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Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900

Delivering pro-poor water and sanitation services: The technicaland political challenges in Malawi and Zambia

Eric Gutierrez 1

Regional Advocacy and Research Adviser – Southern Africa, c/o WaterAid-Malawi, Private Bag 364, Lilongwe 3, Malawi

Received 10 August 2004; received in revised form 9 August 2005

Abstract

Meeting Millennium Development Goals on water and sanitation services in developing countries are fraught with difficulties, as canbe seen most clearly from the experiences of Malawi and Zambia, two of the world’s poorest countries that have committed to meetingthese goals. The challenges are not only technical, requiring programmatic or engineering solutions, but are also and most importantlypolitical, because solutions will most often cause a rearrangement of the peculiar forms of power relations that have emerged within insti-tutional and political environments of the two countries. The challenges include weak state support for water and sanitation provision,unreliable and contested indicators of coverage, poor sectoral co-ordination, and fragmented donor efforts. This field note examines thesechallenges in greater detail to cast new light as well as draw attention to possible solutions that can be implemented.� 2006 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Keywords: Water and sanitation; Poverty reduction; Aid; Budget reform; Water point mapping

1. Introduction

The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals(MDGs) have set a target of halving the proportion of peo-ple without access to safe drinking water and sanitation by2015.2 Much, if not all of this work, will be done in devel-

0016-7185/$ - see front matter � 2006 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2005.09.010

E-mail address: ericgutierrez@africa-online.net1 Eric Gutierrez was the Regional Advocacy and Research Adviser for

WaterAid in southern Africa, covering Malawi, Mozambique andZambia, and was based in Lilongwe, the capital of Malawi. Mr. Gutierrezhas worked for WaterAid since 1999. WaterAid is an internationalorganisation registered in the UK and dedicated exclusively to theprovision of safe domestic water, sanitation and hygiene education to theworld’s poorest people (www.wateraid.org).

2 The United Nations have set eight Millennium Development Goals(MDGs), and within each goal are ‘targets’, and for each target are anumber of ‘indicators’. For the eight goals, there are a total of 18 targetsand 48 indicators. Goal 7 is ‘‘to ensure environmental sustainability’’; thisgoal has three targets, of which Target 10 is – halve by 2015 the proportionof people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation.For further details, see http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp.

oping countries where an estimated 1.2 billion are withoutaccess to safe drinking water, and 2.5 billion are withoutadequate sanitation (WHO and UNICEF, 2004, pp. 3–5).Malawi and Zambia are two highly-indebted southernAfrican countries whose governments have committed tomeet the target. The most important expression of thiscommitment is the inclusion of the target in the two coun-tries’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) submit-ted to the Boards of the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund.3 The PRSPs provide a sin-gle and comprehensive national strategy for poverty reduc-tion and are designed to guide not only legislation and

3 A Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is developed by a country in orderto qualify for concessional funding from the IMF or the World Bank.After the strategy is finished, a Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) is made by theIMF and WB staff, which recommends to their boards whether thestrategy is a sound basis for IDA and IMF concessional grants or loans.The JSAs of Zambia and Malawi have made positive recommendations,but with a number of critical comments on specific aspects of the povertyreduction strategy.

4 According to the World Bank, the ‘‘proportion of people (living)below $1 a day’’ is the percentage of the population with averageconsumption expenditures less than $1.08 a day measured in 1993 pricesconverted using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. The $1.08 a day (or$32.74 a month) standard was chosen to be equal to the median of thelowest ten poverty lines among a set of low-income countries. Calculationsfor this statement were made using the WB’s poverty calculation tool(http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp) with figuresfrom MPRS and ZPRS.

5 Figures drawn from tables at http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_results.asp?crID=894&fID=r15.

E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900 887

policies, but also and more importantly, the annual alloca-tions in the national budget on water and sanitation. ThePRSPs also provide the basic framework for all stake-holder activity in water and sanitation in the two countries.For example, all forms of donor aid are expected to bealigned and harmonised with the objectives of the PRSPs.The strategies therefore are not only expressions of politi-cal will, but are also the key documents for funding andimplementation of projects to, among others, deliver waterand sanitation services to the poor in Malawi andZambia.

To date however, the implementation of the PRSPs hasbeen patchy and has met with a host of technical and polit-ical challenges. Component activities for water and sanita-tion have met problems that include weak state support,unreliable and contested indicators, poor sectoral coordi-nation and fragmented donor efforts. Thus, despite theirpromise, it remains to be seen whether the Malawi PovertyReduction Strategy (MPRS) and the Zambia PovertyReduction Strategy (ZPRS) can actually deliver to meetthe MDG target.

This paper examines some of the particular technicaland political challenges in achieving the MDG target onwater and sanitation in Malawi and Zambia. By examiningthese challenges in greater detail, this paper hopes to castnew light on these problems and thereby draw attentionto solutions that can be implemented. A number of tools,developed through the field work of certain organisations,are presented and can be used to develop more comprehen-sive solutions. These tools can prove valuable not just forplanning water and sanitation investments but also formonitoring sustainability and equity in distribution. Whatis ironic is that the adoption and widespread use of thesetools can face considerable opposition, not least becauseof their potential for rearranging the peculiar form ofpower relations that have evolved within the particularinstitutional and political environments of the twocountries.

This paper is simply a field note, a first step towardsdeveloping a more sustained and analytical treatment ofthe technical and political problems in the attainment ofthe water and sanitation MDG target in Malawi and Zam-bia. This paper does not claim to prescribe the solutions;rather, it simply restates the case for a more thoroughreview of the problems such that the options for potentialsolutions can be better assessed. The paper hopes to triggera more informed and careful exchange of ideas, especiallyamong the key stakeholders in Malawi and Zambiawho are in the forefront of policy and programimplementation.

2. Poverty in Malawi and Zambia

Malawi and Zambia are two of the world’s poorestcountries. Both are among the 10 poorest countries accord-ing to the proportion of their populations living below theWorld Bank-defined poverty line of having per capita

consumption of less than one US dollar a day.4 Malawiestimates the proportion of its people living below the pov-erty line to be 65.3%, while Zambia estimates it to be 72.9%(MPRS: 23; and ZPRS: 23). Life expectancy in both coun-tries has deteriorated to become among the lowest in theworld. In 2001, life expectancy was 39 years (Malawi)and 37 years (Zambia), down from 43 years in Malawi in1996 and 40.5 years in Zambia in 1998 (ZPRS: 84 andMPRS: 26). Falling life expectancies are attributed to thecombination of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, malaria andwater-borne diseases. In 2003, the United Nations esti-mated HIV infection rates in the 15–45 age group at14.2% in Malawi and 16.5% in Zambia. These high infec-tion rates have resulted in the emergence of an estimated500,000 orphans in Malawi and 630,000 in Zambia.5

What makes poverty worse is that both countries haveexperienced periods of relative wealth, followed by dra-matic economic declines. Zambia used to be a mediumincome country that had a per capita income of US$752a year in 1965, due mainly to copper exports from its min-ing regions. The fall of copper prices and the decline of themining industry starting in the mid-1970s mainly contrib-uted to the fall of the per capita income to $351 in 2002(DfID, 2004, p. 3). Malawi, on the other hand, had everysector of the economy registering rapid growth from inde-pendence in 1964 until about 1979. It enjoyed relativelyfavourable balance of payments positions, and industrialoutput expanded at the rate of 10% per annum. Averageeconomic growth was estimated at six percent, comparedto a population growth rate of only 2.9% per annum (Chin-singa, 2001, p. 29). This was strengthened by the invest-ment and market access benefits to South Africa thatMalawi enjoyed as the only African country that main-tained ties with the apartheid regime. By 1978, however,almost every sector was in tremendous decline, followedby erratic recovery trends. The economy first shrunk in1981, and Malawi became the first country in the regionto seek WB-IMF intervention and implement a structuraladjustment programme (SAP) (Chinsinga, 2001, pp. 30–31).

