democratic backsliding and compliance with international ... · democratic backsliding and...
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DemocraticBackslidingandCompliancewithInternationalHumanRightsLaw
VictoriaUniversityofWellington,NewZealand
Draft.Pleasedonotciteorcirculatewithoutpermission.PresentedattheannualconferenceoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,2017
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1.IntroductionPactasuntservanda–theideathattreatiesaretobeobeyed–isabedrockprinciple
ofinternationallaw(Henkin1979).Withoutit,states,internationalinstitutions,and
non-governmentalorganizationswouldnotdedicatethetimeandresourcestheydoto
bargainingoverandcraftinginternationalagreements.Nor,withoutageneral
expectationthattreatycommitmentscarryforward,wouldindividualgovernments
botherinvestingeffortandpoliticalcapitalinratifyingandimplementinginternational
accords.Unlessotherwisespecified,treatiesareexpectedtostandthetestoftime–and
itisforthisreasonthatcourtshavegenerallyembracedanarrowapplicationof
doctrinesthatwouldeasilynullifyexistinglegalcommitments(Binder2013).Changes
inacountry’sleadership,politicalleanings,orinstitutionsarerarelyseenassufficient
groundsfornegatingprevioustreatyobligations.
Yet,evenacasualobserverwillnotethatcompliance1isnotagiven:althoughlegal
commitmentsaremeanttocarryforward,inreality,thepracticeismuchmorecomplex.
Particularlyinthehumanrights(HR)arena,avastliteraturehasshownthatdespite
theirmassiveexpansion,HRlegalinstrumentshaveimpactsonlyunderspecial
conditions(Hafner-Burton2014)–whichremaincontested.Here,thedebatehas
centeredchieflyontheroleofdomesticinstitutions,particularlythosetypically
associatedwith(liberal)democracy.2Whilethereissomeevidencethatdemocratic
institutionscanhelptogivetheseagreements‘bite’becausetheyprovideamechanism
forholdingleaderstoaccount,findingsareverymixed.Results,moreover,varyagreat
dealfromtreatytotreaty,andfromonecompliancemetrictoanother.
1Throughout,Idefine‘compliance’asthedegreetowhichacountry’spracticealignswithwhatatreatyprescribesorproscribes.Therearemanywaystoproblematizethisdefinition,butintheinterestofspace,Isetthemaside.C.f.,Kingsbury1998.2Thisliteratureisratherlarge.SeeforexampleConrad2014;ConradandRitter2013;Lupu2013a,2014b;Simmons2009;andvonStein2016.
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Inrecentyears,anotherphenomenonhasattractedtheattentionofpolicymakers
andscholarsalike.Ineveryregionoftheworld,atleastonecountryhasexperienced
‘democraticbacksliding’–the“state-leddebilitationoreliminationofanyofthepolitical
institutionsthatsustaindemocracy”(Bermeo2016:5).Fromatreatycompliance
perspective,thisphenomenonisinterestingforseveralreasons.Manycurrent
backslidersbecamepartiesduringperiodsoftransition–towarddemocracy(Hafner-
Burtonetal.2015),towardmarketeconomies(Smith-Cannoy2012),andsoon.Now,
conditionshavechanged.Thesecasesareimportantfromatheoreticalstandpoint
becauseoneofthemostcrucialfunctionsofinternationalhumanrightslawisto
enshrineagoalandtoensurethatitstandsthetestoftime(andchange).Does
internationallawcompelthesegovernmentstobehavebetterthantheyotherwise
wouldhave?(Andifso,underwhatconditions?).
Thesecasesareanalyticallyinterestingbecausetheyoffercausalinferenceleverage
onseveraldimensions.First,asisnowwell-understoodintheliterature,selectionand
endogeneityproblemsmakegaugingtreatyimpactschallenging(vonStein2005;Lupu
2013a).Backslidingcasesofferleveragepreciselybecausetheyinvolvesituationsin
whichtheconditionsthatledcountriestojoin,andthosenowpresent,arelikely
substantiallydifferent.3Second,assessingHRAeffectsisparticularlychallenging
becauseformanyoftheseagreements,theconditionsneededforcomplianceand
enforcementareverysimilar(vonStein2016).Forinstance,doesNorwayabidebyits
obligationsundertheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)
becauseitvaluestheseentitlementsanyhow,orbecausedomesticinstitutionsand
practiceshelptoensuretheenforcementofthesepromises?
3Griecoetal.(2009)offerasimilarapproachintheirexplorationofpartisanshiftsandIMFtreatycompliance.
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Third,incountrieswithextensive,robust,‘democratic’institutionsandpractices,itis
difficulttopinpointwhichinstitutionand/orpracticeisdoingthelegworkinthestory
ofHRAcompliance.Forinstance,doesNorwaytakeitsobligationsundertheDisabilities
Conventionseriouslybecausecitizenswillpunishleaderselectorallyforbreaking
promises4,becausecivilsocietyensuresthatbreacheswillbepublicizedandcriticized,
becauseitscourtswillenforcetheseduties,orbecauselegislativeandadministrative
checksandbalancesmakeitapriority?Itisdifficulttosaybecauseinmostentrenched
democracies,theseinstitutionsgohand-in-hand.Incontrast,asdetailedlater,
backslidingcountriesareoftenmorediverse.Thisopensuppotentialopportunitiesto
bettergaugewhichinstitutionsarehavingcausalimpact.
2.DemocraticBacksliding
Whatisdemocraticbacksliding?Theanswerdepends,tosomeextent,onone’s
definitionofdemocracy(Diamond2015).Aminimalistunderstandingwouldfocuson
electoralprocedures:notonlydovoteshavetotranslateintocandidate/partychoice
(i.e.,ballotsmustbecountedandactioned),buttheremustalsobeawidespreadrightto
participationandgenuine,frequent,competitionforoffice(LustandWaldner2015).
Butmanywouldarguethatfreeandfairelectionsareonlymeaningfulifother
conditionsarefulfilled.First,asDahl(1971)argues,citizensmustenjoyequalciviland
politicalliberties,particularlyfreedomofspeechandassociation,sotherecanbeafree
exchangeofideasandinformation,includingcriticismofofficials.
