Defeating Terrorism:

Strategic Issue Analyses

Edited by

Colonel John R. Martin

January 2002

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflectthe official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, orthe U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director,Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by callingcommercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet atRita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

*****

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are availableon the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is:http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update thenational security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcomingpublications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter alsoprovides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested inreceiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at outreach@carlisle.army.mil or bycalling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-080-X

ii

CONTENTS

Foreword · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · v

Introduction· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · vii

1. Terrorism Viewed HistoricallyDr. Douglas V. Johnson II and Colonel John R. Martin · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 1

2. War Aims and War TerminationDr. Stephen Biddle · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 7

3. Beware of Unintended ConsequencesDr. Conrad C. Crane· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 13

4. Avoiding Holy War: Ensuring That the War on TerrorismIs Not Perceived as a War on IslamDr. Sami G. Hajjar· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 17

5. State Support for TerrorismDr. Steven Metz · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 21

6. Maintaining Strategic Balance while Fighting TerrorismDr. Conrad C. Crane · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 27

7. Homeland Security Issues: A Strategic PerspectiveLieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 31

8. The Military’s Role in the New Domestic Security Environment:Will Army Missions Change?Colonel Dallas D. Owens· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 37

9. Defining Preparedness: Army Force Structure in the War on TerrorismColonel John R. Martin · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 43

10. The Campaign against Terrorism: Finding the Right Mixof Foreign Policy InstrumentsAmbassador Marshall F. McCallie · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 47

11. The Carrot and Stick ChallengeDr. Gordon Rudd and Colonel John R. Martin · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 53

12. Potential Changes in U.S. Civil-Military RelationsDr. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich and Dr. Conrad C. Crane · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 59

iii

13. Maintaining Public Support for Military OperationsDr. Leonard Wong · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 65

14. Ethical Issues in Counterterrorism WarfareDr. Martin L. Cook · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 71

15. Coalition Partners: PakistanDr. Steven Metz · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 75

16. Coalition Partners: IndiaDr. Andrew Scobell · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 79

17. Central Asia and the War on Terrorism: Towards a New AlignmentDr. Stephen J. Blank· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 83

18. Russia and the U.S. War on TerrorismDr. Stephen J. Blank· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 87

19. Coalition Partners: ChinaDr. Andrew Scobell · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 93

20. Reaction of Key Asian States to the War on TerrorismDr. Andrew Scobell · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 97

21. Terrorism: Sounding Roland’s Horn across the AtlanticLieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 101

About the Authors · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 107

iv

FOREWORD

After the horrendous attacks of September 11, 2001, the Strategic Studies Institutemarshalled its analytical resources to provide insights on how best to defeat the terroristthreat and wage the war on terrorism. This collection of essays represents the initialcontributions made by the Institute. They were designed to provide senior Army leadershipwith context, information, and policy options as they made strategic decisions in the earliestdays of the war. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to share this collection with thebroader national security community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute

v

INTRODUCTION

Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. ArmyWar College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war onterrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategicimportance. Because national leaders were pressed to issue orders on the prosecution of thewar on terrorism, it was necessary to produce these papers on a very short time-line. This gotthe ideas included in the articles into the hands of decisionmakers as quickly as possible,giving them better understanding of factors affecting their various decisions. Issue analysiswas never short-changed in this process, but authors were asked to provide “think pieces”quickly and to worry less about references and footnotes and more about capturing strategicinsights. The shortened time-line in some cases also meant that it was possible to provideonly an understanding of the context of the decision; specific policy recommendations wereconsidered something that could be developed later if not included in these papers.

Even given these caveats, these papers represent an extraordinary amount of intellectualenergy expended in only a few weeks. They have already been distributed to many seniorleaders, but it still seemed appropriate to publish them formally. This volume provideshistorical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early daysof the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthensand perhaps broadens.

The first paper provides historical perspective, but as you read many of the other essays,you will note several common and recurring themes. The first point is that this war can bewon. Even now, some analysts question the stated war aims and doubt the possibility ofvictory. Nobody suggests it will be anything less than a complex undertaking, but victory ispossible—although that probably only means a “new normalcy,” not the comparativelyhalcyon days of the prewar situation. Conversely, the war on terrorism can be lost if misstepsproduce unintended strategic consequences. One way to do that would be to ignore the otherparts of the world where America’s interests lie. President Bush and the administrationappear to have dodged this pitfall thus far, but they still must work to avoid expanding thewar unnecessarily. As the struggle against terrorism proceeds, it is perhaps best to allowother elements of national power—not the military—to take the lead. The military will stillbe an essential component, but should be a buttress to the diplomatic, economic, andinformation elements as they attempt to end the scourge of terrorism with a minimumamount of further warfare.

The war on terrorism will require a restructuring of the military; it is less apparent thatthe military will have to grow significantly. In particular, the homeland defense mission willrequire a heretofore missing emphasis that will necessitate quantitative and qualitativechanges in the active and reserve components. The defense establishment needs to place ahigh priority on defining the requirements; apportioning them appropriately; and developingthe forces necessary to fight the war on terrorism, defend the homeland, maintain strategicbalance and adapt and accelerate transformation.

Any expansion of the war requires a clear-cut rationale—both international anddomestic. The regional essays, separately edited by Dr. Steve Metz, give global perspectiveson the war on terrorism. They focus initially on the regions where the war is being actively

vii

fought, but look through the wider lens as well. Both regions that were previously lower onthe U.S. priority and possible future peer competitors must be considered before otherterrorist targets are attacked with any of the elements of national power.

It is still impossible to tell, of course, exactly how this war will end. It is possible even now,though, to give some advice and insights that will lead to the best possible conclusions to thewar. If American leaders continue to concentrate on winning the war, not just winning theearly battles, the result will be a world free from mass-casualty terror, a world whereAmerican values of liberty and open markets can continue to flourish.

viii

Terrorism has come in many guisesthrough the centuries, reflecting changes interrorists’ conceptions of the best targetsand methods to use to achieve their politicalends. Until the 20th century, mostterrorism was directed against “tyrants” ortheir agents. This style of terrorism tracesits roots at least as far back as Biblical timesand was sanctioned by no less than Aristotleand Plutarch. There have been periodicwaves of this type of terror, the mosthistorically remarkable being the reign innorthern Iran of the hashishim—theAssassins—for almost 200 years, from 1047to 1296. Another upsurge of assassinationattempts afflicted Europe between 1860and 1911. Although just outside of thatperiod, the assassination of the AustrianArchduke Ferdinand in 1914 is one of thebest-known examples of terrorism byassassination. Assassins have scored some

remarkable successes; however, mostterrorist groups of this nature have beensuppressed fairly quickly.

The 20th century saw a transformationof terrorism through at least two stages.The first was through the use of terror tosupport larger revolutionary insurgencies.The earliest success was the overthrow ofthe Russian government and, following abrutal civil war, establishment of SovietCommunism. The breadth of Russianpopular dissatisfaction—and the weaken-ing effects of World War I, coupled withLenin’s German sponsorship— providednearly ideal conditions. Subsequentcommunist insurgencies employed terrortactics with varying degrees of success,most frequently against decaying colonialregimes or states only recently decolonized.Although certainly not inspired bycommunism, Israeli terrorism against the

1

ONE

Terrorism Viewed Historically

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson IIColonel John R. Martin

Conclusions:• As a tool of the weak, terrorism rarely succeeds in achieving its political goals.

Terrorists rarely have the resources to succeed in a fight against an arousedstate, but their reprehensible methods frequently inspire resolve within thetarget state. Those same methods also separate terrorists from crucial popularsupport.

• The continuing evolution of terror means that a study of history will be animperfect predictor, but historical insights suggest:

– Laws governing domestic and international actions against terrorism must beadapted for comprehensive intelligence collection and for prompt action onthat intelligence. Appropriate safeguards of civil liberties must be provided.

– Terrorists must be separated from their popular support base. Separatingthem from state support is an important element of this effort, but notnecessarily critical.

– Every effort must be taken to maintain American and coalition will in the waron terrorism. The stronger side can win if will remains strong.

British and Palestinians was usedeffectively to support their insurgency andwas sufficiently successful to hasten thecreation of the state of Israel. Israeli successresonated deeply in the better organizedand utterly committed minority Jewishpopulation. In both the Russian revolutionand the Israeli insurgency, the objects ofterror were normally the civiladministrators and the security apparatus,not “the people,” whose support wasconsidered crucial.

The second stage in the 20th centurytransformation of terrorism was the growthof state sponsorship. States which areunable to confront their enemiesconventionally have provided everyimaginable assistance to terrorist groups inorder to weaken their enemies physically ormorally. State sponsorship does notnecessarily ensure success, but does allowthe fight to be prolonged. State-supportedterrorism comes in several forms, includingunwitting or inconsequential “support,” asis the case in many liberal democratic stateswhere laws protecting civil rights also allowa form of refuge for some terrorists;unwilling support, but an inability to takecounteraction, as with Colombian drugoperatives; toleration arising from commongoals vis-à-vis the “enemy,” as with Libya orSudan; and full-blown support, either as adirect instrument of the supportinggovernment or as a happy coincidence ofobjectives and willingness to pursue themactively together, as is the case of Syria andIran in support of Hamas and Hezbollah.Syria, for example, has failed miserably inevery conventional attempt to destroyIsrael, but Syrian—and Iranian—supportof Palestinian terrorism has brought some“positive” results, at least from Syria’s view.Israel’s recent tactic of very selectively“eliminating” Palestinian terroristleadership has been sufficiently successfulthat it may have provided at least some

motivation for the September 11 attacks.Although the original acts of Palestinianterror have brought some internationalcondemnation upon the perpetrators,Israeli responses have resulted in evenworse condemnation for Israel. Formal U.N.reprimands weaken Israel’s moral position,which affects its relations with the U.S.Government. Ironically, the attacks havenot weakened the Israelis physically; ifanything, the attacks have moved theIsraelis to new levels of proficiency ineradicating the threat.

Although the Middle East may presentsome exceptions, terrorism—in whateverguise—rarely achieves its political ends andeven then generally only under specificstrategic conditions. Terrorism is a tool ofthe weak; were terrorists strong enough,they would fight conventionally, whichholds the promise of quicker results.Because terrorism is pursued by the weak,its infrequent success should be expected.Terrorism’s regular failure also stems fromthe reprehensible methods employed. Thosemethods can alienate terrorists frompopular support and possibly from statesupport. Terrorism also can arouse the ire ofthe opposing state, which usually has theresources to crush terrorist movements if itcan muster the will.

Terrorists do succeed on occasion, butthe record suggests strongly that veryspecific conditions need to obtain first. Sincethe target of terrorism—almost bydefinition— has the greater resources, onlyweakness of will can normally keep thestate from prevailing.

Even with the will and resources, thetarget state can lose to terrorists if it lacksthe ability to collect comprehensiveintelligence and to act rapidly and forcefullyon that intelligence. The historical recorddemonstrates that counterterroristcampaigns are most successful when lawsare adapted to address terrorist threats.

2

Intelligence capabilities must be expandedfirst, followed quickly by elimination of anyexcessive concerns for due process thatmight impede direct action—capture andprosecution, if possible; killing, if not—against terrorists. In America and in otherdemocratic countries, any such expansion ofpolice powers—and any expansion ofmilitary involvement in police matters—must be accompanied by adequatesafeguards on civil rights. Terrorists areneither legitimate soldiers nor commoncriminals, so special provisions arerequired. The dilemma for liberaldemocratic states is the need to act againstterrorists as a national security riskwithout destroying the essential rule of law.This dilemma makes democraciessimultaneously vulnerable and resilient.

The so-called “Battle of Algiers” is worthparticular review. In the early 1950s,Algerians started an insurgency in an effortto remove French colonial rule from thatcountry. Repeated insurgent failures led toadoption of terrorist methods. Theseenraged the French and resulted in thedeployment of the French parachutedivision to Algeria. In a coordinated civil-military campaign of incredible ferocity, theterrorists were destroyed. Closelycoordinated intelligence gathering andrapid response to actionable informationwere chief among the tools employed.Although the French were successful instopping terrorism in the short term, theparatroopers relied on brutal excesses oftorture and bribery, which eventuallycaught the attention of the French Republic.This ruined the colonists’ politicalfoundation and ultimately cost them thecolony.

At some point, the terrorists require asupportive population. That support can bebroad-based or can be provided by acommitted minority. Increasingly in thelate 20th century and beyond, media

coverage has been a major factor in eithersustaining popular support for terrorists orin separating them from it. As statedpreviously, state support may not beessential to success of terrorists’ efforts, butcan help provide a “popular” base throughcontrol of state media organs.

These “lessons of history” may not applydirectly to Usama bin Laden and his alQaeda organization. Their form of terrorismmay be an evolved form that isfundamentally different from that used inthe past. Although completely innocentcivilian populations have been targetedpreviously by Palestinians and by the IrishRepublican Army, the scale of theSeptember 11 attacks is unique. Americanshave been targeted before, but rarely inAmerica. Further, the goal of the attacksmay not be simply to inflict enough pain onAmericans that the government is forced, asit was in Beirut and Somalia, to acquiesce toanother’s aims; it may be an attempt todestroy America.

The attacks stem from a pervasivefear—in the minds of bin Laden and manyother Muslims—that American culture iscrushing theirs. In today’s geostrategicenvironment, bin Laden’s stated goal of aseparate Islamic world leaves him no realchoice but to attack the United States withthe goal of destroying American influence.The repressive, extremist regime that heseeks to establish is diametrically opposedto the values Americans hold dear and wantto see flourish in the world: freedom,democracy, free markets, human rights. Ifthese opposing views of civilization couldcoexist peacefully, there would perhaps beconcern only at the intersections betweenthem. However, globalization means thatno nation can completely exclude itself fromthe influence of another. For someAmericans, that idea carries with it a fear ofloss of national identity, but for most itrepresents only a continuation of the

3

assimilative process that defines America.For those of bin Laden’s ilk, globalizationmeans that the “evil” influences of the“opulent and arrogant” Western world—particularly from America—can never bekept from “corrupting” the citizens of hisIslamic world. Thus, he and his followersmust fight the United States, not just toforce it to solve the Palestinian question andget it out of the Arabian Peninsula, but todestroy it before U.S. influences irrevocablychange Muslim culture. The overwhelmingstrength of the United States makes itimpossible to confront conventionally. As aresult, bin Laden turns to terrorism toachieve his political goal—but terrorism isjust his current tactic. If he is allowed tocontinue, he will use any capability he canacquire to press his attack: conventional,unconventional or criminal. It thusbehooves the United States to destroy himand his organization and to neutralize anystate sponsors before he gains addedcapabilities.

If bin Laden’s terrorism is similarenough to past terrorism, history suggeststhat he can be defeated by a strong andresolute government that can separate theterrorists from popular support. Becausebin Laden’s support is international andappears broadly-based, concerted coalitionaction is crucial.

In order to defeat al Qaeda or othersimilar terrorist organizations, thefollowing actions are essential:

• Laws governing the collection ofinformation on suspected terroristorganizations must be adapted to thenature and degree of the threat. Suchadaptations will infringe upon existing civilrights, but not nearly as heavily as do thedeath and destruction wrought by theterrorists. In order to maintain a balancebetween civil rights and necessary lawenforcement powers, reasonable judicialoversight must be maintained. Within the

United States, some expansions of policepowers must be pursued, and effectivecoordination of counterterrorist intelligencegathering and sharing must become thenorm. Legislative and executive actionssince September 11 attempt to lay thefoundation for all of the above require-ments, but the definition of the detailsremains a challenge. Also, a more realisticapproach to foreign counterterroristrequirements must be developed if theUnited States hopes for greater inter-national cooperation. This must include arelaxation of restrictions on the use ofweapons supplied through foreign militarysales so that they can be employed againstterrorists irrespective of the terrorists’nationality.

• State support must be eliminated,although each type will require specializedapproaches. Countries that willinglyprovide direct support to those who attackthe United States should expect to see theirregimes replaced, the stated goal inAfghanistan. For other countries providingunwitting or indirect support, concentratedapplication of international pressure maybe enough. The Afghanistan exampleshould make them more receptive to thisapproach.

• Terrorists must be separated frompopular support, a much more difficultmatter, especially since the al Qaedaterrorists manifest religious motives widelyshared by their fellow Muslims. There mustbe serious efforts to address the underlyingmotivations for terrorism without outrightcapitulation to their demands. Issues mustbe addressed without making compromisesthat neglect Israel’s security or fail toprotect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.These efforts must be accompanied by aninformation campaign highlighting therepugnance of terrorist methods and theirineffectual or counterproductive effect. Theheroic image of the perpetrators must be

4

discredited, preferably by their ownreligious leaders.

• Finally, American will to fightterrorism must be maintained. This willhinge on several issues. Americans arewilling to accept losses if vital interests areinvolved, tactical success is periodicallydemonstrated and operational and strategicsuccess is expected eventually. Casualtiesand tactical failures can be accepted ifregular successes by law enforcement andthe military are honestly portrayed andwidely broadcast. Continuing informationoperations should be conducted to affirmthe justice of U.S. intentions and thereasonableness of military and otheractions. The public should not bemanipulated, but must believe in the war onterrorism.

American will must be maintained;intrusions on civil liberties must bebalanced against the need to gatherintelligence and take action against theterrorists; terrorists’ popular support basemust be reduced, and state support chokedoff. These are not easy tasks, but amultidimensional, sophisticated approachfocusing on the inherent weaknesses ofterrorist organizations will lead to theireventual destruction, both domestically andinternationally.

5

What is our desired end state in thiswar? Is it achievable? If it is, how will weknow when we’ve achieved it? Is this to bean open-ended campaign like the war ondrugs, with no real end point likely, or isthere hope for a meaningful victory thatcould someday terminate the conflict? Isthere a center of gravity against whichdecisive effort can be directed and the warwon thereby, or is the enemy so amorphousand ubiquitous that we face instead a futureof chronic low-level hostilities susceptibleonly to management or containment andwith no real hope of resolution?

In fact, this war can be won, not merelycontained. But this will require war aimsfocused on our enemies’ ideology, not theirtactics. And this in turn will demand anespecially close interconnection between awar of military violence and an inseparablewar of ideas. In fact, the best lens for

understanding this new war and itstermination requirements may be our lastgreat military-ideological struggle: the ColdWar. Just as that conflict used militarymeans to preserve an opportunity totriumph on the battlefield of ideas, so in thisconflict we must look to a synergisticinteraction between violence to root outterrorists and persuasion to prevent theirreplacement from among the great mass ofpolitically uncommitted Muslims.

The case for this interconnected framingof war aims, termination conditions, andstrategies rests on the answers to fourquestions: what’s at stake; what’s the realthreat to those stakes; what would suffice toend the threat; and how would we knowwhen we’ve achieved this?

7

TWO

War Aims and War Termination

Dr. Stephen Biddle

Conclusions:• This war can be won, not merely contained, but only if we choose our aims and

strategies correctly.• Our enemy is not terrorism, it is al Qaeda’s radical ideology.• Our war aim must be the defeat of this ideology. If we achieve this, mass

casualty terrorism against Americans will subside; if we do not, counter-terrorist efforts will inevitably fail.

• To defeat this ideology requires both a war of military violence to destroy alQaeda’s current operatives and a war of ideas to prevent their replacementfrom among the millions of politically uncommitted Muslims.

• We cannot allow our military means to undermine our ideological ends: thehearts and minds of politically uncommitted Muslims are the center of gravity;military exigencies, while important, take second place.

• This war of ideas must focus on a “third way”: neither al Qaeda’s radicalseparatism nor an imposed Westernism, but an indigenous alternative thatallows the legitimate religious yearnings of everyday Muslims to see politicalexpression.

What is at Stake?

In objective terms, terrorism wastraditionally thought to threaten only smallstakes; for many, the real challenge wasthus to avoid over-reacting to vivid butminor acts of violence. This war is different.In just 2 hours, the September 11 attackskilled fully a tenth as many Americans asdied in the entire Vietnam War. This wouldbe horrible enough as an isolated incident,but we can expect many more suchattempts. Unchecked, our enemies couldinflict mass casualties on a scale unseen byAmericans since the World Wars—yet thistime, our dead would be mostly civilians intheir very homes and workplaces.

Nor is this all. As we have already seen,global economic health is at risk. TheSeptember 11 attacks have already plungedAmerica into near-certain recession. Withthe world economy’s current weakness,more such strikes could induce far deepercrises both here and abroad. Some describethis as a war for cheap oil, but far more is atstake economically than just the price ofgasoline at American service stations. Amajor, sustained, worldwide economiccontraction is entirely possible if we fail tothwart a long-term continuation ofmass-casualty attacks. These stakes arethus far closer to those of a major war thanto traditional terrorism, and warrantresponses appropriate to war in their scopeand energy.

What is the Threat?

What—and more important, who—threatens these stakes? Who are ourenemies, what do they want, and how muchof what they want must be thwarted tosecure our vital interests? These questionshave yet to be answered clearly. Attempts todate have included evil itself, terrorism,“terrorism of global reach,” al Qaeda, andOsama bin Laden. None is satisfactory, and

the resulting ambiguity has importantstrategic consequences.

Calls for a war against “evil,” forexample, are rhetorical license withoutmeaningful strategic content. “Terrorism,”by contrast, is a tactic, not an opponent.Declaring a “War on Terrorism” is likedeclaring a “War on Strategic Bombing” or a“War on Alliances.” As such, it is at once toobroad, too narrow, and beside the point. Wesurely do not seek war with the IRA or theTamil Tigers, though both are terrorists.Adding “of global reach” doesn’t help:globalization has so eroded the effects ofdistance that any established terroristgroup can reach targets over inter-continental distances—if the IRA isn’t athreat to America, it’s not because theycan’t get here or couldn’t build a networkhere if they so chose. “Reach” isn’t theproblem. Intent is: our enemies are thosewhose intentions embody mass killing ofAmericans.

Bin Laden and al Qaeda are thus closer,as both clearly harbor such intent. Neither,however, is sufficient. Al Qaeda could nowsurvive without bin Laden; killing himalone would not destroy his organization.More important, al Qaeda itself could bedestroyed without eliminating the threat ifthe ideology it represents survives it. It is alQaeda’s ideology—and the malign intentthis creates and embodies—that pose thereal threat. No campaign which leaves thisideology vital and intact can succeed ineliminating the real threat to our vitalinterests that September 11 unveiled.

What is this ideology, and what makes itso threatening? Two points are mostimportant. First, it is radically separatist.Al Qaeda seeks to preserve a puritanical,strictly fundamentalist Islam by isolating itfrom the destructive influences of modern,and especially Western, culture. Westernideas are seen as a profound threat to theproper practice of the faith; they see in them

8

a licentious decadence that both affrontsGod and corrupts humanity. Only byeliminating the temptation of Westernideas and culture can the community of thefaithful properly serve Allah.

In the near term, this mandatesexpulsion of all Western presence fromArabia; eventually, it implies the need tocleanse all Islam of Western influence. This,in turn, poses major economic risks for aworld economy dependent on Arabian andIndonesian oil, and presents insurmount-able difficulties for long-standing U.S.commitments to Israel.

Yet even if we left Arabia and abandonedIsrael, this would still fall short of satisfyingthe demands implied by the logic of alQaeda’s doctrine. In a world of globalcommunication, international broad-casting, and growing cultural interpenetra-tion, it is impossible to imagine a societysuccessfully insulating itself from outsideinfluences for very long. A strictly observantIslamic world of al Qaeda’s design wouldinevitably find itself in conflict withWestern ideas it could not possibly wall offbeyond its shores. If the proper practice ofIslam and the influence of Western cultureare incompatible, and if the former is acentral obligation of the faithful, thenconflict between the West and al Qaeda’sradically separatist version of Islam isliterally existential, and al Qaeda isunlikely ever to accept long-termcoexistence even if its other aims weresomehow realized. If so, then we cannotsatisfy them with any feasible proffer;ultimately, Western concessions are likelierto stimulate further demands than tosatisfy such an opponent. Only a globalimposition of their interpretation of thefaith could be stable and sufficient for themin the long term. Al Qaeda’s separatistideology thus puts it on an inevitablecollision course with our basic way of life.

The second crucial feature of al Qaeda’sideology is its commitment to violence inpursuit of political empowerment.Separatist religious communities are notproblematic in themselves; on the contrary,they have a long tradition in Americanhistory. The combination of radicalseparatism and mass violence, however, ispoisonous. Al Qaeda sees violence as bothacceptable and necessary, and draws nodistinction between military and civiliantargets for this violence. Nor does al Qaeda’sdoctrine condone passive acceptance of theirideas without active participation in thefighting: bin Laden’s declaration of jihadagainst the West obligates all followers toarmed struggle. In bin Laden’s view,Muslims cannot properly stand on thesideline in this war. Even if only a fractionof bin Laden’s potential followers act on hisinjunction, the spread of these ideas thushas profound military consequences; weneed to be concerned not just with theextent of al Qaeda’s formal membership,but also with the extent of its ideologicalpenetration in the Muslim world.

This combination of radical separatismand jihad is thus dangerous; it is alsounusual, and distinguishes al Qaeda fromother terrorist groups that have not to dateinflicted mass casualties on Americans.Organizations like Hamas or Hezbollah, forexample, while violent, have far morelimited political aims centered on installingfundamentalist Islamic governments inspecific states. Among Middle Easternterrorist groups, only al Qaeda has yetformulated an ideological program orientedaround a radical separatism focusing lesson Israel or on the overthrow of individualArab regimes per se than on the exclusion ofWestern influence from the entire region.While more traditional terrorist groupscould well merge their aims into al Qaeda’sin the future—and especially if the lattersees initial success—they need not, and

9

have not to date. It is strongly in ourinterest to dissuade them from doing so.While terrorists of many stripes maythreaten Americans, the vital nationalinterests sketched above are threatenedonly by a much narrower subsetrepresented by al Qaeda alone. Mostterrorism does not approach the dangersraised by September 11; the real threat toAmerica is thus much narrower thanterrorism as such.

But while al Qaeda is a small minorityeven among terrorist groups, much lessamong Islam as a whole, it aspires tomajority status in the Muslim world. Theexport of this ideology beyond the ranks ofal Qaeda’s current operatives is thus aprofound threat to our vital nationalinterests. This export could take the form ofincreased membership for al Qaeda or theadoption of al Qaeda’s ideological programby terrorists who now share only some of itsaims; either outcome is equally dangerousto us. It will do little good to kill currentoperatives if, in the meantime, they recruitmore new adherents than we have removed.Restricting the ideology’s spread is at leastas important as rooting out its currentmembers if we are ever to get on top of theproblem.

Our real opponent is thus the ideologythat underpins al Qaeda’s terroristprogram—it is not terrorism per se, noreven al Qaeda itself. And this implies thatour war aims must include not onlyeliminating al Qaeda’s current operatives,but preventing their ideology from spread-ing beyond their current membership. To dothis will demand the use of force andcoercive leverage to root out bin Laden’sterrorists and their state sponsors—but itwill also require us to win a war of ideas topersuade the great mass of politicallyuncommitted Muslims that al Qaeda’sseparatist ideology is a dead end. This warof ideas will matter as centrally as the war

of bullets for ultimate victory or defeat: if welose the former, we will surely lose thelatter, as the flow of new recruits willinevitably swamp our ability to find andeliminate veteran fighters.

What Would Suffice to End

the Threat?

This conception of war aims implies acenter of gravity against which a successfulcampaign could be directed. If we can denyal Qaeda a flow of new recruits, we caneventually destroy it. Al Qaeda’s shadowy,covert nature will make the process ofrunning down its members slow andlaborious, but sustained effort caneventually grind down any organization offixed size. The challenge is to keep alQaeda’s size fixed in the meantime. If theysucceed in exporting their ideas to anysignificant portion of broader Islam, thenwe will never be able to cope militarily withthe resulting flood of people and resourcesinto Bin Laden’s camp. But if al Qaeda failsto spread its ideas, then even a slow-movingmilitary campaign will eventually snuff itout. The center of gravity in this war thuslies in the hearts and minds of politicallyuncommitted Muslims: if bin Ladensucceeds in converting them to his ideologyof separatist jihad, then no plausible U.S.military effort will be sufficient to prevail;but if we succeed in winning the war ofideas, then al Qaeda will eventually bedestroyed by our accompanying militaryoperations.

To do this it will not be necessary touncover every last al Qaeda operative—much less to kill every last terroristworldwide. If we can combine steadyprogress on the military front with politicalcontainment of al Qaeda’s ideology, we willmake it ever harder for bin Laden to mountmass casualty suicide attacks (especially inconjunction with energetic efforts inhomeland defense). In this, the Weather

10

Underground offers an instructivemetaphor. The Weathermen’s bombingcampaign did not end because the FBIarrested its entire membership; someremain at large to this day. Instead, it wasthe loss of a sympathetic body of supportersand the ensuing recruits and resources thatkilled the Weathermen as an organization.Many fewer people are willing to risk theirlives for an apparently losing cause thanwill do so in the vanguard of a movementwith a future. If we can deny al Qaeda afuture by winning the war of ideas, we thusmake the military task attainable andvictory achievable even if we cannot everhope to extinguish terrorism as such orannihilate al Qaeda in its entirety.

