democracy works if you let it. - forsa

Democracy worksif you let it.

Stronger localgovernmentmeans betterlocal services.

Make Government Local, Improve Your Local Services

Introduction: Reclaiming the role of local authorities and local democracy............4

Four ‘Dead Hands’ strangling local government ..............................................................5

Irish local government – the poor cousin in Ireland’s democracy ........................8

The least powerful local authority in Europe ........................................................9

Few functions and declining ..............................................................................10

Little money and control......................................................................................13

Public support and electoral turn out ................................................................16

Reimagining and restoring local democracy in Ireland ......................................18

Recommendations for strengthening local government ..................................19

Contextualising European (re) municipalisation ..........................................................22

Disadvantages of private provision ....................................................................23

Benefits of de-privatisation and rationale for public delivery ..........................24

Economic democracy, workers, unions and employment..................................25

Democratic case and mobilisation for public services ......................................26

Public housing ................................................................................................................28

Refuse collection, ..........................................................................................................33

Water ..............................................................................................................................39

Energy ............................................................................................................................44

Conclusion......................................................................................................................48

References................................................................................................................................50

Contents

5

Centralisation has been core theme of a numberof authoritative studies on governmentalstructures in Ireland have highlighted the broadmonopolising tendencies of national government(Callanan 2018, Quinlivin 2018). The subsidiarityof local government offers the potential for adifferent type of connection between thecommunity and local authority, this logic lead theOECD (2009) to recommend that every newservice should be delivered at first considerationby local government. Yet in Ireland a number offunctions have been lost, not to outsourcing, but tocentral (for example water) or regional government,or to new quangos (including higher educationgrants (to SUSI) and driving licences (to NDRL).This has not necessarily improved the services, inthe caser of driving licences both fees andadministrative processing time increased becauseof centralisation.

Executive direction has occurred as new publicmanagement processes and changes inadministration, evaluation and control mechanismshas increased bureaucratic power at the expenseof political representatives. Nowhere is this moreevent than in the managerial processes and

controls associated with public procurementprocess. Irish procurement transaction costs arefar too high at a potential €1.6 billion falling onpublic sector buyers and suppliers over anestimated 85bn procurement budget for the nextfive years.1 Described as ‘horrendous’ by DublinCity Council deputy chief executive and head ofhousing Brendan Kenny2 who considers exectivedirection and procurement is pushing up the costof providing local authority housing. Procurementis also making the process of competing for publicjobs much more onerous for the contractor, itmakes project management processes inflexible,while costing out risk and guaranteeing certaintyin the project delivery is more expensive. Finallyscaling up tendering processes for efficienciesalso rules out the local authority as the preferreddelivery mechanisms. Conversely centralisation ofpurchasing and aggregation of requirements,resulting in bigger contracts, is resulting in theexclusion of not only local government as apotential delivery agent but also rules out smallerand local SMEs and NGOs from the tenderingprocess (ISME 2015) with consequences for localbusiness, local employment and local ratespotential.

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Local government is an important site fordefending and extending democracy and fullcitizenship. Local government is also a source ofeconomic development, developing in local jobs inlocal authorities fuels local spending with localmultipliers. To reach such potential requiresexplicit rebalancing towards direct local publicprovision in Ireland. Unions occupy an importantpublic space. Public sector workers see first-handthe loss of trust in public institutions, which,alongside growing inequality, is contributing tonew forms of populist politics across Europe. It isnecessary to create a critical and oppositionalspace to reclaim Irish local democracy. This paperconstructively engages in what can be done, in theshort and long term, to enhance local democracyand local authority provision of and localdemocratic control over public housing, water,refuse collection and energy policy concerning lowcarbon transition.

Developing new forms of local democratic controland delivery of public services is central tomeeting 21st century challenges (Cumber, 2017).Public ownership and economic democracy arecentral features of contemporary trade union, civilsociety and left alternative projects (Ungar 2013).Concerns about equality, distributional, economicand social justice are now joined by environmentalsustainability and low carbon transition (Fraser2014). Climate change requires that we nowpursue more radical, innovative and ambitiousagendas, many of which need to be local in nature.This means reversing trends of centralisation,

exective direction, privatisation and austerity, allof which combined to undermine the vitality andcapacity of local government in Ireland and thecapacity for progressive forms of local deliverypublic policy.

This paper seeks to both reimagine anddemonstrate the value and relevance of localgovernment in the delivery of key infrastructureand services in Ireland. We first discuss keydevelopments concerning local government inIreland and the degree to which the four deadhands of centralisation, exective direction,privatisation and austerity have undermined localdemocracy in Ireland. Drawing from European andwider evidence us than make the general case forlocal government and democracy and againstcentralisation and privatisation. Keyrecommendations are made to consolidate the roleand capacity of local government delivery in fourkey sectors; public housing, domestic refusecollection, water and energy/low carbon transition.In each of those sectors, attention is drawn how torestore democratic control of both workers andcitizens or residents. Examples of internationalbest practice (from Petitjean and Kishimoto, 2017)are given to illustrate the potential of localgovernment in each sector and recommendationsare made. The conclusion suggests someimmediate and longer-term agendas for reform,which could become a focus for both short termand long term local democracy and public servicecampaigns.


Introduction:Reclaiming the role of local authorities and local democracy

Four ‘DeadHands’ stranglinglocal government

1 http://council.ie/public-procurement-in-ireland-a-critical-review/2 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/horrendous-procurement-rules-pushing-up-social-housing-costs-1.3637482

erosion makes rebuilding the power and functionof local authority more difficult but also makesmore urgent the challenge of restoring publicdemocracy and public services.

Quinlivin (2018) recounts how the banking crisisnegatively impacted on local governmenteverywhere; loss of dividends from banks partlyowned by local governments caused seriousproblems in Flemish local authorities, Dutch localauthorities lost reserves and devaluation ofpension funds while British local authorities lostover €1 billion as a consequence of failedIcelandic banks. Local authorities found it difficultin obtaining or rolling over credit for investmentand to service the increased cost of servicing eurodenominated debt. To some degree, centralcontrols and restraints on local governmentborrowing protected Irish local authorities fromthis scale of financialisation, nonetheless Irishlocal authorities suffered badly under austerity.The decline in central government funding,difficulties in collecting commercial rates becauseof struggling businesses and the virtualdisappearance of development levies due to thecollapse of the construction sector saw localauthority funding decrease by 839m and staffingdecrease by 24 per cent in the five years to 2013(Quinn, 2015, p.13).

To appreciate the impact of austerity on localgovernment it is essential to understand thatausterity adjustments were made not only in thecomposition of budgets but also through theorganizational configuration of state institutionsthrough territorial, functional, financial, managerialand efficiency, and participative reforms (Callanan2016). In Ireland austerity not only meant lessmoney and staff but also more centralized controlof the bureaucracy and more standardizedgovernance and accountability arrangementsacross the public service, in the form of micro-management (Boyle and O’ Riordan 2013) andmanagerialism (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh2013). Administrative rationalisation at the sub-national level has been quite dramatic, reducinginstitutions from 250 to 150 and substantiallymerging local authorities based institutions likeVocational Education Committees into regionalEducation and Training Boards.

7


Figure 2 shows the impact of the 2010employment control framework (ECF), required a20 per cent reduction in personnel from 37,243to 29,480 over the five year period ending in2015. This target was, in fact, met by early 2012.The moratorium on recruitment to the publicservice and the premature retirement of manyofficers have reduced the skill pool within the localgovernment system, and many of the remainingpersonnel are focused on maintaining day-to-dayoperations rather than promoting innovation andreform. This alongside salary cuts and pensionlevies has affected staff morale. Direct staffing

levels dropped from a 2008 37,242 by 9018 to28,224 a drop of 24.2%, this varied acrosscouncils with Galway suffering a 34% (and othersincluding Donegal, Kildare, and Waterford Citylosing in excess of 30%, while some includingCork who lost 17% and Louth with the lowest dropof 15.7%.

While losses varied across councils, the nature ofthe early retirement package mean a loss of seniormanagement, and a loss of skills and functionalcapacity in core areas as well as a loss ofinstitutional memories and inability to transferknowledge and skills.

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Figure 2Total employment in localauthorities (WTE)

Source: DPER Databank

Privatisation has occurred as services have beenmarketised, the most high profile being refuseservices where most citizens now pay bin chargesto private waste management companies. Otherservices which might have been local authorityservices are instead tendered out (for examplemigrant’s language classes and homelessservices), while public housing has beenresidualised to facilitate market provision of socialhousing. Other functions remain a potential focusfor privatisation, in 2014 trade union interventionaverted the possibility of privatising administrationof the Housing Assistance Payment.

Austerity has eroded by stealth local authoritycapacity and downgraded it in scope, scale andskills (Norris and Hayden 2018). Local levelgovernment fared worse than national and in manycases local government, in the context ofausterity, has lived up to the challenge of‘delivering more with less’ (O’Donnell 2013). In thisnew recovery stage, local government has not yetrecovered from the loss of a quarter of itsresources, funding and staff. Gaynor et al’s (2017)assessment of the impact of austerity on citiesand local democracy highlights the viscous cycleof cumulative erosion of local authority power andcapacity. This is nowhere more evident in theobvious inability to meet public housing buildingtargets but is also evident in the degree to localgovernment lacks capacity to innovate, forexample to utilise SEAI retrofitting grants on itsown stock, key to low carbon transition. This

Figure 1Local authority undermined by

overlap of centralisation, managerialism, privatisation, austerity

CentralisationLoss of functions to

central state (water, licences, SUSI)

Executivedirection

Loss of democraticpower

(managerialism and NPM)

Marketisation Loss of functions to

outsourcing (refuse, housing)

Austerity Loss of skills and

personnel (25%)

9

Table one demonstrates how Ireland has far fewerlocal municipalities than the other countriesillustrated, with only one city or county council forevery 148,517 people (far lower in other similarsmall sized states). Citizens’ access torepresentation and the responsiveness of localgovernment to the population is limited when there

are large population sizes per primary unit of localgovernment – the County/City council. Ireland alsohas structural weaknesses and inconsistency instructures, with significant inequality ofrepresentation (with little sub-countyrepresentation, outdated boundaries,fragmentation and duplication of functions).

