deliverable 1.2. - wordpress.com · the deliverable 1.2. will be publicised within the consortium...

EuTRACE_Deliverable 1.1 GRANT AGREEMENT No 306395)

1

EuTRACE

(GRANT AGREEMENT No 306395)

Deliverable 1.2.

Climate Engineering case studies: what lessons can be learned

from recent research?

Dissemination Level: Pu

Deliverable Date: Month 6 (30/11/2012)

Actual Submission Date: 27/12/2012


2

Deliverable prepared by: Rodrigo Ibarrola, Dr Simon Shackley and Dr Josselin Rouillard

School of GeoSciences

University of Edinburgh

Drummond Library

Surgeon’s Square

Edinburgh, EH8 9XP

Tel: +44(0) 131 650 7862

Email: [email protected]

Dr Naomi Vaughan and Dr Jason Chilvers

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research

School of Environmental Sciences

University of East Anglia

Norwich, Norfolk, NR4 7TJ

Tel: +44(0) 1603 593904

Email: [email protected]


3

Climate Engineering case studies: what lessons can be learned

from recent research?

Summary

We analyse four recent cases of climate engineering (CE) (stratospheric particle injection (SPICE), iron

fertilisation in ocean(LOHAFEX) and two bioenergy with CO2 capture and storage (BECCS) – Greenville

and Decatur)) that took place in, or involved, the following countries: USA, Germany, India and the

UK. The aim of WP1 is to assess and refine the framing of climate engineering in academic, policy and

societal contexts and to deliver an overarching framework for the assessment of CE. WP1.2

contributes to this by drawing lessons from the four case-studies in terms of the following.

(1) Technical characteristics, risks, impacts and regulation – where we identified a range of

(often opaque) motivations (from basic research to applied demonstration) and use of

different evalution methods (e.g. risk impact assessment and legal analysis in LOHAFEX, EPA

legislation at Decatur; use of the responsible innovation framework in SPICE). In all cases,

new, or modifications of existing, evalution frameworks were necessary. There is, as yet, no

legal and regulatory framework able to cover most types of CE research, development or

deployment. The application of the current fragmented governance framework has met with

problems and, partly as a consequence, two out of the four case studies were not successful.

While necessary, neither well-developed regulatory processes nor self-governance are by

themselves capable of absorbing controversies on CE and supporting consensus-building.

Where regulatory and assessment innovation has been introduced (e.g. SPICE), this has

engendered new challenges as further perspectives and actors have become engaged and

given new roles.

(2) Role of personal and private-sector interests (again often opaque) which became a source of

conflict in three case-studies (SPICE (directly through a patent application), Greenville

(through distrust of the motive of the company involved) and LOHAFEX (indirectly through

Planktos Inc.)). Given the emerging ethical and political debates around the

commercialisation and motives of CE research and technology, the minimum requirement is

for transparency and openness on any IP position or commercial or other vested interest.

(3) Trust in the project developers, project partnership managers and mediating institutions,

appears fundamental for the success of a CE project (witness the success so far at Decatur,

Illinois, where the long-established relationship between the company and local community

college has been key to the community dialogue). Entrenched views and scepticism

concerning the respective good-will of participants to work for the collective good can

strongly undermine consensus-building.

(4) Public perceptions – Participants in public engagement events highlighted the importance of

looking at health and safety issues, ethics, transparency, the wider context and alternative

options and good governance aspects in CE projects. Local communities became intensively

involved in one of the case-studies in the role of opponent (Greenville), as moderately

supportive in another case (Decatur) and not directly involved in the other two cases (SPICE

and LOHAFEX). In the case of LOHAFEX, it is unclear whom the relevant public would even be

as the experiment was funded by two nations and undertaken in international waters.

International NGOs and the media can play a pivotal role in the success or otherwise of CE

experiments, by bringing the attention of other stakeholders, decision-makers and the public


4

to these activities and raising difficult questions about their legality and appropriate

regulation.

Dissemination and Uptake

The Deliverable 1.2. will be publicised within the consortium through participation of some of the

authors in the January 2013 Berlin project meeting. It will be posted on the project website, where it

will be available to both project partners and external individuals and organisations. We also plan to

circulate the deliverable, once approved, to the key informants who assisted us and will also seek to

present the findings at one or more international conference. Finally, we are working on a

manuscript which we will submit to the journal Global Environmental Change.

Introduction

Climate Engineering (CE) is rapidly becoming a major source of academic and policy debate.

Questions have been raised such as how to predict and manage risks and uncertainties, the role and

scope of regulations, the role of private actors and public participation (Cicerone, 2006; Royal

Society, 2009; Corner and Pidgeon, 2010; Reynolds, 2011; Bellamy et al., 2012). We have examined

four CE experiments with different motivations and outcomes. We define ‘experiments’ as meaning

‘in-situ’, ‘field’ or ‘pilot’ studies or ‘demonstrations’ where the aim is to test scientific hypotheses or

to demonstrate that a technological idea works as anticipated when implemented outside the

laboratory.

We focus on CE experiments that have either taken place or been proposed but then abandoned: the

injection of sulphate aerosols into the lower stratosphere, the enhancement of oceanic uptake of

CO2 via iron fertilisation of oceans, and the capture and storage of CO2 emissions from biomass

sources (so-called Bioenergy Carbon Capture and Storage or BECCS). Four CE projects were

examined: the SPICE project (stratospheric aerosol injection), the LOHAFEX project (iron fertilisation

of oceans) and two BECCS projects. The projects occurred in several legislatures: UK (SPICE), German-

Indian (LOHAFEX) (though with application in international waters) and Ohio and Illinois in the U.S.

(the two BECCS projects). The source of information we draw upon is written records (e.g. risk

assessments, news articles, academic papers, reports, project web-sites and blog sites) and a small

number of key information interviews (3 in person, 4 by telephone, 1 by email). A table with a

summary of the main characteristics of each case study is presented as Table One, while Tables Two

to Four present the main facts and timeline associated with the SPICE, LOHAFEX and two BECCS case-

studies respectively.

Case-Study One: The Stratospheric Particle Injection for climate Engineering (SPICE)

SPICE is a collaboration between the Universities of Bristol, Cambridge, Oxford and Edinburgh in the

UK, and is funded by three British research funding bodies: the Engineering and Physical Sciences

Research Council (EPSRC), the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and the Science and

Technology Facility Council, in partnership under the Living with Environmental Change (LWEC)

programme. In 2010, EPSRC and NERC ran a CE ‘sandpit’, this being a residential interactive

workshop involving 30-40 participants including three ‘mentors’, researchers, end-users and

stakeholders. Two consortia emerged from the sandpit: SPICE, which planned to evaluate the

potential for reducing climate forcing through injecting particles into the stratosphere (SRM) and the

four year Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering Proposals (IAGP) project.