There are many explanations for the rapid economicdecline and poverty in the two countries. One view, forexample, puts the blame on the socialist route like thattaken by the first president Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia,the ‘‘second-richest country in Africa (after South Africa)at independence in 1964’’. This view argues that Kaunda’s

8 These studies are: the 1994 Participatory Poverty Assessment, the 1996

888 E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900

nationalization of the economy, the erection of tariff wallsand currency controls, the subsidisation of agriculturalcrops, the employment of thousands of excess workers inthe copper mines, and the award of supply contracts to rul-ing party cronies, among others, caused Zambian industryto wither, destroyed most productive businesses and leftgovernment to foot the huge bills when copper prices fellin 1974. Also problematic, this view continues, was the nat-ure of donor aid. When the crisis built up in the 1970s, for-eign donors bailed out the treasury in the belief that ‘‘themain obstacle to development was lack of money, and thatgiving poor governments cash to invest would spur eco-nomic growth’’. Aid was also used by Kaunda’s successor,Frederick Chiluba, to bloat the civil service and pay ‘‘thou-sands of the brightest Zambians to shun the kind of pro-ductive enterprise that might have made the country lesspoor’’. Most Zambians grew poorer under Chiluba, despitereceiving roughly $900 a head in aid and debt relief in the1990s (Guest, 2004, pp. 24–25; 152–154).6

In Malawi, one explanation for the economic downturnwas ‘‘the structural rigidities that underpinned the coun-try’s economy’’. These included: the slow growth of small-holder exports as plantation/estate agriculture ‘crowded’them out; the narrowness of the export base and increasedreliance on tobacco; the dependence on imported fuel; therapid deterioration of parastatal finances; and the inflexiblesystem of government- administered prices and wages(Chilowa et al., quoted in Chinsinga, 2001, pp. 29–31).But what is most curious in Malawi is that poverty debatesare ‘‘endlessly marred by the apparent lack of consensus asto what exactly constitutes poverty in the Malawian con-text’’. Part of this problem is attributed to that conditionunder the first President Hastings Banda,7 where therewas virtually no room for views that contradicted the offi-cial position. ‘‘It was virtually taboo to consider poverty asa public problem requiring urgent policy interventions’’(Chinsinga, 2001, p. 27).

Despite debates as to the nature, causes, magnitude anddistribution of poverty in the two countries, what is clear isthat with the publication and submission of the PRSPs tothe WB-IMF, there now exists a clear and official defini-tion, quantification, and perception of the incidence ofpoverty in the two countries. And within this official viewis an explicit recognition on the role of water in povertyreduction. Zambia identifies water as playing ‘‘a major rolein all the sectors of the economy’’ and ‘‘contributes to thecountry’s development objective of eradicating poverty’’(TNDP, October 2002: 107). Malawi states that ‘‘the provi-sion of and equitable access to potable water supplies andreasonable sanitation facilities are central to poverty reduc-tion as they have a direct impact on health status and there-fore productivity’’ (MPRS, 2002, pp. 41–42). However,

6 Robert Guest is the Africa editor of magazine The Economist.7 Banda was ousted after a series of protests that led to Malawi’s first

multi-party elections in 1994.

there appears little understanding as to how water can playthis role, and this has become one of the key problems inmeeting the MDG target.

3. Weak state support for water and sanitation provision

The role of water (and sanitation) in poverty reductionis recognised in the MPRS and ZPRS. But this role isnot defined and not fully understood – a fundamental con-ceptual problem that leads to a lack of prioritisation as wellas difficulties in making specific policy choices within thestrategy.

At the outset, it can be stated that the recognition cameonly as a mere afterthought: it came late in the process ofdeveloping the PRSPs. For example, in the provincial con-sultations in Zambia in 2001, water and sanitation was notstructured as a priority for the discussions (see Table A.2,pages 145–150 of the ZPRS). Also, the ZPRS itself didnot identify water and sanitation as a priority for expendi-ture (see pages 127–130 of the ZPRS). As noted by Profes-sor Venkatesh Seshamani, head of economics at theUniversity of Zambia, this under-prioritisation had takenplace despite the findings of some studies8 that poor peopleidentified water supply issues as the most important prob-lem of all (Seshamani, 2002). In Malawi’s Interim PRSPpublished in August 2000, drinking water and sanitationprovision was not a priority and was seen simply as a com-ponent of health services provision (Malawi IPRSP, Aug2000: 17). In the actual MPRS that came out two yearslater, the ‘location’ of water and sanitation was moved toinfrastructure provision. Furthermore, the sector has notbeen given the same priority in subsequent budget alloca-tions (WaterAid and ODI, 2004, p. 18).

The links of water and sanitation to poverty reductionare obvious but need to be emphasized. Impact assessmentsundertaken by WaterAid show that water and sanitationprojects produce immeasurable benefits far beyond thoseof reducing disease and the burden of long-distance watercollection (WaterAid, 2001, p. 27).9 There are economic,social and other benefits that go directly to the household.For example, water projects can:

• Enable poor rural families to save up to five hours oftime spent collecting water for household use. This timecan be allocated not only to doing other livelihood activ-ities, but also to spending more time with the family andattending to social and religious obligations. This dra-matically enhances the self-esteem of communities.

Participatory Poverty Monitoring and the 1999 Consultations with thePoor Studies undertaken by the Poverty Assessment Group (PAG)Lusaka. For more details, see Seshamani, 2002.

9 WaterAid’s ‘‘Looking Back’’ study is a qualitative evaluation of watersupply and sanitation projects implemented in India, Ghana, Tanzaniaand Ethiopia. It can be downloaded at www.wateraid.org.

10 There are some observations to explain political discretion in fundingreleases, but still needs to be validated. For example, the jump in actualreleases in 2001 to 24.7% (see Table 1) is attributed to the elections heldthat year – speeding up releases can gain votes for the power-holders.Some civil servants attribute actual releases to the strength of personalconnections between MPs and other local leaders with top officials at theMinistry of Finance and National Planning.

E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900 889

• Provide an environment where traditional birth atten-dants can deliver babies more safely. This can contributesignificantly to another MDG target (no. 6) of reducingby three-quarters by 2015 the maternal mortalityratio.

• Improve mental as well as physical health, along withschool attendance and the quality of teaching. Commu-nities that received water projects often see a dramaticincrease in school attendance, since children apart fromwater collection chores also bring domestic animals towater sources. It also improves teaching quality, asteachers often do not want to be posted in schools with-out water as well as sanitation facilities. This contributesto another MDG target (no. 3) of ensuring that by 2015,children will be able to complete a full course of primaryschooling.

• Increase economic opportunities for women, as are thechances for girls to take part in formal education, sincein traditional African societies, women and girls do thewater collection chores. This can contribute to stillanother MDG target (no. 4) on eliminating gender dis-parity in primary and secondary education and improv-ing the ratio of literate women to men.

Given water’s impact on health, livelihoods, education,gender roles and overall well-being, there is a strong argu-ment for it to be a cross-cutting theme in its own right.WaterAid has argued that improvements in water, sanita-tion and hygiene behaviour together constitute the greatestsingle advance in preventive health care; it underpins thehistory of economic development; and most importantly,that these improvements were made possible in the devel-oped world by political will and public resources. Accessto water and sanitation, emphasises WaterAid, is at thecentre of the quality of life and economic developmentacross Africa requires prioritisation and funding forwater.