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MORE POWER TO YOU Make Government Local, Improve Your Local Services

Irish local government scores poorly on a numberof assessments of relative strength.3 Unequalrepresentation and inconsistent structuresreduces its democratic legitimacy. It remainsdominated by central government and has fewfinancial resources. The non-elected manager,renamed the CEO in 2014, dominates a verylimited range of functions and its electedcouncillors, while ironically the new seven yearterm for the CEO (introduced in 2017) also limitsthe power of CEOs relative to central government.

The net effect of recent reforms has been to limit,relative to international practice, the functions andcompetencies of Irish local government (Quinlivin2017, Callanan 2018). Reidy (2018) refers tocentral government’s ‘power monopoly’ as the‘elephant in the room’. The international index ofself-autonomy uses seven categories (legalprotection, organisational autonomy, andinstitutional depth, fiscal autonomy, financial self-

reliance, borrowing autonomy, and financialtransfer system, and administrative supervision,central or regional access) to assess self-autonomy. Over 1990 to 2015 Ireland declinedfrom the third least powerful local authority to theweakest across all Europe (Layand et al 2015).

There are currently 31 local authorities (26 countycouncils, three city councils and two city andcounty councils. With the exception of the localauthorities in the (administrative) counties of DunLaoghaire, Fingal and South Dublin and the citiesof Dublin, Cork and Galway, all counties and citieshave been divided into municipal districts(currently 95 countrywide) with councillorsrepresenting simultaneously the municipal districtand the local authority. The elected council is thepolicy-making assembly of a local authority. Themunicipal district members act as a decision-making sub-assembly of the overall council inrespect of their respective municipal district area.

Irish local government – the poorcousin in Ireland’s democracy

The least powerful local authority in Europe

3 Size and structure of local authority units; the institutions within local government; the balance of power between the administrative and electedparts of local government; the range of functions for which local government has responsibility; the relationship between central and localgovernment; and the financial autonomy of local government.

Figure 5.23Local Autonomy Index: Country Ranking 2014

County Number of Local Average Population Area(EU/EEA) local gov exp as a population

municipalities % of general per unitgovt. spending

Denmark 98 65.9% 57,421 5.6 million 42,921 km²

Sweden 290 51.1% 33,258 9.6 million 438,574 km²

Finland 313 40.2% 17,416 5.5 million 338,435 km²

Norway 428 33.5% 11,897 5.1 million 32,387 km²

Netherlands 390 31.1% 43,152 16.8 million 41,540 km²

United Kingdom 419 23.7% 153,480 64.3 million 248,528 km²

European Union 23.1% - -(current composition)

Euro area 20.4% - -(19 countries)

Ireland 31 8.4% 148,517 4.6 million 69,797 km²

Table 1 Ireland compared to other small EU states and UK Figure 3Local government expenditure as a percentage of general government expenditure

Source: Eurostat gov_10a_main


Morning to evening inDenmark – 65% of publicspending filters throughlocal government

Dorit starts her day with direct engagement withher local authority, noticing the pothole near herhouse has been repaired by the local authority.She drops her 22 year unemployed son to the localauthority delivered public employment service, andher 24 year old daughter to her job in the localauthority delivered crèche. She them visits herelderly father who lives in the local authoritydelivered nursing home.

After a swim and workout in the local authority runrecreation centre she attends a local authorityconsultation on plans for environmental protectionand waste management and water. In theafternoon she goes to her own job in the localprimary school where she works in specialeducation and engages with other local authorityservices in social psychiatry.

Part of her work that day is to make a submissionto the local authority consultation on SocialServices where the local authority has a totalregulatory, supply and financing responsibility, sheis interested in this as a worker and a citizen. Afterwork she attends a local authority class on healthcare preventive treatment, and finds out moreabout how her local authority provides for care andrehabilitation, home care and treatment of alcoholand drug abuse.

In the evening she volunteers teaching Danish inthe local authority run service for integration ofrefugees and services, she hopes to bring theasylum seeker she is working with to the localauthority run museum and another local authorityrun local tourist and cultural attraction, the localart collective. Home and tired she remembers tosort her bins and put them out for the weekly localauthority waste collection.

Late at night she reflects on how lucky she is tohave the security of her long lease cost rentalhome in such a good community and hopes at leastone of her children will choose to move out butstay local in a similar local authority lease.

Morning to evening inIreland – 8% of publicspending filters throughlocal government

Nuala starts her day with direct engagement withher local authority, noticing the pothole near herhouse has been repaired by a local authorityoutsourced private contractor. She drops her 22year unemployed son to the central governmentIntreo public employment service, and her 24 yearold daughter to her job in the privately owned localcrèche.

She then visits her elderly father who lives in theprivately owned and managed nursing home, shefinds it hard to keep them accountable. After aswim and workout in the local hotel leisure centreshe attends a central government consultation‘dialogue on climate change’. In the afternoon shegoes to her own job in the local church managedprimary school where she works in specialeducation and struggles to engage with regionaland national social psychiatry services.

Even though she is interested as a worker and acitizen, she finds it very hard to know who hasregulatory, supply and financing responsibility forsocial psychiatry. After work she attends a localclass on health care preventive treatment, buteven the teacher admits, that without money topurchase privately, it is hard in Ireland to sourcethings like care and rehabilitation, home care andtreatment of alcohol and drug abuse.

In the evening she volunteers teaching English inthe charity run service for migrants. She would liketo bring the asylum seeker she is working with tolocal attractions but would have to pay for bothherself and her guest. Home and tired sheremembers to sort her bins and pays on line tomake sure her private collection service picks upher bin. She finds it hard to sleep wonderingwhether her private sector landlord might give hernotice to quit and wondering when her adultchildren might ever afford a home of their own.

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A number of different legislative acts determinethe specific services local authorities provide andIrish local authorities have a narrower scope thanlocal authorities do internationally; functions(grouped into eight programmes) revolve aroundphysical infrastructure, environmental issues andrecreational facilities.

There are few social or care services, primary orspecialist education, health or public employmentservices. Local government is substantiallystronger and has more control over decisions inother European jurisdictions. The Council ofEuropean Municipalities and Regions (2016) notehow in Ireland even when the function is a localauthority function, for example housing, centralgovernment dominates local democracy.

The scenario is complicated by the degree towhich Ireland does provide some public serviceson a local and regional level (such as health andeducation) but does not include these services aspart of local democratic government. While theLocal Government Reform Act, 2014 introducedan increased role in local economic development,there was little else about functions.

Other powers and functions have been removedfrom councillors, for removal of Section 140 of theLocal Government Act, 2001 means councillors nolonger direct the executive in respect of planningdecisions (this followed the Mahon Tribunal, whichexamined corruption in planning processes) whileother functions such as water, third level grantapplications and driving licences have also beenlost.

As Boyle and O’Riordan (2013) conclude theselosses

“When combined witha reduction in servicedelivery in thetraditional functionalareas of localgovernment such ashousing, roads andenvironment (driven inlarge part by theeconomic downturn),and a growing use ofoutsourcing andshared services, localauthorities are seenas less and lessengaged in directservice delivery tolocal citizens.”

So while Irish local government services are stillrelevant to and valued by Irish citizens (seeexample of library services below), it is also thecase that Irish local government does not reach asextensively into everyday life in Ireland than, as thevignettes below illustrate, everyday life inDenmark. However, in making this comparison weshould be aware that Denmark is not a panaceaand does not have a perfect local governmentsystem.

Few functions and declining

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Irish local government expenditure as apercentage of general government expenditure islow indicating the degree to which Irish localgovernment lacks control over budgets (a hallmarkof democratic control at local level). Ireland ishighly centralised in comparison to most EU/EEAcountries, only Malta, Cyprus and Greece have

less spending and less revenue-raising capacity atlocal government level. On average across the EU23.1% of public spending occurs at localgovernment level compared to 8% in Ireland.Denmark, the highest at 65.9%, has eight timesmore public spending at local level.

Little money and control

County Local government Population Area(EU/EEA) spending as a %

of general govt. spending

Denmark 65.9% 5.6 million 42,921 km²

Sweden 51.1% 9.6 million 438,574 km²

Finland 40.2% 5.5 million 338,435 km²

Norway 33.5% 5.1 million 32,387 km²

Netherlands 31.1% 16.8 million 41,540 km²

United Kingdom 23.7% 64.3 million 248,528 km²

European Union (current composition) 23.1% - -

Euro area (19 countries) 20.4% - -

Ireland 8.4% 4.6 million 69,797 km²

Table 2 Local government expenditure as a percentage of general government expenditure (select countries)

Source: Eurostat gov_10a_main

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Total 2016 expenditure by local authorities was€5.7 billion (€4.3 billion current and €1.4 billioncapital) with the following sources of income:grants and subsidies €1.1bn, contributions fromother local authorities €102m, goods and services€1.23bn, Local Property Tax €312m, Pension-related deduction €53m, Rates €1.5bn. Thisfunding arrangement means that local governmentis reliant on central government and agencies forapproximately a quarter (26%) of its funding.

Two-thirds of local government funding (rates andsale of goods/services) is generated locally, while afurther 8% from Local Property Tax is based on amixture of local funding plus national equalisation

of the LPT fund. With functions transferred fromlocal to national level, already small budgetsdecline more. Recent forms of taxes and chargesincluded Tax on Non Principal Private Residences((e.g. holiday homes and investment properties),Household Charge (later replaced by the PropertyTax), Septic Tank Charges and water charges havenot proved sustainable revenue sources.

Austerity budgets reduced funding for localauthority by 20-25% with the largest impact feltin housing from €1.3bn in 2007 to just €83million in 2013, with only 8,200 units deliveredover that time rather than an additional 25,000social housing units had budgets been maintained.

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The implications of this funding model differsacross Ireland, some funding sources (outlinedbelow) are more meaningful for larger localauthorities. Dublin for example holds reserves

while Donegal carries deficits from year to yearand Longford struggles with an inadequate localrate base and a disproportionately poorpopulation.

