DemocraticBreakdownandSurvivalinLatinAmerica,1945­2005

ScottMainwaring,UniversityofNotreDame

AníbalPérez‐Liñán,UniversityofPittsburgh

Whydodemocraciessurviveorbreakdown?Inthispaper,wereturntothisclassicquestion with an empirical focus on Latin America from 1945 to 2005. Ourargumentdeviatesfromthequantitativeliteratureandagoodpartofthequalitativeliterature on democratic survival and breakdown. We argue that structuralvariables such as the level of development and inequalities have not shapedprospects for democratic survival in Latin America. Nor, contrary to findings insome of the literature, has economic performance affected the survival ofcompetitiveregimes. Instead,wefocusontheregionalpoliticalenvironmentandonactors’normativepreferencesaboutdemocracyanddictatorshipandtheirpolicyradicalismormoderation.Wearguethat1)ahigherlevelofdevelopmentdidnotincreasethelikelihoodofdemocraticsurvivalinLatinAmericaoverthislongtime;2)ifactorshaveanormativepreferencefordemocracy,itismorelikelytosurvive;and3)policymoderationfacilitatesdemocraticsurvival.Paper for the conference, “Guillermo O’Donnell and the Study of Democracy,”BuenosAires,March26‐27, 2012. Weare grateful toMaríaVictoriaDeNegri forassistanceinpreparingthispaper.

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Whydodemocraciessurviveorbreakdown?Inthispaper,wereturntothis

classicquestionwithanempiricalfocusonLatinAmericafrom1945to2005.We

pursueanewresearchstrategytoaddressthisquestion.Followingarichand

extensivequalitativeliterature,weunderstandregimedynamicsintermsof

concretehistoricactors.Thesurvivalorfallofcompetitiveregimesdependson

whatpoliticalleaders,politicalparties,militaries,andotherkeyactorsdo.These

actionsareshapedbutnotdeterminedbystructuralforcesandculturalpatterns.

Butthisqualitativeliteraturehasfacedlimitationsinbroadlytestingargumentsand

theoriesbecauseofthedifficultyofscalingupfromcasestudies.Followinganother

richandextensivequantitativeliteratureonpoliticalregimes,therefore,the

analysisinthispaperisprimarilyquantitativesothatwecangetsomepreliminary

assessmentaboutthegeneralizabilityofsomeofthekeyideasfoundinsomeofthe

qualitativeliterature.

Wearguethatthelevelofdevelopmenthasnotdirectlyshapedprospectsfor

democraticsurvivalinLatinAmerica.Nor,contrarytofindingsinsomeofthe

literature,haseconomicperformanceaffectedthesurvivalofcompetitiveregimes.

Instead,wefocusontheregionalpoliticalenvironmentandonactors’normative

preferencesaboutdemocracyandtheirpolicyradicalismormoderation.Weargue

thatdemocraciesaremorelikelytosurvivewhenpoliticalactorshaveastrong

normativepreferencefordemocracyandwhentheyembracepolicymoderation.

Theevidencealsoshowsthatdemocraticregimesarestrongerwhentheregional

environmentfacilitatestheproliferationofthosevaluesdomestically.

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OurpaperbuildsonthreeimportantinsightsbyGuillermoO’Donnell.First,

in1973,O’DonnellpublishedhisfamousModernizationandBureaucratic­

Authoritarianism,whichcriticizedmodernizationtheoryforpositingtoolineara

relationshipbetweenthelevelofdevelopmentandpoliticalregimes.Foralonger

timespanandbroadersetofLatinAmericancountries,wereplicateO’Donnell’s

argumentthatthelevelofdevelopmenthasnothadastraightforwardimpactonthe

survivalofcompetitiveregimesinLatinAmerica.

Second,inModernizationandBureaucratic­Authoritarianismaswellas

severalotherworkshepublishedinthe1970sandearly1980s,O’Donnellargued

thatthe“threat”thatthepopularsectormobilizationposedtodominantelites

(especiallycapitalists)wasanimportanttriggerindemocraticbreakdownsinLatin

America(O’Donnell1978a).Webuildarelatedargumentbyclaimingthatactors’

policymoderationorradicalismhasanimportantimpactonthesurvivalor

breakdownofcompetitiveregimes.

Afterfocusingondemocraticbreakdownsearlyinhiscareer,inthe1980s

O’Donnellwroteontransitionstodemocracy,culminatinginthefamousworkhe

wrotewithPhilippeSchmitter(1986).Thisworkemphasizedtheroleofpolitical

elites,theircommitments,andtheirstrategicchoices.Inthe“Introductiontothe

LatinAmericanCases,”intheTransitionsvolume,O’Donnellfirstlaidoutsome

dauntingobstaclestostabledemocracyintheregion.But,andthisisthethird

insightuponwhichwedraw,hethenarguedthat

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Myhopesarerootedinasubtle,butpotentiallypowerful,factor.Itconsists ofthefactthattoday,inmostLatinAmericancountries…therehasemerged anewelement.Largelyasaconsequenceofthepainfullearninginducedby thefailuresofthose(authoritarian)regimesandtheirunprecedented repressionandviolence,mostpoliticalandculturalforcesofanyweightnow attributehighintrinsicvaluetotheachievementandconsolidationof politicaldemocracy.Thisisindeedanovelty.(O’Donnell1986:15) OtherscholarsincludingBerman(1998),Lamounier(1980),Ollier(2009),

andWeffort(1984)havealsosuggestedthatactors’attitudesaboutdemocracyand

dictatorshipareimportantinexplainingdemocraticsurvivalandbreakdown.

BuildingonO’Donnell’sinsightandonrelatedwork,wearguethatwhetheractors

normatively(i.e.,intrinsically)valuedemocracyasapoliticalregimehasan

importantimpactonitsprospectsforsurvival.Wetestthisargumentinanewway.

Inthispaper,weprovideanexplanationforthestabilityorbreakdownof

competitiveregimesfrom1945to2005.1DuringthiserathetwentyLatin

Americancountriescollectivelyexperienced644yearsundercompetitivesystems.

Forsimplicityandtoavoidrepetitionweoccasionallyrefertothosecasesas

“democratic”butourstudyincludessemi‐democraticcasesaswell(weclarifythis

distinctioninthenextsection).These644regime‐yearssuffered26breakdowns.

Ouranalysisexploreswhy(andwhen)competitiveregimesbrokedownor,

conversely,whatfactorsfavoredtheirsurvival.

1Althoughwecoderegimesinatrichotomousmanner,inthispaperwefocusonthebreakdownofcompetitiveregimes(democraciesandsemi‐democracies)intoauthoritarianismratherthanonerosionsfromdemocracytosemi‐democracy.

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ClassifyingPoliticalRegimesinLatinAmerica,1945­2010

WeclassifypoliticalregimesinLatinAmericausingasimpletrichotomous

scalethatwedevelopedwithDanielBrinks(Mainwaringetal.2001,2007):

democratic,semi‐democratic,andauthoritarian.Inthispaper,welumptogether

democraticandsemi‐democraticregimesintoabroadercategoryof“competitive

regimes.”

Ourclassificationofpoliticalregimesbeginswithadefinitionofdemocracy

thatrevolvesaroundfourdimensions.First,theheadofgovernmentandthe

legislaturemustbechosenthroughopenandfaircompetitiveelections.2Elections

mustofferthepossibilityofalternationinpowerevenif,asoccurredfordecadesin

Japan,noactualalternationoccursforanextendedtime.

Second,todaythefranchisemustincludethegreatmajorityoftheadult

population.Thismeanssomethingapproximatinguniversaladultsuffragefor

citizensinthecontemporaryperiod.

Third,democraciesmustprotectpoliticalandcivilrightssuchasfreedomof

thepress,freedomofspeech,freedomtoorganize,therighttohabeascorpus,etc.

