del" army on Saudi soil, home to Meccaand Medina, the two holiest cities inIslam (forbidden to nonbelievers), was apotential public relations disaster. On theother hand, Saddam had invaded Kuwait,a fellow Arab country that had materiallyaided Iraq in its war against Iran. More-over, Saddam's own Ba'athist party was anavowedly secular organization devoted inpart to ethnic Arab nationalism. Both ofthese facts helped Saudi Arabia maintainits image in the Islamic world while ac-cepting American aid. But the situationrequired constant, careful manipulation.There were many tensions between theSaudis, who naturally wished Coalitionforces would disrupt Saudi life as little aspossible, and the Coalition forces whooften felt unappreciated by the Saudisthey were ostensibly in the desert to pro-tect.

Saudi military forces were divided intotwo distinct services. The Ministry ofDefense and Aviation (MODA) consistedof the regular Saudi ground and aviationforces, whose mission was to protect thekingdom from external threats. The

Gen Khaled bin Sultan bin Saud, a princeof the Saudi royal family, was the JointForces Commander and GeneralSchwartzkopf's opposite number. JointForces Command was composed of theCoalition's Islamic members forces: SaudiArabia, Egypt, Syria, and others. The Bat-tle of al-Khafji was the first conflict onSaudi soil in decades; as a result GenKhaled was pressured to end the battle de-cisively and quickly.

DVIC DA-ST-92-08034

Saudi aviation forces were folded, alongwith other Coalition air forces, into theair campaign, but the Royal Saudi LandForces or Saudi Army operated separatelyas nine brigades.21

The Ministry of Defense and Aviationunits were supplemented by the SaudiArabian National Guard (SANG) com-prised of two mechanized brigades. Os-tensibly the Saudi Arabian NationalGuard was intended to reinforce the Min-istry of Defense and Aviation forces in theevent of a war, but in reality the Saudi Na-tional Guard's primary role was to protectthe royal family from internal rebellion.Staffed with personnel loyal to the Houseof Saud specifically through family andtribal ties, the Saudi Arabian NationalGuard was descended from the Ikhwan(White Army), a Wahhabi tribal militia,which formed the main body of IbnSaud's forces during World War I. TheSaudi government employed the NationalGuard to protect the holy cities of Meccaand Medina, and to counter the regulararmed forces in the event of an attemptedcoup. It received the lion's share of train-ing and equipment that was available toSaudi forces, although it did not possesstanks.22

The Saudi National Guard was favoredover the Ministry of Aviation and De-fense. The Royal family kept the twoforces separated, and neither forcetrained with the other. Nevertheless, oil-rich Saudi Arabia did not lack resourcesand both services were lavishly equippedwith modern military hardware. Despitemassive amounts spent on moderniza-tion, many Saudi soldiers lacked profes-sional standards or competence and theofficer corps granted the noncommis-sioned officers neither authority nor re-sponsibility.

In 1990-1991, direct American mili-tary assistance to Saudi Arabia centeredaround two organizations. Officially,there was the Department of Defense'sOffice of Program Manager for the Mod-ernization of the Saudi National Guard,which assigned American officers as ad-visors to the Saudi National Guard. Inaddition, the Vinnell Corporation pro-vided military contract advisors to theSaudi National Guard, most of whomwere American veterans of the VietnamWar. In both cases, the personnel as-signed to train the Saudi National Guard

prior to the invasion of Kuwait foughtwith the National Guard forces, greatlyincreasing their effectiveness. The mili-tary advisors and Vinnell Corporationemployees worked closely together sup-porting the Saudi National Guard.23

Since neither Saudi Arabia nor theUnited States was willing to have its forcesunder the other's command, a Joint struc-ture was set up. Joint Forces Command,a parallel organization of Central Com-mand, was composed of most of the Arabcontingents and was led by Saudi GeneralKhaled bin Sultan. A nephew of KingFahd, he was a graduate of the Royal Mil-itary Academy, Sandhurst, and the AirWar College at Maxwell Air Force Base,Alabama. In 1986, after 25 years in thearmed forces of his country, GeneralKhaled was appointed commander of theRoyal Saudi Air Defence Forces.