Environment Fund

n proceeds of the plastic bag levy

n receipts from the landfill levy

Table 3 Funding sources for local government

Source PublicPolicy.ie4

n Commercial water charges, Housing rents

n Waste charges, Parking charges

n Planning application fees

Charges for goods/services

level of fees set locally or nationally

Rates

central government agency carries out valuations and local councils set the Annual Rate on Valuation (ARV)

n Occupiers of commercial property

Specific state grants

paid to local authorities by governmentdepartments in respect of specificservices/schemes

For example

n road maintenance grants

The Local Government Fund (LGF)

financed by the full proceeds of motor tax and property tax, plus an Exchequer contribution

n finance for general discretionary funding ofday-to-day activities and for non-nationalroads, and funding for certain localgovernment initiatives

Community fund

contributions to the community fund may be made by local voluntary, business or communitygroups, and may be raised by the local authority by way of a community initiative scheme

n to support specific community initiatives suchas amenity, recreational, environmental orcommunity development projects of benefit tothe area concerned

n used primarily to support environmentalinitiatives, campaigns and programmes, manyof which are organised at local or regional levelunder the auspices of local authorities

4 http://www.publicpolicy.ie/finances-local-government-ireland/

Figure 3Composition of local authority funding

Rates36%

Goods andservices

28%

Grants andsubsidies

26%

Local Property Tax8%

Contributionsfrom other local

authorities2%

1716


Quinlivin (2017) argues the 2018 abolition oftown councils and territorial upscaling happenedwith little discussion of debate and creates a lossof local knowledge and local voice. While somereforms such as Public Participation Networksmight be seen as an attempt to bring in voices thatare more diverse this is in a context of accesswithout influence. The decline in power may bereflected in decline in the calibre candidates for2019 local government elections.

Public support and electoralturn out

Figure 4National and local electoralturnoutsTurnout: General Elections 1981-2011 (asproportion of the Register and of the Voting-AgePopulation (VAP)

Local elections 1974-2014Turnout as % of Register and by Voting-AgePopulation (VAP)

Local election turnout (urban and rural) 1999-2014

This contributes to an underlying low turnout inlocal government elections, which while morevolatile than national election turnout, dropped toalmost 50% in 1999 and 2014. Turnout dippedbelow 40% in some urban areas, (albeit the 2014local elections saw a narrowing of this urban-ruraldifference when rural areas experienced thebiggest drops (measured by percentage points) inturnout, with the Border, West and Midland areasexperiencing the greatest decline.

Figure 5Local election turn out rural and urban, Ireland1967-2014

Figure 6Female candidates and elected councillors 2014Irish local government elections

Source: DHCLG Local Elections 2014: Results, Transfer of Votes and Statistics

A downward trend in turnout at local elections isclear. Over the period from 1967 to 1999 turnoutfell from 67 per cent to 50 per cent of registeredvoters. Voters in 2011 made up just 50% (49.8%)of the estimated voting-age population.

The lack of elected voices means in effect fewercouncils and councillors; many of these locallosses are potential national politicians, with only21% female politicians there are implications forgenerating a gendered pipeline into localgovernment and subsequently national politics.

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This leads us to offer three recommendations forchange in the context of the forthcoming May2019 local elections. Before we do this we notehow the Council of Europe report in 2013 stronglycriticised Ireland for its lack of constitutionalprotection for sub-national government and itsimportance in articulating shared communityinterests, and factoring local history, geography,political culture and economy into its decision-making processes. Irish local government isrecognised in Bunreacht na hÉireann (IrishConstitution), however it is not protected. The1999 20th amendment to the Constitutionformally recognised the role of local government,Article 28A5 provided for Local Government to bea forum for the democratic representation ofcommunities and in exercising and performingpowers conferred by law, however this does notmean local government is independent of centralgovernment, the centre can and does take controlof local government.

In 2013 the government proposed the abolition ofSeanad Éireann (Irish Senate) but it could notproceed without the approval of the Irish people byway of referendum as the Seanad is protected inthe constitution. This is the not the case for localgovernment, and the abolition of 83 localauthorities in 2014 happened without the need fora referendum. (Quinlivin 2017). While in the longterm we believe there is strong case for aconstitutional referendum we focus now on shortterm recommendations.

Directly elected mayors offer an opportunity torethink and reimagine local government. The 2008Green Paper Stronger Local Democracy favouredthe introduction of a directly elected mayor in inDublin and other city and county councils.Following the Local Government Reform Act,2014 an initiative for a plebiscite for a directly

elected mayor in the four authorities – Dublin CityCouncil, South Dublin County Council and DúnLaoghaire–Rathdown County Council and FingalCounty Council did not proceed when the lattervoted against the proposal on the grounds that the2014 Act lacked detail about the role and powersof the mayor. It is still unclear what executivefunctions or powers a directly elected mayor wouldhold but for it to make a real difference he or shewould have to have significant powers.Consequently in May 2019 there will beplebiscites concerning directly elected mayors inthree councils (Cork, Galway and Limerick). In theDublin region councils, there are instead proposalsto deliberate on the possibility of a directly electedmayor for Dublin in a citizens’ assembly.

There is a clear need to redress the democraticdeficit relating to the 2014 abolition of towncouncils. By abolishing all town councils the LocalGovernment Reform Act, 2014 reduced thenumber of local authorities from 114 to 31 whileintroducing ninety-five municipal districts to coverthe entire area of each county (overlapping localelectoral areas6). A reconfigured sub country formof government and revenue powers has thecapacity to reanimate local government from theground up. Territorially aligned sub county towncouncils should be re-established.

There is also a need to address local fundingsources and revenue. Irish local government hasfew responsibilities and commensurate resources(2.2 % of tax revenues or 8.8% of governmentexpenditure). The 2009 OCED review of the Irishpublic services commented on the lack of fiscalautonomy limited room for manoeuvre in Irish localgovernment. Strengthening local governmentrequires local revenue gathering capacity that isautonomous of national government, this meanssupporting mechanisms to increase revenue

18


The sketches of Danish Dorit and Irish Nualaillustrate how differently local government impactson the experience of worker’s and citizen’s qualityof life in Denmark and Ireland as well as theirpower to influence local services. However there isevidence that, when invested in and nurtured, Irishlocal government can perform well. What isrequired is a fuller vision of what is possiblethrough local government. Library services, parksand recreational centres are all examples ofvaluable community based local services; thesehave increased in use over the last ten years andpoint towards a low carbon future where sharedlocal public services help us live more sustainablelives.

Reimagining Irish local government Libraries are not the only positive example of goodlocal authority provision in Ireland. We know from

recent examples how local governmentadministered driving licences had a speedyturnaround with next day delivery, while thetechnological innovation in motor tax services hasbeen lauded. We know too that historically localgovernment oversaw significant public buildingprogrammes in both affordable and public housingdelivering (for example building over 9,000 housesin 1975 alone).

Norris and Haden (2018) recount how Irish localauthorities provided 365,350 council houses andflats which amounted to almost one quarter(22.2%) of the total Irish housing stock in 2016.There is much to be proud of, historically localauthority built housing contributed much tooaffordable, good-quality and secureaccommodation for low-income households, aswell as the overall quality and increasing the sizeof the Irish housing stock, and strong sustainablecommunities. It is not too late to reverse recentregression in this historical trajectory.

Reimagining and restoring localdemocracy in Ireland

Example of libraries

The Irish public library illustrates what a trusted and valued locally delivered anddemocratically controlled community might look like. This local authority led anddelivered public service facilitates a wide range of social, economic and culturaldevelopment, local democracy and participation.

The national strategy Our Public Libraries 2022 – Inspiring, Connecting andEmpowering Communities is ambitious in its aim of building on technological andservice innovations of recent years to improve access, use and visibility of the publiclibrary as a sustainable, integrated public service. Shining a Light, (Carnegie UK Trust,2017) shows 80% of people feel libraries are important to their communities.Despite austerity over 1998 and 2012, co funding by local authorities delivered€131 million to invest in 95 library buildings, in ICT, stock, and digitised local studiescontent.

This resulting growth in the use of the service saw stock issues increased by 55%and visits increase by 15% between 2008 and 2012. Between 2013 and 2017there was investment in 45 new or re-developed libraries delivered (29 co funded and16 funded solely by local authorities). Book stocks increased by 15% to over 12million books while visits increased by almost 500,000 to 17.3 million visits in 2016.

Recommendations forstrengthening local government

5 “The State recognised the role of local government in providing a forum for the democratic representation of local communities, in exercising andperforming at local level powers and functions conferred by law and in promoting by its initiatives the interests of such communities”

6 Recognising that the previous town council representation was inconsistent and unevenly covered only 14% of the population Quinlivin (2018)recommends that the democratic deficit relating to the 2014 abolition of town councils might be best restored by adding a democratically electedrepresentative layer to newly formed municipal districts that have the advantage of comprehensive and consistent coverage but, with no directelections to the municipal districts or revenue-raising capabilities, are not yet legitimate local government corporate entities.

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sources that are controlled locally and can be usedto pursue innovative local services. TheCommission on Taxation (2009) rejected variouslocal taxation measures including: local incometax, poll taxes/community charges or local sales orbed taxes. They recommended changing the

balance between nationally provided and locallycollected sources of income from the current45:55 ratio to a ratio of 25:75. A national targetcould be to increase the 8% of governmentexpenditure that flows through local governmentto the European average of 22-23%.


Recommendation:

Government should seek to constitutionally protect local government. Directly electedmayors can play a key role in a reimagined local government system, clarity aboutroles, function and powers and relevant legislative changes to facilitate directlyelected mayors should be progressed immediately. In 2020 government should restorethe town council system of sub-county government and do so in a way that achievesterritorial balance.

Local government needs increased revenue and funding powers. Increasing thepercentage of public expenditure that is channelled through local authorities from thepresent low of 8% so it moves towards European average 22-23% would translateinto local employment and local economic drivers.

Increased financial authority requires parallel systems of accountability, transparencyand democratic input including for example participatory budgeting and forms ofequality, gender and sustainability proofing.