Evenifthegovernmentischoseninfreeandfairelectionswithabroadsuffrage,in

theabsenceofaneffectiveguaranteeofcivilandpoliticalrights,itisnotdemocratic

asthatwordisunderstoodinthemodernworld.Aliberalcomponent—the

protectionofindividualliberties—isanecessaryelementofcontemporary

democracy.

2Theelectionoftheheadofgovernmentisindirectinallparliamentarysystemsandinpresidentialsystemsthathaveelectoralcolleges.

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Fourth,theelectedauthoritiesmustexerciserealgoverningpower,as

opposedtoasituationinwhichelectedofficialsareovershadowedbythemilitaryor

byanon‐electedshadowfigure(J.S.Valenzuela1992).Ifelectionsarefreeandfair

butproduceagovernmentthatcannotcontrolmajorpolicyarenasbecausethe

militaryorsomeotherforcedoes,thenthegovernmentisnotademocracy.

Basedonthesefourdimensions,weclassifygovernmentsascompetitive

(democraticorsemi‐democratic)orauthoritarianusingasimpleaggregationrule:

Whengovernmentscommitnosignificantviolationsofanyofthefourcriteria,we

codethemasdemocratic.Iftheyincurinpartialbutnotflagrantviolationstoanyof

thoseprincipleswetreatthemassemi‐democratic.Theyrankasauthoritarianif

theypresentoneormoreflagrantviolationsofthoseprinciples.Inotherterms,we

employtheminimumscoreofthefourdimensionstodeterminetheoveralllevelof

democracy(full,partial,ornone).

WavesofDemocratizationinLatinAmerica,1945­2010

Usingthisclassificationofpoliticalregimes,Figure1showstheevolutionof

democratizationinLatinAmericasince1945.Thefiguredocumentsanabrupt

declineinthenumberofcompetitiveregimesinthemid‐1960s,whichpartly

motivatedO’Donnell’searlyworkonbureaucratic‐authoritarianism,andthe

extraordinarysurgeinthenumberofcompetitiveregimesafter1978,which

motivatedhisworkontransitionsfromauthoritarianrule.

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Figure1.EvolutionofPoliticalRegimesinLatinAmerica,1945‐2010

Animportanttransformationunderpinsthehistoricalcyclesdepictedin

Figure1.Competitiveregimeswerebrittleuntil1978buttheybecameresilient

afterwards.AvastmajorityofLatinAmericancountriesexperiencedatleastone

periodofdemocracyorsemi‐democracybeforethe1970sbutmanysuchregimes

collapsedshortlyaftertheirestablishment.Startingin1978,however,thenewly

establisheddemocraciessurvivedimportantchallengesandthecumulativenumber

ofcompetitiveregimesincreasedasnewtransitionstookplace.By2005,the

cumulativetrendhadstabilized,andeighteenofthetwentycountriesintheregion

enjoyedcompetitivepolitics.Thistransformationoccurredprimarilybecausethe

breakdownrateofcompetitiveregimes(i.e.,thenumberofbreakdownsdividedby

thenumberofyearsofcompetitive)plummetedfrom9.3%in1945‐77to0.8%in

1978‐2005(thethirdwaveofdemocratization).

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Class,Modernization,andStrategicContingentActionApproachestothe

SurvivalandBreakdownofCompetitiveRegimes

Inthissection,asawayofhighlightingwhatisdistinctiveinouranalysis,we

brieflyoutlineclass,modernization,andstrategiccontingentactionapproachesto

understandingthesurvivalandbreakdownofcompetitiveregimesandsignalhow

webuildonanddivergefromtheseapproaches.Inourapproach,democracies

breakdownwhenpowerfulactorsmobilizeagainstthemandoverpowerthe

regime’ssupporters.Theysurvivewhentheconstellationofforcesthatsupport

democracyismorepowerfulthanthosethatmobilizeagainstthem.

Althoughclassapproaches,strategicactorapproaches,andourapproachto

politicalregimesagreeonthisbroadformulationaboutwhydemocraciessurviveor

breakdown,inotherwaystheydiverge.Classapproachesassumeatight

relationshipbetweenactors’structuralpositionandtheirpreferenceaboutthe

politicalregime.Inthisperspective,someclassesstronglytendtobepro‐

democratic;othersstronglytendtobepro‐authoritarian.

Forexample,Boix(2003)positedthatwhendemocracyisfeasible,the

workingclasswillalwayspreferitbecausedemocracydistributesincometothe

poor.Conversely,whenastableauthoritarianregimeisfeasible,thewealthywill

alwayspreferit,exceptperhapsunderconditionsofhighcapitalmobility,which

attenuatesthecosttothewealthyoftoleratingdemocracy.Likewise,Rueschemeyer,

Stephens,andStephens(1992)arguedthattheworkingclassconsistentlyprefers

democracyandthedominantclassesopposeit,againbasedontheassumptionthat

democracydistributesincometothepoor.

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Incontrast,strategicactorapproachessuchasLinz(1978b)andO’Donnell

andSchmitter(1986),andours,whichbuildsonthestrategicactorapproaches,

assumethatclasspositionhasaweakerinfluenceonwhetheractorssupport

democracyorauthoritarianism.Tothelimitedextenttowhichsocialclasses

overcomecollectiveactionproblemsandconstitutecoherentactors,theirdecisions

tosupportdemocracyordictatorshiparehistoricallycontingent(Bellin2000;R.

Collier1999).Specificsocialclassesdonotalwayspreferdemocracyor

dictatorship,butrathersupportaregimeoritsalternativedependingonthe

advantagesanddisadvantagestheregimeoffersatagivenmomentinhistory.For

example,incontrasttothepredictionofclassapproachestodemocracy,the

ArgentineunionmovementsupportedtheauthoritarianregimeofJuanPerón

(1946‐55)becauseofthematerial,organizational,andsymbolic/culturalbenefits

PerónbestowedonArgentineworkers.Until1983,theArgentinelabormovement

opposedrightwingdictatorshipsbutworkedtounderminesemi‐democratic

regimesnotassociatedwithPerónandeveninitiallyembracedthemilitary

dictatorshipofJuanCarlosOnganía,whichoverthrewthesemi‐democraticregime

headedbyArturoIllia(1963‐66).

Anytheorythatinfersactors’preferencesaboutthepoliticalregimefrom

theirclassposition(e.g.,aslocallandowners,transnationalcapitalists,orindustrial

workers)reducesimportantempiricalquestions—if,how,andtowhatextent

structuralforcesdriveactors’orientationstowardsdemocracy—toaconvenientbut

oftenmisleadingtheoreticalassumption.Classapproachesneglecttheformationof

actors’regimepreferencesinagivenhistoricalcontext.

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Ourtheoreticalapproachalsostandsincontrasttomodernizationtheory,

whichwasfamouslyformulatedbyLipset(1959,1960:27‐63).Modernization

theoryclaimsthatmoreeconomicallydevelopedcountriesaremorelikelytobe

democratic.Manyauthorshavedemonstratedthathigherlevelsofdevelopmentare

stronglyassociatedwithagreaterlikelihoodofdemocracy.Recentworkhasalso

convincinglydemonstratedthatthelikelihoodofdemocraticbreakdowns

diminishesathigherpercapitaincome(Epsteinetal.2006;Przeworskietal.2000).

However,theseeminglyrobustassociationbetweenincomeanddemocracydoes

notholdforLatinAmericaforthelengthyperiodfrom1945until2005.As

O’Donnell(1973)noted,thelevelofdevelopmentdoesnotpredictsurvivalorbreak

downofcompetitiveregimesforLatinAmerica(seealsoMainwaringandPérez‐

Liñán2005).Duringthisperiod,competitiveregimeswereasvulnerableto

breakdownatahigherlevelofdevelopmentasatlowerlevels.Competitivepolitical

regimeshaveoftensurvivedatrelativelylowlevelsofdevelopment,andasthe

experienceofLatinAmericasince1978shows,theyhavealsooftensurviveddespite

highinequality.