Part of SPICE entailed development of a tethered balloon delivery mechanism from which aerosols

could be sprayed into the atmosphere. In addition to computational modelling, the plan was to test

out the design of the tethered balloon and pump device, but 1 km up into the atmosphere as


5

opposed to the c. 20 km required for actual deployment. According to some, this constitutes the UK’s

first field trial of a CE technology, even if no actual CE has occurred (Macnaghten and Owen, 2011,

Owen 2012, personal communication) (and despite a less visible CE activity - biochar field trials -

having already started several years earlier). In the several months following the CE sandpit, the

research councils had internal discussions regarding a novel research governance framework to

provide oversight. This was in response to the recommendations of the Royal Society’s 2009 report

on CE, built upon in the issuance of the Oxford Principles for regulating CE (Rayner et al, 2009) and

focus group work on public perceptions of geoengineering organised by NERC in 2010. (The Oxford

Princples called for: i) geoengineering to be regulated as a public good, ii) public participation in

decision making, iii) disclosure of research and open publication of results, iv) independent

assessment of impacts, and v) governance before deployment).

A ‘stage-gate’ process was established, whereby the experiment could only go ahead with the

agreement of an expert panel comprising of an environmental sociologist (Chair), a sociologist of

science, an atmospheric scientist, an aerospace engineer, a management scientist and a

representative of an Environmental NGO. This panel adopted a range of decision-making criteria for

deciding whether the tethered balloon experiment could proceed, these criteria derived from several

decades of experience on ‘constructive technology assessment’ and ‘responsible innovation’ (Stilgoe

et al., 2013): safety, compliance with regulations, communication of the project’s purposes to enable

discussion, anticipating future applications, and identifying public and stakeholder views (Kruger,

2012, personal communication). The stage-gate panel advised that the experiment fulfilled the

following assessment criteria: „(i) the test-bed is safe, the principal risks have been identified and

managed, and are deemed acceptable; (ii) the test-bed deployment is compliant with relevant

regulations; and (iii) the nature and purpose of the SPICE project is clearly communicated to external

parties” (Stilgoe et al., 2013). But the panel agreed only a pass pending with respect to the following

criteria: „ (iv) applications and impacts have been described, and mechanisms put in place to review

these; and (v) mechanisms have been identified to understand public and stakeholder views

regarding these predicted applications and impacts” (ibid.), hence requested that the SPICE team

provide a revised communications plan, further explore ethical and legal issues and organise an

engagement process with stakeholders.

Public perceptions of geoengineering were explored using focus groups in 2010 (NERC, 2010) and by

the IAGP project in 2011 through a series of one-day deliberative workshops held in a number of

cities across the UK. The participants were lay public, not stakeholders such as NGOs, professional or

civic associations. Results from the IAGP workshops are published elsewhere (Parkhill and Pidgeon,

2011) and suffice it to comment here that participants agreed that the SPICE test was a research

opportunity, but few were fully comfortable with using stratospheric aerosols as a response to

climate change. Concerns over environmental, health and safety issues were raised alongside

discussion of the ethics, governance of wider deployment beyond the test and a request for more

transparency and better explanation of why CE research was being funded (Parkhill and Pidgeon,

2011).

In September 2011, the research councils decided to delay making a final decision regarding the

SPICE test in order to allow the team time to respond to the recommendations of the stage-gate

panel. At around the same time, awareness of the SPICE experiment was growing within sections of

the media and some environmental NGOs were taking an increasingly vocal line in opposition to the

experiment proceeding. A key argument of the ENGOs was that the SPICE experiment contravened

the provisions of a decision by the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UN CBD) (of which the UK

was, at the time, the Chair) to permit only those CE field trials which were ‘small-scale’ and ‘low risk’

(The Guardian, 2011). Fifty ENGOs signed a petition organised by the ETC Group, that was sent to the

UK government demanding that the project be cancelled (ETC Group, 2011).


6

In May 2012, the project PI, Dr Mathew Watson of University of Bristol, cancelled the experimental

part of SPICE, though the rest of the project (lab- and desk-based) is continuing. Why was the SPICE

experiment cancelled? There is no single reason but elements of an answer are to found in the

opposition of ENGOs (which is likely to have made research funders anxious, especially since critical

comments were being directed at their paymasters, the UK government) (Cressey, 2012), the lack of

a clear regulatory framework with which to govern CE research (Stilgoe et al., 2013, Watson, 2012)

and a conflict of interest around a patent application related to the tethered balloon delivery

mechanism (Owen, 2012, Watson, 2012 and Stilgoe et al., 2013). One of the mentors had submitted

this patent application prior to the sand-pit event and had informed the EPSRC. For reasons that are

not clear, the EPSRC decided not to inform the participants of the sand-pit of this application. Not

even the PI of SPICE was aware of this application. When the existence of the patent application

became public, considerable consternation was evident amongst some of the SPICE project partners,

stage-gate panel members and within the wider sand-pit group. In addition to the failure of

transparency amongst the interested community, there also appears to have been a

misunderstanding between the worlds of ’natural science’ and of ‘engineering’ – in the latter,

patenting is a routine affair whereas in the former, it was viewed with some suspicion as an attempt

to gain control over an area of technology development and thereby to exclude other developers.

Case-Study Two: The Iron-Fertilisation LOHAFEX Experiment

The LOHAFEX project proposed to undertake iron-fertilisation on a larger scale than previously (ten

tonnes of iron sulphate applied over 300 m2). At least 10 iron enrichment experiments were

conducted between 1993 and 2003 in different parts of the world (Strong et al., 2009a). A major

driver behind such experiments has been to improve understanding of the relationship between

plankton ecology and the carbon cycle and the role that this may have in wider climatic changes

(Smetacek, personal communication, 2012); hence basic research questions have driven iron

fertilisation experiments, not simply an applied interest in CE.

ENGOs had argued that that some of these experiments, in particular one led by Planktos Inc. (a US

based company) in 2007, were a violation of international laws on marine dumping, in particular the

1972 London Convention. The Conference of the Parties to the London Convention issued a

statement of concern in autumn 2007 regarding the legality and practice of large-scale ocean iron

fertilization activities. In early 2008, Planktos Inc. cancelled operations, citing a lack of funds and a

disinformation campaign organised by ENGOs. Plankos’s ambition of creating a revenue stream from

carbon markets from its iron-fertilisation activities were widely condemned by ENGOs (Strong et al.,

2009a). In May of the same year, members of the UN CBD passed a decision on iron fertilization,

citing the concerns of the London Convention, and requesting all member states to ensure that

ocean iron fertilization activities do not take place, with the exception of small-scale scientific studies

in coastal waters, until there is more scientific evidence to justify such experiments.

