defence research paper by maj francisco … · political neglect’7, and james ker-lindsay’s...
TRANSCRIPT
JOINT SERVICES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
DEFENCE RESEARCH PAPER
By
MAJ FRANCISCO BARRIO
ADVANCED COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE
NUMBER 14
SEPT 10 - JUL 11
Defence Research Paper
Submission Cover Sheet
Student Name: Maj Francisco Barrio
Student PIC Number: 10-7606
DRP Title:
Kosovo’s independence:
a ‘unique case’ or the ‘Pandora’s Box opening’?
Syndicate: D3
Syndicate DS:
DSD DRP Supervisor: Dr Bill Park
Essay submitted towards psc(j) and KCL MA
(delete as applicable)
MOD Sponsored Topic? No
Word Count: 14,993
I confirm that this Research Paper is all my own work, is properly referenced and in accordance with Standard Operating Procedure T10.
Signature: Date: 31 MAY 2011
For International Students Undertaking a Sponsored Topic:
I hereby permit my DRP being forwarded to the MoD Sponsor
Signature: Date:
International Student Disclaimer
“The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the author’s national government. Further,
such views should not be considered as constituting an official endorsement of factual accuracy, opinion, conclusion or recommendation of the author’s
national government”.
“The copyright in this paper is owned by parties other than the UK Crown”.
KOSOVO’S INDEPENDENCE:
A ‘UNIQUE CASE’ OR ‘PANDORA’S BOX’ OPENING?
Major Francisco Barrio, Spanish Army
ADVANCED COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE
NUMBER 14
(Word Count: 14,993)
ABSTRACT
The ongoing independence process in Kosovo has confronted the International
Community: the Western countries support it, alleging the atrocities suffered by the
ethnic Albanians; Russia, China and others oppose it, pointing the possibility of
spreading instability by enhancing other separatist movements. This paper will
analyse to what extent this fear is justified. Using sources from all the spectrum,
from the US, the EU, China, Russia, Turkey and others, it concludes that Kosovo can
certainly be used as a precedent and thus prompt instability. The paper will also gain
a wider understanding of the conflict, using ‘Liberalism’ and ‘Realism’ theories as
analysing tools. The conclusions will be surprising: neither the Serbs were so bad nor
the Albanians so good; the US, Russia and the rest of countries have their own
interests in this conflict; and finally, notwithstanding its apparent scholar neglect,
Kosovo has prompted a ‘revolution’ in some traditional concepts of International Law,
and is also partly responsible of the ‘new Cold War’ between the US and Russia.
1
Introduction
The war waged in Kosovo between March and June 1999 was the last one stemming from the
breakdown of Yugoslavia. However, this war was different: for the first time in her history, NATO
waged a war against a sovereign state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in order to stop the
ethnic cleansing that was taking place in the autonomous province of Kosovo.
The war did not resolve the conflict: a UN interim administration was put in place, and NATO
deployed a security force (KFOR). The interim administration was to be followed by a final
agreement between the parties (Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs) regarding the political
status of the territory: independence or autonomy inside Yugoslavia (today’s Republic of Serbia).
However, after 12 years, this agreement has not still been achieved and the International
Community (IC) is divided upon the final solution. This has led to Kosovo being referred as a
‘frozen conflict’1.
It is rather interesting to analyse to what extent this conflict2 has been and still is important for the
IC. Kosovo is a small territory (10,887 km2) with a population of 1.8 m people3; its GDP per capita
is very low ($3,164, which makes Kosovo number 103 in a list of 182 countries, just ahead of the
Democratic Republic of Congo4), with almost 40% of the population living in poverty5. The country
has neither petrol nor any other important mineral reserve. Furthermore, the security situation,
although unstable, is relatively calm6. Hence, at first sight Kosovo does not raise security concerns
and does not seem to have much importance for the IC, which has been focused since 9/11 on
global terrorism, Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, Mark Webber contends that ‘the Kosovo crisis has suffered from undue scholarly and
political neglect’7, and James Ker-Lindsay’s asserts that ‘Kosovo is a crucial issue because it
raises profound questions about the future of the contemporary system of international politics...8’.
This paper will study how true those assertions are, analysing the footprint brought about by the
Kosovo conflict on International Relations (IRs). To do so, this paper will argue that Kosovo is a
multifaceted conflict that needs to be studied from three different perspectives: first, according to
International Law (IL); second, regarding the own interests of different states; and third, as a threat
to security.
1 J. Bolton, L. Eagleburger and P. Rodman, “Warning Light on Kosovo”, The Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com
(accessed February 28, 2011). 2 For the purpose of this paper, the Kosovo conflict includes from NATO intervention in 1999 to present day.
3 “Country Profile: Kosovo”, US Department of State, http://www.state.gov (accessed March 1, 2011).
4 “World Economic Outlook Database-October 2010”, International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org (accessed December 11, 2010).
5 V. Dzihic and H. Kramer, “Kosovo after Independence. Is the EU’s EULEX Mission Delivering on its Promises?”, Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, International Policy Analysis: 11. http://library.fes.de (accessed February 24, 2011). 6 These terms were usually used by KFOR in official reports. The author was deployed in Kosovo for 5 months in 2009.
7 M. Webber, “The Kosovo War: a Recapitulation”, International Affairs, vol.85, no.3 (2009): 448.
8 Ker-Lindsay, J., “Kosovo, sovereignty and the subversion of UN authority”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding. The international
community and the transition to independence, ed. A. Hehir (London: Routledge, 2010), 168.
2
The international system, as we know it today, was born after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
The system was composed of states, whose main characteristic was their exclusive ‘sovereignty’
on a territory. IRs were based on the norm of ‘non interference’ in the internal affairs of other
states9. Article 2 of the UN Charter includes the respect for ‘non interference’:
‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state... ‘10
This principle was based on a narrow concept of security, merely understood as state security.
This concept was challenged initially by Barry Buzan in his study ‘People, States and Fear’ (1983),
expanding the concept beyond the military realm, including political, economic, societal and
environmental aspects11. Subsequently, the concept of security was expanded even further,
focusing on the individual, ‘human security’, as the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan defined it:
‘Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must
encompass economic, development, social, justice, environmental protection,
democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law’12.
The importance given to human rights colluded with the principle of ‘non interference’ and
‘sovereignty’: what happens if a state does not protect its own citizens? Is there a right for the IC
to intervene? The NATO intervention in Kosovo was the beginning of the development of a new
limited concept of ‘sovereignty’: the states are responsible for protecting the rights of their citizens,
and if they failed, the IC has the right to protect those citizens from their own state. That is why
Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, declared that Kosovo was ‘simply the most
important thing we have done in the world’13.
This ‘revolution’ in IL is not the only reason for Kosovo to be considered important: although a
mere pawn in the ‘Grand Chessboard’, to use Zbigniew Brzezinski’s expression14, Kosovo marked
also the beginning of the end of the ‘short honeymoon’15 between the USA and Russia after the
Cold War (CW), and constitutes a clear exponent of what has been described as a ‘new Cold
War’16. The unilateral decision of NATO to attack Yugoslavia17 by-passed the UN Security Council
(UNSC), and therefore Russia felt humiliated. Now the US are supporting the unilateral
9 P. Hirst, War and Power in the 21
st Century: The State, Military Conflict and the International System (Malden: Polity Press, 2001), 56.
10 United Nations Charter. http://www.un.org (accessed March 1, 2011).
11 Cited in John Baylis, “International and Global Security”, in Globalization of World Politics, 229.
12 Cited in Amitav Acharya, “Human security”, in Globalization of World Politics, eds. Baylis, Smith and Owens (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 493. 13
Cited in Webber, “Kosovo War: Recapitulation”, 453. 14
Cited in E. Bonsignore, “The Kosovo Payback”, Military Technology MILTECH, no. 9 (2008): 4. 15
R. Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains: On the Parallels and Uniqueness of the Cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia”, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 8, no. 1, (2009): 3. 16
Z. Brzezinsky, “How to Avoid a New Cold War”, Time (June 7, 2007). http://www.time.com (accessed March 13, 2011). 17
By ‘unilateral’ this paper means ‘without authorization of the UNSC’; by contrast, ‘multilateral’ implies that authorization.
3
independence of Kosovo, bypassing again the UNSC. This unilateral way of acting in the
international arena has obvious links with the 2003 Gulf War. ‘Unilateralism’ versus ‘Multilateralism’
is one of the great debates in today’s IRs, and Kosovo is very much involved in it. That is why
Vitaly Churkin, Russian permanent representative at the UN, declared on the final status of Kosovo
that it ‘might well be the most important issue to come before the Security Council in a decade’18.
Therefore, this paper will conclude that the Kosovo conflict, although often neglected, has actually
had a huge impact on shaping today’s IRs.
But this paper will also focus on security: if Kosovo finally gains independence through the current
process of unilateral declaration of independence, to what extent can that affect other states? Can
it produce a ‘spill over’ effect, enhancing other separatist movements, thus spreading instability?
The US and their allies contend that this will not happen, as Kosovo is a ‘sui generis’ case that
cannot set a precedent for any other conflict. On the other hand, Russia, China and many other
countries contend that Kosovo could open the ‘Pandora’s box’. This paper will analyse how
plausible this threat to international security is, by studying the reactions to the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI) of Kosovo. The conclusion will be worrisome: many separatist
movements consider Kosovo as an example to follow. And of even greater concern, Kosovo was
invoked as a precedent during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Therefore, this paper will conclude
that Kosovo is closer to be a ‘Pandora’s box’ opening that a ‘sui generis’ case.
To proceed with this study, the paper is divided into five different chapters. Chapter one will set up
the context of the conflict, which is important to better understand the rest of the chapters. Chapter
two will study the conflict according to IL, and how this conflict has affected its interpretation.
Chapter three will analyse the relation in different countries between their stance on the
independence of Kosovo and their particular interest. Chapter four will analyse to what extent
Kosovo is a threat to other states’ security. Finally, Chapter five will summarize the main
conclusions.
The methodology used for the research has consisted mainly on articles in journals, electronic
journals, newspapers and web pages, representing a wide spectrum of perspectives: from the
Serbs to the Kosovo-Albanians, through the US, Russia, China, the UK, Turkey, etc. The
multifaceted nature of the conflict has been studied using the IRs theories of ‘Liberalism’ and
‘Realism’ as analysing tools, as well as the concepts of ‘Globalization’ and ‘Security’.
18
Ker-Lindsay, J., “Kosovo, sovereignty and the subversion of UN authority”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 169.
