democracy and data dissemination: the effect of political regime on transparency
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Democracy and Data Dissemination: The Effect of Political Regime on Transparency. B. Peter Rosendorff, NYU James R. Vreeland, Yale. IPES, Princeton, November 2006. Is transparency “incentive compatible”?. Generally Under what conditions do rulers act in the best interests of the ruled? - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Democracy and Data Dissemination:
The Effect of Political Regime on Transparency B. Peter Rosendorff, NYU
James R. Vreeland, YaleIPES, Princeton, November 2006
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Is transparency “incentive compatible”? Generally
Under what conditions do rulers act in the best interests of the ruled?
Representatives may divert resources Elections may act as disciplining devices –
retrospective voting Consumers/voters demand transparency When will policymakers supply transparency?
Is transparency incentive compatible?
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Key insights Policymakers have an incentive to be
more transparent whenSurvival in office depends on electoral
accountability (democratic polities)
Election outcomes are uncertain
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Policy Instruments Monetary base
Direct control Inflation
Costly to society Redistributive effects
Towards borrowers from lenders Tax on money holdings
Revenues accrue to the government Seignorage
"The amount of real purchasing power that government can extract from the public by printing money." -- Cukierman 1992
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Intuition: Incentive Compatible Transparency Monetary policy is made under uncertainty
Policymakers are uncertain about the aggregate state of the economy at election time
Electorate can’t distinguish between (exogenous) aggregate economic shocks
And the executive's excessive inflation tax (endogenous). For example
If voters observe high real income in any period Voters infer aggregate conditions were good, and executive has not been
excessively inflationary Voters inclined to reelect the incumbent
If voters observe low incomes Voters infer aggregate state was poor and/or The executive extracted/inflated too much Voters inclined to evict the incumbent
Possibility of “unfair eviction” Extraction was modest, but exogenous conditions conspired against the
executive.
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Accountability
Autocrats Executives are less accountable to the electorate Will extract more and worry little about eviction
Democratic Executives Sensitive to the will of the voters Will moderate extraction, but still under bad enough
shocks be kicked out of office Democrats are more likely to be subject to unfair
eviction.
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Transparency
Transparency in policymaking Voters can better (but still imperfectly) separate aggregate
shocks from policy Voters punish extractive behavior, not low incomes Smart policymaker
One that is subject to unfair dismissal – democratic executive May choose to relinquish opportunities for rent extraction In exchange for eliminating the risk associated with being unfairly
dismissed The autocrat – does not fear unfair dismissal
Will not be willing to relinquish rent extracting opportunities Hence those politicians sensitive to the electorate adopt
transparent modes of policymaking In order to enhance the possibility of remaining in office.
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Model Large number of identical consumers/voters Infinite horizon Voters choose savings and reelection rule Govt chooses inflation tax
Inflation redistributes and is a public bad. Non-Transparency, in each period
Payoffs: Voters: Government
1. Executive 2. Nature3. Voters4. Voters
Inflation Shock Savings Reappoint?
tt
tu Uts
2
1 21 12t
t t t tu u m s u m s
2
2t
t t tv m s
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Non-transparency Will of the voters: ex ante probability of voters
recommending reelection
Regime Type: The ex ante probability of keeping office
σ in [0,1] : the degree to which the sentiments of the voters are binding on the executive σ =1 : pure democracy σ =0 : pure autocracy
, Prt tU u U
, , , 1t tU U
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Executive’s Reaction Function
u
π
U
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Transparency
Voters do not directly observe π The policymaker announces ex ante a policy Credible source (WB, IMF, independent agency)
Announce if Sequence
Announcement and Policy Savings Signal Election
Nash
, , ,t s
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Transparency
Voters condition their reelection rule on the announcementAs before, If and
reelect, evict otherwise
Voters are weakly better off
ts s t
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Proposition
NE
Transparency is preferred by both players when the polity is sufficiently democratic
* * *2
*
*
/ 21If 1 1 1
/ 2
then and 1;
otherwise , 0, and 0.
s
s
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The Parameter Space
Transparency Preferred by policymaker
Non-transparency preferred
σ
δ1Sufficiently democratic executives prefer transparency.