The LOHAFEX project started in 2005 as a collaboration between the Alfred Wegener Institute for

Polar and the Marine Research (Helmholtz Association) in Germany, and the National Institute of

Oceanography in India. The project was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Research, with

half the ship’s running costs paid by the Government of India, and aimed to examine the effects of

oceanic iron fertilisation on algal growth, biogeochemistry and the carbon cycle (Alfred Weneger

Institute, 2009; Smetacek, personal communication, 2012). An in-situ experiment was to be carried

out in the South West Atlantic in early 2009. LOHAFEX was planned several years prior to the UN

CBD resolution of late 2007 though the project organisers attempted to publicise the experiment

(e.g. Smetacek & Naqvi, 2008), participating in a meeting of the parties to the London Convention

and in informal discussions with Greenpeace. LOHAFEX recevied publicity when the project

agreement was ratified by both German and Indian governments during a visit of the German

Chancellor to India (Smetacek, personal communication, 2012).


7

After the ship had left harbour for the research site, the ETC Group started a campaign against

LOHAFEX, a campaign which Greenpeace and WWF (ibid.) subsequently joined. The legality of the

experiment and lack of independent monitoring were questioned (Federal Ministry for the

Environment, 2009; ETC Group, 2009). In response, the German Research Ministry postponed the

project start for two weeks and organised further independent assessments. The Federal Ministries

for Reserach and Environment agreed that they would jointly seek expert evaluations on whether the

CBD resolution was binding and on the scientific value of the experiment. The three separate legal

opinions were in agreement that the experiment was legal. For example, the legal opinion released

by the Walther-Schücking-Institut for International Law argued that the UN CBD decisions are legally

non-binding and that iron fertilization experiments do not constitute ‘dumping’ if the goal is to

undertake scientific research (Proelss, 2009). Imprecision in the meaning of exemption terms such as

‘coastal waters’ and ‘small scale experiments’, was also noted (Strong et al., 2009b). Meanwhile, the

Indian Minister of Research wrote to their German counterpart requesting that LOHAFEX be

continued as planned. Cancelling the experiment might have been awkward in diplomatic terms.

The German Ministry of Research allowed the continuation of the experiment, though calls for more

clarity and for a clear distinction between experiments and commercial projects followed in its

aftermath (Strong et al., 2009a). Results from LOHAFEX were rather discouraging vis-a-vis use of iron

fertilisation as a CDR technique; iron addition stimulated phytoplankton production, but

accumulation increased for a short time only (Royal Society, 2009). Controversy regarding iron

fertilization again erupted in 2012 when Planktos Inc. dropped 100 tonnes of iron sulphate into

the Pacific Ocean, resulting in increased algal growth over an area of 10,000 square miles. Opposition

groups, again led by ETC, criticised Plankon maintaining that it continued to violate the UN CBD.

The Bio-Energy Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (BECCS) in Greenville, Ohio

The BECCS project in Greenville aimed to demonstrate the feasibility of integrating bioenergy

generation from corn ethanol with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS). There were two main

objectives: 1) to capture one million tons of CO2 over four years from a corn ethanol plant and store

it in a saline aquifer at 1,000 m depth, and 2) to demonstrate the technical and commercial potential

of large-scale CCS. The project was led through a collaboration between Battelle, Andersons

Marathon ethanol plant and two local governments (i.e. Darke County and Greenville). The project

started in early 2007 when preliminary briefings were held between the companies and local

government officials, and was announced to the public in May 2007 (Hammond and Shackley, 2010).

The first public meeting was organised by the companies in August 2008. In March 2009, an

opposition group called Citizens Against CO2 Sequestration was formed (Citizens against CO2, 2009),

raising questions concerning: 1) the possible risks, hazards and liabilities (e.g. groundwater

contamination, use of explosives, increased risk of earthquakes, road closures, decrease in property

values); 2) a feeling of being experimented upon by the industry and government; and 3) a distrust

towards the companies involved and the science underpinning the technology (including climate

change science itself). The group expressed the view that there had been a lack of transparency and

consultation with the local community on the part of the developer and that plans did not include

sufficient local development opportunities (Hammond and Shackley, 2010).

Despite such opposition, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency approved the project in June

2009 with a drilling test to be carried out in July 2009. Over the next three months opposition

became more manifest, for instance a protest march took place, several protest meeting were held

(attracting hundreds of people) and a poll showed that 97% of the local community opposed the

project (Darke Journal, 2009). According to Bradbury (personal commmunication, 2009), the

company was new to the area and its motives for supporting a BECCS project were not fully trusted


8

(with some residents believing that the motivation was to smooth planning permission more

generally). Furthermore, there was widespread scepticism concerning anthropogenic climate change

within the local community, hence the rationale offered for the project was not convincing (ibid.).

In August 2009, the County Commissioners formally requested that the project be terminated, and,

by then, local and state political support appears to have waned. The project was ultimately

cancelled by the developers that same month. Since then, there have been no further attempts to

develop BECCS or CCS technologies in this region, and the Citizens against CO2 Sequestration

continue to support protests to CCS activities in other regions.

The Bio-Energy Carbon Capture and Storage project, Decatur, Illinois

The DECATUR project aims to demonstrate the feasibility of integrating bioenergy generation (corn

ethanol) with CCS. More specific objectives include: i) to inject 3.6 million tonnes of CO2 at a depth of

2,000 meters into a sandstone site; and ii) thereby to test and demonstrate geological CO2

sequestration in a saline reservoir. The project is a partnership between Archer Daniels Midland

(ADM), who operate a corn ethanol fermentation facility in Decatur, the Midwest Geological

Sequestration Consortium, Illinois State Geological Survey, the Richland Community College, and

Schlumberger. Funding also comes from the U.S. Department of Energy‘s large-scale CCS

demonstration programme under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Following a permit

application to the Illinois Environment Protection Agency in 2008, a final authorisation was issued

under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) regulations in November 2011 (EPA, 2011). Drilling of

several wells and the first CO2 injection are now underway and the site is planned to be fully

operational in 2013.

