, trbute,

40

Indio, 192; as"forcedidennty, 192-93

Individual rights, 146

Informal eeonomy ethnoglaphies ol,

75, negotiation with state institunons,

75INI (Instituto Nacional 1rá,,i vista', 231. 232,

254

Inquisition, 241, and census. 198 as svni-

bol oí state vigilance, 115

Intellectuals, xii, 146, 158, 199, 206, 218,

272, 281, and autonomy, 199-200; as

beneficiarles oí decentralization, 117,

curanderos, 275; debates in the Gazeta de

México, 202, dependence en corporate

investors, 116; differences with U.S.,

197; and European model, 197, Ricardo

Flores Magón, 151, geography oí mute-

ness, 284; and governmentality, 202;

government subsidies, 208-9, and inter-

passivity, 208-9; interpreters of national

sentiment, 114, Enrique Krauze, 215,

language oí respect, 285, and Oscar

Lewis, 259, list oí, xi; local level, 266,

275; and Mexican Americans, xii, and

national space, 266; as nation builders,

xxii; and patronage, 116; Porfirian intel-

lectuals, 249; José Guadalupe Posada,

151; postcolonial critics, 126; priests,

276; and public sphere, 283; representa-

tion oí national sentiment, 197-98, 269,

sources oí legitimation, 197; as spiritu-

alisto, 207; and state formation, 198; oí

Tepoztlán, 277, 280, 282, Max Webers

definition of, 266

Interna) colonialism, 128, 140, 191-92,

232, 264

International system, 128

Interpassivity, definition of, 208; and in-

tellectual production, 208

Intimate cultures: definition oí, 116

Intruder, The: asan allegory, 168-71, story

oí, 169-71

ISAAE (International School of American

Archeology and Ethnology), 250

]SI (Impon Substitution Industrializacion 1,

103, 264; Arirlismo as an ideology, 103,

corn;pti on, 120; crisis of national ism,

1 14, cultural rcgions durtng, 1 17, ex-

baustion of, 105, and nationalism, 121,

period of urban growth, 115, teachings

of the revolution, 121

Isla Juana, 15

Imrbide Agustín, 29, 47, 68, 241, 284,

adoption of Aztec eagle, 47, creation oí

Order ol Guadalupe, 47, murdered hy

fractious Mexicano, 69, Plan de Iguala,

29, 64

Jaguaribe, Beatriz, 213

Jalisco, secessionist movements in, 68

James, Edward, 214

Jefes Politices , 147, 155

Jordán, Fernando : Miguel Alemán, 256;

explanation oí Robert Redfield, 255-56;

Nacional School oí Anthropology,

256

Joseph, Gilbert, 220

Journalists : as middle daos, 59

Juan, Jorge, 7, 8

Juárez, Benito , 5 1, 52, 55, 56, 95, 129,

206, 241, biblical imagery , 96; Bulnes,

description oí, 95, as civil servant, 225,

consolidation oí national econoeny, 79;

construction oí presidential persona, 95;

embodiment between nation and law,

95-96; with green eyes, 101, identifica-

tion with che )and , 96, image oí the presi-

dency , 95, impact tan national history,

55, and Indian citizenship , 51, Indian-

ness oí, 95; liberalism oí, 51; mestizaje oí,

101, Mexico: Biography of Power, 222; mili-

tary campaign against Hapsburg imperi-

alists, 67, mythology oí Aztec past, 95;

portrait oí , 99, 101, presidency as an in-

stitution oí power, 95 , railroads, 72; re-

ligiosity and purity oí , 226; suspension

oí individual guarantees in Yucatán, 67;

triumph over Maximilian , 72, universal-

ist liberalism of, 55

Junta Instituyente : and citizenship, 62

Juntas de mejoras, 149

1 n d rx

343 -

Kahlo, Frida, 55

Kaiser, Wilhelm - compared with PorfinaDíaz, 104

Knight, Alan, 220Krauze , E nrique , xi, 215; career of 21 a

and cha risma tic power , 225; com panson

with Cosío Villegas and Oetavio Paz

219, co - awnerul Cho , 220; critique

of, xxii , critique oí p-esidenrialum 213;

"democracy without adjectives' 222.

exceptionallsn ; of Mexico , 217-I8,

"factory of h;stmy ' 220and Fran4ois

Xavier Guerra , 22 1, as a historian ot na-

tion building , xxii; and histoncal soap

operas , 220, 223 ; interpretarion ol

Mexican history , 216, 223 ; Juárez asauthenric , 226,- Krauzometcr, 222-23

and Miguel de la Madrid, 219; mcnrors

of, 222 , and national history , 217; as na-

tionalist i niel lectual , xxii; and 1968 5tu-

dent movement, 212-1 3, 218-19, and

presidencial biograph i es , 2 17, Antonio

López de Santa Atina , 226; and lclevisa,219-20 ; and Tlateloleo massacre 216,

and use oí sources, 221 ; use of state pa-

tronage, 226 ; and Vuelta, 218

Krugman , Paul, xxi

Labor Day parado, 1 19

Ladino , 43, 44, 275; Jews, 44; Muslim,, 44,

as pardy civilized, 44; Spanishspeaking

Africans, 44

1afaye, Jacques, 16

La .Malinche, 218

Land- importante of for i dentiry, 43

La Paz , Bolivia, 113, 129

Lara, Agustín, 206

Latín America , xviii, amhiguiry off status,

127; and antipolitical discourse, 210,

clama ru Europe , xvii, Latin American

left and imperialism , 129, as "non-

Western ," xvii; polities and an tipo B tics,

210, portrayed as backward , 127 sover-

eignty and citizenship , 10, tradition ol

anthropology, 229

Lavallé, Bernard, 17

1aw oí 1608, 17

Laves oi Castille, 18

I.aves of che Indies encomendar, 16, justih-

caiion of Spanish expansion, 16

I-egal code of 1836 and citizenship, 64

Leonard, Irving, 154

Lerda de Tejada, Sebastián, 129

1e1¢ 05e11 , 166, 175, 180, 257, 258,

260 270, 275; Cbildrea ofSánchez, 258,259 260 critique of Sociedad Mexicana deGroy,, fía y Estadística, 258; descri ption of