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Evidence Transparency – take advantage of a hindrance
Missing data – World Development Indicators (World Bank) Inflation Unemployment
GDP growth Infant Mortality Rates
Regime Przeworski et al (2000) - Dichotomous measure
Key government offices (executive and legislature) are filled through contested elections
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Reporting of Data by RegimeFigure 1: Reporting of data by regime
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Inflation Unemployment Grow th Infant Mortality Rate
Regime
Per
cen
tag
e o
f o
bse
rvat
ion
s w
ith
dat
a
Dictatorship Democracy
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But Democracies are… Richer (control for GDP/capita) Recent (use hazard model)
We also control for: IMF participation Country fixed effects Regional effects
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Controls: GDPPC and IMF
Inflation Unemployment Growth Infant Mortality Rates
The effect of Democracy 2.02** 1.65** 1.97** 0.24**
(Robust std error) (0.15) (0.11) (0.24) (0.09)
The effect of GDP/capita 0.0001** 0.0002** 0.00002 0.00001
(Robust std error) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001)
The effect of IMF participation 0.82** 0.66** 1.41** 0.23**
(Robust std error) (0.09) (0.11) (0.16) (0.09)
Constant 0.31** -2.46** 1.67** -2.06**(Robust std error) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08)
# of obs. 5,042 2,935 5,042 5,128
Log pseudolikelihood -1932.65 -1428.22 -1114.83 -2084.83
Table 2: The pooled effect of democracy on transparency controlling for level of economic development and IMF participation
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Controls and Country Fixed effectsConditional Logit
Inflation Unemployment Growth Infant Mortality Rates
The effect of Democracy 4.93** 1.96** 1.59* 0.60**
(Robust std error) (0.87) (0.64) (0.94) (0.10)
The effect of GDP/capita 0.0014** 0.0005** 0.0010* 0.0001**
(Robust std error) (0.00035) (0.00016) (0.00051) (0.00001)
The effect of IMF participation 2.73** 0.96** 2.45** 0.16*
(Robust std error) (0.43) (0.25) (0.49) (0.08)
# of ctries 65 73 34 169
# of obs. 1,806 1,306 915 5,101
Log pseudolikelihood -466.41 -477.21 -301.03 -1793.52
Table 3: The effect of democracy on transparency controlling for economic development, IMF participation, and country specific effects
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RegionalEffects,Controls.BasicLogit
Inflation Unemployment Growth Infant Mortality Rates
The effect of Democracy 1.87** 1.45** 1.57** 0.36**
(Robust std error) (0.16) (0.13) (0.30) (0.11)
The effect of GDP/capita 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.00003 0.00002**
(Robust std error) 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00001
The effect of IMF participation 0.87** 0.62** 1.40** 0.19**
(Robust std error) (0.09) (0.13) (0.17) (0.09)
Africa -0.88** -4.83** -2.82** 0.16(Robust std error) (0.26) (0.44) (0.72) (0.34)
South Asia -2.86** 0.09(Robust std error) (0.47) (0.39)
East Asia -1.49** 0.21(Robust std error) (0.32) (0.45)
S. E. Asia 1.20** -1.52** 0.17(Robust std error) (0.38) (0.43) (0.38)
Oceania -3.64** -3.31**(Robust std error) (0.58) (0.79)
Middle East -0.50* -2.88** -2.87** 0.10(Robust std error) (0.28) (0.43) (0.72) (0.36)
Latin America 0.33 -1.55** -1.31* 0.02(Robust std error) (0.30) (0.43) (0.78) (0.34)
Caribbean -1.18** -3.71** -0.71 -0.19(Robust std error) (0.30) (0.44) (1.01) (0.36)
East Europe -1.37** -1.57** -3.96** 0.38(Robust std error) (0.30) (0.44) (0.73) (0.36)
Industrial ctries -0.58 -2.22** -0.25(Robust std error) (0.53) (0.81) (0.36)
Constant 1.06** 0.93** 4.29** -2.21**(Robust std error) (0.25) (0.41) (0.72) (0.33)
# of obs. 4,013 2,935 4,762 5,128
Log pseudolikelihood -1775.38 -1083.57 -1025.76 -2078.72
Table 4: The effect of democracy on transparency controlling for economic development, IMF participation, and regional effects
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RegionalEffects,Controls.Duration Dependence
Inflation Unemployment Grow th Infant Mortality Rates
The effect of Democracy 1.30** 0.65** 0.62** -0.14
(Robust std error) (0.27) (0.30) (0.23) (0.18)
The effect of GDP/capita -0.00003 0.00004* -0.00003 -0.0001*
(Robust std error) (0.00006) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00004)
The effect of IMF participation 0.55** 0.42* 0.44** -0.29**
(Robust std error) (0.17) (0.24) (0.19) (0.14)
Africa -3.19** -2.51** -1.54** -2.53**(Robust std error) (0.25) (1.08) (0.38) (0.85)
South Asia -2.12** -1.48 0.05(Robust std error) (0.52) (1.18) (0.10)
East Asia -3.18** 0.36* 0.07(Robust std error) (0.38) (0.21) (0.11)
S. E. Asia -1.49** -0.81 -0.09 0.07(Robust std error) (0.30) (1.15) (0.21) (0.07)
Oceania -2.78* -16.10** -14.76**(Robust std error) (1.56) (1.06) (1.30)
Middle East -2.38** -1.46 -1.43** 0.24**(Robust std error) (0.36) (1.12) (0.45) (0.09)
Latin America -2.20** -0.29 -0.55** 0.43**(Robust std error) (0.41) (1.08) (0.27) (0.13)
Caribbean -3.31** -1.59 -0.44 -3.25**(Robust std error) (0.65) (1.09) (0.29) (0.95)
East Europe -2.26** -0.34 -1.85**(Robust std error) (0.39) (1.07) (0.52)
Industrial ctries -1.25** 0.57 -0.47 0.65**(Robust std error) (0.39) (1.14) (0.39) (0.23)
Constant 0.20 -2.23** -0.33 0.08*(Robust std error) (0.24) (1.08) (0.22) (0.04)
Duration dependence (ln p) -0.03 0.11 -0.05 0.30**
(Robust std error) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.15)
# of countries: 144 160 113 97
# eventually reporting: 126 103 110 95
# of obs. 998 1,431 457 270
Log pseudolikelihood -123.30 -162.24 -126.86 -107.12
Table 5: The effect of democracy on transparency controlling for duration dependence
Note: Coefficients not hazard ratios are reported.
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Conclusions Methodological Implications
Definition of democracy Minimalist definition of democracy actually covers more than
just elections Implies transparency too.
Missing Data Highly correlated with regime type Researchers interested in the consequences of regime type
cannot simply use the available data Must recognize the bias that emerges.
Modest attempts to separate out the oft conflated notions of democracy, accountability and transparency.