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hat there s a mismatchbetween efencestrategy(policy) and esourcess hardly startling. In fact,it may have ever been hus,and will, in all probabili-ty, continue o be so in the future. However,after adecadeof cuts, the CanadianForceshave arguablyreached point where his mismatch as becomeacute. Theevidence hat this is so is compelling. For instance, he CFfaces he following challenges: eriouspersonnel empo andreadinessstrains, he inability to meet modernization bjec-tives, deterioratingmorale and quality of life, and recruitingand retentionshortfalls. Individually, any of thesechallengescould perhaps e overlookedor finessed. Together,heyare aharbinger f a majorproblem. Left un-addressed,he CF maynot be able to pull out of its currentdownwardspiral. Thequestion s whetheror not there s the will and the means oconfront hesechallenges eadon.

mately seventymissions than it carried out in the four anda half decadesof the Cold War. This operational empo,although recognizedas both unsustainableand dangerous,shows ittle sign of abating.Finally, the spendmore side of the triangle is merely a Iish. The fiscal year 2000/2001 nd 2001/2002 udgets ro-vided some additionalmoney,althoughmostwould concedethat his was only a temporarystop-gapmeasure.! In no waydid this additional money emedy he fundamental roblemsthat the CF faces. Nor is it likely that significant additionalresources will be forthcoming. In the last 'non-reviewreview', the Defence ServicesProgrammeUpdate (DSPU)directed hatDND/CF must ive within its means. Other haninadequateadjustments or i~flation, and periodic but onlypartial op-ups or unanticipated perational eployments,hedefence ortfolio will seeno significantadditionof resources.In facing this situation, hereare but threechoices;spendmore, cut costs or do less. These three choices could bethoughtof as he ron-triangleof defence. How the forthcoming Defence Review will tackle theproblem remains as uncertain as the pos~ible outcome. Onething is clear however. The traditional approach that has beenemployed over the past decade is insufficient. Some mighteven go so far as to suggest hat the traditional approach sim-ply deferred the hard choices to the future. Others might claimthat previous reviews and reduction exercises had the luxuryof trimming fat, although it is arguable that there was evermuch fat to trim. Nonetheless, after successive trimming

The task s to somehow e-balance he triangle. Asidefrom the questionof whether he will exists, here s also hequestion of how such a re-balancing could be undertaken.Costshave been cut. Defence spending has, over the pastdecade,seen eductions on the order of twenty-five percentor more. Efficiencies are being sought,sometimes uthless-ly so. Doing less may be somethingof a challenge. Thetumultuous nature of global politics has seen the CFdeployed on more operations n the last decade approxi- Dr. Scot Robertson s Associate Professor of Political Scienceat RoyalMilitary College.Autumn 2002 .Canadian Military Journal 21


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exercises, there remains only muscle and bone. Even allow-ing for the additional funds from the 2000101 and 2001/02budgets, and the marginal increase that stemmed from thebudget adjustment following the events of 11 September, heCF remains anaemic. .

threats, forces are sized and postured to attempt to meehreat(s) in some priority order. This priority then drassumptions regarding warning and response time, the pbility of concurrent operations and capability requiremThe threat-basedapproachhas a number of distinct advanthe most significant of which are:If spendingmore s a non-starter nd cutting costs maynot yield significant esults, he only option hat emains s theprospectof doing ess. But, how will this option be framed?What will be offered up? What are the consequencesndimplications of doing ess? What are he risks? How will therisks be assessed?What criteria will be used o measureherisks and consequences?These are difficult and importantquestions. So far, it would seem hat very ittle thoughthasbeengiven o them ndividually, et alone ogether. Yet, f thedefence eview is to be anything more than simply anotherexercise n force reduction, t mustbring somecoherence ndrigour to the process. Otherwise, here will be little prospectof halting the downward rend, o saynothingof ensuring hatdefence s put on a sound ooting for the future.

the credibility of scenarios based on validatedintelligence estimates; ndthe relatively straightforward inkage between hescenario nd he statement f requiredcapabilities.Not surprisingly, the threat-based approach o force sialso comes with some disadvantages. The most significanthese s the narrow, near term focus. Sizing forces for expthreats may lead to forces that are not adaptable to unforechanges n the security environment.