This war of ideas, moreover, is one inwhich we enjoy important long-termadvantages. Al Qaeda promulgates arepressive, sexist, authoritarian distortionof Islam that is unattractive not only to us,but to the great majority of Muslims as well.Most Muslims—like most Americans—donot want their daughters excluded fromeducation. They do not want womenrelegated to veils and denied a meaningfullife outside the home. They do not believethe state should punish people for theclothes they wear or the music they enjoy.And they do not see anyone who disagreeswith them as an enemy of God whose ideasmust be snuffed out and whose life can betaken in the name of Allah. Most Muslimssee a God of peace and forgiveness, not aGod of hate and violence. The mainstreampractice of Islam is today so distant from alQaeda’s twisted extremism that we needonly prevent it from being hijacked by asplinter group whose views are now rejectedby the majority of Muslims in Arabia andbeyond.

We must be careful, however, to avoidwaging this war of ideas in ways that give alQaeda crucial ammunition. Many nowworry about this, but see the problem in

chiefly military terms: they oppose attackson Muslim states like Iraq or Syria asalienating potential allies. Valid or not,however, a different danger of at least equalmagnitude lies in the conduct of ourideological campaign: we must not abet binLaden’s effort to portray us as culturalimperialists bent on destroying Islam andimposing Western licentiousness. To avoidthis implies at least two requirements.

First, we cannot approach this campaignas a war to convert Muslims to our way oflife. Our aim must be to promote a thirdway: neither separatist extremism norimposed Westernism. Al Qaeda and theIslamic mainstream are now so far apartthat many such opportunities should existfor enabling the legitimate religiousyearnings of everyday Muslims to seepolitical expression without creating adualistic struggle with Western ideals. Acentral strategic challenge will be toidentify such alternatives and promotethem—especially where these alternativesthreaten repressive political regimes whosecorruption is seen by mainstream Muslimsas inconsistent with their ideals.

Second, we must counter commonperceptions of the West now beingpromulgated in much of the Arab world. Weare routinely caricatured as rapaciouslibertines with no greater moral compassthan vulgar materialism. These widely-heldmisperceptions make stable coexistenceand effective opposition to extremistfundamentalism much harder. To overturnthem will require a positive effort to providea more accurate picture of America, ourideals, and our culture. This effort mustwalk a fine line between informing othersand imposing our way of life—but ourability to promote a stable Islamic “thirdway” that does not define itself in violentopposition to us depends in part on escapingthe demonized portrayal of ourselves now socommon in the Arab world.

11

These challenges are not trivial, but theycan be surmounted. And the ideologicalbattlefield on which they are to be met is onewhere we enjoy important advantages if weconduct the campaign properly.

How Would We Know When the War

Has Been Won?

Unlike World War II or OperationDESERT STORM, this war will not end atan appointed hour by the signing of a peaceagreement or the declaration of a cease fire.But it can have a discernable ending. Ourdesired end state is the isolation of aremnant of al Qaeda into a small band ofharried individuals living in deep cover asfugitives from the law, cut off from any baseof popular support, despairing of any realhope of establishing their views throughpolitical power, and with no successororganization waiting in the wings to take uptheir struggle on behalf of a sympatheticpeople. Like the Weathermen, al Qaeda’sability to threaten vital American interestswould then be broken even if survivorsremain, and even if these prove able tomount occasional terrorist incidents ofconventional scale. Orthodox terrorism isnot an existential threat to America; masscasualty terrorism on the scale ofSeptember 11 and the ability to sustainthis, by contrast, is not achievable by bandsof isolated individuals. The record to datesuggests that this requires a degree oforganization and profound commitmentcharacteristic only of an institution like alQaeda, and it is within our power to defeatal Qaeda as an institution even if we cannotkill every individual terrorist in the world.

The arrival of this day will not beapparent at the time, but will become everclearer as the absence of mass fatalityattacks on Americans grows prolonged. Justas the Cold War’s end was clear mainly inretrospect, so we can expect that the end ofthis war will be proclaimed by historians

rather than by soldiers. Looking backwardstoday, we can say that the fall ofCommunist Poland, the destruction of theBerlin Wall, and the breakup of the SovietUnion signaled a period within which theCold War ended, though no single event canbe said to have provided more than asymbolic finale. Likewise looking forwardfrom today, there will come a time when wecan be confident that we have seen the endof al Qaeda, but we cannot expect to be ableto proclaim it at any single moment. End,however, it shall—if we formulate our aimsand our strategies properly.

12

The noted British military theorist BasilLiddell Hart wrote in one of his many booksthat “War is the realm of the unexpected.”Military actions often produce unintendedresults that can negate positive gains andmay even worsen the long-term situation.American planners must keep this hardtruth in mind as they develop thecontinuing war against terrorism.

Reverberations from Choices

in the Application of Force.

Strategic choices about the use of forceoften produce unexpected effects at alllevels of war: tactical, operational andstrategic. As an example, look at the normfor the initial American employment ofmilitary power. In an effort to achieveobjectives quickly, limited air strikes oftenconstitute the dominant part of earlyphases of an operation. This selection isdriven in part by the rapid response

capability of aerial assets and the desire toavoid friendly casualties and collateraldamage, but is further motivated by hopesthat goals can be achieved by committing aminimum of resources. Adherents of thisstrategy also assert that it is advantageousbecause it still allows levels of force to begradually escalated to send signals ofAmerican resolve and to increase pressureon enemy decisionmakers. Coalitionpartners tend to prefer this approach.However, lessons from Vietnam, theBalkans, and even early operations inAfghanistan show that this course of actioncan actually stiffen enemy resistance ratherthan break it, providing opponents withtime to develop countermeasures andbecome inured to military pressure, andincreasing enemy confidence in their abilityto hold out. In the long run, the gradualescalation of force tends to cost moreresources and prolongs conflict. There ismuch to be said for delaying action until an

13

THREE

Beware of Unintended Consequences

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

Conclusions:• Prolonged destructive military action, especially with airpower, strains

coalitions and fosters resentment. The best approach is to apply overwhelmingforce in short decisive campaigns, even if that requires time to build upresources in theater.

• Relying on local ground forces for combat reduces American leverage to shapethe postwar environment, encouraging conditions that undermine politicalstability and increasing requirements for military peace operations.

• No matter how widespread American operations against terrorism are, attackson numerous targets in Muslim countries will foster the perspective that theUnited States is engaged in a war against Islam.

• The United States must avoid appearing to be engaged solely in an attempt tomaintain its hegemony or the status quo. Accordingly it should be wary ofbecoming tied too closely to repressive regimes, and should encourage reform inso-called “moderate” Arab governments.

overwhelming application of military poweris possible. One can knock out an opponentquickly with a single, well-placed blow tothe head, but the foe will repeatedly recoverand require further fighting. It is quickerand more efficient in the long run to applyoverwhelming force continuously until thatopponent is permanently eliminated as athreat.

Once the air effort over Afghanistan wassubstantially increased and coordinatedwith major offensive efforts by local allies, itachieved great military success—so great,in fact, that many now hope to apply thesame formula elsewhere. However, theapplication of American airpower in combatoperations can often cause unintendedconsequences at the strategic level of war.The precise nature of the strikes inAfghanistan was supposed to help sustaininternational support for the operation byshowing U.S. concern for minimizingcollateral damage. However, theinternational reaction to the bombingcampaign revealed the difficulties inherentin projecting an image of clean, surgical warto garner public support and reassure allies.Americans who emphasize the surgicalnature of airpower must realize that therest of the world does not view aerialbombardment the same way. Whenbombing commences, U.S. leaders tout theaccuracy shown in strike videos, but theworld press immediately invokes images ofthe carpet bombing of Tokyo and Dresden. Atactical effect was felt almost immediatelyas Pakistani volunteers—inspired to defendAfghanistan by the perceived brutality ofthe bombing and emboldened by its initialapparent ineffectiveness—compensated forsome of the Taliban casualties from theinitial American attacks. The strategicimpact took just a bit longer, having to waituntil inflated expectations for precision—both in intelligence and bombing—increased the impact of inevitable collateral

damage. It should have come as no surprisewhen pictures of dead Afghan women andchildren started to be paraded acrossinternational television screens. Theseimages evoke much more sympathy in theThird World than pictures of the ruins of theWorld Trade Center.

This effect is heightened by theimpression that bombing is anotherexample of American bullying of weakernations, and reinforces the perception thatthe United States is not really committed toserious action. As one Europeancommentator noted after Operation AlliedForce in Kosovo, “Now we know whatAmericans are willing to kill for; but whatare Americans willing to die for?” No courseof action produces more coalition challengesthan a prolonged campaign that makes itlook as though America is “beating up” aweaker country. In such a situation,increasing numbers of civilian casualtiesinevitably erode international support formilitary action. And the backlash from thesignificant destruction wreaked by airattacks can threaten the very peace suchtactics aim to achieve. Many Serbs stillresent NATO’s bombing of their country,and billions of dollars will be necessary torepair the resulting damage and reviveBalkan economies. Journalists have notedmuch hatred of Americans in Afghan townswhere inhabitants feel they wereimproperly targeted by U.S. bombs. Evenair attacks on military targets in mountainredoubts and cave complexes have producedenough civilian casualties to bringaccusations of disproportionate andunacceptable force from international aidorganizations.

Because of its reluctance to commit itsown landpower in Afghanistan, Americahas had to rely on the forces of the NorthernAlliance. This reliance also has producedunintended strategic consequences. Theoperational success of their forces has

14

emboldened the Northern Alliance todemand a major—if not leading—role in thenew government, a situation unacceptableto majority Pashtun tribes. Press reportsabout their execution of prisoners havecaused international alarm. Aid convoys arebeing looted or stopped, and local warlordsare reasserting control of many areasliberated from the Taliban. Though the roleof the Northern Alliance was instrumentalin achieving tactical and operationalsuccess in Afghanistan, without moderationand control their actions might stillendanger the strategic goal of a stablecountry that will not foster futureterrorism. Similar problems appear to bearising with tribes in other parts of thecountry, as various warlords jockey forterritory and bargaining leverage. A recentanalysis of 52 wars since 1960 reveals that50 percent of peace deals break down within5 years, and the situation in Afghanistan isworse than most. Another study onpeace-building in the 1990s warns “usinglocal factions and warlords to provide theground component of a military campaigncan only undermine the political goals ofdiplomatic relations for a post-war state.”The consequence of limiting Americanground involvement in the initial stages ofcombat operations in the country might beto increase its necessity in the long run,both in persistent fighting to root out alQaeda and in keeping the peace after suchcombat is ended.

Broadening the War.

Those conducting the war on terror mustremain focused on reducing the unintendedconsequences of near-term activities thatcould endanger the accomplishment of long-term objectives. Without such foresight, thebacklash from the campaign in Afghanistancould make future operations in the war onterrorism more difficult. Many pundits havecommented on the dangers of destabilizing

Pakistan, and losing support from moderateIslamic states. Without a clear blueprint forthe course of the war, the United Statescould find current actions antagonizing keyallies for the next phase.

But there is an even greater danger inthe future. As the United States pursues itswar against terrorism, planners must keepin mind the ultimate goal of eliminating, orat least significantly reducing, the terroristthreat against the nation and its interests.It will do no good to wipe out al Qaeda whilesowing the seeds that ensure the rise ofsimilar organizations. This will require ahard look at how American actions areperceived.

The phrase is often quoted that “oneman’s terrorist is another man’s freedomfighter,” and reflects the fact that terrorismis an approach sometimes taken by theweak against the strong to induce change. Abroad war against all terrorist groups willreinforce Third World perceptions that theUnited States wants to retain its hegemonyby enforcing the status quo at all costs. Thisargument was first made in the 1960s and1970s by a school of revisionist diplomatichistorians who argued that Americaneconomic prosperity depended on a world oforder, stability, and open markets;according to this view national policies haveaimed to maintain those characteristics inthe international system. This viewpointencouraged much cynicism about Americanideals at home and abroad, and will do thesame again if revived by a war that appearsto value stability over human rights.

U.S. leaders should reevaluate relationswith so-called “moderate” Arab regimes incountries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia,where most popular political aspirationsare repressed and where many terroristshave been produced—including Osama binLaden and most of the hijackers ofSeptember 11. The United States wouldprobably benefit significantly if it could

15

influence those regimes to reform.Continually propping them up andmaintaining the status quo risks arevolutionary explosion in the long term,and will insure a new crop of terrorists inthe short term.

Some who argue for a broader conflictsuggest expanding the war to includenon-Islamic groups outside the MiddleEast, believing such action will obviate theargument that the United States is engagedin a war against Islam. A possibleunintended consequence from thatapproach is that it might drive these othergroups to adopt mass-casualty methods—and perhaps a common cause with alQaeda—thus increasing the overall threatlevel for Americans. Whether or notoperations in non-Arab countries areattempted, attacks against multiple targetsin Arab countries will still reinforce theperception of a crusade against Islam. Theend result of broad attacks will just be tostretch American resources while stillantagonizing an Islamic public easilyconvinced of its victimization.

Avoiding future terrorism will alsorequire that planners thoroughly analyzeconcessions required to obtain support fromsome states. Becoming identified withrepressive regimes such as that inUzbekistan might ultimately do us moreharm than good. American dealings withPakistan, essential as they have been, haveendangered a growing relationship withdemocratic India. Short-term requests forsupport can also backfire in other ways.Though the U.S. request for a small numberof Turkish soldiers provides visible evidenceof Muslim support on the ground for the waragainst terrorism, the long-term impact ofthat action on an important NATO allywhere the vast majority of the public isagainst American policy in Afghanistanshould be carefully considered.

Conclusions.

To avoid sending the wrong message tofuture foes, military actions must bedecisive in achieving operational andstrategic goals. Rapidity is alwayspreferred, but decisiveness is the mostessential requirement. Failure to achievesuch results—as is too often risked whenquick action is overvalued or commitmentsare too limited—would diminish America’simage as a power to be respected. Thiswould further embolden other groups andnations to challenge the United States andits interests, and make others less likely totrust our promises of support. NationalCommand Authorities and the Joint Staff’smilitary planners must ensure thatimmediate regional actions—and theirunintended consequences—don’t compro-mise the long-term strategic goals of thewar on terrorism. Winning battles is not asimportant as winning the war.

16

The war on terrorism will undoubtedlyfail if it is perceived as a war on Islam andgenerates a call for Muslim solidarity in aholy war against the United States and theother powers combating terrorism. Under-standing how to avoid that perception firstrequires some familiarity with the conceptof jihad. Strictly speaking, translating jihadas “holy war” is incorrect. Harbmukaddasah is the Arabic phrase for holywar. The Arabic word jihad means strivingor exertion. In an Islamic context, it wouldmean striving in the way of God:perpetually struggling for the triumph ofthe word of God among men, doing gooddeeds and performing the prescribed dutiesof the faith. A Muslim strives in the way ofGod with his sword, tongue, and wealth,thus giving the concept of jihad amultifaceted nature that applies to theindividual believer and the community.

One meaning of jihad is the duty ofpreaching the faith, since Islam is aproselytizing religion: “And let there befrom you a nation who invite to goodness,and enjoin right conduct and forbidindecency” (Qur’an 3:104). This meaning of

jihad could be accomplished through suchactivities as teaching, preaching, publish-ing, and establishing Islamic centers andschools.

Another meaning of jihad is in the senseof fighting: “Sanction is given unto thosewho fight because they have been wronged:and Allah is indeed able to give themvictory” (Qur’an 22:39). The word qital(Arabic for fighting in the narrow sense—fight as it appears in this Qur’anic verse) asused here is not synonymous with thebroader concept of jihad, which includesfighting where the context so requires.Jihad in the sense of fighting has alwaysbeen a defensive principle. Muslims wereallowed to fight only in self-defense andwere forbidden to be aggressive.Furthermore, Muslim scholars aregenerally in agreement that jihad in thesense of fighting must meet severalconditions to be religiously sanctioned.There must be a just cause for the conflict, itmust be declared by the right authority, andthe fighting must be waged in accordancewith Islamic ethical principles, including

17

FOUR

Avoiding Holy War: Ensuring That the Waron Terrorism is Not Perceived as a War on Islam

Dr. Sami G. Hajjar

Conclusions:• U.S. cannot prevent extremists from declaring jihad in response to military

attacks.• Imperative for the U.S. to limit appeal of such calls with diplomacy and

restrained rhetoric.• U.S. should try to discredit those calling for jihad.• At least initially, U.S. should limit targeted groups to al Qaida and its direct

supporters while avoiding widespread attacks that would look like war againstIslam.

sparing the lives of women, children, andthe elderly.

The United States can do little, ifanything, to prevent Muslim extremists—including al Qaida’s Osama bin Laden andthe Taliban’s Mullah Mohammad Umar—from declaring jihad in response to U.S.military action against them. Questionsabout the “right authority” to call jihad willconstrain the number of Muslims whowould answer that call. However, anabundance of anti-American sentiments inthe Arab and Islamic worlds—sentimentsgenerated over the past several decades byU.S. pro-Israeli and perceived anti-Islampolicies and compounded by deterioratingsocioeconomic conditions—guarantee that acall to jihad by the Taliban and bin Ladenwill fall on many receptive ears across theIslamic world. “Striving with sword, tongue,or wealth”; those who do respond might beenough to cause the stability of friendlyArab and other Muslim nations to be ofconcern. The United States could make thatresponse even greater by expandingmilitary action beyond bin Laden and theTaliban regime that harbors him. If thathappens—at least without some conclusiveevidence proving a connection to the attacksof September 11—there is a high risk thatother “religious authorities” would beenticed to join in the call for jihad againstthe “aggressor.” Emotional broadcasts ofwar conditions showing Muslimmujahideen being defeated by Americanand other Western forces would do morethan call into question the stability offriendly Muslim states; it would put atsignificant risk the U.S. ability to prosecutethe war on terrorism to a successful end.

How then should we extract justice forthe attack on our country on September 11?How can we wage a war on terrorism andnot elicit a holy war in response? Refrainingfrom military action against Afghanistan,the Taliban, and al Qaida—or any other

country or organization suspected ofinvolvement in terrorism—would be asimple answer. Use of the other instrumentsof U.S. national power—diplomatic,economic, and informational—would notengender holy war. Neither would it appeasethe American public, which expects someform of military revenge for the deaths ofthousands of citizens from America andaround the world. The suggestion of notresponding militarily also has the seriousflaw of being an incentive for extremists inAfghanistan and elsewhere in the Muslimworld to engage in further acts of terrorism.It would promote the belief that the UnitedStates would refrain from military responsebecause of American leaders’ fear that thethreat to declare jihad would be heeded byMuslims across the Islamic world.

Rather than being concerned withavoiding even illegitimate calls for “holywar”—a situation over which the UnitedStates has no control save for the absurdoption of not responding militarily—thefocus should be on how to contain thevalidity of a bin Laden or Talibandeclaration of jihad to their immediateadherents and like-minded extremists.Perhaps only rewriting the history of U.S.policies and strategies toward the Arab andIslamic worlds since World War II wouldensure success in this endeavor. However,the Bush administration has thus far mademany proper moves in responding to thecrisis. Declaring war on terrorism, not onIslam, was one of the most critical. It leavesno doubt, at least in national rhetoric, thatAmerica’s enemies are those who pervertIslam with unacceptable violence. Buildingan international coalition with partnersfrom the Arab and Islamic worlds is alsokey. This gives great credibility to theU.S.-led efforts, just as was the case in theGulf War, when Arab allies demonstratedthat aggression by an Arab and Muslimcountry would not be tolerated. Use of all

18

the elements of national power—not justthe military one—is also important incontaining the response to the call for jihad.It is hard to justify fighting theantiterrorism coalition when it is providinghumanitarian assistance and othereconomic incentives to assist Muslims.

The military action—with the imme-diate task of defeating bin Laden and histraining bases in Afghanistan—is only thefirst part of a complex campaign. TheUnited States must take several additionalactions to contain any call for jihad. First, itshould work to discredit the legitimacy of ajihad declaration by an entity thatsanctions terrorism. The desired outcomewould be an Islamic world convinced thatAmerican military response is inself-defense against criminals who willrepeat their deeds unless stopped. Tocontain any fallout from the inevitable callsto jihad, the United States should work withits closest Muslim allies to nudge Egypt—the seat of Al-Azhar Mosque and the centerof orthodox Sunni theology—to question binLaden’s qualifications and authority toissue fatwas (religious edicts) and to declarejihad. It is strongly in the U.S. interest toincrease across the Islamic world thenumbers of mufti (clerics) articulating thispoint of view. The brief exposition of themeaning of jihad outlined above suggestsimportant errors in bin Laden’s call, such ashis declaration of offensive war againstinnocents, and raises serious doubts aboutthe qualifications of bin Laden and theTaliban to declare a jihad of any kind. BinLaden’s doctrine—claiming legitimacy forthe use of terror in a jihad against a strongenemy—could and should be refuted byMuslim clerics. A well-prepared psyopsteam will be able to play a major positiverole in this effort.

The temptation exists to go after several“affiliates” of al Qaida. Many of these—likeHamas and Hizbollah—are scattered across

the Arab world and are viewed by mostArabs and Muslims as organizationsengaged in legitimate self-defense andnational liberation efforts. Overt militaryaction against such groups would be a gravestrategic error if the United States wishesto contain the spread of the call to jihad.More grave would be a military campaignagainst so-called “rogue” states that forsome time have graced the StateDepartment’s list of nations that supportterrorism. In such an eventuality,containing the appearance that the UnitedStates was waging a war against Islammight be impossible.

The United States has much to lose if itis unsuccessful in its efforts to avoid its waron terrorism being characterized as a waragainst Islam. Military action is unavoid-able—although it must be accompaniedthroughout the war by use of the non-military elements of power—but it must becarefully applied to avoid the specter of aMuslim world united behind bin Laden.

19

In today’s world, a terrorist movementcan be built and operate without statesupport. Terrorists can fund themselves viacrime or even legitimate business venturesand charities. They can obtain informationand intelligence via open sources. They cancommunicate and coordinate their activitiesusing the global information infrastructure,protected by various forms of encryption.And they can train almost anywhere bysimply renting an isolated house or farm.Still, state support certainly makesterrorism easier and more effective.Eliminating it is an important but complexpart of the war on terrorism.

Modes of State Support to Terrorism.

In the contemporary security environ-ment, there are three modes of statesupport to terrorism. Each requires adifferent U.S. response. What can be calledCategory I states provide protection,logistics, training, intelligence, orequipment to terrorists as a part of nationalpolicy or strategy. While this sort of activityhas a long history, it became particularlycommon during the Cold War. Support forterrorism and for other forms of lowintensity conflict was seen as a way thatsome Soviet clients, particularly East

21

FIVE

State Support for Terrorism

Dr. Steven Metz

Conclusions:• Analyze state support to terrorism in terms of three categories: Category I

support entails protection, logistics, training, intelligence, or equipmentprovided terrorists as a part of national policy or strategy; Category II supportis not backing terrorism as an element of national policy but is toleration of it;Category III support provides some terrorists a hospitable environment,growing from the presence of legal protections on privacy and freedom ofmovement, limits on internal surveillance and security organizations,well-developed infrastructure, and émigré communities.

• Further develop Army doctrine, concepts, and forces to be able to punishCategory I supporters of terrorism and to contribute to multinationalreconstruction of those that are punished. Make this a focus mission for IBCTs.

• Develop Army doctrine, concepts, and forces to provide engagement and othertypes of support activities to Category II states attempting to eradicateterrorism within their territories to include concepts and organizationsdesigned specifically to support regional partners and allies rather than havingsupport to partners as a secondary mission.

• Use Army wargaming and strategic planning capabilities to create a programdesigned specifically to improve the counterterrorism concepts, doctrine, andorganizations of the U.S. military, other U.S. Government agencies, andpartner nations, with a focus on deterring Category I supporters, augmentingthe capabilities of Category II supporters, and increasing cooperation andcommunication among Category III supporters.

Germany, North Korea, Bulgaria, Cuba,Libya, Syria, and Iraq, could attack theWest and Israel while minimizing thechances of escalation. Many of theseCategory I supporters developed terroristsupport industries, providing large scaletraining facilities as well as intelligence andother forms of direct operational support.

The end of the Cold War did greatdamage to the global terrorist supportnetwork. With the Soviet Union no longeroffering protection, state sponsors werevulnerable to direct punishment. The end ofSoviet economic support led states likeCuba and Syria to seek integration into theglobal economy and global community.Support for terrorism is, of course, a majorobstacle to this. Today the remainingCategory I supporters go to great lengths tocover their involvement with terrorism orprovide only limited forms of support. Thereare no “full spectrum” supporters today.Most Category I support now takes the formof either sanctuary without directoperational support (e.g., Afghanistan) orintelligence assistance from a segment of astate’s security forces sometimes actingwithout the explicit approval of nationalleaders.

Category II supporters do not backterrorism as an element of national policy,but tolerate it to some degree. This oftengrows from an assessment that the risksand costs of eradicating terrorist networksoutweigh the expected benefits—lettingsleeping dogs lie. In effect, Category IIstates have a tacit modus vivendi withterrorists. In exchange for turning a blindeye, the regime is not targeted. In someCategory II states, terrorists have thesympathy of segments of the military orother security services, so the regime mayfeel that pressuring them may causedangerous schisms within the government.Egypt and Pakistan seem to fit this model.Some Category II states may tolerate

terrorist activity to deflect attention fromtheir own shortcomings or repression. Inthe Islamic world, for instance, allowingradicals to blame Israel or the United Statesfor poverty, misery, and so forth removesattention from the flaws of the region’sleaders and systems. The toleration ofvirulent anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabiaand elsewhere is an example. Finally, someCategory II states may provide sanctuaryfor terrorists simply out of an inability topolice and control parts of their nationalterritory.

Category III support is what might becalled “structural.” It comes from thepresence of legal protections of privacy andfreedoms of movement and association,limits on internal surveillance and securityorganizations, well-developed communica-tion and transportation infrastructures,and émigré communities, all providing ahospitable environment for some kinds ofterrorists. The governments of Category IIIstates do not support or approve ofterrorism; most actively seek toexterminate it, but find their effortsconstrained by the legal system and valuesof their states. The United States, Canada,and Germany are examples.

Addressing State Support

to Terrorism.

Stopping and deterring state support toterrorism should, when possible, be pursuedthrough diplomatic, legal, and multilateralchannels. One element of this should bestrengthening the international legalproscriptions on support for terrorism.Attempts to do this have been underway foryears, but have been hindered by ideologicaland political considerations. Even definingthe problem is difficult since one man’s“terrorist” can be another man’s “freedomfighter.” In recent years, though, a basiclegal framework has begun to take shape.For instance, the 1994 and 1996

22

Declarations on Measures to EliminateInternational Terrorism of the UnitedNations General Assembly condemned allterrorist acts and methods regardless ofpolitical, philosophical, ideological, ethnic,or religious considerations. This wasfurther strengthened in Resolution 1269(October 19, 1999) in which the U.N.Security Council: “Unequivocally condemnsall acts, methods, and practices of terrorismas criminal and unjustifiable, regardless oftheir motivation, in all their forms andmanifestations, wherever and by whomevercommitted, in particular those which couldthreaten international peace and security.”Documents like the InternationalConvention for the Suppression of TerroristBombings (1997), International Conventionfor the Suppression of the Financing ofTerrorism (1999), and the DraftInternational Convention for theSuppression of Nuclear Terrorism (1998)focused on specific elements of the problem.

This legal structure, though, has someserious flaws. The first is the continuingproblem of defining terrorism. While thereis little debate that the September 11attacks on the United States constitutedterrorism, many other uses of force areharder to categorize. Second, the existinginternational legal structure largely treatsterrorism as a crime rather than an act ofwar. This creates friction and ambiguitiesin any attempts to deal with it. Third, likemuch of international law, no formalenforcement mechanism exists to deal withterrorism.

The United States could address theseshortcomings first by leading an effort tocodify an internationally accepteddefinition of terrorism. The United Statesshould insist that terrorism or support toterrorism be treated as a threat tointernational peace and security and thusan act of war. Then the internationalcommunity should develop the same sort of

enforcement mechanisms that addressother threats to international peace andsecurity, specifically a procedure by whichthe United Nations authorizes collectivesecurity to address the threat underChapter VII of the Charter. At the sametime, the United States should refine theNational Security Strategy to deal witheach of the three types of terroristsupporters. Eradicating Category I supportwill often require coercion, to include armedforce. U.S. policy should specify that overtsupport to terrorists who target U.S.citizens or the United States is an act ofwar, and will be treated as such. After all,Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states,“Nothing in the present Charter shallimpair the inherent right of individual orcollective self-defense if an armed attackoccurs against a Member of the UnitedNations, until the Security Council hastaken measures necessary to maintaininternational peace and security.”

To deter Category I supporters requiresthat the United States be able to projectdecisive force around the world. The Army’scontribution to this is vital. While theUnited States would always prefer not toproject landpower to a distant state, havingthe ability to do so and, if appropriate,replace a regime, is a deterrent. If decisiveaction is taken against a Category Isupporter of terrorism, the Army may alsoplay a vital role in post-conflictreconstitution of the state by providingsecurity and other forms of support to amultinational force or internationalorganization. In instances where a CategoryI supporter is willing to change its behavior,the United States should be willing toprovide political, economic, and perhapseven military inducements. Armyengagement programs including IMET,MTTs, and combined exercises could be partof this.

