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Degradation Analysis and Risk-Informed Management of Feedwater System in Nuclear Power Plants Wen-Fang Wu, Hung-Ta Kuo, Chih-Hsien Wu National Taiwan University Jang-Shyong You National Taipei University of Education This research is supported jointly by the National Science Council and the Atomic Energy Council (through Institute of Nuclear Energy Research) of Taiwan

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  • Degradation Analysis and Risk-Informed Management of Feedwater System in Nuclear Power Plants

    Wen-Fang Wu, Hung-Ta Kuo, Chih-Hsien WuNational Taiwan University

    Jang-Shyong You National Taipei University of Education

    This research is supported jointly by the National Science Council and the Atomic Energy Council (through Institute of Nuclear Energy Research) of Taiwan

  • Degradation or Aging Mechanisms of Feedwater HeatersDegradation or Aging Mechanisms of Feedwater Heaters

    Formulas for Prediction Degradation Rate of HeaterFormulas for Prediction Degradation Rate of Heater--WallWall

    Probabilistic Analysis of Individual Probabilistic Analysis of Individual FeedwaterFeedwater HeatersHeaters

    Risk Ranking of Components of a Feedwater SystemRanking of Components of a Feedwater System

    Case StudyCase Study

    Contents

  • Degradation Phenomenon of Feedwater HeatersDegradation Phenomenon of Feedwater Heaters

    Steam InletSteam Inlet

    Buffering PlateBuffering Plate

    Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) at the Steam Inlet of Heater (Reflected Steam Impact from Buffering Plate)

    Inlet of Inlet of Condensed WaterCondensed Water

    Outlet of Outlet of Condensed WaterCondensed Water

    Outlet of Condensed Outlet of Condensed SteamSteam

  • Forming droplet by shear force

    Fe3O4

    Water flux

    Aging MechanismAging Mechanism

    Corroded AreaCorroded Area

    TwoTwoPhase FACPhase FAC

  • Examination Grids:Examination Grids:

    Divide the Shell Side of Steam Inlet to L1, L2, R1 and R2 Areas Divide the Shell Side of Steam Inlet to L1, L2, R1 and R2 Areas

    33--inchinch--long Grids expanded to twice the diameter of inlet tube at both long Grids expanded to twice the diameter of inlet tube at both sides sides

    NDT Examination of HeatersNDT Examination of Heaters:: PointPoint--byby--Point MethodPoint Method

  • CodeCode--Based Safety AssessmentBased Safety Assessment

    Make Required Repair Make Required Repair according to ASME B & PV according to ASME B & PV Sec VIII, Division 1 UGSec VIII, Division 1 UG--27& 27& Suggestions made by EPRISuggestions made by EPRI

    (mil/yr)

    FW-LP3A-L1SA-515-70630.5420.4920.88

    5.8

    ASME VIII250 psi405 F

  • PSEPRt0.6

    0.9L =

    ttLL: min. wall thickness required (inch): min. wall thickness required (inch)PP: design pressure (: design pressure (psipsi))RR: inner radius (inch): inner radius (inch)SS: max. allowable stress (: max. allowable stress (psipsi))EE: welding efficiency : welding efficiency

    HP1A/1B LP3A/3B LP4A/4B LP5A/5B LP6A/6B

    (psi) (in) (psi) (in)

    40062

    175001

    0.6466

    25062

    175001

    0.4020

    10063

    175001

    0.1625

    5064

    175001

    0.0824

    5068

    175001

    0.0876

    WallWall--Thickness Required by ASME B & PV Sec VIII Thickness Required by ASME B & PV Sec VIII Division 1 UGDivision 1 UG--2727

  • To Replace the Deterministic Assessment by To Replace the Deterministic Assessment by RiskRisk--Based AssessmentBased Assessment

    To Reduce the Maintenance Cost through To Reduce the Maintenance Cost through RiskRisk--Based ManagementBased Management

    ReliabilityReliability--Based AssessmentBased Assessment

    Safety FactorSafety Factor--Based AssessmentBased Assessment

    Present ResearchPresent Research

  • Incorporating Aging Mechanism into QRAIncorporating Aging Mechanism into QRA

    PDF of wall-thickness corrosion

    Wall-Thickness Corrosion (inch)

    Allowed wall-thickness corrosion

    Obs

    erve

    d P

    roba

    bilit

    y (%

    )

    =

    =

    =

    k

    n

    k

    ji

    m

    ij

    p

    pq

    MCS

    MCS)(FV

    1

    1

    U

    U

    ++

    AgingPhysics

    Risk metricFV, RRW, DIM

    Importance measure& Risk ranking

    Reliability model

    ( )o

    jj R

    Rq

    +

    =RAW

    FTA, ETAFTA, ETA

    ==Risk RankingRisk Ranking

    Importance MeasureImportance Measure

    ( )