Scenario-Based. Scenario-basedorce sizing is not grdifferent from threat-based. t begins with a seriesof geic scenarios erived rom defencepolicy and strategy. Tare then prioritized, after which it is again a relatstraightforward ask to develop orce packages o meerequirementsof each scenario. As with threat-basedsizing, he scenario-based pproach as advantages ndadvantages.The principal advantages re the clear linstrategicguidancea~ the relatively transparentink to forequirements. The ffillin disadvantages its relative inflbility in dealing with the unexpected.One possible soluto this is to generate larger arrayof scenarios, r wider vations within eachspecific scenario. That, however, encomplicateand compound he alreadydifficult taskof deoping force packages.

If this is .a fair characterization of the bounds placed onthe exercis.t!~t becomes glaringly obvious that the process willbe exceedingly contentious. In such a charged atmosphere, acoherent and transparent process might assist deliberations.However, key pieces of the methodology that could assist inthe conduct of the review process appear to be missing.Perhaps most significant in their absence are a methodologyfor force sizing, and a means for evaluating the risk attachedto the various options generated. Lacking these, the reviewmay not achieve a credible result. Moreover, the result mayonly provide a temporary solution that will need to be revisit-ed in the near future.

The object of this paper s to provide a preliminary look atsuitable force sizing and risk assessmentmethodologies. Forvarious reasons, here is little prospect that these will be avail-able to support the current exercise. In the first instance, imeis at a premium, as the deadline for completing the review isexceedingly tight. Second, he tools necessary o conduct boththe force-sizing review and the risk assessment o not exist inthe current analytical inventory. However unfortunate this maybe, it is inevitable that DND will be forced to revisit thisprocess at some future date. It may prove beneficial for DNDto try to develop the methodologies and tools to support anyfuture exercise.

Future Capabilities-Based. Future capabilities-based fosizing attempts to identify the capabilities and forrequired to deal with future threats and opportunities. endeavours to identify the characteristics of the future srity environment and then determine possible missions operating assumptions. Force structure options are developed based on the capabilities required to carry those missions. Given that this approach is largely untrit is more difficult to identify advantages and disadvantaIntuitively, it would appear that this approach is better to address future transformational requirements. Howean offsetting disadvantage might be its inability to addnear term requirements.FORCE SIZING APPROACHES

Based on this cursory overview of the approaches o fosizing, it would appear that no single approach s necesspreferable to the others. Each has advantages and disadvtages. In a perfect world, one would be best served by ingrating these various approaches such that advantagescanmaximized and disadvantages ~nimized. The figure bedepicts an integrated force sizing'~pproach.

T ypically, there are three approaches o the question of siz-ing forces.2 These are: threat-based, scenario-based andfuture capabilities-based..Threat-Based. In this approach, orces are sized to meet spe-cific threats. Employing intelligence estimates of likely

Figure22 Canadian Military Journal. Autumn 20


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It follows a seriesof sequential teps hatare designed oestablish priorities, assess isk and develop orce structurebuilding blocks. The end result is a force structure thatshould be capable of meeting the objectives set out bydefencepolicy and strategy. It also dentifies gapsand risksattendant n the force structure n a transparent nd under-standable ashion.