The command was further subdividedinto Joint Forces Command-North andJoint Forces Command-East. Joint ForcesCommand-North, although dominatedby two Egyptian divisions, also containedSaudi Arabian Ministry of Defense andAviation, Kuwaiti, and Syrian brigades. Itcontrolled the territory from the "elbow"at al-Manaqish to the Kuwait-Iraq border.Saudi National Guard units, Ministry ofDefense and Aviation forces, as well asKuwaiti forces and a Qatari mechanizedbrigade made up Joint Forces Command-East. It controlled the territory from theeastern border of the al-Wafrah oil fieldsto the Persian Gulf coast, including al-Khalji and the surrounding territory.24The assignment of National Guard unitsunder the command of General Khaledwas out of the ordinary, and indicatedhow seriously the House of Saud took thecrisis.25 The placement of the subcom-mands was due to Arab pride which dic-tated that they hold positions in the frontline to ensure theirs would be the firstblood shed.

Although well equipped, and providedwith professional military advisors, theSaudi forces were still not up to Westernmilitary standards. Islamic holidays,daily prayers, and familial obligationsdramatically decreased the amount oftraining. The troops generally averagedan eighth grade education. The officerswere often well educated and most spokeat least some English, but they were dis-couraged from independent thought or

The Battle of al-Khafji 7

action until given battalion-level com-mand. They faced tremendous pressureto keep their superiors happy. As CaptainJoseph Molofsky, 3d Marines liaison offi-cer to the 2d Brigade of the Saudi ArabianNational Guard, noted: "It's all make orbreak. You displease your senior andyou're done forever. You make him happyand he sends you on vacation to Europe.Literally:'26 Saudi forces were untested in1991, having last seen action in the 1920s.There was serious concern about howwell they would perform in battle.27

i

As Desert Shield progressed, addi-tional liaison elements were attached tothe Saudi forces. United States Army Spe-cial Forces teams were attached to Min-istry of Defense and Aviation forces at thebrigade level, and the Marine Corps as-signed 1st Air-Naval Gunfire LiaisonCompany (1st ANGLICO) teamsthroughout Joint Forces Command-East.28 When it became clear that the 1stMarine Division would be fighting besideSaudi forces, the division's commander,Major General James M. Myatt, ordered

his assistant division commander,Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude, totake primary responsibility for liaison du-ties.29 Brigadier General Draude used 3dMarines, the Marine unit nearest to JointForces Command-East units, as the pri-mary focus of his liaison effort. AsColonel John A. Admire, commander ofthe 3d Marines, noted:

We were the only U.S. combat forcelocated on the eastern coast. Nowthe significance of that of course isthat we continued to train withCoalition forces. We were the divi-sion's primary instrument from Oc-tober-November-December andthrough January of training withthe Saudis and training with theQatari forces.

Colonel Admire assigned CaptainMolofsky, an officer with previous expe-rience in the Middle East serving with theUnited Nations on the Sinai Peninsula, asthe 3d Marines liaison officer to the 2dBrigade, Saudi Arabian National Guard.3°From the beginning, there was tensionbetween the Marines and the Saudis."The Marines felt that they needed to gettheir own eyes on," Captain Molofsky ex-plained. "They couldn't trust the Saudis.The Saudis were insulted that the Marinesdidn't trust them."3' This situation was ex-acerbated in January 1991 when 3dMarines was given the duty of protectingthe town and airfield of al-Mishab. Pre-viously al-Mishab had been part of JointForce Command-East's area of opera-tions; placing it within the Marine area ofoperations, especially as the United Statesbegan to use the airfield, implied a lack offaith in Saudi military capabilities on thepart of Marine commanders.32

In addition to the U.S. Army advisorsand Special Forces teams assigned to theSaudi forces, commanders attached air-naval gunfire liaison teams to coordinateMarine air and artillery support for theSaudis. Specifically, 1st ANGLICO wasattached to Joint Forces Command-East,and in turn the company assigned sup-porting arms liaison teams to Saudibrigades and fire control teams to Saudibattalions. These teams worked closelywith their Saudi counterparts, developingexcellent working relationships.33