Richland Community College has provided a platform for undertaking community consultation and

engagement as well as training and education. The College has organised open-forums to disucuss

the project since 2010, typically 100 or so people attending events

(Brauer, 2012, personal communication). The College organised presentations and question-and-

answer sessions between the local community, technical experts (e.g. Illinois Geological Survey) and

companies involved (i.e. ADM and Schlumberger). While the College acted as a meeting place for all

parties, it is not strictly neutral in the sense that it is supportive of the project and has had a formal

role in training workers for and from ADM that goes back several decades. A key message from the

project and College has been the educational and employment opportunities, framed in the context

of a broad notion of sustainability. Other outreach activities include speaking to established and

influential local community groups, and a three-minute TV spot on “CCS and sustainability“ that may

have reached an audience of up to 3 million people in Illinois. The College has devised a number of

specialised degree options on CCS in the last few years.

A National CO2 Sequestration Education Centre, managed by the College, has been developed to

present the Decatur BECCS project. It has a footprint of 15,000 square feet, and contains various

classrooms and laboratory facilities. It is intended that it will provide community and regional

outreach through an interactive visitor’s centre, for example including a game-based CCS computer

simulation. The Centre also aims to position BECCS within the wider context of sustainable energy

options, including wind turbines, solar, geothermal, and biomass technology. The Centre is located at

the surface of the CO2 storage site, the long-term aim being that visitors can observe the injection

process and witness how the the project evolves (Brauer, 2012, personal communication).

Interestingly, the College and Centre major on the role of CCS in reducing pollution more generally,

referring to the number of trucks and cars whose pollution can be dealt with through the BECCS

project, as opposed to focusing upon its role in tackling anthropogenic climate change, because of

the public scepticism of the latter (ibid.).


9

To date, there has been no organised opposition to the Decatur BECCS project. It is worth noting that

coal mining and oil extraction are an important element in the economy of the State. Enhanced-Oil

Recovery through use of CO2 is a potentially important strategy to maintain oil production in the

long-term (Brauer, 2012, personal communication).

Learning from the case-studies

What, then, can be extraced from the four case-studies summarised here with respects to the

governancne of CE?

1. Science and technical characteristics, risks and impacts of CE experiments

• The framing, assessment and mitigation of potential risks and impacts was undertaken using

different methodologies (e.g. risk impact assessment and legal analysis in LOHAFEX and the

Underground Injection Control permit application for Decatur project, Illinois; use of the

responsible innovation framework in SPICE). In all cases, novel assessment frameworks, or

modifications of existing frameworks, were necessary.

• It is difficult to clearly distinguish between terms such as experiment, test-bed,

demonstration, research, development and deployment. Such activities are frequently

driven not just by an applied interest in CE, but also by basic research questions. Better

clarification of selected scale, routes to scale-up and intention would be useful.

• Given the technical uncertainities and complexities in the case-studies, it is unlikely that

robust predictive scientific knowledge would ever be available to the satisfaction of all the

stakeholders involved – whether they be environmental NGOs, government officials,

scientists or engineers.

2. Role of personal- and private-sector interests and companies

• The existence of private-sector or personal interests, whether as intellectual property rights

on the part of individuals or commercial interests by private companies, became a source of

conflict in three case-studies (SPICE (directly through a patent application), Greenville

(through distrust of the motive of the company involved) and LOHAFEX (indirectly through

Planktos Inc.)). This happens in the context of growing ethical and political debates around

the commercialisation and motives of CE research and technology. The minimum

requirement is for transparency and openness on any IP position or commercial or other

vested interest.

• Trust in the project developers, project partnership managers and mediating institutions,

appears fundamental for the success of a CE project (witness the success so far at Decatur,

Illinois, where the long-established relationship between the company and local community

college has been key to the community dialogue).

• Entrenched views and scepticism concerning the respective good-will of participants to work

for the collective good can strongly undermine consensus-building.

3. The regulatory process

• There is, as yet, no legal and regulatory framework able to cover most types of CE research,

development or deployment.

• Governance structures based on local regulations (e.g. US Underground Injection Control

regulations for CCS projects), international treaties or agreements (e.g. UN CBD and the

London Convention) and codes of conduct (e.g. responsible innovation) are the types of

governance associated with the case studies selected.


10

• The application of these forms of governance does not guarantee the success of a project

(i.e. two out of four case studies were not successful). Lack of clarity on the applicability of an

international resolution (by the UN CBD) has led to controversy and resulted in the need for

new assessment procedures to be adopted by the relevant scientific and research funding

communities.

• Not all proponents or opponents appear ready or willing to adhere to a collective approach

in controlling CE experiments and deployment.

• While necessary, neither well-developed regulatory processes nor self-governance are by

themselves capable of absorbing controversies on CE and supporting consensus-building.

• Inclusion of new provisions for assessment of CE experiments and trials (as in the responsible

innovation framework) have contributed to further confusion and procrastination, not

smoothed the path to a decision on the activity in question.

• Politicisation of CE experiments and trials, and the institutional nervousness this can

engender, has tended to over-ride formal assessment processes and outcomes (e.g. SPICE),

at least at the current time.

4. Public participation and engagement (PPE) and collective reflection.

• Participants in PPE events highlighted the importance of looking at health and safety issues,

ethics, transparency, the wider context and alternative options and good governance aspects

in CE projects.

• Local communities became intensively involved in one of the case-studies in the role of

opponent (Greenville, OH.), as moderately supportive in another case (Decatur) and not

directly involved at all in the other two cases (SPICE and LOHAFEX). This variable public

interest probably related to the much larger scale and visibility of the two BECCS projects,

these being demonstrations not experiments. In the case of LOHAFEX, it is unclear whom the

relevant public would even be (German, Indian, residents of the closest coastline in South

America to the experimental site?).

• International NGOs and the media can play a pivotal role in the success or otherwise of CE

experiments, by bringing the attention of other stakeholders, decision-makers and the public

to these activities and raising difficult questions about their legality and appropriate

regulation.

• Early and on-going PPE is an important element of successful CE experiments but does not

guarantee success (as Greenville illuminates).

• Effective PPE requires relationships of trust between the different actors and stakeholders

involved and this often requires a history of institutions working together effectively.

• Public participation should not necessarily aim for consensus-building, as competition

between views on CE will likely remain, but concerns and interests of opposing parties can

still be successfully integrated in the design of the project, as a form of compromise.

References

Alfred Wegener Institute (2009). Risk Assessment for LOHAFEX. Bremerhaven, Germany, 19 pp.

Available online at: http://www.awi.de/fileadmin/

Bellamy, R., Chilvers, J., Vaughan, N. and Lenton, T. (2012). Appraising Geoengineering, Tyndall

Centre Working Paper 143, University of East Anglia.

Brauer, Douglas (2012). Personal communication on November 2012.

Cicerone, R. J. (2006). Geoengineering: encouraging research and overseeing implementation: an

editorial comment. Climatic Change, 77, 221-226.