Wedonotclaimthatmodernizationtheoryisempiricallywrongingeneral,

butratherthattherelationshipbetweenthelevelofdevelopmentanddemocracyis

farfromdeterminateuntilahighlevelofdevelopmentmakesbreakdowns

extremelyunlikely.Modernizationtheorytypicallyneglectstheroleofconcrete

historicalactorsinfavorofmacrolevelquantitativeworkontheimpactofthelevel

ofdevelopmentonthepoliticalregime;mostvariantsofmodernizationtheoryare

actorless.Thefactthatthefindingsofmodernizationtheoryhavenotheldupfor

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LatinAmericaraisesquestionsaboutwhythisisthecase.Onefruitfulwayof

addressingthisquestionistolookatthepoliticalactorsthatendeavortoestablish,

preserve,oroverthrowdemocracy.

Ifweacceptthepremisethatpoliticalactorsdeterminewhetherregimes

surviveorfall,thenitnecessarilyfollowsthatstructuralfactorsincludingthelevel

ofdevelopmentdonotoperatedirectlyonthestabilityofcompetitiveregimes.

Structuralfactorsmayinsteadinfluencetheformationofpoliticalactorsandthe

preferencesandstrategicchoicesofthesepoliticalactors.

Ourunderstandingofthebreakdownorsurvivalofcompetitiveregimes

drawsoncontingentactionapproachessuchasLinz(1978b),O’Donnelland

Schmitter(1986),andPrzeworski(1986,1991).Liketheseearlierscholars,we

emphasizethestrategicinteractionsamongdifferentactors.However,our

approachdiffersintwowaysinrelationtothesecontingentactionapproaches.

First,theseworksfocusedontheregimecoalitionsthatsupportedoropposedthe

incumbentdemocracyordictatorshipwithoutanalyzingtheactorsthat

underpinnedthoseregimecoalitions.Incontrast,specifichistoricactorssuch

presidentsandorganizationssuchaspoliticalparties,laborunions,owners’

associations,andthemilitaryformthecoreofourapproach.These(mainly

organizational)actorsunderpintheregimecoalitions.Thisisadifferenceinthe

unitofanalysis,notatheoreticalconflict.

Second,O’DonnellandSchmitterunderscoredtheindeterminatenatureof

actors’regimepreferencesinsituationsofhighuncertainty.Ourperspectivesits

betweentheirsandthatofBerman(1998),whoarguedthatorganizationalinterests

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andidentities(andinherlexicon,theirprogrammaticpreferences),andtherefore

howpartiespositionthemselvesinbattlesoverpoliticalregimes,tendtobevery

stableovertime.WeshareBerman’sviewthateveninmomentsoffluxandhigh

uncertainty,actors’identities—inouranalysis,specificallytheirpolicyradicalism

andtheirnormativeattitudesaboutthepoliticalregime—shapetheirbehavior.In

otherwords,weemphasizetheconstrainingeffectsoforganizationalactorsand

institutions.However,weshareO’DonnellandSchmitter’sviewthatatmomentsof

deepcrisisandpossibleregimechange,actors’positionsareconsiderablymore

subjecttochangethanisordinarilythecase.Wealsostronglysharetheirview

perspectivethatleadershaverealchoicesthatsometimesdeterminewhether

politicalregimessurviveorfallandthatoutcomesareindeterminate(seealsoLinz

1978bandStepan1978).

Insum,wedonotdenytheroleofstructuralforces(thelevelofeconomic

development,patternsofdependence,classstructures,socialinequality)inthe

constitutionofpoliticalregimes.Buttheeffectofsuchvariablesiscontingentand

diffuse;itultimatelymanifestsitselfintheorganizationofpoliticalactors,inthe

relativedistributionoftheirpoliticalresources,andinthenormativeregime

preferencesandpolicymoderation/radicalismoftheseactors.Anyexplanationof

democraticstabilitythatomitsanindependentassessmentofpoliticalactors’values

andorientationsmayoverestimatetherelevanceofstructuralforcessuchasthe

levelofeconomicdevelopmentorincomeinequality.

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Actors’PolicyRadicalismandNormativePreferencesforDemocracy

Becausethesurvivalorbreakdownofdemocraciesdependsonconcrete

historicalactors,wefocusonhowactors’preferencesandattitudesaffectregime

survival.Incontrasttostructuraltheories,wearguethattwoproximatecauses

affectwhethercompetitiveregimesremaininpowerorfall:whetheractorshave

radicalpolicypreferencesandwhethertheyhaveanormativepreferencefor

democracy.

Actorsdeveloppolicypreferencesthatrunfrommoderatetoradical.Some

actorsalsodevelopwhatwecallanormativepreferencefordemocracy.Policy

radicalismandnormativepreferencesaboutthepoliticalregimearekey,reasonably

specific,andmeasurablecomponentsofactors’politicalidentities.Actorsform

thesepolicypreferencesandtheirnormativepreferencesabouttheregimeinan

interactivehistoricalcontext.Thesepreferencesarenothistoricallyfixed,butas

Berman(1998)argued,theyusuallytendtobefairlystable.

Actorsareradicalwhentheirpolicygoalsarelocatedtowardonepoleofthe

policyspectrum(e.g.,towardtheleftorrightifthepolicyspaceisone‐dimensional)

andtheyexpressanurgencytoachievethosegoals(incountrieswheretheydonot

representthestatusquo)oranintransigentdefenseofthesepositions(wherethese

positionsrepresentthestatusquo).Asdefinedhere,radicalpolicypreferences

neednotbeontheextremeleftorextremeright,buttheymustbefarenoughfrom

thepreferencesofotherrelevantactorstocreatepolarization.Theyareintense

preferences;radicalactorsareunwillingtobargainortowaitinordertoachieve

theirpolicygoals.

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Wehypothesizethatthepresenceofpowerfulradicalactorswillmakeit

moredifficulttosustaincompetitiveregimes.Thelevelofradicalizationandthe

poweroftheradicalplayersaffecthowthreatenedentrenchedactorsfeelbythe

establishmentormaintenanceofdemocraticpolitics.Toprotecttheirinterestsin

casesofconsiderableradicalization,eitheronthepartofthegovernmentandits

alliesorofoppositionactors,somepowerfulactorsaremorelikelytotrytosubvert

acompetitiveregimeorblockitsemergence.

Thisargumentalsoappliestothegovernmentitself.Whereactorsfearthata

competitiveregimecanleadtotheirdestructionortomajorlossesbecausethe

governmenthasaradicalagenda—whetherthisagendaistransformativeor

reactionary—thecostsoftoleratingtheexistingregimeincrease.Theseactors’

willingnesstoabidebydemocraticrulesofthegameislikelytodiminish,andthe

regime’slikelihoodofsurvivaldecreases.Conversely,wheremostpowerfulactors

believethatacompetitiveregimeisunlikelytoimposemajorpermanentlosses,

theyarefarmorelikelytoacceptdemocraticpolitics.Whereuncertaintyaboutthe

consequencesofcompetitiveregimesisgreatandtheperceivedcostsofplaying

competitivepoliticsmightbehighbecauseofradicalactors,thelikelihoodthatsuch

regimescansurvivediminishes(Bermeo1997;Figueiredo1993;Levine1973).