Second,theremustbeaccountabilitymechanism(s),toensurethatgovernments
justifytheiractions,andtopunishleaderswhobreachcodesofconductand/orlaws
4Severalstudiesacknowledgethatthisispossiblytheweakestlinkinthechain.SeeforexampleConrad2014;Conradetal.2017;andvonStein2016.
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(LustandWaldner2015).Thereisdebateaboutwhat,exactly,thosemechanisms
shouldlooklike.Constraintsonexecutivepower(e.g.,checksandbalances,suchas
legislativevetoplayers)areonesuchmechanism,butthesecanvarynotablyeveninthe
highlydemocraticworld.Courtsarealsoimportant.Whensufficientlyindependent,
theyenablecitizenstochallengetheirgovernments,andhavetheabilitytodetermine
whethergovernment(in)actionisconsistentwithexistinglegislation.Additionally,
thesemechanismscanplayacrucialroleinensuringthatthewillofthemajority
(embodied,particularly,inelections)doesnottrammelupontherightsoftheminority
(Madison1788).Inthehumanrightsarena,thiscanbetremendouslyimportant.
Atitscore,then,democracyentails(1)freeandfairelections.Butmaking(1)
meaningful,andensuringthatthissystemofleaderchoiceendures,requires(2)basic
civilliberties,aswellas(3)accountabilitymechanisms.Forthisreason,(1),(2),and(3)
aretightlylinked,andunlikelytoexistinisolationforlong.FollowingLustandWaldner
(2015:4),Iunderstanddemocraticbackslidingtomeanadegradationincompetitive
elections,civilliberties,and/oraccountability.Inassessingbacksliding,wewantto
avoidfalsenegatives:itneedn’tnecessarilyinvolveafull-scaledemocraticbreakdown
andregimechange.Wealsowanttoavoidfalsepositives:thedeteriorationshouldbe
fairlysubstantial–notsimplypartofthenormalback-and-forthstruggleofpolitical
change(LustandWaldner2015).Ireturntothisquestionintheempiricalanalyses.
Isdemocraticbackslidingactuallyhappening?Theanswerdependsonatleastthree
things:(1)whatmetriconeemploys;(2)whatamountofchangequalifiesas
‘backsliding’’;and(3)whichcountriesoneincludesinthecomparison.FreedomHouse
(2017)certainlybelievesbackslidingisunderway:arecentreportdeclares“2016
markedthe11thconsecutiveyearofdeclineinglobalfreedom.”Diamond(2015:144),
relyingonthebroaderFreedomHousedatatime-period(since1972),echoesthepoint
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that“theworldhasbeeninamildbutprotracteddemocraticrecessionsinceabout
2006.”LevitskyandWay(2015:46)disagree,describingthatdecreaseas“extremely
modest,”andshowthatothermetricsdemonstratenodeteriorationorevennetgains
fordemocracy.Furthermore,theyargue,somecountriesthatnowappeartobe
backslidingneverreallyqualifiedasdemocracies;metricssuchasFreedomHousemay
welloverstatehowdemocraticthoseregimeswereattheirapogée.(Instead,theylabel
thoseregimes‘competitiveauthoritarians’[LevitskyandWay2002]).
Whethertheworldhas,overall,experiencedademocraticdeclineinrecentyears
remainsdebated.So,too,doesthequestionofwhethercountriessuchasRussiawere
everreallydemocracies.Whatisclearisthatanumberofcountrieshaveundergone
substantialdeteriorationinelectoralcompetitiveness,civicspacefordissentand
opposition,and/oraccountabilityinrecentyears.Often,thesechangeshaveresulted
fromexecutives’effortstoconcentratetheirownpowerandtoentrenchtheruling
party’scontrol(Diamond2015:147;seealsoBermeo2016andKendall-Taylorand
Frantz2016).Butthatisnottheonlypath.Insomecases,efforts(first)focusmore
heavilyonstrippingthecourtsofauthority,forinstance.Insomecases,suchasEgypt,
thecourtshavetriedtofightbackandtomaintainsomeautonomy,evenasopposition
voicesarequashedandthehopeofelectionsthattrulyenshrinedemocratic
accountabilitybecomesmoredistant.
Adecadeago,scholarsusedgeneralmetricsof‘democracy’totrytounderstandthis
complexinteractionbetweeninternationallaw,domesticinstitutions/politics,and
humanrightsoutcomes.Theresultsweretremendouslymixed,andgaugedthe
underlyingmechanism(s)poorly(c.f.,Hathaway2007).Now,wehavemuchbetterdata.
Togetatthesequestionsempirically,Iexplorebackslidingpatternsacrossthefour
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components,usingfourmetricsthatarenowcommoninthecomparativepoliticsand
IRliterature.
Forelectoralbacksliding,IuseV-Dem’selectoralcomponentindex,whichgaugesthe
extenttowhich“suffrageisextensive;politicalandcivilsocietyorganizationscan
operatefreely;electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematicirregularities;
andthechiefexecutiveofacountryisselected(directlyorindirectly)throughelections”
(Coppedgeetal.2016:51).Togaugecivillibertiesbacksliding,IuseV’Dem’scivil
libertiesindex,whichindicateswhethergovernmentagentsexertphysicalviolence,and
whetherthegovernmentplacesconstraintsonprivateand/orpoliticalliberties
(Coppedgeetal.2016:70).
Asdiscussedearlier,accountabilityhas(atleast)twodimensions.Forjudicial
independence,IuseV-Dem’shighcourtindependenceindex,whichassessestheextent
towhichthejudicialdecisionmakingisautonomous,adoptingitssincereviewofthe
record,asopposedtosimplyadoptingthegovernment’spositionregardlessofthe
case’smerits(Coppedgeetal.2016:202).Forexecutiveconstraints,Ifocusonthe
legislature’srole,usingV’Dem’smeasure,whichindicatestheextenttowhichthe
legislatureorgovernmentagencieshavethecapacitytoinvestigate,question,andexert
authorityovertheexecutive(Coppedgeetal.56).