But funding for water and sanitation in Malawiand Zambia has remained deficient. The issue is not justabout the availability of resources but also, and moreimportantly, about the quality of funding. Two studiesundertaken by WaterAid in Malawi and Zambia revealserious problems in resource allocation for water sup-ply and sanitation provision under the PRSPs in thetwo countries. These problems can be enumerated asfollows:

• There are typically no corresponding funds in the

‘resource envelope’ to match the projects identified for

funding. To ensure the implementation of proposed pri-ority expenditures on poverty reduction, a key principleunder the PRSP is to match projects with actually exist-ing money in the treasury called the ‘‘resource envelope’’which typically comes from debt relief granted by theIMF and WB. But matching projects with resourcesdoes not appear to guide decision-making on waterand sanitation. In Zambia, the PRSP has allocated

US$42.4 million (5% of the total resource envelope)for water and sanitation for 2002–2004. But the Zam-bian Parliament in 2002 and 2003 alone authorisedexpenditures that are already over this amount –US$57.5 million – in disregard of what can actually befunded (Gutierrez et al., 2004, pp. 17–18).

• There is great variance between authorised provision and

actual spending. Mainly because of the lack of matchingresources, less than a fourth of projects and budget lineitems authorised by the Zambian Parliament actuallygets implemented. Table 1 shows that from 1999 to2001, the entire government machinery spent between9.65% and 24.7% of the total approved and authorisedbudget by Parliament for WSS line items. At firstglance, one might assume that there is insufficientcapacity to spend the money allocated. But interviewswith officials at national and local government levelsuggest that existing capacity is in fact underutilised.Firstly, this reflects a lack of accountability in deci-sion-making at central government level. Local officialsin fact complain that they know little about how allo-cations are made, released and monitored. Secondly,there appears a certain element of political discretionin actual funding releases that at the moment remainsunclear.10 Thirdly, as explained by the Finance Minis-try, they are unable to capture donor disbursementsin government accounting systems, making it difficultto plan and monitor overall expenditure (Gutierrezet al., 2004, pp. 18–20).

• The water and sanitation sector is effectively losing groundand appears to be increasingly deprioritised. A mecha-nism called ‘‘Pro-Poor Expenditures’’ (PPEs), has beendeveloped to ring-fence budget items against cuts inorder to avoid fluctuations in the flow of resources topriority areas. The share of water and sanitation expen-ditures in Malawi’s PPE has gone down from 5% in bud-get year 2001–2002, to 2% in 2002–2003, and to 1%in 2003–2004. Table 2 shows that the water sectorunderwent a 20% cut from budget year 2002–2003 to2003–2004. There are a number of reasons why this ishappening. Firstly, the strategies of major donors area key factor. The European Union, for example, hasrecently become a major investor in the agriculture sec-tor; hence, more resources are flowing into agriculture.Other factors include a general lack of confidence andsupport for the Ministry of Water Development (vis-a-vis other channels such as the President’s Office orNGOs), a lack of major donor interest in water, and

Table 1Comparison of total authorised provision and actual spending on WSS line items in the Zambia national budget, 1999–2003 (in Zambian kwachas)

Year Authorised provision for WSS(as approved by the Parliament)

Actual expenditurefor WSS

Percentage of expenditurecompared with the provision

1999 35,974,179,010 ($7.19 m) 3,473,308,922 ($0.64 m) 9.652000 52,213,690,709 ($10.4 m) 8,176,348,001 ($1.63 m) 15.652001 197,587,575,884 ($39.5 m) 48,787,082,154 ($9.76 m) 24.702002 135,696,095,997 ($27.1 m) No figures available –2003 152,107,960,726 ($30.4 m) No figures available –

Source: Consolidated from 1999, 2000, 2001 Financial Reports and 2002, 2003 Estimates of Expenditures.

890 E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900

ineffectual lobbying by the ministry. (WaterAid andODI, 2004, pp. 18–19).

It is almost always assumed that the lack of financialresources is the biggest obstacle to providing water supplyto the world’s poorest people. The lack of resources isindeed an ubiquitous problem. In Zambia, WaterAid esti-mates that anywhere from US$13 million to US$20 millionis needed each year until 2015 in order to provide newinvestments in water and sanitation that will keep up tomeet the country’s Millennium Development Goal commit-ments.11 In Malawi, there is a need to reverse the cuts in thebudget for WSS provision.

However, it should be emphasized that to focus simplyand solely on lack of financing while paying little attentionto problems and inefficiencies in resource allocation mayresult in even less delivery. The two researches show thatproblems and inefficiencies in resource allocation to WSSare a government and a donor issue at the same time.The perennial problems in the government’s budget processare only one side of the equation. The other equally impor-tant side is the set of problems associated with donorbehaviour, where individual decisions on financing specificprojects typically by-pass or undermine PRSP objectives.There also appears the problem of weak donor account-ability to the national government. (Gutierrez et al.,2004, pp. 39–50).

12 The ZPRS for example, notes that ‘‘traditional measures (of poverty),such as the headcount index, that capture only income deficiency are

4. Understanding the role of water and sanitation

in poverty reduction

So the question is why has water and sanitation not beenprioritised, and why does it come only as a mere after-thought in the poverty reduction strategies in Malawiand Zambia? One answer, it appears, lies in how the phe-nomenon of poverty is understood. Both Malawi and Zam-bia have adopted ‘expanded definitions’ of poverty. TheZPRS and MPRS do not define poverty only from theincome perspective – they include other ‘dimensions’ such

11 This is based on the finance gap calculations made by WaterAid-Zambia (2005). The amount cited here covers only new investments anddoes not include the costs of maintenance and rehabilitation of alreadyexisting facilities.

as lack of access to basic needs, lack of capability or humandevelopment, and observes poverty at various levels – atthe individual, gender, household, community and nationallevels.12 The difficulty is that these newly-accepted dimen-sions of poverty are less understood and less investigatedthan the standard or conventional dimensions. For exam-ple, the World Bank’s World Development Report(WDR), a key source of definitions in the development ofpoverty reduction strategies, has been described as notoffering guidance on how to weigh the relative importancefor policy action on the different non-income dimensions ofpoverty. There is also no discussion of how policy trade-offs can be better understood – like how improvements inwater policy, for example, can support and strengthenimprovements in health policy or education policy? (Klug-man, 2001, p. 2).

It can also be observed that while much has been doneto develop the conception of poverty in relation to faminesand food security, there is still very little work available onthe conception of poverty in relation to water, much lesssanitation. The idea of ‘water security’ particularly forpoor families, remains underdeveloped. Understandingthe characteristics of water and its links to the creationor reduction of poverty remains relatively under-investi-gated. This task is critical, if more effective policies are tobe developed so water and sanitation provision can playa key role in poverty reduction.

In his influential study of famines, Amartya Sen devel-ops the ‘entitlement approach’ which focuses on the abilityof a person to acquire food and other commodities withinthe prevailing economic, social and legal arrangements(Sen, 1981). Sen develops a framework for measuring pov-erty that involves two distinct operations – identification ofthe poor, and the aggregation of their poverty characteris-tics. Identification is typically done by specifying a set ofbasic or minimum needs, and regarding the inability to

simply not adequate.’’ As such, it adopts a ‘holistic’ definition thatencompasses elements from the income, basic needs and capabilityperspectives of poverty (ZPRS, May 2002: 22). The MPRS on the otherhand, states that ‘‘poverty has many dimensions including income povertyand human or capability poverty. Poverty exists and is observable atvarious levels: at the individual, household, community and nationallevels, and has a gender dimension’’. (MPRS, Apr 2002: 5).