barrios, 180, as FBI spy, 259, Five Families,

25s 259, letter tu Vera Rubín, 258-59;

and Mexican intelligentsia, 259; RicardoPozas, 259

Liberal,sm, 4, 10, 49, 50, 133, 150, prag-

nRüic accord w,th conservatives, 72,and tacist ideas, 50

Libro kajo El- history oí civil violente,

239, as shared history of suffering,

241

Limón José, xii

Lion's Club, 149

1.ockharr James, 4 1

López, Jesús. proposal to ban bullkghting,66-u7

López de Santa Arma, Antonio, 89, 93,

95, amputated leg, 90; illustration of,

93 iVlexieo Biograpby ofPawer, 226, in

Pastrv Wat, 90, as preserver of order,

90. pmblems with political parties, 90,

as scrvant of the nation, 225, signih-

canc( of eg, 90; Teatro Santa Atina, 90,

1 33: n Texas, 90, theatrieality of, 226,

uses of sacrl fiee, 89-90

López Marcos, Adolfo, National Museum

of Anthropology, 133

López Portillo, José inauguration of re-search facility, 213

1_ópcz Rayón, Ignacio, 62, 63; constitu-

tion o l 181 1, 62

Luther Martín, 15

Lynch John, 90

Mecebu.;les, 173, 174

Macfi iavellianism, 154

Madero, Francisco 1., 96, 216, 224, as

"aposde ol democracy," 98; and 1857

Madrid, Miguel de la , 55, 223, and educa-tional system , 215; election of, 222,Mexico: Btograpby of Power, 222, national-ist reaction to, 55; refornis of, 55; subsi-dies to inrellectual groups , 219; as well-meaning democrat, xxi

Magníficos ("Magnificent Severa "), 231,232, 261

Mallon, Florencia, 65

Maps, 3, 199

Maquiladoras, 139

Maroons, 45

220-21

Martyrdom, 89, 95, 109, degradation of

insurgent priests, 89, images used by as-

piring presidents, 109, linked te ideal of

sovereignty, 94, marryred national lead-

ers, 89, martyrs oí independence, 89,

Alvaro Obregón, 94, and presidencial

persona, 94, proof oí cleanliness, 280,

Guadalupe Victoria, 94, Pancho Villa,94

Marx, Karl: and Mexican education,140

Masses: as obstacles to progress, 65; in-sufficiently civilized, 65

Más vale cabeza de ratón que cola de león, 1 18Maximilian, 87, 241, boulevards of, 133,

killing of, 87-88, and Tepoztlán, 176Mayas: sold as claves, 235Mazabuas, 37

Media, 117, 152, 157, 158, 284, and so-cial persona, 159

Medical doctora' movement, 151-52, 214

Mendieta, Gerónimo, 15

Merchants, 146, 147, 168, 200

Mestizaje, 51

Mestizo, 16, 50, 53, 263, feminine argu-

ments for, 53-54, as fortified version oí

che indigenous yace, 53, and indepen-

dence, 51, masculine arguments for,

53-54; nationalization of, 54, as nation-

al yace, 52, protagonist oí national his-

tory, 53, revaluation of, 52

Mexican Americana, xü

constitution, 96-97, messianic image of, Mexican anthropology: challenges to

98; as a spiritualist, 207, toppling oí foreigners, 255, eontemporary crisis

Díaz, 206-7 oí, 230; final phase of, 262; and Great

National Problems, 260; historical de-

velopment of, 230, 233, indigenismo, 231;institucional infrastructure, 230; modern

aesrhetics, 231, and nationalism, 231;

and 1968 student movement, 231, 261,

process uf, 230-31; romanticization oíIndians, 259, Bernardino de Sahagún,

238; stabilization of national image, 242,

state absorption of, 232, 260, strategiesof government, 242

Mexican democrats critique oí corporate

state, 77, rise of democracy

Mexican history: and public sphere, 157;theories of, 81

Mexican nationalism, 53, 86, 87; Luis

Cabrera, 53, contemporary discourse of,

55, under current regime, 55, formula-

cien of, 53; foundational strain, 86;

Manuel Gamio, 53, and mestizo, 54, asmodernizing, 53-54; Andrés MolinaEnríquez, 53, principal ideologists, 53,as protectionist, 53-54; as revolutionarynationalism, 53

