defendants-appellants’ reply in further support of...
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2012-1506
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
APPLE INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., AND SAMSUNG
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, LLC,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in Case No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, Judge Lucy H. Koh
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR STAY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
PENDING APPEAL
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
Charles K. VerhoevenQUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP50 California St., 22nd FloorSan Francisco, CA 94111Telephone: (415) 875-6600Facsimile: (415) 875-6700
Kevin P.B. JohnsonVictoria F. MaroulisQUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th FloorRedwood Shores, CA 94065Telephone: (650) 801-5000Facsimile: (650) 801-5100
Kathleen M. SullivanWilliam B. AdamsQUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd FloorNew York, NY 10010Telephone: (212) 849-7000Facsimile: (212) [email protected]
Michael T. ZellerQUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP865 S. Figueroa St., 10th FloorLos Angeles, CA 90017Telephone: (213) 443-3000Facsimile: (213) 443-3100
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1
ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................1
I. APPLE IS UNABLE TO DEFEND THE DISTRICT COURT’S REFUSAL TO UPDATE THE RECORD ......................................................1
II. APPLE FAILS TO EXPLAIN HOW THE CURRENT RECORD COULD SUPPORT THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION...........................3
III. APPLE FAILS TO REBUT THAT THE HARM TO SAMSUNG AND THE PUBLIC FROM THE INJUNCTION OUTWEIGHS ANY HARM TO APPLE FROM A STAY..............................................................8
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................10
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INTRODUCTION
Defendants-Appellants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics
America, Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (collectively,
“Samsung”) respectfully submit this reply in further support of their motion to stay
and suspend, pending appeal, the district court’s June 26, 2012 order granting a
preliminary injunction against Samsung’s sales of the Galaxy Tab 10.1. Samsung
demonstrated that it is entitled to stay because (1) it has a strong likelihood of
success on appeal in light of the district court’s refusal to update the record, and (2)
the harm that Samsung and the public will suffer by continuing the injunction
outweighs any harm that Apple might face if Samsung were able to resume sales of
the Galaxy Tab 10.1. In response, Apple distorts the record and governing
authorities. Apple’s attempts to downplay the rights of third parties are also
contradicted by its own recent conduct that includes menacing and disruptive
letters to downstream customers of the Galaxy Tab 10.1. This Court should issue a
stay preventing these harms to Samsung and its customers while it considers an
expedited appeal from the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction.
ARGUMENT
I. APPLE IS UNABLE TO DEFEND THE DISTRICT COURT’S REFUSAL TO UPDATE THE RECORD
Apple fails to rebut that Samsung has a strong likelihood of success on
appeal because the preliminary injunction is based on a stale record that had not
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been updated in the seven months since the October 2011 preliminary injunction
hearing and thus did not reflect substantial new developments that rendered
obsolete the district court’s prior rulings on likelihood of success and irreparable
harm. Mot. 8-10. Apple acknowledges (Opp. 3-5), as it must, that the district
court did not consider any new evidence when issuing the preliminary injunction,
having previously issued—without notice or the benefit of briefing—an order
prohibiting reliance on new evidence. Nor does Apple seriously contest (Opp. 8-
10) that the governing case law, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Salazar
v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010), demonstrates that preliminary injunctive relief
must be based on the circumstances that exist at the time of a court’s order, not as
they may have existed at some point in the past.
Instead, Apple accuses Samsung of employing a “delay strategy” (Opp. 2)
and principally argues that the district court’s refusal to consider additional
evidence was compelled by this Court’s mandate (Opp. 7-8). But this Court’s
broad remand for “further proceedings” regarding the order “denying an injunction
with respect to the D’889 patent,” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 678
F.3d 1314, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012), did not foreclose the district court from updating
the record,1 and it was an abuse of discretion for the court not to do so given the
1 Notwithstanding Apple’s protestations to the contrary (Opp. 7), neither
this Court’s directive that the district court assess the balance-of-hardships and public-interest factors on remand, nor its recognition that this assessment might be
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considerable passage of time since the preliminary injunction hearing and the
substantial developments that Samsung identified. See, e.g., Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at
1816 (“[A] court must never ignore significant changes in the law or circumstances
underlying an injunction lest the decree be turned into an instrument of wrong”);
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(stating that it would be an abuse of discretion not “to consider the facts as they
exist at the time of remand”).2 And Apple never explains why considering the
updated record with the evidence Samsung already had proffered would have
caused undue delay or how any delay could even constitute a legitimate excuse for
refusing to consider the current circumstances as precedent required.