Table 2Malawi Actual PPE in 2002/2003 against budgeted amounts for PPE in 2003/2004

Sector Actual expenditure 2002/2003 (MK million) Budget 2003/2004 Actual change Change as %

Agriculture 856.8 ($7.79) 1543.6 ($14.03) 677.83 ($6.15) +78Water 216.1 ($1.96) 173.0 ($1.57) �43.14 ($0.39) �20

Education 5909.8 ($53.72) 6727.2 ($61.16) 817.40 ($7.43) +14Health 2865.1 ($26.04) 3064.7 ($27.86) 199.55 ($1.81) +7Gender, youth and community services 151.8 ($1.38) 139.9 ($1.27) �11.86 ($0.108) �8Police 356.9 ($3.24) 434.0 ($3.94) 77.07 ($0.70) +22Others, i.e. feeder roads, mining, tourism 768.9 ($6.99) 766.4 ($6.96) �2.51 ($0.023) 0

Total 11134.4 ($101.22) 12848.7 ($116.80) 1714.35 ($15.58) +15

Source: Ministry of Finance, Monitoring Unit.

E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900 891

fulfil these needs as the test of poverty. Aggregation isabout summing up the characteristics of the set of poorpeople into an overall image of poverty.

Many of Sen’s ideas are applicable for water, but a lotstill needs to be understood about the characteristics ofwater. For example, as compared to food and other com-modities, the valuation of water is different. A food crop,such as maize, will almost always have an economic valua-tion or price attached to it, whereas water, while equallyvaluable as food, does not always come with an economicvaluation. Water’s value is not as immediately evident andobservable as that given to food commodities. A pricealmost always needs to be paid for medicines, but wateris treated differently. In its natural form, water is mostoften treated as a common pool resource, with no priceattached to it, especially in places where it is in abundance.This can create serious problems – experience shows that aresource that is free often leads to it being wasted ratherthan conserved, or polluted rather than protected.

The idea of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) –where rational individuals all working to harvest commonpool resources like forest trees, fish or wild animals in theirself-interest without regulation leads to depletion – is acompelling framework for water resources. The conven-tional solution is to impose centralised government or stateregulation, or to privatise the ownership and provision ofthe resource – decisions which are based on some form ofvaluation.

But valuation, regulation or even the privatisation ofwater resources is complex and highly debatable. Thereare those who argue that water could not simply be seenas having only economic value, because it also has socialvalue.13 Hence, the state should primarily pay (not con-sumers in a market) for its provision. There are also differ-ences between intrinsic value (what water is to differentusers) and exchange value (the price actually paid thatmay or may not reflect economic value). Within the eco-nomic valuation of water, further distinctions can be madebetween willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept. As

13 An expanded discussion of the valuation of water is presented inGutierrez (2003) and also in Moss, Moss et al. (2003), which can bedownloaded from www.pacinst.org.

explained by Gary Wolff, willingness to pay is the valuesomeone attaches to something he does not own and wantsto obtain; whereas willingness to accept can be defined as‘‘the minimum compensation payment one must receiveto be indifferent to the loss of something that was ownedbut has been taken away’’. For example, a poor familywho already has enforceable property rights to at leastenough water to meet their basic needs will not be forcedby their poverty to let go of their water right, because theminimum compensation they will demand to be indifferentto the loss of their water will be high. (Gleick et al. (2002)and personal correspondence with Wolff, quoted inGutierrez, 2003, pp. 15–28).

There are therefore plenty of difficult theoretical prob-lems to understand and untangle for water, but there alsoappears some simple omissions. For example, in both theMRPS and ZPRS, water is absent (or at least not explicit)in the definition of ‘basic need’. The MPRS defines ‘‘basicneed’’ only in a very general sense – it includes the food andnon-food ‘‘economic, social, psychological and physiologi-cal requirements’’ at the minimum level estimated at MK10.4714 per day in 1998. (MPRS, 2002: 5). Zambia’s Cen-tral Statistical Office (CSO) quantifies ‘poverty line’ as‘‘the amount of monthly income required to purchase basicfood to meet the minimum calorific requirement for a fam-ily of six’’ (ZPRS, 2002: 23). This definition is worse, as‘poverty line’ is limited only to calorific requirements;hence the water requirement to be above the poverty lineis omitted.

That water and sanitation provision plays an importantrole in poverty reduction can therefore be easily argued for.The links are obvious but often missed, and therefore needsto be emphasized. But furthermore, there are still a numberof theoretical problems to understand and untangle. In2005, both the MPRS and ZPRS will be reviewed, and itis important to flag up and discuss these issues. Resolvingsimple omissions, like the adoption of a more inclusive def-inition of ‘basic needs’ can lead to important policy posi-tions. For example, the International Labour

14 In 1998, the one US dollar is equivalent to 31.1 Malawi kwacha. InMarch 2005, the exchange rate has become US$ 1 – MK 110. So using thefigures supplied, the minimum level would be MK 37.06 in March 2005.

Table 3Water and Sanitation Coverage in Malawi and Zambia, 1990 and 2002WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program

Malawi Zambia

Water 1990 2002 Water 1990 2002

Rural 34% 62% Rural 27% 36%Urban 90% 96% Urban 86% 90%Total 41% 67% Total 50% 55%

Sanitation 1990 2002 Sanitation 1990 2002

892 E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900

Organisation already defines basic needs ‘‘as items of pri-vate consumption (adequate food, shelter, clothing, house-hold equipment and furniture) together with essentialcommunity services (safe drinking water, sanitation, publictransport and health, education and cultural facilities)’’.15

Water can be regarded as an item of private consumption,but its provision can be categorised as an essential commu-

nity service, which governments need to prioritise and thatpoverty reduction budgets need to allocate for.

Rural 34% 42% Rural 26% 32%Urban 52% 66% Urban 64% 68%Total 36% 46% Total 41% 45%

Source: http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowId=665.

Table 4aWater coverage estimates in Zambia

Rural Urban Total

CSO, 2003 – based on the 200 census 29.5% 86.1% 49.1%JMP (UNICEF/WHO) – based on DHS 2002 36% 90% 55%WaterAid-Zambia (provisional), 2004 23% 36% 28%

Table 4bSanitation coverage estimates in Zambia

Rural Urban Total

CSO, 2003 – based on the 200 census 2.1% 39.2% 14.9%JMP (UNICEF/WHO) – based on DHS 2002 32% 68% 45%WaterAid-Zambia (provisional), 2004 15% 40% 24%

5. Contested indicators

Another important problem towards meeting the MDGtarget in both Malawi and Zambia is the lack of reliableindicators on coverage, targeting and the levels of involve-ment of non-state actors (NSAs). There are widely diver-gent coverage figures on sanitation. The lack ofindicators for equity in the distribution of water projectshave resulted in more facilities being constructed not inthe poorer communities that ought to be prioritised, butin those which have already ‘captured’ relatively moreresources. This situation is compounded by how govern-ment institutions remain basically blind to activities andinterventions being made by non-state actors in bothcountries.

There are different coverage figures in use in both coun-tries, some of which provide information that are substan-tially different from the others. This creates confusion andunnecessary debates among donors, government andNGOs as to what exactly is the problem that they shouldaddress.