Citizen against CO2 (2009). http://citizensagainstco2sequestration.blogspot.co.uk/2009/05/mrcsp-

greenville-oh-project-update.html. Visited October 2012.


11

Corner, A. & Pidgeon, N. (2010). Geoengineering the climate: the social and ethical implications.

Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 52(1), 24-37.

Cressey, D. (2012). Cancelled project spurs debate over geoengineering patents. Nature, 485(7399),

p. 429.

Darke Journal (2009). http://www.darkejournal.com/2009/07/co2-sequestration-poll-is-closed.html.

Visited December 2009.

EPA (2011). http://epa.gov/reg5oh2o/uic/adm/index.htm. Visited October 2012.

ETC group (2009).

http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/712/01/nretc_lohafexupdat

e13jan09_final.pdf. Visited October 2012.

ETC Group (2011). http://www.etcgroup.org/

Federal Ministry for the Environment (2009).

http://www.bmu.de/english/press_releases/archive/16th_legislative_period/pm/42985.php

Visited December 2012.

Hammond, J. & Shackley, S. (2010). Towards a Public Communication and Engagement Strategy for

Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Projects in Scotland: A Review of Research Findings, CCS

Project Experiences, Tools, Resources and Best Practices. A report commissioned by the Scottish

Carbon Dioxide Capture, Transport and Storage Development Study, Working Paper SCCS 2010-

08.

IEA (International Energy Agency) (2012). Carbon Capture and Storage, legal and regulatory review.

Edition 3.

Macnaghten, P., & Owen, R. (2011). Environmental science: Good governance for geoengineering.

Nature, 479(7373), p. 293.

NERC (2010) Experiment Earth? Report on a public dialogueon geoengineering. Available at

http://www.nerc.ac.uk/about/consult/geoengineering.asp

Owen, R. (2012). Personal communication on October 2012.

Parkhill, K. & Pidgeon, N. (2011). Public engagement on geoengineering research: preliminary report

on the SPICE deliberative workshops. Technical Report (Understanding Risk Group Working

Paper, 11-01). Cardiff University School of Psychology. 29pp.

Proelss, A. (2009). Legal opinion on the legality of the LOHAFEX marine research experiment under

international law. Walther-Schücking-Institut for International Law.

Rayner, S., Redgwell C., Savulescu, J., Pidgeon, N. and Kruger, T. (2009): Memorandum on draft

principles for the conduct of geoengineering research. House of Commons Science and

Technology Committee Enquiry into The Regulation of Geoengineering.

Reynolds, J. (2011). The regulation of climate engineering. Law, Innovation & Technology, 3(1), 113–

136.

Royal Society (2009). Geoengineering the climate: science, governance, and uncertainty.

Smetacek, V. and Naqvi, S. (2008). The next generation of iron fertilization experiments in the

Southern Ocean. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A. 366, 3947–3967, doi:10.1098/rsta.2008.0144.

Stilgoe, J., Owen, R., Macnaghten, P. (2013). Towards a framework of responsible innovation: from

concerpt to practice through an experiment at the UK research councils. Elsevier Editorial System

for Research Policy Manuscript Draft.

Strong, A., Cullen, J., & Chisholm, S. (2009a). Ocean fertilization: science policy and commerce.

Oceanography, Vol. 22 No.3. 236-261.

Strong, A., Chisholm, S., Miller, C., & Cullen, J. (2009b). Ocean fertilisation: time to move on.

Nature, 461, 347-348 (17 September 2009).

The Guardian (2011). http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/sep/14/geoengineering-more-

evidence. Visited October 2012.


12

Watson, M. (2012). Personal communication on October 2012.


13

SPICE LOHAFEX BECCS- (Greenville, Ohio) BECCS- (Decatur, Illinois)

Project start date End of 2010 January 2009 January 2007 January 2008

Type of climate engineering

technique Solar radiation management (SRM)

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) through

iron fertilization in oceans

CDR through bioenergy with carbon

capture and storage (BECCS)

CDR through bioenergy with carbon

capture and storage (BECCS)

Location United Kingdom South West Atlantic ocean Greenville, Ohio, USA Decatur, Illinois, USA

Scale

Injection of particles at heights upwards of

10km (mid-latitude) and 18km (equatorial).

Test pipe planned for 1 km height.

100 tonnes of iron sulphate in an area

of 300 km2

One million tonnes of CO2 captured

over four years and stored in a saline

aquifer at 1,000 m depth;

3.6 million tonnes of CO2 captured

over four years and stored in a

sandstone reservoir at 2,000 m depth;

MAIN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OBJECTIVES

Main purposes and/or visions

of the science and technology

Investigating whether the injection of particles

into the stratosphere could mimic the cooling

effects of volcanic eruptions and provide a way

to mitigate global warming through SRM.

To use iron fertilization to mitigate

global climate change by sequestering

carbon dioxide in the deep ocean

through CDR

To demonstrate the feasibility of

integrating bioenergy generation from

corn ethanol with carbon capture and

storage

To demonstrate the feasibility of

integrating bioenergy generation from

corn ethanol with carbon capture and

storage

Current stage of case study

technological development

and innovation

The engineering test associated with this case

was cancelled for different reason because of

intellectual property issues, NGO opposition,

and lack of governance. No further tests have

been planned. The lab-and desk-based

elements of the project are still ongoing.

Attempts to develop more iron

fertilization experiments have

decreased significantly since

LOHAFEX. This is probably due to

regulatory concerns, opposition of

environmental groups, and a lack of

scientific evidence that carbon

sequestration is possible through

ocean fertilization activities.

No further attempts to develop BECCS

technologies in this region have been

developed. Opposition and scepticism

towards climate change and this type

of technology is strong in this region.

BECCS technology has been well

received in this region. The first

Decatur demonstration project is still

on-going, in which CO2 injection

activities to the underground begun in

November 2011, and expected to be

fully operational in 2013. An industrial

scale up of this first BECCS project has

been planned for 2014.

GOVERNANCE

Main actors involved in the

development/outcomes of

each case study

Project developers (SPICE research team);

Research funding councils (EPSRC, RCUK);

Stage-gate panel;

Opposition groups (mainly environmental

organizations);

Civil society (participating as part of the public

deliberative engagement event);

Public media

Project developers (AWI, NIO);

Project initiator (German Federal

Ministry of Research);

Opposition groups (German

Environment Ministry and other

environmental organizations, such as

ETC Group and Greenpeace);

Public media

Project developers-Battelle,

Andersons Marathon ethanol plant;

Local government, State

representative; Ohio Environmental

Council; Darke County;

Regulators-Ohio Environmental

Protection Agency;

Opposition groups- Citizens Against

CO, green action groups:

Local media (e.g. Darke Journal);

Local public

Project developers: Archer Daniels

Midland Company, University of

Illinois-Illinois State Geological Survey.