Mexican nationality, and communitarian

ideologies, 35, historical product oí

Mexican peoples, 35, importante of mes-

tizaje, 51, after independence, 46; and

liberals, 51; and Mexican Revolution,

52, during pre-Hispanic period, 35

Mexicanness, 224

Mexican proverbs, 60, 78, 118, 176

Mexican Revolution, xi, xxi, 52, 75, 86,

139,178,183,199,205,216,218;

degradation oí citizenship, 79, and

democracy, 216, goals of, 216, ideo-

logues oí, 86, indigenista anthropology,

231, indigenistas, 231; and indigenous

world, 134, "intellectual caudillos," 218,,Mexico: l3iograpby of Power, 223-24, andpeasant organizations, 151, popular

public spheres, 279-80; projectforna-

tionality and modernity, 114, and prole-

tarian organizations, 151, rapid mod-

ernization, 79; and role oí intellectuals,

I tia , x 1344 _ j Index

= 345 =

210; teachings nl 121 and Tepuztld .o spherc 114 and role.¡ intellcctuals,

178, watershed lor natinnal,ty . 52 14: seat ut viceroyalty , 46, and

:Alexicoo-. ambigwty ol smms , 127: um- frpu,: tlán 167. 186

sciousness ol backward coodiuun. xc,i AI.x!:o It, b adal Evolut," , 241, 243, 244,

desrc ol nanunahry , .XIS Imellectual 24

and artistic production . 210, labe1cd ;Vlfxim i'rofio;do. 263

"developing narco." xvül , narrat;ves ul Meycr Lorenzo, 213

Mezican pcrople . xv;i; nationalism ol 4. ,Abur.... .,', 129

source of nat;o nalnv . xlv: serte paN- ALgants. 9,. 142, 143 , 188, 190, 192,

75 usage of s mb Is 17 I fl. ,O ( anuda . 187, irom Guerrero,

Méx co a Irave , .ir pos , 245 50 cuino. 1811, migiatory proeess , xii; nationalist

tionary scheme of, 245, interpretation hacklash against , 121; to Tepoztlán,

of pre Columbian past , 245, Nahoa , 186; to the United States, 187

246, Otomis , 245-46 Milenio. 212, 213

Mexico at tbe World', Falo , 241 Mllitary leaders , 146, 147

Mexico .. Biograpby of Powee absence of cita- Minera , 146, 147, 149

tions, 221 ; Alemán , 223; Ávila Camacho , Moctezuma , 218, 241

223; Emilio Azcárraga , 224; comparison ;\4odemidad indiana . Nación y mediación en

to National Museum oí Anthropology , México , xix, xx

226; composition of, 215-16 ; Cosío Modernist ruins, 213 , 214, 215, and

Villegas , 221, 224 ; Porfirio Díaz , 223, Tlatelolco massacre, 214

Díaz Ordaz , 222, 223 , election ol de Modernization , xv, xx, 57 , 82, 111, 122,

la Madrid, 222-23; Hidalgo , 224; and 163 , and corruption of morals , 131; criti-

historical evidence , 222, intellectual cal m national state, 136 ; indigenized,

production , 215; Krauzometer , 222, xxi, and nationalist reactions , 138, and

Labyrinth of Solilude , 222; de la Madrid , postrevolutionary government, 214;

223; metaphors for power, 224 , Mexi- principies oí, 128; relationship with the

can history as a ztruggle for democracy , brote, 82, reproduction oí social dasses,

216-17, Mezican Revolubon , 223-24 ; 118-19; threats tu nation states , 82, use

asa mirror oí presidencial power , 220, of nationality, 114

nationalist myth , 226, O'Gorman , 221, Molina Enríquez , Andres, xvi, 53, 54, °ac-

opinions stated as historical facts . 222, [ion ' and "resístante ;' 53-54 , argument

223, Paz , 221, readings of, 218; sources for mestizos , 53, mestizo ideology of,

of, 220, Spanish versus English transla - 53; as pro mestizo nationalist, 53

nion, 222 ; treatment of 1968 student Monsiváis , Carlos , xi, 55, 205

movement , 221, José Vasconcelos , 224, Mora , José María Luis, 48 , 49, 83 , 84, cri-

Zapata , 224, Zedillo , 223. Se, als,, tique oí Rodríguez Puebla , 49, and indi-

Enrique Krauze ger;ismo, 49, interpretation oí the consti-

Mexico Ciry , xii, 158, 171 , 175, 178 ; as tution, 83

"baicony of the republic ,' xii; crowds , ,Morelos, José María , 29, 47 , 85, 227;

60; drivers , 60; earthquake of 1985 , 184; abolshment oí slavery , 85; accusations

freeway to Tepozdán , 184; growth of, against Spaniards , 29, Apatzingán con-

152; lack oí services , 60; mediated move - stitution , 64, edict oí 1810, 85-86; mar-

ments , 59, and national sat'atics , 205, tyred by Spaniards , 69, national ideal

periodicals , 200, politeness of, 59-60 , uf, 8o; persistente oí política) spirit, 86,

during Che Porfiriato , 206, prosti ruti un, "senuments oí the nation ;' 158, 227;

137, and public opinion , xii; and pubis servant, of thc nation, 225

Morelos (atare), 167, 266. 267 271. 273

279, constmction, 18 industr,al,zavon

183, migration to the United Stales 183

postrevoluti onary eco nom ic organiza-

tion 183; regional space 182 siate

governor, 182, tourism, 183

Morenos, 45

t`lorrow, Dwight. 1 37

Mularros, 16 17

Nación, 7, 9 13, and lienedict Anderson.