The most commonly used coverage figures are thosesupplied by WHO/UNICEF in their Joint Monitoring Pro-gram (JMP). These figures are supplied mainly through theannual demographic and health surveys that UNICEFfunds in the two countries. The coverage figures for Malawiand Zambia are as follows (Table 3).

In Tables 4a and 4b, we compare the JMP figures forZambia with those supplied by the Census and StatisticsOffice and those developed by WA-Zambia.

As can be seen, WA-Zambia has the lowest estimates onthe water coverage figure. The most significant differenceare the estimates on urban water coverage, where theCSO and JMP estimates it to be 86.1% and 90% respec-tively, while WAZ estimates it to be a low of 36%. Thisis explained by how both CSO and JMP based their esti-mates on supply-side data from household surveys, a meth-odology that fails to consider the situation in theunplanned peri-urban settlements, where public tapstandsserve large numbers of people with paltry and unreliablesupply but are counted as having good access. WA-Zambiaalso has a lower figure on rural water coverage after takinginto account that a significant percentage of constructed

15 This definition was obtained from www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/files/glossary_b.htm.

facilities are actually not anymore working. Another expla-nation is consideration of such factors as excessive distanceto the water point, or the time it takes to actually obtainwater especially when there are queues. On rural sanitationcoverage WA-Zambia’s estimates differ sharply as well withthe CSO coverage. CSO defines sanitation coverage interms of ‘‘households with access to proper toilet facilities’’which are interpreted as private or shared flush toilets andVIP latrines.

In Malawi, the MPRS reports only 65.6% of householdshave access to potable water supplies while 81.4% have‘‘reasonable access to a latrine’’. (MPRS: 41–43). Malawi’s2001 Joint Sector Review estimates sanitation coverage atonly 10% (JSR: 1). The bottom line is that coverage figuresin the two countries have remained contested andproblematic.

The widely divergent coverage figures on sanitationreveal how the sanitation problem is insufficiently under-stood. Discussions on appropriate solutions could not evenbe started as the benchmarks on which to base interven-tions on are contested.

But there are aspects of the problem more critical thanjust different coverage figures. This includes inappropriatetechnology choice resulting in waste of resources, and thelack of equity-in-distribution indicators that can showhow water points are distributed, particularly among the

E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900 893

rural population. Malawi’s PRSP is a case in point. On thebasis of the coverage figures it used, the MPRS set a targetof rehabilitating 2000 non-functional boreholes, construct-ing 7500 new boreholes, and rehabilitating 15 rural pipedwater schemes. It is doubtful if these targets are well-informed decisions.

How inappropriate technology choice results in wastageof resources is explained by the water point mappingundertaken by WaterAid in Salima district in Malawi in2002. WaterAid estimates 62% (136,000) of Salima’s popu-lation to be living in areas characterised by a shallow allu-vial aquifer, and 38% (83,000) living in a weather basementaquifer. In shallow alluvial aquifers where the water table ishigh and more easily accessible, the most appropriatemethod of providing water is either by installing the muchcheaper hand-drilled boreholes or hand-dug wells. Inweather basement aquifers where the water table is deeperand typically below a rock base, more expensive mechani-cal drilling is necessary. But nearly 3 out of every 4 (73%)of Salima’s water points are the expensive mechanicallydrilled boreholes, as compared to 13.5% hand-dug orhand-augured water points (Nyirenda et al., 2004, p. 50).

The most important finding of the water point mappingin Salima, however, was the discovery of the lack of equityin the distribution of water points (Stoupy and Sugden,2003, p. 5, 17). Fig. 1 shows the location of water pointsin two political subdivisions within Salima (SC Mwanzaand TA Pemba)16 which are further subdivided into Enu-meration Areas – a geographical unit created by theNational Statistics Office for census purposes (on average,EAs have a population of around 1000). Fig. 1 shows thatwater points are concentrated heavily among some enu-meration areas, or along roadsides or paths, while otherEAs have none.

The national government standard is to provide at leastone water point for every 250 persons, which translates intoa water point density of (4) four water points per thousandpopulation. Mwanza, with a population of 12,609 and 47water points, has a water point density of 3.7; Pemba, witha population of 15,440 and 46 water points, has a waterpoint density of 3.0. What these figures hide is the factsome EAs in Mwanza and Pemba have more than eightwater points per thousand, while others have none. Equityin distribution is essential, if MDG targets are to beachieved.

The lack of equity in distribution in Mwanza andPemba, observes Stoupy and Sugden, is a pattern thatcan be observed in practically all areas in the country.Water sector investments tend to flow in those areas thatalready have more. This is shown graphically in Fig. 2, inMulanje South District in the southeast corner of Malawi.Mulanje South has a total of 295 enumeration areas with269,507 inhabitants. The figure shows the increase in water

16 ‘SC’ stands for sub-chief, while ‘TA’ stands for Traditional Authority.These are subdivisions within districts in Malawi that is equivalent to theward in Zambia.

points from 1998 (lighter shade) to 2003 (darker shade).EAs with more than six water points per thousand (B)had more investments than EAs with less than two perthousand (A). If MDG targets are to be achieved, this slopeneeds to be reversed (Stoupy and Sugden, 2003, p. 16).

Zambia undertook a similar mapping exercise from 1993to 1997, initiated by UNICEF, to produce a Rural Water

Point Inventory. It was undertaken by the now defunctCommunity Management and Monitoring Unit (CMMU),which was supported by five different donors17 to employwater point enumerators to locate and survey all knownwater points in the rural areas of Zambia. Excluded fromthis survey were the predominantly urban districts, as wellas urbanised areas (commonly called ‘townships’ or towncentres) in predominantly rural districts. A total of 52 dis-tricts were inventoried.

For each water point visited, enumerators took a read-ing from hand-held Global Positioning System (GPS)devices, plotted them onto maps, and then filled out a ques-tionnaire on the condition of the water point, the technol-ogy type, and if a village water committee managed thewater point. If the water point was not working, someexplanations were provided. Also included was the dateof construction, and the institution, government agency,donor or individual that built it. The results were thenput into digital maps where water points were plotted, aswell as a spreadsheet database with information from thequestionnaire. The private engineering company ASCOwas hired to produce the maps and the spreadsheet data-base. A total of 21,262 water points were inventoried(Community Management and Monitoring, 1995).

The WaterAid PRSP study analysed why there is lack ofequity in the distribution of resources, and came out withthe following reasons:

• Inadequate extension information. Government exten-sion workers are the interface between governmentand communities. Extension information is often inade-quate. Communities with access to such information canget not just more water points, but also other public ser-vices (such as health, education or agricultural extensionservices) as well.

• Absence of water point inventories. Central governmentworkers looking for probable sites for water points areoften blind on where to put them, and rely on thoseindividuals in communities who are more educatedand articulate in identifying sites. It is not unusual forthese individuals to conceal the location of other waterpoints to these government workers, so they can getmore.

17 These donors are UNICEF, the European Union, the NorwegianAgency for Development (NORAD), Ireland Aid, and the GermanAgency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ).

Fig. 1. Distribution of water points in Mwanza and Pemba in Salima District, Malawi. Source: WaterAid/WSSCC Water Point Mapping Project, 2004.

Fig. 2. Increase in the number of water points between 1998 and 2003 inMulanje South District. Source: WaterAid/WSSCC Water Point MappingProject, 2004.

894 E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900

• Lack of access roads. The installation of waterpoints will most often depend on drillers or contrac-tors being able to access the villages. Poorer areaswith less infrastructure therefore tend to get less waterpoints.

• Centralised decision-making. Oftentimes, the identifica-tion of sites for the construction of water points isdependent on decision-makers in central offices, oron elected politicians from various areas. It is notclear what criteria they use when making suchdecisions.