Over four decades of privatisation offer astatistically significant range of evidence of thefailure of privatisation projects to deliver onpromises of improved investment, performanceand efficiency (Hearne 2011). The innovativeAustralian Peoples Inquiry into privatisation(Herthington 2017) offers a holistic overview ofthe damage to workers and citizens, especially themost vulnerable citizens, when public services,

particularly local public services, are privatised.Chief among these negative effects are increaseduser charges and customer frustration withcharges used to subsidise private profit/dividends,the failures of marketised services to deliver toeveryone, or to meet public goals of integratingservice delivery. Finally, there are the costs ofinefficiencies of competition and the costs ofhidden subsidies (tax policy etc.).

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The core importance of local and municipalservices is at the heart of the European model ofdemocracy. Communities, residents and workersthroughout the world are increasingly challengingthe degree to which public services have beenoutsourced to the private for profit sector.Kishmoto and Petitjean (2016) identify 835examples of remunicipalisation in 1600 cities in45 countries, but none in Ireland. This bringsdown costs and tariffs, improves conditions forworkers and boosts service quality, while ensuringgreater transparency and accountability (ibid p11), but also contributes to new social economicand environmental change as well as new forms ofand deeper or wider democracy.

Services remunicipalised range from funeralservice, beach guards and nursing homes, to waterinfrastructure, energy grids and public transport.There is a growing awareness that a low carbontransition requires a strong democratic form of

local governance and local control over the localeconomy. Many on the left are developing a ‘spatialimaginary’ (Cumbers 2012 155) to realise theimportance of local autonomy as a key buildingblock that enables a reconstituted concept ofpublic ownership, framed around economicdemocracy and public participation in economicdecision-making. Only a more participatory modelof public ownership that is deeply embedded ineconomic democracy and civil society can beeffective in mobilizing support for innovative statepolicies and targets for low carbon transition andsustainable communities.

The philosophy of local government stresses twofundamental reasons for its existence, its role inprovision of local public services and its role as abulwark of democracy. In Denmark, for example,there is a fundamental belief in the bottom-upapproach. This reflects the Principle ofSubsidiarity which Ireland has signed up to in theCouncil of Europe Charter of Local Self-Government and the EU Treaty of Amsterdam(Quinlivin 2018).

ContextualisingEuropean (re)municipalisation

Disadvantages of private provision

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Terzis (2016 p 810) has an overall positiveassessment of the benefits to workers ofremunicipalisation and the degree to which itreverses the diminished quality of work associatedwith privatisation and outsourcing. He records thecrucial role public sector unions played in variousremunicipalisation campaigns. The PSI and EPSUlead the Right 2 Water campaign, an EU levelcitizens’ initiative referendum campaign whichgenerated 2.1m signatories, lead to the 2018Water Recast Directive and some improvement inaccess to water for vulnerable citizens (EPSU2018).

The German trade union ver.di led the ‘Public isEssential’ campaign while in Australia The TakingBack Control initiative involved unions workingwith civil society to generate a communityresponse to privatisation and an innovativepeoples inquiry which documented significantimpacts on jobs, wages, conditions of employmentand training for previously publicly employedworkers. Other issues relating to employmentinclude less capacity to implement equalopportunity employment and positivediscrimination policy (Hetherington 2017), or toimplement progressive codes of practice and tomonitor health and safety.

Economic democracy is enhanced byremunicipalisation, while conversely workers andunions are key municipalisation actors.Collaboration between workers and publicofficials, politicians, communities, civil society andcitizens is increasingly commonplace across theglobe and more locally in Europe. Wheras localautonomy of workers and economic democracy isdiminished by privatisation, it is enhanced byremunicipalisation as is the power and role of local,regional and national unions.

Local democracy is also important from anequality perspective. Taking the perspective ofgender equality we know women in Ireland aremore likely to rely on the public services, local andnational. As such they should be properlyrepresented in decision-making positions. But thisis not the case.

In both political and executive positions women areunder-represented, they also struggle to have theirvoice heard in the more participative processeslike Public Participation Networks (PPNs). It wasnot until 1998 that Ann McGuinness was the firstwoman appointed a local authority manager (toWestmeath County Council), and up to 2018 justunder 30% of CEO and Director of Services(26%) roles nationally are held by women.

With just 21 per cent of local councillors arewomen and it would take another 200 years toachieve gender parity at the current rate, Quinlivin(2018) observes how the abolition of towncouncils removes a valuable woman friendlypipeline into local government and nationaldecision making.

As the Fawcett society found in the UK (2017) in amale-dominated environment women councillorsand workers find they are held back by structuraland cultural barriers, facing sexism from fellowcouncillors, including in the public councilchamber, and sexism within the party politicalstructures. The often outdated culture, practicesand protocols of local government createunnecessary barriers to participation for womenwith caring responsibilities.

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The recorded benefits from deprivatisation,remunicipalisaiton, or re-establishment of publicservices range from improved quality of servicesto greater financial transparency. Crucially, from ademocratic perspective, the local authority regainsoperational capacity and control. This enableslocal authorities have more capacity to meetenvironmental and equality objectives and, from anefficiency and equality perspective, to integratepublic services and provide affordable services,both of which are crucial for local authorities tomeet their public duty to promote human rightsand equality (IHREC 2014).

It is ironic that it was often austerity fuelleddeficits that caused local governments acrossEurope to look again at the real cost ofprivatisation and/or to recapture lost revenuestreams. The costs savings from endingprivatisation are significant. Bergen in Norwayfound bringing nursing homes back into publicownership generated a surplus of €500,000instead of a loss of €1m, while in London endinglocal transport PPP has generated savings of £1b.In Chiclana Spain p16, €215m budget savingsover three services enabled the redeployment of200 workers into better quality public sector jobs.

It is interesting that in Ireland the five guidingprinciples of the Green Paper already reflect thedominant debate in Europe and recognise the twoprimary reasons for local government – localdemocracy and local provision of public services:

n Appreciation of the importanceof local democratic institutions;

n Decision-making at the lowestappropriate level (subsidiarity);

n Democratic responsibility andaccountability;

n Proper balance between thenumber and functions of localgovernment structures and therequirements of coherence,value for money and efficientdelivery of service; and,

n Continued focus on qualitycustomer service

Benefits of de-privatisation andrationale for public delivery

Economic democracy, workers,unions and employment

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Putting delivery back into public ownership oftenleads to the renaissance of the municipal economy(Becker 2017 p 118), democratising publicservices through greater participation of workersand users and through greater control by electedofficials and citizens. This is best expressed not asa campaign to return to the past but to imagine anew future with new forms of democratic controlof enterprises and cooperatives. For example inthe Scottish government supported Our Power,35 housing associations, local authorities andcitizens co-operatives work together towards lowpriced energy and fuel policy.

With greater subsidiarity and democratic control,and enhanced citizen input and participation,remunicipalisation has been the site of variousdemocratic experiments. The Berlin Citizens UtilityModel (Burgerstadtwerk) included four keyconstitutional requirements for democratic utilitydelivery a Democratic Advisory Board, a Right toInitiative; Public Assemblies, An Ombudsman(albeit the campaign eventually lead to anunsuccessful referendum for a water utility usingthis model).

Vibrant citizen’s movements have also assertedthe right to public ownership. The UK based ‘WeOwn It’, has been a consistent and coherent voicefor public ownership. Hall and Hobbs (2017 132)argue this dynamic offers important counterpointsto dissipate the polarisation and to direct publicfrustration and energy in the context of Brexit andpopulist politics in the UK.

Various citizen and union led local campaigns inSpain united under the slogan ‘Aigua es Vida’(water is life) to denounce private sector watercompanies irregularities and profiteering and torecover direct public management of water withcitizen participation and social control, thesemovements generate good buy in for new policy.

Referendums and other participative mechanismshave been an anchor of remunicipalisaiton and ofnew water or energy management models, whichoffer transparency, accountability, education andtraining. Irish proposal for referendums againstWater Privatisation and for Right to Housing canbe understood as part of this trend.

Democratic case and mobilisationfor public services

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The general decline of local government has moregeneral consequences for the declining confidencein public provision of social housing. Vice versa isalso the case, with poor perceptions of localgovernment linked in the public mind to negativeperceptions of a now residualised public housingsector. Perceptions and ideology crowd out anyconcept of what local government driven publichousing could or should be.

It is not clear what is driving this policy shifttowards the private sector but ideology,management challenges associated with theongoing residualisation of social housing, andlimited political power of low-income householdsall play a role in driving the strategy. Alsoimportant are numerous government assessmentsflagging concerns about the affordability,efficiency and value for money of council housing,and questions about the long-term sustainabilityand viability of the Irish social housing model(Norris and Hayden, 2018). From the perspectiveof the citizen and worker secure social housingsocial housing is infinitely preferable to insecureprivate sector housing (Hearne and Murphy 2017).While insufficient regulation of the pivate socialhousing market reflects the political conflict ofinterest which exists when large profits can bemade it is also apparent that some actors havealso been searching for alternative sources ofaccommodation for low income households thatare better value and more flexible from theperspective of the state. To this end proposals forcost rental models of accommodation are veryrelevant (NESC 2016, NERI 2015, ICTU 2019).

Norris and Hayden’s (2018) assessment of councilhousing examines the financial sustainability ofcouncil housing and sets out recommendations toincrease its future financial sustainabilitysuggesting some serious root and branch reformsare needed to protect future investment.

Most capital funding for council housing isprovided by the Department of Housing through aslow and unnecessarily bureaucratic approvalssystem. This funding is challenging for theExchequer to afford during recessions and in thecontext of European Semester financialaccounting rules. The financing challenges createsa boom/bust pro-cyclical pattern of social housinginvestment and output which generatesinefficiencies in housing and land procurement andstaffing, and means local authorities cannot takeadvantage of lulls in private construction sector.More stable local sources of funding cannot beutilised as the property tax system redistributesrevenue from local authorities where housing needis high to areas of low housing need (ibid 2018).