5
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND
The origin of Serbia as a country is related to the process of independence of the Serbian
Orthodox Church from the Patriarch of Constantinople, in the 13th Century. The main centres of
the Serbian Orthodox Church were in Pec, Decani and Gracanica, all of them in today’s Kosovo.
Therefore, in a similar way to Israel and Judaism, the current territory of Kosovo includes the main
sites of the Serbian Orthodox Church, from which Serbia originated as a country19.
In the 14th Century the Ottoman Empire started its expansion through the Balkans. In 1389, in the
vicinity of Pristina, capital of Kosovo, took place the battle of Kosovo Polje, where the Serbian
Christian forces were defeated by the Turkish Muslim forces. This marked the beginning of five
centuries of Turkish rule over the Balkans, explained the current interest of Turkey in the region.
As it usually happens, a defeat was converted into a myth, and has being one of the preferred
topics of Serbian folklore and nationalism.
The Turkish were finally stopped at the doors of Vienna in 1653. An Austrian Army pushed back,
advancing as far as Macedonia, and the Serbs supported it. But the Austrians withdrew and the
Serbs were afraid of reprisals, so many migrated from Kosovo northwards. To fill in the vacuum
created by this migration, the Turkish moved population from the neighbour Muslim Albania to
Kosovo. This is the moment in history when the ethnic majority in Kosovo changed from Serbs to
Albanians.
When Serbia finally gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, Kosovo remained
under Ottoman control until 1913, when it was incorporated into Serbia. However, the population
wanted to be incorporated into Albania, who had just gained independence the previous year. This
provoked a general uprising in 1918-1919, defeated by Serbian troops.
During World War II the Italians invaded Albania, and created a Grand Albania, composed of
Albania plus parts of Kosovo and Montenegro. However, when the war ended, Moscow imposed
the reintegration of Kosovo in Yugoslavia.
The first Yugoslavian Constitution was approved on the 31st of January 1946. Yugoslavia was
composed of six Republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and
Macedonia), and two autonomous provinces inside Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo). Hence, the
status of Kosovo differed from the status of a Republic, although in successive Constitutions these
differences were diminished20.
19
S. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order’, Spanish version (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 2001): 123. 20
Spanish Defence Staff ,“Country Book: Kosovo” (Madrid: MoD, 2007): 31.
6
In 1961, 67% of Kosovo population were ethnic Albanians, and 24 % Serbs. The K-Albanians had
the highest birth rate in Europe; on the other hand, many Serbs migrated to Belgrade looking for a
better standard of living. Those processes provoked that in 1991, 90% of Kosovo’s populations
were K-Albanians.
When Tito died in 1980, there was a reverse movement cutting the autonomy given to the
provinces. As a consequence, in 1981 there was a social outbreak in Pristine University,
demanding further political autonomy21. In 1989 Slobodan Milosevic totally suppressed the
autonomy of Kosovo, its Assembly and even forbidding the education in Albanian language. The
K-Albanians initially reacted pacifically, creating parallel structures, their own schools, hospitals
and taxation system, and organising a referendum for independence and declaring it in 1991,
which was recognised just by Albania22. During this period there was a systematic discrimination
of K-Albanians, and the UN General Assembly approved several resolutions demanding the
restitution of the autonomy of Kosovo23.
However, when the Dayton Agreements put an end to the Bosnia War in 1995, the K-Albanians
decided to increase the violence of their opposition, trying to draw international attention. So, the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started a violent campaign, which was contested in even more
violent terms by the Serbian Army24.
In 1998 the situation deteriorated enormously, with a huge amount of refugees fleeing from Kosovo
to neighbouring countries. The Serbian Army openly waged a war against the KLA. The Serbian
government was accused of war crimes and ethnic cleansing, and the UNSC approved several
Resolutions calling for a cease fire (UNSC Resolution 1199) and a pacific solution (UNSC
Resolution 1203). President Clinton pressed the Serbs authorities to negotiate at Rambouillet, but
talks failed mainly because Milosevic did not accept that a referendum on the independence
should be held after a period of three years25.
Finally, NATO launched Operation Allied Force (OAF). The campaign lasted from 24th March 1999
to 9th June 1999, when Yugoslavian Government surrendered. As a consequence, the UNSC
approved Resolution 1244, which imposed the withdrawal of Yugoslavian forces from Kosovo and
set up an interim UN administration, pending an agreement on the final political status.
After five years of stasis, in 2004 a riot exploded across Kosovo. As a result, the UN Secretary
General asked the Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide for writing out a report, whose conclusion was that
21
Doga Ulas Eralp, “Kosovo and Turkey: What Lies Ahead?”, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, no. 50 (November 2010): 4. http://setadc.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 22
A. Hehir, “Introduction”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 6. 23
UNGA Resolutions 49/204, 50/190, 51/111, 52/139 and 53/164 between 1994 and 1999. Eralp, “Kosovo and Turkey: What Lies Ahead?”, 4. 24
Hehir, “Introduction”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 7. 25
Spanish Defence Staff ,“Country Book: Kosovo” (Madrid: MoD, 2007): 57.
7
‘the future status process must be moved forward with caution’26. The UNSC agreed and tasked
the former Finish President Martti Ahtisaari to carry out the process. However, an agreement
between the parties proved impossible: the Serbs offered everything but independence, while the
Albanians just wanted independence. Finally, Ahtisaari submitted his report, calling for a
‘supervised’ independence. The UNSC did not approve it, due to the Russian veto.
The independence process stalled. To push it, on 17 February 2008 the authorities of Kosovo
decided to approve a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), which was immediately
acknowledged by the US and the majority of EU countries. The next day Russia called for a
meeting of the UNSC, which rejected the UDI. Serbia reacted obtaining the approval of the UN
General Assembly to request the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on
‘whether the UDI is in accordance with IL’. The ICJ released its answer on the 22 July 2010, but
the Court bypassed the real issue of the legality of the Kosovo UDI, merely asserting that in IL
there was not any explicit prohibition on unilateral declarations of independence27. Consequently,
the Court’s ruling has not had an actual impact on the process. Kosovo has not still gained
international recognition as an independent country, and the conflict is threatening to become a
‘frozen’ conflict.
26
D. Harland, “Kosovo and the UN”, Survival, vol. 52, no. 5 (2010): 80. 27
ibid., 80-93.
9
CHAPTER TWO: A LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE
The concept of International Society was introduced by Kant to define a system composed of
states that voluntarily constrain themselves through adherence to a common set of rules, the IL,
applied by International Institutions28. IL tries to mitigate the excesses of power of the states,
compelling them to behave according to its rules, to resolve any conflict peacefully. The ongoing
conflict in Kosovo, from the NATO-Yugoslavian war in 1999 to the current struggle for
independence, may be explained in terms of IL. This is the first layer of a multifaceted conflict.
From a liberal perspective, states play an important role in IRs, but there are more actors. In the
Kosovo conflict the UN and NATO played, and still play, a very important role. Another tenet of
liberal thought is that interest is not the only ‘fuel’ of IRs: morality also matters. Kosovo was the
beginning of a new era in IRs characterized by the defence of human rights, as far as intervening
in the internal affairs of states which abused the human rights of their own citizens.
There are many legal arguments to judge the different positions regarding the Kosovo conflict,
many of them conflicting. This paper does not pretend to assert who is right or wrong; it just tries
to evaluate the repercussions of this conflict on some key tenets of IL.
The OAF and the Right to Protect (RTP)
The Peace of Westphalia supposed the advent of modern states29. One of their main attributes
was ‘sovereignty’, meaning that they have a right of ‘exclusiveness’ over a territory30: no state can
intervene in the internal affairs of other state. This principle of ‘sovereignty’ has applied since then
in IRs.
According to ‘Realism’, states are the main actors of IRs, and their security, their survival, was their
main goal31. However, the 20th Century witnessed a phenomenon that, although not new, had not
appeared before in such a huge scale: globalization. John Baylis defines ‘Globalization’ as the
‘process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the
world more and more have effects on peoples and societies far away’32. One of the most important
consequences of globalization is the change in the concept of security, moving it away from the
traditional concept of state security towards the new concept of ‘human security’33: it is the human
being, the citizen, the main value to protect, not the state. Consequently, when a state does not
28 Antonio Hermosa Andújar, “The Kantian conception on International Relations”, Journal of Political Studies, no. 64, vol. 165, (1989): 163-189.
29 Hirst, War and Power, 44.
30 ibid., 45.
31 T. Dunne and B. Schmidt,”Realism”, in Globalization of World Politics, 101.
32 J. Baylis, S. Smith and P. Owens, “Introduction”, in Globalization of World Politics, 8.
33 Acharya, “Human Security”, in Globalization of World Politics, 492-493.
10
respect the human rights of their own citizens, the principle of ‘non intervention’ in internal affairs
does not apply: as A. Bellamy contends, sovereignty is limited by the respect to human rights34.
So, when the Kosovo conflict erupted in 1998, the media showed images of a massive flow of
refugees and, and Western audiences demanded their governments that something had to be
done35. In previous conflicts the IC had not being capable of intervening effectively (Somalia,
Rwanda, Bosnia), and now the political leaders almost felt compelled to intervene. For the first
time in history NATO fought a war, and fought it against a sovereign state, Yugoslavia, interfering
in its internal affairs. President Clinton defined NATO’s campaign in humanitarian terms:
‘... a moral imperative to protect the ethnic Albanians...the first of a new kind of international
use of force, not aimed at protecting or furthering traditional national interests, but at
protecting people and their fundamental rights’36.
The British Prime Minister Tony Blair also played a prominent role. He asserted that ‘globalization
was changing the world in ways that made traditional sovereignty anachronistic’37, and that ‘acts of
genocide can never be a purely internal matter’38. He established a new doctrine of ‘humanitarian
intervention’39.
The key point of OAF is that NATO launched it without authorization of the UNSC. In the Western
countries there was a feeling that the use of force ‘may be illegal but legitimate’40: something
should be done to stop the ethnic cleansing. As Andrew Cottey highlights, OAF was so described
as a ‘triumph of liberal humanitarian intervention’41.
However, that was an extremely Western-centric vision. As Professor Barbara Delcourt put it:
‘With the 1999 bombing campaign, they [Western countries] had a tendency to consider
that what was in their eyes legitimate should in a certain way be considered as legal and a
means of justifying the circumvention of the UN Security Council’42.
Reality is that the majority of other states disapproved NATO’s campaign43. China and Russia
strongly opposed it; the Rio Group of Latin American states, the Non-Aligned Movement and the
Group of 77 condemned OAF as unilateral and ‘undermining the authority of the UN’44.