Anormativepreferencefordemocracymeansthatanactorvaluesdemocracy

intrinsically,i.e.,aboveanypolicyoutcomes.Theactorhasanideological

commitmenttodemocracyasthebestkindofpoliticalregime.Itisexpressedinthe

willingnessofpoliticalactorstoincurpolicycostsinordertodefendthecompetitive

regime.Manyscholarshaveclaimedthatdemocracyhasintrinsicvalue(Dahl1971:

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17‐32;Dahl1989;Lamounier1981;Przeworski1999;O’Donnell2010;Weffort

1984,1989).Ifscholarsbelievethatdemocracyhasinherentvalue,politicalleaders

andotheractorscanalsovaluedemocracyonintrinsicgrounds.Anormative

preferencefordemocracyisdifferentfromsituationaloropportunisticbehaviorin

whichanactor’ssupportfortheregimeiscontingentonpolicyresults.

Whencandidatesacknowledgetheirdefeatinanelectioninsteadof

challengingtheadverseresults,theysignalcommitmenttotheprinciplesofthe

democraticregime.Whengovernmentleadersacceptacongressionaldefeatonan

importantissue,eveniftheycouldmanipulateproceduralrulestoimposetheir

preferredlegislation,theysignalcommitmenttoexistingprocedures.Thesesignals

arecredibletoothersbecausetheyarecostly.Suchbehaviorsareconsistentwith

whatMaxWebercalled“valuerationality.”

Wehypothesizethatastrongnormativepreferencefordemocracyamong

politicalforceswillmakecompetitiveregimesmoreresilient.Strongnormative

preferencesfordemocracylimithowactorspursuetheirpolicygoals.Ifactorsvalue

theregimeonintrinsicgrounds,theyaremorewillingtoendurepoliciesthathurt

theirinterestsbecausetheyperceivethemaslegitimatebindingdecisions.

Conversely,theymaybewillingtorejectbeneficialpoliciesbecausetheyarenot

adoptedbyalegitimateregime.

Ouremphasisonactors’normativeattitudestowarddemocracydrawson

multipletraditionsinpoliticalscienceandsociology.Lipset(1959)underscoredthe

importanceoflegitimacyforthesurvivalofdemocracy.Linz’s(1978a,1978b)

distinctionsbetweentheloyal,semi‐loyal,anddisloyaloppositionsrevolvearound

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differencesinattitudestowardtheregime.Inhiswork,thesedifferencesin

attitudestowardtheregimehaveanimportantimpactonactors’behaviorand

thereforeonregimedynamicsandoutcomes.Severalotherworkshavealso

underscoredtheeffectofactors’attitudestowarddemocracyanddictatorshipon

regimeoutcomes(Berman1998;Dahl1971:124‐188;O’Donnell1986:15‐18;Ollier

2009;Stepan1971:153‐187;Walker1990;Weffort1984).

Althoughmanyworkshavestakedaclaimabouttheimportanceofactors’

normativeregimepreferences,empiricallydemonstratingthispointisdifficultfora

largesetofcountriesoveralongperiodoftime.Nopreviousquantitativeanalysis

hasundertakensuchanendeavorbecauseofproblemsofconceptualization,

measurement,datagathering,andendogeneity.

CodingRadicalismandPreferencesforDemocracy

Oneofthecriticalchallengeswefacedintestingourhypotheseswasdata

collectionandmeasurement.Fromtheoutset,itwasclearthatweneededa

combinationofquantitativetestingtoexaminethegeneralizabilityofargumentsfor

twentycountriesoveralongperiodoftimeandofqualitativecasestudiestoprobe

thecausalmechanismsinadeeperway.Thechallengeforthequantitativework

wasfiguringoutawaytodeterminethemostimportantactorsinthetwenty

countriesandcodetheirpolicyradicalismandtheirnormativeregimepreferences.

Weengagedateamofnineteenresearchassistantstodothiswork.They

undertookextensiveresearchtopreparelengthycountryreportsthatfollowed

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detailedcodingrules.3Theresearchteamidentifiedmajorbooksandarticles

dealingwiththepoliticalhistoryofthecountry,andthereportsdescribedthemain

politicalactorsduringeachpresidentialadministrationbetween1944and2010.

Oneresearcher(occasionallytwoorthree)coveredeachofthetwentycountries

understudy(someresearcherscodedmorethanonecountry).Thereports

identifiedaparsimonioussetofactors(usually3to7peradministration)thatwere

mostprominentinthehistoriographyofeachperiod.Actorswereincludedinthe

listiftheywereindividuals,organizations,ormovementsthatcontrolledenough

politicalresourcestoexercisestronginfluenceinthecompetitionforpower.

Together,thereportsdiscussed1,459politicalactorsforover290administrations.

Thepresidentwasalmostalwaysidentifiedasapowerfulactor(withtheexception

ofafewpuppetpresidents).Politicalparties,tradeunions,businessassociations,

themilitary,mediaorganizations,andsocialmovementswerealsocommonly

amongthemostimportantactors.

Researchersfolloweddetailedcodingrulestodetectinstancesofradicalism

andnormativepreferencesfordemocracy.Thisteamdidnotcodethetrichotomous

regimescaletoavoidcontaminationbetweenthecodingofthedependentandthe

independentvariablesinourstudy.

Theresearcherscodedpoliticalactorsasradicalwhentheymetanyofthe

followingconditions:(1)theactorexpressedanuncompromisingpreferenceto

achieveleftistorrightistpolicypositionsintheshortrunortopreserveextreme

3Thereportswereonaverage83singlespacedpages,andthemeannumberofreferencesusedtogeneratethereportwas46.

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positionswheretheywerealreadyinplace;or(2)expressedwillingnesstosubvert

thelawinordertoachievesomepolicygoals.Thegovernmentwasalsocodedas

radicalif(3)itimplementedpolarizingpoliciesthatdeliberatelyimposed

substantialcoststootheractors(e.g.,expropriationswithoutcompensation;labor‐

repressiveregulationstoincreaselaborsupply).Non‐governmentalactorswere

codedasradicalif(4)theyundertookviolentactsaimedatimposingorpreventing

significantpolicychange.Ifactorsweredividedorambiguousaboutthose

positions,theywerecodedas“somewhat”radical;otherwisetheywerecodedasnot

radical.

Mostpoliticalactorspaylipservicetodemocracy,sotheresearchteam

primarilydocumentedtheabsenceofanormativepreferencefordemocracy.Actors

werecodedasnotholdingapreferencefordemocracyiftheydisplayedatleastone

ofthefollowingcharacteristics:(1)expressedambivalenceorquestioned

“bourgeois”,“liberal”,or“formal”democracy;(2)expressedhostilitytoward

democraticinstitutions(parties,legislatures,courts,electoralbodies)insteadof

challengingtheirdecisions;(3)questionedthevalidityofdemocraticprocedures

whentheyproducedunfavorableresults;(4)claimedtobethesolerepresentatives

ofthepeople;(5)questionedthelegitimacyofanyoppositionoutsidean

encompassingnationalmovement;or(6)consistentlydismissedpeaceful

opponentsasenemiesofthepeopleorthecountry.

Governmentofficialswerealsocodedaslackinganormativepreferencefor

democracywhenthey(7)introducedprogramsofpartisanindoctrinationintothe

publicschoolsystemorthemilitary,andwhenthey(8)manipulatedinstitutional

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rulesfrequentlyinordertogainpoliticaladvantage.Non‐governmentalactorswere

treatedaslackingstrongpreferencesfordemocracywhenthey(9)expressed

willingnesstosubverttheconstitution;or(10)acceptedtheuseoffraud,political

exclusions,orviolenceforpoliticalpurposes.

Politicalactorswerecodedashavingastrongnormativepreferencefor

democracyiftheydidnotmanifestanyofthetenhostileorientations;as"fairly

strongbutnotentirelyconsistent”intheirnormativesupportiftheyexhibited

ambiguityinanyofthesetenindicators;andaslackinganormativepreferencefor

democracyiftheydecisivelymetanyofthecriteria.