23

To stop and deter Category II support,the United States must provide induce-ments to eradicate terrorist networks,support for doing so, and, in some cases,punishment for failing to do so. Theinducements could include economic stepslike preferential market access and debtrelief, or political ones like increasedattention to a diplomatic problem of concernto the Category II supporters. Punishmentsfor Category II supporters that fail to takeserious steps could also include a range ofpolitical and economic actions. For instance,the United States could expand the systemfor listing state sponsors. The current list,which is prepared by the State Department,focuses on Category I type support. It mightalso include Category II support fromnations not making strenuous efforts to dealwith terrorist support networks withintheir territory. Various types of economicand political inducements could be tied tothis list. As with policies to promotedemocracy and counter narcotrafficking,the United States should oppose WorldBank or IMF funding to Category II stateson the State Department’s list. In addition,the United States should instigate an effortto create a multinational legal forum to tryto punish terrorists. This would limit thevulnerability of Category II states toretribution as they brought terrorists tojustice.

Each Category III state, including theUnited States, must assess its legal systemand security organization to become moreeffective at countering terrorism whileprotecting national values. AmongCategory III states, the United Statesshould take the lead in improvingintelligence sharing and cooperation ineradicating terrorist support infra-structure, particularly financial flows.

Conclusions.

Addressing state support for terrorismwill require a broad effort on the part of theUnited States, integrating economic,diplomatic, law enforcement, andintelligence steps. The Army can contributeto this by:

• Analyzing state support to terrorismin terms of three categories: Category Isupport entails protection, logistics,training, intelligence, or equipmentprovided terrorists as a part of nationalpolicy or strategy; Category II support iswhen a regime does not back terrorism asan element of national policy but toleratesit; Category III support provides someterrorists a hospitable environment,growing from the presence of legalprotections on privacy and freedom ofmovement, limits on internal surveillanceand security organizations, well-developedinfrastructure, and émigré communities.

• Further develop Army doctrine,concepts, and forces to be able to punishCategory I supporters of terrorism and tocontribute to multinational reconstructionof those that are punished. Make this afocus mission for the Interim BrigadeCombat Teams.

• Develop Army doctrine, concepts, andforces to provide engagement and othertypes of support activities to Category IIstates attempting to eradicate terrorismwithin their territories, to include conceptsand organizations designed specifically tosupport regional partners and allies ratherthan having support to partners as asecondary mission.

Use Army wargaming and strategicplanning capabilities to create a programdesigned specifically to improve thecounterterrorism concepts, doctrine, andorganizations of the U.S. military, otherU.S. Government agencies, and partnernations, with a focus on deterring Category

24

I supporters, augmenting the capabilities ofCategory II supporters, and increasingcooperation and communication amongCategory III supporters.

25

The recent terrorist attacks on NewYork and Washington have focused theattention of the nation and its military onimmediately combating this serious threat.The dominant National Military Strategyparadigm of the 1990s—“shape, respond,and prepare”—was in the process of beingredone by the Bush administration prior tothe attacks, but still provides a concise wayof broadly describing the tasks the militarymust perform. Along with its sisterServices, the Army is currently concen-trating almost exclusively on respondingand even more narrowly on actions topunish and prevent terrorism. PresidentBush and his cabinet have been clear thatthis will be a long struggle, however, andthe Army must not neglect its many otherimportant shaping and preparing missionsduring that time. A victory over terrorismwill be meaningless if it is not accompaniedby the continuing spread of peace, security,democracy, and free market ideas thatthose other military missions support.

U.S. needs and interests require a broadand balanced security focus. While theArmy will understandably place high

priority on contributing to winning the waragainst terrorism, the service mustsimultaneously conduct operations alongfour other axes. It must continue itsinvolvement in day-to-day engagementactivities around the world, sustain itscapability to conduct peace operations,remain ready to fight and deter major wars,and maintain momentum for transforma-tion. The Army was already stretched by itsoperational tempo before September 11; thenew demands will only exacerbate thatsituation. However, they must not divertthe Service from accomplishing its otheressential missions.

First, the Army must not allow anincreased emphasis on force protection andother operations against terrorism todeflect it from supporting regional CINCs intheir efforts to remain engaged overseas.Through its 150,000 forward-stationed anddeployed forces, the Army provides over 60percent of America’s forces committed toengagement. Often such involvement canshape the regional environment to preventconflicts or facilitate responses when theyoccur. The U.S. ability to conduct current

27

SIX

Maintaining Strategic Balance while Fighting Terrorism

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

Conclusions:• While fighting terrorism, the Army must maintain its ability to remain engaged

in the world, perform peace operations, fight and deter wars, and executetransformation.

• The service will quickly need an expanded and restructured active force withincreased intelligence/CS/CSS/SOF assets.

• Reserve Component mobilization plans need to be reexamined with their forcesreorganized for new missions and reapportioned with the Active Component.

• Reconfiguring the force to better combat terrorism should reinforce andaccelerate transformation efforts.

operations against Afghanistan was aidedconsiderably by 82d Airborne Divisionexercises with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistanin 1997. Remaining engaged around theworld now will similarly facilitateoperations when the next unexpected crisisoccurs and will also help prevent crises fromoccurring in the first place. The coalitionsforming to combat different aspects ofterrorism include a number of new partnersand should provide even more opportunitiesfor military-to-military contacts and otherengagement activities.

Even while initiating new operationsagainst terrorism, the Army will still haveforces involved in numerous peacekeepingmissions and must resist calls to withdrawfrom these missions to provide resources forthe war on terrorism. The current Armymissions in Bosnia and Kosovo remainimportant, though future similarassignments should not be lightly acceptedbecause of the strain these seeminglyunending deployments impose on existingforces. However, there will be times—evenwhile fighting the war on terrorism—whennational interests will require humani-tarian assistance and secure peaceoperations that only American militaryforces can provide. Effective and efficient“peace-building” efforts must remain animportant element of any national securitystrategy. The current situation in Afghan-istan highlights again that post-conflictsocieties can become breeding grounds forcrime and terrorism if some sort of order isnot imposed.

To prevent peacekeeping assignmentsfrom dragging on and tying up scarceassets, the Army and supporting agenciesmust become better at nation-building.Though President Bush has againreiterated his resistance to that mission,long-term solutions to create a more stableworld will require the United States toengage in it, and only the Army can really

do it in an environment of questionablesecurity. Success in stabilization operationsand success in the war against terrorismwill be closely linked because of thecause-effect relationship that existsbetween them and because of the similarityof unit requirements. The service should bedaunted by—and prepare for—the respon-sibilities it might assume to help stabilizeand rebuild Afghanistan after bin Ladenand his supporters are rooted out.

The Army must also retain its ability todeter and fight wars. Cross-border wars ofaggression are not the most likely type ofconflict predicted for the future, but theyare certainly not impossible and clearlyrequire forces ready to fight them. In fact, itis precisely because forces are ready to fightthem that they are so unlikely. Even in thewar on terrorism, where major combatforces will likely have only limited utility,they will still be essential if operationsexpand to take on states that supportterrorism. The most powerful military forceon the planet remains a joint force basedaround a heavy corps, and those units mustnot be allowed to atrophy. Cross borderincursions remain a threat in Asia and theMiddle East. The Bush administration’sstern warning to Iraq not to attempt to takeadvantage of America’s concentration onterrorism would not be an effectivedeterrent without the joint force—includinglandpower—to back it up.

While the Army must continue toemphasize the importance of a balancedjoint force to fight and deter wars, it mustalso simultaneously maintain its focus onlong-term transformation. The evolvingrequirements of the war against terrorismwill highlight even more the necessity forlighter, smarter, more lethal, and moreagile forces. As originally conceived,transformation was to prepare the Army forfuture wars. That concept needs to beshaped by the new geostrategic focus on

28

terrorism and then probably should beaccelerated to allow the new capabilities tobring increased levels of effectiveness to thewar on terrorism.

Force Structure Considerations.

When combined with ongoing missionsand responsibilities, the demands of thenew focus on fighting terrorism will strainthe Army considerably and highlight manyshortfalls in its structure. The force thatfought and won Operation DESERTSTORM is long gone. The current Army isreally too small to fight a major land waragainst a state like Iraq without even morecoalition landpower augmentation than itreceived in the Gulf War, but it is alsodeficient in many elements necessary tofight terrorism, provide for homelanddefense, and conduct peace operations. Thenumber of active component intelligence,psychological operations, civil affairs,military police, and engineer units must beincreased, not only to perform contempo-rary peacekeeping and stabilizationfunctions, but also to meet the newdemands of the war against terrorism,including significantly increased forceprotection requirements around the world.

Performing all these missions will alsobe very stressful on the National Guard andArmy Reserve. They will be pulled betweenfuture significant and immediate require-ments for homeland security, the recentdemands of peace operations, and the needto support or participate in the overseasfight against terrorism. If more of theReserve Components are committed toduties at home, deployment schedules forthe Balkans could be affected, increasingthe burden on active forces for peacekeepingin Bosnia and Kosovo. The 50,000 reservistsbeing called up and National Guard troopsproviding airport security are only thebeginning of a long-term commitment tohomeland security and consequence

management which, if the mission remainswith the Reserve Components, mightseriously compromise their ability tosupport a major theater war. Currentmobilization plans clearly need review andprobably need significant revision.

The war against terrorism is only one ofmany essential missions the Army mustperform. The service must be veryforthright with Congress and the Bushadministration about the additional forcesneeded to conduct its myriad of importantduties. The HQDA staff should immediatelydevelop plans and gather support to beginthe process of expanding and restructuringthe force. Recruiting, training, andequipping new soldiers and units will taketime. While Reserve Component mobiliza-tion and some economy of force efforts mightsuffice in the short term to meet Armyrequirements, these arrangements cannotbe maintained for a long period withoutdebilitating the force and raising the level ofrisk for long-term missions.

In summary, maintaining strategicbalance will require more than just betterguidance, planning, and training. Increasedforce structure—accompanied by revisionsin the makeup of that structure and byreallocation between the Active andReserve Components—will be necessary toenhance the Army’s ability to fight the waragainst terrorism while simultaneouslykeeping the peace in other areas. Thesimultaneous and ongoing demands forhomeland security, anti-terrorist strikes,peace operations, and deterring war willrequire more land forces, especially in theActive Component, and mostly in the areasof CS, CSS, and SOF. Increasingintelligence assets will be especially crucial.Forces will need to be reapportionedbetween the Active and ReserveComponents and reserve units reconfiguredto handle new and existing long-termrequirements. At the same time, the Service

29

cannot become so focused on currentoperations that the momentum anddirection of transformation is lost. Theworld changed on September 11, 2001, andthe Army must adjust accordingly. But itslong-term vision remains viable, and thecourse to reach it must be maintained.

30

This paper provides a brief analysis ofthe U.S. homeland’s current threats andvulnerabilities, outlines a general strategyfor homeland defense and the war againstterrorism, and discusses some salient issuesrelated to command and control.

Assumptions.

The U.S. will continue to wage a multi-lateral and sustained war against allterrorist organizations with “global reach”and their state (and nonstate) sponsors.Hence, homeland security requires along-term perspective.

Unless significant legislative changesoccur, the U.S. military will perform mosthomeland security missions in support ofother federal agencies.

The U.S. will remain politically andeconomically engaged in the world. It willmaintain sufficient military presenceoverseas to deter aggression and honor itsalliance and treaty commitments.

Threats and Vulnerabilities.

Terrorism. Despite heightened aware-ness and increased security efforts since thetragic events of September 11, 2001, theU.S. remains vulnerable to a wide variety ofterrorist attacks. On October 5, 2001, forinstance, the Project on Government Over-sight reported that America’s ten nuclearweapons research and production facilitiesare still inadequately protected. A reportrecently published by the Henry L. StimsonCenter revealed that the 850,000 sites thatproduce, consume, and store hazardouschemical materials in the U.S. remainvirtually unprotected.

Furthermore, while much attentionremains focused on the war overseas,domestic terrorist organizations—e.g., the“Michigan Militia,” the “Order,” and the“Aryan Nations”—remain at large anddangerous. Until September 11, 2001,international and domestic terrorists hadclaimed 670 lives on U.S. soil in over 2,700

31

SEVEN

Homeland Security Issues:A Strategic Perspective

Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II

Conclusions:• The new war being waged against America is a form of asymmetric warfare

using terror tactics, not a standard terrorism campaign.• DoD’s role is evolving but will likely remain largely a supporting one in

homeland defense.• The new threat environment and the numerous “vulnerabilities” within the

homeland require a new way of thinking about “threats” and how to addressthem.

• Assessments of critical infrastructure and key assets require updating.• NMD will remain a critical component of homeland defense.• The nation needs a Federal Defense Plan to complement the Federal Response

Plan (FRP) that exists for consequence management.

incidents, with white racist groups causingthe majority (51 percent) of deaths.Domestic terrorist groups could wellretaliate in response to the federalgovernment’s introduction of increasedsecurity measures in the aftermath ofSeptember 11.

Although the number of internationaland domestic terrorist attacks has declinedin the 1990s, the lethality of those attackshas risen dramatically. This rising lethalitycan be looked at in one of two ways: 1) as theemergence of a “new” or “apocalyptic” brandof terrorism bent on producing masscasualties, or 2) as a new or “asymmetric”form of warfare that employs terror tactics.The first view tends to regard “terrorism” asan aggregate, placing disparate terroristgroups—such as the Aryan Nations, theIRA, and al- Qaeda—into a single category.In so doing, it obscures their ideological,political, and cultural differences. Anunderstanding of such differences is criticalto the development of effective strategies fordefeating such groups. The IRA has shown aproclivity to employ small-scale attacksthat do not involve large numbers ofcasualties and which damage infra-structure such as power grids. These areclearly not the tactics of the al-Qaeda group.The motives of al-Qaeda, unlike those of theIRA or the Aryan Nations, have uniquereligious and cultural underpinnings which,if not understood, could result in anescalation of the current conflict or lead toother negative strategic consequences forthe U.S., its allies, and coalition partners.Thus, a “one-size-fits-all” approach toterrorism could lead to an inappropriatestrategy for defending the homeland and forconducting military operations overseas.

The U.S. Army and DoD would do better,therefore, to take the view that America isengaged in a new or asymmetric style ofwarfare perpetrated by certain states andnonstate actors who prefer terror tactics.

This view permits the disaggregation of“terrorism” based on useful criteria such aspolitical and cultural motives, enabling abetter understanding of a particular group’sstrengths and weaknesses. It alsofacilitates development of a more integratednational security strategy, one thatprovides for a comprehensive defense of thehomeland while also dealing with nonstateactors and their state sponsors. Third, itallows the U.S. Army to demonstrate thestrategic relevance of its core competenciesand its transformation programs. The Armyshould also stress how the campaign inAfghanistan has highlighted the limitationsof an airpower-centric approach to warfare.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological,Nuclear, and High-Explosive/High-Yield(CBRNE) Weapons. CBRNE weaponscontinue t o prol i ferate. Seventeencountries—including Iran, Iraq, Libya, andNorth Korea—have active chemical andbiological weapons programs. While itremains difficult to manufacture, deliver,and activate certain types of CBRNEweapons, the apparent availability of“free-lance” expertise from the former SovietUnion combined with today’s rapid pace oftechnological innovation suggests thatpotential adversaries will succeed inovercoming these difficulties sooner ratherthan later. The recent decision to increasethe reserve of smallpox and anthrax vaccinesis, therefore, encouraging.

Critical (and Other) Infrastructure. In1997, the Presidential Commission onCritical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP)assessed the vulnerability of the nation’scritical infrastructure. At that time, U.S.critical infrastructure included: 400airports; 1,900 seaports; 6,000 bus and railtransit terminals; 1,700 inland riverterminals; 1.4 million miles of oil andnatural gas pipelines; and other banking,financial, and energy-related networks. TheCommission assessed the Energy, Physical

32

Distribution, and Banking and Financesectors as either well-protected or relativelyresilient to an attack, while it regarded theVital Human Services and Information andCommunications sectors as highly vulner-able to cyber and physical forms of attack.

The PCCIP admitted that it did notknow enough about water-borne pathogensand the threat they could pose if releasedinto the nation’s water supply. TheAmerican Waterworks Association(AWWA) maintains that the sheer volume,chlorine content, and multiple filtrationsystems built into major water suppliesmake them resistant to contamination byall but a few pathogens. At risk, however,are smaller water supplies.

Unfortunately, the PCCIP also com-pletely overlooked the nation’s agriculturalinfrastructure. While the U.S. Departmentof Agriculture (USDA) is confident that itcan respond to “natural, accidental, andinadvertent introductions” of exoticdiseases and pests into the food supply andagricultural system, it admits that it isincapable of addressing the “widespreadintentional introduction” of such threats.The number of pathogens and other agentsthat could devastate U.S. livestock andcrops are numerous and inexpensive todevelop. Since the U.S. produces some30-50 percent of many of the world’sfoodstuffs, an agricultural crisis could haveglobal implications.

The PCCIP also failed to consider theentertainment and recreational industries—amusement parks, sports arenas, shoppingmalls, and other locations where largenumbers of people gather. While notnecessarily critical to the nation’s ability tofunction, these are the types of targets thatal-Qaeda and other such organizationsseem inclined to strike. A successfulCBRNE attack against Disney World or amajor sports arena, for example, couldresult not only in thousands of casualties,

but in adverse economic consequences aswell.

The PCCIP’s oversights combined withthe rapid pace of urbanization and economicdevelopment, even since 1997, suggest thatthe Commission’s assessment requiresimmediate updating. By way of illustration,in 1999 the National InfrastructureProtection Center (NIPC), an interagencyoffice housed at the FBI, identified a list ofjust over 200 key national assets requiringprotection. However, its FY01 report isexpected to include a total of 4,385 keyassets.

The Cyber Threat. In February 2000, theDirector of the CIA testified before Congressthat the foreign cyber threat was growingrapidly. More than one dozen countries—including Russia, the PRC, and severalstates of concern—have developed, or aredevelop- ing, the means to launchstrategic-level cyber attacks. The inter-connectedness of much of the nation’sinfrastructure means that a successfulcyber attack against one sector will likelyresult in adverse effects in others.

Ballistic Missiles. Today, more than 25countries possess ballistic missileprograms, though only two, Russia andChina, currently have missiles capable ofreaching the U.S. The Rumsfeld Com-mission reported that North Korea and Irancould build ballistic missiles capable ofstriking the U.S. within 5 years of decidingto do so. Iraq could have the same capabilitywithin 10 years of such a decision. It isdifficult, if not impossible, to know preciselywhen one of these states might take such adecision. North Korea, Iran, and Iraq havealso been known sponsors of terrorism forsome time. In other words, America’s waragainst terrorism could lead in time to aconfrontation with one or more statescapable of targeting the U.S. with ballisticmissiles.

33

Cruise Missiles. Cruise missiles includea wide variety of types, ranging fromrelatively inexpensive unmanned aerialvehicles (UAVs) to the more expensiveU.S.-made Tomahawks. Intelligenceestimates indicate that some 80,000 cruisemissiles of numerous types will exist by2010. More than 75 countries alreadypossess some kind of cruise missiles, andthe technology for developing them isproliferating rapidly. Many types inexistence today can be concealed in andlaunched from standard shipping con-tainers. On average, 1500 ships carryingstandard containers navigate the Pacificand Atlantic oceans within cruise-missilerange of the United States every day.

“Threats” versus Vulnerabilities.

Today’s threat environment reflects theinfluences of a faster-paced and more inter-connected world. In this environment, thetraditional notion that “a threat =capabilities x intentions” remains valid forconventional warfare, but has seriousdeficiencies when applied to America’s“New War.” In the attacks of September 11,2001, for example, terrorists demonstratedan ability to use common materials—boxknives and airliners filled with fuel—ratherthan uniquely military “capabilities.” Theso-called capabilities of al-Qaeda andsimilar terrorist groups are, therefore,limited only by their imagination and theirability to gain access to the specific itemsthey want to use.

Moreover, the general intention of suchgroups is self-evident, namely, to hurt theU.S. in whatever way possible. Yet, thespecific intentions of individual tacticalcells—such as which targets will beattacked, when, and how—are much moredifficult to divine and are clearly much moreimportant. The traditional definition of“threat” essentially provided a usefulcalculus for the strategy of deterrence that

characterized the Cold War. However, it isinadequate for the new security environ-ment in which an enormous number ofvulnerabilities exist, and where many of theplayers do not readily conform with the“rational-actor” model.

National Missile Defense (NMD).America’s war on terrorism will make NMDmore important to U.S. security despite thefact that attacks so far have been largely“asymmetric.” Since a long war againstterrorism and its state-sponsors runs therisk of escalating into a war against one ormore states of concern, the U.S. iseffectively in a race against time to developsome type of comprehensive missile defensesystem. Reports that development of anNMD system will proceed are, therefore,encouraging. The U.S. should maintain aglobal perspective when it comes to missiledefense, since an attack against an ally orstrategic partner could adversely affectAmerica’s ability to protect its interests.

A Strategy for Defense. Mostgovernment- sponsored studies of homelandsecurity have focused primarily on issuesrelated to consequence management.Indeed, defense seems a nearly impossibletask, given the large number of potentialtargets, the vast number of scenarios, andthe overall financial expenditures that aneffective defense would likely require.While consequence management is clearlyimportant, the events of September 11,2001, demonstrate that the absence of acomprehensive, preventive strategy forhomeland defense can result in anenormous loss of lives and even greaterfinancial costs than prudent defensivemeasures would have entailed.

One of the first actions that the Office ofHomeland Security (OHS) shouldundertake, therefore, is to develop acomprehensive strategy for homelanddefense. A Federal Defense Plan wouldprovide a critical element in that strategy.

34

DoD’s strategists and war planners couldprovide valuable assistance in thedevelopment of both. One possible outlinefor a homeland defense strategy follows:

1. Prevention: Hardening potentialtargets—whether nuclear reactors or shop-ping malls—against attack. This measurewill require thorough vulnerabilityanalyses involving all forms of attack.

2. Active Countermeasures: Systematicsurveillance and preemptive confrontationwith known terrorist sympathizers andsupporters, increased law enforcementand/or military presence, and an activepublicity campaign designed to letterrorists know that the U.S. is prepared torespond.

3. Aggressive Intelligence: Proactiveintelligence gathering, analysis, dissemina-tion, and sharing among appropriatenational (and international) agencies, alliesand coalition partners, and state and locallaw enforcement authorities. This is themost essential and yet most complicatedcomponent due to legal constraintsregarding the collection of intelligence onU.S. citizens.

4. Development of Indicators: A set oftriggering events that could be used to focusintelligence efforts and/or initiate counter-measures.

5. Anticipatory Crisis Response:Multilateral, global response mechanismsdesigned in anticipation of terrorist attacks.This component would include coordination(particularly with Canada and Mexico),training, readiness evaluation, andrehearsals of what to do and how to do it inthe event of an attack.

This model served the U.S. well in theGulf War (1990-91) by helping military andcivilian officials deter or defeat Iraqiterrorist attacks. It offers a clear reminderthat effective homeland defense requires aglobal perspective, particularly with regardto intelligence.

Successful execution of any strategy willrequire effective management by an over-arching organization, such as the OHS.While personal influence, individualleadership skills and direct access to thePresident will help, ultimately the OHS’seffectiveness will depend upon the degree ofbudgetary and legal authority it has overthe more than 40 federal and otherorganizations that play a role in homelandsecurity.

Command and Control. Militarycommand and control in homeland defensecould take a variety of forms, from enlargingJoint Task Force-Civil Support to standingup a unified combatant command.

Recent studies that recommend againststanding up a U.S. combatant commandmight have arrived at the right answer forthe wrong reasons. One study split the over-arching mission of homeland security intotwo parts: defense of the U.S. and support tocivil authorities. The author saw littleadvantage in combining the two parts of theoverall mission under one command, acommand that, if current plans remain ineffect, would not have assigned forces.Instead, he recommended that UCP’01reflect a short-term fix by (1) consolidatingcivil support functions at JFCOM throughthe realignment of DOMS from the Army toOSD and the Joint System, and (2)assigning NMD to SPACECOM.

However, such objections do not standup to closer scrutiny. First, whether asynergy exists between the two homelandsecurity missions—and whether this is avalid criterion for not putting them under asingle command—are matters of judgment.One could combine both missions under onecommand to facilitate coordination andreduce possible conflicts over resources.Second, the fact that forces are notcurrently assigned does not necessarilypreclude their assignment at a later date.The problem of defending the homeland is

35

larger than the solution a revised UCPcould provide. The nation needs a FederalDefense Plan to complement the FederalResponse Plan that exists for consequencemanagement.

A more compelling reason for notcreating a “CINC America” is that currentlaws prohibit the military from collectingand storing intelligence on U.S. citizens.Until those laws are changed, a militarycombatant commander cannot gather theintelligence necessary to take proactivesteps in defense of the homeland.Accordingly, a combatant commanderwould do little more than respond to“taskings” for military forces by the FBI orother lead federal agencies. It is far fromcertain that the courts would grantexceptions to the law, even under a wartimefooting. At issue are privacy rights and civilliberties, the preservation of which remainsan enduring vital interest of the U.S. and itscitizens.

If legislative changes do not occur, thenthe establishment of a para-military civildefense force might offer a better long-termsolution for defending the homeland. A civildefense force would not fall under theconstraints of the Posse Comitatus Act andcould perform a variety of functions, such asprotecting key national assets andaugmenting local law enforcement, borderguards, customs officials, and the CoastGuard. It could come under the control of anorganization similar to the OHS.

36

The Issue.

Events on September 11, 2001, changedmany aspects of the domestic securityenvironment. Those changes will ultimatelyredefine the military role in domesticsecurity, which will subsequently affectArmy missions. After a solid analysis of thenew or revised missions, the Army will berequired to adjust its force structuresignificantly and adapt to major DoDstructural changes, particularly thosenecessitated by development of the Home-land Security Agency.

The military’s role in domestic securityhas evolved over many years and isconstrained by the Constitution of theUnited States and subsequent laws. Thatevolution has been engendered by periodicchanges in the domestic securityenvironment, either when new require-ments were identified or when old methodsof dealing with previously-identifiedrequirements were found to be inadequate.The military’s current role in domestic

security is officially defined by a collection ofDoD and other agency documents.

1This

paper will examine the major changes forthe military role and will determine whichof those are likely to result in significantchanges for the Army’s mission. Thedomestic security environment is dividedinto two dimensions for purposes ofexamining the issues pertinent to militaryroles and missions. The first, crisismanagement, is the prevention of eventsthat threaten national security. The second,consequence management, deals with thosetimes when prevention fails, and themilitary and others respond to those eventsto minimize damage and effect recovery.Consequence management also covers theactions taken to provide consequences forthe perpetrator of the event. Anyexamination of changes in requirements—orassignment of responsibility for thoserequirements—in domestic security mustconsider both prevention actions and responseactions.

37

EIGHT

The Military’s Role in the New DomesticSecurity Environment: Will Army Missions Change?

Colonel Dallas D. Owens

Conclusions:• Events on September 11, 2001, changed aspects of the domestic security

environment that will ultimately redefine military roles and affect Armymissions for domestic security.

• New or enhanced Army missions are in the areas of internal air defense,international response, intelligence sharing, immigration support, nationallevel coordination, law enforcement support, and infrastructure protection.

• The Army’s Active Component is likely to require additional air defense,intelligence, and information operations forces.

• The Army’s Reserve Components are likely to require significant additionalincreases in military police forces and minor increases in air defense,intelligence, and information operations forces.

Prevention and Response

Requirements.

With perhaps one exception, no newpreventive requirements were discovered inthe aftermath of the attacks on September11. Before the attack, there were validrequirements to identify potential enemies,deny them entry into the United States, andto apprehend those who nonetheless wereable to enter and would commit criminalacts. These roles were primarily performed,respectively, by the intelligence community,immigration services, and the Departmentof Justice. The military provide some minoramount of support to the intelligencecollection effort and some likewise smallamount of assistance to immigrationagencies (primarily border patrol support).Military support to law enforcement isgenerally proscribed by law. The onepotentially new or—more accurately—renewed requirement is for internal airdefense, i.e., prevention of a similar attackin which terrorists use the airplane as abomb. Air marshals and airport securityoffices will play a major role in this effort,but the air defense role is uniquely suited tothe military since no other agency has thenecessary equipment, training, andresponse time to perform the roleadequately.

In the response category, there has beenno change in the requirement to respond,either domestically or internationally.However, there has been a subtle shift inthe meaning of the international response.After a criminal incident of this nature,American citizens expect immediateresponse in the form of domestic disasterassistance, normally coordinated by theFederal Emergency Management Agency,with military support provided asnecessary. They also expect theperpetrators to be caught and brought tojustice as quickly as possible. Domestically,

this role is normally performed by theDepartment of Justice, working with local,state, and federal law enforcementagencies. This requirement remains valid,but the magnitude of the attack has causedit to be characterized as an act of war,making the military the expected mainmeans of dealing with the perpetrators.This role is the norm for internationalresponse, but the domestic division ofresponsibility between civilian lawenforcement agencies and the military is yetto be defined completely.

Internationally, the military is currentlyat center stage in responding to the attack.The stage is shared by the Department ofState, but for the purpose of finding androoting out Usama bin Laden and al Qaida,at least in Afghanistan, the military isclearly in the lead, with the StateDepartment supporting with diplomaticefforts to obtain basing rights, maintaincoalitions, etc. Subsequent stages of the warmay find the lead role taken by theDepartment of State as the push formilitary action dissipates.