34
A.J. Bellamy, “Kosovo and sovereignty as responsibility”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 40. 35
F. Portero, “Does anyone know why our troops remain in Kosovo?”, Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis, no. 69 (2008): 2. 36
A.J. Lyon and M.F.T. Malone, “Kosovo’s call for humanitarian intervention”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 19. 37
Bellamy, “Kosovo and sovereignty as responsibility”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 43. 38
ibid. 39
Ker-Lindsay, “Kosovo, sovereignty and the subversion of UN authority”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 168. 40
Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 7. 41
A. Cottey, “The Kosovo War in perspective”, International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 3, (2009): 608. 42
B. Delcourt, “Justifying Kosovo’s Recognition: Between the Eccentric and the Absurd”, Institute 4S, In Press 4S (May-June 2008): 1. 43
ibid., 605. 44
Webber, “Kosovo War: Recapitulation”, 453-454.
11
This strong opposition was apparent before the campaign when the UK disregarded the possibility
to use the ‘Uniting for Peace’ provision for gaining credit for the intervention through the support of
two-thirds of the General Assembly, due to the high improbability of obtaining that support45.
NATO was accused of unilateralism, ‘bypassing traditional International Law’46 and the UNSC,
contravening Article 53 of the UN Charter:
‘The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council...’47
In this sense, it was a precedent of the 2003 Gulf War, where the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ also
unilaterally, bypassing the UNSC, attacked Iraq. Curiously, in the same way, in 1999 NATO also
tried to justify its intervention by asserting that previous UNSC Resolutions (nos. 1160, 1199 and
1203) allowed a military action, having Yugoslavia failed to adhere to them. As a result, the US
concluded that ‘it was authorized to undertake military action to ensure that the will of the Council
was enforced’48. Therefore, the NATO intervention in Kosovo inaugurated a unilateral policy,
bypassing the UNSC and trying to justify legally interventions on the grounds of previous UNSC
Resolutions that actually did not mention any military intervention. So, a link can be traced from
Kosovo intervention to the 2003 Iraq invasion.
OAF initiated a process in IL to limit the concept of ‘sovereignty’. The UN Secretary General, Kofi
Annan, in his opening Address to the 1999 General Assembly, acknowledged this process and
showed the path to follow in the interpretation of the UN Charter:
‘State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined ... States are now widely
understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa ... When we
read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual
human beings, not to protect those who abuse them’49.
Therefore, the Kosovo’s campaign started a conceptual debate about ‘sovereignty’ as
responsibility (the sates are responsible to protect the rights of their citizens) and the RTP,
meaning that the IC could interfere in internal affairs of those states which failed to protect the
human rights of their citizens, or even constitute a threat to them. Some states (Cuba, Algeria,
Iran, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Venezuela) radically opposed this new interpretation of the Charter,
being scared of a Western intervention in their internal affairs. However, Jonathan Eyal argues
45
Hehir, “Introduction”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 8. 46
D. Averre, “From Pristina to Tskhinvali: the legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia’s relations with the West”, International Affairs 85, no.3, (2009): 575. 47
United Nations Charter. http://www.un.org. 48
A.F. Lang, Jr, “Global constitutionalism and Kosovo”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 73. 49
Cited in Bellamy, “Kosovo and sovereignty as responsibility”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 43, 53.
12
that the majority of states did not oppose the new concept of RTP, but the practical way of its
application: the Western could not be judge and executor at the same time, the UNSC should
approve any intervention50. In other words, they strongly opposed any form of unilateralism,
supporting instead a clear multilateralism, represented by the UNSC. Finally, an agreement was
reached when the UN 2005 World Summit Outcome Document stated that:
‘... we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’51.
The RTP has been also invoked and applied in the current crisis in Libya, where NATO is
intervening under UNSC mandate.
NATO intervention did not resolve the Kosovo conflict, just put it in stasis. NATO had intervened in
the internal affairs of a sovereign country, but as Rein Müllerson contends, the next question was:
is it possible to intervene in a country to defend the human rights of an ethnic minority without at
the same time encouraging their struggle for independence?52 In other words: the Kosovo conflict
not just begun the process to limit the traditional concept of ‘sovereignty’, but also put in the
spotlight the traditional concept of ‘territorial integrity’, and its relation with the self-determination
right.
UNSC Resolution 1244, the UDI and the ICJ opinion: the road to independence
NATO intervention was accused of not respecting Article 53 of the UN Charter, acting unilaterally,
bypassing the UNSC; but NATO was also accused of supporting the ‘de facto independence’ of
Kosovo, infringing so the principle of territorial integrity recognised in the Article 2.4. of the UN
Charter:
‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...’53
Andre Stemmet points that NATO argued that the goal of the attack was not the independence of
Kosovo, but exclusively terminating the violation of human rights, and therefore OAF did not
infringe Article 2.454. John Norris, Director of Communications of the US Under-Secretary of State,
declared that ‘NATO was not demanding Kosovo’s independence ... [actually] NATO wanted to
50
ibid., 55. 51
United Nations. The 2005 World Summit Documents: 30. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org (accessed on March 2, 2011). 52
Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 20. 53
United Nations Charter. http://www.un.org . 54
A. Stemmet, “International Law and the Use of Force. Some Post 9/11 Perspectives”, RUSI Journal (October 2003): 26.
13
keep Yugoslavia intact’’55. NATO used this argument to obtain a ‘seal of approval in the form of a
UN SC mandate’56, and also to maintain unanimity inside the Alliance57. It is arguable that had the
independence of Kosovo been the aim of NATO intervention, some countries would have never
participated in the campaign, Spain being one of them58. So, after 78 days of bombardment, and
by declaring its commitment to the principle of territorial integrity, NATO finally got a UN legal
cover, UNSC Resolution 1244, which established the withdrawal of Yugoslavian security forces
from Kosovo, put the territory under UN ‘interim’ administration’, and authorised the deployment of
KFOR.
Resolution 1244 reaffirms in its Preamble ‘the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’59. However, it is contradictory in its
wording, since it also mentions a ‘pending political settlement ... to determine Kosovo’s future
status’60. So, despite using the term ‘territorial integrity’, notwithstanding the government of
Kosovo is always described as ‘autonomous’ and despite the word ‘independence’ is never used to
refer to the final political situation of Kosovo, UNSC Resolution 1244 also gave hope to the
advocates of the independence.
Advocates of independence deny that UNSC Resolution sets up the territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia as the final status of the territory, but merely acknowledges it during the ‘interim’ period.
They contend that the main purpose of the resolution was stopping the bombing, not deciding the
final political status of Kosovo61. In the same way, Sir John Sawers, the UK ambassador in the UN,
infers from the word ‘autonomous’ referred to the government of Kosovo as a merely provisional
condition of that government until a final agreement have been achieved62. These opinions have
been contradicted by many scholars and politicians, but it is noteworthy highlighting the opinions of
Anthony Clark Arend63, Director of the International Law Institute of Georgetown University, John
Bolton, former permanent US representative to the UN, Lawrence Eagleburger, former US
Secretary of State, and Peter Rodman, former assistant Secretary of Defence of International
Security Affairs64; all of them stated that UNSC Resolution 1244 reaffirms Serbian sovereignty over
Kosovo.
55
Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 8. 56
J. Eyal, “Kosovo’s Independence: Re-Wiring the Balkans, the Wrong Way Around”, Royal United Services Institute, vol. 153, no. 1 (February 2008): 22. 57
ibid. 58
J. Rupérez, “Kosovo: a ‘secession’ of errors”, Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis, no. 67 (2008): 3. http://www.fundacionfaes.org/ (accessed February 24, 2011). 59
United Nations Security Council Resolutions, http://www.un.org (accessed on March 2, 2011). 60
ibid. 61
Alexander Nicoll, ed., “Kosovo’s uncertain future”, Strategic Comments, vol. 13, no. 6 (2007): 1. 62
R. Bermejo and C. Gutiérrez, “Kosovo another time: critical comments on its independence declaration, its constitution and other thoughts”, Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper 41 (2008): 15. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 63
A. Rizzi, “International Legality fall on again”, El País (26 Feb 2008), http://www.elpais.com (accessed February 28, 2011). 64
Bolton, Eagleburger and Rodman, “Warning Light on Kosovo”.
14
Therefore, UNSC Resolution 1244 is contradictory and, notwithstanding its literal wording
reaffirming in three occasions the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, it maintains an open window for
the advocates of independence. More importantly, UNSC Resolution 1244 actually established a
‘de facto’ independence of Kosovo by eliminating the presence of Serb authority on the territory
and creating a UN administration that converted Kosovo into an international protectorate65. Since
1999 the Serbian sovereignty over the province has been merely nominal, in any way effective.
Therefore, UNSC Resolution 1244 actually started the ongoing process of challenging the Serbian
sovereignty over the territory of Kosovo, undermining its territorial integrity by establishing a ‘de
facto’ independence.
During several years the final status of the territory was not treated: the UN administration was
occupied with security and the economic development of the territory. In 2005, after some riots,
the UNSC decided to open negotiations to define that final status, reckoning that instability in the
territory will end with a final political solution. Martti Ahtisaari was tasked to carry out the process.
An agreement between Serbs and Albanians proved to be impossible, and finally in 2007 Ahtisaari
submitted his report, which was not approved by the UNSC. The report called for a ‘supervised’
independence, challenging so the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia. Ahtisaari described
the Kosovo conflict as a ‘sui generis’ case. This was the first time this expression was used to
refer to Kosovo. Bermejo and Gutiérrez infer from those words that IL should not be applied on
Kosovo independence process66.
Since then, this argument has been used many times by the advocates of Kosovo’s independence.
When the UNSC rejected the conclusions of Ahtisaari’s plan, the process of Kosovo’s
independence stalled. In order to reactivate it, the authorities of Kosovo unilaterally declared the
independence on the 17th of February 2008. Bermejo and Gutiérrez argue that this declaration
was previously coordinated with Washington and Brussels67, and Dzihic and Kramer contend that it
was even drafted by the US Department of State68. The next day, Russia called for an emergency
meeting of the UNSC, where the UDI was rejected. Nevertheless, some countries recognized
Kosovo as an state, mainly the US and the majority of the EU countries.
This episode of the UDI strongly reminds the launch of OAF: since the current IL seems not to
allow the independence of Kosovo (remember the commitment to ‘territorial integrity’ included in
Article 2.4 of the UN Charter and the recurrent reaffirmation of ‘territorial integrity’ in UNSC
Resolution 1244), the Western countries, leaded by the US and the UK, decided to act unilaterally,
again bypassing the UNSC. If OAF started the process of limitation of the traditional concept of
65
Eyal, “Kosovo’s Independence”, 22. 66
R. Bermejo and C. Gutiérrez, “Kosovo’s Independence from the Perspective of the Right of Free Determination”, Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper 7 (2008): 15. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 67
Bermejo and Gutiérrez, “Kosovo another time”, 2. 68
Dzihic and Kramer, “Kosovo after Independence”, 5.