On the eve of the battle of al-Khaf5i,

8 The Battle of al-Khaf)i

Coalition Armored Vehicles

P. i A

Vehicle Type Armament TopSpeed

1

I____ AMX-30105mm main gun

Coax 12.7mm MG

7.62mm MG

65kph

M-60105mm main gunCoax 7.62mm MG12.7mm MG

48kph

LAV-25

25mm main gun2 x 7.62mm MG4 troops

orTOW-2 ATGM

lOOkph

—----L V-150

.50 caliber MG6-8 troops

or4 troopsTOW-2

88kph

..t—-..

M-113

12.7mm MG11 troops

or4 troopsTOW ATGM

6lkph

American and Saudi forces had workedand trained together for five months.There was some unease between the twoforces, but both sides had made a con-certed effort to overcome it. The Iraqi in-vasion would put those efforts to the test.

The Saudi coastal town of Ra's al-Khal5i, more commonly know as al-Khafi, lies approximately seven milessouth of the Saudi-Kuwait border. Beforethe war, the primary industries in thetown were oil and tourism, but it was es-sentially deserted just prior to the attack.General Khaled bin Sultan had orderedthe town evacuated in August because itwas too close to the Kuwaiti border toproperly defend.34 North of the townthere was a water desalination plant, andto the south there was an oil refinery, apier, and a small airstrip. Southeast, be-yond the town's outskirts, was a SaudiArabian National Guard compound.

Ra's al-KhaI5i was particularly difficultto defend because the town lies to thenorth of extensive sabkhas or saltmarshes. As Captain Molofsky explained:"A sabkha is a patch of desert that hassome kind of underlying moisture thatcauses a thin, mud like crust to developon the top, which cracks in the heat, butit's easily penetrated by a vehicle and verysoft underneath—you get stuck in it in ahuge way."35 The sabkhas served to chan-

nel traffic onto the coastal highway, espe-cially the heavy vehicles needed to sup-port the logistics of large military forces.

Covering deployed Coalition forceswere a series of observation posts strungout along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. Eachpost was situated near a Saudi border fort,described by virtually every eyewitness asa "Beau Geste fort' U.S. Navy Sea, Air,and Land (SEAL), Army Special Forces,and Marine reconnaissance teams

manned these posts in order to gather in-telligence on Iraqi forces in Kuwait.Placed at 10 to 20 kilometer intervals, Ob-servation Post 8 was set on the coast, Ob-servation Post 7, further to the west, withObservation Posts 2, 1, 4, 5, and 6 follow-ing the border until the "elbow" wasreached at alJathathil.*

Nearest to the coast, the Marine Corps'1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and In-telligence Group controlled ObservationPosts 8, 7, and 2.** The coastal highwayran between Observation Post 7 and Ob-servation Post 8, which gave those twoposts overlapping oversight of the mostlikely route into al-Khafi. In addition tothe special operations teams, air-navalgunfire supporting arms liaison teamsalso occupied these observation posts.The 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and

*MOSt works on the Battle of aI-Khaf)i list the ob-servation posts slightly differently from east to west:OP-8, OP-7, OP-i, OP-2, OP-4, OP-5, and OP-6.Two important primary sources, the commandchronology of the 2d Light Armored Infantry Bat-talion and the after action report of 1st AN-GLICOI 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, andIntelligence Group both make clear that the ordershould be the one given in the text.**The 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intel-ligence Group (1st SRIG) was a unit responsible forcoordinating intelligence gathering operations, andwas subordinate to the I Marine ExpeditionaryForce (I MEF) rather than the 1st Marine Division.Its primary headquarters was with the I MEF head-quarters, but it maintained a forward headquartersin al-Khaf)i.

The Battle of al-Khafji 9

Photo courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

Saudi soldiers move through the evacuated border city of aI-Khafji. Although the city'sarchitecture was relatively monotonous it offered civilized amenities and was a popularstop for Coalition commanders and journalists.