Local authorities are obliged by government policyto sell council housing to tenants at a discount ofup to 60 per cent of market value. Whilerecognising the loss of housing stock this entails inthe end, Local Authorities are motivated in theshort run to encourage sales to fund ongoingcouncil housing management and maintenance(accounting procedures disguise the full costs ofthis policy). No viable European models of socialhousing are built on incentivising the right to buyat 60% discount (Norris and Hayden 2018).

Availability of non-standard smaller sizedcommunity based housing options could enableimaginative downsizing options and allow standardaccommodation to be relet. Likewise, moreresources could prompt changes in letting andsuccessor policy and practice.

The differential rent system not only operatesinconsistently across the state but based on anincome assessment (€50.63 a week per dwellingin 2015) does not recover revenue sufficient toplanned funding housing management,maintenance and upgrading of dwellings. A shift inchanging differential rent to a cost rental model(potentially subsided by HAP) would allow localauthorities tap into secondary inomes inhouseholds. Instead, Local Authorities over rely oncentral government regeneration and upgradinggrants, this is not only inefficient, it means noincentive to swiftly re-let vacant dwellings. This

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Local authorities maintaincrucial housing and planningfunctions which are toonumerous and complex toaddress here. Crucial forexample is the role localauthority’s play in theplanning and provision ofinfrastructure for private landbank development and formixed-use development onpublic lands. The issuesraised in the Cherrywooddevelopment in DunLaoighaire-Rathdownexposes the range of seriouspolicy and political issuesthat emerge when large landbanks are in the control of aprivate cartel. Irish localauthorities utilise and investsignificant public resourcesto develop infrastructure toservice such land banks. Thistransfers significant hidden(or sometimes very visible)subsidies to the private sector, however they haveno guarantee as to when or if these land banks willbe used and national policy frameworks limit thedegree to which local councillors can imposeconditions stipulating percentage returns in socialand affordable housing.

Recognising the importance of such issues, thissection draws on Norris and Hayden (2018) tofocus more narrowly on how to protect andenhance the direct provision of public housing bylocal authorities. It also draws on ICTU’s (2017)call for a Local Authority led emergency responseto the housing crisis and NERI (2017) proposalsfor cost rental models for affordable housing andon the NESC (2014) proposal for a similar model.

The shift away from the role of local authoriites inprovision of public housing has been a long term

trend which began in the 1980’s. As such theeconomic crisis has been a smoke screen hiding alonger term dynamic and shift towards the privatehousing market. This shift is reflected in a changein language from public housing (delivered by thepublic body) to social housing (which can bedelivered by the market). Reclaiming the languageof public housing is therefore an important startingpoint in reinvigorating demand for public housingdelivered by local authoriites. There is little doubt,as the figure above illustrates, that thetraditionally dominant provision of council housinghas been displaced by the growing importance ofprivate sector rental subsidies including the mostrecent Housing Assistance Payment (HAP), whichRebuilding Ireland (2016) positions as the primaryprovider of social housing by 2021.

Figure 7Public housing provision

Source Norris and Hayden 2018

Public housingFigure 8

Capital spending, boom and bust

Source Norris and Hayden 2018

Capital spending on New Council Housing Provision by Central Government

and Local Authorities (€000s).

In 2012 the UK Arm’s Length Management Organisations werebrought back into full council control in both Sheffield andIslington following 14 councils who had already taken back directcontrol of their council housing. In Islington the decision to take itsAlmo back in-house was the prospect of long run savings andgenerating funding as well as removing uncertainty in the contextof renewal and government's intentions about long-termownership of the stock. Finance and accountability are the key issues for Sheffield, whichballoted tenants on returning to the council triggered in part a new[Labour] administration with strong attachment to the democraticrelationship between tenants and city councils. However, the majority of the 60 Almos that currently exist arelikely to continue in some (often-expanded) forms and remits(Birch 2012).

Recommendation:In the short term investment can enable less outsourcing of local authority short-termand long-term maintenance functions; employment of direct labour can enable morepreventative maintenance, effective void management and proactive use of SEAIretrofitting grants.

In the medium term a new local authority led public housing financial model for socialhousing which changes the funding model to a cost-rental model, with no right to buyor successor policy, and adequate down-sizing capacity alongside supports for localsustainable communities for diverse families across generations.

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creates a structural incentive to allow voidspersist, illustrated by the degree to which adedicated budget over 2014-17 enabled LA’ssuccessfully return 5,000 houses to publicprovision.

Relating back to the earlier discussion onausterity, the loss of 25% of staffdisproportionately hit housing, as with no capitalbudgets to plan for or implement, afterredundancies, the remaining professional staffwere redeployed. Not only was there loss ofprofessionals (planners, architects etc.), but giventhe tight labour market for such skills, it is difficultto restore such capacity in the short term (Norrisand Hayden 2018).

Removal of those in market delivered housingassistance payment (HAP) subsidised housingfrom local authority housing need assessementsdeflates the demand for public housing (in Cork forexample only 6,000 are counted in need of public

housing while 2000 are on internal transfer listsand the HAP). Crucially all build programmes andnegations between the local and cnetralgovernemnt is determined by formal housing needassessement. Local demand will remain artificallylow as long as HAP is excluded from theassessment of need. Further demand foraffordable public housing is evident in the numberof workers who cannot get mortgages and who donot want to remain long term in private sectoraccommodation.

Unreformed, the underlying model for localauthority housing incapacitates and limitspotential to not only meet direct build targets butto innovate and utilise existing grant and support.Given the loss of many technical staff many voidrelated services are now outsourced, this is notefficient, more direct labour capacity inmaintenance would enable effective use of SEAIretrofitting grants which presently many LA’s haveinsufficient resources to utilise.


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Internationalcase study:public housing

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Fórsa has a long history of representing municipalcleansing workers, the Muno (Municipal EmployeesWorkers Union), established in 1883, merged withIMPACT in 1991. While Irish domestic wastecollection is no longer primarily a local authorityfunction many local authorities across Europe areremunicipalising waste management. Thisoccurred in Britain (North Tyneside 2008,Thurrock 2010) and in Germany the towns ofUckermark and Bergkamen, 2005, Rhein-Hunsrück-Kreis, 2006 and Böblingen 2007. InSpain when Leon waste and cleaning servicesremunicipalised in 2013, the cost reduced from€19.5m to €10.5m and 224 workers gainedpubic employment contracts. When Oslo inNorway remuncipalised waste services, 170workers transferred from part time jobs to full timejobs with municipal salaries and pension rights.(Trevis 2016, P174).

Refuse collection policy is not only an importanthousehold service but also crucial in terms oftransition to a low carbon economy. Future policywill be understood in the context of the EUCircular Economy. Ireland, like all EU states,adopts a policy of market environmentalism, whichposits a market logic in environmental policy, anduser polluter pays principles. This logic wasapplied to bin charges over the last decade. Inlarger councils over time, the ineffective feecollection and unsustainable charging models7 andother pressures including absorbing seniormanagement pension costs, meant an unviablebusiness model for domestic refuse. Faced withunsustainable financial models (and in the Dublinregion pressure to maximise use of the newincinerator) councils exited waste managementservice effectively abandoning the service toprivate operators. However privatisation has had a

number of negative consequences includingincreased charges, a decline in recycling and anincrease in fly tipping and dumping.

Initial waste permit systems saw a number of newcompanies alongside established companiesPanda, Greyhound, Thorton, Greens Star, howeverover time these were absorbed into approximately20 large private refuse collection services.However there are a significant number of illegalpractices with no waste collection permit whoengage in illegal dumping or fly tipping. This can beillustrated by the Irish Business Against Litterreport which found Dublin’s North Strand to beparticularly problematic for fly tippingnecessitating Dublin City Council to provide a freeof charge bin collection, to request ‘Reliant Drivers’to manage fly tipping and to provide a ‘bin car’ toclear all refuse. This is also a problem in ruralcouncils. Longford, for example, has only oneoperator who is able to charge excessively highprices which are unaffordable in a county withdisproportionately high social welfare dependencyand low income and consequently high levels ofdumping with vacant houses often targeted byillegal dumpers.

All of this costs. Addressing fly tipping requiresfollow up services relating to unmanaged waste(that is not collected or brought to a waste facility)which causes pollution in the environment whenburned, buried or dumped, a problem that iswidespread in some councils including for exampleLongford where there are considerable health andpollution implications. The EPA (2018) estimatesthat 44,868 tonnes was unmanaged in 2016.While the 65 staff formerly employed in DCCdomestic waste collection have been redeployedwithin DCC, there are concerns that the private

Refuse collection

7 In context of the local political agreement of significant waivers for low income users were agreed including for workers on FIS and on labour market programmes like CE. 26,000 waivers were in practice in Dublin City Council and between 4,000-5,000 in otherlarger city councils, costing from €1m in some councils to up to €6.5 m in lost revenue in the Dublin City Council budget.

While Goggin finds no evidence of price, gougingthe €350-400 annual cost is significant for many,particularly those on low income who no longerhave waivers. While only ‘6% of people cite cost asa reason for not having their waste collected’, thenumber of operators in the market is concentratingand expected to decrease more and consumersand citizens have little influence in monopolisticconditions. Further, a significant number ofhouseholds do not have a choice of operator,competitive markets do not exist. Viability ofoperators in a given area is influenced by routedensity and collection costs, sparsely populated orrural areas are less economically attractive

In Ireland the national waste collection permit actsas the regulator but this results in a side-by side‘quasi market’ which is problematic and poorlyregulated with environmental and other costs.Rather than an open competition betweenuncoordinated providers there is more a ‘cartel like’market or a ‘natural monopoly’ (Goggin 2018).

refuse service workers are underpaid andoverworked with poor working conditions. Someprivate sector refuse workers depend on the inwork benefit working family payment (formerlyFIS), so that the state is in effect subsiding the lowwages.

The Competition and Consumer ProtectionCommission (CCPC) report on waste market(Goggin 2018) highlights the degree to which theunique Irish waste management market, operatinga ‘’side by side’ licensing permit model, is highlyinefficient in enabling a competitive market that intheory might drive efficiencies and pricecompetition. This produces “a natural monopoly”with little competition in the market. The lack ofcompetition is evident in that only 20 mainoperators service 90% of households that avail ofa collection service. 18% of households nationally,and 25% in the Dublin region, do not have choiceof provision from multiple suppliers, while 23% ofhouseholds do not have a waste-collection serviceat all.