Foreachofthefourmeasures,Icalculate(1)thehighest(i.e.,most‘democratic’)
valueachievedbetween1990and2016;(2)thelowestvalueachievedinrecentyears
(2015and2016).Ithensubtract(2)from(1)andmapthevaluesontothemapsin
Figure1.Thegoalofthisapproachistoprovidearecentsnapshotofhowfaracountry
hasfalleninitsexperienceofdemocracyoverthepastquarter-century.Itissuperiorto
thenot-uncommonpracticeofcomparingearly1990slevelswithrecentlevelsbecause
anumberofcountrieswheredemocraticinstitutionsarenowunderseriousthreat
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achievedtheirmostrobustphasesatlaterpoints(e.g.,Thailand,Fiji,andBelarus,
dependingonthecomponentofdemocracyonefocuseson).
Figure1demonstratesclearlythatmanyofthecountrieshavingexperienced
backslidinginthepastquarter-centuryhavedonesoonalldimensions.Venezuelaisa
primeexample,rankingthirdforelectoralbacksliding,seventhforcivilliberties
backsliding,firstforexecutiveconstraintsbacksliding,andsecondforjudicial
backsliding.Thiswillcomeasnosurprisetothosefamiliarwithpoliticsinthe
BolivarianRepublic,particularlysince2004.PresidentChávezharassedcritics
(includingtheopposition),capturedthecourts,andconcentratedhisownpower–
legally.Althoughcompetitiveandgenerallyonschedule,electionsbecamelessandless
freeandfairunderChávez.
ThissituationhasdeterioratedunderMaduro(starting2013),but2015electionsput
theoppositioninpower,restrictingthePresident’sabilitytopasslegislation.However,
theresulthasbeenfurtherbacksliding:MadurorespondedbydeclaringtheNational
Assemblydevoidoflegalityandplacingthecourts(nowstackedwithloyalists)in
charge,postponinggubernatorialelections,andmakingotherchangesdesignto
disempowertheopposition(Corrales2016).Figure2,slide1,presentsdataonthefour
metricsforVenezuelasince2004.Inormalizethevariablesbetween0and1sotheycan
bevisualizedonthesamegraph.ItisevidentthatVenezuela’sbackslidinghas
negativelyaffectedallareasof‘democracy,’firstthroughconstraintsontheexecutive,
thenbydramaticreductionsinthecourts’independence,andlaterthroughharmful
limitationsondemocraticelectionsandcivilliberties.Thesolenotableexceptionsare
executiveconstraints,whichtightenedsomewhatin2011(followingthe2010
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Figure1.DemocraticBackslidingAroundtheWorld
Electoral Backsliding Civil Liberties Backsliding
Executive Constraints Backsliding Judicial Independence Backsliding
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Figure2:DemocraticChangeinTwoCountries
Toenhancevisualrepresentation,eachmetricisnormalizedbetween0and1.
parliamentaryelections,whichsawgainsfortheopposition)andnotablyin2016
(followingthe2015parliamentaryelections,whichgavepowertotheopposition).5
5GiventheSupremeCourt’stakeoveroftheNationalAssembly,thisexecutive-constraintstrajectorywilllookdifferentinV-Demin2017.SeeCorrales2017.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Venezuela
electoralcivillibertiesexecutiveconstraintsjudicial
0.000
0.200
0.400
0.600
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1.000
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
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2014
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2016
Egypt
electoral
civilliberties
executiveconstraints
judicial
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Yet,backslidingisoftenmessier,movinginfitsandstartsandaffectingdifferent
dimensionsofpoliticallifeindifferentways.ConsiderEgypt,alsodisplayedinFigure2
(since2004,toprovidetemporalcomparisonwithVenezuela,althoughlittlehappened
priorto2011).InthewakeoftheArabSpring,popularuprisingsledtoPresident
Mubarek’sresignationandahugeopening-upofthepoliticalspace,withpresidential
electionsandgreatertoleranceofprotestandfreespeechin2012.Theseelections,of
course,enabledtheMuslimBrotherhoodtotakeover,whichthenattemptedtopassan
IslamistconstitutiongivingPresidentMorsisubstantialpowers.Themilitary’s2013
coupsubsequentlyreversedmostdemocraticgains,but–notably–thecourtshavenot
followedthistrajectory.Instead,theEgyptianjudiciaryhasassertedsomedegreeof
autonomyinthewakeoftheArabSpring,dissolvingone-thirdoftheparliamentafter
findingthatthepreviousyear’selectionhadbeenunconstitutional,findingthatthe
panelcreatedtodraftanewconstitutionhadbeenformedunconstitutionally,and
rejectinglegislationoutlawingMubarek-erarankingofficialsfromsubsequently
runningforoffice(Daragahi2012).
Thecourtshavecontinuedtoattempttoasserttheirindependencesincethecoup
thatputAlSisiinpoweraswell;severalcaseshaveruledagainstthegovernment.6To
beclear:Egyptiancourtsfacegenuinethreatstotheirindependence;theydonotenjoy
theautonomyseeninthecourtsofmostadvancedindustrializeddemocracies.
However,theimportantpointhereisthattheyarefightingtomaintain(somedegreeof)
autonomy.WhereasPresidentAlSisihasbannedprotests,severelycurtailedthe
activitiesofNGOs,andshutdowncriticalmediaoutlets,thecourtsarefightingfor
independencewithsomesuccess.However,recentlegislationallowingthepresidentto
6BBC.EgyptcourtvoidsrulinghaltingtransferofislandstoSaudiArabia.April2,2017.
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appointthemostseniormembersofthejudiciaryplacesthesystemundersignificant
threat(AmnestyInternational2017).
3.Democracy,Backsliding,andHumanRightsTreatyCompliance
Many(though–importantly–notall)countriesthatarenowstrugglingwith
democracyratifiedvariousHRAsduringthewaveofpoliticalandeconomicchangethat
swepttheglobeintheearly1990s.Whetherthesegovernmentshadsincereintentions
ofentrenchingreformor,rather,weremoremotivatedbyadesiretoappealtomarkets
andtoWesterndonorgovernmentsisaquestionofdebate(Smith-Cannoy2012).
Whethertheirmotivationsweresincereornot,whatisnowclearisthatdomestic
institutionalconditionshavechanged.Itisundeniablethatthesetreatyobligations
carryforwardinalegalsense.Butdotheycarryforwardinpractice?Dotheyimpose
realconstraintsongovernments’treatmentofcitizens,evenwhendomesticconditions
havechanged?