15
‘sovereignty’ in IL, the UDI seems having started a process of limitation of the traditional concept of
‘territorial integrity’.
The US Secretary of State, Condolezza Rice, declared that ‘Kosovo is sui generis and this is
because of the special circumstances out of which the breakup of Yugoslavia came’69. This
argument refers to the violations of human rights, which are again used to limit another traditional
principle of IRs, ‘territorial integrity’ of the states, in the same way they were used before to limit the
traditional concept of ‘sovereignty’.
To regain the initiative, Serbia succeeded on the 8th October 2008 to obtain the approval of the UN
General Assembly to request the opinion of the ICJ on the next question: ‘Is the unilateral
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in
accordance with IL?70. The resolution was only opposed by six countries, the US and the UK
between them71. The US even declared that the ICJ opinion would not change its stance. It can
so be argued that the US was convinced that the opinion would be negative to its position.
However, on the 22nd July 2010 the ICJ delivered its opinion:
‘General International Law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of
independence. Declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general
International Law’72.
Although this was interpreted as a victory for the pro-independence73, actually it was not: the Court
merely asserted that there was no explicit prohibition on declaring independence in IL, but avoided
to ‘debate the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of any right of “remedial
secession” ... that issue is beyond the scope of the question’74. As a document of the International
Crisis Groups states, ‘The opinion was a defeat for Serbia but not a victory for Kosovo’75.
Perhaps the impression on a Serbian defeat is mainly due to the opinion of the ICJ about the
interpretation of UNSC Resolution 1244: ‘The object and purpose of the resolution ... is the
establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, without making any definitive determination
on final status issues’76. So, according to the ICJ the literal wording of the resolution, naming
69
Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 3. 70
“Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion”. International Crisis Group, Europe Report no. 206 (26 Aug 2010): 1. http://www.crisisgroup.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 71
Harland, “Kosovo and the UN”, 89. 72
“Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo”, International Court of Justice (22 July 2010): 3. http://www.icj-cij.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 73
M. Derks and M. Price, “The EU and Rule of Law Reform in Kosovo”, Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute for IR “Clingendael”: 5. http://www.clingendael.nl (accessed February 28, 2011). 74
“Accordance with IL of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo”, 31. 75
“Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion”, 1. 76
ibid., 42.
16
several times the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, does not refer to the final status, but merely to
the interim period. Therefore the ICJ opened the possibility of independence as a final status.
Kosovo and the Right for ‘Remedial Secession’
So far a total of seventy-five countries have recognized Kosovo as an independent state77.
However, Kosovo cannot gain international recognition simply by having the support of the majority
of countries in the UNGA: Article 4 of the UN Charter establishes that ‘membership ...will be
effected by a decision of the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Security
Council78’. As both Russia and China oppose the independence of Kosovo, this process is
currently in stasis. Had not Russia and China opposed the independence, a new right of ‘remedial
secession’ would have been born, resulting of limiting the traditional concept of ‘territorial integrity’
with the respect of human rights.
Budislav Bukas and Rein Müllerson think that the principle of territorial integrity must be respected,
although can be ignored when human rights are violated79. Cedryc Ryngaert and Christine
Griffioen, although recognising that the right of self-determination needs to be applied in a
restricting way for reasons of international peace and security, also contend that a right of
‘remedial secession’ could be contemplated in today’s IL80. Traditionally the right of self-
determination was recognised in the context of decolonisation81: that is known as ‘external’ self-
determination. In turn, the concept of ‘internal’ self-determination was introduced by President
Wilson, and it means the right to participate in the political process of the state, without being
excluded in any way. However, when the right to ‘internal’ self-determination is denied to a people,
when their human rights are violated, these people could claim a right to ‘external’ self-
determination: this is the ‘remedial secession’. Some conditions must been fulfilled for invoking this
right: the group invoking the right must be a ‘people’, their human rights must have been violated
and their participation in the political process of the state denied82. These same conditions are
named by John Chipman83 as well.
This right of ‘remedial secession’ was also recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada. In its
ruling about the right to secession of Quebec, the Court recognises the right to external secession
for colonial peoples or when a people is subjected to alien subjugation; but interestingly, the Court
77
“Who recognized Kosova as an independent state?”. http://www.kosovothanksyou.com (accessed April 6, 2011). 78
S. Economides, J. Ker-Lindsay and D. Papadimitriou, “Kosovo: Four Futures”, Survival, vol.52, no.5 (2010): 113. 79
Bermejo and Gutiérrez, “Kosovo’s Independence”, 7; Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 19. 80
C. Ryngaert and C. Griffioen, “The Relevance of the Right of Self-determination in the Kosovo Matter: In Partial Response to the Agora Papers”, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 8, no. 3, (2009): 575. 81
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples - Resolution 1514 (XV)’. http://www.un.org (accessed March 1, 2011). 82
Ryngaert and Griffioen, “The Relevance Self-determination in the Kosovo Matter”, 575-581. 83
J. Chipman, “Managing the Politics of Parochialism”, Survival, vol. 35, no.1 (1993): 150-151.
17
also recognises the right to external self-determination when ‘a definable group is denied
meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural
development’84.
So, in the same way as human rights limited the traditional concept of ‘sovereignty’, and as a result
emerged the RTP, it seems possible that in a near future human rights will also limit the traditional
concept of ‘territorial integrity’. The outcome of this process could be the right to ‘remedial
secession’, but the key point here is the same as for the RTP: the right to ‘remedial secession’
should be approved by the UNSC, that is to say, in a multilateral way, not unilaterally.
But, does Kosovo worth this right? Although the purpose of this paper is not to determine it, it is
interesting to present different perspectives about that. As it was set out before, several Western
political figures, e.g. President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair or US Secretary of State Condolezza
Rice declared that Serbian authorities perpetrated an ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity in Kosovo against the K-Albanians. Some sources reckon that 800,000 refugees fled
Kosovo and another 500,000 people were internally displaced, and that at least 4,400 Albanians
civilians were killed85. This is the main reasoning to support the right to ‘remedial secession’ of
Kosovo.
On the other hand, when the Serb Army and security forces withdrew from Kosovo, a ‘reverse
ethnic cleansing’ took place: more than 230,000 K-Serbs were forced to leave the province, 271
were killed and 650 missing86. Carla del Ponte, chief prosecutor of the ICTY, has asserted that
Albanians fighters (KLA) killed in 1999 three hundred Serbs, harvested their organs and sold them
on the international black market87. Recently, according to a report of the Council of Europe, the
current Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, could be involved in this organ trafficking88. It is
not the first time a Prime Minister of Kosovo is accused of committing war crimes; Ramush
Haradinaj was acquitted in April of 2008 by the ICTY of war crimes, but has been indicted again in
2010 after allegations of witness intimidation in the first trial89.
The KLA, short before the launch of OAF, was qualified by President Clinton as a terrorist
organization; the US special envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, also described the KLA as a
terrorist organization, stating that ‘I know a terrorist when I see one and these men are terrorists’90.
The Washington Times stated in May 1999 that Al-Qaeda ‘has both trained and financially
84
Cited in Ryngaert and Griffioen, “The Relevance of Self-determination in the Kosovo Matter”, 581-582. 85
Cited in Hehir, “Introduction”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 7; Cottey, “The Kosovo War in perspective”, 597; Webber, “Kosovo War: Recapitulation”, 451. 86
G. Bono, “Explaining failures in security and justice”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 134. 87
John R. Schindler, “Europe’s Unstable Southeast”, Naval War College Review, vol.61, no.4 (2008): 28. 88
BBC News Europe. http://www.bbc.co.uk (accessed on March 2, 2011). 89
“November 2010- Security Council Report”. United Nations Security Council (2010). http://www.securitycouncilreport.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 90
Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 9.
18
supported the KLA’91 Alistair Campbell, Tony Blair’s head of communication, asserted that the ‘KLA
were not much better than the Serbs and looking for NATO to bomb Milosevic for them’92. Even
the UNSC condemned both the Yugoslavian authorities and the KLA in Resolution 116093,
approved on 31st March 1998.
It has been speculated that the lesson the K-Albanians learnt from the Bosnian conflict was that to
draw the international attention they needed to create a conflict. So, the KLA started a violent
campaign to provoke an excessive Serb response, forcing so the IC to condemn Milosevic and to
support the Albanian side94. Tim Judah claims that ‘the question of human rights became another
weapon in the arsenal of the Kosovars’95. As A.J. Bellamy points out, even in the UN Secretary
General’s office there were doubts as for the culpability of the KLA and the extent of the ethnic
cleansing96.
It is also worth noting the role played by the media, which determined the stance of Western
audiences towards the conflict. Michael Radu points that the media, especially the CNN,
presented a campaign of ‘stopping genocide’ largely exaggerated97. Likewise, Rein Müllerson
asserts that ‘to justify the use of military force against Serbia...Serb atrocities were always noticed
and often exaggerated while crimes of the KLA were usually hushed up’98. Francesca Morris
points that the Albanian lobby hired the services of a media firm in New York, Rudder Finn, to win
the propaganda battle99, a battle they won according to John Schindler:
‘Serbian crimes against Albanians were seriously overstated for propaganda effect ... the
Serbs lost the propaganda war, as in Bosnia, in the opening round and never recovered’100.
Finally, when the 2004 riots exploded across Kosovo, 27 people were killed, 550 homes and 27
Orthodox churches and monasteries were destroyed, and 4,100 people fled, mainly Serbs101. As a
consequence, the UN Secretary General tasked Karl Eide to write down a report, whose
conclusion was that the process towards a final status should be moved forward, since ‘future
91
Cited in F. Morrison, “Paramilitaries, Propaganda and Pipelines. The NATO Attack on Kosovo and Serbia, 1999”, Western Oregon University, http://www.wou.edu (accessed February 28, 2011): 18. 92
ibid. 93
Bellamy, “Kosovo and sovereignty as responsibility”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 46. 94
Hehir, “Introduction”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 6-7 95
Cited in Lang, Jr, “Global Constitutionalism and Kosovo”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 69. 96
Bellamy, “Kosovo and sovereignty as responsibility”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 53. 97
M. Radu, “Kosovo: The Revenge of CNN and the Politics of Emotion”, Foreign Policy Research Institute (2008): 1. http://www.fpri.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 98
Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 9. 99
Morrison, “Paramilitaries, Propaganda and Pipelines”, 3. 100
Schindler, “Europe’s Unstable Southeast”, 27. 101
L. Ball, “United States Diplomacy in Kosovo Final Status Talks: A Case Study in Multilateral Negotiations with Principal Mediators”, School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton University (May 12, 2009): 4. http://wws.princeton.edu (accessed February 24, 2011).