The military is comfortable with itstraditional role as international responder,but there are new strategic implications tosuccess or failure. The traditional battle-war linkage has become a more directbattle- national perception linkage. In otherwords, a successful battle or operationwould lead not only to the longer-term goalof “winning a war,” but also to theestablishment and sustainment of theperception of security by the populace of thehomeland. Failed operations no longerrepresent a short-term setback withtangential effects on popular opinion; theymay have immediate consequences forfeelings of security. The requirement forpublic success for every operation will be anenormous burden on the military.

38

Prevention and Response Failures.

In the prevention category, intelligenceis most often noted publicly as a failure.Most cite inadequate coordination andinsufficient resources as the major causesfor that failure. The resource issuesurrounds both personnel (type andnumber) and funds, with a major focus onhuman intelligence. Correcting this failure,particularly the human intelligence aspect,will take long-term investment thatrecognizes the difficulty and risk inidentifying and infiltrating terrorist cells.The coordination issue involves intelligencesharing, both national and international,and is linked to the coordination of thecollection and dissemination effort. Themilitary has little stake in the collectionissue, but has significant stake inintelligence sharing.

Response failures continue to beidentified. Domestically, the creation of acabinet-level post for homeland defenseindicates some recognition that improve-ments in response coordination are needed.The actual events did not create thisrecognition,

2but they drove home its

importance and immediacy. Infrastructuresecurity measures have been condemned onmany fronts; again, few of the inadequaciescame as a surprise. Recognition of domesticinadequacies has two consequences for themilitary. As a supporting agency, theoversight and coordination role at thecabinet level will have some effect on howsupport is provided, but that effect will onlygradually be felt as the post evolves.Infrastructure protection will affect themilitary in the short term with assignmentsof missions to complement capabilities oflaw enforcement to protect selected keyassets. Concurrently, force protectionrequirements have increased at militaryfacilities, its own internal key infra-structure.

Army Missions.

The impact on military roles will affectArmy missions when the Army is theappropriate service for performing themilitary role. New missions include:

Internal Air Defense: Though much ofthis mission will fall to the Air Force, theArmy may be expected to provide airdefense for fixed key infrastructure. Thismission is similar to or an extension of thatproposed as part of the missile defenseprogram, which has significant forcestructure implications.

3

Recommendation: Determine theArmy’s mission and analyze the adequacy ofexisting structure. If the requirement islarge, constant, and long term, the Army’sActive Component (AC) will requireadditional air defense forces. The ReserveComponent could provide near-termsupport while the AC restructures.

International Response: The Armywill not necessarily see changes at thetactical level, depending on how battles areconducted. It will be a challenge to Armyleadership to ensure that the perceivedrequirement to succeed in every battle doesnot affect the performance of its units.

Recommendation: The Army canattempt to shield its units from unduepressures, but the CINCs and DoD havemore ability than the services to meet thischallenge. The military should alsoanticipate an occasional tactical failure andassume such failures will become public. Aplan should be prepared to minimize theimpact of such failures on the publicperception of increased threat to its securityand to strategic goals.

Intelligence Sharing: Though not anew mission for the Army, the newemphasis will have some impact on theArmy as a collector and user of intelligence.The greatest burden is likely to be in therequirement to receive greater amounts of

39

intelligence at the higher echelons of theArmy. Receiving more may requireadditional assets to interpret anddisseminate what is received. The greatdanger is that more would be received, butnot disseminated to the units that need itmost.

Recommendation: The Army shouldreassess its ability to receive, interpret, anddisseminate intelligence. If that abilityproves insufficient, intelligence assetsshould be increased.

Immigration Support: The Army’smission for immigration support hastraditionally been in the areas of commandand control and communications. The lawenforcement nature of border patrolling isbeyond what the Army sees as its domesticrole and is not legally appropriate undermost routine circumstances. However, theArmy National Guard—in state status, notfederal—may perform law enforcementfunctions. The Army’s position will probablyremain one of only providing short-termsupport, preferably not of a law enforcementnature, until immigration can expandcapacity to the needed level.

Recommendation: Anticipating along-term demand for intermittent support,the Army needs to analyze the skills neededfor such support and make the minorchanges in RC force structure necessary tomeet that requirement. The RC is the mostappropriate force to meet the requirementbecause of its intermittent and short-termnature.

National Level Coordination:Clearly a perception exists thatcoordination of homeland security has“failed,” but it is not yet certain what thenew office will do to correct that failure orhow successful those corrections will be. Atthis point, it is equally clear that themilitary will need to respond to newcoordination demands, but specifics arelacking. Likewise, the Army’s mission in

this coordination scheme is not yetapparent. The DoD will continue to makeinternal adjustments and the Army’smission will become more clear over thenext few months. The Army’s mission forsupport to civilian authorities will receivenew emphasis and reorganizationrecommendations like those provided by theHart-Rudman Commission

4will receive

new consideration.Recommendation: The overall mili-

tary reorganization will largely determinethe Army’s reaction. However, the Armyshould resist pressures to restructureradically—at the expense of importantlong-term issues—to address immediateconcerns. Restructuring responsibilitiesand staffs to coordinate DoD responsebetter is certainly necessary. Some forcerestructuring is also needed, but manyrecommendations being proposed, bothinternal to DoD and in Congress, may not bebeneficial to either the Army or the Nation.

Law Enforcement Support: Underthe general rubric of “security,” alabor-intensive Army mission resulted fromthe 11 September attacks. The guards atairports and Army facilities were thehighest profile Army missions. Thesemissions were not new, but the “off-site”security requirements are a unique andpotentially large twist to expectedconsequence management. If this mission isseen as a long-term or frequently-spikingrequirement, there are definite forcestructure implications. The Army’s militarypolice are already in high demand withpeacekeeping and routine installationrequirements. Significant additionalrequirements certainly exceed capabilities.If the current novel funding status of ArmyNational Guard airport security portendsthings to come, the Active and ReserveComponents both need more military policestructure. Indeed, it is possible to havesoldiers other than military police perform

40

security missions and many securitymissions are only marginally lawenforcement in nature, but it is wise to haveappropriately trained soldiers performmissions that even loosely fall into thecategory of law enforcement duties.

Recommendation: See InfrastructureProtection.

Infrastructure Protection: Themission of infrastructure protection clearlycrosses the boundaries of two, and possiblythree, missions already discussed: domesticair defense, law enforcement, and (possibly)immigration support. The preferred missionfor the Army is to have long-termresponsibility for its own facilities, but onlyshort-term enhancement missions fornonmilitary infrastructure. If the latterbecome long term or the short-term spikesbecome frequent, the Army’s force structurewould certainly be affected. The nature ofthose effects would depend on themagnitude of the mission and types ofinfrastructure selected for protection. Forinstance, information network protectionmissions are far different than port securityprotection, both in manpower levels andskills.

Recommendation: Each of the threerelated missions (domestic air defense, lawenforcement, and immigration support) andinfrastructure protection have minor forcestructure impacts. Cumulative impacts,though, are potentially significant. For theAC, those impacts may be for additional airdefense, intelligence, and informationoperations forces. For the RC, implicationsare for significantly more military policeforces and minor increases in the threetypes having impacts on the AC. Most ofthese requirements likely will be met withexisting structure. The AC will need tomake difficult choices to shift forces, but theRC should have less difficulty. The ArmyNational Guard has previously committedto providing increased combat support and

combat service support forces through theirDivision Redesign program. Traditionally,the Army Reserve also readily changes itsforce structure to remain complementary toactive forces.

Endnotes.

1. For consequence management, the definingdocuments are the Federal Response Plan, U.S.Government Interagency Domestic TerrorismConcept of Operations Plan, DoD Directive 5100.1(Functions of the Department of Defense and ItsMajor Components), and the 3025 series of DoDDirectives on Military Assistance to CivilAuthorities (MACA). Domestically, the DoD role isclearly one of support to a Lead Federal Agency(LFA) in either crisis management (LFA:Department of Justice) or consequence management(LFA: Federal Emergency Management Agency).For consequence management, missions would bethe outcome of taskings by the LFA, subsequent toRequests For Assistance (RFAs) from local and Statefirst responders. For crisis management, the LFAwould request assistance as appropriate to thenature of the threat.

2. The Hart-Rudmann Commission and othersidentified this need prior to the event.

3. Antulio J. Echevarria II, The Army andHomeland Security: A Strategic Perspective, CarlisleBarracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March2001.

4. For discussion about the assumptions behindand implications of the Hart-Rudman Commissionrecommendations, see Ian Roxborough, The Hart-Rudman Commission and the Homeland Defense,Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,September 2001. Also see Michael P. Fleming,National Security Roles for the National Guard,Journal of Homeland Defense, August 2001,http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/article.cfm?article=20

41

The deployment of Army forces, both toAfghanistan to fight terrorists and through-out the United States for homeland defense,places additional strain on an Army forcestructure that is already overcommitted. Itshould already be obvious to militaryplanners, but as war efforts continue athome and abroad, it will becomeincreasingly clear that the Army needs asignificant increase in its force structure.There will be no corresponding reduction inthe requirements for the Army’s numerousother missions: worldwide engagement,transformation, strategic reserve. Theincreased requirements for homelanddefense and the overseas war on terrorismare permanent—or at least long term—andwill require major force structure growth,restructuring of the force and reapportion-ment among the Active and ReserveComponents.

To assess the adequacy of its forcestructure, the Army develops a simultaneity

stack of mission task-organized forces(MTOFs). This list of MTOFs represents theforces needed by the Army when the UnitedStates is confronted with a demandingdomestic and global environment, present-ing the Army with several simultaneousmajor missions. To be judged adequate, theevaluated force structure must be capable tosome degree of simultaneously accomplish-ing all the missions in that stack. Since arealistic scenario is used instead of the“worst case,” some acceptable level of risk isassumed. Because the Nation hasmaintained much of the strategic focus thatpertained prior to the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, the simultaneity stack afterthat date retains several MTOFs with onlymarginal changes. The increases in the otherMTOFs, though, will produce significantchange in the total force structure—both itssize and composition—and in the allocationof that structure between the Active andReserve Components.

43

NINE

Defining Preparedness:Army Force Structure in the War on Terrorism

Colonel John R. Martin

Conclusions:• Significant growth of Army force structure will be required to prosecute the war

on terrorism successfully. Virtually all mission task-organized forces will haveincreases, but the predominant growth will be in homeland defense and theforces needed to fight the antiterrorism battle overseas.

• Reduction in forces assigned to other missions is not prudent. The Army stillneeds the forces to transform, to constitute a strategic reserve and to maintaina strategic balance around the world.

• The Reserve Components should constitute the majority of the forces forconsequence management, but forces for homeland defense should comepredominantly from the Active Component.

• The strategic reserve should retain its combat structure, giving it the flexibilityto perform a variety of missions across the spectrum of conflict.

Even before the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, the simultaneity stack wasevolving, reflecting the focus of the newadministration and its review of thenational security strategy. Perhaps themost significant change involved the forcesto conduct major combat operations.Previous administrations felt that it wasessential to maintain the forces to fight twomajor theater wars (MTWs) simulta-neously. The new administration believedthat the probability of simultaneous MTWswas low enough to justify a new measure.Forces would have to be able to fight a“large” MTW and a “small” one at roughlythe same time. It was understood, at leastimplicitly, that these forces would also haveto be able to defeat enemies who mightchoose to fight asymmetrically. AfterSeptember 11, the defeat of terrorismbecame an explicit part of this element ofthe simultaneity stack; requirements grewand the mission element assumed amuch-higher priority.

The other simultaneity stack element toget a major priority boost after September11 was the homeland security MTOF.Although many indicators before that datesuggested homeland security neededattention, it continued to be given lowpriority, primarily because of constraints inthe budget. With inadequate funds toaccomplish all of its missions, the Armyplaced homeland security on a lowerpriority so it could maintain its appropriatefocus on fighting major wars and marshalits resources for current readiness andtransformation. With the exception ofnational missile defense, most of thehomeland security effort was focused onconsequence management, not homelanddefense, either passive or active. As a directresult of the attacks, both elements ofhomeland security are receiving increasedattention, which should quickly validate theneed for added capabilities to defend the

United States and its interests and to reactwhen attack inevitably occurs. Whetherthose capabilities are produced or notdepends upon budget sufficiency and properprioritization. Neither is yet assured.

Some voices have called for reduction ofthe amount of forces allocated to thedeterrence MTOF. These are the forces usedby each regional Commander-in-Chief toexecute his day-to-day requirements toshape a particular part of the world. ThisMTOF also includes the forces needed toconduct critical smaller-scale contingencies(SSCs) in areas such as the Balkans and theSinai. Fortunately, the voices calling fordeterrence reductions are not prevailing. Tomaintain strategic balance while fightingthe war on terrorism, the United Statesmust continue to focus a large amount of itsforces in locations where the risk of conflictis low. That risk will remain low—aprerequisite for fighting the war onterrorism—only if U.S. forces maintainadequate levels of engagement worldwide.Although some limited economies might bepossible, any cuts would be quicklysubsumed by the need to increase forceprotection for units exposed to terroristaction.

The transformation MTOF is alsogetting increased attention sinceSeptember 11. While some call for reductionof transformation to allow concentration onthe current war, most call instead fortransformation to be adapted to the post-September 11 geostrategic environmentand to be accelerated. In any event, theforces required to execute transformationproperly will increase, although probablynot by an order of magnitude.

Other MTOFs in the simultaneitystack—the generating force, forces toconduct noncritical SSCs, the strategicreserve—are not significantly differentafter September 11. Those forces needed togenerate and project power overseas have

44

increased force protection concerns, butthey should be captured under thehomeland security MTOF. The same forceprotection requirements apply to thenoncritical SSC units, although thoserequirements must be documented insidethat MTOF. The size of the strategicreserve, a hedge against uncertainty, is alsoprobably not noticeably different.

It is clear that the force structurerequirements for the Army have increased.The size of that increase will be a function ofthe breadth of the war aims. If the militarycontinues to take the lead in carrying thewar to Iraq, Libya, Colombia, thePhilippines or wherever, a major expansionof the force will be required, probably atsome point requiring resumption of thedraft. If the target list is not expandedunnecessarily and the other elements ofnational power—diplomatic, economic andinformation—are given the lead, significantmilitary increases will still be required, butthey can perhaps be produced withoutresort to extraordinary methods.

One of the major changes must occur inthe homeland security forces. GovernorRidge and others are calling for the ArmyNational Guard (ARNG) to take the bulk ofthis mission. In the short term, ReserveComponent forces are critical inaccomplishing this mission, particularly thehomeland defense portion. They are theonly sources of available manpower toprovide critical infrastructure protection.This mission, though, ultimately will not bea part-time mission. In the long term, forcesassigned to it must be full-time soldiers.Civil defense forces—perhaps part of anational gendarmerie—should be construc-ted to provide the personnel to man criticaldefensive positions, but an ActiveComponent element should provideleadership and possibly a rapid reactionforce. Equipping and training the civil

defense force should also be an ActiveComponent responsibility.

Because consequence managementrequirements present themselves onlyinfrequently, the predominance of the forcestructure allocated to this mission shouldcontinue to reside with the ReserveComponents. With the majority of itsstructure consisting of combat support (CS)and combat service support (CSS) forces,the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) is alreadytailored for this mission. However, thoseforces will generally be required for MTWsor SSCs. Additional forces must be grown,either in the USAR or the ARNG. TheARNG Division Redesign, although startedyears before the terrorist attacks, continuesto be an important initiative as it convertslow-priority combat structure to CS andCSS. Alternatively, the Army could add thewarfighting CS/CSS requirements to theactive structure and allow the ReserveComponent to focus on consequencemanagement. This would move away fromthe paradigm that requires reserve forcemobilization any time the Army deploys,but has the advantage of replacing thereserve forces that are regularly being usedin an active role supporting ongoingcontingency operations.

The strategic reserve probably changesless than any of the other MTOFs.Preparation for the unexpected requires aflexible force, but one that is focused oncontributing units at the higher end of thespectrum of conflict. The combat structureof the strategic reserve must therefore beretained, but those flexible forces may alsobe of intermittent value in homelanddefense and consequence management.

As defeating terrorism remains a highpriority, the composition of some forces mayneed to change. The Army should begin nowto build more special operations forces(SOF), but must not do so to the detrimentof larger combat formations. Although only

45

SOF and air power have been used insignificant strength thus far, the war onterrorism can still require a “D-Day," wheremajor land, sea and air forces combine todefeat a strong state sponsor of terrorism.

Army transformation must be assessedin light of the war on terrorism and someadaptation is undoubtedly needed. BeforeSeptember 11, though, it seemed safe totake some risk with the transformationprocess, allowing some units to “standdown” while transforming. It is stillimportant that they be stood down, but it isimprudent to assume away the riskinherent in standing down forces. Theremust be enough force structure to allowunits—perhaps two to three brigade combatteams at once—to undergo transformationwithout adversely affecting the accom-plishment of other missions in thesimultaneity stack.

The forces needed to accomplish othermissions in the stack—deterrence, forcegeneration, strategic reserve—need to beonly incrementally larger than beforeSeptember 11. However, because accom-plishment of those missions is critical if thewar on terrorism is to be successful, theforces for those “other” missions must beconsidered as essential as those in the frontline in Afghanistan or guarding criticalinfrastructure in the homeland. The Armymust immediately acknowledge the need forincreased force structure; take promptaction to organize, equip, man and train theunits required; and apportion themappropriately between the Active andReserve Components. Broad war aimsexpected to be implemented quickly willmake successful completion of this taskcritical.

46

Foreign Policy Implications

of September 11.

Until September 11, American foreignpolicy elites debated the utility of variousapproaches to grand strategy. Should theUnited States adhere to a policy ofcooperative security or, mindful of ourunique power, should we pursue a policy ofprimacy? The latter would be tempting.With apparently no other nation in positionto challenge American authority and withthe strongest economy and military forcesin the world, we could consider a unilateralapproach to international affairs. Somepundits have argued that we had alreadychosen the unilateral approach and that ourchoice had been reflected in the rejection of

a series of international treaties andprotocols during the first nine months of2001.

Whatever arguments may have obtainedbefore September 11, the reality of U.S.interdependence with the rest of the worldreadily became apparent as we sought torespond to the most significant attack uponcontinental American soil since Britishforces burned Washington in 1814.Immediately after the attack on the WorldTrade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S.Government chose a policy of coalitionbuilding to seek and destroy terrorists andtheir organizations throughout the world.This policy will have far reachingimplications for U.S. foreign policy in the

47

TEN

The Campaign against Terrorism:Finding the Right Mix of Foreign Policy Instruments

Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie

Conclusions:• If the U.N. is to play a strong and helpful role in the fight against terrorism, as

well as in the stabilization of failing or failed states, the United States will haveto give that organization full moral and financial support.

• Several specific flashpoints in the world call for U.S. diplomatic and military-to-military engagement, and possibly greater policy flexibility. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the Indian/Pakistani confrontation over Kashmir areonly two such cases.

• “Nation building” or “peace building” does not necessarily call for the long-termpresence of U.S. military forces, but does require the attention and resources ofthe world’s leading power, along with the parallel civil-military assets of itsallies.

• The United States must strengthen the range of its human assets and internalcapabilities to influence global affairs. No amount of technology can replace thehuman element required to gather and assess intelligence, conduct diplomacy,and promote military cooperation.

• Our best insurance for the future will be set upon three supports: a strong andunited democratic country, a more capable homeland defense, and a moreeffective capacity to project national power—including landpower—overseas.

years ahead and will strongly influence thestructures of our regional and bilateralrelations worldwide.

Four implications of this policy areimmediately apparent:

• The United States will have to breathenew life into its relationship with theUnited Nations. If that organization is toplay a strong and helpful role in the fightagainst terrorism, as well as in thereconstruction and stabilization of failedstates, we will have to give it full moral andfinancial support.

• Several specific flashpoints in theworld call for U.S. diplomatic engagementand possibly greater policy flexibility. TheIsraeli/Palestinian conflict and the Indian/Pakistani confrontation over Kashmir needthe attention of the United States, perhapsin concert with other significant powers.

• The United States must commit itselfto long-term development efforts in stateswhere instability can threaten the securityof the entire region. “Nation building” or“peace building” does not necessarily call forthe long-term presence of U.S. militaryforces, but it does require the attention andresources of the world’s leading power alongwith the parallel assets of its allies.

• The United States must strengthenthe range of its human assets and internalcapabilities to influence global affairs. Noamount of technology can replace thehuman element required to assessintelligence, conduct diplomacy, influencepublic opinion, and promote militarycooperation.

Strengthening the Role of the United

Nations.

For many years, an article of faithamong foreign diplomats was that theUnited States gained politically far morefrom the existence of the U.N. than anyother country. While many nations mayhave worked against U.S. interests in the

General Assembly, most concluded that theUnited States used its seat in the SecurityCouncil to achieve its ends with remarkablesuccess. Only in recent years, as the UnitedStates began to fall behind in its dues andas U.S. politicians disparaged the organiza-tion, did observers begin to questionwhether we lacked the will to use theorganization we had worked so hard toestablish after World War II.

With the strong support of the SecretaryGeneral and the Security Council for a neweffort against terrorism and with anunderstanding that all member states areobliged to help fight terrorism, the U.S.Government has been handed anopportunity to reengage with theorganization in meaningful ways. Therecent payment of dues, as well as theacknowledgement of President Bush thatthe U.N. can help with nation building andstabilization, holds promise for a revitalizedrelationship. For the United States to retaincredibility, however, we must pay our dueson time and cooperate in as many jointventures with the U.N. as is feasible.Strengthening the U.N.’s Department ofPeacekeeping Operations, as well as itsimportant humanitarian assistanceorganizations, should be high on the list ofAmerican priorities at the U.N.

Dealing with Flashpoints.

While there can be no justification forthe horrific acts of terror the worldwitnessed on September 11, we need tounderstand some of the frustrations whichfuel disaffection and alienation from thenorms of international behavior. Undoub-tedly, no amount of diplomatic or otherpositive activity by the United States willturn the hatred of a relatively small group ofhardened ideologues, but we shouldexamine the causes of so much resentmentof the United States among the broaderMiddle East population. The unresolved

48

conflict between the Palestinians and theIsraelis remains a festering sore which willcontinue to breed atrocities if we and otherinternational partners do not take action.The cycle of violence must be stopped. Yet itis hard to see how this can be done withoutrecognizing Israel’s right to exist on the onehand and a state of Palestine and thelimitation of Israeli settlements on theother. The issue of governance andprotection of holy sites in Jerusalem isperhaps even more inflammatory. It is hardto overestimate the degree of feeling inIsrael and the Arab states on this issue.Unless a plan is devised allowing forunbiased international administration ofthese sites, long-term peace is unlikely, andthe United States will continue to be pulledinto the maelstrom.

Likewise, the international communitycan ill afford to stand by as India andPakistan, both possessing nuclear weapons,continue to struggle over Kashmir. Volatileand subject to pressure from internalradical fundamentalist groups, Pakistanneeds help to find its way out of aself-defeating confrontation which drainsresources and fuels political intemperance.Should Pakistan implode, the consequencesfor the region and, indeed, the world couldbe costly. As Pakistan and India sit at astrategically important point in the world, itseems unlikely that one nation serving as amediator would be sufficient to overcomethe various balance of power interestswhich could militate against a solution.This conflict best lends itself to mediationby a carefully selected contact group ofthree to five nations.

The continued rogue status of Iraq isequally worrisome. Saddam Hussein showsno signs of retreating from his desire todevelop weapons of mass destruction, buthe appears to be winning the propagandawar. Broad sanctions against Iraq areunenforceable, and continued allied efforts

to contain his activities are losinginternational support. Forceful ejection ofSaddam militarily would be costly andpolitically disastrous under currentcircumstances, as we work to build aninternational coalition against terrorism. Apolicy of containment and development of afiner regional understanding of the threatthat he poses to his neighbors would be ourbest strategy at this time. Such a strategyshould be supplemented, nonetheless, withrenewed and quiet warnings to Saddamthat any use of WMD by his governmentwill be met with his own certaindestruction.

Laying the Groundwork for Stability.

Where there is hunger and dire poverty,nothing will advance in the absence ofhumanitarian assistance. It is the sine quanon of existence where all else has failed,but it is not sufficient to ensure a stablefuture. In states threatened by poverty,weakened by corrupt governments, anddevoid of representative structures,instability and violence are liable to emerge,particularly in a world in whichincreasingly accessible views of materialprosperity elsewhere inflame the appetitesof those who have been denied. Demagogueswith ethnic or ideological agendas easilymanipulate such passions.

If the United States wishes to removethe breeding ground of radicalism andpolitical violence, there is no substitute fornation building. There is no cheap ticket tosuccess. A mixture of developmentassistance, strengthening of education andhealth care systems, and, above all, anemphasis on good governance will berequired. The good news is that, in additionto the U.S. military, the United States isrichly endowed with governmental andnongovernmental organizations which canaddress these issues, provided sufficientresources exist. It is time we regard this

49

challenge not solely as a development issue,but as a national security one.

Happily, we don’t have to tackle thesechallenges alone in developing countries.We have partners in Europe and Japan whohave demonstrated interest and commit-ment through generous assistance which,on a per capita basis, far exceeds our own. Inany event, in order to avoid charges ofseeking hegemony either in individualstates or regions of the world, we will find itadvantageous to strengthen our develop-ment partnerships in the OECD and theU.N.

In our efforts to confront globalterrorism, we undoubtedly will deal moreclosely with states from which we have keptat some distance in the past. Uzbekistan is aprime example. With a government which iscorrupt and undemocratic and a recordfurther blemished by the existence ofthousands of political prisoners, Uzbekistanhardly lends itself to traditional Americanassistance. Yet if the United States is toembrace Uzbekistan for practical securityreasons, then we must extend ourdevelopment assistance to it as well,including emphasis on education, goodgovernance, and the development ofdemocratic structures.

While the United States cannot naivelyseek to make the world in its own image, wemust surely recognize, after years ofexperience with failed states, that goodgovernance and legitimate forms of popularrepresentation are essential to develop-ment. Flexibility will be required in statesfragmented by ethnic or religious division.Federal structures, governments ofnational unity, and proportional represen-tation systems, all of which avoid thechimera of “winner take all” solutions, maybe particularly applicable. Further, systemswhich acknowledge the importance oftraditional leaders and fold them intomodern governance may be helpful. We

should not delude ourselves, however.Nation building and the development ofdemocratic processes are hard work.Failure to address these issues, on the otherhand, is even more costly.

Americans regard our technical prowess,economic strength, and proficient militaryas the primary building blocks of oursecurity. Ironically, while these factors areenormously important, they are mostsignificant as support for America’sgreatest strength: our democratic tradition.In a world where ideology may eschewwealth and guerrilla bands and terroristsmay avoid confrontation with over-whelming military force, our genius for goodgovernance and public education may beour most effective long-term weapon. Innorthwestern Pakistan, where childrenmay be fed, housed, and schooled in narrow,mind-bending madrasahs, the mosteffective program we could support wouldbe the provision of excellent and accessiblegovernment schools which meet the needs ofyoung minds and bodies. In countriesstruggling to make governments andeconomies perform, the provision offinancial expertise and governance trainingis essential. And, in utterly failed states, theinternational community, under the leader-ship of the U.N., may wish to considerreturn to international trusteeship, muchas is being done in East Timor. There is noquestion that economic assistance and debtrelief must be matched by the developmentof good governance capacity and educa-tional opportunity.

Likewise, it would be a mistake tounderestimate the importance of military-to-military contacts and assistance. Foryears, U.S. Special Forces have demon-strated the efficacy of “mil-to-mil” programsin de-mining, peacekeeping, militaryjustice, and civilian/military operations.Equally, the United States has benefitedfrom contacts developed as foreign officers

50

have attended U.S. military institutions.There may be increased pressure forweapons sales abroad and a growing desireto reduce military personnel tied up in“engagement” activities overseas, but wewould do well to remember that our greatestreturn on investment is precisely in theareas where U.S. forces demonstratepersonal interest and competence. There isno substitute for focused, professionalmilitary contact.

Strengthening Our Human Resource

Base.

Our capacity, ultimately, to influenceevents throughout the world will dependupon the quality of our people on the frontlines. If we are to spot the development ofpolitical trends, if we are to intercept andcut off dangerous currents, if we are topromote positive programs, we will need toreinforce our cadre of language qualifiedForeign Area Officers, Foreign ServiceOfficers, and intelligence officers. Wereaped the peace dividend at the end of theCold War by neglecting our Foreign AreaOfficers’ careers, failing to hire sufficientnumbers of Foreign Service Officers andcutting resources for human intelligenceoperations for too long. We are currentlypaying a price. There is no substitute for topnotch, professional personnel at diplomaticmissions and listening posts throughout theworld. This is the backbone of intelligentpolicy and effective engagement, and if wewish to win the campaign against terrorism,we must effectively fund it.

Conclusion.

As realists, we must recognize that thecampaign against violence and instabilitywill never end. We may eradicate one formof terrorism, only to see another raise itshead. Our best insurance for the future willbe set upon three supports: a strong and

united democratic country, a more capablehomeland defense, and an extremelyeffective capacity to project our diplomatic,democratic, and military strength overseas.This calls for long-term commitment andthe expenditure of significant resources. Wemust be attuned to local conditions in everyregion of the world, and we must remainengaged with partners across the fullspectrum of social, economic, and politicaldevelopment. If we eschew this respon-sibility, the forces of instability and violencewill find us where we live.