II. APPLE FAILS TO EXPLAIN HOW THE CURRENT RECORD COULD SUPPORT THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Apple is also unable to defend the preliminary injunction based on the
current record, which reflects that (1) the tablet computer market no longer has just
two players as the district court previously assumed (see Mot. 10-12); (2) the
physical 035 mockup—not the iPad 2—is an embodiment of the D’889 patent and
conducted “in short order,” Apple, 678 F.3d at 1333, can reasonably be read as foreclosing the district court from updating the stale record with respect to the other preliminary injunction factors.
2 Apple’s invocation of the district court’s denial of Samsung’s motion for reconsideration (Opp. 10) is unavailing, as Samsung will argue on appeal that the preliminary injunction itself should be vacated for failure to consider significant changes in circumstances since the preliminary injunction record closed.
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that mockup is substantially different from the Galaxy Tab 10.1 (Mot. 12-18); and
(3) the Galaxy Tab 10.1 differs substantially from the D’889 patent, as suggested
by an analogous decision just this past week from the British High Court of Justice
finding that Samsung’s Galaxy Tabs do not infringe Apple’s British design patents.
1. As to the tablet market, Apple does not dispute that there has been a
surge of major entrants into that market, but instead wrongly contends that
Samsung had raised this issue in the prior appeal. Opp. 15. The evidence that
Samsung has identified, however, involves entrants into the tablet market that post-
date the closing of the preliminary injunction record. See Mot. 10-11 & nn.2-4.
Further, the conceded absence of a two-player market, plus Apple’s undisputed
gain in market share since the Galaxy Tab 10.1’s introduction, undermines any
“inference that an infringing sale amounts to a lost sale for the patentee.” Robert
Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 20011); see also
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006) (no presumption of
irreparable harm based on infringement).3
2. As to the 035 mockup, Apple does not dispute (Opp. 11-15) that the
physical mockup was not part of the preliminary injunction record (because, as
3 Nor can the fact that Apple and Samsung are “direct competitors” (Opp.
16) support a finding of irreparable harm due to lost market share. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that “generic competition” that affects sales of patented product not sufficient to establish irreparable harm).
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Samsung explained (Mot. 14, 17), Apple had withheld production until after the
preliminary injunction hearing), that Apple has admitted since the preliminary
injunction record closed that the 035 mockup embodies the D’889 patent, and that
the physical 035 mockup reveals substantial differences from the Galaxy Tab 10.1.
Instead, after overstating the district court’s reliance on drawings of the patented
design,4 Apple first contends that “[c]ourts are not required to compare the accused
device to any embodiment claimed by a patent.” Opp. 13. But the fact is that, at
Apple’s urging (Dist. Ct. Dkt. 449 at 47 n.27), the district court did look to the iPad
products that it considered to be an embodiment of the D’889 patent, and Apple
cites no authority for its view that a party can cherry-pick which claimed
embodiment it will show the court and the jury, and which it will hide from them.5
Further, Apple’s statements (Opp. 11-12) about a gap on the physical
mockup are disingenuous, as they contradict Apple’s own prior argument that “no
gap can be seen between the front surface and the rim” when the 035 model is
viewed from the front (Dist. Ct. Dkt. 1136 at 5 n.1). Moreover, Apple’s argument
4 Contrary to Apple’s assertion (Opp. 11), in concluding that Apple has a
likelihood of success on infringement, the district court relied heavily on its finding that the Galaxy Tab 10.1 is “virtually indistinguishable” from the Apple products. (Dkt No. 449 at 47-48; Dkt No. 1135 at 4.) The district court’s additionalconsideration of the patent drawings cannot immunize that error from scrutiny, as it is clear that the iPad comparison was the driving factor in the court’s analysis.
5 Nor is there any requirement that the embodiment be a commercial one. See, e.g., Lee v. Dayton-Hudson, 838 F.2d 1186, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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that a single feature—which Apple claims is unnoticeable—could make the 035
model substantially different from the D’889 patent would apply all the more to the
numerous noticeable differences between the iPad 2 and the patented design:
thinner profile; different aspect ratio; no rim around the front; no thick side edge
running perpendicular to the back and front; no reflective material on the back or
sides; added buttons, slots, and markings.
Apple also mischaracterizes (Opp. 12-13) the history of the photos in the
D’889 file history to imply that the 035 mockup is not proper evidence. But the
PTO did not even comment on Apple’s statement that the 035 model was an
embodiment of the D’889 patent. Nor did the PTO “cancel” the 035 as an
embodiment, as Apple states. (Opp. 13.) Instead, it merely prevented Apple from
including a photo appendix (not simply drawings) in the issued patent pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 1.153 (see Matsui Decl. Ex. 6 at APLNDC00032436). Far from
showing that the physical 035 mockup is irrelevant, Apple’s attempt to include
pictures of the 035 in the issued patent is even stronger evidence of its relevance as
an embodiment of the patent on which it was based.