19
inter-ethnic violence remained a frightening and plausible scenario if the status-quo persisted’102. It
is surprising how the side responsible for ethnic violence was rewarded with a political concession.
Therefore, it could be argued that the K-Albanians were also responsible for what happened, and
Kosovo’s right to ‘remedial secession’ is highly controversial. As James Ker-Lindsay has put it, at
best it can be said that Kosovo does not represent ‘a straightforward case in International Law’103.
Conclusion
Kosovo presents a multifaceted conflict. One way of analysing it is focusing on IL, the defence of
human rights and the role played by International Organisations, mainly the UN and NATO. This is
a liberal approach that begets several interesting conclusions.
NATO intervention was far from being generally supported and the responsibility of the conflict
does not lie exclusively on the Serbian side. But what is really important is the ‘revolution’ in the
interpretation of the traditional concept of ‘sovereignty’, which crystallized in the RTP approved by
the UNGA in 2005. Furthermore, it is not possible to intervene in the internal affairs of a nation,
limiting its sovereignty, without at the same time affecting its territorial integrity.
The shadow of unilateralism has appeared several times during the conflict, from OAF to the
support of the UDI by the US and many Western countries. Unilateralism raises bad memories
about the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The UNSC is bypassed and its authority undermined.
Finally, the advocates of Kosovo’s independence, mainly the US, have described Kosovo as a ‘sui
generis’ case: the IC must recognize its independence because of the humanitarian atrocities the
Serbs committed there. But, as Javier Rupérez, Ambassador of Spain, says: ‘the virtue of the law
lies in ensuring equal and general application’104. The ‘sui generis’ argument can be unfair in the
sense that some rules apply just in the cases that suits someone’s interests.
In the next chapter this paper will analyse the Kosovo conflict from a ‘Realist’ perspective, focusing
in the interests of the states and scrutinizing what really lies behind their position regarding the
Kosovo conflict. As Andre Stemmet put it, ‘International Law is by nature a weak system and its
interpretation often beholden to political preferences105’.
102
ibid. 103
Ker-Lindsay, “Kosovo, sovereignty and the subversion of UN authority”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 177. 104
J. Rupérez, “Georgia: Kosovo takes its toll”, Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis, no. 76 (2008): 5. http://www.fundacionfaes.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 105
Stemmet, “IL and the Use of Force”, 29.
21
CHAPTER THREE: A REALIST PERSPECTIVE
In Chapter two the Kosovo conflict has been explained through the IL prism. On the one hand, the
advocates of Kosovo’s independence underline the violations of human rights committed by the
Serbs to claim the ‘RTP’ and the right to ‘remedial secession’. On the other hand, the defenders of
Serb sovereignty over Kosovo stress the concept of ‘territorial integrity’ and the authority of the UN,
condemning any attempt to solve the problem unilaterally.
This Chapter will explore whether these legal arguments are sincere or there is something behind
them, the own interests of every state. To do so, this Chapter will focus on the main states
involved in the conflict: the US, the EU countries, Russia, China and Turkey.
The US
In the last years the increasing tensions between a raising Russia and the Western countries have
been a commonplace. This situation has been described by Zbigniew Brzezinsky as a ‘new Cold
War’106. For some analysts, as Younes Bhat, ‘even though the Cold War ended 20 years ago the
US has continued to treat Russia as an enemy, pushing the NATO to Russia’s borders,
surrounding it with a ring of military bases and supporting patently anti-Russian leaders in former
Soviet states’107. This policy is described by Rein Müllerson as ‘containment’108, and as
‘encirclement’ by Ezio Bonsignore109. In any case, those terms do not precisely reflect a benign
policy. This confrontation has also being described, and even enhanced, by Robert Kagan. In an
article in The Sunday Times, he advises to ‘Forget the Islamic threat, the coming battle will be
between autocratic nations like Russia and China and the rest’, and asserts that ‘the future is more
likely to be dominated by the ideological struggle among the great powers’110. So, there is an
ongoing confrontation between great powers, and what really matters is their respective interests.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on 24 June 2007 at an energy summit in Zagreb that ‘the
Balkans had always been a sphere of Russian special interest’111. And here is the point: being
Serbia a traditional ally of Russia, and given the US strategy of containing and encircling Russia,
106
Brzezinsky, “How to Avoid a New Cold War”. 107
Y. Bhat, “Kosovo Independence opens up a Pandora’s Box: Extended Crisis from the Balkans to the Caucasus”, Global Research, Center for Research on Globalization (October 14, 2009). http://www.globalresearch.ca (accessed February 28, 2011). 108
Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 29. 109
Bonsignore, “The Kosovo Payback”, 4. 110
R. Kagan, “The world divides … and democracy is at bay”, The Sunday Times (September 2, 2007) http://www.timesonline.co.uk (accessed on March 3, 2011). 111
Nicoll, “Kosovo’s uncertain future”, 2.
22
‘Kosovo has become caught up as a pawn in the greater scheme of world affairs’112, as Alexander
Nicoll has put it.
The US interests in the area are multifaceted. Like in the case of Albania and Bosnia Herzegovina,
Kosovo is another pawn in the US strategy to show to the world that a European Islam, moderate,
modern and democratic is possible113, denying so Samuel Huntington’s theory of the ‘clash of
civilizations’114.
Energy security is also important. The Albania, Macedonia, Bulgarian Oil Corporation (AMBO),
registered in the US, is building a pipeline to bring oil from the Caspian Sea to the Albanian port of
Vlora, surpassing the overcrowded Strait of Hormuz, but more importantly, bypassing Russia115
and diminishing so dependency on Russian oil and gas. The importance of this project was
acknowledged in November 1998 by Bill Richardson, the US Secretary of Energy: "This is about
America's energy security"116.
Niels Aadal Rasmussen links the US military base in Kosovo, Camp Bondsteel, one of the largest
American military bases outside the US, with other strategic concerns further than the mere
security of Kosovo: ‘force projection in the Black Sea area and parts of the Middle East and
connected with planned oil pipelines directly from the Black Sea to the Adriatic’117. The same
opinion is shared by Alexis Troude, who quotes an editorial of the Washington Post in January
1999: ‘...we will need bases and the right to fly over the Balkans in order to protect petrol from the
Caspian sea’118.
Therefore, the US has clear interests in the region, being the main one to counter balance the
Russian influence in the region.
Russia
In 1999 NATO was expanding, both geographically (Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland) and
strategically (a new wider area of operations resulting from the new concept of ‘Crisis Response
Operations’)119. When NATO launched OAF, Russia accused it of unilateralism and undermining
112
ibid. 113
A. Rubio Plo, “Kosovo’s diplomatic battle: bigoted stances and shared interests”, Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper 91 (2007): 1. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 114
Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, 203-212. 115
Bhat, “Kosovo Independence opens up a Pandora’s Box”, 1. 116
G. Monbiot, “A discreet deal in the pipeline”, The Guardian, 15 February 2001. http://www.guardian.co.uk (accessed March 3, 2011). 117
N. A. Rasmussen, “Kosovo Independence: de Jure versus de Facto”, Danish Institute for International Studies Report, no. 14 (2005): 30. 118
A. Troude, “Kosovo on the Geopolitical Chessboard”, in “Justifying Kosovo’s Recognition: Between the Eccentric and the Absurd”, In Press 4S (May-June 2008): 11. 119
Averre, “From Pristina to Tskhinvali”, 576.
23
the UN authority. The Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, described OAF as ‘NATO
colonialism’120.
However, it seems that the Russian defence of the concept of ‘sovereignty’ and the authority of the
UN has more to do with a ‘perceived attempt by the US to marginalize Russian influence’, as
Evgenii Primakov put it121, than with a genuine adherence to the principles of IL and the UN
Charter: Russia felt threatened by the US and NATO.
Furthermore, OAF denied Russian intervention through the UNSC in an area of the world
considered by Russia of especial interest for them, the Balkans. Therefore, Russian influence was
severely limited, and as Derek Averre puts it, the NATO-Yugoslavia war on Kosovo showed ‘the
country’s limited political influence’122. Russia was losing power. Nevertheless, Russia
desperately needed the Western economical help after the collapse suffered in 1998, and in
practice did not oppose too much resistance. Apparently, Russia received $200 m from the IMF to
cooperate with the West to solve the Kosovo crisis123.
But the Kosovo conflict did not finish with OAF, the final political status is still to be defined, with
the US and Russia supporting different positions. Today Russia is a very different country from
Boris Yeltsin’s Russia: as Jonathan Eyal contends, today Russia is a country ‘determined to
defend its interests’124, and those interests conflict in many areas with those of the US, like in
Kosovo or in the Caucasus125. Russia also acknowledges this clash of interests with the US,
although rather than using the somewhat hard expression of new ‘Cold War’ era, the Russian
Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, described it as a ‘crisis of trust126’.
The current struggle on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence seems a copycat of OAF: the
US and many Western countries are trying to solve the problem unilaterally. Jonathan Eyal argues
that Kosovo has given Russia the opportunity to create an strategic link with Serbia, to use Kosovo
as a precedent to justify Russians interventions (like in Georgia) and also to show itself as the
paladin of IL, the UN and multilateralism, portraying at the same time the US and the Western
countries as ‘cynical lawbreakers’127. And as Pavel Felgenhauer points out, all this advantages
obtained by Russia have been really cheap, with no need of deploying troops or investing
120
ibid., 579. 121
ibid., 578. 122
ibid. 580. 123
A. M. Brudenell, “Russia’s Role in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999”, Royal United Services Institute, vol. 153, no. 1 (February 2008): 32. 124
Eyal, “Kosovo’s Independence”, 29. 125
Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 10. 126
Bhat, “Kosovo Independence opens up a Pandora’s Box”, 4. 127
Eyal, “Kosovo’s Independence”, 26.
24
money128. As Tim Judah says, Russians consider Kosovo as a ‘weak link’129 in Western policy that
must be exploited.
The strategic bond with Serbia has already paid some dividends: in January 2009 the Serbian
state-owned oil monopoly enterprise was acquired by the Russian Gazprom, and Serbia was
included in the South Stream pipeline project to transport Russian gas and oil to Western
Europe130.
For Russia, Kosovo is not important. As Andrew Cottey defines it, Kosovo is a ‘small but useful
pawn’131 in the balance of power, ready to be used in other issues where Russian interest can be
more affected, as the Caucasus: e.g., Russia justified its intervention in Georgia, with no
authorization of the UN SC, on the same grounds that NATO did when launched OAF, invoking the
RTP due to supposed Georgian atrocities132.