• Community’s educational level. There are certain villageswhere retirees from the civil service reside. They arequicker in understanding issues, and are consequentlymore adept in accessing resources.

• Lack of monitoring. No verification is made if drillersand contractors have actually installed water pointswhere they should. Drillers and contractors tend toinstall in areas that are more easily accessible, or whereground water is closer to the surface.

• Failures in reporting. Monitors checking on the qualityof contracted projects sometimes submit wrong reports(e.g. that a borehole is 45 meters deep, as stipulated inthe project contract, when it may actually be only 20meters) due to mistakes, but may also be due to briberyor collusion with contractors.

• Lack of collaboration by different implementers. Govern-ment and NGO implementers of projects do not collab-orate, resulting in duplication. There is also multipleapplication and procedures through which communitiescan obtain a water point, resulting in furtherduplication.

• Untimely disbursement of funds. Drilling is usually a dryseason activity, but when funds are delayed, or releasedonly in the wet season, drillers mobilise their rigs in thewet season when rural roads are mostly impassable.When this happens, rather than not drill and not bepaid, the driller will approach the headman or TA andgive them the option to re-allocate the borehole.

As shown by the preceding reasons, problems in cover-age figures and equity in distribution are not just technicalproblems that can be resolved by simply creating waterpoint maps. Most of the problems are more political in nat-ure. The maps’ contribution is the measurement and quan-tification of equity in distribution, which could perhaps bethe single most important step to ensure that communitiesthat are too poor to articulate demand are included withinthe scope of planning. It will minimise ‘gatekeeper’ privi-

Table 5Functional and non-functional water points funded by donors in Malawi

Fund provider Total water points funded Functional Non-functional Percent non-functional

USAID 784 177 607 77.42Government 10,984 6071 4913 44.73Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief 221 140 81 36.65Japan Cooperation 178 127 51 28.65Marian Medical Mission 2257 1649 608 26.94Action Aid 498 366 132 26.51World Vision 1146 844 302 26.35UN Children’s Emergency Fund 577 427 150 26.00Save the Children Fund – UK 560 415 145 25.89Plan International 288 218 70 24.31Gesselschaft fuer Technische Zusamenarbeit 777 603 174 22.39Japan International Cooperation Agency 560 443 117 20.89Concern Universal 641 518 123 19.19European Union 611 497 114 18.66Malawi Social Action Fund 4012 3338 674 16.80WaterAid 137 132 5 3.65GITEC (German agency) 795 776 19 2.39

E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900 895

leges that often lead to corruption – the undue influencethat those with access to information and donor supportuse in (re)directing resources to favoured areas. It will alsostimulate initiative amongst local government units tolobby and argue the case for increased resources to theirlocalities. Finally, it provides not only concrete basis fortransparent allocations within Malawi’s national budgetprocess and donor initiatives, but also enhance sustainabil-ity of water sector investments. Already, the maps arebeing used to evaluate the high level of non-functionalwater points constructed by past programs. In sum, themapping process potentially rearranges not only fundingbut also accountability relationships between donors, localand national governments and communities. The mappingprocess is an important tool for effective water governanceand for improving equity in distribution of investmentsthat it so urgently needed in Malawi and Zambia.

A simple table that can be generated from the maps canprovide basis for a more thorough evaluation of workbeing done by the different implementing agencies. Table5 shows the water points funded by different sector players– from the government, multilateral donors like UNICEF,bilateral donors (like the United States Agency for Interna-tional Development, Japan International CooperationAgency and Germany’s GTZ), to international non-gov-ernment organisations. The water points are classified intowhether they are functional or non-functional. The resultsare quite revealing. For example, 77% of the 784 waterpoints funded by USAID are non-functional. The govern-ment, which funded the installation of 10,984 out of the42,613 water points covered by the maps, has a breakdownrate of 44.73%; while the NGO Canadian Physicians forAid and Relief (CPAR) has a breakdown rate of 36.65%.These figures argue that these funding providers need tolook at reasons for the high breakdown rates and addressthem in the future. The figures also suggest that rehabilita-

tion of non-functional water points, rather than the con-struction of new ones, can be a priority for future action.

The maps can therefore provide information that ispotentially embarrassing, and may lead to it being rejectedor suppressed. The experience in Zambia is indicative –after the Water Point Inventory was finished in 1997, themaps and databases were ‘lost’, while the CommunityManagement and Monitoring Unit (CMMU) was dis-solved. It is quite ironic that as Zambia embarked on wide-spread national consultations since 2000 to develop itsPoverty Reduction Strategy, it was not able to benefit fromthe information supplied by the maps and database. Goodworking relationships between institutions – i.e. increasedcollaboration among implementers, decentralisation ofdecision-making, or timely releases of funds – are equallyas important as having maps and databases in existence.

The maps and the database therefore, which are simplytechnical tools, can cause a profound re-ordering of powerrelations and can influence access to resources across gov-ernment, the donor community and even among NGOs. Alist of the impact of these tools includes the following:

• The database provides a record of breakdown rates offacilities installed by certain organisations – whethergovernmental, non-governmental or donor – whichcan be potentially embarrassing or lead to the termina-tion of the project or program for bad performance.

• The maps and database may potentially lead to a re-allocation of resources towards the least-served areas,which may not necessarily be the areas that deliver thevotes, or may not be the areas where those who havemore power reside. As a result, the maps are ignoredby a number of key players who would rather not‘know’, for example, that a still functional boreholeexists just 50 meters from a new one they areconstructing.

18 This refers to the UN Financing for Development Conference held inMonterrey, Mexico in 2002.

896 E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900

• The maps and database are potentially powerful toolsfor decentralisation. Priority areas for investment willbe determined by local authorities validating the waterpoint density figures and the equity in distribution indi-cators, not central planners used to moving huge sumsfor big projects.

• The maps and database will show that in areas that areoverserved with water points that are non-functional,investments need to be redirected to the repair and reha-bilitation of broken down water points, and towards thebuilding up of social components that will ensure thesustainability of the water points.

• The maps and database will lead to lesser roles for ‘gate-keepers’ who thrive on the lack of information and thestate of chaos in national planning.

• The maps and database can lead to a substantial restruc-turing of existing multi-million programmes that areevaluated mainly on the simple counting of how manywells and boreholes have been installed, not on the basisof improvements they have made in equity in distributionindicators or on the sustainability of projects installed.

The goal therefore is not just to install more waterpoints and increase aggregate water point densities, as thiswould result in a purely engineering solution to the prob-lems of lack of water. The installation of water points haveto be continually linked to prevailing social and politicalconditions.

6. Poor sectoral coordination and fragmented donor efforts

The lack of coordination, particularly between govern-ment and non-state actors, is a main problem identifiedin Malawi and Zambia. The Joint Sector Review of Malawinotes that the importance of water and sanitation to devel-opment has attracted the attention of donors, NGOs andgovernment itself. But the ‘‘procedures adopted by theseimplementing agencies are inconsistent with one anotherand cause confusion at community level. A co-ordinatedand consistent approach is essential to avoid duplicationof efforts and waste of resources’’ (JSR: 7).

The most outstanding expression of lack of coordina-tion is that up to 75% of expenditures on water and sanita-tion is estimated to be outside the government budget,which means these are also ‘off-plan’ – i.e. created with dif-ferent planning horizons and implemented outside thescope and priorities of the PRSP (Nyirenda et al., 2004,pp. 30–31). The chief economist of Zambia’s Ministry ofFinance and National Planning, Mr. Edward Simukoko,explains that this is the reason why government is unableto capture the true extent of expenditure in the sector(interview, February 2004). In Malawi, the Ministry ofWater Development is unable to track down and monitorsimilarly. As a result, government becomes largely blindto the activities of non-state actors.