ConsiderArmenia.In1993,soonafterindependence,itaccededtoahostofmajorUN
HRAs,includingtheConventionAgainstTorture(CAT)(althoughithasyettoallow
individualstolodgecomplaints),theCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)
(includingitsoptionalprotocolallowingindividualcitizenstolodgecomplaints),and
theCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights(ICESCR).7Thistookplaceamidst
abackdropofgreathopeforthecountry,whichmanyperceived(atthetime)asan
exemplarofdemocraticandeconomictransitionintheregion(Bravo2007).Although
imperfect,civillibertiesinArmeniahavegenerallyremainedstableorimprovedsince
independence.Itsfirstelections,in1991,weregenerallyunderstoodtobefreeandfair,
7www.humanrightstreaties.org.
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andtherepealofSoviet-eralegislationandthedraftingofaConstitutionwithextensive
humanrightsprotectionssignaledthatchangewasunderway.
Yet,by1994,Armenianelectoralprocedureswereunderseriousquestion,andby
1998,thePresidentwasforcedtoresigninabloodlesscouporganizedbythemilitary
andbymembersofhisadministration.Since,theintegrityofArmenianelections(ballot
stuffing,countingflaws,intimidationandviolence,andsoon)hasdeterioratedfurther
(Bravo2007).Furthermore,the1995Constitutionwasdeeplyproblematicbecauseall
judgesareappointedbythePresident(withtherecommendationoftheJudicial
Council).Thisandotherlimitationsonthejudiciary’sindependencecametoaheadin
thedisputedpresidentialelectionsof2003.Althoughitrefusedtooverturntheelection
result,theConstitutionalCourtdidfindthatsignificantelection-relationviolations
occurred,andrecognizedthat(forced)administrativedetentionofmanycandidates
harmedthePresidentialoppositioncandidate’schances(HumanRightsWatch2003).
Consequently,theCourtrecommendedareferendumofconfidenceinthePresident
withinayear.Althoughthiswasanimportantmomentof(relative)independencefor
theArmenianjudiciary,thegovernment’sdecisiontoignorethelatterrecommendation
demonstratedasubstantialinabilitytoprovidetimelyorrealremediestodocumented
violations(Bravo2007).TheArmenianjudiciaryhasslumpedfurtherintosubservience
totheexecutive.
TheArmeniancaseisintriguingbecausethecountrytookonseveraltreaty
obligationsatatimewhenitappearedthatdomesticpoliticalinstitutionswouldbe
conducivetoenforcementoftheseobligations.Overtime,(aspectsof)thoseinstitutions
havefrayedorbeendismantled;conditionshavechanged.Thisisausefultestof
whetherandhowinternationalhumanrightslaw‘works.’Debatesaboutwhether
treaties‘matter’havehingedinpartontheperennialproblemofselectionbiasand
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endogeneitythatarewellknown(Downsetal.1996).Yet,theArmeniancaseisnotof
thisilk:conditionshavechanged,inwaysthatmaynothavebeenanticipatedatthetime
ofratification.Armeniaisnotunique,forseveralcountrieshavetakenontreaty
obligationsandsubsequentlyexperiencedsignificantdemocraticbacksliding.
Here,itisusefultooutlinepreciselyhowdemocraticinstitutionsarethoughttoaffect
compliancewithinternationalhumanrightslaw.Scholarshaveemphasizedfourmain
waysinwhichdemocraticinstitutionscanserveasHRAenforcementmechanisms.
First,becausefreeandfairelectionsmakeiteasierforcitizenstopunishleaders,
leadersoperatingindemocraticelectoralsystemshavestrongerincentivestokeeptheir
promises.Citizensmightpunishleadersbecausetheyareopposedtotheparticular
rightsabuse,and/orbecausetheydisapproveofrule-breakinginparticular.Hence,the
electoralmechanismmightengagetwodifferentaudiences(pro-rights,pro-treaty-
abiding),butinbothcases,theideaisthatHRAsareaneasiertoolforcitizensto
activateiftheyhaveaccesstoafreeandfairballotbox.
Therearetwomainchallengestotheargumentthatelectionsenhancehumanrights
treatycompliance.First,electoralcontestationisamajoritarianinstitution.Ifthe
majorityprefersrightsviolations,thenweshouldinfactexpectelectionstoexacerbate
compliance.Itmaybehardtobelievethatcitizenswouldactuallywantleaderstoabuse
rights,butthisoverlooksanimportantpoint:themajorityissometimeswillingto
tolerateorevensupportabusewhentargetedataminority,particularlyiftheformer
derivessomebenefit,suchasaheightenedsenseofsecurity(Conradetal.2017b).
Second,amongallthethingsthatvoterscareabout,itseemshardtobelieveadherence
tohumanrightslawwouldbetowardthetopofthelist.Tomz(2008)andWallace
(2013)havedemonstratedinsurvey/experimentalsettingsthatcitizenscareabout
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adherencetointernationalrules,butwhetherthesepreferencesturnintoelectoral
rewardsorpunishmentsismuchhardertoestablish.
Civilsocietyhaslongbeenunderstoodasamechanismforgivinginternational
humanrightslawmeaningandforce.Citizengroupsoftenmakeappealstohuman
rightsnorms(includinginternationallaw)regardlessofthecountry’sratificationstatus,
butsomearguethatratificationupstheante(Simmons2009).Civicgroupscanuse
treatiesasrhetoricalandmobilizationtools(KeckandSikkink1998),anditisharder
foragovernmenttoclaimnodedicationtotheprinciple(s)atreatyenshrinesifithas
gonetothetroubleofratifying.SomethinkofHRAsas‘focalpoints’aroundwhichcivil
actors–betheypro-humanrights,pro-internationallaw,orboth–coalesce(Simmons
2009).