Theserulesprovidedacommonprotocoltogeneratecomparable

informationfortwentycountriesoveralonghistoricalperiod.Theyareconstructed

sothatthecodingofbothvariablesisconceptuallyindependentofthecodingforthe

politicalregime;actors’positionsonpolicyradicalismandnormativepreferencefor

democracydonotintrinsicallyaffectaregime’sclassification.Theyarealso

intendedtoscreenoutinstrumental,insinceredeploymentofdemocraticdiscourse.

Thecodingrulesarebasedonbehaviorsanddiscoursethatareobservableand

documentableratherthanstrictlysubjectiveevaluations.Theindicatorsusedto

coderadicalismandnormativepreferencesfordemocracydonoteliminatetheneed

forhistoricaljudgmentsaboutactors’preferences,buttheyputthejudgmentsona

firmerground.

Weaggregatedtheinformationinasimpleway.Actorsweregivenascoreof

1(radical),0.5(somewhatradical),and0(notradical);andof1(aconsistentand

strongnormativepreferencefordemocracy),0.5(afairlystrongbutnotentirely

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consistentpreference),and0(inconsistent,ambivalent,orhostileviewsabout

liberaldemocracyonintrinsicgrounds).Wethenestimatedtheaveragevalueof

bothofthevariablesforeverycountry‐year.Thus,ourvariableradicalismcanbe

roughlyinterpretedastheproportionofpowerfulpoliticalactorswithradicalpolicy

preferences,andourvariablenormativepreferencefordemocracycanberoughly

interpretedastheproportionofactorswithanormativecommitmenttodemocracy

ineachcountrybetween1945and2010.

Figure2depictsthehistoricalevolutionofthemeansforthetwovariables

fortheLatinAmericancountries.Thetoppanelsummarizesthescoresforcountry‐

yearsundercompetitiveregimes(thefocusofthispaper).Thebottompanel,

presentedforcomparison,summarizestheinformationforauthoritariancases.

Amongcompetitiveregimes,radicalismshowedasustained—althoughbynomeans

monotonic—declineduringthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.Bycontrast,

normativesupportfordemocracytendedtoincreaseovertime.Thegapbetween

thetwoseriesstabilizedbythemid‐2000s.Noequivalenttrendisvisibleamongthe

authoritariancases.

20

Figure2.EvolutionofRadicalismandNormativeSupportforDemocracy,1945‐2010

AcarefulreadingofthetoppanelinFigure2hintsattherelevanceofpolicy

radicalismandnormativeregimepreferencesfordemocraticsurvival.In1977,

seventeenofthetwentycountriesinLatinAmericahaddictatorships;only

Colombia,CostaRica,andVenezuelaenjoyedcompetitiveregimes.Aroundthis

pointintime,theseriesforthecompetitiveregimesdisplaysthelowestlevelsof

radicalismandthehighestlevelsofnormativedemocraticcommitmentforthe

wholeperiod.Thispatternsuggeststhatinahostileinternationalenvironment,

21

competitiveregimessurvivedonlyincountrieswherepoliticalactorswere

consistentlymoderateandweddedtoademocraticimaginary.

ComparisonofthetwopanelsinFigure2alsounderscoresanimportantself‐

reinforcingmechanism.Powerfulactorsincompetitiveregimesdisplayonaverage

lowerlevelsofradicalismandhigherlevelsofnormativepreferencefordemocracy

thanactorsinauthoritariansystems.Thisdifferenceishardlysurprising,notonly

becauseoftheselectioneffectsdescribedinthepreviousparagraph,butalso

becausepoliticalregimesemploystatecapacitytoprotecttheirvaluesandsuppress

potentialthreats.Whileauthoritariansystemsmaysimplyrepressmostformsof

dissent,competitiveregimesmayregulatetheactivitiesofradicalgroupsandinvest

significantresourcesinpoliciesintendedtopromotedemocraticvalues.Asaresult,

thenatureoftheincumbentregimeoftenreinforcestheorientationofdominant

politicalactors.

AlternativeExplanationsofDemocraticSurvivalandBreakdown

Theoriesofdemocraticstabilityandbreakdownhaveaddressedalarge

numberofalternativeexplanations.Accordingly,inadditiontoourmain

independentvariables,weconsiderthreetheoreticalclustersofexplanatory

variables:structuralfactors(economicdevelopment,classstructures,dependence

onprimaryexports)andeconomicperformance,institutionaldesign(partysystem

fragmentation,presidentialpowers),andinternationalconditions(thelevelof

democracyintherestoftheregion,USpoliciestowardsLatinAmerica).

22

LevelofDevelopment.Oneofthemostconsistentfindingsinthe

democratizationliteraturehasbeenthatthelevelofmodernizationhasamajor

impactonthelikelihoodofdemocracy(Diamond1992;Lipset1959;Przeworskiet

al.2000;Rueschemeyer,Stephens,andStephens1992).Inthispaper,we

emphasizeanargumentmadebyO’DonnellinModernizationandAuthoritarianism

(1973):modernizationdoesnotnecessarilyincreasethelikelihoodthatcompetitive

politicalregimeswillsurvive(seealsoLipset,SeongandTorres1993;Mainwaring

andPérez‐Liñán2003).WemeasurethelevelofdevelopmentusingpercapitaGDP

inthousandsof2000USdollars(basedonWorldDevelopmentIndicatorsandPenn

WorldTables)andemployaquadraticspecificationtocapturenon‐lineareffects.

ClassStructure.Diamond(1992),Lipset(1959),Moore(1966),and

Rueschemeyeretal.(1992),amongothers,seetheprospectsfordemocracyas

restingsignificantlyonthenatureoftheclassstructure.Rueschemeyeretal.argued

that“(C)apitalistdevelopmentisassociatedwithdemocracybecauseittransforms

theclassstructure,strengtheningtheworkingandmiddleclassesandweakening

thelandedupperclass”(p.7).Weusethepercentageoflaborforcein

manufacturingasagrossindicatorofthenumericalleverageoftheworkingclass.

ThesizeofdifferentclassesshouldberelevanttotestingRueschemeyeretal.’s

arguments;indeed,theyexplicitlyarguedthatclasssizeisanimportant

determinantofdemocracy(p.59).

ResourceDependence.Becauseseveralscholarshavearguedthat

countriesthatdependonnaturalresourcessuchasoilarelikelytoexperience

viciouscyclesdetrimentaltodemocracy(Karl1997;Ross2001),weincludea

23

dichotomousmeasureofnaturalresourcedependence,codedas1ifexportsofoil

andmineralstypicallyrepresentedmorethan10percentofthegrossnational

income—inBolivia,Chile,andVenezueladuring1945‐2005,andinEcuadorsince

1973(computedfromtheWorldDevelopmentIndicators).

EconomicPerformance.Severalscholars(Diamond1999:77‐93;Diamond

andLinz1989:44‐46;Gasiorowski1995;Geddes1999;HaggardandKaufman

1995;Lipsetetal.1993;Przeworskietal.2000)havearguedthatcompetitive

regimesaremorelikelytobreakdowniftheireconomicperformanceispoor.We

usedchangeinpercapitaincome(i.e.,therateofeconomicgrowth,basedonour

percapitaGDPfigures)toassessoveralleconomicperformance.

PartySystemFragmentation.Anextensiveliteraturehasemphasizedthe

roleofinstitutionaldesignincreatingstableconditionsfordemocracy.Onesuch

argumenthascenteredonthenatureofpresidentialregimes.Linz(1994),

Mainwaring(1993),andStepanandSkach(1994)arguedthatpresidentialregimes

withfragmentedpartysystemsaremorepronetobreakdown.Theyclaimedthat

whenpresidentshadminoritysupportincongress,impassesbetweenthepresident

andcongressweremorecommon,sometimesleadingtodemocraticbreakdown.