The crew of a Marine LAV-25 scans the desert. The LAV-25 was the backbone of the lightarmored infantry battalions, an untried concept prior to the Battle of al-Khafji. The bat-talions were used in a traditional cavalry role, providing a screen in front of the main bodyof I Marine Expeditionary Force.

History Division Photo

Intelligence Group had a headquarters atthe desalination plant located to the northof al-Khafji.36 The 1st Air-Naval GunfireLiaison Company, attached to JointForces Command-East, was a subordi-nate unit of the 1st Surveillance, Recon-naissance, and Intelligence Group, whichcoordinated closely in and around al-Khalji with the various units in theKuwaiti border area.

Task Force Shepherd (1st Light Ar-mored Infantry Battalion) of the 1st Ma-rine Division had companies on ascreening mission near Observation Post4 (Company D), Observation Post 5(Company B) and Observation Post 6(Company C). Only Observation Post 4had a Marine reconnaissance platoon inplace when the Iraqi attack occurred on29 January.37 * The 2d Marine Division's2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion es-tablished a similar screen to the east di-rectly in front of the al-Wafrah oil fieldsand Observation Post 1, between TaskForce Shepherd and the Joint ForcesCommand-East area of operations alongthe coast.

Under the command of Maj or GeneralSultan 'Adi al-Mutairi, Joint Forces Com-mand-East was further divided into taskforces. Abu Bakr Task Force, comprisedof the 2d Saudi Arabian National GuardBrigade and an attached Qatari armoredbattalion, was responsible for al-KhaiJiand the surrounding desert. The 2d SaudiArabian National Guard Brigade's 5thBattalion established a screen north of al-Khafji and west of the coastal highway,behind Observation Post 7. Tariq TaskForce, comprised of the nascent SaudiArabian Marines as well as a battalion ofMoroccan infantry, was along the coastsouth of al-Khafji. Further west was 0th-man Task Force, built around the 8thMechanized Ministry of Defense and Avi-ation Brigade. A battalion of the 8thBrigade served as a screening force be-hind Observation Posts 2 and 7. In addi-tion, further west in Joint ForcesCommand-East's area of operation wasOmar Task Force, built around the 10thMechanized Ministry of Defense and Avi-

* The 1st Marine Division's 1st Light Armored In-fantry Battalion was actually a composite organiza-tion with companies from three separate lightarmored infantry battalions. To encourage a senseof identity in the ad hoc battalion, it was designatedTask Force Shepherd.

ation Brigade, with a battalion serving asa screen behind the border. The Saudimechanized screens were approximatelythree kilometers behind the border, whilethe main Saudi defensive positions wereapproximately 20 kilometers behind thescreen.

The I Marine Expeditionary Force'sarea of operations at this time was shapedsomewhat like a fat "L." The leg of the "L"extended along the bend of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border from al-Jathathil to justeast of the oil fields at al-Wafrah and thefoot of the "L" extended south of JointForces Command-East's area of opera-tions to al-Mishab and the airfield. Al-Mishab and the surrounding area wereheld by Task Force Taro, built around the3d Marines. The pillar of the "L" was heldby Task Force Shepherd and 2d Light Ar-mored Infantry Battalion, whichstretched along the border in a light ar-mored screen. Behind this screen was themassive Marine logistical base at Kibrit,which Lieutenant General Boomer, com-mander ofT Marine Expeditionary Force,decided to place forward of the main Ma-rine combat forces, in order to speed theeventual attack into Kuwait. Kibrit wasrelatively vulnerable, and during the Iraqiattack on a1-Khaii, Brigadier GeneralCharles C. Krulak, commander of the Di-rect Support Command and the Kibrit lo-gistics base, would quickly call forarmored forces to establish positionsnorth of the base. There is little indica-tion, however, that the Iraqis were everaware of the base, or its importance to fu-ture Marine operations in the region.39