Schlumberger acts as a subcontractor

for drilling purposes;

Regulators: Illinois Environment

Protection Agency (IEPA); US

Environmental Protection Agency;

Local community: Richland

Community College

Type of governance

structure/mechanism

Stage-gate innovation governance model

based on five criteria: safety, compliance with

regulations, communication of the project’s

Governance approach based on

international regulation (see below)

Governance approach based on local

and national regulations (see below)

Governance approach based on local

and national regulations (see below)


14

SPICE LOHAFEX BECCS- (Greenville, Ohio) BECCS- (Decatur, Illinois)

purposes to enable discussion, anticipating

future applications, and identifying public and

stakeholder views

Regulations/best

practices/protocols in place

Research came to adopt the assessment

criteria of the responsible innovaton

framework through use of the stage-gate

process.

UN Convention on Biological Diversity

(CBD), The London Convention on the

Prevention of Marine Pollution by

Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter

US Underground Injection Control

(UIC) regulations and the Clean Water

Act, administered by local regulators

US Underground Injection Control

(UIC) regulations and the Clean Water

Act, administered by local regulators

PUBLIC DEBATE

Public perception,

engagement and dialogue

activities

Public perceptions research was conducted on

behalf of NERC (2010); a more deliberative

event was undertaken by IAGP in 2011 to

understand public views on SPICE and

geoengineering in general.

No engagement activities were

performed as part of this project.

Public perceptions research and

engagement events, public

presentations, regular informal

meetings.

Development of the Richland

Community College’s National CO2

Sequestration Education Center,

whose aim is to highlight the two

carbon dioxide capture projects in

Decatur. Extensive training and

engagement process with the

community.

Participants in the public

dialogue activity

Requested by: EPSRC and NERC (funders);

No activities performed

Project developers Project developers/ Richland

Community College

Orchestrated by: researchers of the Integrated

Assessment of Geoengineering Proposals

(IAGP) project; NERC-appointed consultants

Project developers Richland Community College

Participants: public individuals from a range of

disciplines and backgrounds. Members of

Environmental NGOs, public media or other

type of organizations did not participate in the

process.

Members of local community,

opposition groups (e.g. Citizens

Against CO2 sequestration), local

media

Members of local community

Local media

Table One: Characteristics of the four case-studies: Summary table


15

Case study Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE)

Type of

project

Research- To assess the feasibility of injecting particles (sulphur aerosols) into the

stratosphere from a tethered balloon for solar radiation management purposes.

Location United Kingdom

Developer(s) Research institutions (University of Bristol, Edinburgh, Cambridge and Oxford), Met

Office, and Marshall Aerospace

Project

developer’s

vision

Investigate the benefits, risks, cost and feasibility of solar radiation management

through the deployment of reflecting aerosol particles into the earth[s atmosphere

to know whether the injection of these

particles could mimic the cooling effects of volcanic eruptions and provide a way to

mitigate global warming.

Project set up to answer three main points:

• How much, of what type of particles, needs to be injected into the

atmosphere to effectively and safely manage the climate system;

• How to deliver those particles;

• Understand the likely impacts.

Source: SPICE project website:

http://www2.eng.cam.ac.uk/~hemh/SPICE/SPICE.htm

Stakeholders

involved

Project developers (SPICE research team, see above);

Research funding councils (EPSRC, RCUK);

Stage-gate panel in charge of the project’s governance process (including a social

scientist, a representative of a civil society organisation, an atmospheric scientist

and an aerospace engineer);

Opposition groups (mainly environmental organizations);

Civil society (participating as part of the public deliberative engagement event);

Public media

Story • The Royal Society publishes a report about recommendations for

geoengineering research in 2009, which includes solar radiation

management;

• In March 2010, a sandpit funding workshop is organized by the Research

Councils, which gives rises to the SPICE and the Integrated Assessment of

Geoengineering Proposals (IAGP) projects, based on the recommendations

of the Royal Society;

• In October 2010, the project officially starts;

• In November 2010, a stage-gate innovation governance model is agreed

between the research councils and the developers to address a set of five

criteria associated to responsible innovation. The governance model would

be managed by a stage-gate panel;

• In order to allow the SPICE team to continue with the preparation of the

test-bed trial (aimed to investigate the design of a particle delivery system

with solar radiation management potential), some pre-conditions were

required, which involved a revised communications plan, the exploration of

ethical and legal issues, and an engagement process with stakeholders;

• In the Summer of 2011, a public deliberative engagement (PDE) process is

performed to comply with one of the requirements established by the

stage-gate panel, which consisted in the identification of mechanisms to

understand public and stakeholder views regarding geoengineering, solar


16

radiation management, and the test-bed trial. The PDE process is

performed by researchers IAGP project, conformed by partners of UK

scientific institutions including Lancaster University, University of East

Anglia, Cambridge University, Cardiff University and the Hadley Centre.;

• In August 2011, the PDE report and its results is made public (source:

http://psych.cf.ac.uk/understandingrisk/docs/spice.pdf )

• In September 2011, the research councils postpone the go-ahead decision

associated to the development of the test-bed (meant to take place in

October 2011), in order to allow the team to undertake actions to comply

with all the pre-conditions agreed;

• At the same time, a debate in the media was going on. For example, The

Guardian talks about the test bed as geoengineering: " But a team of British

academics will next month formally announce the first step towards

creating an artificial volcano by going ahead with the world's first major

"geo-engineering" field-test in the next few months". Source:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/31/pipe-balloon-

water-sky-climate-experiment

• The guardian compares this experiment with cloud whitening, and

mentions that "environment groups in Britain and the US said the

government's experiment was a dangerous precedent for a full-scale

deployment that could affect rainfall and food supplies."

• It also mentions the concerns of environmental group, e.g. ETC Group:

"What is being floated is not only a hose but the whole idea of geo-

engineering the planet. This is a huge waste of time and money and shows

the UK government's disregard for UN processes. It is the first step in

readying the hardware to inject particles into the stratosphere. It has no

other purpose and it should not be allowed to go ahead"; and Friends of

the Earth:: "We are going to have to look at new technologies which could

suck CO2 out of the air. But we don't need to do is invest in harebrained

schemes to reflect sunlight into space when we have no idea at all what

impact this may have on weather systems around the globe."

• Mentions as well results from the public engagement debate, emphazing

skepticism of public: "Members of the British public who were consulted by

researchers in advance of the Spice experiment were broadly sceptical."