Table 6 provides a snapshot on the lack of coordination.It presents the sources of funding for 1218 water points

installed in Salima and Machinga districts in Malawibetween 1998 and 2002. It shows that 69% of expendituresin Machinga and 89% in Salima are off-budget. Note thelarge number of water points whose providers are‘unknown’ – the process of data collection involved askingcommunity members who installed the water point and ifthey were unclear, the answer was recorded as ‘unknown’.But even with a large number of ‘unknown’ answers, it isstill clear that the vast majority of water points wereinstalled outside the District and MoWD budget (Nyirendaet al., 2004, p. 45):

It is difficult to track nationally expenditures coursedthrough the government as there is no centralised informa-tion available. But in general, the rule of thumb in Malawiand Zambia is that aid money from donors and NGOs donot necessarily support the PRSPs and are delivered mainlythrough individual projects which have their own planningand implementation cycles. As explained by the UK’sDepartment for International Development (DfID), ‘‘alldonors express a commitment to PRSP principles, butthe plethora of projects supported by over 40 donors activein Zambia mean they are less well aligned behind the PRSPthan they should be – particularly in terms of aid instru-ments, and the provision of flexible and predictable fund-ing’’ (DfID, 2004: 8). DfID regards the implementationof the PRSP in Zambia as ‘patchy’ and reiterates that ifdonors are to conform to the Monterrey ideal18 of predict-able budget support, they need to ‘‘have more confidencethat the Government is addressing the high fiduciary risksmore effectively’’ (DfID, 2004: 2).

In other words, there is hesitation to deliver or courseaid money through the national budgets or the PRSP pro-grams because of worries over lack of capacity in govern-ment and the possibilities of corruption. This is mostacute in the water sector in the two countries. In Zambia,there is an unresolved confusion in water services provi-sion: two ministries, the Ministry of Energy and WaterDevelopment (MEWD) and the Ministry of Local Govern-ments and Housing (MLGH), are at loggerheads with eachother on who should provide institutional leadership (andget the funding) for water services provision. In Malawi,there is a very significant lack of confidence in the Ministryof Water Development. WaterAid’s experience is indicative– after it invested in developing capacity by paying for thetraining of key civil servants in water point mapping, thesepersonnel were transferred to another Ministry. As a resultthe maps, which should technically be in the hands of acentral government body and accessible to all implement-ing agencies, have remained under the control of NGOs(WSSCC and WaterAid) and is still in the process of beingtransferred to the appropriate government body.

Even if donors were to channel their funding throughgovernment, the responsible ministry will not have full

Table 6Sources of funding for water points in Salima and Machinga

Machinga district, Southern region Salima district, Central region

Fund provider New water points 1998–2002 Fund provider New water points 1998–2002

On MoWD budget

Government 182 Government 30GITEC 28 National WDP 23Japan cooperation 10 Japan cooperation 1National WDP 1

Sub-total 221 Sub-total 54

Off MoWD budget

MASAF 176 MASAF 190Unknown 142 ActionAid 63World Vision 32 Unknown 62OPC 27 SCF UK 56EU 23 Presidential Fund 21OTHER 23 WaterAid 21Religious institution 22 EU 11GTZ 11 Proscarp 9Concern Universal 6 Religious institutions 9Proscarp 6 MADZI (local NGO) 3SCF UK 6 Red Cross 3ARC 3 Danida 2Private 3 District Assembly 2Danida 2 World Vision 2DFID 1 African Muslim Agency 1District Assembly 1 MAKDA 1USAID 1 Self help 1WaterAid 1

Sub-total 486 Sub-total 457

On MoWD budget 221 (31%) On MoWD budget 54 (11%)Off MoWD budget 486 (69%) Off MoWD budget 457 (89%)

District total 707 District total 511

Source: Nyirenda (2004).

Table 7The MoWD Development Budgeta by provider, 2003/2004

African Development Bank 444,478,555 27.6%African Development Fund/Malawi Government 239,894,849 14.9%World Bank 187,265,396 11.6%World Bank/Malawi Government 264,817,399 16.4%Japanese Government 5,264,470 0.3%Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaubauf (KWF) 2,956,871 0.2%Malawi Government 187,115,499 11.6%Malawi Government/UNDP 121,468,218 7.5%Malawi Government/UNICEF 55,641,098 3.4%Norgwien Government 81,565,380 5.1%UNICEF/NORAD 22,732,005 1.4%

Total 1,613,199,741

Source: Nyirenda (2004).a The ‘development budget’ covers allocations only for projects and does not include recurrent expenditures like staff salaries.

E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900 897

control over the projects. For example, the WaterAid studyrevealed that a total of Malawi Kwacha 1613 million(US$14.6 million) for water and sanitation projects werecoursed through the MoWD (see Table 7). But the levelof control of the Ministry over these projects ranges fromtotal control to virtually no control. For example, theMoWD has partial control over finances provided by the

World Bank/Malawi government, where costs are typicallyshared with a ratio of 90:10. With projects funded by theJapanese government, the MoWD suggests and agreesareas where water points are needed, but then have virtu-ally no control over any other aspect of the project (Nyir-enda, 2004, pp. 30–31). The three categories are shown inTable 8.

Table 8The Malawi MoWD development budget (2003/2004) by degree of control (Source: Nyirenda, 2004)

Type 1 – MoWD in full control MK 185,803,185 ($1,689,119) 12%Type 2 – MoWD w/partial control & Some influence MK 1,396,443,210 ($12,694,938) 87%Type 3 – MoWD w/little control or influence MK 30,953,346 ($281,394) 2%

Total MK 1,613,199,741 ($14,665,452)

898 E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900

A number of donors appear now to be moving awayfrom water and sanitation. UK’s DfID, which is champi-oning the cause of water and sanitation globally, is ironi-cally not allocating aid for the sector in Zambia, andvery little in Malawi. As explained by Richard Montogom-ery, DfID’s Deputy Head in Zambia, they actually wel-come this down-prioritisation of water. This is because‘‘water has become a very complicated area to invest publicmoney in. It is difficult to put up sustainable systems inwater, especially in rural areas where the government’sDistrict Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Education(D-WASHE) committees are not working’’ (interview,February 2005). Montogomery stresses that policy workand research needs to be done urgently, not only to con-vince donors to think otherwise, but to show them howwater sector investments can be done effectively andefficiently.

The lack of a coherent sectoral investment plan,combined with weak capacity for planning and imple-mentation, discourages donors from engaging in program-matic support. This vicious cycle has proven very difficultto break and is an important issue that needs to beaddressed.

Malawi’s MoWD has, however, taken a number of stepsto address these problems, and it is in this regard that theyneed to be urgently supported. In September 2003, theMoWD came out with its Strategic Plan for 2003–2006.In this document, the Ministry committed to focus workon key strategic areas, namely:

• Improving the Ministry’s management and workingenvironment.

• Inventorying, managing and monitoring the current andfuture availability of water resources in the country.

• Increasing the provision of equitable and sustainablewater, environmental and sanitation services bystrengthening policies, standards and enforcement ofpractices.

• Enhancing the knowledge, skills and abilities of all staff.• Implementing an effective decentralisation policy.• Developing a water and environmental sanitation infra-

structure and maintenance sector plan.• Increasing gender equity and improving the manage-

ment of HIV/AIDS in the Ministry.