Finally, by defending Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo, Russia is also defending its own territorial
integrity133. Russia considers that the Kosovo precedent can embolden separatist movements in
different Russian republics: Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-
Cherkessia and Adygeya . As the Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, once said to the US
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright: ‘Madeleine, don’t you understand, we have many Kosovos
in Russia?’134.
China
The Chinese stance towards Kosovo’s independence and Kosovo conflict in general can be
understood in the same terms as the Russian one. On the one hand, as Antoaneta Bezlova
highlights, China is afraid of Kosovo being taken as a precedent for separatist movements inside
its borders, e.g. in Tibet, Xinjiang Hong Kong, Macao or even in Taiwan135. On the other hand,
China also considers that the US is trying to contain it. China perceives the US policy as neo-
imperialist and neo-interventionist, and describes it as a ‘hegemon on the offensive’136. In the
same way as Robert Kagan predicts an ‘ideological struggle between great powers’137, Rosalie
Chen asserts that the Marxist-Leninist legacy is still present in Chinese minds, in the sense that
128
Felgenhauer, “The Tactics and Strategic Goals of Russia”, 1. 129
Judah, Tim. “Kosovo: from Russia with love…”. Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper 88 (2007): 4. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 130
Cottey, “The Kosovo War in perspective”, 595. 131
ibid. 132
Averre, “From Pristina to Tskhinvali”, 590. 133
Felgenhauer, “The Tactics and Strategic Goals of Russia”, 6. 134
Brudenell, “Russia’s Role in the Kosovo Conflict”, 30. 135
A.Bezlova, “Kosovo Holds Lessons for Tibet, Taiwan”, IPS News (Feb 19, 2008). http://ipsnews.net (accessed February 24, 2011). 136
R. Chen, “China perceives America: Perspectives of the IR Experts”, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 12, no. 35: 289,294. 137
Kagan, “The world divides … and democracy is at bay”.
25
they perceived politics in dialectical terms, as an ideological struggle, and that IR are ‘heavily
burdened by the realist approach’138. So, China follows a strategic relationship with Russia and
India to grapple with the Western unilateralism, and Kosovo is one sample of that policy139.
The EU
Since the introduction of the ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) in the Treaty of
Maastricht (1992), the EU has shown a desire to be something more than a mere economic and
monetary union140. The EU has always been an economic ‘giant’ but a military ‘dwarf’ and a
political ‘pygmy’. And Kosovo was the perfect occasion to remedy that perception: the security
crisis in the backyard of Europe, the humanitarian emergency and the threat of a massive flow of
refugees impelled the usually timorous EU into action. The fact that the EU was incapable to cope
with the previous situation in Bosnia also compelled it to act more efficiently this time141. According
to Alistair Shepherd, the ‘Kosovo crisis provided the decisive catalyst for transforming the EU’s role
in international conflict management’142.
When the UN administration was put in place in Kosovo after the war, the EU took over the pillar of
reconstruction. From 1999 to 2008, the EU has invested in Kosovo € 2.3 bn143. Furthermore, on the
4th of February 2008, the EU approved the deployment of its biggest civil mission ever, EULEX,
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. This mission was supposed to help create
efficient structures in police, justice and border control. It was accused by the Serbs to promote
independence by helping to build a new state, and this reticence was just overcome by declaring a
firm commitment with UNSC Resolution 1244 and a neutral stance towards de ‘final status’144.
Therefore, EULEX is acting under the umbrella of the UN and the UNSC Resolution 1244. The
United Nations Mission for Kosovo, which EULEX was initially supposed to supersede, is still in
force145, although very reduced.
The key point is that EULEX shows the internal contradictions of the EU. Its mandate was
approved the day before the K-Albanians declared UDI; otherwise, as Bermejo and Gutiérrez
contend, some countries that would not support the UDI would be forced also not to approve
138
Chen, “China perceives America”, 296. 139
J. Almqvist, “The Politics of Recognition, Kosovo and IL”, Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper 14/2009. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org (accessed February 28, 2011). 140
J. Peterson and M. E. Smith, “The EU as a Global Actor”, in The European Union: How Does it Work, eds. Bomberg and Stubb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 202-203.. 141
J. Jezdimirovic, “Limitations to post-conflict cooperative security: Kosovo 1999-2000”. Atlantic-Community.org. http://www.atlantic-community.org (accessed February 28, 2011): 50. 142
Webber, “Kosovo War: Recapitulation”, 458. 143
Dzihic and Kramer, “Kosovo after Independence”, 14. 144
Harland, “Kosovo and the UN”, 92. 145
“Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion”, 3.
26
EULEX146. From the 27 EU member states, 22 have recognised Kosovo’s independence. Spain,
Greece, Romania, Cyprus and Slovakia opposed that recognition, due to internal separatist
problems147. Even more contradictory, just 6 months before the UDI Stefan Lehne, Director of the
Council of the European Union’s Directorate General for External and Politico-Military Affairs,
affirmed:
‘Unilateral action, or other irresponsible behaviour in Kosovo, would take away all the
goodwill that you have received and achieved in the meantime. It will not help you to
overcome the remaining obstacles but it will build many, many more’148.
The CFSP can scarcely be defined as ‘common’: it lacks clear objectives, and Kosovo is a good
example. The particular interests of each of the 27 members are still too much important. Kosovo
is much more for the EU than a mere province in the heart of the Balkans; it provides the EU CFSP
both with an opportunity and a threat: opportunity to demonstrate what the EU can one day be, a
political great power capable of being taking into account in the global balance of power; but also a
threat to those aspirations.
Turkey
Turkey is a country with strong historical, cultural and religious links with Kosovo. Millions of Turks
have an Albanian origin, and there is a strong Turkish ethnic minority living in the region and also
in Kosovo. The Turkish former Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, stated that Turkey’s support to
Kosovo’s independence is perceived ‘as a debt it owes to its own history’149.
Doga Ulas Eralp justifies Turkey’s support to Kosovo’s independence because it is the best way to
achieve peace and stability, and that ‘Kosovo’s declaration of independence is a unique case and it
is the optimal solution for regional peace’150. However, this position seems to contradict internal
separatist problems in Turkey, which consistently denies independence for the four million Kurds151
that live inside its borders. So, there could be something behind.
For a start, the argument of ‘unique case’ is very convenient to Turkish interests: it allows denying
the Kurds the same outcome that Turkey is advocating for Kosovo: independence. In other words,
146
Bermejo and Gutiérrez, “Kosovo another time”, 13. 147
“Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe’s Responsibility”, International Crisis Group, Europe Report no. 185 (21 August 2007): 13. http://www.crisisgroup.org/ (accessed February 28, 2011). 148
“Kosovo and the Middle East: Unilateral Palestine Declaration?”, Spanish Group of Strategic Studies, no. 7529 (2010): 4. http://www.gees.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 149
E. Abazi, “Kosovo Independence: An Albanian Perspective”, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research. Policy Brief, no.11 (April 2008): 3. http://setadc.org (accessed February 28, 2011). 150
Eralp, “Kosovo and Turkey: What Lies Ahead?”, 6. 151
G. Chappel, “Turkey, Russia and Iran: Common Interests, Common Positions?”, Center for IR. http://csm.org.pl (accessed February 28, 2011).
27
this argument gives the possibility to justify one political position in one case and the radical
opposite position in another, according to the state interests.
The Turkish explanation to support Kosovo’s independence reminds very much of the US and
most of the EU countries explanations, perhaps too much. It raises a reasonable doubt: is Turkey
band-wagoning the Western countries because is looking for a more prominent role in international
affairs, as an emerging power, or even facilitating its accession to the EU, joining the position of
the majority of the EU countries? Doga Ulas Eralp, inadvertently, seems to point in that direction,
acknowledging the Turkish ambition to play a more important role internationally:
‘The United States, which is mainly preoccupied in finding an exit plan from Afghanistan,
would welcome a more active Turkey in the negotiations on Kosovo. Turkey’s involvement
could remove some of the burden from the US’ already over-crowded foreign policy
agenda’152.
Turkey also opposes a referendum for the independence of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia
Herzegovina153. Therefore, Turkey is improving its relations with Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. If
the enlargement process includes those countries before than Turkey, they can pay back the
support received.
Another important question is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), just recognised
internationally by Turkey. Although Kosovo has being described by Turkey as a ‘unique case’, why
the TRCN cannot been in some time another ‘unique case’, as Kosovo? As Gallia Lindertrauss
contends, Turkey hopes that Kosovo’s independence recognition can overcome the strong
international rejection to the TRCN recognition154.
Finally, Turkey is an emerging power, with an enormous ambition to gain weight in the international
arena. Turkey wants to reaffirm itself as a regional power, and the Balkans are ‘an inseparable
part of its history and culture’155. And Russia is the rival there. According to the Turkish former
Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, a Serbian-Orthodox alliance between Russia, Serbia and even
Greece could be problematic for Turkish interests, and it is in the interests of Turkey to prevent it.
Therefore, aa Eika Abazi asserts, an independent pro-Western and pro-Turkish Kosovo can be a
way to diminish Russian influence in the region156.
152
Eralp, “Kosovo and Turkey”, 8. 153
ibid. 154
G. Lindestrauss, “Pockets of Instability: What Links Kosovo, Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh?”, The Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University (February 24, 2008). http://www.inss.org.il (accessed February 24, 2011). 155
Abazi, “Kosovo Independence: An Albanian Perspective”, 3. 156
ibid., 4.
28
Conclusion
A ‘Realist’ approach helps to better understand the Kosovo conflict, complementing the Liberal
perspective. ‘Realism’ is useful to realize that when states seem to defend IL, the UN authority
and multilateralism against unilateralism, or when states hoist the human rights’ flag, usually there
are other reasons lying behind: their own interests, looking for increasing what Morgenthau defined
as ‘power’157. Every major player in Kosovo’s conflict has its own interests, and adopts its position
according to them.
The Kosovo conflict has affected the relationship between the US and Russia. This paper is not
suggesting that what Zbigniew Brzezinsky defined as a ‘new Cold War’ stems mainly from the
Kosovo conflict, but Kosovo has played an important role in that. It does not mean that Kosovo is
important for either of them: Kosovo in itself does not really matter. But Kosovo has become a
pawn in the game, a tool or an excuse to be used in other scenarios when it suits to the major
powers’ interests.
The big question to be answered now, in the next Chapter, is: can Kosovo’s independence affect
the national security of other states? In other words, is Kosovo a ‘sui generis’ case or can it spill
over instability?