• John Shepperd, Prof. at Royal Society says more evidence is needed and

makes a series of points regarding regulation, the social context and the

views of some environmental groups. Shepperd puts geoengineering, as a

global issue and mentions that more international cooperation is neede .

Places SPICE project in the loop of the UN Convention and mentions the

need of international agreements:" The UN Convention on Biological

Diversity has decided that small-scale and low-risk field trials are

acceptable (and the proposed Spice experiment is certainly one of these),

but it did not define the boundaries of what is considered "small scale".

Indeed there are, at present, no adequate international agreements to

restrict or control many possible geoengineering activities, especially those

in the atmosphere, and little experience of applying international

legislation to this area."

• In September 2011 EPSRC receives a letter and open petition signed by

more than 50 non-governmental organisations (NGOs),

demanding that the project be cancelled;

• The communique of the groups states that "This experiment could prove

disruptive to international discussions on geoengineering ongoing at the


17

Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) following the decision of the 10th

Conference of the Parties in Nagoya, Japan less than one year ago." They

mention that there is a conflict of interest if the UK backs up this project,

and at the same time sponsor and chair discussions at the CBD. This could

undermine credibility of the UK in other in other climate-related

negotiations;

• While responding to one of the criteria required for the responsible

innovation governance process (provide a communications plan), the SPICE

team are made aware of the existence of a prior patent application on the

concept of a tethered balloon delivery mechanism, submitted by one of the

members of the sandpit funding workshop. The patent application included

one of the SPICE project investigators as a co-author. The SPICE project

leader was unaware of this patent application;

• In May 2012, the Research Councils and the SPICE project leader take the

decision to cancel the test bed, giving as main reasons a lack of

geoengineering governance and a conflict of interest due to the existence

of the patent application;

• The debate continues in the media. Nature writes an article about conflicts

of interest within SPICE due to intellectual property rights. In this article,

several scientists involved in Solar Radiation Management give ideas about

IP patent management. Source: http://www.nature.com/news/cancelled-

project-spurs-debate-over-geoengineering-patents-1.10690;

• During the same month, Matthew Watson, lead researcher of this project,

mentions the governance and intellectual property issues as the main

reasons for the cancellation;

• March 2014, expected project completion date.

Outcome in

terms of

project

developer’s

aim

Cancellation of the test bed planned. Matthew Watson, project leader, mentions a

lack of governance related to geoengineering and intellectual property conflicts of

interest as main reasons, and the need of more work related to deliberation and

public engagement. The project continues based on computer modelling and

laboratory experimentation.

Table Two: Detail and Timeline for the SPICE (Stratospheric Particle Injection) Case-Study


18

Case study Iron fertilization experiment in the Southern Ocean (LOHAFEX)

Type of

project

Research- Fertilizing the ocean with iron sulphate to study the development and

impact of phytoplankton bloom on its environment and the fate of the carbon

sinking out of it to the deep ocean.

Location Southern Ocean in a location in between Cape Town (South Africa) and Punta

Arenas (Argentina)

Developer(s) The Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research (AWI), Germany, and

the National Institute of Oceanography (NIO), India, together with nine other

institutions in India, Europe and Chile.

Project

developer’s

vision

• To study the effects of iron fertilization on the environment by comparing

the results with similar measurements carried out in surrounding,

unfertilized waters in great detail with state-of-the-art methods by

integrated teams of biologists, chemists and physicists over a period of

about 45 days.

• To encompass the processes of unicellular algae growth to their consumers

and assesses the impact on the biogeochemistry and carbon cycle.

• To address the fate of the carbon sinking out of the surface to the deep

ocean.

Source: Alfred Wegener Institute (2009), Risk assessment for LOHAFEX

Stakeholders

involved

Project developers (AWI, NIO);

Project initiator (German Federal Ministry of Research);

Opposition groups ( German Environment Ministry and other environmental

organizations, such as ETC Group and Greenpeace);

Public media

Story • Closest precedent to LOHAFEX happened in 2007, when Planktos Inc.,

planned to conduct a large fertilization experiment (10,000 km2) in the

equatorial Pacific near the Galápagos Islands, first pilot project at this scale;

• Environmental groups argue that it was a violation of international laws on

marine dumping, specially the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention

of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter;

• In fall 2007, the full Conference of Parties to the London Convention issues

a statement of concern about the legality and practice of large-scale ocean

iron fertilization activities. This is the first explicit international regulation

of iron fertilization;

• In early 2008, Planktos Inc cancels operations, citing a lack of funds and a

disinformation campaign waged by anti- carbon offset crusaders.

• In May 2008, members of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)

passed a decision on iron fertilization, citing the London Convention’s

statements of concern. They requested all member states to ensure that

ocean iron fertilization activities do not take place, with the exception of

small-scale scientific studies in coastal waters, until there is adequate

scientific basis on which to justify these activities. Emphasize placed on

small-scale studies could not be used for the generation of carbon offset

credits.

• January 2009 LOHAFEX experiment planned start date;

• German Research Ministry stops the experiment, citing the UN CBD

moratorium on ocean fertilization, when the research vessel Polarstern was

midway between South Africa and South America;


19

• The Ministry demands more environmental risk assessments and

independent scientific assessments of the project, specifically mentioning

the coastal water stipulation and citing the ecological concerns raised by

CBD;

• AWI releases a risk assessment while the Walther-Schücking-Institut for

International Law and the Christian Albrechts University at Kiel release a

legal opinion on the legality of this experiment. Sources:

http://www.awi.de/fileadmin/user_upload/News/Selected_News/2009/LO

HAFEX/0%20AWI_NIO_LOHAFEX_Risk_Assessment.pdf

http://www.internat-recht.uni-

kiel.de/de/forschung/opinions/LOHAFEX_en.pdf

• In the risk assessment, members of the LOHAFEX scientific team argue that

iron fertilization in the Southern Ocean would stimulate the growth of

“coastal species” of phytoplankton. In their interpretation, this is the way

to describe their open-ocean experiment as “coastal” (requirement of the

CBD).

• The legal opinion argues that the CBD decisions are legally non-binding and

that iron fertilization experiments, when scientifically based, are consistent

with all the regulations mentioned before as it does not constitute

“dumping”.

• The German Ministry of Research ultimately allows the continuation of the

experiment to proceed.

• In late January, several environmental groups, including the German

Environment Ministry, express regret at the decision to re-authorize the

project.

• In March 2009, some of the results of the experiments are started to be

known by the scientists involved, and the media continues covering this

experiment mentioning the achievent of “modest results”.