Apple is also wrong (Opp. 13-14) that the iPad 2 can embody both the
D’889 patent and another design patent. Were that so, any attempt by Apple to get
a new patent on that design would, contrary to public policy, effectively restart the
clock on the limited monopoly it was granted seven years ago. Apple’s authorities
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are inapplicable. MPEP § 1504.06(II) states that a party may overcome a double
patenting rejection by the PTO through a terminal disclaimer, but Apple nowhere
claims it has filed a terminal disclaimer of any relevance here. MPEP
§ 1504.05(II)(B)(8) simply provides that “segregable parts” of an entire design are
to be separately patented, but that has no relevance where, as here, a party seeks to
patent a whole design. Thus, Apple’s efforts to justify the district court’s reliance
on the iPad 2 are misplaced.
3. Apple also fails to mention this week’s decision from the British High
Court of Justice that found that Samsung’s Galaxy Tablets do not infringe Apple’s
community registered design. See Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,
Case No. HC 11 03050 (July 9, 2012), available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/samsung-
apple.pdf (last accessed July 12, 2012). The court explained that the Galaxy
Tablets “do not have the same understated and extreme simplicity which is
possessed by the Apple design. … The overall impression produced is different.”
Id. ¶ 90. This ruling reinforces the substantial differences that exist between the
Galaxy Tab 10.1 and Apple’s patented designs, and thus further strengthens
Samsung’s likelihood of defeating Apple’s allegations of infringement in the
underlying proceeding.
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III. APPLE FAILS TO REBUT THAT THE HARM TO SAMSUNG AND THE PUBLIC FROM THE INJUNCTION OUTWEIGHS ANY HARM TO APPLE FROM A STAY
Apple cannot overcome Samsung’s showing that the harm to its customer
relationships, reputation and good will from the injunction outweighs any harm
that Apple might experience from the continued sale of the Galaxy Tab 10.1. Mot.
18-20. In its Opposition, Apple gainsays any prospect of irreparable harm to
Samsung and its downstream customers while sales of the Galaxy Tab 10.1 are
enjoined during the pendency of this appeal. But Apple omits to mention that on
June 28, it sent letters to multiple carriers and downstream customers of the Galaxy
Tab 10.1 letters insisting that they are obliged by the preliminary injunction to,
“[a]t a minimum,” “immediately remov[e] for sale the Galaxy Tab 10.1 from all
physical and online venues under your direction or control” and, also to “ceas[e]
immediately to engage in any of the specified acts (e.g., importing, offering to sell,
or selling within the United States) in connection with the Galaxy Tab 10.1 ….”
Exh. 1-2 to Reply Decl. of Kathleen M. Sullivan.6 While Samsung does not know
precisely how many such letters Apple sent, it has received reports that Apple has
sent them to many entities that currently carry the Galaxy Tab 10.1.
6 Samsung received the letters submitted herewith pursuant to the
submitting party’s obligation to provide notice to Samsung of a potential claim under their Supply Agreement.
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Apple’s menacing letters greatly overreach, incorrectly claiming that third-
party retailers are subject to the prohibitions of the preliminary injunction, which
they clearly are not. None of them is a party to the action, and the law is clear that
they are permitted to sell their existing inventory, even without a stay. 7
Nonetheless, such letters seek unfairly to disrupt the business of both Samsung and
its retail partners, who are now being threatened by a company with a self-
proclaimed commitment to “thermonuclear” litigation—disruptions that Apple’s
bond does not take into account.8
7 See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 25
F. Supp. 2d 372, 374-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (nonparty distributors and retailers were not subject to copyright injunction against publisher and thus were entitled to continue sales of their existing inventory); Peterson v. Fee Int’l, Ltd., 435 F. Supp. 938, 943-44 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (nonparty reseller of infringing wrenches not enjoined from sale of inventory acquired prior to entry of injunction); see also Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 9, 13 (1945) (“The courts, nevertheless, may not grant an enforcement order or injunction so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according to law.”); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1395 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Because the appellants were never made parties to the underlying action and thus never had an opportunity to contest the findings of liability in that case, they are not subject to being enjoined or held in contempt with respect to their independent conduct regarding the subject matter of the [underlying] case.”).
8 Contrary to Apple’s assertions (Opp. 17), the public statements by Samsung representatives about the significance of the injunction on its global business operations do not defeat Samsung’s argument of irreparable harm. Samsung’s statements to reassure the market do not mean, or imply, that Samsung’s good reputation and good will are not being tainted by the preliminary injunction. Nor, of course, do those statements, made before Apple’s threatening
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Apple’s actions show that it is using the continued operation of the
preliminary injunction, and this Court’s denial of an interim stay, to improperly
harass downstream customers and to interfere with the availability of computer
tablets that third parties have rightly come to prefer and to rely upon. In light of
these unwarranted injuries to third parties (and Samsung’s relationships with those
third parties), this Court should stay the preliminary injunction until this Court
receives highly expedited briefing and decides the substantial questions posed by
this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The June 26, 2012 Order Granting Preliminary Injunction should be stayed
pending expedited appeal.
letters were known, account for Apple’s attempts to interfere with downstream customers.