157
Hans Morgenthau, ‘Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace’. 5th edition, revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1978): 4-15.
29
CHAPTER FOUR: A SECURITY PERSPECTIVE
Kosovo’s road to independence has divided the IC. Some described it as a ‘sui generis’ case;
others as the opening of the ‘Pandora’s box’.
Condolezza Rice, US Secretary of State, described Kosovo as a ‘sui generis’ case that ‘cannot
seen as precedent for any other situation in the world today’158. The EU Council159, the President
of the European Parliament160, the EU High Representative for the CFSP, the British Foreign
Secretary161, etc, have supported this argument.
On the other hand, President Vladimir Putin declared that ‘the solution to Kosovo should have a
universal character and not be unprecedented, as implied by Western circles’162. In the same way,
the Russian Vice Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, stressed the dangerous possibility that the
ongoing process of Kosovo’s access to independence can actually happen the Pandora’s box163,
spreading instability in many other areas of the world. Mikhail Gorbachev shares that opinion, and
contended that Kosovo could be a ‘dangerous precedent, capable of detonating conflicts
elsewhere in the world’164.
These two opposed visions of Kosovo’s independence process revolve around one main concern:
can Kosovo set a precedent to be used by other separatist movements across the world, spreading
instability?
Is Kosovo’s independence a threat for other states’ security?
Security is a contested concept that, especially after the end of the Cold War, has been hugely
enlarged. As John Baylis smartly puts it, today security encompasses any ‘threat to core values’165.
However, the concept of security used in this Chapter will be the traditional one: the threat to the
territorial integrity of the states.
As it was explained in Chapter two, the concept of ‘territorial integrity’ has been one of the pillars of
IRs together with the concept of ‘sovereignty’. The UDI of Kosovo, supported by the US and the
158
Almqvist, “The Politics of Recognition, Kosovo and IL”, 8. 159
ibid., 9. 160
U. Caruso, “Kosovo Declaration of Independence and the International Community-an assessment by the Kosovo Monitoring Task Force”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, no.2 (2008): 20. 161
“After UN Court Ruling, Fears of Global Separatism”. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Associated Press (24 July 2010). http://www.iiss.org (accessed February 28, 2011). 162
Ball, “United States Diplomacy in Kosovo Final Status Talks”, 9. 163
Felgenhauer, “The Tactics and Strategic Goals of Russia”, 4. 164
Ker-Lindsay, “Kosovo, sovereignty and the subversion of UN authority”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding, 176. 165
Baylis, “International and Global Security”, in Globalization of World Politics, 229.
30
majority of the EU countries, is challenging this principle, advocating instead a right to ‘remedial
secession’ in case of violations of human rights.
But, as Ryngaert, Griffioen and Javier Rupérez argue, ‘territorial integrity’ is one of the pillars to
maintain global peace and security166. What would happen if the world had 500 countries instead
of the current 192? Many countries suffering from internal separatisms are worried that if Kosovo
finally gains independence, that can enhance their internal problems.
The advocates of Kosovo’s independence tried to calm down the fear defining Kosovo as a ‘unique
case’ which cannot be applied to any other country in the world. But this argument is flawed:
Kosovo is not going to be unique because somebody says so. Actually, as Rein Müllerson puts it:
‘Uniqueness...is usually in the eye of the beholder. Whether certain situations, facts or
acts serve as precedents depends to a great extent on whether one is interested in seeing
them as precedents or not’167.
In other words, if the independence of Kosovo suits the interests of other separatist movements,
these movements will consider Kosovo as a precedent, regardless what Condolezza Rice, William
Hague, Javier Solana or any other had said. Perhaps those movements will not get the political
support of Western countries, but they will create instability and will endanger the territorial integrity
of some state: they will threat security.
Furthermore, there is a point of hypocrisy in describing something as ‘sui generis’: it allows the
user of this reasoning supporting the opposite point of view when it suits him, changing his mind
according to his interests. Several examples can illustrate this idea: the US supports the
independence of Kosovo from Serbia, but opposes the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia from his ally, Georgia; conversely, Russia supports the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, and even justifies it in the same terms that the US justifies Kosovo’s
independence168, but opposes the independence of Kosovo from Serbia, who happens to be
Russia’s ally; France and the US support Kosovo’s independence, but oppose the independence
of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic169 from Morocco; Turkey supports Kosovo
independence, but denies independence to the Kurds.
Hence, when Kosovo declared unilaterally its independence, and the US and many other countries
recognised it, several separatist movements all across the world were sympathetic. Milorad Dodik,
President of Republika Srpska, said that the recent ICJ ruling on Kosovo ‘represents a good road
166
Ryngaert and Griffioen, “The Relevance of Self-determination in the Kosovo Matter”, 575; Rupérez, ‘Georgia: Kosovo takes its toll’, 2. 167
Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 2. 168
The Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergei Lavrov, declared that ‘the recognition by Russia of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent States does not set a precedent ’. Cited in Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 4. 169
Bermejo and Gutiérrez, “Kosovo’s Independence”, 2.
31
sign for our future’170, and showed its interests in celebrating soon a referendum to separate from
Bosnia Herzegovina171. The presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia both declared that this was
the way ahead for their respective countries in their struggle for separate from Georgia172. Arkady
Ghukasian, President of Nagorno-Karabakh, stated that if Kosovo’s independence was recognised,
so must Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence. In Chechnya, Usman Ferzauli, ‘Minister of Foreign
Affairs’ of the proclaimed Republic of Ichkeria, saluted Kosovo’s independence as a model to
follow to gain independence from Russia173. In the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, Kurdish
politicians have declared that they will follow with interest the Kosovo’s independence process174.
In Kashmir, Yasin Malik, chairman of pro-independence group Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front,
declared that ‘the world community, the European Union in particular, should play a Kosovo-like
role in getting the dispute resolved in Kashmir’175. In Romania, Laszlo Tokes, leader of the ethnic
Hungarians, declared: ‘Kosovo gained independence, couldn’t we achieve autonomy?’176. In
Taiwan, Su Tseng-Chang, vice-presidential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party, and
former Prime Minister, said that ‘Taiwan was better equipped for independence, and had more
justification, than Kosovo’177. In the Arab world, several intellectuals have pointed out that ‘if the
Arabs want to see and independent Palestine, supporting an independent Kosovo would be a step
in the right direction’178. And so forth.
Therefore, for Bosnia Herzegovina, Georgia, Russia, Iraq, India, Romania, China, and many other
countries, Kosovo’s independence can be understood as a dangerous precedent that threatens
their internal stability, regardless the ‘halo of uniqueness’ that the US, the UK, France, etc, have
tried to print on this independence process. Hence, the definition of Kosovo’s independence as a
‘Pandora’s box opening’ seems closer to reality than the ‘sui generis’ case, as it has a potential for
creating internal instability in many countries.
Has the ‘Pandora’s box’ already been opened?
When Russia warned that accepting Kosovo’s independence according to Ahtisaari’s Plan would
set a dangerous precedent and could have repercussions, the Western politicians did not pay
170
“After UN Court Ruling, Fears of Global Separatism”, IISS. 171
Dervisbegovic, Nedim. “For Bosnia’s Dodik, Referendum Law Means It’s Make-Or-Break Time”. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty (February 11, 2010). http://www.rferl.org (accessed March 10, 2011). 172
Felgenhauer, “The Tactics and Strategic Goals of Russia”, 4-5. 173
C. Echevarria, “The Unilateral Independence of Kosovo Ignites Yihadist Fronts in the Caucasian Region”, War Heat International, no. 63 (April 2008). 174
“After UN Court Ruling, Fears of Global Separatism”, IISS. 175
A. S. Ghazali, “The Oil factor in Kosovo independence”, Uruknet.info. http://www.uruknet.de (accessed February 28, 2011). 176
“After UN Court Ruling, Fears of Global Separatism”, IISS. 177
R. Callick, “Taiwan Upsets China over Kosovo Recognition”, The Australian (February 21, 2008). http://www.theaustralian.com.au (accessed March 10, 2011). 178
“Kosovo and the Middle East”, 6.
32
much attention. Pavel Felgenhauer points out that the German Minister of Foreign Affairs even
denied that eventuality, declaring that ‘Kosovo cannot be a model for the Georgian conflict’179.
However, when in early August 2008 Georgian forces entered the rebel province of South Ossetia,
Russia immediately dispatched military forces to support its ally. The Americans strongly
condemned the Russian invasion of Georgia. Vice President Cheney stated that “Russian
aggression must not go unanswered’180, and President Bush declared that ‘this violence is
unacceptable’181.
Dimitri Simes, President of the Nixon Center, had predicted six months before the consequences in
the Caucasus in case of recognizing Kosovo’s independence:
‘…Kosovo became a precedent … [The Russians] would have to swallow humiliation over
Kosovo. But they would get what is much more important for them in the Caucases … [if]
there would be military operations by Georgians against Abkhazia and in particular South
Ossetia … let me make a prediction …The first thing that would happen would be that two
Russian divisions … are going to be moved into the area’182.
As Javier Rupérez contends, ‘the Western world gave Russia the perfect pretext to invade Georgia
the day Kosovo was torn away from the territorial integrity of Serbia, and its independence
acknowledged’183. In the same way, James Gow asserts that ‘the US-led approach to Kosovo’s
independence was a significant factor in shaping events in Georgia’184. Particularly clear to this
respect has been Ezio Bonsignore:
‘Those who are now tearing their vests apart and crying wolf about the “Russian
aggression”, the “sacrosanct territorial integrity of sovereign states” and the like should
ponder on the fact that it was us, and only us, who for our own reasons did deliberately
open this particular can of worms’185.
The conclusion is that no matter the US and others define Kosovo as a ‘sui generis’ case, it is not
up to them. The point is that other country, in this case Russia, saw Kosovo as a valid precedent
to be invoked to justify the invasion of another country.
Let’s play ‘counterfactuals’, according to Professor Joseph S. Nye’s definition186. Imagine that
President Bush’s desire of inviting Georgia to join NATO in the Bucharest NATO Summit187 in early
179
Felgenhauer, ‘The Tactics and Strategic Goals of Russia’, 4. 180
Nichol, Jim. ‘Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests’. Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, order code RL34618 (September 22, 2008): 22. http://fpc.state.gov (accessed March 4, 2008). 181
ibid. 182
“Independence for Kosovo? Managing the consequences”, Council on Foreign Relations (14 Dec 2001). http//www.cfr.org (accessed February 28, 2011). 183
Rupérez, “Georgia: Kosovo takes its toll”, 4. 184
J. Gow, “From administration to statehood”, in Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding,164. 185
Bonsignore, “The Kosovo Payback”, 4. 186
J. S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 51
33
April 2008 would have been successful. Imagine Georgia’s President, Saakashvili, emboldened by
NATO membership, overreacting in South Ossetia and Abkhazia188. Imagine Russian politicians
also overreacting, strongly pressed internally by public opinion, demanding to defend Russian
citizens in both rebel provinces, without forgetting that South Ossetians have Russian passports.