The processof prioritizing the various sizing elementsraisesseveralquestionsor decisionpoints. Most importantare whether:

Step1 -Definition of Sizing Elements. The first stepdefines the force sizing elementsor missions called for bypolicy and strategy. In this case, he eleven orce planningscenariosdevelopedover the past few years serveas a suit-able starting point, but elevenmay be too many o be man-ageable. It might be better o reduce hese o three centralscenarios -combat, stabilization and assistance. Otherrequirements such as searchand rescue can be dealt withseparately.

to size he force primarily for combat;to size it for both combatand peacetime emandssuchas stabilization nd assistance issions;to size t for future capability equirementstransfor-mation); orto size it primarily for stabilization/assistanceis-sionswith a residualcombat apability.Once decisions have been reached on priorities, it is pos-sible to begin to address he question of risk. Obviously, thehigher priority areasare those where lower levels of risk can betolerated. Conversely, ower priority areas may be where high-er levels of risk can be tolerated.

Step 3 -Force Building Blocks. Once the sizing elementshave been established,and the priorities and risk levels consid-ered, the third step develops the individual force structurebuilding blocks (Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit(s) (TSSUs))consistent with the target evels of risk.Someof the major considerationsor eachof the sizing

elements re:Combat.Source:Lorell. et al., The Gray Threat ! ...~~

TableStep 2 -Prioritization. This step prioritizes the force sizingelements based on policy and strategy guidance. This shouldreveal where emphasis should be placed and where risk mightbe acceptable. Within this step, one needs to establish levelsof risk. For high priority areas,one might only be prepared toaccept low to moderate risk. For lower priority areas, onemight accept a higher degree of risk.

Major Force RequirementsBrigade, Task Group, Squadron/Wing, C2Logistical & C4ISRRotational BaseSupport BaseForce Generation (Reservesand Mobilization)Stabilization

This step is perhaps the most critical, and at the sametime the most difficult. The object is to prioritize the forcesizing elements identified in Step I in order to determinethe levels of r isk for each element. In considering the var-ious force sizing elements, it is not necessary, or perhapseven desirable, to add the elements at this stage. Rather, itis best to think of them as a prioritized list that will have alevel of acceptable risk assigned as part of the resourceallocation process.

Major Force RequirementsBattle Group, TG( -), Sqn( ),C2Logistical & C4ISRRotational BaseSupport BaseForce Generation (Reserves)Low Density-High Demand Units

AssistanceMajor ForceRequirementsUnitsLogistical

& C4ISR

CombatStabilizationAssistanceTransformation

Task GroupTask GroupShip

BrigadeBattle GroupBattalion

Squadron/WingSquadron (-)Flight

Source: Lorell, et al., The Gray Threat: Assessing the Next Generation European Fighters (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995)Table 2

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ly and frequently used, but it is not clear that the terms areunderstood. Given the importance of strategy developand force planning, this is both surprising and unsetWithin the context of the review it is becoming obviousthe exercise will have to grapple with risk, risk assessmerisk management. Hence, it would be beneficial if theresome commonly held appreciation of the various dimenof risk. Such a common appreciation would assist in disions of the risk inherent in the various options developemeet the overall objective.

SupportBaseForce Generation Reserves)OtherSpecializedCapability SAR, DART,etcTransformation

RequirementsCF Experimentation entreand experimentalunits'CanadianManoeuvre rainingCentreEducationEstablishmentsResearch DevelopmentFor the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to dguish three types of risk, namely: national security risk, sgic military risk and operational isk.

Step4 -Addressing Overlap. This step and the followingstep seek to aggregate he building blocks into a forcestructure option. The first task in Step 4 is to examine hepotential for overlap between the building blocks. Inessence,his begins toconsider concurrency,dual-hatting, and theability to extractforces from one typeof operation stabiliza-tion and/or assistance)and provide for a high-er priority, less risktolerant mission (com-bat). Some assump-tions are necessaryregarding dual-hattedTSSUs. Also, this stepneeds o takeinto account risk levels, and could result in adjusting theaggregate orce structure.