Dated: July 13, 2012 Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Kathleen M. SullivanCharles K. VerhoevenQUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP50 California St., 22nd FloorSan Francisco, CA 94111Telephone: (415) 875-6600Facsimile: (415) 875-6700
Kathleen M. SullivanWilliam B. AdamsQUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd FloorNew York, NY 10010Telephone: (212) 849-7000Facsimile: (212) [email protected]
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Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
Kevin P.B. JohnsonVictoria F. MaroulisQUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th FloorRedwood Shores, CA 94065Telephone: (650) 801-5000Facsimile: (650) 801-5100
Michael T. ZellerQUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP865 S. Figueroa St., 10th FloorLos Angeles, CA 90017Telephone: (213) 443-3000Facsimile: (213) 443-3100
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CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants certifies the following:
1. The full name of every party or amicus represented by me is:
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc. and Samsung
Telecommunications America, LLC
2. The name of the real party in interest (if the party named in the
caption is not the real party in interest) represented by me is:
N/A
3. All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that own
10 percent or more of the stock of the party or amicus curiae represented by
me are:
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (“SEA”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (“SEC”), a publicly held corporation organized
under the laws of the Republic of Korea. SEC is not owned by any parent
corporation and no other publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.
No other publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of SEA’s stock. Samsung
Telecommunications America, LLC (“STA”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
SEA. No other publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of STA’s stock.
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4. The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that
appeared for the party or amicus now represented by me in the trial court or
are expected to appear in this court are:
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP: Charles K. Verhoeven; Kathleen M.
Sullivan; Kevin P.B. Johnson; Victoria F. Maroulis; Michael T. Zeller; Todd M.
Briggs; Margret M. Caruso; Rachel Herrick Kassabian; Kevin A. Smith; William
B. Adams
Steptoe & Johnson LLP: John M. Caracappa; Paul A. Gennari; Michael R.
Heimbold; Huan-Yi Lin
Dated: July 13, 2012 Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Kathleen M. Sullivan______Kathleen M. SullivanQUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP51 Madison Avenue, 22nd FloorNew York, NY 10010Telephone: (212) 849-7000Facsimile: (212) [email protected]
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on July 13, 2012, I electronically filed
the foregoing DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO STAY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL
and supporting REPLY DECLARATION OF KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN with
the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the
case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the
CM/ECF system.
I further certify that on July 13, 2012, I caused to be served by email the
confidential version of the REPLY DECLARATION OF KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN on the following counsel:
Harold J. McElhinny Brian Robert MatsuiMichael A. Jacobs Morrison & Foerster LLPJennifer L. Taylor Suite 6000Morrison & Foerster LLP 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW425 Market Street Washington, DC 20006San Francisco, CA 94105 [email protected]@[email protected]@mofo.com
/s/ Kathleen M. Sullivan__________ Kathleen M. Sullivan
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
APPLE INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., AND SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, LLC,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 2012-1506
PUBLIC NON-CONFIDENTIAL REPLY DECLARATION OF KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN hereby declares as follows pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1746:
1. I am a partner in Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, counsel
for Defendants-Appellants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics
America, Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (collectively,
“Samsung”). I submit this reply declaration in further support of Samsung’s
Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal.
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Confidential Material Redacted
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and accurate copy of a letter
(with enclosures), dated June 28, 2012, from Jonathan A. Patchen of Taylor &
Company Law Offices, LLP, to Dane A. Drobny, Senior Vice President, General
Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Sears Holding Corporation.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and accurate copy of a letter
(with enclosures), dated June 28, 2012, from Jonathan A. Patchen of Taylor &
Company Law Offices, LLP, to Charles Wunsch, General Counsel, Senior Vice
President and Corporate Secretary, Sprint; and John W. Chapman, Vice
President/Legal Department, Sprint/Nextel Corporation.
4. Confidential Material Omitted: Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this declaration
and Exhibits 1 and 2 contain confidential business information concerning the
recipients of the letters from Plaintiff-Appellee Apple Inc. addressing the
preliminary injunction that was entered in the underlying action. Portions of
Paragraphs 2 and 3 and Exhibits 1 and 2 have been redacted to protect the
aforementioned confidential information.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on July 13, 2012 in New York, New York
/s/ Kathleen M. SullivanKathleen M. Sullivan
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EXHIBIT 1
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EXHIBIT 2
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