Colonel Admire, responsible for thedefense of al-Mishab, was unconvincedthat Saudi forces between the Marinesand the Iraqis would fight if attacked. InJanuary, he began to run reconnaissancetraining missions into the town of al-Khafji. Teams from the 3d Platoon, Com-pany A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion,then attached to Task Force Taro, wouldinfiltrate the city by vehicle, usuallyhumvees, establish an observation post,and then leave a day or so later. Unfortu-nately, these missions were not coordi-nated with the Coalition forces inal-Khafji. This would have a dramatic im-pact during the Iraqi invasion, as CaptainMolofsky later noted: "I was unaware, [1stANGLICO's Captain James R.} Bradenwas unaware, and the Saudis were un-

aware, that the Marines had reconnais-sance teams up in al-KhaIji."4°

Other Marine operations would leadto the Coalition's success at al-KhafJi,however. In response to the difficultiesinvolved in defending Saudi Arabia froman Iraqi attack in the early days of Oper-ation Desert Shield, Marine planners haddeveloped Task Force Cunningham.They designed it as a task organized, avi-ation only task force that would stop Iraqiground maneuver forces with concen-trated fire from the air, covering the with-drawal of Saudi and Marine forces alongthe coastal highway. Bell UH-1N Hueyand AH-1W Super Cobra helicopterswould operate alongside North AmericanOV-1OD Broncos and McDonnell Dou-glas AV-8B Harrier II fixed wing aircraftin the task force. Joint Forces Command-East liked the plan, and it would serve asthe model for air support during the bat-tle.41

After the air campaign against Iraqbegan, I Marine Expeditionary Forcebegan a series of artillery raids againstIraqi forces in Kuwait. The first artilleryraid occurred on the night of 21 January,and was fired from a location just north ofal-KhafJi against enemy artillery positionsnorth of the border. Two subsequent raidsoccurred on the nights of 26 January and28 January. The 26 January raid was nearthe "elbow" at al-Jathathil, while the thirdwas again from just north of al-KhafJi. Al-though Iraqi counter-battery fire was in-effective, there was a vehicular accidentduring the 26 January raid that resulted inthe death of three Marines.

The raids served multiple purposes.First, they were aimed at specific Iraqi ar-tillery forces; second they were designedto confuse and bewilder the Iraqis bymaking the ultimate Marine breachingpoints unclear; and third they permittedMarine air to strike against the Iraqi ar-tillery, considered Iraq's most dangerousconventional asset, which inevitablyreplied with counter-battery fire.

Each raid followed the same basic pat-tern. A Marine artillery battery would ad-vance to the border and fire a carefullyplanned barrage. As soon as the shellscleared the barrels, they would "limber"the artillery pieces and drive away. Withinminutes, the firing location would be

10 The Battle of al-Khafji

empty desert. When Iraqi artillery at-tempted counter-battery fire, it would fallon the abandoned position, and waitingMarine air would pounce on the revealedIraqi artifiery and destroy it.

The composition of the raid forces fol-lowed a pattern as well. The ground ele-ment consisted of a battery of artillerywith a small security force and a companyof light armored vehicles from one of thelight armored infantry battalions. The 3dMarine Aircraft Wing provided an avia-tion element: usually an OV-10 aircraftacting as an airborne forward air con-troller, a McDonnell Douglas F/A-18DHornet and two Grumman A-6E Intrud-ers to strike the enemy artillery sites, anF/A-18D and two McDonnell DouglasF/A- 18 Hornets to suppress enemy air de-fenses, an F/A-18D as a forward air con-troller, and a Grumman EA-6B Prowlerto provide electronic counter-measuressupport.42 *

Despite the danger of Coalition air at-tacks, Saddam Hussein journeyed fromBaghdad to the southern Iraqi city of al-Basrah on the morning of 27 January,

*The F/A-18D was a two seat version of the F/A-iS.It was often used to perform coordination duties orto act as an airborne forward air controller.

where he met with two of his senior Iraqiofficers in Kuwait, General Aeeid KhlelZaky, commander of IV Corps, and Gen-eral Salah Aboud Mahmoud commanderof III Corps. Among others at the meetingwas the Minister of Defense, the chief ofstaff, their deputies, other members of thegeneral staff, and Colonel Aboud HaneedMahoud, commander of Saddam's body-guard.43