    =

    kk

    k

    jj

    j

    dqqR

    dqqR

    qDIM

  • FAC Empirical ModelsFAC Empirical Models

    1. KWU/KR Model: Siemens Co. & WATHEC Software Package

    2. ERPI-CH Model: EPRI & CHECWORKS Software Package (not released to public)

    3. BRT-Cicero Model: Electricite de France by Cicero Test Loop (not released to public)

  • KWU SingleKWU Single--Phase FACPhase FAC Empirical ModelEmpirical Model

    ( )[ ]( ) )(18.1775.0135.6 118.02 tfepHeBk gWNcR +=

    ( ) 5.13279.010375.95.10 24 += TThB( ) ( ) 15.210078.110275.10875.0 225 += TThN

    ( ) 3162117 10849972.310624812.510356901.39999934.0 ttttf +=

    = R

    =ck=W=pH

    =g

    =h

    =Tfluid velocity (m/s)

    oxygen content (g/kg)

    pH value

    geometric factor (0.8 for T junction) Cr and Mo in steel ( 0% for SA515-70)

    temperature (K)

    FAC rate (g/cm2h)

    t = exposure time (1.5 yr=13140 hrs per EOC)

  • KWU TwoKWU Two--Phase FAC Empirical ModelPhase FAC Empirical Model

    =11 st

    w

    xmW&

    Modified Flow Velocity:Modified Flow Velocity:

    m&

    w

    stx

    = steam quality

    = void fraction

    = mass flux(kg/m s)

    = density of compressed liquid (kg/m )3

  • ( )stxWTgpHf ,,,,KWU =Parameter Sensitivity AnalysisParameter Sensitivity Analysis

    FAC rateFAC rate--pHpH FAC rateFAC rate--Fluid velocityFluid velocity

    FAC rateFAC rate--Oxygen contentOxygen content FAC rateFAC rate--Steam qualitySteam quality

    FAC rateFAC rate--TemperatureTemperature

  • Parameter Symbol Mean valueStandard deviation Distribution

    Temperature (F)

    Fluid velocity (ft/s)

    Oxygen content (ppb)

    Water chemistry (pH)

    Steam quality

    Piping geometry ck

    pH

    g

    W

    stx

    Cr + Mo in % h

    tExposure time (hr)405

    13.2

    30

    0.88

    7

    0.8

    0

    13140

    40.5

    N/A

    3

    0.7

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    13.2

    Normal

    Normal

    Normal

    Normal

    Point estimate

    Point estimate

    Point estimate

    Point estimate

    Monte Carlo Simulation of FAC RateMonte Carlo Simulation of FAC Rate

    T

  • Temperature Fluid Velocity g pH FAC Rate (mil/yr)

    387 11.6321 31.9058 6.3728 6.0569

    337 10.2929 28.1958 7.0946 9.2151

    410 14.5020 31.6536 6.9027 6.3281

    416 12.5154 26.7005 6.1856 8.2137

    358 13.6321 30.2580 7.8286 7.4289

    453 13.5090 23.9863 6.9892 9.5993

    453 13.2283 28.5207 7.3754 6.4162

    FAC Rate (mil/yr)

    Obs

    erve

    d fr

    eque

    ncy

    141210864

    25

    20

    15

    10

    5

    0

    Distribution of Thinning RateDistribution of Thinning Rate

  • Distribution

    Normal

    Lognormal

    Weibull

    Test value ( )=

    =

    11

    1

    2

    i i

    ii

    EOE

    Critical value 8,95.0

    Goodness of fit

    16.8625

    13.7310

    6.4282

    15.5

    Acceptable

    Acceptable

    Not acceptable

    FAC Rate (mil/yr)

    Per

    cent

    (%)

    101

    99.999

    9080706050403020

    10

    5

    32

    1

    0.1

    Weibull

    FAC Rate (mil/yr)P

    erce

    nt (%

    )

    15109876543

    99.9

    99

    95

    90

    80706050403020

    10

    5

    1

    0.1

    Lognormal

    FAC Rate (mil/yr)

    Perc

    ent (

    %)

    14121086420

    99.9

    99

    95

    90

    80706050403020

    10

    5

    1

    0.1

    Normal

    GoodnessGoodness--ofof--Fit TestFit Test

  • PDF of wall-thickness corrosion

    Wall-Thickness Corrosion (inch)

    Allowed wall-thickness corrosion

    Obs

    erve

    d P

    roba

    bilit

    y (%

    )

    HP1A/1B LP3A/3B LP4A/4B LP5A/5B LP6A/6B

    (psi) (in) (psi) (in)

    40062

    175001

    0.6466

    25062

    175001

    0.4020

    10063

    175001

    0.1625

    5064

    175001

    0.0824

    5068

    175001

    0.0876

    RandomRandom--Fixed Reliability ModelFixed Reliability Model

  • Wall-thickness corrosion (in)