51

In an effort to marshal resources againstUsama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terroristorganization, the United States has imple-mented a carrot and stick approach to helpbuild a coalition. Carrots—or rewards—areprovided for “voluntary” compliance withimplied preferences or explicit direction,while sticks—or punishment—are imposedto coerce compliance. Democraciesgenerally prefer the carrot option, believingthat reward will have a more positive orlong-lasting effect, and that the rewardprovided will be viewed either as a duereward for desired performance or as justpayment for services rendered. Unfortu-nately, the perception from the other sidemay be of a bribe—tainting both the donorand recipient—or of equally distastefulpayment from a master to a servant.

Machiavelli did not use the same terms,but essentially argued for the stick over thecarrot, noting that it is better for the strongto be feared than loved. He contended that

“love” or “gratitude”—in exchange forreward—is inherently fickle, all the more soif it appears to be a bribe. Machiavellidefined two forms of fear: one based onhatred, the other based on respect. Respectis obviously preferred, as hatred will haveregressive effects in the long term.Effectively applying these two tools—usingcarrots and sticks, either together or asoptions to achieve synergy through theirintegration—is no small challenge. Ifcarrots and sticks are applied arrogantly bya strong state—without proper regard forthose who see them as bribes or arm-twisting—the results may be limited, bothimmediately and in the longer term.Improperly implemented, carrots and stickscan make the stronger state appear a bully,cost it resources to no advantage, or lead toimposition of punitive action with negativeconsequences.

To make the carrot and stick moreeffective, a state must be just and propor-

53

ELEVEN

The Carrot and Stick Challenge

Dr. Gordon RuddColonel John R. Martin

Conclusions:• As the United States builds and maintains the coalition fighting the war on

terrorism, it may obtain some good short-term results from the use of carrotsand sticks— rewards and punishments to induce compliance with U.S.desires—but must be wary of potential negative effects in the long term.

• A just cause makes the use of carrots and sticks more effective. The justice ofthe U.S. cause is easily defined with al Qaeda and the Taliban, but muchharder if the war is against all terrorism. The list of targets in the Muslimworld must not be unnecessarily expanded.

• Even if countries see the justice of the cause, they may not make it their cause.• Appeasement cannot be part of the solution, but issues that provide al Qaeda

great resonance in the Muslim population—the Palestinian issue, sanctions onIraq, and U.S. presence on the Arabian peninsula—must be fairly addressed bythe U.S.

tional in its application of rewards andpunishments, which in turn should bealigned with a just cause. Such a cause mustbe just in the eyes of other states, not simplyin the eyes of the stronger state. In such asituation, the reward for compliance is notseen as a bribe or a payment, but simply asan expected consequence of working for ajust cause. If punishment is imposed, itmust be seen as a proportional requirementof justice, not the act of a “bully” whichcannot buy what it wants. To makeAmerica’s just cause compelling to others,their different values and perceptions mustbe taken into account.

Even if others acknowledge America’scause and actions as just, there can be noassumption that America’s cause thenbecomes their cause. The United States doesnot actively support all just causes with itsresources, nor do other states. This is theinherent challenge in structuring acoalition of states with different interestsand characteristics. Caution must beapplied in any demand that another statealign itself with the United States or riskbeing considered an enemy. In Thucydides’history of the Peloponnesian War, Athensdemanded that the state of Melos join anAthenian-led coalition against Sparta.When Melos resisted, stating that it wishedto join neither Athens nor Sparta, Athensforced the issue, and stated “. . . the strongwill do what it will, while the weak will dowhat it must.” When Melos refused to jointhe coalition, Athens had no recourse but todestroy it or lose credibility. When Athenschose the former and destroyed Melos, ithad less trouble getting other states to jointhe coalition, but the fear that caused themto join was not from respect based on justice.When the coalition came under duress laterin the war, it came apart because it lackedgenuine cohesion, and Athens lost the war.A demand by the United States that otherstates are either “with it or against it” may

make good domestic rhetoric, but will becounterproductive if enforcement isattempted internationally.

The other NATO countries did not needto be bribed or coerced to support America,nor should there be any need to resort to thecarrot or stick to sustain their support. Theinvocation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty—declaring that the World Trade Center andPentagon attacks constituted an attack onall—was a treaty requirement. However,even without that requirement, thosestates’ comparable values would have ledthem to recognize the cause as just; theyidentify with it and have made it theircause.

NATO countries are democracies; assuch, their governments represent the willof their people. With nondemocratic states,it is often difficult to determine the will ofthe people, which may not be the same asthe will of their government. When dealingwith non-democratic states, their govern-ments may be convinced to comply withAmerican objectives through a carrot andstick approach, but if the people of thatstate do not see America’s cause as just,then they will believe that their governmenthas been either corrupted or unfairlycoerced. In either case, this weakenswhatever bond that government has withits people, destabilizing the state, andperhaps instigating insurrection or civilwar, neither of which is in a coalition’sinterest.

The most obvious carrot or reward usedrecently is economic assistance. Sanctionshave been lifted; direct payments have beenmade; food and other refugee assistancehave been delivered. All of these can beuseful, but they may also be more limitedand temporary in value than anticipated. Ifthe government or people felt sanctionswere improper, then lifting them will beperceived as a correction of a wrong, ratherthan a gracious act, and may not motivate

54

the desired action. If the government thatreceives the economic assistance is eithercorrupt or perceived by its people ascorrupt, the money may be useful topersuade the government, but will have adifferent effect on the people. If economicassistance is diverted to military forces thatthe government can use to suppress its ownpeople, the effect may be counterproductive,even if the intent was to enhance thegovernment’s role in the military aspects ofthe coalition.

Use of food to influence directly thepeople of a country may allow governmentsto be by-passed to some degree. Thealtruistic motives of the givers may begenuine, but if the hungry recipientsperceive that the food aid is given simply tobring a coalition together, it will appear asimple bribe rather than a just reward. Ifthe hungry identify with al Qaeda or theTaliban, the appearance of such a bribe maynot alter their views towards America at all.In fact, they may eat the food with anincreased contempt for the United States.Food aid given to the hungry in Pakistan—in bags of grain marked USA—shouldsatisfy hunger for a short period, but it willnot correct the long-term causes of hungerand may make the Pakistani people seetheir government as incapable of feedingthem.

President Bush recently started acampaign to have American children donatea dollar each to be used for aid to the Afghanchildren. This plays well in the UnitedStates, but there may be little gained inAfghanistan and the broader Muslim world,where the effort may be seen as a simpleand inexpensive propaganda ploy. The realvalue in such a campaign may be tocondition the American people to see thepeople of Afghanistan as worthy ofAmerican assistance. The provider againmay be genuinely altruistic, but theperception may be very different, and

effects overseas may be very different fromthose domestically.

The ultimate challenge is to makeAmerica’s cause just in the eyes of thegovernments and people of the Middle Eastcountries, whose physical and moral assist-ance is needed in the war on terrorism.There may be some utility in a simple bribeor use of force, but the returns could only betemporary and potentially counter-productive. If the American cause does notbecome the cause of others, theintermediate position is to at least make acompelling case that the American cause isjust, and to use the carrot and stickapproach as just rewards or justpunishments to support that cause. Howthat cause is defined thus becomes crucial.

The al Qaeda terrorist organizationmust be defined as an aggressor adversarybecause it has attacked and hurt the UnitedStates. The Taliban should be described asAmerica’s adversary because they willinglyharbor those aggressors. There is greatclarity in such a position, and there is nodifficulty in defining the terroristorganization or the Taliban. But if theadversary is terrorism, that term must bedefined. That is not difficult with NATOallies.

However, many states in the MiddleEast may not share the same definition ofterrorism or may not find terrorism asobjectionable if the target of terrorism is anoppressive government. They may see anassault on other terrorist organizations as amore general attack on Islam or as a meansto neutralize the aspirations of severalgroups in the Middle East who have nottargeted the United States. Such a viewcould have two negative results: first, if allterrorist groups are declared targets, suchgroups that have not targeted the UnitedStates may soon do so or providepreviously-denied support to al Qaeda.Second, by enlarging the target set beyond

55

al Qaeda, America makes its positionadversarial to those people that identifywith the goals of those newly-targetedgroups, even though they may not havesupported al Qaeda, either its goals or itsmethods. To have as many Muslim states aspossible in the coalition on the war againstterrorism is essential. It is thus importantthat there be no unnecessary enlargementof the states in the Muslim world that areconsidered targets.

To complement the application ofrewards and punishments—or to avoid thechallenges of their use—some of the rootcauses of Muslim disgruntlement must beaddressed. The al Qaeda organization hasseveral ways to rationalize their attack onthe United States. The primaryrationalization is that the values of theWest and the United States inparticular—are profane. To them, theultimate profanity is U.S. presence in SaudiArabia: a perceived major affront to theMuslim faithful. Secondary objectionsinclude American actions towards Iraq andsupport for Israel with respect to thePalestinian issue. A potential weakness foral Qaeda is that it receives far greaterpopular support in the Muslim world fromits secondary objections to the UnitedStates than for its primary objections.There is little question that, if the situationsin Iraq and with the Palestinians wereresolved, al Qaeda would try to attack theUnited States. But if either conflict wereresolved or American efforts to resolve themappeared more balanced, al Qaeda wouldgain far less popular support in the process.

Middle East governments, particularlyEgypt, have stated that their primarydifficulty in supporting the war onterrorism more aggressively is America’ssupport for Israel, which they perceive to beat the expense of the Palestinians. Thatperception cannot be denied, but it is fair tosay that America’s real intent is not so one

sided. The central concern for Israel issecurity, and that will not change, but U.S.support for Israeli security should not meansupport for settlements in Gaza and theWest Bank or oppression of thePalestinians. The central concern for thePalestinians is sovereignty. Americansupport for that goal appears lukewarm,but it can be reinforced without reducingsupport for Israeli security. American policyis sympathetic to Israeli domestic politics; itcould be more overtly sympathetic toPalestinian domestic politics. Beyonddomestic politics in either case, a morebalanced American approach is in theinterest of both Israel and the Palestiniansif there is progress towards a resolution.Such a resolution is in the interest ofeveryone, except terrorist organizationsthat need popular support to sustain theirefforts against the United States.

Some pundits suggest that it would beappeasement to attempt to resolve thePalestinian issue, review and revisesanctions on Iraq, or look for ways to protectU.S. interests in the Persian Gulf regionwithout a major military presence there.Since these were bin Laden’s goals—according to this line of reasoning—America should be even more resolute indenying them for fear of showing otherterrorists that they can achieve their goalsif they can mount a similar attack. It is notappeasement, though, if the United Statescan isolate al Qaeda from popular support,which may be essential to destroy it. Usamabin Laden and al Qaeda will not seeAmerica as less adversarial if the UnitedStates makes greater attempts to solve thePalestinian issue, they will instead see thatas a threat to their popular support.

A carrot and stick approach may haveutility in the effort to fight al Qaeda and theTaliban, although the results may onlyaccrue in the near term. In the longer term,such an approach can be counterproductive.

56

The carrot and stick approach will havegreater utility if perceived to be fairlyapplied in a just cause. Ultimately, any useof carrots or sticks must be part of a morecomprehensive effort to deny al Qaeda thepopular support it needs to survive. Thateffort must demonstrate—with all availablemeans—that America’s cause is just andmust create the conditions that lead othersto believe that this cause is their cause. Thatis unnecessary with America’s allies andfellow believers in NATO; the immediatechallenge is in the Middle East, both withtheir governments and their people.

57

State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations

Prior to September 11.

While the state of U.S. civil-militaryrelations prior to September 11, 2001, wasgenerally strong, certain tensionswarranted monitoring and attention bothwithin the military profession and acrossthe governmental agencies that interactregularly with the military.

Imbalance of Power. Perhaps the mostimportant issue was the improperrelationship between the politicalleadership and the military in the policy-making process. Political leaders shouldmake policy decisions with advice from themilitary. During the Clinton years, though,the administration’s reluctance to confrontthe military and the military’sdisagreement with many policy initiativesof its elected and appointed masterscombined to allow the military to exertundue influence in the policy-makingprocess. Critics contended that the U.S.military did not consistently follow thenorm of supporting political objectives—

especially those requiring the limited use offorce in various peace operations—in goodfaith, but instead engaged in behaviorsthat, in effect, had a determinative effect onpolicy outcomes. Some observers believedthat the interjection of conditions, such asthe “Powell Doctrine,” into the policy-making process was an overplaying of themilitary’s designated role as expertadvisers.

During the first months of the Bushadministration, there were signs ofattempts to redress this apparentimbalance—and some military resistance tothe change. There were many reports offriction between Secretary of DefenseRumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff overhis strategic review, especially concerningthe impression that Rumsfeld was ignoringor bypassing them in shaping his policies.Many in Congress also became involved inthis dispute over future national securitystrategy and the structure and transfor-mation of military forces.

Civil-Military Gap. Another concernthat may have relevance for civil-military

59

TWELVE

Potential Changes in U.S. Civil-Military Relations

Dr. Marybeth Peterson UlrichDr. Conrad C. Crane

Conclusions:• A nation at war gives its military strong support and power, but military

leaders must still provide expert and professional counsel. They must alsoresist the temptation to force policy, to make inappropriate demands on thebudget, or to avoid “out-of-the- box” thinking.

• The current crisis provides the military a chance to strengthen its connectionswith the rest of American society.

• With public confidence in the military soaring, it is even more essential thatmilitary leaders maintain professional standards for nonpartisanship.

• The Army must accept and focus on its essential homeland security mission,including rethinking of AC/RC roles and analyzing potential legal issues.

relations in this newly emergent era is themuch touted civil-military gap. Years of anall-volunteer force, major down-sizing ofthat force, and recent rounds of baseclosings have contributed to a growingisolation of the military from the society itserves. Scholars have warned that theimplications of this gap may have negativeconsequences for manning the all-volunteerforce and for sustaining the ideal imageamong the American people of the U.S.military as being comprised of America’sArmy, America’s Navy, America’s Air Force,and America’s Marines—that is, forces ofAmerica and not forces separate from U.S.society. Concerns also exist about a lack ofmilitary experience in civilian leaders, andthat generals and admirals will not properlyrespect congressional oversight from thosewho are perceived as unqualified.

Partisanship. Another source of tension,and closely related to the policymakingimbalance, is the perception of many thatpolitical partisanship gradually has beenincreasing within the U.S. military. Theconcern is that the U.S. military is losing itsadherence to an apolitical ethic. Somecritics contend that assumed and perceivedpreferences of the military—sometimesopenly expressed by retirees—were leadingto attempts by military institutions toinfluence unduly the American politicalprocess.

Homeland Security. Homeland defenseissues in civil-military relations were alsoevident prior to the September 11 attacks.Various strategic reviews were attemptingto focus the U.S. military—and the U.S.Army, in particular—on homeland securityissues. Perhaps the foremost issueregarding home- land security was themilitary’s reluctance to accept it as ahigh-priority mission, relegating it insteadto police forces or, at best, the NationalGuard. The low priority assigned to thismission—similar to that assigned to

peacekeeping operations—allows theService to continue focusing on itswarfighting mission. There were severalother key emergent challenges in this area.Among these was fulfilling the homelandsecurity mission within a domestic environ-ment where civil liberties remained intact.Another issue was articulating thehomeland security mission in such a waythat effectively differentiated respon-sibilities across the U.S. Government, whiledistinguishing between civilian andmilitary roles.

Anticipated Changes in U.S. Civil-

Military Relations.

The full impact of the September 11terrorist attacks on civil-military relationsis still evolving, but some projections can bemade. While a united civil-military front isapparent now, many sources of potentialfriction and concern remain.

Imbalance of Power. The role of themilitary in the post-September 11 policy-making process may pose particularchallenges for both civilian and militaryparticipants. Many of the parameters thatregulated civil-military relations in thepolicymaking realm have changed since theattacks. Budget constraints that limited thedemands of the Services have been lifted tosome extent, Congress and the Executiveare united to an unprecedented degree, andthe nation as a whole is focused on nationalsecurity in general and the war on terrorismspecifically. Such an environment calls forstrict adherence to traditional standards ofmilitary professionalism in policy councils.

The present process relies heavily onmilitary expertise relevant to theapplication of force in the attainment ofstated political objectives. Militaryprofessionals must be careful in theirpresentation of options to include allpotential applications of the militaryinstrument of power without limiting

60

choices to those options consistent with aparticular preferred doctrine, e.g., thePowell Doctrine. The current strategicchallenge does not appear to have ashort-term exit strategy and may not beconducive to the application of over-whelming military force, as required by thatdoctrine. The civilian leadership should notdeny military leaders the right to argue infavor of particular options, but they mustdemand presentation of comprehensivemilitary options on ways and means toachieve political ends. Media reportssuggest that Secretary Rumsfeld has beendisappointed by the lack of innovativemilitary advice he has received. In general,the military leadership should stay withintheir roles as expert advisors to thePresident and the Secretary of Defense,even when greater influence may besolicited by other forces—particularlycongressional—in the policymakingprocess. The leadership must still think“out-of-the box” to meet the needs of thisnew war.

Restraint on the part of militaryprofessionals also will be needed especiallyon the budget front. More monies areavailable to fight the war on terrorism, butmilitary leaders must subordinateinstitutional interests to national interests.Some might be tempted to take advantageof the environment to fund other servicedesires that might not be consistent withthe national interest of limiting deficitspending, or which might not be sustainablewhen public, congressional, and adminis-tration support for increased defensespending inevitably declines. Service chiefsmust also not become so focused on currentneeds that they forget about transformingfor the future, and must not allow theircivilian masters to develop similar myopicviews.

While the pre-attack clashes betweenthe Services and Secretary of Defense over

his vision of transformation have beenmuted, the issues still remain. SecretaryRumsfeld’s position in Washington, though,has been strengthened by both his ownstrong leadership and the unified nationalsupport for the military that hasaccompanied the war on terrorism. Themedia reports that he wants to revise theUnified Command Plan because of theglobal nature of the current conflict tocreate a central command structure moreresponsive to direction from Washington.This might create new friction with theCINCs as well as the Services.

Civil-Military Gap. Additionally, theremay be challenges related to congressionaloversight of covert operations. One of theprimary objectives of the war on terrorism isto conduct it in such a way that democraticinstitutions remain intact and thatAmerican democratic values are notundermined. The military and the admin-istration must fulfill their responsibilitiesto be accountable to the American peoplevia complete cooperation with the requisiteoversight committees in Congress.

On the positive side, American society isunusually focused on national securityissues. The heightened visibility of themilitary and an appreciation that thearmed forces will play an ongoing andcrucial role in a protracted war presentsopportunities for recruitment, re-enlistment, and—more importantly—thegeneral reconnection of American societywith the military. Military experts can alsoplay an important part in exercising theinformation element of U.S. national powerthrough an educational role that explainsthe national security challenges at handand publicizes its myriad successes andchallenges in an effort to sustain publicsupport.

Partisanship. Challenges related topolitical partisanship include maintainingprofessional standards for nonpartisanship

61

in the upcoming 2002 mid-term electionsand presidential campaign in 2004.Assuming that the war on terrorism will bea long-term effort, it will be incumbent uponthe military profession to disconnectconsistently their professional support forthe war effort with political support forcandidates of a particular party that may beconducting the effort.

Homeland Security. The defenseestablishment has not been quick to adopthomeland defense as its primary mission inthe wake of the September 11 attacks,preferring to focus on a warfightingcampaign in Afghanistan. Critical infra-structure protection and control of bordersare still seen as police missions, althoughNational Guardsmen and some ActiveComponent soldiers are involved. The Armymust immediately apply the necessaryfocus and resources to this vital mission,ensuring the homeland is secure enough toallow operations overseas.

Consensus on the ongoing threat ofterrorism has heightened awareness thatthe Pentagon must be ready to provide itscapabilities and support to other federalagencies, both in counterterrorism effortsand in a response role. As emerging detailsof the new Homeland Security Council andGovernor Ridge’s powers become clearer,the Army should be actively studying itslong-term roles and missions and theimplications of participating within such abroad-based homeland security effort.Though the exact scope, powers, andbudgetary authority of the new homelandsecurity entity are still unknown, its finalform will inevitably include a mix of lawenforcement and national security tasksthat will call for ongoing collaborationbetween civilian and military authorities.

The Army and the other services shouldbe thinking about the potential effect thesevarious new relationships will have on theoverall state of civil-military relations and

on the ability of the services to perform theirfunctional obligations across a compre-hensive array of national security threats.As new civil-military relationships areformed—such as that between theSecretary of the Army as DoD’s executiveagent for all homeland security matters andGovernor Ridge as the head of the Office ofHomeland Security— civilian and militaryparticipants should strive to ensure thattheir efforts remain collaborative ratherthan competitive.

Challenges also exist with regard to thelong-term implications of using the ReserveComponents (RC) to participate in smallscale contingencies and major wars abroadand in the homeland defense roledomestically. Active Component (AC) andmilitary leaders must think through suchissues as the viability of prolonged employersupport for RC utilization, functionalspecialization of the AC or RC for homelandsecurity and finding funds for equipmentand proper training.

A new focus on homeland security willalso highlight a number of legal issues.Posse comitatus considerations need to beexamined to insure optimum militaryinvolvement in domestic operations tocombat terrorism. Other legal issues thatneed to be resolved include permissiblemethods to obtain critical intelligencedomestically and whether to treat capturedterrorists as criminals or POWs.

Conclusion.

Clearly the events of September 11,2001, have resulted in new challenges andopportunities in U.S. civil-military rela-tions. Some of the tensions that existedprior to September 11 seem trivial in light ofrecent events. Others have taken on a newsignificance as the current environmentcould possibly exacerbate pre-existingtensions. U.S. military leaders must provideexpert and comprehensive advice in a

62

complex and uncertain war that does notfall neatly into traditional conceptions ofmilitary campaigns. U.S. military leadersalso face significant challenges inmonitoring their own professionalism inways that best serve the nation and theprofession itself. Finally, a uniqueopportunity exists to reconnect withAmerican society as America’s Army, anArmy that fully accepts its responsibility toprotect the homeland and that needs theongoing support and participation of allAmericans to accomplish its many missions.

63

The American public continues to showan unprecedented level of support for thecountry’s leaders and institutions since theSeptember 11 attacks. The President’soverall job approval rating of 90 percentexceeded that of President George H. W.Bush after the Gulf War, President Trumanafter VE day in World War II, and PresidentRoosevelt after the attack on Pearl Harbor.Similarly, approval ratings of Congressachieved a record high, and even the mediareceived high marks in the coverage of theattacks.

Amid this surge in public support forgovernment institutions, public opinionpolls are also reflecting extraordinarilywidespread support of military action. Aslate as the end of September, the vastmajority of Americans support the generalidea of military action against groups ornations responsible for the attacks. Pollsshow support for retaliatory action at aboutthe 90 percent level, with 89 percentfavoring direct military action inAfghanistan, and 73 percent in Iraq.

One of the most remarkable findings inassessing public opinion is the strong

support of the American people despiteawareness of the possible consequences ofmilitary action. In past uses of militarypower, public opinion may have beenaffected by the perceived rapidity of theprosecution of the war, the amount ofcasualties involved, the possible personallydetrimental consequences of the war, andthe degree of agreement among thecountry’s leaders.

Duration.

Americans appear to be ready for aprotracted use of military power. Whenasked if they would support military actionagainst terrorism even if it lasted a period ofseveral months, 86 percent of Americansresponded that they would, and a still-high69 percent said they would support militaryaction even if it lasted several years.Interestingly, 92 percent of Americanspolled said that they expected the waragainst terrorism to be long, and 94 percentsaid it would be difficult. Contrast thesepercentages with the reaction of Americansafter the attack on Pearl Harbor, when 51

65

THIRTEEN

Maintaining Public Support for Military Operations

Dr. Leonard Wong

Conclusions:• Public support for military action is at levels that parallel public reaction after

Pearl Harbor.• Americans believe military action is appropriate, support a protracted war, and

are willing to endure negative consequences from that war.• Despite favorable polls, public support is bound to be fickle, since most

Americans are not really involved with the conflict and are being asked toreturn to their normal lives where they largely ignored the military.

• Support for military action will diminish unless the military continually showsprogress in the war against terrorism, keeps the nation connected to its armedforces, and provides effective domestic security that is mostly unseen.

percent thought the war against theJapanese would be long, and 65 percentthought the war would be difficult.

Despite the realization that this war willlikely last several years, Americans areexhibiting an apparent willingness to waitfor the right moment to strike at theterrorists. One poll asked those who favoredmilitary action if they felt the United Statesshould act immediately against all knownterrorist organizations even if it wasunclear who orchestrated the attacks, or ifthe United States should take a morerestrained approach of waiting for thoseresponsible to be identified—even if it takesmonths—before conducting military strikesagainst them. Only 23 percent favoredimmediate strikes, while 62 percent favoredwaiting until those responsible areidentified.

Similarly, just 3 weeks ago, some 59percent of Americans agreed that theUnited States should take as long asnecessary to plan something that will work.That number actually increased to 65percent 1 week later. In this unique periodof history, Americans appear to be willing toaccept a long war and long preparationperiod before military action begins.

Casualties.

Previous debates about the supposedaversion of U.S. casualties by the military,government leaders, or the public appear tobe moot. One poll reported that 69 percentof Americans support going to war even if itmeans “getting into a long war with largenumbers of U.S. troops killed or injured.”Another poll specifically asked respondentsif they would support a war that might costthe lives of 5,000 U.S. troops and 5,000 U.S.civilians. In each instance, about 80 percentof the respondents continued to indicatethat they would support the use of militaryaction.

When a Newsweek poll posed thecondition that military action would includea “high likelihood of [non-U.S.] civiliancasualties,” 7 out of 10 Americans stillsupported military action. A subsequentCBS/New York Times poll added the morespecific condition of “thousands of innocentcivilians” who would be killed, and 60percent of the respondents still continued tosupport military action. These findings areremarkable since casualty aversion (atmuch smaller numbers) and civiliancollateral casualties have been dominantfacets of any recent debate on publicsupport for military action.

Past possible explanations for casualtyaversion in military operations included theperceived lack of vital interests or thenonparticipation of American elites in theoperation. With issues such as the economystruggling to avoid recession, half of thecountry reporting that they are worriedabout a terrorist attack affecting their ownfamily, and polls indicating that 20 percentof the public personally knew someone whowas missing, hurt, or killed in the attacks,casualty aversion is currently not a majorfactor in public support of the war onterrorism.

Consequences.

One possible consequence of militaryaction is an increase in terrorist attacks.One poll asked public opinion about twocourses of action—what would happen if theUnited States did conduct militaryoperations, and what would happen if it didnot. While 43 percent of the public believedthat terrorist attacks would increase as aresult of U.S. military action, 89 percentbelieved that the chances of terroristattacks would increase if the United Statesdid not take military action.

Polls show that Americans supportmilitary action against those responsible forterrorism, even when explicitly advised of a

66

series of possible consequences of suchaction. Consequences tested in pollinginclude (in addition to casualties and a longwar) the reinstitution of the draft, shortagesof oil and gas, and the possibility of havingless money to spend on such social programsas education and Social Security. The tablebelow shows the details. Americans seemdetermined to support military actiondespite personally detrimental conse-quences.

Political Leadership.

Some studies argue that the degree ofconsensus exhibited by political leaders is amajor determinant of public support formilitary operations. While no pollsspecifically attempted to measure politicalconsensus, there has been an unusuallyhigh degree of trust placed in thegovernment since the attacks. The publicwas asked, “How much of the time do youtrust the government in Washington to dowhat is right?” Responses showed in thegraph that the trust in government to do the

right thing has risen to levels not seen sincethe 1960s.

Implications.

There are two possible scenarios takingplace in America today. The first suggeststhat our nation has returned to an erasimilar to the early days of the Cold War.People who earnestly desire our demisehave threatened our national existence, ourshores no longer protect us, and, unless wetake action, our way of life is in danger. Civildefense is back, the National Guard hasreturned to doing more than disaster relief,and intelligence is moving back into aprominent role in national security. As aresult, public support of military action ishigh, and America will indefinitely continueto approve of the use of the military tosafeguard the nation.

The other scenario suggests that thiscurrent situation is merely a temporarydisruption. The public is willing to supportmilitary action for months and even longerin order to return to life as it was beforeSeptember 11. The public, in this scenario,is looking forward to the day when themilitary finally gets its hands on terrorismand is successful in attempts to “stop it,eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.”

67

Question: Would you support the U.S. taking military action if you kneweach of the following would happen?

The U.S. military action would continue for aperiod of months

Taxes would be increased

U.S. ground troops would be used in aninvasion

Shortages of gas and oil would occur

There would be less money to spend ondomestic programs such as education andSocial Security

A prolonged economic recession would occur

Further terrorist attacks would occur in the U.S.

Support OpposeNo

opinion

Sample: 1,032 adultsMethodology: Telephone interview conducted September 14-15, 2001Margin of error: +/-4%

86%

Support

84%

80%

79%

78%

78%

78%

11%

15%

18%

18%

18%

18%

19%

3%

1%

2%

3%

4%

4%

3%

The military action would continue for aperiod of several years

1,000 American troops would be killed

66%

65%

30%

30%

4%

5%

The military draft would be reinstituted 77% 18% 5%

Percent responding “Always” or “Most of the Time.”

How much of the time do you trust thegovernment in Washington to do what is right?

*****

Military force is necessary and supported,but only long enough to permit theAmerican public to get back to enjoying“normal” lives again.