Cheibub(2002)challengedthisanalysis,arguingthatthereisnosignificant

relationshipbetweenpartysystemfragmentationanddemocraticsurvivalin

presidentialsystems.Thedebateabouttheimpactofpartysystemfragmentationon

democraticstabilityinpresidentialregimesisnotrelevantforexplainingtransitions

fromauthoritarianism,butitmighthelpexplainthestabilityofdemocraticand

semi‐democraticregimes.Wecreatedadichotomousvariablecodedas1ifthe

24

effectivenumberofpartiesinthelower(oronly)chamberwasequalorgreaterthan

3.0inagivenyear.4Weemployadichotomousindicatorfortheoreticalreasonsand

becauseofmissingdataontheprecisenumberofpartiesforEcuadorinthe1950s

andPeruinthemid‐1940s.

PresidentialPowers.ShugartandCarey(1992)arguedthat

presidentialismfunctionsmoreeffectivelywithweakerconstitutionalpresidential

powers.Ahighconcentrationofpowerinpresidentialhandsencouragesthe

ExecutiveBranchtoby‐passCongressandpromotesinstitutionaltensionsinthe

regime.Inordertoassessthisargument,weemployShugartandCarey’s(1992)

measureofpresidentialpowers.

RegionalPoliticalEnvironment.Untilthe1990s,researchonpolitical

regimesfocusedheavilyondomesticfactors(foranexception,seeWhitehead

1986).Sincethe1990s,however,scholarshavepaidmoreattentiontointernational

factorsinregimechangeandstability(Brown2000;Gleditsch2002;Levitskyand

Way2010;Pevehouse2005;Whitehead1986,1996).Afavorableinternational

environmentmightenhancechancesfordemocracy,whileanunpropitious

environmentmightworkagainstdemocracy.Toexplorethispossibility,we

includedavariable(Region)toassesstheimpactofLatinAmerica’sregional

politicalcontextonthelikelihoodofregimedurabilityandchange.Wemeasuredthe

regionalpoliticalenvironmentastheproportionofdemocraticcountriesinthe

regioneveryyear,excludingthecountryinquestion.Thecodingforthis

4Theformulafortheeffectivenumberofpartiesis1/sum(p2),wherepistheproportionofseatsobtainedbyeachparty(LaaksoandTaagepera1979).

25

independentvariablewasbasedonourtrichotomousmeasureofdemocracy(with

semi‐democraticcountriescountingashalf).Thevaluescantheoreticallyrange

fromzero,ifnoneoftheother19countriesintheregionweredemocraticinagiven

year,to1iftheother19countriesweredemocraticinthatyear.

USForeignPolicy.AsahegemonicpowerintheAmericas,theUScanaffect

thelikelihoodoftransitionstocompetitiveregimesandofregimebreakdowns.We

createdacontinuousscaletoassesstheorientationofUSadministrationstowards

democracyinLatinAmerica.Usinghistoricalsources,weansweredeight

dichotomousquestionsaboutUSpolicymakers.Fourcapturedpoliciesand

attitudesharmfultodemocracy,5whilefourothersaddressedbehaviorsintendedto

supportdemocracyinLatinAmerica.6Thefirstsetofquestionswascoded‐1when

theanswerwasaffirmative,andthesecondsetwascoded+1whentheanswerwas

affirmative.Theresultingscoresforeachadministration(from‐4to4)werere‐

scaledtocreateacontinuousindexcalledUSPolicy,rangingbetween0and1(where

1indicatesmaximumsupportfordemocracy).

5WhetherUSleaders(1)supportedcoupsorarmedrebellionsagainstcompetitiveregimes;(2)limitedthesovereignty(andhencedemocracy)ofLatinAmericancountriesthroughmilitaryinterventions;(3)clearlysupportedauthoritarianregimes;or(4)expressedtheviewthatLatinAmericancountriescouldnotbedemocraciesbecauseofculturaldispositions.6WhetherUSleaders:(1)expressedapreferencefordemocracyevenwhenthereweretradeoffswithUSeconomicorsecurityinterests;(2)promotedthedemocratizationofauthoritarianregimesormadeeffortstobolsterdemocraciesunderthreat;(3)criticizedauthoritarianregimesthatwerenotleftist;and(4)practicedapolicyofnon‐recognitionwhenamilitarycoupoverthrewacompetitiveregime.

26

EstimationandResults

Weestimatedtheriskofdemocraticbreakdownusingadiscrete‐time

survivalmodel.Thedependentvariableisadichotomousindicatorcodedas1for

yearsifthecompetitiveregimebrokedownandwasreplacedbyanauthoritarian

systemand0ifitsurvivedthatyear.Accordingly,apositivecoefficientinthe

regressionresultssignalsagreaterlikelihoodthatacompetitiveregimewould

breakdowngivenahighervalueforagivenindependentvariable.Inadditionto

ourmainindependentvariables,RadicalismandPreferencefordemocracy,the

equationincludeseightpredictorsreflectingthethreeclustersofvariables

describedintheprevioussection(structuralfactorsandeconomicperformance,

institutionaldesign,andinternationalpoliticalconditions).

FollowingCarterandSignorino(2010)wealsocontrolledforduration‐

dependenceusingacubictransformationoftheregime’sage(measuredinyears).

Thisfactorisrelevantforeconometricaswellasforsubstantivereasons.Rustow

(1970)arguedthatfollowingaregimetransition,the“habituation”phaseiscritical

toestablishthelong‐termsurvivaloftheregime.Thecubictransformationofage

allowsustoassesswhetherthehazardratefordemocracieschangesovertimeand

whethertheytruly“consolidate”inthelongrun.

27

Table1.SurvivalModelsforCompetitiveRegimes,1945‐2005

Model1.1 Model1.2 Estimate (s.e.) Estimate (s.e.)Radicalism 3.047 * (1.140)PreferenceforDemocracy ‐3.686 * (1.534)PercapitaGDP(t‐1) ‐1.071 (0.568) ‐0.043 (0.670)PercapitaGDP^2 0.133 (0.078) 0.040 (0.091)Growth,t‐1 4.990 (6.203) 2.663 (6.185)Industriallaborforce,t‐1 ‐0.011 (0.035) 0.026 (0.039)Oilandmineralexports ‐0.673 (0.676) ‐0.884 (0.669)Multipartism,t 0.102 (0.462) ‐0.325 (0.519)Presidentialpowers ‐0.216 * (0.074) ‐0.228 * (0.090)Region,t‐1 ‐4.307 * (1.502) ‐4.901 * (1.929)USpolicy,t ‐0.795 (0.768) ‐0.256 (0.865)Ageoftheregime 0.049 (0.127) 0.328 * (0.158)Ageofregime^2 ‐0.002 (0.007) ‐0.015 (0.009)Ageofregime^3 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)Constant 3.667 * (1.801) ‐0.055 (2.279)N(regime‐years) 644 644 Pseudo‐R 0.16 0.31 Entriesarelogisticregressioncoefficients(*significantatthe.05level).

Table1presentslogisticregressionsurvivalestimates.Model1.1isprovided

forreference,anditexcludesourmainindependentvariablessothatwecanverify

whetherstructuralandeconomicperformancevariablesaffectdemocraticsurvival

beforeweaddthevariablesforradicalismandnormativepreferencefordemocracy.