35

Goggin’s concludes government should establish a‘regulator for household waste collection’ (toinclude the functions of economic-licensing, data-collection and analysis, market design andconsumer protection). The CCPC recommendsthat a national economic regulator be establishedwith the principal objective of developing overtime, an efficient, sustainable and commercialmodel of domestic waste collection in Ireland, in amanner that protects the interests of consumersand adheres to the principles of better regulation(Goggin’s 2018 p104). Goggin’s argues that theeconomies of scale and density which areprevalent in household waste collection marketsmean that, at some local levels, the market forhousehold waste collection is a natural monopoly,then a single (private) supplier serving an entiremarket will never be a competitive market. This isprecisely the scenario where public goods are themost logical option.

Siptu (2018) argue the review confirms the onlylong-term solution for the industry is the return ofservices to local authority control. Terzic (2017,86) recounts examples of German and Austrian

waste disposal privatisation where only a fewprivate tenders are actually submitted, given Irishscale density issues, even in a well regulatedmarket, the single supplier outcome will likelydominate. While no Cost Benefit Analysis existsthere is on the surface a strong case for a newfinancial and charging model with the localauthority as central provider of refuse collection,only organisation that can be trusted to operate “anatural monopoly” is the State and more regulationwithout a fundamental rethink “is doomed to fail”.

Regulation could create conditions for localauthority to re-enter domestic bin collection (seethe example of Scotland who having privatisedthen remunicipalised with a different economicmodel). If pricing and local markets were regulatedby competition authority in an affordable butrealistic charging model some larger localauthorities would seek re-entry, particularly citieswho want regular, quality and efficient service toavoid cost of managing fly tipping and want toavoid present practices where private refusecompanies won’t enter tenders, (cherry picking,reluctance to give rural cover, no collection for flat

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Figure 9Household waste collection coverage

Source: CCPC analysis of NWCPO and CSO household data

Figure 10 International regulation of household waste collection

Side-by-side Competitive Competitive Competitivetendering tendering tendering

and State-run and side-by-sidemonopoly

Ireland Poland UK FinlandLatvia Italy Estonia FranceSlovakia Lithuania

Sweden

The presence of multiple providers in some localmarkets is seen as inefficient while in other localareas the natural monopoly means insufficientcompetition to create market conditions thatmight regulate price and quality. The marketstructure and supporting regulatory regime inIreland is atypical. Other states more closely alignpractical realities, consumer needs and theeconomics of waste collection. Environmentalpolicy is the primary focus of the current

regulatory regime but is difficult to implement inthe current market structure. The currentregulations for household waste collection do notcover economic or market considerations and arenot assessed as part of the operator permitmanagement process. Authorities have limitedenforcement mechanisms to addressnoncompliance and the fragmented regulatoryregime presents a further challenge instandardising the approach taken by the State.

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complexes). Regulation would have to cover,government subvention required for non-economicroutes or anti-social collection – as in the previouspractice which used the council ‘vulture car’ toback up primary routes.

The advantages of well-regulated system can alsobe generated with a return to full local authoritydelivery in a context of regulatory and policyregime that can address; eexpertise, balance andlong-term sustainability, evidence to informeddecision-making; state control and influence to co-ordinate with other State organisations and leversocial, environmental and policy goals;

consultation, accountability, accessibility, servicestandards; stability. The function of any regulatoryauthority should include a culture and healthpromotion and education service to highlighthazards of internal domestic burning which cantrigger respiratory and other health problems. Alocal authority lead regime could also considercompulsory subscription to a local affordable binservice. Finally, from a local authority workersperspective, most of the members in wastemanagement are now waste enforcement officers.A regulatory regime would allows qualifications tobe recognised in career structure or meaningfulroles.

In 2017, the municipality of Oslo took its waste collection services back intopublic hands after 20 years of competitive tendering. The last private provider,Veireno, which had won the tender for the capital’s waste services in October2016, quickly became a perfect illustration of competitive tendering gone wrong. In February 2017, Oslo remunicipalised waste collection and also took over theassets of the private contractor and employed its 170 former staff. The takeoveris expected to be costly, as Veireno had several part-time employees, who willnow work full-time for the municipality, with municipal salary and pension rights.In the period between October 2016 and February in 2017 the municipalityreceived tens of thousands of complaints from citizens whose waste was notbeing collected. The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority examined Veireno and disclosed work weeks of up to 90 hours for some employees. One employee had a seven-day work week, for several weeks at the start of the private company’s contractwith the Oslo municipality. Many employees had worked for more than 70 hoursper week, with workdays lasting from 6h00 to 22h00. Veireno’s low-cost waste services obviously came at great expense for theworkers’ conditions. These employees who were responsible for the capital city’sgarbage collection and for driving heavy vehicles were putting themselves andother people at risk with such long workdays and so little rest between shifts. Veireno is not unique. Competitive tendering of waste collection services is badfor employees and expensive for citizens. Even when services are outsourced, themunicipality ends up covering for anything that goes wrong. If Oslo had not takenback the services and employed the people engaged by Veireno, the employeeswould not have received any salaries after 1 January 2017 because the companyfiled for bankruptcy, freeing itself from all responsibilities.

Recommendation:Outsourcing waste collection was driven by the commercial viability of the charging regimesas well as other factors (including the Poolbeg Incinerator). Crucially this was not driven bylocal government inefficiency or workforce considerations.

It is possible to imagine a local authority led professional, affordable environmentally friendly,cost efficient and citizen friendly service, which has the potential to generate local multipliersin local economy. There is also demand from customers who want the service to return tolocal authorities.

What is first required is the regulation of the waste sector to ensure every household isguaranteed an affordable waste disposal service; this is a necessary precursor to directprovision.

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Internationalcase study:Oslo wasteservices

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Water as traditionally provided though the localauthority was originally understood as a publicgood, essential for public health, it was a universalmunicipal service with the focus on ‘hydraulic’investment to ensure supply (Dukelow 2016). The2002 European Water Directive or frameworkplaced a new focus on environmental and financialsustainability, and, pointing to state failure toinvest in water infrastructure, encouraged marketbased provision. This market environmentalismlodged the market logic in environmental policyalong with the use of price signals, charges, andpolluter pay principles. Water Charges have been along-term agenda in Ireland with attempts tointroduce them in 1977, 1985, 2002-10, andagain over the 2013-2014 period. There is now alimited charging regime for excess use.

Part of the long-term issue for water policy inIreland has been the traditional low level ofinvestment in water infrastructure. From historicalIrish underdevelopment in water services Figure11 shows the degree of catch up over 2014/5.Centralisation from local to national is partiallymotivated by the need to guarantee adequatelevels of investment. A form of market approachhas been developed in the increased role of PPPsin the provision of water infrastructure. Up to2015 Ireland was an EU leader in this form ofprivatisation with 45% of such investmentdelivered through PPP’s (the 2nd highest in EUnext to Greece). This Public Private PartnershipModel of private sector participation in thedelivery of services at municipal level existed since1999 prior to Irish Water using Design BuildOperate contracts that are off ‘off-balance sheet’.While Ervia has discontinued this practice manysuch contracts cover decades of infrastructuralprovision remain valid.

WaterFigure 10Exp share spent on waterand household services,Western Europe states1988-2010

Source: Ruelens, A., & Nicaise, I. (2018)

Figure 11Exp share spend on waterand household services,Western Europe states2014-2015

Source: Ruelens, A., & Nicaise, I. (2018)

Montpellier was the last large French city to remunicipalise itswater services in 2016. This case is particularly significant sincethe Montpellier area, where a lot of Veolia’s and Suez’s researchteams are located, has long been a stronghold of the privatewater sector. Montpellier has created its new public water operator building onthe lessons from previous experiences in Grenoble, Paris andNice. As a result, the price of water dropped by 10 per cent,which could have been even more significant had it not been forthe poor state of the water infrastructure as discovered by localofficials after remunicipalisation. Montpellier created a WaterObservatory to allow for citizen participation, based on the Parismodel. The board of the new public operator also has 30 per cent civilsociety representation. This element of democratic participationwill be all the more important given that there is still a divergencebetween local authorities and the citizen movements.


Flanders has a rich tradition of dialogue in relation to water poverty. Firstly,Combat Poverty Service, organised regular dialogues with around 40representatives of organisations ranging from social NGOs, environmentalNGOs, poverty organisations, charities, public centres for social welfare, publicauthorities, and also energy and water companies across Belgium. Their recommendations are strongly rights-based and relate mainly to theconcrete realisation of the right to water in general and for vulnerable groups inparticular. Secondly, the Samenlevingsopbouw Antwerpen Provincieframework project for the Flemish Minister for the Environment, works on waterand poverty in 2014 with a rich dialogue based methodology to consultvulnerable clients. Their recommendations, based on individual cases, individual contacts with thepeople from target groups and group discussions, mostly relate to improvementsin the attitude of water companies, in relation to the realisation of access toquality water for all. Thirdly, the local project of Samenlevingsopbouw Oost-Vlaanderen at the PWOin Wetteren in 2017 enabled vulnerable participants to identify concrete stepsthat can be achieved in the practices of water companies8.

8 Utilising the participatory approach for the assessment of access to affordableprovision of water and sanitation of good quality in Belgium, this case studyincorporates existing participatory approaches in the Flemish region whereSamenlevingsopbouw, having since2014 led a number of consualtive processes to address water poverty, and who in 2017, engaged with the NGO Permanent Welzijnsoverleg (PWO).

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Internationalcase study:Water inMontpellier

Internationalcase study:Water customerservices inFlanders

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Public control over the level of such investment isessential; hence, the pubic demand to guaranteepubic ownership of water into the future and thespecific demand for a constitutional referendum.Various water related referendums have beenconducted at municipal level across Europe, whilesome succeed (Hamburg) other have not (Berlin)but were often important rally points for publiceducation and deliberation. National levelreferendums (non-binding) have been conducted inGreece and Italy, but only in Slovenia in the EU hasthe constitution been amended to include the rightto water, although 14 other countries globallyhave this constitutional right.

