Delegation CP

This CP would be run against affirmatives whose agent was the Congress- the CP delegates rule making authority to an executive agency, and then has the agency do the plan. The primary net benefit is Politics- delegation allows congress to maximize credit and minimize blame for controversial issues.

Heres how criddle explains the due process clause applied to delegation

The Due Process Clause's application to congressional lawmaking has important implications for legislative delegations to administrative agencies. Specifically, due process of lawmaking prohibits Congress from entrusting lawmaking authority to agencies outside the constraints of liberty-conserving administrative procedures. In other words, to satisfy due process, administrative rulemaking procedures must be sufficiently fair and deliberative to ensure, at a minimum, that an agency's institutional capacity for arbitrariness in the administrative process is not manifestly greater than Congress's capacity for arbitrariness in the legislative process. n229 While due process does not require any "particular form of procedure" in rulemaking proceedings, n230 Congress must take care to prescribe procedural [*170] safeguards that will prevent delegations of lawmaking authority from introducing domination that would subvert the republican ideals implicit in the checks and balances of Articles I and II. n231

1NC Delegation CP

The counterplan avoids politics- Public choice theory proves

Williams, Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law 2K (Stanford Law Review, Vol. 38: DOUGLAS: SYMPOSIUM CONGRESS: DOES IT ABDICATE ITS POWER?: CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION, LEGAL THEORY, AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY. published in 2000.)KalM

The question of whether and why Congress abdicates power is a complex one. n4 In Part I, I consider the distinction Dr. Fisher draws between abdication and delegation. I conclude that, with respect to war and budgetary matters, congressional behavior is different from ordinary forms of delegation. Nonetheless, delegation poses some of the same general concerns that attend Dr. Fisher's claim of abdication. For that reason, it makes sense to consider these behaviors as linked, with an initial hypothesis that they stem from the same general conditions. [*76] In Part II, I explore the question of why Congress might willingly choose to give away power. In my view, partial explanations or factors of significance are about the best one can hope to identify in pursuing this inquiry. I will first argue that, to the extent that Congress may be said to have abdicated its constitutional authority, a public choice analytic supplies a useful starting point. On this view, individual Members of Congress will act in ways that maximize their opportunities for reelection. In some circumstances, choices that maximize reelection opportunities may compromise institutional powers and responsibility. In cases of this sort, we should expect the interests of individual members in advancing their own fortunes to dominate over the members' interest in advancing institutional interests.

Extensions Solvency-Due ProcessCp text: Congress should delegate authority to the nsa under the due process clause of the constitutionDue Process is the best method of delegation

Criddle Associate law professor 11

Evan WHEN DELEGATION BEGETS DOMINATION: DUE PROCESS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAWMAKING From the university of Georgia Law Review

As developed in the foregoing discussion, the due process model promotes the Constitution's republican design by conserving liberty in the administrative state. While reasonable minds might disagree about which particular safeguards are necessary to safeguard individual liberty when Congress entrusts lawmaking powers to administrative agencies, the three-part due process model outlined in the preceding sections best captures the Court's answer to these republican concerns.

This due process model is superior to both the traditional nondelegation doctrine and the current delegation doctrine because it allows Congress to harvest the benefits of broad delegation while checking the attendant threats to individual [*186] liberty. Like the traditional nondelegation doctrine, the due process model takes seriously the republican values embodied in constitutional checks and balances, but it does not require Congress to make every meaningful policy decision within those bounds. Instead, the due process model reconciles administrative lawmaking with the Constitution's republican design by requiring Congress to establish a minimalist substantive standard, combined with administrative procedures and judicial review to further limit potential agency arbitrariness. This approach is more principled than the traditional nondelegation doctrine because it sidesteps the dubious proposition that Congress does not delegate legislative powers to administrative agencies. n313 It also clarifies why congressional delegations need only establish an intelligible principle rather than a fully determinate criterion to pass constitutional muster at a substantial level. n314

For similar reasons, the due process model is vastly superior to the new nondelegation doctrine. n315 Both the new nondelegation doctrine and the due process model support the principle that federal agencies lack inherent authority to make law absent a delegation from Congress through legislation or from the President through subdelegation. The due process model is less susceptible to judicial domination than the new nondelegation doctrine, however, because it does not deputize courts to narrow broad congressional delegations through canons of statutory interpretation. n316 The due process model leaves the responsibility to establish an intelligible principle where it belongs: with Congress and the President, subject to the checks and balances of Articles I and II. The Judicial Branch's role, in contrast, is limited to evaluating whether Congress has established (1) an intelligible principle, (2) fair and deliberative administrative procedures, and (3) structural constraints such as political accountability and judicial review.

Delegation agencies have to abide by the due process clause, solves case

Criddle Associate law professor 11

Evan WHEN DELEGATION BEGETS DOMINATION: DUE PROCESS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAWMAKING From the University of Georgia Law review

A third area where the due process model could inform federal administrative law is agency self-regulation. Prior to American Trucking, some legal scholars argued that courts should allow administrative agencies to narrow unconstitutionally broad congressional delegations by establishing substantive standards to limit their own discretion. n353 The Court soundly rejected this position, however, in American Trucking. n354 Just as federal courts cannot cure unconstitutional delegations by supplying intelligible principles of their own design, n355 agency self-regulation does not adequately address the problem of unfettered administrative agency authority. The problem, as the Court recognized, is that an administrative agency's "choice of which portion of [Congress's delegated] power to exercise . . . would itself be an exercise of [*197] [unchecked] legislative authority." n356 If Congress does not provide an intelligible principle to guide agency discretion at the outset, principles of procedural and structural due process are ineffectual as safeguards against administrative arbitrariness because agencies, like courts, lack an independent standard against which to evaluate their actions. Although agency self-regulation might be desirable from a republican perspective to limit arbitrariness downstream at the adjudication stage, it does not fully address the domination concerns that arise when Congress delegates unfettered lawmaking authority to an agency at the rulemaking stage. An agency cannot, therefore, "cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute." n357

On the other hand, agency self-regulation may remedy Congress's failure to prescribe appropriate administrative procedures. Procedural due process asks whether an agency has engaged in a fair and deliberative process leading to a rational explanation of the legal and factual basis for the agency's action. n358 When courts conduct this inquiry, it should make little difference whether an agency's procedures derive from the APA, other federal legislation, or administrative self-regulation. Although agencies cannot exercise delegated lawmaking powers without employing minimally fair and deliberative procedures, Congress need not be the one to establish those procedures. As long as an agency's lawmaking procedures satisfy the minimum requirements of due process, congressional delegation does not lead to domination. n359

The due process model thus suggests that administrative agencies may cure procedural defects in congressional delegations by binding themselves prospectively to employ fair and deliberative lawmaking procedures. As recognized in American Trucking, however, no amount of agency self-regulation, no matter how well- intentioned, can compensate for Congress's failure to establish a substantive intelligible principle to constrain agency discretion. n360

Solves case

Criddle Associate law professor 11

Evan WHEN DELEGATION BEGETS DOMINATION: DUE PROCESS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAWMAKING Published in the university of Georgia law review

This Article has argued that federal courts should abandon the traditional nondelegation doctrine and embrace due process as the primary constitutional constraint on congressional delegation. According to the due process model, Congress may delegate lawmaking authority to administrativ