Onlytwocontrolvariablespresentsignificanteffects:amoredemocraticregional

environmentconsiderablyreducestheriskofdemocraticbreakdown,while—

againsttheoreticalexpectations—greaterpresidentialpowersalsotendtoreduce

28

theriskofinstability.7ConsistentwithO’Donnell’sModernizationandBureaucratic

Authoritarianism,percapitaincomehadnoimpactonthesurvivalprospectsof

competitiveregimesinLatinAmericafrom1945to2005.Noneoftheother

structuralvariableshasadirectimpactondemocraticsurvival.Multipartismand

USPolicyexerciseinfluenceintheexpecteddirection,buttheircoefficientsarealso

statisticallyinsignificant.Therateofeconomicgrowthdidnotaffectthelikelihood

ofregimesurvival;manycompetitiveregimessurvivedinthethirdwavedespite

abysmaleconomicperformance,andbefore1978,somebrokedowndespite

respectableeconomicperformance.

ThesefindingsremainconsistentinModel1.2,whichincludesourmeasures

ofradicalismandnormativepreferencesfordemocracy.FourresultsinModel1.2

deservecomment.First,actors’policyradicalismhasabigimpactonthecapacity

ofcompetitiveregimestosurvive.Radicalactorsraisethestakeofcompetitive

politics.Ifradicalactorswinstatepower,theycanimposeveryhighcostsonother

actors,makingittemptingfortheloserstoresorttocoupsasawayofpreventing

majorandextremelydifficult‐to‐reversecosts.Forexample,theradicalpoliciesof

SalvadorAllende’sgovernmentinChile(1970‐73)andofthefarleftpushedthe

dominantfactionoftheChristianDemocrats,theConservatives,andthemilitary

towardsupportingthe1973coup.Theyfearedthattheconsequencesofallowing

7Atleastinpart,thisresultmaybeanartifactofhistoricaltiming:trendsinconstitutionallawdroveconstitution‐makerstowritemoreexplicitpowersfortheexecutivebranchinrecentdecades.Thus,therewasacoincidencebetweenthewaveofdemocratizationandthepowersofthepresidentestablishedinthenewcharters.

29

thePopularUnitygovernmenttoremaininpowermightbedisastrous.8Although

thisspecificexampleinvokesthefearthatleftistradicalismcreatedduringthe

heightoftheColdWar,thesamelogicappliestorightistradicalism.Conversely,the

SocialistParty’smoderationafterthereestablishmentofdemocracyin1990madeit

easierforthedemocraticregimetosurvive.

ThisfindingisconsistentwithO’Donnell’swork(1973)onthelevelofthreat

asanimpetustodemocraticbreakdowns,withSantos’s(1986)analysisofthe

impactofradicalismonthedemocraticbreakdowninBrazilin1964,andwith

Berman’sanalysis(1998)oftheimpactofsocialdemocraticparties’radicalismor

moderationontheirbehaviorandindirectlyondemocraticsurvivalorbreakdown

inSwedenandGermanyinthe1930s.

Second,ifactorshaveanormativepreferencefordemocracy,competitive

regimesarefarmorelikelytosurvive.Althoughthisfindingishardlysurprising,it

indicatesthatO’Donnell(1986:15‐18)wasprescienttoarguethatactors’normative

preferencescouldgoalongwaytowardoffsettingmanyliabilities,includingahigh

levelofinequality,lackofademocraticcultureinmostLatinAmericancountries,

andsevereeconomicchallenges.Linz(1978b)emphasizedasimilarideawithhis

notionofdemocraticlegitimacy;legitimacyenablesaregimetooffsetperformance

problems.

Argentinaisanexampleofhowactors’normativepreferencefordemocracy

canmakeapositivedifferenceforregimesurvival.Fromthelate1920suntil1976,

8ThisisreminiscentofPrzeworski’sargument(1986)thatthecostofdemocracyiswillingnesstorespectcapitalists’bottomlineinterests.

30

fewactorsinArgentinavalueddemocracyonnormativegrounds.Earlierworks

includingDahl(1971:129‐140),O’Donnell(1973,1978b),Potter(1981),Rouquié

(1982a,1982b),Smith(1978),Viola(1982),andWaisman(1987,1989)agreedon

thispoint.AsRouquié(1982b:341,380)noted,“Allpoliticalforcespreferred

winningovertheadversaryinpowertosafeguardingtheinstitutions.”9

Competitiveregimesneverenjoyedthesteadfastsupportofpowerfulactors,sothey

werehighlyvulnerabletobreakdown.In1930,theConservatives,theSocialists,the

military,andevenpartsofhisownpartyconspiredagainstPresidentYrigoyen.

From1946until1973,bothofthemainpoliticalparties(theRadicalsand

Peronists)andthepowerfullaborunionswerequicktodefectfromthedemocratic

coalition.In1955,theRadicalssupportedasuccessfulcoupagainstPerón,and

fromthenuntil1969theybackedhisproscription.In1966,thePeronistsandlabor

unionssupportedacoupagainstaRadicalpresidentinthehopethattheywouldbe

abletoregainstatepowerbyendingtheelectoralproscriptionagainstPerón.

Duringthosedecades,powerfulactorstoleratedcompetitivepoliticsonlyifit

broughtdesirablepolicyresults.

After1976,thekeyactorsaccepteddemocraticcompetitionasthelegitimate

routetowinningpoliticaloffice.Thisreorientationtowardanormativepreference

fordemocracyallowedtheregimetosurvivedespitesevereeconomiccrisesinthe

9Inaconvergingopinion,Portantiero(1987:281‐282)wrotethat“BothRadicalisminitsYrigoyenfactionandevenmoresoPeronismdidnotseethemselvesaspartsofasystem,butratherasatotalitythatexpressedthenationandthepeople.ThelearningofloyalcompetitionbetweengovernmentandoppositionwasneverseriouslyundertakeninArgentina.”SeealsoDahl(1971:130‐140);GómezandViola(1984).

31

1980sandin2001‐02,hyperinflationinthe1989‐91period,asteeprisein

inequalities,andonaveragebadeconomicperformancefrom1983until2003.

Whentherewereseriousthreatstodemocracyinthelate1980s,theunionsandthe

mainpartiesmobilizedtoprotectit.Laborenduredverynegativeeconomic

conditions,butitnevermobilizedonbehalfofacoup.

Toillustratethehugesubstantiveeffectofpolicymoderationandnormative

preferencesfordemocracyonregimesurvival,considerthefollowingestimates.

Holdingallothervariablesattheirmeans,acompetitiveregimeinwhichallactors

areradicalandinwhichnoonehasanormativepreferencefordemocracywouldbe

expectedtolastforaboutayear.Ifallactorsabandontheirradicalpositions,the

expecteddurationoftheregimewouldincreasetosixyears.Andif,inaddition,all

actorsembraceanormativecommitmenttodemocracy,thepredictedlifetimefor

theregimewouldbemorethan200years.10

Third,amoredemocraticregionalpoliticalenvironmentconsiderably

reducestheprobabilitythatcompetitiveregimeswillbreakdown.Thisresult

mesheswiththerobustliteraturethathasemergedoverthelast25yearson

internationalinfluencesondemocratization.Amoredemocraticregionalpolitical

environmentfostersthediffusionofidealsaboutwhatispossibleanddesirablein

politics,anditledtotheestablishmentoflegalnormsintheOrganizationof

AmericanStatesintendedtosafeguardcompetitiveregimes.Theendofthecivil

war,thepeaceagreementof1992,andtheestablishmentofacompetitivepolitical

10Thepredictedprobabilitiesofbreakdownforthethreeconfigurationsare.796,.156,and.005,respectively.EstimatesarebasedonModel1.2,treatinginsignificantcoefficientsaszero.