8, distinguished from puma, 9; extension

of national identity , 8, and panimperial

identiry , 8, and sovereignty , 8; usage of,

7, 8

Naco , 120, Art-Naqueau , 11 3; categorical

transformation of, 114, changing con-

notaGOns of, 111, closet nacos , 113; as

colonial imagery, 112; definition oí

nacos kitsch , 112, description of, 1 1f,

foreign-sounding names, 1 12-13; as

lack oí distinction , 113, lumpenpolitics

of, 113; as mark oí Indian , 114; and

modernization , 113; Nac -Art, 113,

naquismo, 112 , 113; as sigo oí provincial

backwardness , 111, similar process in

Latin America , 112; threat to tradicional

political forms , 113; as urban aesthetic,

112

NAFTA ( North American Free Trade

Agreement), xxi, 108; backlash of,

121

Nahoa, 246Nahuad, 37 , 172, 173, 192 , 272, 273,

274, 278 , 285, national anthem, 177;

speakers, 174

Nation, xiii; 48; appeals to nationhood,

11, as Christian utopia , 86, and citizen-

ship, 48 , as community, 13, 35, 146,

identification with homeland , 47; ini-

portance oí blood, 43 ; importante of

land, 43 , intellectuals and nation build-

ing, 212 ; local proeess oí state forma-

cien, xv, myths of, xiii; nationalization

oí the church, 47; and race , 27, redefini-

[ion of, 46; and sacrifice , 1 1, symbols

of, xiii, transformation oí semantics, 7

National culture as dismodernity, 1 14

National history 81. 139 failure to de-

liver, 81

National identiry, xx, xxi, 14, 128, 132,

adoption of foreign techniques, 130;

changing aspecrs of, 1 I I, formation ol.

141, formed in transnational networks,

126- Trames of contact, 130, interna[

business 132, narratives oí identity,

125; and neo),beral ism. 129, production

of, 125, production oí "Mexico," 126;

sociology oí, 127, topography of, 130,

women and children, 10

National image , 143, implementation of,

126, management of, 141

Nationalism, xxiii , xv, 5, 10, 11, 13, 54, 55,

120, 122, 191 , alternatives for Mezican,

56, 83 ; and Benedict Anderson, xx, 3,

30, 200, bonds oí dependence, 12; citi-

zenship, 10 , 11; and communitarianism,

xvi, xx, 3, 33, 34; connected to con-

sumption , 121, connected to work, 121;

contradictory claims of, 126; Creole na-

tionalism, 6 , crisis of , xxi, 114; defini-

tion of , 6-7, 33, development of, 27;

discourse of, 13i evolution of, 27, exclu-

sion oí Spaniards, 29; failure to refor-

mulate, 122 ; formation of, 30; and fra-

ternity, 12, freemasonry , 31, ideological

construction , 132, as invented nature,

4, 7, under ISI, 121, and language, 14,

229, and linguistic identification, 5; and

Mezican anthropology , xxiii, mytholo-

gy, 151, 279; myths of, xüi, origins (an-

thropolog.cal stories), 233, polemical

nature oí che national question, 47;

politics of , 122, power of , 12-13, and

racism, 14 ; and religion , 14; revolution-

ary nationalism , 56, sacrifice , 7, 11; as a

sigo oí modernity , 128; and sovereignty,

xiv; standardization of, 125; and subject-

formation, 3; substitute for religious

community , 7; successor to religion, 3,

thick description, 32, and transnational

relations , 125; uniry and the intelli-

gentsia , 209; violente of, 30; oí weak

nations, 126

l r, :l e x 1 e d ex= 346 = ea 347 =

Narionalist ideology, 48, alternatives ol,

56, social hierarchies, 48

Narionalist movenients: adoption oí an-

cient political forros, 36; caste wars, 49

Nationalists, 13, adoption oí ancient po-

litical forros, 36; bardes of, l0, discoursc

of, 12, and nationalistic scienGsts, 202,and ven Humboldt, 199

Narionality, xiv-xv, 286

National Museum oí Anthropology 226.231,242,254

National Polytechnlc Instituto, 214National Preparalory School, The, 243Nacional sentimenr, 197, 207, census

198; concentrated in Mexico City, xii

and Agustín Iturbide, 284; and opinions,

158; and ritual, 156, 158, and starislin,

198, techniques for interpreting,208;

use oí quesrion naires, 198

National sovereignty, 83, 88, secular pro-cess of, 83

National space, xv, xxiü, 265, conceptual

challenge of, 264; cultural gcography

of, xxi, developmenr of, xv; histodcalsociology of, xix

Neocolonial exploitation, 54

Neoliberalism, foreignization of, 129; int-plementau,an of, 129

Nerherlands, 15, 21

New Lawsof 1542, 174

New Spain, 8; as cante society, 40, hierar-

chical relationships, 40, as a kingdoni otSpain, 8

Newspapers, 5, 6, 156; and "empry time,"

22-23, limits of public discussion, 148,

as pdvileged inedia, 159. Seealso Print

capitalisno

Neu, York Times, xxiNexos, 219, 226

Nolahles, Los 276, 277, 278, 279

Novo, Salvador, xi

Nuestra señora de Guadalupe, palro,w dr laNueva España, 19

O, Genovevo de la, 179

Obregón, Alvaro, 94, 104, Barde ol

Celaya, 104-5; building oí the state,

74; Ioss ol arm, 94; monument built co

honor lost arm, 94, martyrdom of, 94;