Al-Basrah's infrastructure was in ruins:"It was apparent on the road, which hadbig holes from the bombs and some de-stroyed military vehicles on the both sideof the road:' General Salah Aboud re-membered. "In al-Basrah region all thedamage was clear and we noticed it on thebridge, railroads, on the roads, on the fa-cilities.... And the streets were very dark,compared to before the war, when theywere glowing." At the military headquar-ters there was no power and small candlesdimly lit the rooms. General Salah did notrealize that he was to meet Saddam untilhe "saw the faces of the special guards'

At the meeting, the Iraqi president pre-sented the plan for the attack on al-KhaIJiand then gave his officers some words ofinspiration. As General Hashem Sultanlater recalled, Saddam began by discussingIraqi military successes in the Iran-IraqWar. He said that success had come from

Iraqi willpower, despite Iran's advantagesin personnel and material. Then he dis-cussed the Coalition air campaign against"our factories, cities, and roads:' The airattacks had already lasted two weeks, heexplained, because the Coalition did nothave as much willpower as the Iraniansand was afraid to fight a ground waragainst Iraq.45

He then told his officers that by inflict-ing casualties on the Coalition they wouldwin the war, and save the lives of thou-sands of Iraqi citizens. Waiting was not toIraq's advantage, they must do somethingnow, implying that Iraq could not survivethe continuous air bombardment. Heconcluded with an old Iraqi proverb: "Inorder to be ready to fight the fox, youmust prepare to fight the lion'46

General Salah Aboud Mahmoud,given command of the al-Khaf)i mission,informed Saddam that he would presenthim with the city as a present on themorning of 30 January.47 The meetingthen broke up and the Iraqi president re-turned to Baghdad, surviving an attack bytwo U.S. Air Force General Dynamics F-16 Falcons. The Air Force did not realizethey had hit Saddam's convoy until afterthe war.48

General Salah Aboud returned toKuwait and met with his division and

The Battle of al-Khafi 11

History Division Photo

Marines of Task Force Shepherd plan their next operation. In addition to screening duties, the light armored infantry battalions alsoprovided security for the Marine batteries conducting artillery raids on Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom, 1991, Modified by W. Stephen Hill

brigade commanders at the 5th Mecha-nized Division's headquarters, then at theoil facility of al-Maqoa. He instructed hiscommanders in tactics for counteringCoalition airpower and ordered them todig in quickly after reaching their objec-tives. He then passed on Saddam's inspi-rational words and told them of hispromise to make Saddam a present of al-Khafji on the morning of 30 January. Fi-nally, he approved IV Corps' request forartillery fire against the sector oppositethe 7th Infantry and 14th Infantry Divi-sions. The Iraqi forces then began to

move into position for the upcoming bat-tle.49

The Coalition did have some indica-tions that the Iraqis were planning some-thing. One of the E-8C Joint Surveillanceand Target Acquisition Radar System air-craft reported large Iraqi vehicle move-ments on the night of 22 January, andagain on 25 January. These were only pre-liminary Iraqi movements, but it alsonoted the Iraqi movement on the night of28 January, which was the direct prepara-

tion for the upcoming offensive.50All three of the observation posts

manned by air-naval gunfire liaisonMarines (Observation Posts 2, 7, and 8)reported unusually heavy Iraqi activity onthe nights of 27 and 28 January. In addi-tion, the Marines reported "sporadic Iraqirocket and artillery fires were directed atthe city of al-KhaIji, the forward Saudi de-fensive belt, and the border observationposts, often with illumination roundsmixed in?'5t On the night of 27 January,Marines at Observation Post 7 called in astrike on Iraqi "mechanized reconnais-

12 The Battle of al-Khaf3i

sance forces" moving in front of their po-sition, reporting two Iraqi armored per-sonnel carriers destroyed.52 Some Marineofficers considered the Iraqi movementsto be a response to the Marine artilleryraids which had taken place on 21 and 26January.53