Acritiquesimilartothatoftheelectoralcomponentcanberaisedinthecontextof
thecivilsocietymechanism.Ifthemajorityofcitizens,orthosewillingtomobilize,are
opposedtotherightinquestion,thiscouldworkagainstcompliance.Hence,itishasty
tobelievethatprovidingatighteralignmentbetweenpolicymakersandcitizenswill
alwayspushtowardcompliance;thisdependscruciallyonwhatcitizenswant.A
differentcriticismacknowledgesthatcivilsocietycanplayanimportantrolein
advancinghumanrightscauses,butquestionswhetheraratifiedtreatyaddsanything
totheequation.Afterall,citizengroupsoftenmakeappealstohumanrightsnorms
(includinginternationallaw)regardlessofthecountry’sratificationstatus;forinstance,
mostwebsitesdedicatedtoSyrianwarcrimesandgenocidemakenoreferenceto
internationallegalobligations.Conversely,thosewishingtomakelegalappealsdonot
necessarilyneedtreaties,forsomeofthemostfundamentalrightsarecoveredbyjus
cogens.
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Othersemphasizetheroleofaccountabilitymechanisms.Lupu(2013a),forinstance,
arguesthatalthoughlegislativevetoplayersmakeratificationlesslikelytobeginwith,
theyalsomakeHRAsmoreeffectivebymakingithardertoreversepolicies.Once
ratifiedandincorporatedintolaw,treatiesaremuchhardertoviolateiflegislative
actorshavetosignoffonsuchdecisions.Legislativeopponentscandenysupportto
executiveswantingtoalterthestatusquobyrefusingtosupportlegislationthatcuts
againstcompliance,byholdingtightlyontopurse-strings,and/orbybringing
contentioustreatyviolationsintothepublicview.
Thebiggestchallengetotheveto-players-as-treaty-enforcementargumentisthatit
hingesonthestatusquobeingarights-friendlyone.If,incontrast,thestatusquoisone
ofrightsviolations,theprevalenceofvetoplayersmightfrustrateattemptstorectify
thesituation,bymakingitmoredifficulttopassimplementinglegislationortochange
problematicexistinglaw,etc.Anadditionalconsiderationisthatofscope.Legislative
vetoplayersarelikelyto‘matter’inrightsareasinwhichtheexecutivetendstomeddle;
areasoverwhichexecutivesandlegislativesstruggleforauthority.
Othersunderscoretheroleofthejudiciary.Slaughter(1995)wasperhapsthefirstto
pointoutthatdomesticcourtscanplayacrucialroleintheenforcementofinternational
law.Thiscanbeparticularlypowerfulinthehumanrightscontext,as(well-
functioning)courtshavetheauthoritytoreviewwhethergovernment(in)action
adherestoexistinglaw,includingratifiedtreaties;8theyarealsochargedwith
guaranteeingindividualrightsandenablingcitizenstochallengetheirgovernmentif
necessary.Somestudieshaveshownthattreatiescanhaverealbitewhenthejudiciary
issufficientlyindependent(Lupu2013b;vonStein2013).
8Butseebelowforcaveats.
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However,theprospectofjudicialenforcementcanbeadouble-edgedsword.Indeed,
somestudieshavefoundthatcountrieswithindependentcourtsoftenoptnottojoin
theseagreements,particularlywhencomingintocompliancewouldbehard(vonStein
2016)orwhenthereisnotintensepressurefromoppositiongroupstoparticipate
(Conrad2014).Additionally,domesticcourtshavecomplexdoctrinessurrounding
wheninternationalagreementscanbeinvoked–hence,theymaychooseorberequired
nottoorderotherdomesticpartiestoadheretorules.Inanothervein,Lupu(2013b)
pointsoutthatforsomerightsviolations,itisdifficulttoobtainevidence,andthe
standardsofproofarehigh.Inthesecases,itishardevenforindependentcourtsto
restraingovernmentsbecausetheformerhavealimitedabilitytoactuallyprosecute
violations.Afinalpointisthatdomesticcourtsdonotoperateinavacuum.Eventhe
mostindependentjudiciariesoperateingivensocialcontexts;(aperceptionof)too
muchjudicialactivismcanleadtobacklashonthepartofcitizensand/orleaders.
Asdiscussedearlier,countriessuchasArmeniaareofinteresttothestudyofHRA
compliancebecausetheyinvolvesituationswheretheconditionsinplaceatthetimeof
ratificationhavechangednotably.Casessuchasthesearealsonotablebecausethey
potentiallyprovideanopportunitytobettergaugewhichdomesticinstitutionisdoing
thelegworkinthecausalstoryoftreatycompliance.Previousstudieshavestruggledto
parseoutthedifferences,eitherbecauseofpoordataavailability(forinstance,
Hathaway[2007]ischieflyinterestedindomesticlegalenforcement,butmeasuresthis
usingthePolitydata)and/orbecausecountrieswithfreeandfairelectionsalsotendto
protectcivilliberties,andtypicallyhaveaccountabilitymechanismsaswell(vonStein
2016).
Betterdata(Coppedgeetal.2016)provideafixforthefirstproblem.And,while
acknowledgingthatsomecountriesregressonmostorevenalldimensions,the
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diversityofbacksliders’experienceprovidesapossiblesolutiontothesecondproblem.
Inotherwords,becausetheirbackslidinghasnotbeenuniform,countrieslikeArmenia
and/orEgyptmightgiveusleverageinunderstandingwhichdomesticinstitution(s)
matters(most)intheenforcementofinternationalhumanrightslaw.
4.APreliminaryLookatSomeDataThepurposeofthissectionistodosomepreliminarydataanalysisofthe
relationship(s)betweenratificationofHRAs,democraticbacksliding,andthehuman
rightspracticespre/proscribedbytheparticulartreatyinquestion.Therearedozensof
HRAsfromwhichtochoose(vonStein2017),butIfocushereontwoaccords(along
withtheirrelevantoptionalarticles/protocols).ThefirstistheCAT,createdin1984;its
optionalarticle22isofparticularinterestbecauseitenablesgovernmentsthatso
desiretodelegateauthoritytotheCommitteeAgainstTorturetoreceivecomplaints
fromindividualswhoallegethattheirgovernmenthasfailedthem.TheCAT’s2002
optionalprotocolfurtherdelegatesauthoritytotheCommittee,allowingthe
SubcommitteeonthePreventionofTorturetoconductvisitstomonitorcountries’
adherencetotheagreement.Thisagreementhasbeenthesubjectofmanystudies,soI
donotdiscussitfurtherhere(c.f.,Conrad2014;ConradandRitter2013;Simmons
2009).Forinformationalpurposes,Figure3showseachcountry’sratificationstatusvis-
à-vistheCAT.