overlap ol presidential personas, 104-5,

and Zapatistas, 179

Ocampo, Melchor 214

O'Corman Edmundo, xviii, disapproval

of K;auze's biographies oí power, 221,

ídem ahout che invention oí America,

xvui

Oil indusery, 104, nationalization underCárdenas, 104

Olympie Carnes in 1968, 108, 259

Opposition parties. PRD, 117

Ortega Y Gasset, José, 209

Ortiz, Luis 2 I, 22

Oswald, Felix L, 239

Otnm,, 245, 246

Oteoman Empire, 15

Ouweneel, Arij, 275

Pagden, Anthony, 28, 172, 220

Parda 45

Parián Market, 131

París World's Fair oí 1889, 250

Paseo de la Reforma, 206

Pastrv War, 90

Patience, 61

Patria, 5, 9, 43

Pa triotic deaths, 3

Parriotic sacrifice, 13

Payno, Manuel, 239

Paz, ( ctavio, xi, 53, 55, 218, 219, 221,

222 227, critique of National Museum

of Authropology, 226; The Critique of tbe

Pyruruid, 226, mentor to Krauze, 222, en

xlesican nacional culture, xiv, Mexico:Riog¢iphy of Pou,er, 222

Pcasant communiti es, 152; forums for dis-

cisson, 149, gendered forms for discus-

sion 149; and public sphere, 149

Peasants,52,151,191,232,266,281;

claims of citizenship, 76, exchange oí

votes 76; parfieipation in national dis-

coune, 76

Peña Guillermo de la, xix, 161

Poimseln res, 5, 8, 17, 45, 199

Peo¡les Cuide to Mexico, 134

Phelan, John Leddy, 15

Pietschmann, Horst, 21, 22, 23, 25

Pimentel, Francisco, 53, 252; high official

in Maximilian's court, 260

Plan de Ayala, 278

Plan de Iguala, 29, 64

población del valle de Teotihuacán, La, 253, na-tional dimensinns of, 251

Pocho, 139

Poinsett, Joel, 31, 88, effort to build pro-

American parry, 31, establishment of

Masonie lodges, 88, organizarion ofMasonic lodges, 31

Political elites, developmenr oí distinct

forms, 118; parasitism, 120-22, por-

trayed as out oí touch, 120; as preda-tors, 120

Political rallies, 177, as expression of pub-

lic sentiment, 160; theatrical element,159

Political ritual, 146, 159; appropriarion

of corruption, 146, and corruption 162,

substitution for discussion, 164

Politics: connections with ritual, 145Polis, 204

Poniatowska, Elena, xi, 55

Population, oí 1950, 54, of 1990, 54Porfirian elite: and European immigration,

140

Porfirians: and internacional arena,252

Porfiriato, xx, 180, 206, 218, 250; consoli-

dation oí nacional economy, 79, elite,

140, 180, 210; evolution oí citizenship, ,72, economic growth, 72, futuros for subsidies, 209, and narcotice trade, 131;discussion, 149, government institutons, and self-clnsorship, 59197; "order" and "progress" superseded PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), 82,citizenship, 72, and Political ritual, 73, 111, asan Ancien Régime, 82; and de

and positive seienee, 210,, progress as la Madrid, 222; and democracy 216, ;fetish, 73; and public education, 73, and idiom oí village uniry, 1 19; institutional-

public opinion, 147; schools and festi- ized heir of che revolution, 98; and

vals, 155, 156; state theater, 205, and local villages, 119, monument for Alvaro

Tepoztlán, 170, 178 Obregón, 94, 1988 campaign, 76, po-

Posada, José Guadalupe, 151 litical campaigns, 222; as a refashioningPosrcolonial, 142; challenges ro nacional- of colonial system, 115, use oí public

ism, 128, elements of postcolonial theo- rallies, 76, use of relevision stars, 114

ry, 125, identity production 128 Pues,, 168, 241, as inrellectuals, 275-76

Postmodernity, 110

Pozas Horcasitas, Ricardo, 151; medical

students strike, 214

Pratt, Mary Louise, 141

PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) -

use oí celebrities, 117

Prefectura del Ceniro 242

Prensa Graffca, La, 255

Presidency, 84, 96, construction oí na-cional image, 88, identification withmodernization, 104; Juárez as strongimage , 95, messianic imagery, 89, dur-

ing the nineteenth century, 104, presi-

denttalism, 213; sacrifice as ideology,

89, 225, statistics, 104

President, 83, 99; development oí image,

xxi; figure of, 106, 108, 115; inaugura-tions of, 213, Mexico.. Biography of Power,216; since 1982, 105; as servant, 225,shaping of public persona, 83

Presidential authority, 98: nationalizationoí the law, 98

Presidential candidate: relationship with

che suit, 77, use of costumes, 77

Presidential persona, 81, 96; importante

oí technological innovations, 104,

shaped by 83, 98-99, uses oí martyr-dom, 94

Presidential power, 88; and política) par-

ties, 88

Presidential repertoires, 89

Press, 59, 146, 150; censorship of, 59,

during colonial period, 115; eritieism

oí the government 78; and government

IuJr^ Indrx348 =

349 =

Prieto . Gmllern;u,. xi 25U-51

Prlmordiahst nacional lsm. 265

Primordial loy albas, 36. 49

Primordial tules. ti

Pr ; pales. 174

I'nnc capitalism 3.5.6, 14.22..43

Private sphere 268

Progrerisfw , 268. 169. 280

Progress, 54

Praletar;an ; zanun. 1

Pranundam ;m;tm 299

Protochronisnt xix; definition of nx

Puebla , Rodríguez, 48, 51

Puebla (state), 155Pueblo , El, 78, 79, 80, bad pueblo as todder

for politicians , 71, discourse oí good

and bad pueblo , 70; portrayals of, 65

positive and negative , 65; substiituted

by progress, 79

Public opinion , xxii, 146 , 156, 157, 159,

206, 208 , 210, 266; concentrated in

Mexico Ciry , xü; and intel lectuals, 197;

lack of , 284, mechantsms of, xxii; and

social movements , 152, subsidized hy

Che state, 233

Public rallies as corporate organisin, 76;

divided by sectors , 76; increase in par-

ticipation , 78; 1988 PRI campaign, 76;

use oí dress , 76, 77, use oí television

stars, 117

Public sphere , xv, xxii , 10, 25, 82, 102,

145, 147 , 149, 153, 159, 233 ; and col-

lective actors , 150; definition of, 265;

development of, 149; geography of, 146,

and independence , 150; and local imel-

leetuals , 283; media of , 266, obstarles

for creation ol, 163, and popular will

156; preferente for gossip , 158; and pro-

letariat , 151; scgmented quality of, 83

Quetzalcoatl , 47, 272

Race , 27, 33, 48, 55; 'Old Christians 32

Racial identity ; manipulation of, 51

Racial ideolugies - during colonial pe; i ;d.