On the night of 28 January the re-ported Iraqi mechanized movements co-incided with another Marine artilleryraid. The teams at the desalination plantnorth of al-Khafi, and at ObservationPost 8, each called for airstrikes on Iraqiforces they observed, but the artillery raidjust to the west had the priority for airsupport.54 By 0315 on the 29th, the ar-tillery raid had concluded and air supportwas again available to the observationpost teams. At Observation Post 7, theair-naval gunfire supporting arms liaisonteam under Captain John C. Bley II calleda flight of Fairchild-Republic A-b Thun-derbolt attack aircraft in on a column ofIraqi armored vehicles moving westacross its front toward the al-Wafrah oilfield. The Iraqi column suffered heavydamage; Bley's team reported nearly adozen vehicles destroyed. The team ob-served Iraqi soldiers trying to recover ve-hicles at sunrise.55 The team atObservation Post 2 also observed a largeIraqi force moving from east to west,which Coalition air power engaged. Allthree observation posts heard the move-ment of the Iraqi vehicles for the rest ofthe night.56

One Coalition officer who realized, atthe time, that the Iraqis were preparingfor an offensive was Lieutenant ColonelRichard M. Barry, commander of the for-ward headquarters of the 1st Surveillance,Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group.He closely monitored Iraqi radio trafficduring the airstrikes on 28 January anddecided that "the Iraqis put probably 150sappers out there to try and clear thatroad. [I] sensed they really wanted itopened. They were obviously using thatroad as some sort of interior line like atGettysburg:'57 The information waspassed on to higher headquarters. Lieu-tenant Colonel Barry was right; the air at-tacks against the 3d Armored Division as ittried to pass through the Iraqi minefieldsof al-Wafrah paralyzed much of the divi-sion and General Saiah Aboud spentmuch of 29 January trying to fix thescheduling problems these attackscaused.58 When the division's attacks fi-nally did fall on Observation Post 4 andObservation Post 1, they would be farweaker as a result.

Despite Lieutenant Colonel Barry'swarning that "this is it . . . the Iraqis wantKhal5i," Central Command thought thepossibility of an Iraqi ground attack re-mote as attention was focused on the aircampaign and the expected ground of-fensive to liberate Kuwait.59

eral Salah Aboud inspected the assemblyareas of the SthMechanizedDivision, andfound fewer vehicles moving than he ex-pected, many being broken down along-side the road. He also found that thedivision's deception operations wereworking well and he saw no sign thatCoalition forces knew of its movements.He believed this was because "the orderwas given to take cover under the smokeclouds of the burning oil, and also thetanks, the armored personnel carriers,and the support weapons' vehicles wereall deployed under the trees of al-Thaiand were hard to see."6°

Things were going worse with the 3dArmored Division, especially with the di-vision's 6th Armored Brigade commandedby Colonel Ibdii Raziq Mahmoud. Thebrigade had been pounded by Coalitionaircraft the night before and it had lost atleast two tanks.

"On the morning of 29 January, theenemy started screaming and shoutingafter we completed deploying our forcesin the desert area; although the enemyhad their reconnaissance technologiesthey were not able to notice our forces:'recalled Brigadier General Hussan Zedincommander of the 3d Armored Division.He added: "[Coalition aircraftl started toattack our troops during the daylight, intheir concealed locations. They tried toaffect our morale and cause damage inorder to make us too weak to execute themission:' 61On the morning of 29 January, Gen-

The Marines of 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, would spend much of their time in the desert at ObservationPost 4. Here they pose around an Iraqi T-55 tank captured on the morning of 30 January 1991.

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

The Battle of al-Khafji 13

The air attacks led General SalahAboud to conclude that the Coalition haddiscovered his brigade, and he expectedit would face stiff resistance at its objec-tives. He told the 3d Armored Divisioncommander, Brigadier Commander Hus-san Zedin, that the 6th Armored Brigadecould expect to face "tanks, anti-tankweapons, and armored cars." He orderedthe brigade to employ "a reconnaissanceassault a suitable distance ahead of themain convoy to get information about thestrength of the resistance of the enemy."62

General Salah Aboud was wrong,however. Aside from Lieutenant ColonelBarry at 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance,and Intelligence Group, the Coalition wasnot expecting an Iraqi attack, missingmuch of the Iraqi movement and inter-preting the movement that it did observeas either training exercises or reactions tothe Marine artillery raids. On the morn-ing of 29 January, the Iraqi III Corps andIV Corps had moved to their assemblyareas successfully. Coalition air powerhad already inflicted significant losses,but those losses had resulted from routinestrikes in Kuwait and chance attacksagainst Iraqi forces caught moving in theopen. The bulk of the Coalition's air effortremained focused elsewhere.