While Evira is now in place, and the question ofcharges is politically settled, there are stillremaining issues of transfer of services from localto central levels and outstanding questions aboutthe role of local authorities in water infrastructure.From the citizens perspective there is therelationship between local democracy and waterprovision, and from the users perspective there areissues of user’s rights and service delivery. Thereremains a clear public democratic deficit; thecitizen’s point of contact for service provision isthe local government however, a constitutionalreferendum can consolidate the role of the state,national and local, in the provision of water and dothis from a rights perspective.

The future of SLA’s between Ervia and LocalAuthorities was the subject of a September 2018report to the Minister from the Workplace

Recommendation:A water referendum is essential and wording must facilitate SLAs between Irish Waterand local authorities, and ensure local authority water staff continue to be covered aspublic sector workers, regardless of whether they are employed in the local authority ora public national water company.

The right to water can be made real through a local authority delivered water customerservice as in the Flanders region and citizen participation as in the Montpeliergovernance model.

Relations Commission which outlined a range ofconcerns from interested parties concerning thefuture of water services and issues relating to3500 staff under existing Service LevelAgreements between Evria and local authorities.There are also broader concerns about the impactof the loss of water functions on the sustainabilityof the local authority more generally (WRC 2018).Central to the issue of resolving SLA’s (due toexpire in 2021) and the future of public sectorworkers who are presently employed in localauthorities is a commitment to maintain theirstatus as public sector employees who benefitfrom present and future public sector wageagreements.

The referendum is key to protecting the publicsector status of workers in SLAs with Ervia. AReferendum can ensure, not only the right towater, but can keep Ervia in public ownership as astate-run commercial or non-commercial stateentity. Workers concerns vary; for many workers itis essential that Ervia must be a single state runpublic utility incorporated into public sector wageagreements. The Joint Committee on the FutureFunding of Domestic Water Services supportedthe concept of a referendum on the issue of waterservices continuing in public ownership as aprotection against any privatisation. A November2018 Ministerial a memo to cabinet to proposed aMay 2019 referendum to stipulate that ownershipof a water services authority must be retained bythe State or a State-controlled body. Wording isnow with the Attorney General.


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which subsumes the previous National EnergyForum. In its early state of roll out with 4 regionalmeetings in 2018 and 2019, this aims to engagepeople with the challenge of climate change; tomotivate changes in behaviour; and createstructures at local, regional and national levels tosupport the generation of ideas and theirtranslation into appropriate cost-effective actions.Key is creating structures and information flows tofacilitate people gathering to discuss, deliberateand maximise consensus on appropriateresponses to these challenges, to enable andempower appropriate action; to establishnetworks for people to meet periodically toconsider evidence-based inputs on the economic,social, behavioural, environmental and publicaspects of climate and energy policy; to input intothe prioritisation and implementation of climateand energy policy which can be reported andmonitored at local/regional/national levels.

With structures such as the Local CommunityDevelopment Committees (LCDCs), StrategicPolicy Committees (SPCs) as well as throughdevelopment plans and local economic andcommunity plans which set the future local andcommunity development direction and prioritiesfor each city and county, local authorities are wellplaced to integrate high-level SDG objectives and

targets into their various plans and programmes.Public Participation Networks (PPNs) can also playan important role in this process through theirengagement with all aspects of local government.They can also raise the awareness of the generalpublic and community groups to the SDG processand how it can improve their quality of life andwider environment. It is difficult to imagine howthese targets can be reached without significantlocal input to planning and delivery.

National Mitigation Plan andRole of Local Authorities The role of the local actor is a recurring theme inacademic literature concerning sustainability(Felber 2013). Cumbers (2016) seesremunicipalisaiton as central to low carbontransition and energy democracy and in an Irishcontext Kirby (2016) argues local democracy ascentral to low carbon transition. However, there isno consistency in Irish public administration withenergy and local government administered fromtwo different central departments. This does notrecognise the importance of local drivers ineducation and proofing, in driving recycling and indriving a circular economy.

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Becker (2017 121) argues energy provision is nowa concern for a wide range of policy outcomesincluding environmental objectives and targets aswell as the need to develop renewable energy inthe context of low carbon transition. Climatechange triggers increased concern aboutsustainability of energy security and supply;renewable energy is essential to low carbontransition, while at the same time climate changetriggers disruption of supply. Instead ofoverloaded centralised national grids, localdecentralised forms of energy supply can limitdisruptive impacts. Cumber (2017) argues newforms of power in local or regional alliances candisrupt international and national vested energyinterests. Integrated local strategies are essentialtackle climate change, encourage energyefficiency and advance renewable energysolutions. In Wolfshagen over 100 contracts forenergy distribution networks have returned to thepublic sector, many in small municipalities and/orrural areas (Cumber 2017p 131). In Ireland, wesee local examples of best practice for example CoTipperary engagement with Cloughjordan EcoVillage and various councils support for theTransition Town Movement.

Concerns about energy security and energypoverty suggest state based investment iscentral to realising new forms of renewableenergy. The municipal level Robin Hood Initiative inNottingham, England offers a creative example oflocal citizen focused energy policy that protectsemployment conditions and is sustainable for notonly the economy but also those on low incomes,addressing both climate change obligation andfuel poverty. In Germany, remunicipalisation hasplayed a key role in facilitating the country’senergy transition (Energiewende). Below we seecase study of innovative local energy policy fromDenmark. What each of these processes have incommon is not only local delivery but also localdemocratic participation and economic democracyin the planning and monitoring of such services,this recognises the degree to which much of the

innovation needs to be vested in the ‘local’. Manyexamples of remunicipalisaiton of energy weretriggered by mobilisations from citizens and civilsociety (in a 2013 Hamburg referendum citizensvoted to take for city electricity grid back intopublic ownership).

In many instances remunicipalisation also lead tobetter work conditions and wage increases forworkers. Various US city level initiativessuccessfully maximise partnership and generate ‘acommunity’s collective wisdom’ (Cumber 2017128) as well as generate community buy in,engagement and ownership in transitionprocesses. In Germany over 800 communityenterprises and initiatives have experimented withnew forms of collective ownership and democraticparticipation including mutuals, relevant toIreland’s strong cooperative tradition. At the sametime, experiments in remunicpalisation haveexposed power alliances where workers in energyindustries ally to maintain what they perceive arebetter working conditions.

Figure 12 (right), where Ireland is ranked secondlast after Poland, tells us much about Ireland’sdismal record for fighting climate change and theconsiderable challenge we have to meetinternationally agreed targets. Ireland’s NationalStrategic Objective No 8 Plan (NDP 2018 – 2027)focuses on the low carbon transition localgovernment and local democracy is core torealising this objective.

National Dialogue on ClimateAction – local citizen educationand mobilisationThe national mitigation plan stresses the role ofcommunity engagement to build public support forthe action plans and the Programme for aPartnership Government committed toestablishing a National Dialogue on Climate Action

EnergyFigure 12Ireland’s international ranking for fighting climate change

Source: Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe, Off Target: Ranking of EU countries’ ambition and progressin fighting climate change, June 2018

Recommendation:Investment is needed in local authority environmental and sustainable energy staffinfrastructure to ensure sufficient capacity to enable maximum use of the SEAI BetterEnergy programme (BE 3 (private rental) and BE 7 (social housing)), support renewableenergy in the existing LARES framework and advance Citizens Assemblyrecommendations to facilitate micro generation and community ownership ofrenewable energy projects.

In line with the National Dialogue on Climate Action local government has a key role incitizen education, county ‘targets’ could mobilise towards low carbon transition.

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The SEAI (2013) coordinated methodology for theLocal Renewable Energy Strategy (LARES)recognises in theory that the local authority andpublic sphere should be at the heart of the lowcarbon transition and provides a four step processfor local authorities to engage in local planning forrenewable energy. The National Mitigation Planacknowledges in Acton Point 9 the role of LocalAuthorities in enabling successful transition to alow carbon economy and that a bottom-upapproach is essential to promote awareness andengagement within individual communities acrossIreland. The Climate Action and Low CarbonDevelopment Act, 2015 provides that a LocalAuthority may adopt mitigation measures. TheLocal Authority has a leadership role to encourageappropriate behavioural change in localcommunities and conversely is often the first pointof response to climate related incidents. A regionalapproach to climate action envisages regionaloffices dedicated to coordinating climate activitiesfor the local authorities and relevant regionalassemblies play a key role in coordinating relevantactivities related to the National Dialogue onClimate Action.

Decarbonising the built environment The public are aware by now of energy savingmeasures like attic insulation and lightingreplacement. To enhance the potential of energyefficiency to contribute to low carbon transitionrequires a step change in the level of activity andthe ‘depth’ of the measures undertaken todecarbonise heating and energy use, this requiresnew thinking about how we renovate, design,construct and use our buildings. Local authoritieshave a key role in promoting and implementingenergy efficiency measures and these have otherpotential benefits including fuel poverty and publichealth. Reducing energy use in the builtenvironment can occur at Design, Acquisition andUse stages and SEAI through DCCAE are pilotingvarious ways to promote energy efficiency in theBetter Energy Programme and grant scheme for

homes and communities. Two measures are ofparticular relevance to local authorities; MeasureBE3 – Rental Sector – Housing AssistancePackage In 2017, a pilot scheme to encouragelandlords participating in the Housing AssistancePayment to avail of the Better Energy Programmewill get underway to incentivise energy standardimprovements in the rental sector and LocalAuthorities are signed up to participate and makethe scheme operational; Measure BE7 – SocialHousing enables Energy efficiency upgrades to beundertaken by local authorities to social housingstock funded by DHPCLG. Local authorities have aclear promotion role for all other BE measures (1-8).