    Freq

    uenc

    y

    0.240.200.160.120.080.040.00

    300

    250

    200

    150

    100

    50

    0

    Loc

    -3.561 0.2802 100-3.357 0.3147 100-3.199 0.2827 100-3.008

    Scale

    0.3186 100-2.847 0.3264 100-2.739 0.3132 100-2.599 0.3078

    N

    100-2.435 0.2974 100

    -4.587 0.2812 100-3.927 0.2994 100

    Variable

    EO C 22EO C 23EO C 24EO C 25EO C 26EO C 27

    EO C 18EO C 19EO C 20EO C 21

    Lognormal

    Allowed wall-thickness corrosion

    ReliabilityReliability--Based Aging AssessmentBased Aging Assessment

    ?

  • Risk Metric & Importance MeasuresRisk Metric & Importance Measures

    ),( IE ji qfhR =

    Risk Metric:Risk Metric: A Function of Frequencies of Initiating Events & A Function of Frequencies of Initiating Events & Conditional Probabilities of Failure Modes of Conditional Probabilities of Failure Modes of SSCsSSCs

    (i) FV IM: (i) FV IM: Focus onFocus on Weight ofWeight of Failure of Failure of CutsetsCutsets containing containing BEBEjj

    =

    =

    =

    k

    n

    k

    ji

    m

    ij

    p

    pq

    MCS

    MCS)(FV

    1

    1

    U

    U

    Probability of union of all min cutsets (MCS) containing BEj

    Nominal risk (probability of all MCSs)

    0

    0)(FVR

    RRq jj

    = or

  • (ii) RAW IM:(ii) RAW IM: Focus on Weight (Increase) of Risk owing to Focus on Weight (Increase) of Risk owing to BEBEjj

    ( )o

    jj R

    Rq

    +

    =RAW

    (iii) Differential IM (DIM): (iii) Differential IM (DIM): Focus on Risk Change due to Variation of Focus on Risk Change due to Variation of BEBEjj((BorgonovoBorgonovo & & ApostolakisApostolakis, 2001), 2001)

    ( )

    =

    =

    =

    =

    kk

    k

    jj

    kk

    k

    k

    k

    jj

    j

    jj

    k k

    j

    kk

    k

    jjq

    j

    qqR

    qqR

    qq

    dqqR

    qq

    dqqR

    q

    qR

    qR

    dqqR

    dqqR

    dRdR

    q j

    ) DIM(

    DIM

    or

    H1

    H2

    ji qq =

    ==j

    j

    i

    i

    qq

    qq

  • Case Study: PRA of a BWR Feedwater SystemCase Study: PRA of a BWR Feedwater System

    LP6A LP6B

    LP5A LP5B

    LP4A LP4B

    LP3A LP3B

    LP2A LP2B

    HP1A HP1B

    CC

    CD

    FP

    1B

    1A

    LP6A LP6B

    LP5B

    LP4B

    LP3B

    LP2B

    LP4A

    LP3A

    LP2AHP1BHP1A

    LP5A

  • Fault Tree AnalysisFault Tree Analysis

    Break down of feedwater system

    feedwater pumps fail to start

    Cond. & dem. system fail to start

    Failure of HP heaters

    1A 1B

    Main cond. & cond. pumps fail

    to start

    Failureof LP heaters

    CC

    Failure of

    LPA segmentFailure of

    LPB segment

    5B 6B4B3B5A 6A4A3A

    FP

    2A 2B

    CD

  • Operational Conditions (by assumption):Operational Conditions (by assumption):

  • Numerical AnalysisNumerical Analysis

  • Failure Probability of Series Systems:

    ( )( ) ( )nseries qqqF = 1...111 21

    Failure Probability of Parallel Systems:nparallel qqqF ...21=

    Feedwater Pumps

    Condenser & De-Mining Units

    High-Pressure FW Heaters

    Low-Pressure FW Heaters

    Hot Well & Pump of Main Condensers

    1qFFP =

    2qFCD =

    43qqFHP =

    ( )( )( )( )( )[ ] ( )( )( )( )( )[ ]141210861311975 111111 111111 qqqqqqqqqqFLP =

    15qFCC =

  • Example: LP2A at EOC 26 (assuming no repair)

    Risk Metric of Feedwater SystemRisk Metric of Feedwater System( ) ( )( )( )( )( )