50, and Indians , 50, and procreauon

50; Spanish forros ol, 50

Ra;ln,ads . en;raliza tion of thc goverm

roen; 72. under Juárez 72; and public,pi,', 295

Kan;o, Samuel . 53. 74 78; on ^tilexiean

pan==nal charactcr , 73; pelado as enemy

.n good Guy. 73; pelado as massihed

,,trzen , 70; use of thc pelado, 73

Ranchos 155

14, 15, importance af blood.

1 r;pi )e ni;;re , 16, nationalization

oi ;ha church, 42

Rccyclmg. detinuion ol, I I8

Rcdticld Robert 166, 175 , 182, 270; cor-

recto,, 192 , 275; and orientalize, 166;

radio interview , 255-56; tontos, 275

Regional cultures composed of, 116, cul-

ture of , 115; dependence en commodi-

ties, 117; and telephone , 117; and tele-

1

Religious fesrivittes : and collective actors,

147, 150 ; slave and black, 147

Represertlante de bienes communales, 268

Republica de indios, 44

Respeta 270-71, when doing ethnographie

work , 270-71

Restorcd Republie, xx

Reto del Tepozteeo , El, 281, 282

Revolutionary nationalism , 55-57; model

o¡, 55; reanimation of, 56

Revolutionary state : and the church, 156;

creation oí corporate groups , 74-75;

differences between Porfirian state, 74;

forros of cltizenship, 80

Revol utions , 207, 208

Reyes Los, 189

Ritual. 151 , 153, 159 ; appropriation

ot corruption , 146; and common cul-

ture , 155, connection with politics, 145;

constitution oí polity, 159-60 ; and cor-

ruption , 155; domination and subordi-

nation , 153; expansion oí state institu-

tion. 157 ; importance during colonial

period , 153; and political discourse,

154; production of, 146; and public

opinion , xxii, 160 ; and public sphere,

145. 160 ; and ruptor , 154-55; and

,ehools , 155-56

Riva Palacio, Vicente, 53, 239

Rivera, Diego, 53. 55

Rodó, Enrique. Ariel. 103, ideology ol

103

Rojas, José Guadalupe, 277. 279 289,

dlaries of, 278; and Nahuad, 278, and

nationalist mythology, 278-79

Rojas, Mariano, 277-78

Rojas, Simón, 278

Rojas, Vicente, 277

Rojas (family), 174. 274. 280

Rumor, 157, 159, as chisme de viejas, 157, as

cowardly, 157; as feminized, 157; and

public opinion, xxii; and public sphcre,

155, 158; and ritual, 155

Sacrifice , 5, 10, 1 I, 12, 42, association

with nationalism , 7; Aztec ideology of,

38, 39, coercive pressures of, 11, ideo-

logical appeals te, 1 I, and misconstrued,

13; and nationalism, 7, 12

Sahagún, Bernardino de, 38, 238

Sahlins, Marshall, 166

Salinas , Carlos, 223 , 227; and Héctor

Aguilar Camín , 219, campaign of, 206;

subsidies to intellectual groups, 219; use

oí television stars during campaign, 117;

and Anuro Warman, 232 , 233; as a well-

meaning democrat, xxi

Salve Reina de la América (atina, 28

San Andrés , 173, 266

San José, 189 ; change oí carnival signs,

189; symbolism oí names, 189-90

San Juan Teotihuacán , 250; description

of, 250

San juanico, 173

San Martín, 9

San Miguel, 173

San Salvador, 15

San Sebastián , 189; change oí carni-

val signs , 189; symbolism oí names,

189-90

Santa Catalina, 173Santa Cruz Teypaca ; change oí carnival

signs, 189 , symbolism oí names , 189-90

Santa María, 173

Santísima Trinidad , La, 173

Santo Domingo 15, 173, 174, 266, 270,

change of carnival signs, 189, and intel-

lectuals, 269, political factions, 260;

symbolism of names, 189-90, tecolotes,

269 ertunes, 269

Secretary of Agravian Reform, 232

Seed, Patricia, 42

Schools, 155, 156. 177; festivals, 155; fol-

lowing che Mexican Revolution, 155;

and i nstitution oí discipline, 155, and

ritual, 155; schoolteachers, 155. 168

Science, under protectionist state, 1 15

Scientifically marvclous, 201, 202; ex-

aniples of, 201-2, as propaganda, 201

Scientific socialism, 140

Scott, James, 178

Scottish rite, 88. See also Freemasonry

Serdán, Aquiles, 206

Seven Laws (1835); and Catholic reli-

gion, 48

Sierra, Justo, 243, 244, vision oí national

evolution, 245

Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de, 16

Slavery, 38-45, 50, 63, 64, 85, 147, 218;

abolition of, 62, 85, African, 45, 241 ;