Who can foresee what would have happen? As Dimitri Simes put it:
‘How would Russia respond? Well, a key European leader intimately familiar with thinking
of the Russian leadership, stated that it’s inconceivable that Russia would enter into a
conflict with major European powers over Serbia. He was right for two years. His name
was Kaiser Wilhelm. He made this prediction in 1912. It lasted through 1914’189.
Change Serbia for South Ossetia and this quote is totally updated.
It can therefore be reasonable to state that the ‘Pandora’s box’ was lightly opened in August 2008.
The Western support to Kosovo’s independence, if not directly responsible, justified in some way
the Russian intervention in Georgia. Consequently, the Kosovo’s independence process,
proclaimed as a ‘sui generis’ case, was totally linked with the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and
with the ‘Pandora’s box opening’.
The real danger of the Pandora’ box is that, if opened, it can spread instability in many directions.
Vedran Dzihic and Helmut Kramer point out that ‘Kosovo’s declaration of independence gave
considerable impetus to those Serb forces aiming at the establishment of Republika Srpska as a
separate entity [from Bosnia Herzegovina]’190. Javier Rupérez contends that the same appetite for
independence can spread across the entire Balkans: the Croats of Bosnia Herzegovina to join
Croatia, the Albanians of Montenegro and Macedonia to join Albania, the Hungarians of Vojvodina
to join Hungary191 . This spread can continue in Ukraine, affecting the Russian-speaking
Crimea192; can affect the Baltic states, where according to Alexander Kutnetsov, Ambassador of
the Russian Federation in Madrid, ‘[the Russian ethnic minority] are isolated and deprived of their
rights’193; and can even threat Russia’s territorial integrity, especially in Chechnya194.
187
Bonsignore, “The Kosovo Payback”, 6. 188
ibid. 189
“Independence for Kosovo?”. Council on Foreign Relations. 190
Dzihic and Kramer, “Kosovo after Independence”, 5. 191
Rupérez, “Kosovo: a ‘Secession’ of Errors”, 6. 192
T. G. Carpenter, “Kosovo Independence Grenade”, The Middle East Times (February 22, 2008). http://www.cato.org (accessed February 28, 2011). 193
“Prospects for EU-Russia Relations – A Spanish Perspective”, Eurussia Centre (26 Sep 2007). http://www.eu-russiacentre.org (accessed February 28, 2011). 194
Brudenell, “Russia’s Role in the Kosovo Conflict”, 1.
34
Conclusion
The advocates of Kosovo’s independence justify it by describing it as a ‘sui generis’ case that
cannot be applied to any other country. They try so to overcome the reluctance of those other
countries that perceive Kosovo’s independence as a threat to their own security, as a spark that
can ignite many separatist movements across the world. But what Western countries cannot
assure is that other separatist movements, emboldened by a hypothetical independence of
Kosovo, will increase their actions, causing instability. It seems quite apparent that more than a
‘unique case’, Kosovo can open a ‘Pandora’s box’, as it almost happen in Georgia in August 2008.
35
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
Kosovo is a multifaceted conflict. It can be analysed through an IL perspective, through national
interests at stake and through a threat to international security.
Kosovo is not a straightforward case of IL. It is not easy at all to determine if Kosovo’s has a right
to be an independent nation or not. And this paper does not draw any conclusion on that. But this
paper concludes that NATO intervention in Kosovo launched a process to understand in a new
way one of the pillars of IRs since the Westphalia Peace: the concept of ‘sovereignty’. The end of
the CW and the globalization process prompted a shift in the meaning of ‘security’ from a narrow
state perspective to a wider one, focusing in human security. These processes, together with the
horrors of Rwanda and Bosnia, contributed to create the adequate momentum for NATO to
intervene in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, trespassing so its sovereignty. This ‘revolution’ in IL
was finally crystallized in the approval of the RTP by the UN in 2005. And the RTP has been
exercised again in Libya.
Another pillar of IRs, the ‘territorial integrity’ of states, can be also limited by the defence of human
rights, giving birth to a wide concept of the right of self-determination: the right to ‘remedial
secession’.
The Kosovo conflict has raised again the confrontation between the US and Russia. When NATO
waged war on Yugoslavia without authorisation of the UNSC, and when the US recognized the UDI
of Kosovo notwithstanding the UNSC disapproved it, the division between blocs emerged again.
The US and his allies were accused of unilateralism, of undermining the authority of the UN. In this
sense, Kosovo is linked with the 2003 Gulf War. But those claiming for multilateralism have also
hidden interests: Russia and China claim so strongly for multilateralism because by enhancing the
authority of the UNSC they are also securing at the same time its influence on international affairs,
through their veto power.
All countries have their own interests, and they adjust its stance on Kosovo’s independence
according to them, regardless possible contradictions: why the US supports Kosovo’s
independence and not South Ossetia’s independence? Why Russia supports South Ossetia’s
independence and not Kosovo’s independence? Why Turkey supports Kosovo’s independence but
denies the self-determination right to her Kurd minority? The answer is that they are following their
own interests.
What is really important in this ‘balance-of-power’ game is that the relations between Russia and
the US started to deteriorate when Russia felt humiliated by the unilateral NATO intervention in
Kosovo, and this confrontation is still ongoing on Kosovo’s UDI. Kosovo is not important in itself
for the major powers; Kosovo is a pawn that can be used in other games, for example in Georgia.
The different positions on Kosovo can enhance the current difficult relationship between the US
36
and Russia, affecting a wider port-folio of important issues: from the US-Russia stance on a
nuclear Iran to the Russian permission for NATO forces to access Afghanistan through her
territory.
So far, the main conclusions are that the Kosovo conflict is really important to understand the
transformation of the concept of ‘sovereignty’, but also has an important place in the balance of
power between the US and Russia, being one of the causes of the so-called ‘new Cold War’.
Kosovo has been, from the 1999 NATO intervention, ‘ground zero’ for dialectical confrontation
between the US and Russia, between a ‘unilateral’ and a ‘multilateral’ vision of the world.
Even this importance can be sensed in the EU CFSP. Kosovo’s was the main experiment of such
a policy, after the failure in detaining atrocities in Bosnia. The EU has inverted prodigious amounts
of money in Kosovo, and has deployed its biggest civilian mission ever. But the EU has been
incapable of developing a ‘Common’ Foreign and Security Policy: five out of the twenty-seven EU
member states of the EU do not recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Therefore, Kosovo
has shown both the ambitions and limitations of the EU as a security provider.
However, the big question that the Kosovo’s struggle for independence poses is: can it spread
instability to other parts of the world? The advocates of Kosovo’s independence described it as a
‘sui generis case’ that cannot be applied to any other country. This explanation is both hypocrite
and flawed. It is hypocrite because it allows defending one thing in one case (e.g. defending the
independence of Kosovo against the territorial integrity of Serbia) and the opposite in another place
with arguably a similar context (e.g. defending the territorial integrity of Georgia denying the right to
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia). And it is flawed because the character of Kosovo
as a precedent does not depend on the US and others telling so, but ‘to a great extent on whether
one is interested in seeing them as precedents or not’195.
All across the world many separatist movements have declared that they seem Kosovo as a
precedent to take into account in their respective ‘fights for freedom’, and therefore there is a very
real possibility that the Kosovo’s UDI will prompt instability. As Bolton, Eagleburger and Rodman
have brilliantly exposed:
‘Recognition of Kosovo’s independence without Serbia’s consent would set a precedent
with far-reaching and unpredictable consequences for many other regions of the world ...
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the current [US] policy is the dismissive attitude
displayed toward Russia’s objections’196.
Therefore, and this is the main conclusion of this paper, the answer to the question ‘Is Kosovo a
unique case or the Pandora’s box opening?’ is definitely the second. If Kosovo finally gains
independence through this unilateral process, Kosovo is much closer to open the ‘Pandora’s box’
195
Müllerson, “Precedents in the Mountains”, 1. 196
Bolton, Eagleburger and Rodman, “Warning Light on Kosovo”.
37
than to create stability in the Balkans. The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 was a clear
signal. Kosovo is not unique. As the Russian Foreign Minister said to the US Secretary of State:
‘Don’t you understand [that] we have many Kosovos in Russia?’197. And even in a smarter way,
Timothy Garton Ash, professor of European Studies at Oxford University, asserted: ‘Kosovo is
unique, and there will be more Kosovos’198.
197
Brudenell, “Russia’s Role in the Kosovo Conflict”, 30. 198
T. G. Ash, “The Kosovo Precedent”, The Los Angeles Times (February 21, 2008). http://www.latimes.com (accessed March 5, 2011).
39
EPILOGUE
Nobody knows what is going to happen in Kosovo. This paper does not try to foresee the future,
which is highly unpredictable. The trick, as Professor Michael Howard put it, ‘is not being so wrong
that you cannot adjust quickly to new circumstances’199. Today Kosovo is ‘de facto’ independent,
after 12 years of UN administration. Jessica Almqvist contends that the formation of new states is
in many occasions a matter of fact and not of IL200. But Kosovo cannot achieve ‘de jure’
independence: Russia and China oppose it, blocking the UNSC. It seems that at the end there
must be some kind of agreement with Serbia: a greater autonomy for the Serb North Kosovo, or
even a partition of the territory. Serbia also seems come to terms with the impossibility of
recuperating Kosovo, and could be looking for an ‘honourable’ end of the conflict201.
The last conclusion is that multilateralism cannot set up the final solution for the Kosovo conflict. A
UNGA Resolution was approved on 9th September 2010 asking for a dialogue between Belgrade
and Pristine. This dialogue, mediated by the EU, began on 8-9 March 2011 in Brussels202: perhaps
this can be the beginning of the end of this conflict.
199
Cited in General Sir Richard Dannat, “A hung Parliament cannot deliver in Defence”, The Telegraph (24 April 2010). http://www.telegraph.co.uk (accessed on March 5, 2011). 200
Almqvist, “The Politics of Recognition, Kosovo and International Law”, 5. 201
“Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion”, 4. 202
“North Kosovo: Dual Sovereignty in practice”. International Crisis Group, Europe Report no. 211 (14 Mar 2011): 1. http://www.crisisgroup.org (accessed April 6, 2011).
41
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