Of course, our future probably liessomewhere between these two scenarios.Americans are uniting in this fight becausewe understand that this is a total war likethe Cold War, yet we are also being told to“Do your business around the country. Flyand enjoy America’s great destination spots.Get down to Disney World in Florida. Takeyour families and enjoy life.” Americanswant the single-minded resolve thatcharacterized the fight against communismfound early in the Cold War, but our societyis also struggling not to “let the terroristswin” by minimizing the changes to everydaylife. This unique combination of publicexpectations has three implications inmaintaining public support for militaryactions.

First, the public desires and expectsvictory. A surprising 87 percent ofAmericans said they believe the UnitedStates “absolutely must” capture or kill binLaden and break up al Qaeda, and 8 out of10 were confident that this would happen.Similarly, 91 percent said the United Statesmust reduce the number of terrorist attacksin the United States, and an equalpercentage was confident that this would bedone. The military must show the publicthat their expectations are being met.Tactical successes must be periodicallypublicized. A decrease in the threat ofterrorist attacks will be evident, but thepublic must be occasionally made awarethat its armed forces are why the terroristsare on the run. Part of the strategicplanning for this war on terrorism needs toinclude combining operational securityrequirements with the realization thatpublic support is part of America’s center ofgravity in this war. The focus should not beon “spin” or public relations, but on showing

a correlation between military action and adecrease in terrorist activity.

Second, as images of the collapsingtowers and burning Pentagon wear off, andAmericans realize that their contribution tothis war effort is to live as if there were nowar, public support will drop as individualinvolvement in the war decreases. It is hardto mobilize the public when their role is notto ration or to step up security, but to actnormal. Part of the message the militarysends to the public must emphasize thatAmerica’s military is part of America. Thepublic cannot be permitted to disconnectpsychologically from the war effort. Thismay be difficult as much of the war will beconducted by less visible special operationstroops instead of entire divisions. It may betime to resurrect notions of national service(not the draft) as military manpower getsstretched beyond current available endstrengths. This will be especially crucial forthe reserve component in a protracted war.National service will require the sacrificethat pulled the public together in othermajor wars.

A good interim solution is toimmediately offer short-term enlistments(18 months) to college graduates inexchange for college loan repayment. Theseenlistees could serve a year in Bosnia,Kosovo, or Afghanistan and then revert toseveral years in the reserve component. Theshort-term benefit would be valuable, highquality manpower in the active and reservecomponents, but the longer lasting andmore important result would be an Americathat is more connected to its armed forces.

Third, there will be an expectation ofcontinuing effectiveness without the visiblesigns of domestic military action. Whilearmed National Guardsmen patrolling thenation’s airports is a reassuring sight today,the time will come when Americans willquestion the necessity of such shows offorce. After the attacks, it was common to

68

hear that the United States had finallybecome just like Israel—an armed countryconstantly wary of attack. Americans do notwant to live like Israelis. Americans wantthe security, but an overt military presencegoes against the American way of life.Planning should take place now on shiftingto a domestic security posture that producesa minimal signature. For example, thecurrent combat air patrol protectionprovided by the augmentation of 26airbases throughout the United States givesthe assurance that the skies are safe, yetthe fighters are largely invisible to thetraveling public. The military will still haveto be actively engaged in the war onterrorism, but it must have a low domesticprofile. Despite today’s tolerance of themilitarization of America, the public willbegin to expect that the arm of the militarybe strong, yet invisible when used withinthe shores of the United States.

Public support for military action is atlevels that parallel the public reaction afterthe attack at Pearl Harbor. Americansclaim today that they believe militaryaction is appropriate, that they support aprotracted war, and that they are willing toendure the negative consequences that mayaccompany the war. Despite the favorablepolls, Americans are bound to be fickle intheir support. This war will not be likeWorld War II where every citizen is directlyor indirectly involved with the conflict.Americans are being told to return to theirnormal lives—lives that largely ignored themilitary before the attacks. As they returnto those lives, their support of militaryaction will diminish unless the militarycontinually shows progress in the waragainst terrorism, keeps the nationconnected to its armed forces, and providesdomestic security that is effective, but forthe most part unseen.

69

Introduction.

Much has been said and written inrecent weeks about the changed nature of“warfare” as it pertains to responding to theattacks on the Pentagon and the WorldTrade Center. That attacks of such vastscale are made directly on U.S. soil bynonstate actors poses important newquestions for military leaders and plannerscharged with conceiving an appropriate andeffective response.

The established moral and legaltraditions of just war are similarlychallenged. Forged almost entirely in thecontext of interstate war, those traditionsare also pressed to adapt to the new andunforeseen character of a “war againstterrorism.” This paper is a preliminaryeffort to extrapolate and apply existingfundamental moral principles of just wartheory to this novel military and politicalterrain.

Fundamental Moral Principles.

The theoretical framework of the justwar tradition provides two separate moralassessments of uses of military force. Thefirst, jus ad bellum (right or justice toward

war) attempts to determine which sets ofpolitical and military circumstances aresufficiently grave to warrant a militaryresponse. It focuses on the “just cause”element of war, and attempts to determinewhether use of force to redress a givenwrong has a reasonable hope of success andwhether nonviolent alternatives have beenattempted (the “last resort” criterion) toredress the grievance. Given thehorrendous loss of innocent American (andother) life in these recent attacks, it iswithout serious question that a just causeexists to use military force in response.However, legitimate questions remainregarding reasonable hope of success giventhe difficult and diffuse nature of theperpetrators of these events. Indeed, thevery definition of success in conflict of thissort is to some degree ambiguous.

The second body of assessmentsconcerns jus in bello, right conduct ofmilitary operations. The central ideas hereconcern discrimination (using force againstthose who are morally and legally respon-sible for the attack and not deliberatelyagainst others) and proportionality (areasonable balance between the damage

71

FOURTEEN

Ethical Issues in Counterterrorism Warfare

Dr. Martin L. Cook

Conclusions:• Even in the war against terrorists, attacks must be discriminate and

proportionate.• Attacks can legally and morally be directed against all those reasonably

believed to be involved in a wide circle of conspiracy.• Tenets of military necessity and double effect may permit some collateral

damage.• Terrorists are not entitled to protection of the Geneva Convention, but are they

truly outside the protection of any law?

done in the responding attack and themilitary value of the targets destroyed).

These fundamental moral principlescontinue to have force, even in the quitedifferent “war” in which we are nowengaged.

Jus ad bellum Considerations.

The scale and nature of the terroristattacks on the United States withoutquestion warrant a military response. Theimportant questions about jus ad bellumare confined to the other questions the justwar tradition requires us to ask regardingthe ability to respond to those attacks withmilitary force that will, in fact, respond tothe attackers themselves and be effective inresponding to the wrong received.

Just cause requires that we identify withaccuracy those responsible and hold them tobe the sole objects of legitimate attack. Whoare those agents? In the first instance, thosedirectly responsible for funding anddirecting the activities of the now-deceasedhijackers. There is a tremendous intel-ligence demand to identify those agentscorrectly. But, having identified them to amoral certainty (a standard far short ofwhat would be required by legal criteria ofproof, it should be noted) there is no moralobjection to targeting them. Indeed, one ofthe benefits of framing these operations as“war” rather than “law enforcement” is thatit does not require the ideal outcome to bethe apprehension and trial of theperpetrators. Instead, it countenances theirdirect elimination by military means ifpossible.

What of the claim that we maylegitimately attack those who harborterrorists, even if they are not directlyinvolved in authorizing their activities? Thejustification for attacking them has twoaspects: first, it holds them accountable foractivities which they knew, or should haveknown, were being conducted in their

territories and did nothing to stop; second, itserves as a deterrent to motivate otherstates and sponsors to be more vigilant andaware of the activities of such groups ontheir soil.

How far ought the moral permission toattack parties not directly involved extend?I would propose application of a standardfrom American civil law: the “reasonableperson” (or “reasonable man”) standard ofproof. This standard asks not what anindividual knew, as a matter of fact, about agiven situation or set of facts. Instead, itasks what a reasonable and prudent personin a similar situation should know. Thus,even if a person or government truthfullyasserts that they were unaware of theactivities of a terrorist cell in their territory,this does not provide moral immunity fromattack. This standard asks not what theydid know, but what they ought to haveknown had they exercised the diligence anddegree of inquiry a reasonable person intheir circumstance would have exercised.

Also, legitimate targets include morethan those who have carried out or areactively engaged in preparing to carry outattacks against U.S. citizens and forces.There will presumably be numerousindividuals who, in various ways, assistedor harbored attackers, or who possessedknowledge of planned attacks. From amoral perspective, the circle of legitimatetargets surely includes at least theseindividuals. A rough analog for the principlehere is the civil law standard for criminalconspiracy: all those within the circle of theconspiracy are legitimate targets. Theanalogy is not perfect, but in general itjustifies attacks on those who possessedinformation about the contemplatedterrorist activity or who supplied weapons,training, funding, or safe harbor to theactors, even if they did not possess fullknowledge of their intent.

72

Jus in bello Considerations.

How do ethical considerations constrainthe manner of attack against legitimateadversaries? The traditional requirementsof just war continue to have application inthis kind of war. Attacks must bediscriminate and they must be propor-tionate. Discrimination requires thatattacks be made on persons and militaryobjects in ways that permit successfulattack on them with a minimum of damageto innocent persons and objects. In practicalterms, this requires as much precision aspossible in determination of the locationand nature of targets. Further, it requireschoice of weapons and tactics that are mostlikely accurately to hit the object of theattack with a minimum of damage tosurrounding areas and personnel.

Proportionality imposes an essentiallycommon-sense requirement that thedamage done in the attack is in somereasonable relation to the value and natureof the target. To use a simple example: if thetarget is a small cell of individuals in asingle building, the obliteration of the entiretown in which the structure sits would bedisproportionate.

Two important real world considerationsbear on this discussion. The first is militarynecessity. Military necessity permitsactions that might otherwise be ethicallyquestionable. For example, if there simplyare no practical alternative means ofattacking a legitimate target, weapons andtactics that are less than ideal in terms oftheir discrimination and proportionalitymay be acceptable. It is important not toconfuse military necessity with militaryconvenience. The obligation of militarypersonnel is to assume some risk in theeffort to protect innocents. However,situations can certainly arise in which theresimply is not time or any alternative meansof attacking in a given situation. There,

military necessity generates the permissionto proceed with the attack.

The other consideration is the tendencyof adversaries of this type to co-locate them-selves and their military resources withcivilians and civilian structures in order togain some sense of protection from suchhuman shields. Obviously, when possible,every effort should be made to separatelegitimate targets from such shields. Butwhen that is not possible, it is acceptable toproceed with the attack, foreseeing thatinnocent persons and property will bedestroyed. The moral principle underlyingthis judgment is known as “double effect,”and permits such actions insofar as theagent sincerely can claim (as would be thecase here) that the destruction of theinnocents was not part of the plan orintention, but merely an unavoidableby-product of legitimate military action.

It is important to note, however, thatthere can be no just war justification for aresponse to these attacks with attacks of asimilar character on other societies. Notonly would this constitute an unethical andillegal attack on innocent parties, it wouldalmost certainly erode the moral “highground” and wide-spread political supportthe United States currently enjoys.

The Moral Status of the Adversary.

The individuals who initiated the terrorattacks are clearly not “soldiers” in anymoral or legal sense. They, and others whooperate as they did from the cover of civilianidentities, are not entitled to any of theprotections of the war convention. Thismeans that, if captured, they are notentitled to the benevolent quarantine of thePOW convention or of domestic criminallaw. For the purposes of effective responseto these individuals, as well as futuredeterrence, it may be highly undesirableeven if they are captured to carry out theextensive due process of criminal

73

proceedings. If we can identify culpableindividuals to a moral certainty, their swiftand direct elimination by military means ismorally acceptable and probably preferablein terms of the goals of the policy.

However, as this conflict proceeds,especially if ground operations commenceagainst fixed targets, one may foresee thatindividuals and groups may come to operateagainst U.S. forces as organized militaryunits. It is important to keep in mind that,no matter how horrific the origins of thisconflict, if and when this occurs and suchgroups begin to behave as organized units,to carry weapons openly, and to wear somekind of distinctive dress or badge, theybecome assimilated to the war convention.At that point, close moral and legal analysiswill be required to determine the degree towhich they become entitled to the status of“combatant” and are given the GenevaConvention protection that status provides.The previous permission for swiftelimination applies to the period in whichthey operate with civilian “cover.” Shouldelements of the adversary force eventuallychoose to operate as an organized militaryforce, the long-term importance of universalrespect for the Geneva Convention’sprovision would make our treating them atthat point as soldiers under the law thepreferred course of action.

74

Pakistan may be the most pivotalcoalition partner during the initial phase ofthe war on terrorism since it has the longestborder with and provides the best access toAfghanistan. In a broader sense, Pakistanis crucial because it is the world’s secondmost populous Islamic state. Its cooperationhelps prevent the war on terrorism frombecoming a conflict between Islam andChristianity. Pakistan is also a Category IIsanctuary for global terrorist movements.

*

And Pakistan has an effective military andintelligence service and thus could serve asan important ally for anti-terroristoperations.

The United States would like to seePakistan emerge from the war on terrorismas a stable, developing state wherereligious-based extremists do not findsupport or recruits. As such, it could providea model for other Islamic states and play a

75

FIFTEEN

Coalition Partners: Pakistan

Dr. Steven Metz

Conclusions:• Resuscitate and broaden contacts with the Pakistani military through a

coordinated NATO engagement plan (with a major role for Turkey); renewedand expanded IMET for Pakistani officers and NCOs; establishment ofPakistani faculty liaison positions at the CGSC, USAWC, TRADOC, andbranch schools; provide U.S. instructors at Pakistani PME schools; and explorea new form of engagement that leads to the rotational stationing of a Pakistanicompany or battalion at a U.S. Army base for training and professionaldevelopment.

• Support Musharraf while quietly pressuring him to undertake the political andeconomic reforms necessary for long-term stability.

• In collaboration with the European Union and the United Nations, lead a majoreffort to find a solution to the Kashmir problem that satisfies that region’sMuslim majority but does not do so at the expense of India’s security.

• Continue debt forgiveness and increased access to the American market,particularly for textiles.

• Provide reconstruction assistance focused on the rebuilding of the educationalsystem.

• Resist any urge to use Pakistani territory for military operations againstAfghanistan.

• Broaden and deepen military engagement with India to assure that New Delhidoes not see improved ties with Pakistan as a strategic “tilt.”

* Category I states support terrorist movements as official policy (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq). Category II states turn a blind eyeor allow terrorist movements to exist because of fear, weakness, or sympathy (e.g. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE).Category III states host terrorist activities because their systems of legal and civil rights and their large immigrantcommunities provide a form of protection (e.g. Germany and the United States).

leading role in building regional stabilityand prosperity.

This positive outcome is certainly notpreordained. Pakistan could disintegrateinto a nightmare internal war of ethnicconflict, sectarian violence, and humanitar-ian disaster. Under such conditions,religious extremists could ally withsympathetic military officers, seize politicalpower, and thus control nuclear weapons.

The ultimate outcome for Pakistandepends on the sagacity of that nation’sleaders and on the wisdom of Americanstrategy.

Context.

Pakistan faces severe constraints andproblems that American strategists mustconsider. From its creation in 1947,Pakistan has had a weak sense of nationalidentity. Composed of a multitude of ethnicgroups with different cultures andlanguages, its only unifying feature wasIslam. Pakistan has never decided whetherit seeks to be an Iran-style nation ruled byreligious leaders or a secular state along thelines of Turkey.

Punjabis, who constitute about 48percent of Pakistanis, dominate theeconomy, government, and military. Thishas created deep resentment among theother ethnic groups. Ethnically PashtunPakistanis, who represent about 8 percentof the population, feel as much connectionwith their fellow Pashtuns in Afghanistanas with Islamabad. Thus the Taliban hasdeep reservoirs of support in westernPakistan and in the slums of other citieslike Karachi.

Pakistan suffers from rigid classdistinctions intermingled with religiousconsiderations. Members of the upper classtend to identify with modernization and theWest. Many have been educated in Europeor North America, and all speak English.While some are devoutly religious, most

consider the religious extremism popularamong the largely illiterate lower classes asa threat.

To avoid inflaming class war, thePakistani elite has tolerated thisextremism. The tendency of the extremiststo blame external forces, particularly theUnited States and Israel, for Pakistan’sproblems was a convenient way to deflectattention from the shortcomings of thenation’s leaders and political structures.

Bad governance has been the norm inPakistan. The first decade of independenceestablished a pattern of political instabilityand corruption. In combination with rapidpopulation growth, crushing poverty, andethnic and sectarian conflict, this isincendiary.

Pakistan has experienced cycles ofmilitary dictatorship and weak, corruptcivilian governments. In October 1999 theArmy deposed Prime Minister MuhammedNawaz Sharif when he attempted to replaceChief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf witha family crony. General Musharraf, whilepromising a return to civilian rule, hasruled since then, attempting with onlymodest success to root out corruption,forestall ethnic and regional conflict, controlreligious extremism, and resuscitate thenation’s stagnant economy.

Pakistan’s external debt burden iscrushing with $21 billion coming due in2002-03. Defense spending consumes asignificant portion of government expendi-tures. These economic problems contributedto a collapse of public education, the publichealth system, and the criminal justice andlaw enforcement systems. Foreigninvestment has nearly dried up. GDPgrowth during most of the 1990s was lessthan population growth, leading to a declinein living standards and widespreaddiscontent.

Pakistan’s primary foreign and securityproblem has been its conflict with India. In

76

recent decades, this has centered on thestatus of Kashmir. While this state isoverwhelmingly Muslim, its ruler at thetime of independence was Hindu and thussought to join India. Armed conflict ensuedwhich led to India’s occupation of theeastern part. In 1990 Kashmiri militantsbegan an armed insurgency against Indiancontrol. While Islamabad officially deniesinvolvement, it is widely known thatPakistan supports the insurgents. This hasled India to label Pakistan a supporter ofterrorism. The fact that both India andPakistan are nuclear states makes theirconflict one of the most dangerous on earth.

While grappling with these problems,Pakistan developed close ties with theTaliban government in neighboringAfghanistan. The military and intelligenceservices trained and equipped themujahedin who fought against the Soviets.Out of the concern that the civil war anddisorder in Afghanistan that followed theSoviet withdrawal would spill over, thePakistani military and security serviceshelped form and support the Taliban, mostof whom emerged from the refugee campsand radical religious schools (madrasahs) inPakistan. (These schools, which are the onlysource of education for many poorPakistanis, remain a breeding ground forviolent extremism).

Support for the Taliban remains high,particularly in the heavily Pashtun areaslike Quetta and Peshawar, among theurban poor in large cities like Karachi, andamong the more radically religioussegments of the professional classes,including the military and intelligenceservices.

Pakistan’s Strategy.

The United States’ declaration of war onterrorism forced General Musharraf toabandon his attempts to tolerate or mollifyextremism. In effect, he had to choose

between alternative futures for his country,one based on an improved relationship withthe West and integration into the globaleconomy, the other leading toward the“Talibanization” of Pakistan.

Musharraf has several interlinkedobjectives:

• Improving ties with the West in orderto gain the removal of sanctions imposedafter the 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999military coup, deflecting pressure caused bythe slowness of the return to civilian rule,attracting economic assistance and invest-ment, and providing a diplomatic counter-weight to India, particularly on theKashmir issue;

• Diminishing the threat from theextremist movements inside Pakistan;

• Avoiding the disintegration ofAfghanistan which would create seriousrefugee problems for Pakistan andpotentially engulf the western section of thecountry; and,

• Preventing the emergence in Kabul ofa successor government hostile to Pakistan(on this point, Musharraf supports acoalition government dominated byPashtuns, who form a majority inAfghanistan).

In September Musharraf pledged“unstinted cooperation in the fight againstterrorism,” but out of concern with thebacklash among Pakistan’s lower classesand other Taliban sympathizers, stipulatedthat there be no U.S. forces in Pakistan andthat the Pakistani military not be usedoutside the nation’s borders. He madeseveral attempts to broker a deal with theTaliban leading to the turnover of Osamabin Laden, but all failed.

Musharraf’s government has controlledthe anti-American demonstrations thatexploded once military operations beganand shown a willingness to use force ifnecessary. He has consolidated his grip onpower. The most important step in this was

77

an October 7 purge of senior militaryofficers and intelligence officials thought tobe sympathetic to the Taliban and otherextremists. In general, then, he hasattempted to go as far as he can in supportof the United States and the Afghanistanoperation without sparking outrightrebellion within Pakistan.

Prognosis.

In the short term, Musharraf appearsfirmly in control of Pakistan and likely tocontinue cooperation with the UnitedStates. The level of professionalism amongthe officer corps is high; its senior leadersappear solidly behind Musharraf’sapproach. He has expressed his confidencethat Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are fullyunder control and cannot be seized byradicals. This is all very important for theUnited States: if Musharraf should beremoved from power, any successor wouldbe less likely to cooperate in the war onterrorism and might be overtly hostile.

Three things could help solidifyMusharraf’s position and support. One is ifthe Afghanistan phase of the war onterrorism is short, leads to minimumcivilian casualties and refugee flows, andpaves the way for a coalition governmentand the reconstruction of that batteredcountry. Second is some immediateeconomic payoff. It is not yet clear whetherthis will happen. On one hand, the UnitedStates, the European Union, and Japanhave all taken steps to provide debt reliefand other means of economic support. Inlate September the IMF, with U.S.approval, authorized the final tranche ofPakistan’s $596 million standby loan. Onthe other hand, the turmoil in South andCentral Asia have further deterredinvestment and increased shippinginsurance for goods to and from Pakistan.Third is international involvement leadingtoward a solution of the Kashmir problem in

a way satisfactory to the Muslim majoritythere.

Musharraf’s position and support couldbe weakened by several things:

• A protracted military operation inAfghanistan leading to refugee flows andwidespread civilian casualties;

• An outright takeover of Afghanistanby the Northern Alliance;

• Anti-terrorist attacks by the UnitedStates on other Muslim countries such asIraq or Libya;

• A significant crackdown on theMuslim insurgents in Kashmir by India;

• Failure on the part of the UnitedStates and Europe to produce tangibleeconomic benefits in exchange forPakistan’s cooperation; or

• The coalescence of opposition fromwithin the Pakistani military.

Conclusion.

Without cooperation from Pakistan, theUnited States would have a very difficulttime completing the first phase of the waron terrorism. But the United States hasbeen burned many times by placing its trustin friendly dictators unwilling or unable toundertake serious political reform. This isthe dilemma with Pakistan: the UnitedStates may not be able to succeed withoutMusharraf, but to be associated with himcould be risky over the long term if hebecomes just another corrupt, repressivemilitary dictator.

78

While Pakistan may be the most pivotalcoalition partner in the initial phase in thewar on terrorism, a top U.S. priority inSouth Asia must be to keep India-Pakistantensions at the lowest level possible. Asuccessful outcome in this phase of the warnot only requires ongoing cooperation withIslamabad but also parallel U.S.engagement with New Delhi. Because of thedecades-old animosity between India andPakistan, especially concerning theterritorial dispute over the region ofKashmir, a misstep by the United States,Pakistan, or India could easily lead to adangerous heightening of tensions betweenthe two nuclear armed South Asianneighbors and possibly escalate into war.

Rightly or wrongly, India continues tosee Pakistan as “part of the problem” ratherthan “part of the solution” in the war. FromNew Delhi’s perspective, Islamabad is amajor exporter of terrorism—first to

Afghanistan and then, since the late 1980s,to Kashmir. Indeed, Afghanistan is seen bymany Indians as a virtual colony ofPakistan, with the Taliban serving as aproxy of Pakistan’s military.

Context.

At independence from Great Britain in1947, the subcontinent was partitioned intothe predominantly Hindu state of India andpredominantly Muslim state of Pakistanbecause Hindu and Muslim leaders couldnot agree on a political formula to keep theircommunities in one country. Although Indiaremains officially a secular state, more than80 percent of its one billion people areHindu, and the dominant political party inNew Delhi’s current governing coalition isthe Hindu nationalist Bharatiya JanataParty (or BJP). Nevertheless, approxi-mately 12 percent of the country’spopulation is Muslim. Numbering some 120

79

SIXTEEN

Coalition Partners: India

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Conclusions:The United States must work very hard to prevent people from viewing the war onterrorism as a religious struggle between Islam and Hinduism by:

• Continuing to develop and expand its relationship with India while beingcareful at the same time not to be viewed as leaning toward India at theexpense of Pakistan;

• Expanding mil-mil relations on a trajectory comparable with that planned forPakistan;

• Assisting India to improve command and control systems for its nuclearweapons;

• Urging India to moderate its response to communal unrest and insurgency inKashmir at least in the short term;

• Encouraging India to seek over the longer term a negotiated solution inKashmir with the help of an honest broker such as U.N. Secretary General KofiAnan.

million, this gives India a Muslimcommunity even larger than that ofPakistan and second only to that ofIndonesia.

India today shares approximately a twothousand mile-long border with Pakistan,and it has fought three major wars and onemini-war with Pakistan. All but one of thesewas fought over Kashmir. The first wasfought at Independence in 1947 when theMuslim majority in Kashmir sought to joinPakistan, and the Hindu hereditary rulerappealed for help from India. The result wasa war that led to the division of Kashmirinto Indian and Pakistani control sectorsseparated by the so-called Line of Control. Asecond Indo-Pakistan war was fought overKashmir in 1965. Six years later the twocountries fought another war, this time overthe status of East Pakistan. India’s victorymeant East Pakistan became theindependent state of Bangladesh.

More recently, in 1999 Indian troopsfought a small war against Pakistanirregulars in the remote Kargil region ofKashmir. It remains to be seen whetherIndia’s strikes against Pakistani-controlledKashmir on October 15 of this year willescalate into another full-blown war orsimply dissipate.

India and Pakistan are both nuclearpowers and therefore the possibility existsof a nuclear conflict in South Asia.Moreover, there are serious questions aboutcommand and control mechanisms fornuclear weapons in both countries.

India’s Strategy.

India views itself as a natural ally of theUnited States and an indispensablecoalition member of the war. New Delhi isvery eager to continue the rapprochementwith Washington that began during theClinton administration and continued in itsview until the immediate aftermath ofSeptember 11.

India has expressed strong support forthe war on terrorism. New Delhi has offeredbases, airfields, and intelligence for U.S.forces involved in operations againsttargets in Afghanistan. India is extremelyconcerned about Pakistani support forterrorism particularly in the disputed areaof Kashmir, especially in the wake of theOctober 1 car bombing outside the stateparliament building in the capital ofSrinagar. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayeereportedly gave assurances to PresidentBush prior to October 1 that India wouldshow restraint in Kashmir.

New Delhi supports ongoing U.S.military actions but remains wary about thecloser ties developing between the UnitedStates and Pakistan. Vajpayee andPakistani President Pervez Musharrafspoke by telephone on October 8. Vajpayeeinsisted that Pakistan must end support forIslamic terrorists in Indian-controlledKashmir, and he declined Musharraf’sinvitation to meet face-to-face with thePakistani leader.

India’s main objectives are:• Further improvement in bilateral

relations with the United States;• The continued existence of a unified

Pakistan;• The defeat of “terrorism” in Kashmir;• No significant impairment of India’s

impressive economic growth.

Prognosis.

India will continue to support stronglythe war and will remain very interested inexpanding security ties and defensecooperation with the United States. At thesame time, New Delhi will continue to beextremely concerned about growing U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation.

India will also be extremely sensitive tofurther terrorist activities in Kashmir. Itwill be difficult for New Delhi not toretaliate with force in the event of further

80

terrorist attacks in the disputed territory.Nevertheless, India’s actions will beconstrained by the sober recognition thatsustained military action against Pakistan-controlled Kashmir would exacerbate thepolitical challenges confronting Islamabad’smilitary government and perhaps lead to itscollapse—the last thing New Delhi wants.

If, for whatever reason, Pakistan’sarmed forces intervened in Afghanistan,India would vehemently condemn this, andIndo- Pakistani tensions would heighten.

Recommendations.

The United States must work very hardto prevent people from viewing the war onterrorism as a religious struggle betweenIslam and Hinduism by:

• Continuing to develop and expand itsrelationship with India while being carefulat the same time not to be viewed as leaningtoward India at the expense of Pakistan;

• Expanding mil-mil relations on atrajectory comparable with that planned forPakistan;

• Assisting India to improve commandand control systems for its nuclear weapons;

• Urging India to moderate its responseto communal unrest and insurgency inKashmir at least in the short term;

• Encouraging India to seek over thelonger term a negotiated solution inKashmir with the help of an honest brokersuch as U.N. Secretary General Kofi Anan.

81

Introduction.

Although the five Central Asian statesare similar, there are significantethnographical, religious (Sunni versusShia), and linguistic cleavages among them.Therefore, policies and strategic optionsthat involve them must be tailored to theirspecific needs and conditions. But if weunderstand their interests, we should beable to devise successful responses andinducements of an inclusive strategicnature, within whose umbrella we cantarget specific countries’ needs. Success indoing so will enhance the U.S. coalition’sviability and allow us to exploit the presentcrisis so that we can bring about asignificant and lasting geostrategicrealignment in America’s interest.

Impact of the Crisis and Support for

U.S. Goals.

The willingness of the Central Asianstates to cooperate with the United Statesvaries. Because of this, our assistanceshould be tailored and go proportionally tothose who help us the most.