TheimportantpointtotakeawayfromFigure3isthatwithinthe‘backslidingworld,’
thereisgreatdiversityininternationallegalcommitmentstoeradicatetheuseof
torture.KazakhstanhasacceptedeveryaspectoftheCAT:themainconvention,article
22(allowingindividualstolodgecomplaintswiththeCommittee),andtheoptional
protocolallowingforvisitsfromtheSubcommitteeonPrevention.Armeniaratifiedthe
18
noratification CATonly CAT+optprotoc CAT+art22 CAT+optprotoc+art22
CATwithintwoyearsofindependence;ithasyettoacceptarticle22,butwasamong
theearliestratifiersoftheoptionalprotocol.Incontrast,Russia–alreadyapartytothe
CATsince1987–acceptedarticle22justastheSovietUnionwasdisintegrating.Hence,
itscitizenscan–andhave–lodgedcomplaintsagainsttheirgovernmentforfailingto
abidebytheConvention(Smith-Cannoy2012).Yet,Moscowhasrefusedtoallow
monitoringvisits.Oneneednotlooktremendouslyfartofindabacksliderthathas
largelyeschewedtheCATregime:Uzbekistan,forinstance,hasonlybecomeapartyto
theCAT,butdoesnotacceptthemoreinvasivecomponents.Tofindabonafide
backslider(IranandSyriadonotreallyqualify,asneitherhaseverbeensufficiently
democratic)withnoCATobligationswhatsoever,onemustlookfurtherEast,for
exampletoBurma/Myanmar.
Does(thedegreeand/ordurationof)acountry’scommitmenttotheinternational
anti-tortureregimeaffectitsabilitytocomplywiththisagreement?Anumberofstudies
haveexploredthisquestion,sothepurposeofthissectionisnottorehashthose
debates(c.f.,Conrad204,ConradandRitter2013,andSimmons2009,amongothers).
Figure (. Degree of Participation in the Convention Against Torture
19
Rather,Iaminterestedinassessingwhetherandhowdemocraticbackslidingaffects
compliance,ifatall.
Asdiscussedearlier,identifying‘backsliders’canbechallenging.Wehavealready
establishedtheconceptsofinterest–free/fairelections,civilsocietyprotections,and
twoaccountabilitymechanisms.Butmustacountryhavereachedacertainlevelof
democraticembeddednesstobeconsideredabackslider?Andhowsevereshouldthe
regressionbetoqualifyasbacksliding?Onbothquestions,Iavoidimposingdecisions
onthedata.Substantialinstitutionaldeteriorationinacountrythatneverreally
achievedentrencheddemocracy(perhapsGhanainthe1980s)isconsidered
backslidinginthesamewayasdoessubstantialdeteriorationwheremostthought
democracytobethe“onlygameintown”(perhapsChilein1973).Inthatsamespirit,I
useacountry’sdegreeofdeteriorationtoindicatetheseverity,ratherthanimposinga
dichotomyof‘backsliders’and‘non-backsliders.’Bothdecisionsmaycallfor
reassessmentinasubsequentdraft.
Usingeachoftheinstitutionalmeasuresdescribedearlier,Icreatefourseparate
variablesindicatingthedegreeofbacksliding.Ifacountryexperiencednoinstitutional
changeoranimprovementtowardgreaterelectoralintegrity(respectforcivilliberties,
etc.),itsvalueiszero.Thisallowsustofocusourattentiononbacksliding.Chilesuffered
thelargestsingle-yearbackslideinelectoralintegrity(inthedata)in1973,asaresultof
themilitarycoupthatoustedPresidentAllendeandputGeneralPinochetinpowerfora
quarterofacentury.Onlyayearandahalflater,Cambodiaexperiencedthelargest
single-yeardeteriorationincivilliberties(inthedata),whentheKhmerRougetook
power.Czechoslovakiaunderwentthelargestsingle-yearjudicialindependenceslipin
1948,whentheSoviet-ledCommunistcoupevisceratedacourtsystemthatwasabout
asindependentascurrent-dayJapan’s.Finally,thelargestone-yeardropinlegislative
20
constraintsontheexecutiveinvolvedThailandin2013-2014,whicheventuallyresulted
inPrimeMinisterShinawatraousterandthemilitaryjunta’stakeover.
Inthispreliminarysetofanalyses,Iexploretwokeyquestions:
• Doratifiersbehavedifferentlyfromnon-ratifiers?
• Doesbackslidingaffectratifiersdifferentlyfromnon-ratifiers?
Istartwithseparateanalysesofhumanrightsbacksliding,usingeachofthefour
institutionalbackslidingvariablesdescribedabove.IusetheCIRIdata,whichgauge
governmentrespectfortherightnottobetortured,summarilyexecuted,disappeared,
orimprisonedforpoliticalbeliefs(Cingranelli,Richards,andClay2014).Becausethere
isnoagreementonhowbesttomeasuregovernmentrespectforhumanrights,Ilater
usethePTSdata.Thedependentvariableisthechangeinhumanrightspractices
(laggedoneyear);larger(positive)valuesindicatemoreseriousbacksliding.An
exampleofsubstantialhumanrightsbackslidingincludesFiji,whose1987coups
jettisonedthecountryintoaperiodinwhichtorture,imprisonmentofthoseof
opposingpoliticalviews,andotherviolationswerecommon.
IuseaGLSrandomeffectsmodelwithalaggeddependentvariableandrobust
clusteredstandarderrors.Ialsoincludethecountry’sbaselinePTSscore,asbacksliding
mightdependonhowseverethehumanrightssituationalreadyis.Ialsoinclude
variablesthatotherstudieshavefoundtoaffecthumanrightspractices:whetheracivil
warisunderway,GDPpercapita,andtheyearoftheobservation.BecausetheCAT
regimehasmanyoptions,Igaugethreecomponents:whetheracountryhasratified(1)
themainagreement;(2)theoptionalprovisionallowingforindividualcitizenstolodge
complaints;and/or(3)theoptionalprovisionempoweringtheSubcommitteeto
performmonitoringvisits.Figure4presentsthebasemodels,whichdonotlookatany
interactiverelationships.