In Zambia, a certain degree of sectoral coordination isachieved through a new mechanism called sectoral advi-sory groups (SAGs) composed of donors, NGOs, academ-ics and concerned leaders, which are convened by each

Ministry to provide them with advise on their budgets.The Ministry of Local Government and Housing has alsospearheaded the convening of a Rural Water Supply andSanitation Forum, which functions like a venue for policydeliberation. MLGH has also taken some steps to revivethe mapping process left behind by the now defunctCMMU.

Overall, resolving the problem of poor sectoral coordi-nation can be the first step needed in sorting out the manytechnical and political challenges faced by Malawi andZambia in providing water and sanitation services for thepoor. It is much more difficult to address the other prob-lems of weak state support, poor resource allocation, orlack of equity in distribution if there is insufficient coordi-nation within the water and sanitation sector in bothcountries.

7. Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that the task of deliveringwater and sanitation services to the poor, particularly inthose countries implementing WB/IMF-approved PovertyReduction Strategies, is multi-faceted and faces a host oftechnical and political challenges. This is the case takingplace in Malawi and Zambia, two of the world’s poorestcountries.

Firstly, the support for water and sanitation provision inMalawi and Zambia remains weak and funding for the sec-tor remains deficient in both quantity and quality. Despiteits potential positive cross-sectoral impact on the quality oflife, water and sanitation provision remains underpriori-tised in the two countries’ poverty reduction strategies.There are serious problems in resource allocation, like:the lack of funds in the resource envelope to match projectsidentified for funding; the great variance between author-ised budget provision and actual spending; and how thesector is increasingly being de-prioritised under the ‘‘Pro-Poor Expenditure’’ mechanism. The rhetoric for support-ing water and sanitation in the two countries is not lacking,what is wanting is the appropriate action in both govern-ment strategy and national budget allocations. The weakstate support and funding may be traced to how the roleof water and sanitation in poverty reduction is not suffi-ciently understood. There remain problems on the valua-tion of water, and also from how policy action on waterand sanitation provision can directly affect other key pov-erty reduction actions like health and education policy.

Secondly, there is a lack of reliable and consistent indi-cators on coverage, pro-poor targeting and the levels of

E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900 899

involvement of non-state actors. Indicators used byMalawi and Zambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategies aredifferent from those used by these two countries’ nationalstatistical agencies, or those supplied by the Joint Monitor-ing Program of the WHO and UNICEF. Conflicting indi-cators often lead to inappropriate technology choice orlack of equity in the distribution of resources. The lackof equity in distribution has been illustrated clearly in thetwo countries’ Water Point Mapping and Inventory exer-cises. The reasons for this lack of equity are more politicalthan technical.

Finally, another key challenge is poor sectoral coordina-tion and fragmented donor efforts. This leads to a lack ofinstitutional leadership and the existence of projects thatdo not ‘talk’ to each other, with each having their ownplanning horizons and which are implemented outside thescope of the poverty reduction strategies. Donor effortsare less well-aligned behind the PRSPs than they shouldbe, particularly in terms of aid instruments and the provi-sion of flexible and predictable funding.

Various tools are necessary in order to deal with thesetechnical and political challenges. In dealing with issuesregarding the low funding priority, more systematic budgetanalyses are necessary. More effort is also needed todevelop an understanding of the poverty reduction roleof water and sanitation provision, its cross-sectoral impactsand the policy trade-offs of its implementation. Nationalwater point inventories that provide maps and databaseshave also proven to be essential in ensuring not only equityin the distribution of resources, but also pro-poor targetingof projects. Finally, improving sectoral coordinationthrough various mechanisms that have already been tested(e.g. donor coordination forums, long-term capacity build-ing for the relevant government agencies) may be a firststep that can open the door for the use of the other tools.

It is almost always assumed that the lack of financialresources is the biggest obstacle to meet poverty reductionobjectives and provide water and sanitation services to thepoor. But simply bailing out national treasuries and infus-ing them with cash can in fact be counter-productive.Donors and aid organisations have realised this principle,and much of their work has now moved to delivering aidthrough projects that they manage themselves. But thistoo can be counter-productive in the long run; it under-mines the capacity-building within government structuresand leads to a fragmentation of development efforts withno clear institutional leadership.

Certain steps need to be taken. This includes not onlyunderstanding the links of water and sanitation in povertyreduction, but also reviewing the funding and accountabil-ity relationships between donors, aid organisations, NGOs,local and national government bodies, and grassroots com-munities. Tools like annual budget analysis and waterpoint mapping need to be institutionalised for more effec-tive governance in the sector. The development of thesetools is both a technical and political challenge for the allthe concerned stakeholders in Malawi and Zambia.

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Nyirenda, N., 2004. ‘‘Watsan and PRSPs: Flow of Funding from CentralGovernment’’, report prepared for WaterAid-Malawi, unpublished.

Nyirenda, Milazi, Nyirenda, et al., 2004. ‘‘Report of research into thefinancial flows, resource allocation processes and impact of invest-ments made in the water supply and sanitation sectors in Malawi’’,WaterAid-Malawi Research Report, Draft version.

Sen, Amartya K., 1981. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlementand Deprivation’’ in The Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze Omnibus(1999). Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Seshamani, Venkatesh, 2002. Poverty Reduction and Water Access inZambia. WaterAid and ODI, London.

Stoupy, O., Sugden, S., 2003. Halving the number of people withoutaccess to safe water by 2015 – A Malawian perspective. WaterAid-Malawi.

WaterAid, 2001. ‘‘Looking Back: The long-term impacts of water andsanitation projects’’, condensed from Looking Back: participatoryimpact assessment of WaterAid projects in Ghana, Tanzania, Ethiopiaand India. WaterAid, London.

WaterAid and ODI, 2004. In: Slaymaker, Newborne (Eds.). ‘‘Implemen-tation of Water Supply and Sanitation Programmes Under PRSPS:Synthesis of Research Findings from Sub-Saharan Africa’’. WaterPolicy Report No. 2. WaterAid and ODI, London.

WHO and UNICEF, 2004. Meeting the MDG Drinking Water andSanitation Target: A Mid-Term Assessment. WHO and UNICEF,Geneva.

Websites used

http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp.http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_worldregn.asp.http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/jmp2004/en/.http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_results.asp?crID=894

&fID=r15.http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/tables/table1-1.pdf.http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp.

900 E. Gutierrez / Geoforum 38 (2007) 886–900

Further reading

Annamraju, S., Calaguas, B., Gutierrez, E., 2001. ‘‘Financing water andsanitation: key issues in increasing resources to the sector’’, WaterAidBriefing Paper, London, WaterAid.

Botolo, Ben, et al., 2003. The Annual Review of the Malawi PovertyReduction Strategy, 2002–2003. UNDP and Malawi Government,Lilongwe.

IMF and IDA, 2002a. ‘‘The Malawi PRSP: Joint Staff Assessment’’,handout, IMF and IDA, Washington DC, 10 pp.

IMF and IDA, 2002b. ‘‘The Zambia PRSP: Joint Staff Assessment’’,handout, IMF and IDA, Washington DC, 10 pp.

Republic of Malawi, 2000. Interim Poverty Reduction and GrowthStrategy Paper – A Road Map, Malawi Government, Lilongwe.

Republic of Malawi, 2002. The Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy –Final Draft, Malawi Government, Lilongwe.

Republic of Zambia, 2002a. Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,2002–2004. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Lusaka.

Republic of Zambia, 2002b. Transitional National Development Plan2002–2005. Ministry of Finance and National Planning: Lusaka, 374 pp.