Aztec ideology of, 38; captives oí "just

wats," 45; constitution oí 1824, 204;

indigenous, 52, as liberation oí human

energy, 38; prohibition against ¡odian

nobles, 174; prohibition of, 204

Social Darwinism, 52, 53, Mexican view

oí Indians, 52

Social democracy, 56

Socialization: oí children, 59-60; as

mechanism oí courtesy, 60; and per-

sonal relations, 61

Social movements, 27, 50, 80, 149, 171,

199, 208, challenge to nacional image,

143, and conditions oí reproduction,

152, and fiscal crisis oí 1982, 77; as ges-

tures oí revolt, 159, incorporation of

the state, 77, and national media, 159;

and public opinion, 158-59; violente

against, 143

Social sciences, xvi, xvü; part oí inter-

national horizon, xvi; tied to national

development, xvi

In dex

351 =

Sonora, 52

Sovereignry, xiv, 81, dynamic of cultural

produerion, 81; and fueros, 9, as palerpotestas. 9; as poini of referente, xv

Spain, 14, 1 5 , Bourbon reforms, 21, 23. 82

8 pan i ards, i ntellcctua l represen tati ,,n, 27[

Spanish cOncept ot, 17, legal category of,

16, legal notion of, 17

Spanish America, 5 administrativo colo-

nial practicas, 5 enlightened munarchs,

200; following independence, 199,- ,larle

,ensota, 200, 202 and nauonalism, xx

4, nacional symbols ol, xiii; presidencialpower, 225; revolutions, 27; upper cIas-

es, 200; and Alexander van Hwnholdt.199

Spanish eonquesr, 250; as origin of na-

tional race 53, as a "war of imagos," s3

Spanish Cortes, 64

Spanish Enlightenmenc. and patrcotism.23

Spanish invason of 1829, 70

Spanish language, 21, 32, 172, languageof, 18; as modero fono of Latín, 32 no-tionalizabon of the church, 18

Spanish lasr names, 174, 274

Spanish nationalism, 18, 21; built un reli-

gious militancy, 21; developmeni of, 27

Spanishness, 9, 18; and civil izarion. 18

and connection with church, 18-19;

and language, 18, nacional consrruction

of, 18-and eelig;on, 18; and territory, 18

Spencei, Herbert, 50, 52

Sports; and fiestas, 156

State formatiom. and,ntellectuals 198,

and population information , 198,- ro[, in

crcating nacional ci tizcnry, 1 17

Sratistics, 136, 204; in Chiapas, 244, as

a mcasu,, of common good, 198, and

mystique of modernity 205, in Yucatán,

244

Slatue of Ibe ;blrxtsan Goddess of War í or ofdealh] Teoyaomiqui, 240

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, 232

Stern, Alexandra, 139.252

St ident movenient ( 1968), x1, 77, 214.

216, 221, 226, 259; and indlgcnistas, 232,

254 and Mexican anthropology, 231,

232

Supc;hnrrio, 158

Tacuhaya, 179

laxco, 266

Tatro S.tnla Anua, 90

lecoloto 269

l elephone, 116 117

Televisa and high culture , 1161 andEnrique Krauze, 200, Iinks to intellectu-al groups, 1 16, and ' transition to democ-racv' 220

TclevIsion 116, 117 122 156, 219

Te ancho ti ln, 37

Tenorio= Trillo, Mauricio, 241, 249

Tcpoztccan mythology, 168;center-pcripltery ntythology, 168-69, story

of El Fepoztecátl, 168-69

Tepozrecád El, 168-69.181

Rpozteco. 6l, 181, 282; pseudonym oí El

Tepo'ztecát1, 181

lepoztlán, xxii, 159, 161, 188, 189, 265,

266. 279, 285; antiprogressive dis-

conOC . 184, artificial flowers st,ategy,

170, 181, 192; brujos, 270 ; calpuflis of,

173 ampesinos , 280; carnival , 188-91;

and (áth,he church, 169; and cidzem

286; Colonio Tepozteca, 179; and

colonization , 184, consdmtion of, 167;

cunsuuacd as peri pheral , xxü; con-

struuion uf che center, 169, and corrup-

in,n 207; and cultural mediation, 283;

uva n,ieros , 270-71; education, 186,

elites. 174, 180; employment, 186, fies-

tas 148-90;1540 censos ,173;foreign-

ers 185; as " I ndian ," 170; intellectuals,

169, 272, 277, 280, 282, The intruder,

169-71, lack ol cominunal voice, 276;

land ;,,cc, 184, 185; location of, 167,

mokanp oí jurisd iction, 173, Mexican

Ihevaluriun, 178; migrants, 171-72,

1 85 186, 187, 190, 192-93; rnulti-

col rural 1511' 186; los notables , 276, 277;

Ccnovevo de la O, 179; Orne Tochdi,

173; and orientalizatfon, 166; peasants,

167, perlpheral status of, 167; politieal

41

groups, 269, 274, 282; principales, 277;

and progress , 184, pseudonym of El

Tepoztecátl, 181; rebellion, 276-80;