21
ThemainupshotsofFigure4are:(1)the‘standard’variables(civilwarandwealth)
predictbackslidingasonewouldexpect,whichisencouraging;and(2)onlycivil
libertiesbackslidinglinkstightlywithhumanrightsbacksliding(thethreeother
variableshavenoobviousrelationtoit);and(3)ratificationstatusdoesnotbearany
relationtohumanrightsbacksliding.
Theseinitialnon-resultsfor(2)and(3)arenotaltogethersurprising.Alarge
literaturehasdocumentedtheCAT’sstrangerelationtophysicalintegrityrights
practices.9Furthermore,ifwebelievethattreatiesaffectcompliancethroughdomestic
institutionalchannels,thentheeffectsareinteractive.Totestthatargument,Iaddto
theanalysesaninteractionoftherelevant‘democraticbacksliding’variableandthe
relevanttreatyratificationvariable.
Figure4.BaseModelsofPhysicalIntegrityRightsBacksliding
9Amongavastliterature,seeConrad2014;ConradandRitter2013;andSimmons2009.
Civil War
GDP per Capita
Year
Electoral Backsliding
Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-.2 -.1 0 .1(Less) HR Backsliding (More)
Civil War
GDP per Capita
Year
Civil Liberties Backsliding
Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8(Less) HR Backsliding (More)
Civil War
GDP per Capita
Year
Judicial Backsliding
Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2(Less) HR Backsliding (More)
Civil War
GDP per Capita
Year
Exec Constraints Backsliding
Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2(Less) HR Backsliding (More)
Civil War
GDP per Capita
Year
Electoral Backsliding
Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-.2 -.1 0 .1(Less) HR Backsliding (More)
Civil War
GDP per Capita
Year
Civil Liberties Backsliding
Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8(Less) HR Backsliding (More)
Civil War
GDP per Capita
Year
Judicial Backsliding
Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2(Less) HR Backsliding (More)
Civil War
GDP per Capita
Year
Exec Constraints Backsliding
Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2(Less) HR Backsliding (More)
22
Figure5.InteractiveModelsofPhysicalIntegrityRightsBacksliding
Figure5showsthattherearesomeinterestinginteractiveeffectsworthnoting.
Referringbacktothefirstquestion–“doratifiersbehavedifferentlyfromnon-
ratifiers?”–theansweristhatitverymuchdependsonthenatureoftheinternational
legalcommitment.FortheCAT(maintreaty),Ifindnoevidencethatratifiers’human
rightsbackslidingdiffersfromthatofnon-ratifiers.Theonlypotentialexceptionisin
thecontextofcivillibertiesbacksliding,wherethereissomeevidencethatasthecivil
Civil WarGDP per Capita
YearElec Backsliding
Ratified CATElec Backsliding # Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind ComplaintElec Backsliding # Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)Elec Backsliding # Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-1 -.5 0 .5
Civil WarGDP per Capita
YearCivil Lib Backsliding
Ratified CATCivil Lib Backsliding # Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind ComplaintCivil Lib Backsliding # Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)Civil Lib Backsliding # Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1Civil War
GDP per CapitaYear
Judic BackslidingRatified CAT
Judic Backsliding # Ratified CATRatified CAT Ind Complaint
Judic Backsliding # Ratified CAT Ind ComplaintRatified Op-CAT (Visits)
Judic Backsliding # Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Civil WarGDP per Capita
YearExec Constraints Backsliding
Ratified CATExec Constraints Backsliding # Ratified CAT
Ratified CAT Ind ComplaintExec Constraints Backsliding # Ratified CAT Ind Complaint
Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)Exec Constraints Backsliding # Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6
23
libertiessituationdeteriorates,ratifiersaremorepronetosufferphysicalintegrity
rightsviolations(Figure6,slidea).Thismaynotbesurprising,giventheextraordinarily
mixedfindingsforthisagreementinthebroaderliterature.However,thisfindingfalls
shortofstandardstatisticalsignificance.FortheCAT’sindividualcomplaintsprocedure,
thereissomeindicationthatcountriesexperiencingnoorverylittledemocratic
backsliding,ratifiersfacelessphysicalintegrityrightsbacksliding.Again,however,this
resultfallsshortofstandardthresholdsofsignificance(thoughitdoesoftencome
close).
ThemostnotablefindingsariseinthecontextoftheCAT’soptionalmonitoring
(visits)procedure.ReturningtoFigure5,itisevidentfromtheinteractiontermthat
electoralbackslidingaffectspartiestothisagreementdifferentlythanitdoesnon-
parties.Thesamecanbesaidofcivillibertiesbacksliders,althoughthisfindingfalls
shortofstandardthresholds.Tobettergaugethesedifferentialeffects,Figure6,slidesb.
andc.graphthepredictedphysicalintegrityrightsbacksliding,asafunctionofelectoral
andcivillibertiesbacksliding,respectively.Theresultsarestrongestfortheelectoral
component:countriesthathaveratifiedthisoptionalprotocolaresignificantlyless
pronetobackslideintheirphysicalintegritypractices,ascomparedtonon-ratifiers
(question1).Thelargertheelectoralbacksliding,thestrongertheOp-CAT’seffect.