• In mid-2009, Nature Geoscience publishes an editorial where it is discussed

more in detail the meaning of the London convention and the CBD

moratorium and how to interpret these regulations. It argues that “when a

marine research project is put on hold by the lead country's science

ministry, after the research vessel has already set sail, it is clear that

communication between scientists, the public and politicians has gone

seriously wrong”. Source:

http://www.nature.com/ngeo/journal/v2/n3/full/ngeo464.html

• In September 2009, another Nature article argues that iron fertilization in

the context of geoengineering should be abandoned. It argues that

“engaging in experiments with the explicit purpose of assessing iron

fertilization for geoengineering is both unnecessary and potentially

counterproductive, because it diverts scientific resources and encourages

what we see as inappropriate commercial interest in the scheme”. They

continue:” It is time to disentangle the science of small scale ocean

fertilization from geoengineering. In our view, small-scale projects

addressing testable hypotheses should proceed unimpeded by unnecessary

controversy or regulation, whereas larger projects aimed at exploring the

geoengineering potential of ocean fertilization should not be allowed, as

they cannot resolve crucial issues about this mitigation strategy.

Differentiating between these two types of experiments requires

regulatory clarity”. Source:

http://ehis.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.webfeat.lib.ed.ac.uk/ehost/pdfviewer/p

dfviewer?vid=5&hid=26&sid=0f4ab246-74d8-4844-a93f-


20

839599488ba0%40sessionmgr11

• In late 2009, Strong et al (2009) publish a Ocean Fertilization: Science,

Policy, and Commerce. This paper goes over the history of iron fertilization

and some details of the LOHAFEX case study. They conclude that “ interest

and investment in ocean fertilization as a climate mitigation strategy have

only grown and intensified, fueling media reports that have misconstrued

scientific results, and conflated scientific experimentation with

geoengineering”. It suggests there is enough information about ocean

fertilization to say that it should not be considered further as a means to

mitigate climate change.

Outcome in

terms of

project

developer’s

aim

The project was completed in March 2009 with the following main research

conclusions:

• Iron addition stimulated production, but accumulation rates of

phytoplankton increased for a very short time only;

• LOHAFEX showed that iron fertilization of nutrient-rich(NO3,PO4) waters

does not necessarily lead to algal blooms, carbon export and thus CO2

uptake;

• The state and functioning of the whole ecosystem plays an essential role; in

particular: the plankton assemblage (initial conditions) and the amount of

silicic acid;

• Potential of ocean iron fertilization as a means of CO2 sequestration is

substantially smaller than believed so far.

Source: http://epic.awi.de/20580/1/Bat2009a.pdf

Table Three: The Detail and Timeline for the LOHAFEX Iron Fertilisation Experiment Case-Study


21

l

Case study Bioenergy and Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) plant, successful attempt,

Illinois Basin-Decatur Project (IBDP)

Type of

project

Bioenergy generation from corn ethanol with carbon capture and storage

Location Decatur, Illinois, United States

Developer(s) A collaboration of the Midwest Geological Sequestration Consortium, the

Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), Schlumberger Carbon Services,

and other subcontractors and the Illinois State Geological

Survey.

Project

developer’s

vision

• To inject one 3,600,000 tonnes of CO2 at a depth of 2,000 meters in Mount

Simon sandstone, before the project ends in 2015. The peak rate of

injection will be 1,000,000 tonnes per year, which implies that this BECCS

project may be considered a large scale demonstration also in comparison

with large scale coal power plant CCS demonstration projects;

• To test geological carbon sequestration in a saline reservoir (Mount Simon)

at a site in Decatur, Illinois.

Stakeholders

involved

Project developers: University of Illinois-Illinois State Geological Survey is

developing the IBDP, but the actual permit holder is the Archer Daniels Midland

Company which owns the site and is the supplier of the CO2 from its ethanol

fermentation facility. Schlumberger acts as a subcontractor for drilling purposes;

Regulators: Illinois Environment Protection Agency (IEPA); US Environmental

Protection Agency (US EPA);

Local community: Richland Community College

Story • Illinois is a primacy state, which means that the implementation of US

Underground Injection Control (UIC) regulations and the permitting of

certain classes of wells under the federal Clean Water Act is administered

by IEPA. Development of the first 1 million tonne saline reservoir storage

demonstration in Illinois was permitted by the IEPA under a Class I Non

hazardous permit classification. This project is the IBDP;

• In January 2008, the permit application was submitted;

• In June 2010, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced that Decatur was

one of 3 projects to receive up to $612 million from the American Recovery

and Reinvestment Act - matched by $368 million in private funding - to

demonstrate large-scale carbon capture and storage from industrial

sources.

• The final authorisation to inject was received in November 2011;

• During this period, the injection well was permitted and drilled and two

other wells were drilled for monitoring as permit modifications were

approved during this nearly four-year period.

• In in mid-November 2011, continuous injection began at 1,000 tonnes per

day. Permitting took place in this way because IEPA felt that there was the

most background and precedent to issue a Class I permit rather than a Class

V experimental permit at the time the original application was submitted;

• Currently, the new Class VI UIC regulations, issued by the US EPA, now

apply to CO2 storage wells and Class I permits are no longer being issued in

the US for storage.

• A second project at Decatur, the Illinois Industrial Sources Carbon Capture

and Storage project, submitted a Class VI permit application in July 2011.

This was the first submittal of a Class VI permit in the US at this scale. The


22

project will inject approximately 2.5 million tonnes over three years. This

project is an industrial scale-up of the IBDP and the expectation is that the

permitting timeline may allow drilling to begin in mid- to late 2012;

• The first Decatur project is expected to be fully operational in 2013;

• Part of the project includes the National Sequestration Education Center

(NSEC), located nearby on the campus of Richland Community College.

NSEC is a 15,000 square-foot sustainably designed center that will contain

classrooms and training and laboratory facilities, including renewable

energy features such as wind turbine, solar, geothermal, and biomass

technology;

• In addition, the NSEC will provide community and regional outreach

through interactive visitor’s center;

• No opposition from local community or environmental groups seem to be

ongoing, as in the case of Greenville, Ohio.

Sources:

Global Status of BECCS Projects report (2010), CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE.

Legal and Regulatory Review (2012), http://energy.gov/articles/co2-capture-and-

storage-project-education-and-training-center-launched-decatur-illinois

Outcome in

terms of

project

developer’s

aim

The project has started operations and will operate at full capacity in 2013

Table Four: The Detail and Timeline for the two Bio-energy CO2 Capture and Storage (BECCS) case-

studies

deliverable 1.2. - wordpress.com · the deliverable 1.2. will be publicised within the consortium...

Documents