The most willing to help is the mostindependent-minded of all these states,

Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan seeks maximumfreedom of action and distance from bothRussia and China, but must deal with whatit perceives as a constant threat of Islamicinsurgency and terrorism emanating fromAfghanistan. It also is obviously contendingwith not just the threat of internal unrestand insurgency, but Russian and perhapsChinese pressure to limit any militarycooperation with Washington. PresidentIslam Karimov’s regime has stated itswillingness to provide the use of air spaceand one military base for humanitarianmissions. It also has allowed 1,000 U.S.troops to be stationed in Uzbekistan,probably at that base. Presumably thisinvolves intelligence cooperation as well.

Kazakstan, the most distant from thescene of current Central Asian insurgenciesand the most abundantly endowed withenergy, must always balance Russia andChina. Therefore, it generally seeks todiversify its external and defense relation-ships. It, too, has offered the United Statesbases and air space.

Turkmenistan has followed a formalpolicy of neutrality since becoming inde-pendent, and perhaps due to that has thebest relations with the Taliban of any of

83

SEVENTEEN

Central Asia and the War on Terrorism:Towards a New Alignment

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Conclusions:• Upgrade military engagement, security assistance, and PFP relationships.• Implement intelligence cooperation and training.• Link assistance to political and economic reforms.• Support petroleum pipeline routes through Central Asia to India.• Provide infrastructure, public health, and ecological assistance.• Assist developmental NGOs and foundations that work in Central Asia.

these states, often serving as aninterlocutor. Thus its support is limited toopening its air space to humanitarianflights.

Tajikistan, the victim of civil war andwith a fragile regime sustained mainly byRussian troops, nevertheless has consentedto use of its bases. But most likely anyfurther or future cooperation fromTajikistan will remain covert andunspoken. Kyrgyzstan, another small statethat depends largely on Russian support,has offered its air corridors forhumanitarian flights and has not totallyruled out military cooperation. In thiscontext, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan offerexcellent bases for missions directed atAfghanistan and are the real logistical keysto any success in launching missions fromCentral Asia.

Central Asian Demands or Needs.

At the same time, all these states willexpect and also need “compensations” fromthe United States. These rewards for theirsupport are both short and long term innature. They are not exclusively military,but the military “compensations” appear tobe the most urgent ones. As these are statesthat face permanent and ongoing threatsfrom terrorists aligned to the drug tradefrom Afghanistan, they will want militaryassistance. Uzbek officials, for instance,talk of “annihilating the Taliban.”Specifically, they appear to want upgradedPartnership for Peace (PfP) relationshipsand improved bilateral relations andassistance in weapons and training, as wellas intelligence, from Washington. Thelonger-term goal is to obtain, if not asecurity guarantee from Washington and/orNATO, then a permanently functioningU.S. military presence or relationship inand with Uzbekistan. Thus it is hardlysurprising that Uzbekistan now wants tonegotiate a Status of Forces Agreement

(SOFA). Uzbekistan, and probably the otherstates as well, want independence from thehegemonic plans of both Russia and China,now enshrined in the Shanghai-6 commun-iqué of July 2001. That communiqué notonly licensed the external power projectionof Russian and Chinese forces in CentralAsia (the latter signing off on such anagreement for the first time), it also definedterrorism, separatism, and extremism assecurity threats. Despite Russian offers ofcooperation, it is clear that Moscow objectsto these states having any meaningful orlasting defense relationship with theUnited States.

The Central Asia states may not fully beable to escape the Russo-Chinese defensestraitjacket, but they certainly wish to havereal alternatives to it. For Kazakstan,Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, this isrealistic. Perhaps it would be possible toprovide some or all of these kinds ofassistance. However, the danger for theUnited States is that it creates too close anidentification with these extremely repres-sive regimes whose policies, includingdisregard for civil and human rights,massive corruption, authoritarianism, andfierce religious repression, are creating thegrounds for insurgency. Not surprisingly,the increasing impoverishment of masses ofpeople as a few grow very rich, theunresolved socio-ecological-economic issues,and an apparently growing identificationwith Islam as a form of political expressionprovide fertile grounds for internal andpossibly interstate conflict. Thus militaryand security assistance must be finelycalibrated and should not be the only card inour deck.

Economic-Political Needs

and Assistance.

All these regimes desperately needlarge-scale and long-term economic, ecolog-ical, and political support. They require

84

help to obtain favorable terms of trade fortheir products and access to markets. Thatmeans major infrastructural investments intransportation and pipelines to free them ofdependence on Russia. Only such invest-ments, coupled at the less glamorous endwith developmental programs of a smallerscale such as have worked elsewhere in theThird World, can allow these regimes tomake substantial economic progress andeventually a breakthrough. This wouldinclude substantive assistance to build theBaku-Ceyhan pipeline, or pending thepacification of Afghanistan, UNOCAL’sproposal for a pipe- line from Turkmenistanthrough Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Indeed, for Turkmenistan andKazakstan, as well as the states lessendowed with oil and gas, a majorrealignment can be realized if we can pacifyAfghanistan and reverse Pakistan’s supportfor insurgents in Afghanistan, Central Asia,and Kashmir. To the degree thatWashington can persuade or, more bluntly,frighten either Tehran or Islamabad intorenouncing terrorism and negotiating withtheir rivals, it can support morealternatives for Turkmenistan, Kazakstan,and Uzbekistan, as well as smallerKyrgyzstan and even the Russian client,Tajikistan, to expand and diversify theirinternational trade. That possibility entailsenergy pipelines and construction of majorinfrastructural and transportation outletsthat will greatly stimulate all commercialtraffic, not just in energy products, amongall these states. Such large-scale growth oftrade offers Central Asia major security andeconomic benefits, provided Afghanistan ispacified and becomes the recipient ofsustained international efforts atreconstruction. Certainly it would helpovercome the logjam concerning pipelinesand shatter the material basis for Iranian-Russian alliance, partly directed againstCentral Asian states and Azerbaijan.

This strategic realignment also offers apossibility for genuine Indo-Pakistani nego-tiations and reduced tensions between Iranand its neighbors and/or Israel. Either orboth of those outcomes would clearly bemutually beneficial for everyone in theMiddle East, Central Asia, and/or SouthAsia. While this vision may seem tooaudacious, this crisis and the fact that thewar will not likely be a short one offer thepossibilities for major restructuring ofCentral Asian alignments to the benefit oflocal regimes and the United States.

Recommendations.

U.S. inducements for support shouldavoid long-term and binding ties likeSOFAs. Rather, we should make thefollowing kinds of military-political-economic offers in return for real support.

• Upgraded bilateral military exercises,training, weapons sales, IMET agreements,and more frequent participation for all whowant it in PfP exercises.

• A regular program of intelligencecooperation and training as needed.

• Political assistance to bolster thosecountries against China and Russia. Thisassistance can also take the form of thebilateral and multilateral militaryprograms listed above, since those enhancethese regimes’ capability to defendthemselves or to solicit Western support.However, we cannot ally ourselves withrepressive domestic tactics. Ideally, adiscussion should begin that requirespolitical and economic reforms as acondition for aid.

• Support for pipelines through thosecountries to India and beyond, givingproducers a real outlet to the sea that is analternative to Russian and Iranianpressures, pipelines, and ports.

• Large-scale assistance to build roadsfor rail, truck, and commerical trade south

85

from Central Asia, tied to the EU Silk Roadproject.

• Large-scale assistance with waterpurification and cleanup and developmentof renewable sources of water.

• Large-scale assistance in publichealth and pollution cleanup.

• Major financial assistance to NGOsand foundations with a proven record ofsuccess that are working to develop areasfrom the bottom up to parallel the larger,macro-economic projects cited here.

86

To grasp the impact upon Russia of ournew war and the requirements forsustaining Russia’s cooperation, we mustdistinguish four sets of players in Russiaand one set of foreign players besides theUnited States. President Vladimir Putinmust balance the inputs and pressuresemanating from these sources. Based onpublic record, they are the intelligencecommunity, i.e., the Foreign IntelligenceService (SVR) and the domestic FederalSecurity Service (FSB), the Ministry ofForeign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry ofDefense (MOD), and the armed forces,represented by the General Staff. TheCentral Asian governments also influenceMoscow’s thinking from the outside.

The Players in Russia.

The SVR and perhaps FSB apparentlyhave previously offered the United Statescovert rights to bases in Tajikistan for useagainst Osama Bin Laden. The Russiangovernment regularly professes deepanxiety about the rapid spread ofinsurgency in Central Asia supported by binLaden and the Taliban. The assassinationof the latter’s main rival, Ahmad ShahMassoud, military leader of the NorthernAlliance forces in Afghanistan, mighteventually provoke a Taliban offensive

towards the Afghan border with CentralAsia. That would facilitate the direct spreadinto Central Asia and beyond of large-scalerefugee flows, terrorism, insurgency, andrampant narcotics trading that financesthis violence. Russia also argues that theseAfghan-based forces are materiallyimplicated in Chechnya.

The SVR and FSB have previouslyshared intelligence up to a point with theirU.S. and Western opposite numbersconcerning these terrorists. They clearlyview the attacks on America as a basis for adeeper and more enduring intelligence andthus political entente with the West. Theyalso evidently believe that the U.S.-ledmilitary alliance will facilitate resolution ofthe problem of military suppression ofeither the Central Asian and Afghan-basedforces or allow Russia greater scope foraction in Chechnya without worldwideopposition. Preliminary indications con-cerning the expectation of less Westernopposition to Russia’s activities inChechnya seem to be justified. Thereforethe SVR and FSB have now revealed theirpast cooperation with Washington (ingeneral terms) and appear ready to upgradeit. Thus, after Putin’s offer to shareintelligence with Washington, it is likelythat a deeper and perhaps more regularized

87

EIGHTEEN

Russia and the U.S. War on Terrorism

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Conclusions:• Provide Russia expanded trade access to the U.S. market and investment

opportunities.• Develop programs help Russia with the clean up of nuclear materials, ecological

repair, and reconstruction of its public health system.• Provide some form of compensation for an end to proliferation of WMD

technology and systems.

mechanism of sharing and cooperationbetween our two intelligence systems willtake place.

The MFA evidently also seesopportunities for gain here, including atleast the expectation of Western silence, ifnot active approbation for Russianactivities in Chechnya. Therefore Moscowhas steadily proclaimed the tie between theChechens and Bin Laden’s network. U.S.,German, and Italian reactions to Russianpolicy in Chechnya evidently justify thatexpectation. The MFA also apparentlyentertains the hope of future membership ina revamped NATO. Defense Minister SergeiIvanov, who supports such cooperation, nowalso urges the establishment of amechanism with NATO for deeper and moreregularized security cooperation withMoscow. Moscow also wants compensationfor any cessation of weapons and weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) capabilitytransfers to Iran and other “rogue states”(Iraq and North Korea, among others); aveto, presumably in the U.N., over anyaction that may be taken against Iraq;presumably membership in the WorldTrade Organization; and debt forgiveness.Thus it is also urging that the United Statesact exclusively through the U.N., a bad ideafor many reasons.

The point of this gambit is not justapproving Russian aims in Chechnya, butalso preventing NATO enlargement in2002, especially to the Baltic, reversing theidea of NATO and Western primacy inproviding security to Eastern Europe, andrecognizing a privileged place in theCommonwealth of Independent States(CIS) for Moscow—the last one being itstopmost foreign policy and defense priority.This attempted reconstitution of NATO notonly reverses the thrust of Western policy inEurope, it also gives Russia its long-sought-after veto on NATO’s activitieswithout having undergone or affirmed

internal reform, defense reform, andacceptance of the territorial status quo inEurasia, not to mention renouncing itshegemonic aspirations in the CIS. None ofthese objectives, except for financial andeconomic assistance, comport with vitalU.S. goals that our new war on terrorismdoes not supersede.

However, Putin’s offer to assistWashington also came about becauseMoscow cannot control the Central Asianstates to the extent that it wishes. His offerfollowed numerous reports that Uzbekistanand Kazakstan, and possibly Turkmen-istan, would offer the United Statesoverflight rights, access to air bases andintelligence sharing, and that U.S. forceswere either in Uzbekistan or en route there.Failing to stop this move by Central Asiangovernments, Moscow apparently tried tojump on the bandwagon and regain controlof it. Moscow wants to retain control overthe duration, modalities, and extent of U.S.military and other presence in Central Asiaby offering Washington more than would beotherwise expected. It also hopes to obtainthe political benefits sketched out above.

The military, led by the General Staffand its Chief, General Anatoly Kvashnin, isclearly the most suspicious element inRussian policymaking. Beyond concernabout being dragged into another Afghan orChechen-like war which it cannot win, or ofbecoming a target for further terroristattacks, it also harbors deep suspicionsabout any U.S. military presence in the CISunder any conditions. Consequently, it notonly refused to commit any troops to theoperation, it preempted Putin when Ivanovpractically ruled out even the kind ofcooperation that Putin later supported. Wecan reliably expect the MOD and GeneralStaff to resolutely oppose any extended U.S.strategic presence in Central Asia and theCIS, generally to seek to limit America’spresence and Russian and Central Asian

88

cooperation with U.S. forces, and loudly todemand compensations even beyond whatwe have mentioned.

Russia’s Offer and Its Ambivalent

Role in the War on Terrorism.

Putin offered the United Statesintelligence cooperation with the SVR andpossibly FSB, opened Russian airspace tohumanitarian flights and to search andrescue missions, and offered weapons andarms to Afghan anti-Taliban forces. Putinalso tried to pretend that he was graciouslyoffering former Soviet air bases in CentralAsia and had coordinated this with thosegovernments to maintain the pretense ofRussian hegemony there. But he refrainedfrom offering Russian military or air basesas staging posts for U.S. or coalition forcesor from allowing overflight rights to U.S.aircraft in support of military missions.Thus actual operational assistance will belimited strictly to nonmilitary operations.Russia will not directly support attacks onthe Taliban. Should the war shift to othertheaters known for harboring terrorists,like Iran, Iraq, Syria, or Libya, it is verydoubtful that even this limited cooperationwill continue.

Indeed, Russia’s actual conduct in thewar on terrorism is highly suspect andrather different from its loud anti-terroristrhetoric. The war in Chechnya largelystems from Putin’s and Yeltsin’s effort tolaunch a quick, victorious war against anenemy that certainly could be charged withterrorism in Dagestan and perhaps beyondthat in Russia, and to do so for domesticelectoral purposes. Yet there is no credibleevidence of any Chechen terror in Russiasince 1999 apart from Dagestan, and thereare new charges that the FSB was behindthe terrorism of 1999 in Moscow. Althoughinternational Islamic fighters are present inChechnya and ties to Bin Laden do exist,

that war is more about Russian issues thanabout terrorism.

Moreover, Polish scholars have notedthat the only power that benefits fromongoing insurgency and terrorism inCentral Asia is Russia, since that justifiesRussian efforts to project its military powerand to advocate integrating Central Asianstates around Russia’s armed forces. Yetwhen those states faced real threats lastyear, Russian help was minimal andderided by local governments. Furthermore,there are charges within the Russian pressthat Russian forces allowed the IslamicMovement for Uzbekistan (IMU) to crossinto Central Asia by opening the Tajik-Afghan border to them in 2000. Russiantroops and commanders in Central Asiahave also participated in the drug tradeoriginating there and in Afghanistan.Nuclear smuggling has taken place inCentral Asia, and this suggests at leastsome officials’ or armed forces’ connivancewith the smugglers and the intendedrecipients of this contraband. Finally,Russian intelligence (as the WashingtonTimes reported on June 14-15) sold BinLaden high-tech communications andapparently encryption technology stolen byRobert Hanssen. These facts suggestRussia’s rather unique approach toterrorism, one that the United Statesshould not reward unduly.

Sustaining the Coalition.

Most Russian objectives run counter toU.S. goals in Europe and Asia and our newopportunities to gain a lasting influence inCentral Asia. Since many Central Asiangovernments clearly seek some lasting U.S.presence and were disappointed at notgetting it, we now have an opportunity togain that presence while making fewer “sidepayments” to Russia than might otherwisehave been the case. We can offer thefollowing “compensations” to Russia, even

89

while expanding our visibility in CentralAsia.

• We should offer Russia expandedtrade access to U.S. market and investmentopportunities (provided the legal bases forthe latter are implemented).

• We should also offer large-scale publicprograms to clean up nuclear materials, andhelp deal with some of the monumentalecological and public health issues therethat are beyond Russian control.

• Furthermore, we can and should offerreasonable compensations to induce acessation of proliferation of all forms ofWMD technology and systems (and, if weare able, conventional weaponry as well) toIran and other rogue states: Iraq, Syria,Libya, etc.

• A very important inducement toRussia is to move rapidly on reducingstrategic offensive arms in return forbuilding strategic defenses to levelsoutlined by President Bush and theadministration. This neutralizes some ofthe Russian military opposition tocooperation, reaffirms our willingness andability to be a reliable partner, eases manyRussian security dilemmas since theycannot afford parity any longer, andconforms to our overall desire to rewriterelations with Russia. Agreement heredemonstrates our desire to forge trulynonadversarial relations with Russia. But,at the same time, it does not compromiseany of our other existing and stillcontinuing broad strategic-politicalobjectives across Eurasia.

• It would also be helpful to devise, if itis possible, a mechanism for regularintelligence exchanges on terrorism andnarcotics trafficking.

• These incentives should not stop orlimit our plans for NATO enlargement andour intention to forestall spheres ofinfluence in the CIS.

• Nor is it time to admit Russia intoNATO. Indeed, doing so would be an act ofthe greatest strategic folly because it wouldutterly compromise NATO’s mission,purpose, and standards for entry, as well asregional security, especially in the Baltic,Balkan, Black Sea, and CIS areas.

• Although there is no doubt of Chechenties to Bin Laden and other such groups, thatwar has a different profile and etiology thanour current campaign, and they should not belinked. While we may urge the Chechens tosever ties with Bin Laden, we should notrefrain from criticizing Russian operations, ormore importantly, urging a political solutionto the war.

• This crisis offers us an opportunity toachieve other key aims beyond Russia’sintegration into the West through strategicarms and economic agreements sketchedout above.

• In particular, this crisis provides anopportunity to undermine the essentiallyanti-American thrust of the ShanghaiCooperation organization that was imposedon Central Asia by Russia and China. Thatorganization’s recent communiqué licensesChinese and Russia military presencesthere in the guise of anti-terrorist oranti-separatist operations (terms that couldjustify Russian assistance over Taiwan).

• Recent events demonstrate not onlythat the Central Asian states, particularlyUzbekistan and Kazakstan, still desire ameaningful and multifaceted U.S. presencethere, they also show that Russia cannotstop it from taking place. Therefore, weneed to prevent this area from becoming notonly a site for regular terrorist activitiesand insurgency, but also a platform for ananti-American coalition aiming to restoreRussian hegemony or extend Chineseinfluence in Asia. Our invited presencethere can serve all the strategic objectives ofsecurity, energy, and maintaining tradeaccess and Central Asian states’ indepen-

90

dence that we have previously proclaimedfor Central Asia. And we might successfullydo so at a smaller cost vis-à-vis Russia thanhas been imagined.

91

At a minimum, China’s tacit support orat least nonopposition is crucial to theeventual success of the war on terrorismbecause Beijing holds one of the permanentseats on the U.N. Security Council. China’sactive participation in the war is notessential. In fact, the United States shouldprobably not expect much in the way ofsubstantive Chinese support.

Officially, Beijing has offered supportiverhetoric for America’s war on terrorism andhas shared intelligence with the UnitedStates. Some Chinese analysts see theevents of September 11, while tragic, asheralding a brighter future for U.S.-Chinarelations. These analysts see significantpotential for U.S.-China cooperation oncounterterrorism efforts, which cancontribute to an improvement in overallbilateral relations. Other Chinese analysts,however, expect that the United States willsingle-mindedly and unilaterally pursue itswar on terrorism, which will result in adeterioration in relations.

Context.

China’s leaders are very concernedabout ethno-religious terrorism in their owncountry—especially from Islamic extrem-ists seeking greater autonomy orindependence from China in the western

region of Xinjiang. Xinjiang shares anextended land border with central Asianstates (including a short stretch withAfghanistan), Pakistan and Kashmir.

Beijing is also concerned about other“separatist” movements seeking independ-ence in places such as Tibet and Taiwan.These are all seen as constituting seriousthreats to national security, and China’sleaders are extremely sensitive to the pointof paranoia about internal security. Theissue of “separatism” tends to be on theagenda alongside the subject of “terrorism.”

During his visit to Shanghai to attendthe Asia-Pacific Economic Conference(APEC) meeting on October 20-21,President Bush got a qualified statement ofsupport for the war from his Chinesecounterpart. The first ever face-to-facemeeting between the two national leaderswent as well as could be expected. TheChinese did not want the issue of terrorismto monopolize the agenda or for PresidentBush to upstage the Chinese leader.

China’s Strategy.

President Jiang told President Bush onOctober 8 that China supports efforts tocombat terrorism but cautioned him to keepcivilian casualties limited. However, as theU.S. and coalition forces continue to conduct

93

NINETEEN

Coalition Partners: China

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Conclusions:• Reactivate mil-mil ties with China across the board with a more comprehensive

pro-active approach to promote our long-term war on terrorism. The existing“case by case” review of activities should be discarded.

• Place the topic of counterterrorism prominently on the agenda in mil-milexchanges.

limited military operations in Afghanistanagainst the Taliban and al Qaeda, Beijinghas heavily censored Chinese media reportsof the war. China has sealed itsapproximately 50 mile-long border withAfghanistan and provided a small amountof humanitarian assistance for theresettlement of Afghan refugees. For now,the Chinese government is also denyingvisas to passport holders of countries in theArab world and Southwest Asia, andChinese airlines and travel agents aredeclining to sell air tickets to these sameindividuals.

China’s main objectives are to:• Prevent terrorist acts and defeat

secessionist movements in China;• Maintain good relations with the

United States;• Ensure stability in Central Asia and

cordial relations with the states of theregion;

• Secure a stable supply of foreignenergy resources;

• Continue economic growth whichentails smooth entry into the World TradeOrganization (China formally joins theWTO next month).

Prognosis.

As time goes on, Beijing could begin toexpress publicly reservations or condemna-tion, although Chinese leaders mayprivately be pleased that terroristorganizations that also pose a threat toChina are being destroyed or greatlyweakened.

However, if the United States pursuesoperations beyond the current limitedU.S./coalition military action in Afghan-istan, there will likely be strong officialChinese condemnation. China fears thatthe United States might undertakeextensive military operations against otherstates in Southwest Asia or the Middle East(e.g., Iraq) or establish a long-term military

presence in the region. This would damageU.S.-China relations and result in closerties between China and Russia. Bothcountries would redouble their efforts tooppose U.S. actions via the United Nationsand the recently established ShanghaiCooperation Organization (composed ofRussia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan).

Recommendations.

The United States should not expectmuch actual support from China and shouldprobably be satisfied with no vocalopposition to the war on terrorism.

Nevertheless, Beijing could make someuseful contributions, although Washingtonshould not expend valuable political capitalin pursuit of these. If the United States doesseek substantial help from China in thewar, Washington should anticipate Beijinginsisting on a significant quid pro quo (e.g.,regarding Taiwan). The United Statesshould avoid going down this road. Instead,Washington should play up Beijing’s senseof its status as a great power and Beijing’sdesire to be treated like a distinguishedmember of the community of nations.

If efforts in Afghanistan take placeunder U.N. auspices (once the Taliban istoppled), China may be willing to providetoken military units for peacekeeping orhumanitarian relief activities inAfghanistan. At the very least, China maybe willing to offer some humanitarian aid.This Chinese involvement might be ofconsiderable value in stressing the broadnature of the antiterrorism coalition and beuseful in improving mil-mil relationsbetween the People’s Liberation Army andother armed forces (including U.S.military).

The United States should make everyeffort to ensure that bilateral relations withChina improve. To this end we should:

94

• Reactivate mil-mil ties with Chinaacross the board with a more compre-hensive pro-active approach to promote ourlong-term war on terrorism. The existing“case by case” review of activities should bediscarded;

• Place the topic of counterterrorismprominently on the agenda in mil-milexchanges;

• Stress the importance of calm andstability in the Taiwan Strait and KoreanPeninsula.

95

This paper surveys the reaction of sevenkey Asian states to the U.S. war onterrorism following the events of September11, 2001. Four of these states are allies orgood friends of the United States (Australia,Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines),and the three remaining states are coalitionpartners or potential coalition partners(Indonesia, Malaysia, and North Korea).Each of these states merits close attentionfrom the United States and its armed forces,either to ensure that a particular countryremains in the coalition or at least that itdoes not actively oppose the coalition.

ALLIES AND FRIENDS

Australia.

Response so far: There has been strongbipartisan and public support in Canberrafor the war. Both the government of PrimeMinister John Howard and the mainopposition Labour Party have beenextremely outspoken in their support.Australia has offered SAS (specialoperations forces), air-to-air refuelingaircraft, and intelligence.

Responses to military action: Canberra’sresponse has been strongly supportive todate, but broader military action outsideAfghanistan might cause the erosion ofpublic support and then political support.

What we can expect in the future:Continued strong support, particularly ifthe incumbent administration winsnational parliamentary elections scheduledfor November 10.

Policy recommendations: Express publicthanks and appreciation for Australiansupport.

Japan.

Response so far: There has beensurprisingly strong official and publicsupport for a U.S. military response in thewar. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumiannounced a 7-point program, includingefforts to clear legal hurdles to allowSelf-Defense Forces to serve in supportfunctions for military action againstAfghanistan. Compared to the paralysisand timidity Japan displayed during theGulf War, Tokyo’s response has beenremarkably swift and robust.

97

TWENTY

Reaction of Key Asian States to the War on Terrorism

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Conclusions:• Encourage higher profile military support and major financial contributions by

Japan to help rebuild Afghanistan.• Publicly welcome humanitarian assistance efforts by South Korea but

encourage ROK forces to remain in the country to continue to serve as adeterrent against a North Korean attack. Leave U.S. forces deployed as theyare on the Korean Peninsula.

• Continue to cultivate good ties with the Philippines and share intelligence onterrorist groups, especially on Abu Sayyaf which has links to Osama bin Laden.Do not seek the deployment of Filipino troops in Afghanistan.

Responses to military action: Japan hasalready sent military air transports withrelief supplies to Pakistan. Official andpublic support for limited military actionagainst Afghanistan has been widespread.

What we can expect in the future: Furtherofficial backing and qualitative improve-ment in the level of military support offeredto U.S. operations. The continued reactionsof South Korea and China to Japan’sinitiative to play a larger military roleoverseas also will be crucial to futureactions. This extreme sensitivity toJapanese forces operating abroad is linkedto the prolonged and harsh Japanesemilitary occupations of these two countriesin the last century. To date Prime MinisterKoizumi has actively consulted with hiscounterparts in Seoul and Beijing, and theyhave been remarkably receptive. If eitherSeoul or Beijing voice grave concern at anyphase of the war, this could dramaticallyundercut public support within Japan forsuch steps. Moreover, there are indicationsthat public support would likely erode quiterapidly if the United States widened thecampaign beyond this one country or ifJapanese forces suffered casualties.

Policy recommendations: The UnitedStates should encourage higher profilemilitary support and major financialcontributions by Japan to help rebuildAfghanistan. At the same time, the UnitedStates should be realistic about the limits ofwhat Japan will be able or willing to do andnot push too far.

South Korea.

Response so far: Seoul has given strongpublic backing. On September 17, PresidentKim Dae Jung offered his full support forU.S. strikes against terrorists and statedthat South Korea will be part of thecoalition fighting the war on terrorism. TheROK Defense Ministry offered some 450noncombat personnel in medical, air

transport, and sea transport units as well ashumanitarian assistance to Afghanrefugees.

Responses to military action: On October7, the first day of bombing in Afghanistan, aROK spokesman said South Korea “activelysupports” the attacks on Afghanistan, andPresident Kim ordered increased securityaround U.S. military installations in thecountry.

What we can expect in the future: Seoul islikely to remain very supportive of limitedaction, but this can change in the event ofmore extensive military action, especially ifpublic opinion turns strongly anti-American. If the United States widens thewar beyond Afghanistan, a groundswell ofpublic opposition might put governmentsupport in question.

Policy recommendations: The UnitedStates should publicly welcomehumanitarian assistance efforts by SouthKorea but encourage ROK forces to remainin the country to continue to serve as adeterrent against a North Korean attack.The United States should also be on guardagainst doing or saying anything that mightbe construed as a weakening of resolve orreadiness of USFK forces. Therefore, noU.S. forces should be redeployed away fromthe Korean Peninsula.

Philippines.

Response so far: The Government of thePhilippines has offered to cooperate fullywith the United States in the war. OnOctober 2, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo very strongly stated that Manilawas “prepared to go every step of the way.”Arroyo offered the use of airfields andseaports, logistics support, intelligence, andeven combat forces.

Responses to military action: Manila hascertainly supported limited military actionagainst targets in Afghanistan andprobably will continue to provide solid

98

support, even if the war on terrorism widensbeyond Afghanistan.

What we can expect in the future: Giventhe Philippines has its own serioushomegrown Islamic terrorist/insurgencyproblem, the United States can expectcontinued public and substantive support inthe war and requests for Americanassistance in dealing with terrorist groupssuch as the Abu Sayyaf group based in thePhilippines.

Policy recommendations: The UnitedStates should continue to cultivate good tieswith Philippines and share intelligence onterrorist groups, especially on Abu Sayyafwhich has links to Osama bin Laden.Filipino troops should not be deployed inAfghanistan or vicinity because of theperception they are anti-Islamic, given theirrole in the ongoing Muslim separatist warin the southern Philippines.