    CCHPLPCDFPCCHPCDFPCCLPCDFP

    CCCDFPCCHPLPCDCCHPCDCCLPCDCCCD

    CCHPLPFPCCHPFPCCLPFPCCFPCCHPLP

    CCHPCCLPCCHPLPCDFPHPCDFP

    LPCDFPCDFPHPLPCDHPCDLPCDCD

    HPLPFPHPFPLPFPFPHPLPHPLP

    CCHPLPCDFPj

    FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

    FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

    FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

    FFFFFqR

    ++++

    +++++

    ++++++=

    = 111111

    02E64.5)(

    )()(

    )DIM( :H115

    1

    55 =

    =

    =k k

    j

    j

    qqR

    qqR

    q

    ( ) 02E59.8)()(

    )DIM( :H215

    1

    55

    5 =

    =

    =k

    kk

    j

    j

    qqqR

    qqqR

    q

  • In R(qj), delete all terms not related to q5 to obtain MCS containing BE5

    3548.1)(

    )RAW( 55 ==+

    jqRqq

    ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )

    CCHPLPCDFPCCHPCDFPCCLPCDFP

    CCCDFPCCHPLPCDCCHPCDCCLPCDCCCD

    CCHPLPFPCCHPFPCCLPFPCCFPCCHPLP

    CCHPCCLPCCHPLPCDFPHPCDFP

    LPCDFPCDFPHPLPCDHPCDLPCDCD

    HPLPFPHPFPLPFPFPHPLPHPLP

    CCHPLPCDFPj

    FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

    FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

    FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

    FFFFFqR

    ++++

    +++++

    ++++++=

    = 111111

    ( )( )( )( )( )]111

    111)[(

    141210

    86131197513117513975137513119513115

    1395135119751175975751195115955

    qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq

    qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqFLP

    +++

    ++++=

    ( ) 02-9.84EMCS

    )FV(

    )(15

    15

    5

    =

    ==

    qR

    pq

    qi

    iU

  • RAW IM FV IM

    DIM H1 DIM H2

    FP CD 1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B 4A 4B 5A 5B 6A 6B C

    C

    EOC1820

    2224

    2628

    0

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    120

    FP CD

    1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B 4A 4B 5A 5B 6A 6B CC

    EOC1820

    2224

    2628

    0

    0.05

    0.1

    0.15

    0.2

    0.25

    0.3

    0.35

    FP CD

    1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B 4A 4B 5A 5B 6A 6B CC

    EOC18

    21

    2427

    0

    0.05

    0.1

    0.15

    0.2

    0.25

    0.3

    0.35

    0.4

    0.45

    0.5

    FP CD

    1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B 4A 4B 5A 5B 6A 6B CC

    EOC1820

    2224

    2628

    0

    0.05

    0.1

    0.15

    0.2

    0.25

    0.3

    0.35

    0.4

    0.45

    0.5

  • Risk Rank by FV IMRisk Rank by FV IM Risk Rank by RAW IMRisk Rank by RAW IM

    Risk Rank by DIM H1 Risk Rank by DIM H1 Risk Rank by DIM H2 Risk Rank by DIM H2

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    12

    18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

    EOC

    Ran

    king

    1A1B2A2B3A3B4A

    4B5A5B6A6B

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    1218 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

    EOC

    Ran

    king

    1A1B2A2B

    3A3B4A4B5A5B

    6A6B

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    1218 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

    EOC

    Ran

    king

    1A1B2A2B3A3B4A4B5A5B6A6B

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    1218 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

    EOC

    Ran

    king

    1A

    1B

    2A

    2B

    3A

    3B

    4A

    4B

    5A

    5B

    6A

    6B

  • Concluding RemarksConcluding Remarks KWU model predicts FAC of FWH wellKWU model predicts FAC of FWH well

    FAC Rate (mil/yr)

    Obs

    erve

    d fr

    eque

    ncy

    141210864

    25

    20

    15

    10

    5

    0

    5.8

    (mil/yr)

    FW-LP3A-L1SA-515-70630.5420.4920.88

    5.8

    ASME VIII250 psi405 F

    In studied case, In studied case, FWHsFWHs atat highhigh--pressure section have pressure section have lower risk rankslower risk ranks, and can be allowed for less intensive , and can be allowed for less intensive examination if so desiredexamination if so desired

  • Those Those deserve more intensive examinationsdeserve more intensive examinations are are LP6BLP6BLP6ALP6ALP5ALP5ALP5BLP5BLP4BLP4B

    As compared to RAW IM, As compared to RAW IM, FV IM & DIM are more FV IM & DIM are more effective to distinguish risk differenceseffective to distinguish risk differences among among componentscomponents

  • The case study indicates The case study indicates a riska risk--based inspection plainbased inspection plain or or riskrisk--based management program based management program can be employedcan be employed to to replace the current codereplace the current code--based inspection programbased inspection program

    Although Although LP2A & LP3ALP2A & LP3A locate close to highlocate close to high--pressure pressure section, their risks are section, their risks are moderately highmoderately high (owing to smaller (owing to smaller allowable thicknesses) and need to be paid attention to allowable thicknesses) and need to be paid attention to

    Thank you for your attention.

    The above viewpoints do not necessarily reflect those of AEC and NSC of Taiwan.