Achieving local renewableenergy targets While the SEAI supported LARES envisages a rolefor local authorities in shifts to renewable energy,resources are needed to enable this to happen.Recommendations v and vi of the CitizensAssembly report How the State can make Irelanda Leader in tackling Climate Change (2018)address the role of enabling communities initiatelocal based renewable energy solutions.Recommendation V (voted by 99% of theMembers) recommended that the State shouldenable, through legislation, the selling back intothe grid of electricity from micro-generation byprivate citizens (for example energy from solarpanels or wind turbines on people’s homes or land)at a price which is at least equivalent to thewholesale price. In Recommendation vi 100% ofthe Members recommended that the State shouldact to ensure the greatest possible levels ofcommunity ownership in all future renewableenergy projects by encouraging communities todevelop their own projects and by requiring thatdeveloper-led projects make share offers tocommunities to encourage greater localinvolvement and ownership. The infrastructure forthis should be developed by local government.

A controversial remunicipalisations and one contested by unions was therepurchase of the Hamburg energy grids, which were at that time 74.9 per centowned by the energy groups Vattenfall and E.ON., two of the biggest energyplayers within Europe. The remunicipalisation was initiated by more than 50 Hamburg civil societyorganisations. The civil society initiative achieved a referendum on theremunicipalisation of the energy networks in Hamburg, which was held in 2013.The workers’ council feared a drop in income, a reduction in social standards anda threat to jobs. Employee satisfaction with the private employer was high and workers wantedthe existing jobs, working conditions and wages to be maintained. Additionally,there was fear of a counter-financing of the public expenditure on the gridtransfer at the expense of the employees. Despite the resistance of segments ofthe trade unions, of the majority of the political parties (SPD, CDU and FDP) andof employers’ associations, the inhabitants of Hamburg voted for theremunicipalisation of the networks. In 2015, the electricity network wasrepurchased. The gas network remunicipalisation is to be implemented in 2018-19.Have thefears of the workers’ council been confirmed after the remunicipalisation? It doesnot seem so: working conditions and salary have not deteriorated. The politicalcommitment to maintain the collective agreement is limited in time, however. In terms of jobs, a positive conclusion can be drawn: There are now more jobsthan before, since services are now purchased from (municipal) companysubsidiaries.

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Internationalcase study:Hamburgenergy grid

This paper makes a strong argument for investing in local publiccontrol and delivery of local services and infrastructure. Allassessments of Ireland point to the historically weak role of localauthorities and the degree to which, over decades, centralisationand managerialism of power has consistently eroded the alreadymeagre power base of local government. Over the last two decades, various forms of marketisation andprivatisation have also served to disempower local governmentwhile austerity has seriously undermined remaining capacity. Workers in local authorities fear that local government isbecoming only a figure head, local government should be aboutdelivering substance, like water, housing or other public sectorgoods, that are essential to underpin sustainable communities orpromote local authority as the base for local economicdevelopment as well as local democracy and subsidiarity. While much innovation is happening in local authorities, includingmoves towards new forms of collaborative work and sharedservices, a strengthening of local government functions, powersand capacity offers a pathway to a sustainable future of inclusivegrowth and dynamic democratic communities and work places.

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ConclusionLocal Government Legislative changes to Restore sub-county Maximise local

facilitate directly government through employment andelected mayors should a territorially economic potentialbe progressed rebalanced town by increasing the %immediately council system of public expenditure

channelled through local authorities from the present low of 8% towards European average 22-23%

Public housing Investment in direct A new local authority Referendummaintenance staff led public housing for right to

financial model for housingsocial housing which changes the funding model to a cost-rental model

Waste Address fly Regulation of Direct entry oftipping waste management to local authority

ensure abolish side by into regulatedside and guarantee all waste managementhouseholds an affordable servicewaste collection service

Water Local authority Ensure public Referendumled citizens water service conditions for right toadvocacy of employment in water and public

all SLAs ownership water infrastructure

Energy Advance National To advance LARES Advance CitizensDialogue on Climate invest in AssemblyAction through local environmental and recommendations togovernment citizen sustainable energy facilitate microeducation and county staff infrastructure generation andlow carbon transition community ownershiptargets of renewable energy

projects

Recommendations

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Hall D (2012) Re-municipalising municipal servicesin Europe, Brussels: EPSU

Hall D and Hobbs C (2017) Public ownership isback on the agenda in the UK in Petitjean, O. andKishimoto, S. (2017) Remunicipalising PublicServices Brussels: PSI

Hearne, R. (2011). Public private partnerships inIreland: Failed experiment or the way forward?Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hearne, R. (2017). A home or a wealth generator?Inequality, financialisation, and the Irish housingcrisis. Dublin: TASC.

Hearne, R., & Murphy, M. (2017). Investing in theright to a home: Housing, HAPs and hubs. Kildare:Maynooth University

ICTU (2017) A Local Authority led emergencyresponse to the housing crisis, Dublin ICTU

Kishimoto S and Petitjean O. (2017) IntroductionThe untold story in Petitjean, O. and Kishimoto, S.(eds) Remunicipalising Public Services BrusselsPSI

Ladner, A, Keuffer N and Baldersheim H (2015)Self Rule Index for Local Government, EC,Brussels

Murphy, M. P., & Dukelow, F. (Eds) (2016). The Irishwelfare state in the twenty first century. London:Palgrave Macmillan

NERI (2017) Ireland’s Housing Emergency - Timefor a Game Changer WP 2017/No 41 Dublin NERI

NESC (2014) Social Housing at the Crossroads:Possibilities for Investment, Provision and CostRental No. 138. Dublin NESC

Norris M., and Hayden A., (2018) the future ofcouncil housing in Ireland, Dublin, CFI and UCD

Nolan P (2018) https://www.forsa.ie/water-referendum-all-party-support-crucial/

O Donnell O (2013) Transforming LocalGovernment Lessons gleaned from a review ofinternational examples of resilience and change,Dublin IPA

Oireachtas (2017) Joint Committee on the FutureFunding of Domestic Water Service Dublin,Government of Ireland

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Oireachtas Library and Research Service (2012).Spotlight – Local Government Reform. Dublin;Government of Ireland

Oireachtas Library and Research Service (2016).Spotlight – Election Turnout in Ireland:measurement, trends and policy implicationsDublin; Government of Ireland

OECD (2001) Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Local Partnerships forBetter Governance. Paris: OECD

OECD (2008) Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Ireland: Towards anIntegrated Public Service. Paris: OECD

O’Riordan S and van Egeraat C (2013) newregional governance in Ireland: Perspectives andchallenges, Administration, vol. 61, no. 3 (2013),pp. 3–10

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Pettersen B and Mohsen N (2017) Norwegianmunicipalities bringing social services back intopublic hands – Petitjean, O. and Kishimoto, S.(Eds) Remunicipalising Public Services BrusselsPSI

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Anon (2012) Local Government in Times ofAusterityhttp://www.southmayo.com/images/stories/downloads/OLA_Local_Government_in_Times_of_Austerity_June_20122.pdf

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References

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Historical back drop

The Spotlight series (Oireachtas 2012)outlineshow counties were historically established underthe Local Government (Ireland) Act 1898 andremain the predominant units of local government.The Local Government Act 1925 put in place thestructures of local government that were relativelyuntouched until the first iterations, albeit minor, ofreform in the 1970s. From 1925 until 1975,reforms introduced including the abolition of ruraldistrict councils, reinforced powers for dissolutionof local authorities, creation of a localappointments commission, introduction of a cityand county management system, implementationof a code for local authority personnel and theinstitutionalisation of development plans for localauthority areas.

From the 1970s to 1985 despite, a number ofcommissioned reports and review groups on localgovernment there were few concerted efforts atlocal government reform. The 1985, policystatement, Reform of Local Government21, whichrecommended devolution of certain functions tolocal government but was not acted on. Thecentral government response to an ambitious1991 Report of the Advisory Expert Committeeon Local Government Reorganisation and Reform(‘Barrington Report’) was at minimalist, selective,piecemeal and conservative”. The 1996 BetterLocal Government – A Programme for Change waspublished in the context of Government’s StrategicManagement Initiative for the broader publicservice including local government.

It focused on enhancing local democracy andwidening participation, serving the customer

better, developing efficiency in local governmentand resourcing local government to fulfil itsassigned roles. The 1997 second report of theDevolution Commission recommended a wider rolefor local authorities in respect of specificfunctional areas and envisaged that localauthorities as multipurpose entities relating to abroad range of government departments and otherstate agencies. The Local Government Act 1998provided a new funding framework for a localgovernment fund financed by motor taxation andthe central exchequer. From 2003, politicianswere no longer able to have national/local dualmandate.

This altered the practice whereby following the2002 elections, 138 of the 226 members electedto the Oireachtas were also members of localcouncils. An excessive focus on local issues in Irishpolitics is blamed for weakening parliament'scapacity to hold the Government to account andscrutinise legislation. This localism has beenattributed, in part, to the weak system of localgovernment. In 2008 government publishedStronger Local Democracy – Options for Changewith according to Quinlivin 2017, “…somesignificant proposals, with a focus on strongerdemocratic processes and improving the balanceof powers between management and electedrepresentatives’. A Bill to legislate for directlyelected mayors was published in 2010 while a2010 White Paper was prepared but notpublished.

The Local Government Reform Act 2014 updatedLocal Government Act 2001, the principallegislative code outlining supporting thestructures, powers, functions and duties of localgovernment in Ireland (Quinlivin 2017, 2018).

Appendix Timeline of policyinitiatives on localgovernment reform (Oireachtas 2012)

1971 Local Government Reorganisation White Paper

1973 Local Government Discussion Document

1985 The Reform of Local Government Policy Statement

1991 Local Government Reorganisation and Reform – Report of Advisory Expert Committee

1991 Government Statement on Local Government Reform

1996 Towards Cohesive Local Government – Town and County

1996 Devolution Commission – Interim Report

1996 Better Local Government – A Programme For Change

1997 Devolution Commission – Final Report

2008 Green Paper, Stronger Local Democracy – Options for Change

2012 Putting People First: Action Programme for Effective Local Government

2014 Local Government Reform Act

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Fórsa Trade Union

Fórsa trade union

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Report by: Dr Mary.P.Murphy,

Department of Sociology, Maynooth University .

Peer review: Aodh Quinlivin (University College Cork)

democracy works if you let it. - forsa

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