Strategic Military Risk. Strategic military r isk conthe overall probability that a military force will be unabachieve all of the objectives of a particular defence straMeasuring strategic risk involves judgements about the pties inherent in the strategy and the likelihood of accomping all of the stated objectives.Step5 -Rotation Requirements. This step explicitly address-es rotational issues and considerations. Some criteria are nec-essary, such as the 4: 1=5, or the ship-to-shore ratio. The result-ing force structure is then compared with the force structuredeveloped from the basic building requirement and adjustedfor overlap. The greater of the two structure requirements isthe bottom line. .

Operational Risk. Operational isk connotes he pability that a military force will be unable o achieve heticular operational bjectivescontained n the largerstraMeasuring or assessing perational isk involves exama given orce structure'spotentialperformance n two afirst, the ability to meet he objectives n postulatedscios, and second, he force structure's ability to sustainterm readiness crossan extended ime frame and a ranoperations.tep 6 -Adjusting the Force Structure. This step addressesforce generation issues, such as the recruiting and training baseand other unique requirements. For the most part, these are thecapabilities required for force sustainment and force genera-tion. A partial list could include:

Beside the articulation of the types of risk, there are sal other dimensions to the problem that must also be takenaccount. There are, at a minimum, four dimensions to They are force performance, force sustainability, affordaband preparation for the future. Force performance meahow a particular force structure will perform or fight. Fsustainability addresses he problem of how a particular fstructure maintains readiness over time. Affordability is siwhether the force structure is affordable. Preparation forfuture attempts to determine whether the force structure opallows for future transformation and hedging against fuuncertainties.

TrainingMaintenance Support 3rd ine and national)StrategicMobilityNationalC4ISRStep 7 -Modelling and Analysis. The final step nvolvesmodelling and analyzing he resulting orce structure o deter-mine whether it meets he requirementsof the policy andstrategyat an acceptable evel of risk. This is a significantchallenge, or it is not clear that the modelling and analysistools are adequate, or is it even clear that we have a solidunderstanding f risk assessment ethodologies nd how toapply hem.

Given the importanceof risk assessmentnd risk magement,t is surprisinghow few efforts have beenmadevelop robust measures. Perhapsbecauseof its ethnature, any effort to measure he risk associatedwith fstructuredecisions s fraught with uncertaintyand compty. That aside, t hardly needs o be said that any methogy for risk assessment ill involve both quantitativequalitative measures. The main challenge emains hointegrate he various elements nto a consistent, eplicprocess or risk assessment.

RISK ASSESSMENO ne of the first obstacles hat must be overcome s todevelop an appreciationof the meaningof risk. Risk,risk assessmentnd risk managementre erms hat are wide-24 Canadian Military Journal. Autumn 20

National Security Risk. National security risk ismost ethereal measure, in that it attempts to gauge intables such as diplomatic power. Risk in terms of natsecurity connotes the overall probability that the instrumof national power (diplomatic, military and economic)be insufficient to meet the goals of higher national poGiven the somewhat vague nature of the problem atlevel, measurement or assessmentof risk becomes parlarly challenging.


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How then might one approach he task of developingarisk assessment ethodology?The ollowing issues houldbetaken nto account n any effort to conducta risk assessment:assessmentof unacceptable risk connotes the judgement thatfailure is likely and that the expenditure of very high levels ofresources across an extended timeframe is required, but stillwith no assuranceof a favourable outcome.Questions Pertaining to Strategic and Operational Risk.

The first question to ask about strategic and operational risk iswhether failure is likely. A second, yet equally important ques-tion concerns the consequences of failure. Risk is therefore afunction of assessing two variables -the likelihood of failureand the magnitude of the consequences of failure. As the con-sequences of failure increase, the degree of risk that can be tol-erateddecreases.