At al-Khafji, the various special oper-ations and reconnaissance forces occupy-ing the city were proceeding with whathad become their normal day. For theair-naval gunfire liaison Marines, thismeant routine relief of the forward posi-tions. Captain Douglas R. Kleinsmith'ssupporting arms liaison team relievedCaptain Bley and his team at ObservationPost 7 in the early morning, and Bley'steam returned to the group headquartersat the water desalination plant north ofal-Khafji.

Less routine, but not surprising, wasthe capture of three Iraqi soldiers byMarines at Observation Post 8. All threewere in clean uniforms, and appeared tobe in good health, despite two weeks ofCoalition airstrikes. First Lieutenant Kur-tis E. Lang, commander of the air-navalgunfire team at the post, thought theywere forward observers; the Iraqis carriedmaps that detailed Iraqi and some Coali-tion positions, including ObservationPost 8. A U.S. Navy SEAL unit tookcharge of the prisoners and sent them tothe rear. Approximately 30 minutes after

the team captured the Iraqis, the enemyfired a single tank shell at the position,causing no damage.63

Along the coastal highway there werealso indications of increased Iraqi activ-ity. At Observation Post 7, Captain Klein-smith reported Iraqi artillery six to eightkilometers in front of his position, whileat Observation Post 8, Lieutenant Langreported heavy vehicle noises.64 At 2000,Captain Kleinsmith directed a successfulA-6 attack on the two Iraqi artillery posi-tions, eliminating at least one of thesites.65

Observation Post 4 was a two-storySaudi police post known as Markaz al-Zabr. To the north, along the border rana large berm approximately 15 feet high.The fort protected one of the few open-ings in the embankment.66 On 29 Janu-ary, Observation Post 4 was the only postthis far west that was manned; it was heldby 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Recon-naissance Battalion, and a company oflight armored vehicles.

The reconnaissance platoon had orig-inally been Deep Reconnaissance Platoon,Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battal-ion, based on Okinawa. Comprised ofvolunteers, it had shipped out to the Mid-dle East in the initial rush to get Marines

to Saudi Arabia in September 1990. Withits parent battalion remaining on Oki-nawa, the platoon was absorbed into 1stReconnaissance Battalion.67

Nearly two weeks before, the platoon,commanded by First Lieutenant Steven A.Ross, was assigned to Observation Post 4.Working as a platoon was a welcomechange, since it had been previously as-signed to various observation posts insmaller groups alongside other Marine re-connaissance and Army special forcesteams. Supplies were running low, how-ever, and the platoon was to be relievedon 30 January. Lieutenant Ross had dis-persed his men along the berm, dividedinto three teams along a 500-meter front.Armed with M16 rifles, M249 squad au-tomatic weapons, M60 machine guns,and M136 AT4 antitank weapons, theMarines were not equipped to stop amajor Iraqi assault. Lieutenant Ross sta-tioned the platoon's vehicles, fourhumvees and a 6x6 5-ton truck, behind aU-shaped berm approximately 500 me-ters to the rear of the observation post. Inthe event of a serious Iraqi attack, the planwas for the platoon to withdraw to the U-shaped berm, mount up, and move to therear while calling in airstrikes on theIraqis.68

Captain Roger L. Pollard's CompanyD, 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion,

14 The Battle of al-Khafji

Marine Corps Art Collection

The Saudi border fort at Observation Post 4 was known as "OP Hamma" to someMarines. The painting by Capt Charles G. Grow depicts the oilfields at al-Wafrah on firefollowing a Coalition bombing raid on 24 January 1991.