Robert Redfield, 175; Relación de Tepoztldn,173; road to Cuernavaca, 184; Rojas

Family, 174, 277, El Tepozteco, 181, 282;Tepoztizos, 185; tourism , 170-72, 281, -tribute, 167; Unión de Campesinos Te-

poztecos (UCT) 179, 180, 182; Valley

of Arongo, 184; Villa de Tepoztlán,

173, 267; Che vulgar class , 276, Zapa-

tismo, 280, Zapatistas, 178, 179

Tertulias, 146

Testera Jacobo, 153, conversion oílndians , 153; use oí icons, 153

Texcocans, 16

Texcoco, 37

Textile workers, 149

Tlahuica Nahua, 173

Tlabuieole, 97

Tlanepanda, 173

Tlatelolco massacre, 214; and EnriqueKrauze, 216

Tlaxcalans, 16

Tonalli, 38, 39

Tourism,142,183,184,185, 186,188,252, 273, 281; excursionistas, 184; and

land prices, 186; patterns of urbaniza-

tion, 186

Trade unions, 152; and public sphcre,151

Transition to democracy, xxi. 152, 164

Transnational capital impact of xxi

Túpac Amaru, ton

Tornee, John Kenneth, 255

Turner, Víctor, 11, 108, 224; essay en

Hidalgos revolt, 108Tutino, John, 220

Tylor, E. B . , 234-35, 236, 239, 241,

242, 254; Juan Alvarez, 245, Anahuac,orMexrco and tbe Mexicans, Ancient andModere, 235, classihcation of Mexicanraces , 244-45, contrast w,th Justo Sierra,

242; description of Mexico, 235, 237-39,

description of Mexico's national muse-

um, 237-38; description of Yucatán,

235, development oí Mexican anthro-

pology, 238-39; and French occupation

oí Mexico, 239; and Mexican intellectu-

als, 238; types oí Mexican lndians, 245

UNAM (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de

México), xviii, 210, 214, 215, 231; pre-

Columbian urban design, xviii; scientificoutput, 115

Universal Catholic Monarchy, 15

United States of America, 87, 131, 138,

171; alliance with Juárez, 96, fetishismwith "Rationality," xvi; fetishism with

"Western tradition," xvi, immigration

control, 122, migration from Morelos,

183; opposition to Mexican monarchy,

87; Tepoztecan migrants, 190; and uni-versal rationality , xvii; universities,

xvi-xvii, 198; and U.S-Mexico border,122

University system, xvi, architecture

of, xvi, xviii; based on French models,

197-98 based en U.S . models , 197-98;under Echeverría, 214-15; emulation oíEnglish universities , xvi, expansion of,214-15

Untitled photograpb of a Maya Woman, 257Urbanity. equated with civilization, 172,

signs of, 172

Urban rabble, 74-75

U,S.-Mexican War: and backwardness,204

Usos y costumbres, 150

Valley oí Teotihuacán, 250

Van Young, Eric, 220

Vasconcelos, José; building oí schools,

74; and contact zone, 135; as "intellec-tual caudillo," 224

Vásquez, Genaro, 140

Vaughan, Mary K., 73, 155, 156

Velásquez, Fidel, 119

Velásquez de León, Don Joaquín; debate

with FatherJ. Antonio Alzate, 8

Veracruz, 15, 147, 200, 206; 1915 renters'strike, 152

Verdery, Kathleen, xix

Viceroys, 198

índe352

x=

353 =

Victoria, Guadalupe, 31, 94, rem.nns

placed in Merco C nv. e4: violauon

ot tomb hy Panrrican s:ddiers c,+

Vilar, Manuel. 97

Villa, Pancho 9.1 98 descc ratlon

tomb 94; as ol,cct ot scient,hc'utcr-

es 94

Violente < ,f 1-13Virgen de C,undalule and Miguel Hidalgo

47, 48, and losó María Morelos -47

painting ot . 19. 20 217, 28

Virgen de Guadalupe escudo dr sah;d em:nn

la epidemia de M,lllam6unti de vie-1735.

20

Virgin oí the Nativiry, 168, 169

Von Humboldt, Alexander, 26, 30, 234;

and Bourbon rcforms, 26; portrayal of

Spanish America , 199, publications of,

26; roya) mmmission of, 26

Vuelta, 218 , 219, 226

Waire, C. B 105

Wallerstein, Immanuel, 191

Ward, George, 30

Warman, Arturo, 183; director oí INI,

232; minister oí Agravian Reforni, 232,

260; and Carlos Salinas, 232-33; and

Ernesto Zedillo, 233

Weber, Max, 35, 266

Weiner, Annette: discussion of exchange,

36; focus un inalienable goods, 36

\V'snrack, lohn 267

\Fndd Bank. 129

Sc.... hubia. xl

Xc 11ol1h'111ic ; n1Velrlents: ante-Chinese

n roa u m Sonora 131, anti-Spanish

nti n;ent 131 : Arabs 131; identifica-

flor, w ,t1, Ioreign businessmen, 131;

us.. 131

X eu te ncatl. 239

Xo:1[In. 26'i

Yautepec. 178,271

Yucatán, 52, 67, 244

Zapata, Emiliano, 98, 178, 280, 283,

Mrxieo: Biograpby of Pomo, 224; Zapa-

tismo, 180, 280

Zárate, Julio, description of conditions

oí Indians, 66, prohibition of jails in

haciendas, 66

Zavaln, Lorenzo de- chronicle of voyage

to America, 65, comparisons between

the United States and Mexico, 65-66

Zedillo, Ernesto, 223; as well-meaning

democrat, xxi

Zineantán, 161

Zizek. Slavoj, 208

Zolov, Frie, 134; description oí the hippie

movement, 134

Zúñiga, Ángel, 285

edex

354 =

4

CLAUDIO LOMNITZ is professor oí history and anthropology at the

University oí Chicago. His arcas oí interest include politics, culture, and

history. He is author oí Exits from tbe Labyrintb, Culture and Ideology in the

Mexican National Space, Evolución de una sociedad rural, and Modernidad indiana:

nueve ensayos sobre nación y mediación en México.