Assessing Strategic Military Risk. Strategic military riskinvolves issues of national survival, stability of key regions oralliances, critical global interests, commitments and influence..It is a complex, cumulative judgement based on the prioritiesassigned o elements within a given strategy. How well a strat-egy and force structure prepares for the unexpected requiressome qualitative judgement or assessmentof future transfor-mation and hedging prospects. Finally, there is the always-important question of affordability. Can or will the nationexpend the resourcesnecessary o sustain he strategy and forcestructure over time?The ability of a given orce structure o support he mis-sion areasof a given military strategy etermines perationalrisk. Strategicmilitary risk dependsnot only on operationalrisk, but also on the relative priority of the differentelementsthat comprise he strategy, s well as whether he elements reaffordable. Assessing Operational Risk. The credibility of a force struc-ture depends upon the perceived ability to execute the taskscalled for by the strategy. Two dimensions are important inassessing operational risk: force performance and force sus-tainability. Force performance is the ability to perform satis-factorily in the postulated scenarios. Force sustainability refersto the ability to retain effectiveness over many operations for along period of time. To be credible, a force structure must be

effective in both dimensions.

Framing Risk I,.ssessment. Breaking the risk assessmentchallenge down further, risk assessmentat the strategic andoperational levels'should focus on the following: force per-formance, force sustainability, preparation for the future andaffordability.Defining Risk Levels. Four levels of risk should be consid-ered: low, moderate, high and unacceptable. An assessment flow risk constitutes a judgement that failure is unlikely and thatobjectives can be accomplished with an acceptableexpenditureof both resources and time. Moderate risk constitutes a udge-ment that failure is still unlikely, but that success may call fora somewhat higher expenditure of resources and that the time-frame for achieving successmight be extended. High r isk con-stitutes a judgement that failure is possible, but still unlikely.However, it will call for the expenditure of higher levels ofresources across an appreciably longer timeframe. Finally, an

A RISK ASSESSMENt METHODOLOGYT he figure below portrays a

It is a logical, coherent anding risk.There is one major obstacle to executing this type of riskassessmentn support of any review; namely, the developmentof appropriate quantitative and qualitative metrics to measur-ing risk. As yet, there s no satisfactory setof metrics available,

Figure 225utumn 2002 .Canadian Military Journal

risk assessment ethodology.semethod or examin-


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and it is not clear that such metrics could be devised in the timeavailable for the conduct of the review. This leaves only sub-jective judgement. In different circumstances, he applicationof informed judgement would not necessarily be a seriousimpediment. In fact, the overall methodology requires theapplication of judgement at several stages. Nevertheless, n theabsence of supporting quantitative metrics, a risk assessmentbased solely upon judgement is open to interpretation andquestioning, particularly by sceptics.

Implications. In exploring the implications, these shoin terms of the internal integrity of the Defence Se(DSP). That is, what would each option do over time? These could be cast in terms of:

EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS ANDCONSEQUENCES OF OPTIONST he force sizing and risk assessmentmethodologies out-lined above attempt to bound the option and solutionspace, and develop a measure of the risk attendant with anindividual option. What remains undone s to consider he con-sequences and implications of one particular option overanother. This may be the most difficult part. In judging a par-ticular option, it is important to tackle it from two perspectives.First, it is necessary o understand the implications of the pro-posed o-ptionitself. Second, one needs to understand the con-sequencec~'ofhoosing a particular option.

a balance between Personnel,Operations &Maintenance and Capital;the ability to generate quantitatively sufficient forceto meet stated commitments and to sustain them tothe stated evel;the ability to generate qualitatively sufficient forcesto meet obligations under various initiatives (NATODefence Capability Initiative, Strategy 2020, etc.);and ,.the ability of the CF to 're-generate' itself to meetthese criteria over the longer-term (Strategy 2020agenda).

Consequences.Gauging he consequencess more diffgiven that any conclusionswill be based, o some degrsubjectiveudgement. To avoid prolongeddebateon ndual interpretations,t might be of benefit o consider hterms of first and second order consequences.First consequencesre those that have some obvious tangisuchas:mplication: What is involved or implied in the choice oraction. being unable tIlaintain personnel at 60,000; andthe inability to meet stated commitments (e.g.,.deployment timelines for Vanguard and MainCombat Forces).Consequence: Results from choice or action.