Additionally,electoralbackslidingaffectsthetwogroupsdifferently(question2):
whereithasnodiscernableimpactonnon-ratifiers(p=.554),itappearstodecrease
physicalintegrityrightsbackslidingamongratifiers(p<.001).Thisissomewhat
surprisinginthefollowingregard.WhileitissensiblethatOp-CATratificationalters
governments’incentivestocoupleelectoraldegradationwithheightenedphysical
integrityrightsviolations,itishardtounderstandwhyratifierswouldbecompelledto
behaveincreasingly‘nicely’onthephysicalintegrityfrontastheirelectoralsituation
24
Figure6.SelectedMarginalEffects
a. CAT
b. CATOptionalProtocolonMonitoring(Visits)
c. CATOptionalProtocolonMonitoring(Visits)
0.2
.4.6
.81
(Sm
alle
r) Ef
fect
on
Phys
ical
Inte
grity
Rig
hts
Back
slid
ing
(Lar
ger)
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8(Less) Civil Liberties Backsliding (More)
Has not ratified CAT Has ratified CAT-1
.5-1
-.50
.5(S
mal
ler)
Effe
ct o
n Ph
ysica
l Int
egrit
y Ri
ghts
Bac
kslid
ing
(La
rger
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4
Electoral Backsliding
Has not ratified Op-CAT Has ratified Op-CAT
(Less) Electoral Backsliding (More)
-.20
.2.4
.6(L
ess)
E
ffect
of P
hysic
al In
tegr
ity R
ight
s Ba
cksli
ding
(M
ore)
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8(Less) Civil Liberties Backsliding (More)
Has not ratified Op-CAT Has ratified Op-CAT
25
deteriorates.Ifanything,Iwouldhaveexpectedratificationtomakethelineflat,
whereasnon-partiestotheOp-CATwouldtypicallycoupleelectoralbackslidingwith
physicalintegritybacksliding.Ostensibly,thatisnotthecase.Thisdeservesfurther
consideration.
Turningnowtohowcivillibertiesbackslidingaffectsphysicalintegrityrightsin
combinationwithtreatystatus,onestrongfindingisthatamongcountriesthathavenot
ratifiedtheCAToranyoptionalprovisions,deterioratingcivillibertiessituationsare
stronglylinkedtoaworseninginphysicalintegrityrightspractices(Figure5).Neither
CATratificationnorparticipationintheindividualcomplaintsproceduremediatesthat
relationship.However,asintheaboveparagraph,participationinOp-CATdoesmediate
thatrelationship.Indeed,amongnon-partiestothatProtocol,civillibertiesbacksliding
clearlyleadstophysicalintegrityrightsbacksliding(p<.001).Incontrast,among
parties,thatrelationshipwashesout(stillslightlypositive,butsmallandhighly
insignificantatp=.717).AsFigure6,slidec.,shows,thedifferencesbetweenratifiers
andnon-ratifiersarefairlylargeandasonemightexpect(withthenon-ratifiers
backslidinginresponsetobacksliding),butthisfindingfallsslightlyshortofstandard
statisticalsignificance.Overall,thereislittleevidencethatchangesinjudicial
independenceorthedegreeoflegislativeinterferenceintheexecutive’spolicymaking
affectphysicalintegrityrightsbacksliding.
Themostconsistentfindingsinthisstudypertaintotheoptionalprotocolon
monitoring/visits,electoralbacksliding,andtoaslightlylesserdegree,civilliberties
backsliding.ThesefindingsheldquiteconsistentlyusingthePTSdatainstead.
SchnackenbergandFariss’s(2014)latentmeanvariableisanotheroption,butits
calculationmayincludesomeofthedemocraticbackslidingvariablesusedherein,
26
whichmayposeproblems.10Ofcourse,themodelingtechniqueheredonotcontrolfor
thepotentialendogeneityandselectioneffectsthatarewell-knownintheliterature.As
aresult,onehastobecarefulaboutinferringmuchabout‘effects.’Anextstepinthis
projectistoidentifythebestmodelingapproachandtoconducttheanalyseswithit.
5.Conclusion
Treatiesaretobeobeyed.Thisisoneofthemostfundamentalprinciplesof
internationallaw.Thefactthatcountriesenter(relatively)freelyintothemcanhavea
frustratingimplication:oftentimes,governmentsdonotjoinonuntiltheyarefairlysure
theycancomply(vonStein2016).Yet,governmentsandregimescananddochange.
Whatismore,governmentssometimestakeoninternationallegalobligationsduring
periodsoftumult.Perhapstheirleadersweresincere,wantingtoentrenchprohibitions
onsomeoftheverybehaviorstowhichtheyweresubjectedasdissidents.Or,perhaps
theywerenotsincere,butperceivedtreatyparticipationasawaytoattractforeign
investmentordevelopmentaid.Whateverthemotivations,thepointisthis:times
change,butpactasuntservanda–intheory,anyhow.
Thisarticlehasexploredthisrealityinthecontextofdemocraticbacksliding,a
prominentphenomenonthatmany(thoughcertainlynotall)scholarsbelievehas
becomeparticularlyprevalentinrecentyears.Thisfocusallowsusto(attemptto)hone
inonthemechanismsatplayintheideathatdemocraticinstitutionsformthebasisof
HRAenforcement.Insomeways,theresultswillbedisappointingtochampionsofthe
internationalanti-tortureregime.ParticipationintheCATand/ortheindividual
complaintsmechanismdoesnotappeartopreventphysicalintegritybacksliding,in
combinationwithorindependentofdemocraticbacksliding.Itmay,assomeother
10Awaitingclarificationonthispoint.
27
studieshavealsofound(e.g.,HollyerandRosendorff2011),makethesituationworse–
althoughthefindingshereinshouldberegardedaspreliminaryatbest.
However,thereisanimportantareawherethefindingsprovidesomepreliminary
evidencethattreatiesalterleaders’incentives.ThefactthatparticipantsintheCAT’s
optionalmonitoringprovisionresponddifferentlyfromnon-participants–inthefaceof
substantialelectoraland/orcivillibertiesbacksliding–isimportant.Although
preliminary,thisfindingsuggeststhat(certaintypesof)pactaareindeedservanda.Itis
nocoincidencethatthiscomponentoftheanti-tortureregimeinvolvesrealmonitoring
andadegreeofsovereigntycost.Governmentsthattakeonthisparticularobligation
willfinditdifficultto‘hide’physicalintegritybackslidingortoshakeitoffasrumor,or
necessaryforthesakeofstatesecurity.
Lookingforward,thisresearchcanbefurtherdevelopedinatleastthreeways.First,
asalreadynoted,amoresophisticatedmodelthataccountsforselectionand
endogeneityisneeded.Second,furtherresearchonwhyandhowgovernmentsbecame
partiestotheCAT’soptionalprotocolwouldbeusefulasawayofexploringtheidea
thattimeschangebuttreatiescarryforward.Finally,itwouldbeworthwhiletoexplore
additionalhumanrightstreatiestodeterminewhetherandhowdemocraticbacksliding
affectscountries’abilitytoabidebytheseagreementsmorebroadly.
28
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