32

regimeinElSalvadorhelpedinspiresimilardevelopmentsinGuatemalaafewyears

later.Conversely,beforethethirdwave,someauthoritarianregimesservedas

inspirationsforcoupsandauthoritarianpopulistselsewhereintheregion.For

example,theestablishmentinBrazilin1964ofamilitaryregimethatpromotedthe

“economicmiracle”from1967to1974,andthemilitary’sabilitytoquicklydefeat

therevolutionaryleftandcontainthebroaderlefthelpedfuelconfidencein

SouthernConemilitariesandrightistsaboutthepotentialthatthearmedforcesin

theircountriescouldalsogovernsuccessfully.

Insum,theresultsinTable1indicatethatdemocraticsurvivalismostly

drivenby(theabsenceof)radicalpolicypreferences,bystrongnormative

preferencesfordemocracy,andabyfavorableregionalpoliticalcontext(reflectedin

thepresenceofotherdemocraticcountriesintheregion,butnotnecessarilyinUS

policies).Theregressionresultsareopentoanobviousconcernofendogeneity:ifa

competitiveregimeisincrisis,itcouldpushsomeactorstowardmoreradicalpolicy

positionsordepressnormativepreferencestowarddemocracy.Spatialconstraints

preventafulleconometrictreatmentofthisproblemhere,butanexaminationof

historicalcasesshowsmanyexamplesinwhichactors'policyradicalismandtheir

normativepreferenceshelpexplaintheregimeoutcomes,andinwhichtheregime

outcomeisclearlyhistoricallysubsequentto,andhencecannotexplain,actors'

positions.Theeffectofnormativeregimepreferencesandpolicyradicalismcannot

simplystemfromreversecausation.

Finally,Table1alsounderscoresthatstructuralfactorshadnodirect

consequencesfordemocraticstabilityinLatinAmerica.Structuralpredictorsfailto

33

achieveconventionallevelsofsignificanceeveninmodel1.1excludingthemore

proximatecausesofregimebreakdowntappedbyourvariablesforpolicy

radicalismandnormativepreferencesfordemocracy.O’Donnell(1973)wasrightto

beskepticalabouttheimpactofmodernizationonthesurvivalofcompetitive

regimesinLatinAmerica.Thefindingforabroadersampleofcountriesthathigher

percapitaincomelowersthelikelihoodofdemocraticbreakdown(Epsteinetal.

2006;Przeworskietal.2000)doesnotholdforLatinAmerica.11

Model1.2alsosuggeststhatthebaselinehazardchangesovertime,butthe

resultsworkagainsttheideaofconsolidation:thecoefficientforageispositiveand

significant,revealingaprogressiveincreaseintheriskofbreakdown.Thiseffectis

non‐linear:althougheveryadditionalyearelapsedincreasesthelevelofrisk,this

happensatadecliningrate.Beyondyear10,theeffectofregimeageonthehazard

rateisinsignificantatthe.05level.

Conclusions

Inthispaper,wehaveintroducedanovelstrategyforthestudyofregime

breakdownandsurvival,namely,theuseofanactor‐basedapproachonalarge

enoughscalethatitispossibletodoquantitativeanalysis.Previousquantitative

approachestothestudyofdemocraticsurvivaldidnotindicatewhothekeyactors

are,andtheydidnottestpropositionsaboutregimesurvivalandbreakdownbased

ontheobservedpropertiesofrealpoliticalactors.Mostvariantsofmodernization

11ThemarginaleffectofpercapitaGDPinModel1.2,givenbythefirstderivativeofthequadraticfunction[i.e.,0.08(GDP)–0.04]isinsignificantforthewholeincomerangeobservedinthesample.

34

theorydonotexplicitlyspecifyactorsorcausalmechanisms,sothereasonsforthe

linkagebetweenahigherlevelofdevelopmentandagreaterprobabilityof

democracyisnotclear.Boix(2003)andAcemogluandRobinson(2006)assume

thatthepoor,middleclass,andrichdeterminethenatureofpoliticalregimes,but

theydonotestablishthatthesebroadincomecategoriesareactuallycapableof

overcomingcollectiveactionproblemsandbecomingpoliticalactors.Inglehartand

Welzel’sculturaltheory(2005:149‐300)arguesthatmasspoliticalculture

determinespoliticalregimes,butitdoesnotclearlyenoughspecifywhotheactors

areandwhatthecausalmechanismsarebywhichmasspoliticalcultureinfluences

actualpoliticalactors.Becausebattlesaboutpoliticalregimesinvolvespecific

actorswhosepreferencesabouttheregimearenoteasilypredictableonthebasisof

thestructuralorculturalvariables,westronglyadvocatehistorically‐grounded,

actor‐basedapproachestostudyingregimes.

Asopposedtothis“actorless”traditioninthestudyofpoliticalregimes,

anotherlineagethatincludestheiconicworksondemocraticbreakdownsbyLinz

(1978b)andontransitionsfromauthoritarianrulebyO’DonnellandSchmitter

(1986),aswellasmanyrichqualitativecasestudies(Figueiredo1993;Levine1973;

Stepan1971;A.Valenzuela1978)hasfocusedoncoalitionsofactorsoronconcrete

historicactors.Thebestworkinthistraditionhasgreatlyenrichedour

understandingofwhydemocraciesemergeandstabilizeorbreakdown,andour

corehypothesesflowoutofthispreviousqualitativework.However,the

generalizabilityofthefindingsfromthistraditionhasbeenuncertainbecauseofthe

limitednumberofobservations.Ourapproachbuildsoninsightsfromthose

35

qualitativestudiesbut,forthefirsttime,extendsanactorbasedapproachtoabroad

rangeofcountriesoveralongperiodoftime.

Weemphasizethreesubstantivefindings,whichexpandGuillermo

O’Donnell’sseminalcontributions.First,thelevelofdevelopmentdidnotaffectthe

likelihoodofbreakdownofcompetitiveregimesinLatinAmericaduringthelong

timespanfrom1945to2005.ThisnullresultgenerallyconfirmsGuillermo

O’Donnell’sprescientanalysisinModernizationandBureaucraticAuthoritarianism.

Second,actors’policyradicalismmakesitmoredifficulttosustain

competitivepoliticalregimes.Whenmanyradicalforcescompeteforpolitical

power,thechancesthatsomeactorswillfindthecostoftoleratingdemocratic

politicstoohighincreases.Radicalthreatsencouragedefectionfromcompetitive

regimes.Conversely,pervasivepolicymoderationlowersthestakeofdemocratic

politics.

Third,alongwithDahl(1971),Linz(1978b),O’Donnell(1986:15‐18),Ollier

(2009),Walker(1990),andWeffort(1984),webelievethatactors’normative

attitudesaboutthepoliticalregimehavealargeimpactonwhethercompetitive

regimesendureorbreakdown.Someactorsintrinsicallyvaluedemocracyfarmore

thanotheractors.Democracycanwithstandseverecrisesandprotractedbad

performanceifmostactorsarenormativelycommittedtotheregime.Conversely,it

ishighlyvulnerabletobreakdownifthemostpowerfulactorsareindifferenttothe

intrinsicvalueofliberaldemocracy.Thesenormativepreferencesabouttheregime

arenotreducibletoactors’structuralpositionortobroadsocietalculturalpatterns.

36

Measuringactors’policyradicalismandnormativepreferencesaboutthe

politicalregimeisahugechallenge,anditwouldbefatuoustoclaimthatwehave

fullysolvedallofthedifficulties.However,ifpolicyradicalismandactors’

normativepreferencesaboutthepoliticalregimearehighlyimportantvariablesthat

arenotreducibletostructuralfactorsorbroadsocietalculturalpatterns,associal

scientists,weshouldstrivetoincorporatethemintoouranalyses,bothqualitative

andquantitative.Previousscholarshavedonesoqualitatively;webelieveitis

importanttoalsostudytheseissuesquantitatively.

37

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