While these definitions are broadly similar, there are sub-tle differences. An implication is largely connected to theinternal aspects of a particular choice or course of action. Aconsequence, in contrast, addresses the external aspect, inwhich an attempt s made to consider the broader results of thecourse of action.

Second order consequencesare those that stem fromto amend, walk-away from, or simply avoid statedThese could include loss of:

In examining the consequences, we are attempting togauge the impact of these on the larger question of how thesewill affect the ability of the Department to meet wider nation-al and international obligations. This is a much more difficulttask. It requires making judgements for which evidence iseither lacking, or is ambiguous. The immediate consequencecould be that overall defence capability continues to degradeover time. A future consequence could be that the currentdefence policy becomes insupportable at some indeterminatedate. Other possible consequencesare that Canada oses cred-ibility with its allies, is incapable of making its voice heard andis unable to shape the external environment in ways matchingits larger agenda.

prestige nternationally;accesso allied resourcesintelligence,ift, cooperative R&D, etc.);a voice n internationalorumsdealingwith securityand oreign policy (UN, NATO, NORAD, etc.);access r nfluenceon a wider front (G-7, OECD,OSCE);andtrade or other etribution.Bringing the considerationof implications and cquences o the fore might assist n assessingorce struoptions,particularly n comparing ariousoptions.

CONCLUSIONThe consequencesshould be viewed as first and secondorder consequences. First order consequencesare those thatare immediately obvious and tangible. Second order conse-

quences are those that are of a less immediate character, andare by t4eir very nature less readily identifiable or measurable.This is not to say that they are less important, simply that theyare more complex and less tangible.

T he review faces a difficult -some might say dauntintask. To some extent, this task is complicated by aceived lack of coherence, transparency and credibility iprocess. While arguably this r~view might be more cohetransparent and credible than, previous efforts, sucProgramme Review ~ and Progratt1meReview II, it still rigour in the area of force sizing ahd risk assessmentmeologies. The development and application of such methogies could improve the outcome, both in the short termover the longer term as well. In the short term, the result wundoubtedly be more coherent and transparent, hus leadigreater credibility at the inter-departmental and governmlevels. Over the longer term, it would provide a baselinewhich future reviews could proceed, and there will, inevitbe future reviews.

It would be helpful to structure this to first address theimplications, and then take up the consequences,argely due tothe fact that the implications are simpler to quantify. A secondreason for approaching this in a phased manner s that the dis-cussion of consequences s much more political and philo-sophical, and hence exceedingly difficult to quantify.

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hypothetical force option. In this example, he option provideslow risk in tenus of perfonnance and sustainability, a mediumlevel of risk for future adaptability and an unacceptable evel ofrisk in tenus of affordability. Other force options would pro-vide a different pattern of risk. The aim of depicting risk in thisfashion is to be able to compare options with a view to findingone that best mitigates risk according to agreed criteria.pproachodifficult tonent.Thewman' for Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the entire riskassessment xercise is the further development of the criteria

and risk levels. The criteria and risk levels suggestedabove aremerely placeholders. Obviously, far greater thought must bedevoted to the precise measures hat will.be applied.Formployed:

In addition, consideration must be given to whether theappropriate tools and techniques are currently in the inventoryto carry out this type of risk assessment.The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of ProfessorMichael Hennessy, Dr: Sean Maloney and Dr: Charles Morrisey.

'risk rnet-~Isof risk

~ureA-I),:d graphi-lent for a

~Performance

legend:0 unacceptable.high.medium

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'Y Institute and The Council on CanadianTwenty-First Century have highlightednister of National Defence concedes that'ces would be of assistance.

2. This is aside from the affordability approach.Affordability is always an ssue,and one that nfluencesany force sizingexercise.

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