COALITION OR POTENTIAL

COALITION PARTNERS

Indonesia.

Response so far: Jakarta has madepositive official statements but significantand widespread anti-Americanism exists inthe world’s most populous Islamic state. Inthe wake of the October 7 bombing, radicalIslamic groups in Indonesia havethreatened to storm the U.S. embassyand/or attack U.S. citizens and demandedthat the government break diplomaticrelations with Washington. PresidentMegawati Sukarnoputri was very support-ive of the United States during her recentvisit to Washington (pre-October 7).

Responses to military action: However,Indonesian Foreign Minister HassanWirayuda expressed “deep concern” onOctober 8 about the danger to innocents inthe ongoing military operations. He saidthat Indonesia neither supports nor opposesthe military strikes against Afghanistan.

Both before and after October 7, radicalIslamic groups active in the countrythreatened to strike at U.S. targets inIndonesia. Since October 7, the rhetoric hasbecome increasingly vociferous, andprotests have multiplied. Largedemonstrations and fears of violenceprompted the U.S. Embassy to take theprecaution of closing for several days andauthorizing the departure of nonessentialpersonnel and dependents. Although someprotests have been violent, many othershave been peaceful and, to my knowledge,no U.S. citizens have been injured so far.

What we can expect in the future: Thereis likely to be continued and even growingMuslim radicalism with a strong anti-U.S.flavor whether military action continues ornot. Given the economic problems that willcontinue to plague the country, Indonesiawill remain fertile ground for Islamicextremist groups who share bin Laden’sviews. Some of these groups have been (andcontinue to be?) funded by al Qaeda, ortrained by the Taliban. In recent years,hundreds of young Indonesian Muslimshave attended Islamic schools in Pakistan.

Policy recommendations: The Indones-ian government is in an extremely delicatesituation. Washington should not pressJakarta for strong public statements ofsupport or any form of military assistancesince it will place President Megawati in aneven more precarious position. The UnitedStates should be satisfied with moderateexpressions of support or no condemnationof the war on terrorism. DoD personnelshould keep a very low profile in Indonesiafor the foreseeable future.

Malaysia.

Response so far: The United States hasreceived solid support for counterterroristefforts from this predominantly Muslimstate. The Malaysian Foreign Minister SyedHamid Albar on October 6 stated that the

99

United States was “justified in its action towipe out this [terrorist] menace.”

Responses to military action: Thegovernment of Prime Minister MahathirMohamad has issued sternly worded state-ments condemning terrorism and crackeddown on his country’s major oppositionparty, the Pan Malaysia Islamic Party(PAS). PAS leaders have been vehementlyanti-United States.

What we can expect in the future:Mahathir will continue to exploit theinternational situation in order tostrengthen his domestic political position. Amoderate Muslim state, Malaysia is a keymember of the 56-member Organization ofthe Islamic Conference (OIC) that met inQatar on October 10. Significantly, the OICissued a public statement that did NOTcondemn U.S. attacks on Afghanistan.However, the OIC did express concern overthe “deaths of innocent civilians.”

Policy recommendations: Malaysia canbe a pivotal actor in the coalition againstterrorism because it is a moderate Muslimstate. Malaysian participation or contribu-tions to humanitarian relief efforts inAfghanistan would send a powerfulmessage that the war is not a war on Islam.

North Korea.

Response so far: Pyongyang has offered arelatively muted response and termed theevents of September 11 “regrettable andtragic.” The United States may ask NorthKorea for intelligence on terrorism.

Responses to military action: However,the Korean Central News Agency issued aOctober 9 statement warning the UnitedStates against embarking on a “vicious cycleof terrorism and retaliation.”

What we can expect in the future:Criticism is quite likely if militaryoperations continue, even if they are limitedin scope. There could even be heightenedbellicose language warning that the United

States is pursuing a policy of worldwideaggression that might herald imminentaction on the Korean Peninsula. However, itis possible that Pyongyang could see thewar as an opportunity to improve ties withthe United States and continue itsmoderate and quite muted response.

Policy recommendations: At a minimum,Washington should work closely with Seoulto ensure that the United States and ROKpresent a strong united front that continuesto deter North Korea. If Pyongyangcontinues to offer a moderate and relativelyconciliatory response to the war,Washington could outline to North Koreathe steps by which it could get itself off thelist of terrorist states.

100

The United States cannot defeat globalterrorism without support from its friendsand allies. Europe plays center stage in thecounterterrorism campaign. A disinterestedEurope can only assist terrorism. As anactive U.S. ally, Europe can provideresources, expertise, and access to terroristcitadels, while at the same timestrangulating the terrorist cells thriving onits soil. Not surprisingly, the UnitedKingdom provided immediate, unwaveringsupport for Operation ENDURINGFREEDOM and requires no furtheredification. Continental Europe is adifferent matter altogether. Europe’spolitical will and military capabilities canbe problematic. The United States must notonly understand and allay Europe’s fears,but also come to terms with its limitedmilitary capabilities. The United Statesneeds to awaken Europe’s incrediblepotential and shape European security forthe new millennium.

European Perspective.

The September 11 terrorist attack on theUnited States outraged Europeans, but notin the same manner as it did Americans.Although currently united in principal withthe United States to defeat the al Qaeda

terrorist network, political will andconsensus are likely to wane as OperationENDURING FREEDOM protracts. Thisparadox is best explained by seeing howEuropeans view terrorism.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon inEurope. In fact, it is interwoven in thetapestry of its modern history. The terroristactivities of the Serbian Black Hand againstthe Austro-Hungarian Empire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, culminating in the assassi-nation of Archduke Ferdinand, were thecatalyst to World War I. In the interwarperiod, terrorism was rampant in Germany,Russia, and France as various groups viedfor power. The terror bombings duringWorld War II reduced the major cities ofEurope to rubble. The Cold War spawned ahost of terrorist organizations that seemedto vie with each other for sanguinarypublicity. If Europeans are not inured byterrorism, they certainly are numbed byand fearful of it.

Of all the instruments of power to beemployed in Operation ENDURING FREE-DOM, a prominent military option is likelyto be the most contentious with Europeans.The arguments against the use of militaryforce would expound the following themes:terrorism does not threaten the survival of

101

TWENTY ONE

Terrorism: Sounding Roland’s Horn across the Atlantic

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen

Conclusions:• Continue an active information campaign in Europe to sustain the

anti-terrorism coalition.• Make the Middle East peace process a transatlantic initiative with a major role

for Europe.• Contribute an IBCT to the Eurocorps.• Sell or lease C-17 and RO/RO ships to the EU.• Contribute to the maturation of the Eurocorps.

the state—the military is the wronginstrument of power; Operation ENDUR-ING FREEDOM appears to be anopen-ended obligation—fear of militaryadventurism; a military conflict will resultin collateral damage—alienation ofindigenous populations and added impetusto the terrorist movements; the conflictcould easily escalate into a full-fledged war;a long-term war would have severeeconomic consequences; and because of itsgeographic proximity to the Middle Eastand Magreb, Europe is particularlyvulnerable to terrorist retaliation from theMuslim community. Although Europeansare not likely to condemn covert operationsand discrete military strikes, they do seelaw enforcement as the primary means offighting this conflict.

As a backdrop to these fears, manyEuropean commentators enjoy counselingagainst rash action. The common theme isthat terrorism is a symptom of poverty,imperialism, great power arrogance, disen-franchised citizenry, and so on—each apossible root to the conflict. Extending theirargument, they offer a reasoned approach toresolving the conflict—pacifism, appease-ment, international laissez-faire, andmodus vivendi. Even though the extent oftheir influence is not known, such talk doesreach a sympathetic ear with Europeans. Asthe United States learned during theKosovo conflict, consensus is not a strongsuit with Europeans. Given the nebulousnature of a counterterrorism campaign,European consensus regarding tactics,strategy, and objectives is equally notlikely.

Fortunately, the U.S. initial approachhas impressed the Europeans. One of thegreatest concerns following the wake of theterrorist attacks was that the United Stateswould use a “cowboy” approach—shootingfirst and asking questions later. To theEuropean Union’s relief, the U.S. measured

approach and decision to build acounterterrorism coalition have allayedfears and muted criticism. But the UnitedStates must go further.

In order to maintain solidarity andconsensus with Europe, the United Statesneeds to conduct an active informationcampaign in Europe. Ambassadors, defenseattachés, and TRADOC senior liaisonofficers must present the U.S. rationalewith public statements and articlesregarding the campaign strategy. The U.S.State Depart- ment should encourageAmerican commen- tators to appear onEuropean talk shows and news programs.These actions would present the Americanperspective without the European editorialfilter. The problems associated withmisstatements and contradictory assertionsare small in comparison to the biases thatpermeate the European media. Withoutcontinued dialogue, Europe will lose focusand assume a disinterested posture as theconflict extends over the months and years.

Military Capabilities.

Even if the European allies maintainsolidarity, their military capabilities arecurrently insufficient to meet the demandsof the imminent conflict. In pursuit of thepost-Cold War peace dividend, everyEuropean state downsized its armed forceswith insufficient, concomitant reforms.Moreover, they made virtually noinvestments in defense modernization. Thearmed forces may be smaller, but theirdivisions are still heavy. With little air- andsealift capabilities, European powerprojection is still confined to road and rail.

These military discrepancies becamewoefully apparent during the KosovoCampaign in 1999, particularly in the realmof avionics, electronic warfare, precisionmunitions, and C4SIR. NATO’s resultantDefense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), whichprovides a roadmap for correcting the

102

deficiencies, is a slow, expensive process—something none of the European statesseems willing to shoulder.

The conflict will not have a negativeimpact on NATO enlargement. Thecampaign against global terrorism has hada unifying effect and is likely to acceleratethe desire to increase membership amongNATO members and candidates. In times ofregional instability, states seek greatersecurity. The danger lies in accelerating theprocess beyond NATO’s capability toassimilate new partners. NATO shouldresist this temptation and continue with itsthoughtful, measured approach toenlargement.

Despite European proclamations of theEurocorps being ready by 2003, a morerealistic appraisal is 2010. Lack of fundingis the main but not the only culprit. Actualtroop contributions are below the minimumrequirements, the provisional corps head-quarters appears mired in nascency, corpscombat service support is nonexistent, andthe issue of consensus, which has hauntedevery European defense initiative in thepast, is not likely to be resolved any timesoon. Furthermore, sufficient strategic air-and sealift capabilities are unlikely to berealized by the end of the decade.

One bright light does shine, however.European Special Operating Forces (SOF)appear to be the most appealing and readilyavailable for employment. Thus far, onlythe United Kingdom has deployed itsSpecial Air Service (SAS) into Afghanistanalong with U.S. forces. Germany is hotlydebating whether to authorize thedeployment of its Division for SpecialOperations, composed of a Special ForcesDetachment (KSK) and two airbornebrigades. The KSK currently numbers 400out of an authorized strength of 1,000, andthe airborne brigades comprise approxi-mately 6,000 paratroopers. The airbornebrigades also have K9 platoons for tracking

humans as well as sniffing out explosivesand mines. France also has a robust SOFcapability and, unlike Germany, has plentyof experience. Additionally, several otherEuropean countries have SOF, although notas large. In aggregate, Europe possesses asignificant SOF capability and, because ofits covert nature, the various Europeancountries are likely to contribute theseforces with alacrity upon a U.S. request.

Not to be overlooked, Germany, France,Austria, and Italy possess mountainbrigades, which can provide enormousassistance in mountain warfare. Thesebrigades are actually the elite forces of theirrespective ground forces and would beindispensable to any mountain operation.At the very least, their alpine specialistscould be attached to the SOF as technicaland tactical experts.

Given the penurious military budgets,European militaries are not likely toimprove in the near term. The UnitedStates can expect financial, infrastructure,combat service support, and discretepersonnel participation withoutreservations, but, given the Europeanpropensity to muddy the waters ofconsensus, it would be more beneficial to thecoalition initially to request specificcapabilities (SOF, mountain experts, naval,and airpower) under U.S. operationalcontrol, rather than a blanket commitmentof forces as authorized under NATO’sArticle 5.

Energizing Europe’s Potential.

The United States can recommend anumber of initiatives, which would allowEuropeans to take an active part in thecounterterrorism campaign. Europeanversions of the television show, America’sMost Wanted, would greatly assist govern-ments in identifying and capturing wantedterrorists; HUMINT is still the mostpowerful resource for intelligence.

103

Government subsidies will ensure thatthese shows remain on the air. In thismanner, Europe can flush out the terroristnests and organized crime.

A few European countries have lax drugenforcement laws. Since drugs (especiallyheroin) are a major source of revenue forterrorist organizations, an anti-drugcampaign must address this link. Suggestedthemes are: “Drug money lines the pocketsof terrorists,” “For terrorists, needles havetwo shots—one in the arm and one in theback,” and “A moment of pleasure can bringa lifetime of grief—don’t give terrorists achance.” Such efforts have a patrioticappeal and should curtail drug sales.

As an enduring incentive to depriveterrorists of funds, European countriesshould take the money from frozen terroristfinancial accounts and apply it to their owncounter-terrorist initiatives, funding thecoalition, or compensation for the destruc-tion wrought by terrorists. Terrorists andtheir financial supporters can pay by morethan one means for their crimes againsthumanity.

The time is ripe for an integratedEuropean Intelligence Agency, perhapsunder the aegis of Europol. Such aninitiative would greatly enhance intelli-gence sharing, coordination of assets andeffort, and greater powers to apprehendterrorists and organized crime. Such anagency may be harder to establish than anAmerican would think. Given the recenthistory of secret police (KGB, Gestapo,Stasi), Europeans will be very wary of anyorganization with overarching powers. Inany case, it is time to debate the issue.

In a related issue, greater cohesion isneeded among law enforcement agencies. Inorder to defeat the terrorist network, closecooperation and sharing of informationamong allies are crucial. Because of thevarious legal systems involved, domesticlaw enforcement agencies have greater or

lesser access to information. Information orevidence shared from some allied agenciescan assist domestic agencies gatherprobable cause against criminal/terroristelements operating in their countries. Fewlaw enforcement agencies like to shareinformation; the State Department willneed to initiate the process in order for it togain momentum.

European countries have considerableaccess to and influence with their formercolonies. In fact, their relations are morecooperative than adversarial. The UnitedStates should allow these Europeancountries to supplement its efforts withregional consensus building, intelligencegathering, and diplomacy. Every actor inthe Middle East believes that theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict must be resolvedbefore progress against terrorism can bemade. Given their connections, Europeansare better placed to take the lead in theIsraeli-Palestinian peace process. TheUnited States need not abandon the peaceprocess, but it should make it a trans-atlantic initiative.

It is never too early to secure agreementsfor use of rail, air bases, sea ports, facilities(medical, fuel storage, warehouses, and soon), and over-flights from all relevantNATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP)members. Such arrangements providegreater flexibility as shifts in priorities anduse of force change during the campaign.Land access to future theaters of conflictwill allow NATO and PfP nations toparticipate by deploying heavy units by rail.Lastly, access agreements are easier tosecure in the aftermath of the terroristattacks than later in the conflict.

Shaping the European Security and

Defense Policy.

The European Security and DefensePolicy may be moribund, at least as aseparate entity from NATO. The current

104

conflict exemplifies the reality of theAlliance—that no conflict or crisis should behandled unilaterally. Success in modernconflicts requires consensus building, unityof effort, and unity of command. Acontingency does not necessarily need theactive participation of every member of theAlliance, but it should require theinvolvement of each member in somecapacity.

The United States needs to take agreater role in shaping Europe’s defensecapabilities. Conceptually, the Eurocorpshas the greatest potential to contribute tothis type of conflict, but without U.S.leadership, it is doomed to remain a papertiger. America is very good at establishingconsensus and building coalitions. In apractical sense, the creation of theEurocorps is a permanent coalition.

First, NATO must secure nationalcontributions for the corps headquarters,the combat service support units, and theground forces, as well as the air and navalsquadrons. Due to their unique character,multinational divisions allow both largeand small countries to contribute forceswithin their means, ranging in size of aspecialized company to a brigade. America’scontribution to the ground forces could bean Interim Brigade Combat Team. TheEurocorps should be open to NATO, EU,and PfP countries, but upon alert, must fallunder NATO’s command authority.Contributing nations would have the optionof not deploying their Eurocorps-designatedunits if it is not in their interest. The depthof the Eurocorps would not suffer from thenonparticipation of a few.

Second, in order to fill the air- and sealiftvacuum, the United States could sell orlease C-17 transports and RO/RO ships tothe European Union until its ownproduction capabilities bear fruit. Thisphase-in/phase-out approach assures that

the Eurocorps establishes a powerprojection capability within a short time.

Third, the Eurocorps allows thecontribut- ing countries to focus resourcesin order to fulfill the DCI. As the Eurocorpsis to be a modern force, NATO must attainconsensus on standardization of equipment.Either this initiative can be accomplishedby a consortium and/or by nationalcontracts. In this manner, newer memberswith current, obsolete equipment can buy orlease equipment without shouldering anenormous financial burden. This approachenhances interoperability and keepscombat service support at manageablelevels.

Fourth, NATO establishes a train-upand certification timeline in order toestablish milestones for progress. Byinstituting a train-to-standard attitude anda sequential collective training schedule,the Eurocorps can be operational within 2-3years of its establishment.

Lastly, the mission of the Eurocorps doesnot need to deviate from the PetersbergTasks. All the tasks contribute to theultimate objectives of Operation ENDUR-ING FREEDOM. The basic organization ofthe Eurocorps is sound, and the proposed5,000-man police force is a superb idea andhelps bridge the capabilities gap betweenmilitary and law enforcement. TheEurocorps can be rounded out with aSpecial Forces detachment that can deployinto a crisis region weeks or months inadvance of the Eurocorps. The inclusion of aSpecial Forces group with each membercontributing its own forces would greatlyenhance the capabilities of the Eurocorps.

The New Vision.

If the United States is the globalpoliceman, then Europe surely should be itsdeputy. The United States must awakenEurope to the insidious dangers of terrorismby changing how it views terrorism and

105

infusing it with the resolve to take action.Although its military means are currentlylimited, Europe does have specific forceswhich can make an important, immediatecontribution. Lastly, the Eurocorps has thepotential to allow Europe to assume agreater security role in the world withoutshouldering heavy military expenditures.The Islamic terrorists thought they wouldcow and divide the world, instead they haverevitalized the transatlantic link.

106

About the Authors

DR. STEPHEN D. BIDDLE joined the Strategic Studies Institute in June 2001. He hastaught at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and has held research positions atthe Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, Virginia; the Harvard UniversityCenter for Science and International Affairs (CSIA); and the Kennedy School ofGovernment’s Office of National Security Programs. Dr. Biddle has presented testimonybefore congressional committees on matters of conventional net assessment and armscontrol, served as U.S. Representative to the NATO Defense Research Group Panel 7 studyon Stable Defense, and is a member of the directing faculty for the Columbia UniversitySummer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS). Hisresearch has won Barchi, Rist, and Impact Prizes from the Military Operations ResearchSociety; most recently, his paper “Why Skill Matters in Combat Outcomes—and How toInclude It in Combat Modeling,” won the Society’s 2000 Rist Prize. He holds AB (1981), MPP(1985), and Ph.D. (Public Policy, 1992) degrees, all from Harvard University. Dr. Biddle’spublications include articles in International Security, Survival, The Journal of Politics,Security Studies, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Contemporary Security Policy, DefenseAnalysis, and Military Operations Research; shorter pieces on military topics in The WallStreet Journal, Joint Force Quarterly, Orbis, and Defense News; various chapters in editedvolumes; and 24 IDA and NATO reports.

DR. STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on theSoviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor ofSoviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, MaxwellAFB, Alabama, and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and the University ofCalifornia, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Positionin Asia, coeditor of Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice:Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many articles andconference papers on Russian, Commonwealth of Independent States, and EasternEuropean security issues. Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferation and therevolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia. He holds a B.A. in Historyfrom the University of Pennsylvania, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the Universityof Chicago.

DR. MARTIN L. COOK has been a Professor of Ethics in the Department of Command,Leadership and Management at the U.S. Army War College since 1998. He previouslytaught ethics and religion at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Santa Clara University, and theCollege of William and Mary. Dr. Cook received a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from theUniversity of Illinois in 1974 and a master’s degree in Religious Studies from the Universityof Chicago in 1975. He obtained his doctorate in Philosophical Theology and Ethics from theUniversity of Chicago in 1981.

DR. CONRAD C. CRANE joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 2000 after 26years of military service that concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S.

107

Military Academy. He has written or edited books on the Civil War, World War I, World WarII, and Korea, and published articles on military issues in such journals as The Journal ofStrategic Studies, The Journal of Military History, The Historian, and Aerospace Historian,as well as in a number of collections and reference books. He holds a B.S. from the U.S.Military Academy along with an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also agraduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army WarCollege.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II currently is assigned as theDirector of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated fromthe U.S. Military Academy in 1981, was commissioned as an armor officer, and has held avariety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States; hehas also served as an Assistant Professor of European History at the U.S. Military Academy;Squadron S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of BN/TF and Bde Doctrine at the U.S. Army ArmorCenter at Fort Knox; as an action officer at the Army After Next project at HQ TRADOC, Ft.Monroe, VA; and as a speechwriter for the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. He is a graduate of theU.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees inHistory from Princeton University. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria is the author of AfterClausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War, published by the UniversityPress of Kansas (2001). He also has published articles in a number of scholarly andprofessional journals to include the Journal of Military History, War in History, War &Society, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly, MilitaryReview, and Airpower Journal.

DR. SAMI G. HAJJAR was born in Beirut, Lebanon. He taught a variety of courses includingAmerican Government, Middle East Politics, and Islamic Political Theory at the Universityof Wyoming as Professor of Political Science from 1966-87. While at Wyoming, he wasassigned for 2 years to the Governor’s Office and worked on international trade promotion forthe State of Wyoming. In 1987 Dr. Hajjar joined the U.S. Information Agency and wasassigned first to Riyadh as Cultural Affairs Officer and in 1990 to Abu Dhabi as PublicAffairs Officer, before returning to Washington in 1992 as Gulf Desk Officer. In 1993 heresigned the Foreign Service to become consultant to the Emirates Center for StrategicStudies in Abu Dhabi. In September 1994, he joined the U.S. Army War College as Professorand Director of Middle East Studies. Dr. Hajjar received a B.A. and M.A. in PublicAdministration from the American University of Beirut and a Ph.D. in Political Science fromthe University of Missouri-Columbia in 1969. He is the author of more than 30 professionalarticles in public administration, political science, and Middle East studies.

DR. DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II has been with the Strategic Studies Institute since 1985,first as Strategic Research Analyst and then as Research Professor of National SecurityAffairs. His 30 years of service in the U.S. Army included two combat tours, a variety of troopand staff assignments, and instructor duty at the U.S. Military Academy and the School ofAdvanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Dr. Johnson’s current research addressesArmy transformation. He is co-author of Soissons, 1918 (Texas A&M University Press). Heholds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. in History from the University ofMichigan, and a Ph.D. in History from Temple University. He is also a graduate of the U.S.

108

Army Command and General Staff College and holds a diploma from the U.S. Army WarCollege.

COLONEL JOHN R. MARTIN became Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Instituteand Chairman of the Art of War Department in August 2000. He has served extensively inthe Republic of Korea, where he commanded an Aviation Company and Battalion. Hisexperience there also includes service with the United Nations Command Military ArmisticeCommission and as Commander of a liaison team with the Korean Army. Colonel Martinpossesses considerable experience on the Army Staff, having served as a Division Chief withboth ODCSOPS and ODCSPER, where he assisted in development of the Army’s forcestructure and programmed manning of that force structure. He served previously withODCSOPS as the Systems Integrator for the RAH-66 Comanche and as Director of theWashington office of the Defense Language Institute. Just prior to coming to the StrategicStudies Institute, Colonel Martin was deployed operationally to the Balkans for a year,serving sequentially as Chief of Staff of Task Force Falcon in Kosovo and as ExecutiveAssistant to the Commander of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. A previous operationaltour in 1975 took him to Guam to assist Vietnamese refugees. Colonel Martin graduatedwith highest distinction from the College of Naval Command and Staff at the Naval WarCollege, Newport, RI. He is also a 1996 graduate of the National War College and holdsmasters’ degrees in National Security Affairs from both institutions. Colonel Martin alsoholds a master’s degree in Aeronautical Engineering from the U.S. Naval PostgraduateSchool and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School at Patuxent River, MD. He is a1974 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.

AMBASSADOR MARSHALL F. MCCALLIE is Deputy Commandant for InternationalAffairs at the U.S. Army War College. Previously he served as the Special Coordinator for theAfrican Crisis Response Initiative. He also served as Diplomat in Residence at the Ralph J.Bunche International Affairs Center at Howard University in Washington, DC. AmbassadorMcCallie has served most of his career in Africa. He completed a 3-year tour as U.S.Ambassador to Namibia from July 1993 to July 1996. Prior to that time, he served as DeputyChief of Mission at the American Embassy in South Africa and at the American Embassy inZambia. During his 27-year career with the U.S. Foreign Service, he has also served asPolitical Officer in Zaire, Economic Officer in the United Arab Emirates, Political Counselorin Liberia, and Country Desk Offier for Nigeria in the State Department. AmbassadorMcCallie earned a B.A. in History from Vanderbilt University, and received an M.A. andM.A.L.D. in Development Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

DR. STEVEN METZ is Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute and Chairmanof the Regional Strategy and Planning Department. He has been with SSI since 1993,previously serving as Research Professor of National Security Affairs and the Henry L.Stimson Professor of Military Studies. Dr. Metz has also been on the faculty of the Air WarCollege, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. Hehas served as an advisor to U.S. political organizations, campaigns and commissions;testified in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives; and spoken on military andsecurity issues around the world. He is author of more than 80 articles, essays, and bookchapters on such topics as world politics, national security policy, and military strategy. Dr.

109

Metz’s research has taken him to 25 countries. He is currently examining the changingnature of military strategy and the U.S. security relationship with Pakistan. Dr. Metz holdsa B.A. in Philosophy and a M.A. in International Studies from the University of SouthCarolina, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Johns Hopkins University.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND A. MILLEN is currently assigned as the Director ofEuropean Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from the U.S.Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety ofcommand and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States; he has alsoserved as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the German Infantry School atHammelburg, Germany; Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell,Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section,SHAPE, Belgium. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Collegeand holds an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is aForeign Area Officer for Western Europe. He has published articles in a number of scholarlyand professional journals to include Infantry Magazine and Military Review. His book,Command Legacy, will be published by Brasseys in the Fall/Winter of 2001.

COLONEL DALLAS D. OWENS became the U.S. Army Reserve Adviser to the StrategicStudies Institute in July 2000. His recent assignments include Mobilization Branch Chief,DCSOPS Army Operations Center; and Transportation Action Officer, Mobility Division,Logistics Directorate (J4), Joint Staff. He holds Sociology degrees from the University ofNorth Carolina (B.A.), Utah State University (M.S.), and the University of Tennessee(Ph.D.), and has served on the faculty of Clemson University, North Carolina StateUniversity, University of Virginia, and University of Colorado. His military educationincludes Infantry OCS and Basic Course, Transportation Basic Course, QuartermasterAdvance Course, CAS3, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the NationalSecurity Fellowship at Harvard University. Colonel Owens served as a Port Operator with aTransportation Terminal Unit during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM andas an Infantryman in Vietnam.

DR. GORDON RUDD attended Virginia Tech, where he was commissioned through ROTC.He served in the U.S. Army for 23 years in Infantry and Special Forces units. He also servedas a Joint Staff Officer and as a Middle East Foreign Area Officer, serving a total of 9 yearsoverseas, including tours with the United Nations and NATO. He attended graduate schoolat Duke University—subsequently earning his doctorate in history—and taught militaryand Middle East history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Upon retirement fromthe Army, he joined the faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, then movedto the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, where he has served since 1998.

DR. ANDREW SCOBELL joined the Strategic Studies Institute in August 1999 and is SSI’sexpert on Asia. He taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, and Rutgers University,New Jersey. Since 1988 Dr. Scobell has published articles in such journals as Armed Forcesand Society, Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Journal of Political andMilitary Sociology, and Political Science Quarterly. Recent articles have focused onChina-Taiwan relations and Chinese military modernization. Dr. Scobell holds a B.A. in

110

History from Whitman College, an M.A. in International Studies from the University ofWashington, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

DR. MARYBETH PETERSON ULRICH is Professor of Government in the Department ofNational Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. She has also taught at theUnited States Air Force Academy and at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Ulrich receivedher Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois and a B.S. from the UnitedStates Air Force Academy. She has written extensively in the field of strategic studies with aspecial emphasis on civil-military relations and national security democratization issues inpostcommunist Europe. Among her publications is a book, Democratizing CommunistMilitaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces, (1999) and numerous bookchapters and articles. Dr. Ulrich is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

DR. LEONARD WONG joined the Strategic Studies Institute in June 2000 after serving 20years in the U.S. Army. His time in the Army included teaching leadership at the U.S.Military Academy, serving as an analyst in the Program Analysis and EvaluationDirectorate and later in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and serving asthe Director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis. He has authored severalarticles, chapters, and papers on organizational issues in the Army such as downsizing,leadership, and junior officer retention. He is a registered Professional Engineer and holds aB.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and an M.S.B.A. and Ph.D. from Texas TechUniversity.

111

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Volume Editor

Colonel John R. Martin

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell