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The New Face oF DigiTalPoPulism

Jamie Bartlett

Jonathan BirdwellMark Littler

he rise o populism

in Europe can betraced through onlinebehaviour...


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D is a think-tank ocused on power and politics.

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The New Face oF DigiTalPoPulism

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opn . s rt rrvd.As the publisher o this work, Demos wants to encourage thecirculation o our work as widely as possible while retainingthe copyright. We thereore have an open access policy whichenables anyone to access our content online without charge.

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Acknowledgements

Disclaimer

Executive summary

Background the new European populists

Who are the online populists?

Why do people join?By Jack Benield, Je Howard and Marley Morris

Social and political views

Trust in institutions

What is the relationship between onlineand oline activism?

Annex 1Methodology

Annex 2European populist groups surveyed

Notes

Reerences

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akndnt

is paper would not have been possible without the generoussupport o the Open Society Foundations, or which we arevery grateul. In particular, we would like to thank EllenRiotte and Heather Grabbe or their support, insight andhelpul eedback throughout.

We are indebted to several translators and in-countryexperts, who or various reasons are probably best lenameless. Special thanks as well to all those individuals wemet with and interviewed particularly in Denmark as parto this research. In particular, thank you to all the individualswho took time to complete our survey or the research. We hopethis report presents their views accurately and without bias.

At Demos, special thanks are due to all the abulousinterns who worked on the report and without whom thisreport would be have been possible. We are very grateul orthe hard work o Jack Beneld, Laurence Elliot, Je Howard,Marley Morris, Sarah Pilchick, Jeeta Patel, and SusannaPettigrew. Special thanks are due to Mona Bani or all o herwork on the Danish and Scandinavian aspects o our research,which will be the subject o uture reports; and SebastianKraus or his German language work. We would also like tothank Beatrice Karol Burks and Ralph Scott or seeing thereport to publication.

All errors and omissions remain our own.

Jamie BartlettJonathan BirdwellMark LittlerNovember 2011


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Dr

It is important to set out a number o disclaimers at the outseto this paper. e research is based on an online survey oFacebook ans o populist parties across Europe. e results,thereore, do not necessarily reect the views o the parties orgroups mentioned in this paper. All reerences in this paperto supporters o populist groups reer to our sample o socialmedia supporters. How ar our sample represents these partiesoine supporter base is something we discuss in detail.

is paper is an attempt to get a clearer understandingo the motivations, concerns and attitudes o online supporterso populist parties across Europe, and to understand therelationship between oine and online activism. Given thegrowing importance and signicance o social media as a toolo organisation, recruitment and proselytising, we believe thissample alone is o unique value and signicance.

Finally, it must be recognised that this paper is apreliminary investigation, and not a denitive work. It isbased on an innovative method o data collection, which hasboth strengths and weaknesses. ese are acknowledged, andare discussed at length, but should be borne in mind wheninterpreting any ndings. Given the collapsing response rateso traditional survey mediums, and the inherent problems orepresentativeness in any social survey, the generation o newdata sets through social media is likely to be an important areao methodological innovation in the years to come. We welcomethe chance to contribute to the debate around this new methodo inquiry, and embrace any comment, critique and debatecapable o improving the methodology applied here.

Demos is an independent think-tank that is committedto undertaking innovative research in areas o public interest.We are non-party political. Our results are set out objectively


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Disclaimer 13

and accurately, without normative judgement, something thatis oen lacking when discussing this subject.

We would like to thank those who took the time torespond to our survey. We hope this work airly and honestlyreects their views.


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extv ry

Over the last decade, populist parties have been growing instrength across Western Europe. ese parties are dened bytheir opposition to immigration and concern or protectingnational and European culture, sometimes using the languageo human rights and reedom. On economic policy, they areoen critical o globalisation and the eects o internationalcapitalism on workers rights. is is combined with anti-establishment rhetoric and language. Oen called populistextremist parties or the new right, these parties do not teasily into the traditional political divides.

eir growth over the past decade has been remarkable.Formerly on the political ringes, these parties now commandsignicant political weight in the parliaments o Austria,Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden,Latvia and Slovakia, as well as the European Parliament. Insome countries, they are the second or third largest party andare seen as necessary members o many conservative coalitiongovernments.

e growth o these movements is mirrored online.Populist parties are adept at using social media to ampliytheir message, recruit and organise. Indeed, the online socialmedia ollowing on Facebook and elsewhere or many o thesegroups oen dwars their ormal membership, consistingo tens o thousands o sympathisers and supporters. ismlange o virtual and real-world political activity is theway millions o people especially young people relate topolitics in the twenty-rst century. is nascent, messy andmore ephemeral orm o politics is becoming the norm or ayounger, digital generation.

Yet despite their growth and obvious importance noone has ever investigated these online supporters. is is the


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17Executive summary

In total, 12,320 people responded to our survey, rangingrom 143 returns rom the supporters o the Bloc Identitaireto 2,564 rom supporters o the Austrian Freedom Party.Following the removal o data that were either corrupt,intentionally misleading, or incomplete, a nal data set o10,667 survey responses was produced.

e results were weighted against the groups onlinedemographics available through Facebooks advertising tool.is was done in order to improve the validity and accuracyo any inerences made in respect o the online population.Although online recruitment in social research is widespread,sel-select recruitment via social network sites brings novelchallenges. Because this is an innovative research methodwith both strengths and weaknesses, we have included anin-depth discussion o the methodology in annex 1.

In chapter 1, we present a brie background to theemergence o populist parties and movements (henceorthPPAMs) across Europe. While oen described as ar right,the ideology o many o these groups represents a mixture olewing and rightwing political and economic belies withpopulist rhetoric and policy.

In chapter 2, we outline the demographic makeup o thePPAMs under investigation. is includes members gender,age, education level and employment status. We also explorethe extent to which online supporters vote or these parties(where applicable), consider themselves ormal members orattend demonstrations.

In chapter 3, we present supporters reasons or joining aPPAM. is is based on over 5,000 open text responses romsupporters explaining, in their own words, their reasons andmotivations or membership. e results are discussed in thecontext o existing academic literature on the subject.

In chapters 4 and 5, we present the social andpolitical views o online supporters, and their levels o trustin political and social institutions including the nationalgovernment, the media and the EU. Comparisons aremade against national averages using data available romother surveys.

rst quantitative investigation into these digital populists,based on over 10,000 survey responses rom 11 countries andincludes data on who they are, what they think, and whatmotivates them to shi rom virtual to real-world activism.It also provides new insight into how populism and politicsand political engagement more generally is changing as aresult o social media.

mtdye survey data presented in this report were collected bytargeting the Facebook ans o each o the ollowing groups:Bloc Identitaire (Identity Block; France), the British NationalParty (UK), CasaPound Italia (Italy), the Dansk Folkeparti(Danish Peoples Party; Denmark), the English DeenceLeague (UK), the Front National (National Front; France), thePartij voor de Vrijheid (PVV or Dutch Party or Freedom; theNetherlands), Die Freiheit (Freedom; Germany), FreiheitlichePartei sterreichs (FPO or Austrian Freedom Party; Austria),the Fremskrittspartiet (Norwegian Progress Party; Norway),Lega Nord (Northern League; Italy), Perussuomalaiset(rue Finns; Finland), Sverigedemokraterna (SwedenDemocrats; Sweden) and Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest;Belgium). A short description o each o these groups isprovided in annex 2 at the back o this report.

e Jobbik movement in Hungary was also surveyed, butthe results are not included in the current data set or reasons ocomparability. A report on this data is orthcoming.

Facebook was selected because it is the most widespreadand popular social media site in Western Europe; populistparties have a sizeable presence on this site; and it allows orprecise and highly targeted advertising. For three months inthe summer o 2011 we targeted adverts at individuals whowere supporters o these groups on Facebook. On clicking theadvert, individuals were redirected to a survey that they wereinvited to complete. e survey and adverts were presented inthe appropriate language, and were then translated back intoEnglish or the purposes o this report.


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19Executive summary

Finally, in chapter 6 we present the results o our logisticregression models exploring the relationship between onlinesupport and oine activities. We examine the extent to whichonline supporters vote (where applicable) or these parties, areormal members, or participate in demonstrations and streetmarches. We also examine which background characteristicsand attitudes are correlated with increased likelihood ooine engagement. Because o their size, the ull regressionoutputs are not included in this paper but are available todownload rom the Demos website (ww w.demos.co.uk).

Rte results reveal new insights into the social media world othese groups:

Online supporters are primarily young men: an average o 63 percent are under 30, and 75 per cent are male. In no country doemales make up more than 36 per cent o online supporters.Even when compared against the national demographics oFacebook users in each country, supporters o PPAMs areyounger, and more likely to be male.

Online supporters are slightly more likely to be unemployed. Onaverage, 14 per cent are unemployed, compared with anaggregate national average o around 7 per cent. However,given the young age demographic o our sample, this isprobably not much higher than average. Nearly a third (30 percent) o online supporters are students.

Online supporters are not just armchair activists: many are partymembers and voters and they are more likely to demonstrate thanthe national average. For political parties, 67 per cent o onlinesupporters voted or the party at the last general or nationalelection, although only 32 per cent dene themselves as ormalmembers. Although only a minority report having beeninvolved in protests or demonstrations (26 per cent), this issignicantly higher than the EU average, which is under10 per cent.

Supporters are motivated by positive identication with the partysvalues and the desire to protect national and cultural identity. Manyjoin or support PPAMs because they ear that immigrationand multiculturalism are destroying national (and sometimesEuropean) values and culture. ere are high levels odisillusionment with mainstream politics, and greater trustin PPAM leaders who speak their mind. Our research ndslittle evidence o economics being a driving actor o support,contrary to previous research and common explanations inpublic discourse.

Younger supporters are more likely to cite immigration than oldersupporters as a reason or joining. wenty per cent o those aged16-20 cite immigration as the reason they join or supportpopulist groups, compared with 10 per cent o over 50s. is iscontrary to the common perception that older people tend tobe more opposed to immigration.

Supporters display low levels o trust in both national and Europeanpolitical institutions compared with national population averages.While online supporters have only slightly lower levels ogeneralised trust (trust in other people) than the nationalaverage, they are much more distrustul o national andEuropean political institutions. Only 20 per cent onlinesupporters trust the national government (compared with43 per cent across Europe); and only 14 per cent trust theEuropean Union (compared with 44 per cent overall).

Compared with national population averages, supporters o PPAMshave low levels o trust in the justice system, but average levels o trustin the police and army. Online supporters display shockinglylow levels o trust in their own countrys judicial system. Anaverage o only 30 per cent trust the justice system, comparedwith 60 per cent nationally. However, PPAM supporters arejust as likely to express trust in the police and army as the resto the countrys population.

Online supporters are disgruntled democrats: they overwhelminglybelieve that voting matters, and disavow violence, but do notbelieve that politics is an eective way to respond to their concerns. On average, only 16 per cent o respondents agreed thatit does not matter who you vote or. While supporters o


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21Executive summary

street-based groups in the UK and Italy were more likely toexpress disillusionment in the act o voting, the pattern doesnot hold in France. However, only just over a third o onlinesupporters elt that politics was an eective way to respond totheir concerns. On average, 26 per cent o online supportersagreed that violence is acceptable i it leads to the right ends.is does not, o course, necessarily mean that this quarter osupporters will undertake violence, and comparisons with thegeneral population are not possible.

Online supporters display average levels o personal optimism,but very low levels o optimism about their countrys uture.Considering their rhetoric and concerns over immigration,crime and the loss o culture, it is surprising that onlinepopulist supporters tend to be optimistic when it comes totheir own personal lives: 27 per cent thought their lives wouldimprove in the next 12 months compared with a Europeanaverage o 26 per cent. However, only 10 per cent o onlinesupporters thought that their country was on the right track,compared with an average o 28 per cent across EU countries.

Online populist supporters are highly critical o the European Union,with many blaming it or a loss o control over borders and theerosion o cultural identity. Compared with European populationaverages, PPAM supporters are ar more likely to associate theEU with not enough control over external borders and losso cultural identity.

e shi rom online activism to voting is motivated by concernsover immigration, and Islamic extremism. Supporters wholisted immigration as a top concern were 109 per cent morelikely to vote or a populist party than those who did not listimmigration, while those who listed Islamic extremism as a topconcern were 85 per cent more likely to vote or a populist partythan those who did not. Women supporters were 52 per centmore likely to vote or populist political parties, when otherdemographic and attitudinal characteristics were held constant.

e shi rom online activism to becoming a party member ismotivated by concerns over multiculturalism and the belie thatpolitics is an eective way to respond to their concerns. Supporterswho listed multiculturalism as a top concern were 32 per cent

more likely to ormally join a populist political party thanthose who did not list it. Supporters who thought that politicswas an eective way to respond to their concerns were 42 percent more likely to be ormal members. Men and women wereequally likely to be a ormal member.

e shi rom online activism to street protesting is motivated byconcerns over corruption, and correlated with gender, as well asviews on politics and violence. Corruption appears to be moreo a motivating actor than either immigration or Islamicextremism when it comes to online supporters taking to thestreets in protest. ose who cited corruption as a top concernwere 38 per cent more likely to demonstrate than those whodid not. Men are 16 per cent more likely to participate in astreet demonstration. Interestingly, those who think politicsis an eective orm o redress were 23 per cent more likelyto demonstrate, while those who thought that violence wasacceptable i it leads to the right outcome were 37 per centmore likely to demonstrate.

iptnGiven the pan-European nature o our results and theimportance o the national and local context, specicrecommendations are not possible. is is an interim paper, sowe limit our implications section to a small number o generalcomments. Country-specic papers will be released in thecoming weeks with greater detail and nuance.

It is clear that a signicant number o Europeans areconcerned about the erosion o their national culture in theace o immigration, the growth o Islam in Europe, andthe blurring o national borders as a result o Europeanintegration and globalisation. ese concerns are likely toremain, i not grow, in the coming years.

Similarly, the inuence o social media will continue tochange our understanding o social and political movements.In the past, attempts to understand emerging politicalmovements were limited to the pronouncements o partyleaders and ormal party members. Little attention has been


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23Executive summary

politics is not currently seen as an eective way to respondto their needs. Populist supporters have lost aith in nationalgovernments, the European Union, and the justice system.In this, they shadow the general trend o alling condenceacross the public as a whole in political institutions. Restoringcondence in civic institutions must be part o any response.Importantly, those online activists who are also involved inoine activism voting, demonstrating, or being part o apolitical party appear to be more democratic, have moreaith in politics, and are more likely to disavow violence. isis powerul evidence that encouraging more people to becomeactively involved in political and civic lie, whatever theirpolitical persuasion, is an important way orward.

paid to the role o online activists. is needs to change.Online supporters o populist movements represent a wholenew generation o predominantly young activists, who aroutnumber the ormal members o these parties. And theirinvolvement extends oine: they tend to vote or the partiesthey like, and are ar more likely to get involved in politicalactivism compared with the general public. Understandingwho these people are, their background and activities, will bekey to understanding new political movements, and whetherthey are likely to grow or ade.

is work was commissioned beore the terrorist attacksin Norway in July 2011; and the majority o the research wasundertaken beore then. Norway was added to the sampleollowing the attacks. Whether or not these terrible events willhave a modiying eect on European populism is not clear.It is to be noted, however, that in many respects the responsesrom supporters o the Norwegian Progress Party were themost moderate o all groups surveyed.

is tragic event underscored the act that a tiny numbero people are prepared to pursue some o the arguments opopulist groups to violent extremes. is does not meanthat supporters o populist parties are inclined to violence:our research shows they are not. Nor is this a problemthat is limited to populist or nationalist groups. However,the attacks highlight the potential or extreme rhetoric tolead some individuals to conclude that violence is the onlyanswer. Certainly, some populist groups convey a sensethat the existence o Europe itsel is at stake (oen citingdemographics and high immigrant birth rates), and thatmainstream society, politicians and the media are eitherignorant to the threat or complicit. Mainstream politiciansneed to respond: addressing concerns over immigration andcultural identity, without succumbing to xenophobic solutions.Not shutting these parties or their supporters out as beyond thepale, but engaging and debating orceully with them.

Finally, the research suggests that many supporterso populist parties have extremely low levels o trust andcondence in mainstream political institutions or them


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1 Bkrnd: t nerpn ppt

In June 2009, an unknown group calling itsel the EnglishDeence League (EDL) organised a protest march in the towno Luton, just outside London. e march was in response tothe planned demonstration o a now-banned radical Muslimgroup Al Muhajiroun against the Aghan war and theBritish Armed Forces. e EDL members, many draped inthe cross o St George, claimed to be deending England andEnglish culture against Sharia law and radical Muslims.e ollowing year, Geert Wilders o the Dutch Freedom partytook 16 per cent o the vote in the Dutch national elections,and the Swedish Democrats entered Swedish parliament orthe rst time.

ese seemingly unrelated events are emblematic o aseismic shi in European politics the emergence o a growingcast o activists, street groups and political parties which areoen grouped together under the label populist extremistparties,1 ar-right parties2 or the new right. ese groupsnow number at least several distinct parties and movements,3and while most are not ormally aligned, there appears to bea growing trend towards inormal alliances between them,including expressions o mutual support and the sharing oelectoral tactics.

Despite being reerred to as ar-right, many o thesegroups are not easily placed according to traditional politicalcategories, oen combining elements o lewing and rightwingphilosophy, mixed with populist language and rhetoric.

What they share in common is a deep concernabout maintaining national (and sometimes European)identity, which they see as under threat rom high levels oimmigration especially rom Muslim majority countries.ey tend to agree that multiculturalism has been an


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27Background: the new European populists

the welare state and strenuously denying anti-Semitism.4She describes her position on immigration in France asnothing to do with racism, its an economic problem. Sheprotests at the Islamication o France and says that shewants to deend republican values, eminism and secular ismrom Muslim extremists. Opinion polls suggest that thesemessages are resonating. A March 2011 opinion poll putMarine Le Pen at 23 per cent, two points ahead o PresidentSarkozy, suggesting that she could win the rst round o the2012 presidential election.

ere have also been signicant gains or anti-immigrantparties in Italy, the Netherlands and Austria. Italys leadinganti-immigration party, Lega Nord (the Northern League),has seen its support more than double since 2005, polling at12.7 per cent in 2010; it is now seen as a crucial member o SilvioBerlusconis ruling coalition. In the Netherlands, Geert WildersFreedom Party, ounded in 2004, now holds 24 out o 150 seatsin the Dutch Parliament and received 16 per cent o the vote in2010. Wilders has called or a ban on the Koran, describing itas the Islamic Mein Kamp.5 He styles his critique o Islamas a deence o human rights, questioning Islams stance onwomens and gay rights, and saying that he is only intoleranto the intolerant.6 Although it is not a ormal member o thecurrent coalition, the Dutch Government relies on the FreedomParty or support. In Austria, in early 2011 the Austrian FreedomParty (FP), led by Heinz Christian Strache, evidenced supportthrough opinion polls o around 2429 per cent, on a par withthe two major mainstream parties.

Similarly, the rise o anti-immigrant, nationalist partieshas been pronounced in Scandinavian countries, typicallyseen as bastions o lewing and liberal social policy. Indeed,the terrorist attacks in Norway this summer have led to a gooddeal o introspection about the rise o ar right anti-immigrantgroups, largely as Anders Breivik, the Norwegian terrorist, wasa member o the Norwegian Progress Party beore becomingdisillusioned with their moderate approach.

In Denmark, the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish PeoplesParty) claims to deend the independence o Denmark, both

unmitigated ailure and argue or restrictions on newimmigrants, greater emphasis on integration and assimilationand, in some cases, repatriation o immigrants who reuseto integrate or whose cultures are seen as in conict withWestern European values. Some have shied rom traditionalar-right concerns about race to more nuanced positionsrelating to values and culture. Many nd common cause inopposing a perceived Islamication o secular liberal andChristian societies. ese groups lay claim to the mantle othe Enlightenment, espousing support or the undamentallyliberal values o ree speech, democracy and equality, whichthey seek to deend rom the threat o Islam.

On economic policy, however, the current economicclimate has also heightened rhetoric beyond national culturalprotection to include national economic interests, and workersrights typically the language o the le. ese groups areincreasingly critical o the European Union, internationalcapitalism and globalisation.

ey are also, indubitably, populists with a broad distrusto elites and the establishment, which they believe haveallowed immigration to ourish and national cultures to bethreatened. Banker bailouts, as well as media and politicalscandals, have le many Europeans hostile to the status quoand desiring signicant changes. ey present themselves asthe voice o the people against the elites, as outsiders braveenough to say the uncomortable, politically incorrect truth.

ese groups dey simple categorisation. We reer to themthroughout as populist parties and movements (PPAMs).

Ppt pt prtPopulist political parties are enjoying unprecedented electoralsuccess and growing membership. In the last decade, manyhave moved rom the ringes o society to become integralmembers o coalition governments and important politicalorces, capable o shiing mainstream political debate.

In France, Marine Le Pen is reorming the French FrontNational party, styling hersel as a deender o the republic and


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Ppt trt vntIn addition to the rise o populist political parties, streetprotest movements have also appeared and are growing,advocating similar policies. e most notable and active othese groups in Western Europe include the English DeenceLeague in the UK, Bloc Identitaire in France, and CasaPoundItalia in Italy. ese groups preer organising protests, streetmarches and other modes o direct activism over ormalpolitical engagement. ey rely heavily on the internet andsocial media to convey their message, build their ollowing andorganise events. Many o their demonstrations are marked byviolence, oen provoked by counterdemonstrations o anti-ascist groups.

e English Deence League (EDL) is the largest andmost well-known populist street-based group, but it is relativelynew, having been ounded only in 2009. e EDLs missionstatement species the groups undamental aim is to upholda commitment to human rights, support or democracy,opposition to Sharia law, the creation o an open and honestdiscussion about the threats posed by Islamism, maintenanceo traditional English culture, and solidarity with similarlyminded governments o oreign countries which are unitedagainst the global Jihad. While the organisation increasinglycasts its objectives in the language o human rights, itscritics have consistently asserted that the group is racistand Islamophobic.

Frances Bloc Identitaire and Italys CasaPound Italiaboth emerged much earlier than the EDL, in 2003. Foundedby Fabrice Roberts, a ormer member o the dissolved UnitRadicale party, Bloc Identitaire campaigns against theIslamisation o Europe, illegal immigration and anti-whiteracism.10 One o their major initiatives was the launch o abrand o soupe au cochon (pork soup) at a Parisian soupkitchen, aimed at excluding Muslims.11 e group calls itselidentitarian, not nationalist, as it deends regional andEuropean identity as well as national identity, and distinguishesitsel rom other PPAMs through its pro-Europe stance and itsocus on non-electoral political campaigning.

rom the threats o oreign cultures and what it takes to bethe sovereignty-eroding aspirations o the European Union.It explicitly renounces the idea o Denmark as a multiethnicsociety: Denmark is not an immigrant country and neverhas been.7While support or immigration is higher inSweden, the Sweden Democrats in 2010 achieved enoughvotes 5.7 per cent to gain representation in the Swedishparliament or the rst time. e Sweden Democrats advocateheavy restrictions on immigration and incentives or currentimmigrants to return to their home countries. ey claim thattheir slogan Keep Sweden Swedish is not about racismbut the rejection o multiculturalism. e rue Finns, whorecently renamed themselves e Finns, are less outspoken onissues o immigration and Islam, but nonetheless are proudlynationalistic, tough on immigration and highly sceptical othe European Union. e Eurozone crisis has buoyed theirelectoral support, with a recent aloustutkimus opinion poll(conducted in April 2011) giving them 15.4 per cent o the votecompared with 6.8 per cent support in March 2010.

Moreover, national opinion polls obscure the act thatthese groups and political parties are cultivating pockets oeven higher levels o support in certain parts o their respectivecountries. For example, until last year, the British NationalParty was the ocial opposition in the council in the outerLondon borough o Barking and Dagenham. Other researchsuggests that support or European populist parties andgroups is higher in areas that are adjacent to large Muslimcommunities.8 As a result, the tactics o many o these groupsis to ocus on achieving success in local and regional elections,and then seeking to build a stronger national prole rom theground up as is the case with the National Democratic Party(NPD) party in Germany, the Sweden Democrats, and a newDanish party called the Danskernes Parti.9


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CasaPound Italia is a prominent ar-right youth streetorganisation in Italy that takes its name rom the Americanexpatriate and prolic author Ezra Pound, a deendero ascism and supporter o his resident Italy during theSecond World War. It began in 2003 with the occupation oa state-owned building in Rome by student right-wingers.CasaPound Italias occupied spaces have been, and continueto be, sites o communal engagement or political discussion,sports and musical perormance, prominently centredaround the band ZetaZeroAla, which eatures CasaPoundItalias leader, Gianluca Iannone. eir policy positionsand rhetoric are grounded in economic populism beingsceptical o the ree market when it does not work in the bestinterest o Italian workers. is is inused with rebelliousanti-statist contrarianism, all alongside traditional amilyvalues. CasaPound Italia has been extremely successul atmobilising poor, angry, white Italians. Casting themselvesas ird Millenium Fascists, members emphasise their tiesto Mussolinis ideology while simultaneously presentingthemselves as serious contributors to contemporary politicaldiscourse and policy reorm.

Pp n dt Our research presented in this report adds to the emergingpicture o European populist supporters, with a particularocus on the type o person who expresses their support orthese groups through social media sites. e internet is deeplyingrained in the strategy and identity o these new PPAMs.ey use it to promote and disseminate their ideology, recruitnew members, organise events and present acts aboutimmigration and Islam, among other topics. Until now, socialscience research has ignored the distinct category o onlinesupporters o groups such as these when trying to understandnew political movements. is is the new ace o politics andpolitical expression, and will increasingly become an object ointerest and research to social scientists.


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2 w r t nnppt?

Support or populist parties and movements (PPAMs) hasbeen growing online as well as oine.

In many cases, the Facebook membership o theseorganisations is larger than the ormal membership. Forexample, the Freiheitliche Partei sterreichs (FP), orAustrian Freedom Party, claims approximately 40,000ormal members but has twice as many Facebook ans.Similarly, the British National Party (BNP) has just under15,000 ormal members and over 80,000 Facebook ans.Yet to date, no systematic study has been undertaken toinvestigate who these online populists are.

e rise o social media has created a novel way oexpressing allegiance to a person, organisation or idea.Individuals can show support or become a member o anyone o thousands o groups with just the click o a mouse.is raises a host o questions about the strength o anityto online groups, and the relationship between online andoine involvement.

Oine, previous research has shown that argumentsby PPAMs are resonating with men both very young andvery old those with ew educational qualications, and thelower middle and working classes.12 According to MathewGoodwin, it was the mix o appealing to both the lowermiddle classes, as well as skilled and unskilled workers thathas resulted in the growth and electoral success o thesemovements across Europe. ese are the segments o societythat are most likely to eel economically insecure in thecurrent climate and threatened by the perceived economicand cultural impact o immigration. Yet, there has been verylittle research i any that analyses the distinct category oonline supporters o these groups.


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35Who are the online populists?

In this chapter, we set out some o the backgrounddemographic data on who online PPAM supporters are andthe extent o their oine activity.

DrpIt is possible to identiy the makeup o a groups Facebookmembership by total size, age and gender by using Facebooksown (publicly available) advertising tool (see methodologyin annex 1 or details). By way o comparison, in table 1 weshow the gender and age breakdown o the total populationo Facebook users or the countries containing the groupstargeted, which are presented in brackets.

Table 1 sz, nd ndr br PPam Fbkn ntr nvttd

sz rp m(countrytotal) (%)

F(countrytotal) (%)

a 1620(country total) (%)


Bloc Identitaire 2,340 78 (49) 22 (51) 33 (21) 18 (19)

British National Party 82,700 79 (49) 21 (51) 39 (19) 23 (18)

CasaPound Italia 16,200 87 (54) 13 (46) 25 (18) 22 (17)

Dansk Folkeparti(Danish Peoples Party)

15,640 64 (49) 36 (51) 24 (18) 17 (14)

Die Freiheit 4,280 79 (52) 21 (48) 13 (22) 13 (21)

English Deence League 38,200 81 (49) 19 (51) 36 (19) 24 (18)

Freiheitliche Parteisterreichs (FPO; Austrian Freedom Party)

84,700 69 (52) 31 (48) 37 (23) 25 (20)

Fremskrittspartiet(Norwegian Progress Party)

64,860 64 (50) 36 (50) 13 (17) 13 (15)

Front National 34,960 79 (49) 21 (51) 47 (21) 21 (19)

Lega Nord 45,740 78 (54) 22 (46) 45 (18) 24 (17)

Partij voor de Vrijheid(PVV or Dutch Freedom Party)

7,140 77 (49) 23 (51) 19 (18) 18 (17)

Perussuomalaiset(True Finns)

15,640 74 (47) 26 (53) 21 (19) 16 (17)

Sverigedemokraterna(Sweden Democrats)

16,660 74 (49) 26 (51) 63 (18) 14 (16)

Vlaams Belang(Flemish Interest)

6,970 75 (51) 25 (49) 29 (19) 20 (17)

Tt rp nbr 436,030

Tt vr 75 (50) 25 (50) 32 (19) 19 (17)




a 51+(country total) (%)

Bloc Identitaire 15 (15) 15 (21) 9 (12) 9 (12)

British National Party 11 (14) 13 (21) 10 (15) 4 (13)

CasaPound Italia 15 (14) 20 (25) 11 (16) 6 (10)


10 (11) 19 (21) 17 (17) 13 (17)

Die Freiheit 14 (16) 24 (20) 21 (14) 15 (8)

English Deence League 12 (14) 14 (21) 10 (15) 4 (13)

Freiheitliche Parteisterreichs(FPO; Austrian Freedom Party)

15 (16) 14 (20) 6 (13) 3 (8)


10 (13) 21 (22) 23 (17) 20 (16)

Front National 9 (15) 10 (21) 6 (12) 7 (12)

Lega Nord 10 (14) 12 (25) 5 (16) 3 (10)


13 (14) 22 (21) 18 (16) 10 (15)


17 (15) 23 (22) 13 (14) 10 (13)


6 (12) 9 (21) 4 (16) 5 (17)


14 (14) 15 (22) 12 (15) 11 (13)

Tt vr 12 (14) 17 (21) 12 (15) 8 (13)

ere are a number o actors that lead to variation inthe size o the online presence o these groups, which do notnecessarily reect their size in the real world. For example,overall internet and social media use varies rom countryto country, as does the uptake o Facebook usage by age.ere are also issues inherent in our method and approachthat could lead to variation, which are covered in ull in themethodology section to this report.

Nevertheless, some interesting trends emerge. Whileacross Facebook there is an even gender split, supporterso PPAMs are overwhelmingly male (75 per cent comparedwith 25 per cent). Given the even national split on Facebook,the disproportionate number o men cannot be claimedto be a result o men being more active online in general.


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edtn nd pyntEducation-related data cannot be accessed using Facebooksopen access advertising tool. We thereore asked respondentsto speciy their highest level o educational achievement. Whilethe results are complicated by the varying education systemsacross the countries surveyed, they do provide some insightinto the educational achievement o PPAM supporters.

Across our research sample, an average o 45 percent o supporters cited a school qualication (eg GCSEor A-level) as their highest level o education (sd=18).Meanwhile, 53 per cent indicated that they were educatedto college or university level or had attained a vocationalqualication (sd=19).

e Sweden Democrats had the highest proportiono supporters with only a school qualication (82 per cent;n=567). is is likely to be at least partially explained by therelative youth o Sweden Democrats supporters (63 per centwere below 21; n=567). By way o comparison, NorwegianProgress Party supporters, on average the oldest groupsurveyed, were ar less likely to speciy a school qualicationas their highest educational achievement (21 per cent; n=909).Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) online supporters had the lowestpropensity to have achieved only a school qualication only19 per cent had done so while 80 per cent had been eithereducated to university or college level, or had attained avocational qualication (n=335). is was the case despite theact that online PVV supporters did not tend to be particularlyyoung 50 per cent were over 30 (n=7,140).

We also asked respondents whether they wereemployed, unemployed or a student (table 2). On average,54 per cent o supporters classied themselves as employed(sd=12) while 14 per cent described themselves as unemployed(sd=5) and 30 per cent described themselves as students(sd=11). BNP online supporters reported the highest level ounemployment 22 per cent (n=283). At the other end o thescale, FP supporters were the most l ikely to be in work 70per cent (n=2,333) described themselves as employed.

CasaPound Italia experiences the lowest proportion oemale support only 13 per cent o online supporters werewomen (n=16,200). At the opposite end o the scale, both theNorwegian Progress Party (n=64,860) and the Danish PeoplesParty (n=15,640) registered 36 per cent emale support.

Interestingly, gender imbalances appear to be morepronounced among online supporters when compared withother data on support or populist parties. According to theEuropean Social Survey, emales account or 36 per cento Vlaams Belang voters (compared with 25 per cent in oursample); 37 per cent o rue Finns voters (compared with 26per cent o our sample); and 43 per cent o Danish PeoplesParty voters (compared with 36 per cent o our sample).13

In respect o age, PPAM supporters are also younger:overall 63 per cent are under 30, compared with 51 per cento Facebook users overall. e Sweden Democrats have theyoungest online supporters: 63 per cent are below 21, whichis particularly noteworthy given that Swedish Facebookusers in general tend to be older than in the other countriessurveyed 54 per cent are over 30 (n= 4,032,420). In contrast,64 per cent o Norwegian Progress Party supporters are over30 (n=64,860), compared with a national gure o55 per cent (n= 2,250,240).

e older online support-base o the NorwegianProgress Party is perhaps unsurprising given that the partywas ounded in 1973 and holds an established position withinmainstream Norwegian politics. However, Die Freiheit, whichwas established barely a year ago, also appears to attractolder online supporters 60 per cent are over 30 (n=4,280),compared with a national gure o 42 per cent (n=19,491,360).is indicates that the actors driving variations in the averageage o online supporters go beyond the longevity and relativeestablishment o a given organisation.


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Table 3 extnt n nvvnt br PPam nntr nvttd

Across all groups only a minority o Facebook ansconsidered themselves to be ormal members. While thisvaried rom country to country, only among EDL supportersdid expressions o ormal membership exceed 50 per cent.Particularly low levels o ormal membership were evidentor PVV supporters (13 per cent), but this is likely to bebecause the PVV has no ocial party structure or norms omembership.16

As one might expect, a ar higher proportion o onlinesupporters actually voted or the party they supported

Table 2 epynt r r br PPam n ntrnvttd

mbrp nd nvvnte relationship between what people do online and theiractivity oine is one o the key questions o our research.We asked whether the respondents considered themselvesormal members o the group in question; whether they votedor them at the last election (i the group in question was apolitical party); and whether they were involved in a politicaldemonstration or march in the last six months (table 3).

Ntnnpyntrt (%)

unpyd (%) epyd (%) stdnt (%)

Bloc Identitaire 9.9 13 60 28

British National Party 8.1 22 32 46

CasaPound Italia 7.9 11 58 29


7.1 17 48 33

Die Freiheit 6.0 5 69 22

English Deence League 8.1 22 57 20


3.7 9 70 20


3.2 16 62 16

Front National 9.9 15 38 45

Lega Nord 7.9 14 38 46


4.5 11 66 22


7.8 19 54 24


7.2 11 42 45


6.8 11 61 26

avr 7 14 54 30

Standard deviation 5 12 11

mbr t prty rrp (%)

Vtd r tprty ttn (%)

hd tkn prtn r rd prttt 6 nt (%)

Ntnvr tknprt n pbd t 12nt 15

Bloc Identitaire 32 47 18

British National Party 18 44 15 2

CasaPound Italia 20 43

Dansk Folkeparti(Danish Peoples Party) 24 48 19 8

Die Freiheit 29 20 8

English Deence League 76 55 2


39 83 15


38 80 14 10

Front National 19 65 25 18

Lega Nord 30 43 43


13 84 11 3


28 81 9 1


46 62 20 5


42 83 31 6

avr 32 67 26 6Standard deviation 16 17 15


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signicant proportion takes to the streets. e gures alsosuggest that many supporters do not reject the politicalsystem entirely. ey take politics ser iously enough to vote,join political groups and attend demonstrations.

on Facebook. Five o the parties surveyed scored over 80per cent on this measure, while three scored under 50 percent. One possible explanation or this is that support orsome o these groups has increased since the last election.However, it could also be that this variation suggests thatsome populist parties are more successul than others inconverting their online support into votes.

It could be that supporters o particular parties aremore reluctant to take the extra step between articulatingvirtual support and taking an action that could have areal-world consequence. It also suggests that parties such asthe BNP (where only 44 per cent o supporters translatedthat support into votes) are presenting ideas that resonatewith a wider group than their current electoral results wouldsuggest. In other words, the parties with low scores on thismeasure have a signicant pool o supporters who do not atpresent vote or the party, but who may do so in the uture.

e nal measure o oine activism considered waswhether or not the respondent had taken part in a protest,march or demonstration in the past six months. able 3includes results rom the European Social Survey, in whichrespondents were asked a similar question, and providessome baseline o comparison.

Although there is considerable transnational variat ion,online members o PPAMs are shown to be more likelyto demonstrate than the general public in all countriesor which data is available this suggests that Facebookmembership acts as a bridge to oine activism, rather thana replacement or it. rue Finn supporters are the leastlikely to take part in demonstrations, possibly reecting thegeneral reluctance o the Finnish public to take to the streets.At the opposite end o the scale, CasaPound Italia, BlocIdentitaire and the EDL scored highest on this measure. isis unsurprising given the street-based nature o these groups.

e results suggest that the relationship betweensocial media membership and real world support is varied.Overall, signicant numbers o online supporters are alsoactive oine: many are party members and voters and a


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43

3 wy d pp jn?By Jack Benfeld, Je Howard andMarley Morris

Our study examined what motivated people to support apopulist political party and movement (PPAM). Respondentswere asked in an open-response question why they supportedthe group. In total, 5,125 PPAM supporters responded to thequestion. We had all the responses translated into English,and devised nine broad categories into which the majorityo responses could be placed. We have included someo the quotes rom respondents below, with the originallanguage quotation provided in the endnotes. e responseswere weighted, and European averages produced based ona multi-data set average (see methodology in annex 1 or aull explanation).

extn trtrAlthough there have been no previous studies aimed atunderstanding why people join PPAM social media groups,there is an expansive body o research examining why peoplein general vote or populist parties in Western Europe.

Most explanations emphasise one o three dierent setso grievances that motivate citizens: economic grievances,disillusionment grievances and immigration grievances.17

e economic explanation o populism contends thateconomic rustration is the prime motivator o populists.is view has two components: rst, that most supporters oPPAMs are blue-collar workers (victims o globalisation andoutsourcing); and second, that these workers are motivated tojoin by nancial concerns. Both views are disputed, however.Evidence o high numbers o middle-class supporters orcertain PPAMs has raised doubts about the socioeconomichomogeneity o populist supporters.18 Meanwhile, a study


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45Why do people join?

studies concerning oine supporters. Below, we presentthe most common results according to category type,including a small number o illustrative responses. At theend o the chapter, we discuss how our ndings relate tothe existing literature.

Rn r jnn PPamgrp v

While it is not discussed specically in the literature, onetypical explanation or a person joining an organisationis because they have a broad identication with its values.Respondents classied in this category were those whocited, in general terms, the values, principles, norms, belies,aspirations or ideas o a PPAM as reasons or joining it.

On average 38 per cent (sd=18) o respondents providedreasons that ell within this category. ere was, however,very high var iation across countries. e proportion orespondents citing such reasons ranged rom 81 per cent oNorwegian Progress Party respondents (n=909) to 15 per cento both English Deence League (EDL) (n=804) and BritishNational Party (BNP) respondents (n=283). Females weremore likely than males to reer to group values within theiranswers an average o 46 per cent (sd=23) o women didso, compared with an average o 34 per cent (sd=17) o men.ere was no clear correlation between the tendency to reerto group values and age.

idntty

As noted above, recent studies have avoured identity-basedtheories in explaining support or PPAMs. Respondentswere classied in the identity category when they reerredto a love o their country, commitment to preservation otraditional national and cultural values, or representation othe interests o real countrymen as reasons or supportingor joining the organisation.

An average o 17 per cent (sd=9) o respondents gavereasons that ell within the identity category. e proportion

by Elisabeth Ivarsaten ound that populist parties haveailed to mobilise those voters who are unhappy with theirnations economy any better than the mainstream parties.19Another study has shown that cultural determinants are armore inuential than economic determinants in establishingworking class support or populist parties.20

e second set o grievances concerns votersdisillusionment with prevailing political parties andinstitutions. One argument advanced by scholars is that thisdisenchantment has led citizens to vote or populist politicalparties or join street groups out o protest. According to thisprotest vote model, supporters o populist parties are notnecessarily ideologically committed to the principles andpolicies o PPAMs, but support them to vent rustration.

e literature is conicted on the importance o protestsentiment. While many studies report disillusionmentamong PPAM supporters,21 there is considerable nationalvariation in the importance o such sentiment as a mobilisingactor.22 Moreover, scholars have questioned the accuracyo characterising votes or populist parties as protest votes.Ideological and policy commitment have, or example, beenshown to be crucial motivators or such groups as VlaamsBlok and the FP.23

e nal category o grievances concerns immigration.24Some studies have demonstrated that concern, worry orantipathy toward immigrants is the eature that uniespopulist groups.25 For example, one detailed studydemonstrated that immigration scepticism, rather than racism,is the galvanising orce behind the BNP.26 Until recently,much o the academic literature on this point suggested that alarge degree o concern relating to immigration was economicin nature people were earul about jobs or housing.However, more recent research suggests that immigrationis seen as a threat to cultural identity. As highlighted byMatthew Goodwins recent report,Right Response, this is anincreasingly avoured view.27

Our data set provides a unique opportunity to test howar the results rom our online sample match the ndings o


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Interestingly, it was not only the indigenous populationthat responded in this manner:

Because despite the act that Im Brazilian I have elt acceptedby CasaPound Italia I am Italian, I even have an identitycard and I love this country or which I would die.(Italy CasaPound Italia)30

ant-rtn

Recent studies have shown that concern over immigrationis a key predictor o support or PPAMs. Respondents wereclassied as being in the anti-immigration category when theyexplicitly proessed concern or anger about rising immigrationand its eects.

An average o 17 per cent (sd=10) o respondents includedimmigration scepticism as a reason or joining a PPAM.e proportion o respondents expressing anti-immigrationsentiment ranged rom 36 per cent o Sweden Democratsrespondents (n=568) to 1 per cent o CasaPound Italiarespondents (n=424). Women were slightly less likely to citeanti-immigration reasons than men on average 15 per cent(sd=10) o women respondents compared with 19 per cent(sd=13) o men did so. Interestingly, younger respondents weremore likely to speciy anti-immigration reasons on average,20 per cent (sd=12) o 1620-year-olds cited it, while just 10 percent (sd=11) o those aged 51 or over did.

Fear o a bleak uture in which immigrants willoutnumber nationals was a common theme:

e oreigners are slowly suocating our lovely country. ey haveall these children and raise them so badly that in three or our

generations time therell be no decent behaviour or well behavedchildren at all. (Denmark Dansk Folkeparti)31

o those providing such reasons ranged rom 31 per cent oEDL respondents (n=804) to 3 per cent o Norwegian ProgressParty respondents (n=909). ere was little variation betweenthe propensity o men and women to cite identity reasons apan-European average o 18 per cent (sd=9) o men did so,compared with 15 per cent (sd=13) o women. ere was nocorrelation between a respondents age and their likelihood oreerring to identity.

Although it is oen believed that members o PPAMsjoin because they dislike non-members o their ethnic group,the reality appears more nuanced, with many citing positivedeence o liberal Western values, albeit oen in juxtapositionto the threat o Islam:

Every countryman has their right to speak their thoughts!For hundreds o years the monarchy has stood or its people andtheir reedom! No way can a Muslim race bring their rules to ourcountry! I believe the leader o EDL is a true Englishman doing

something or the honour o England and its people! (UK EDL)

Human rights against Islamisation o Europe and intoleranceby urkish and Arabic immigrants towards Gays and Jews

Preservation o the cultural values o our European democracies.(Germany Die Freiheit)28

While large number o respondents identied immigrantsas the salient threat to their national identity and culture,not all those responding within the identity category alsoincluded anti-immigration or anti-minority sentiments. Somerespondents considered PPAMs to be positive promoters otraditional national values:

Because it respects identities and it believes in the preservation othe history and culture o popular traditions. (Italy Lega Nord)29


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Dnnt

As noted above, disillusionment with mainstreaminstitutions the protest vote is posited as a actor indriving support or PPAMs. Respondents were placed into thedisillusionment category when they expressed disenchantmentwith major political institutions, with the political elite or withthe direction o their country.

An average o 13 per cent (sd=7) o respondents reerredto disillusionment in their answers. e proportion rangedrom 27 per cent o Die Freiheit respondents (n=427) to 1 percent o Bloc Identitaire respondents (n=128). e dierencebetween men and women was marginal on average 12 percent (sd=7) o male respondents and 15 per cent (sd=15) oemale respondents cited such reasons. e tendency to citedisillusionment did not vary with age.

In their responses, some respondents reerred toparticular parties that they elt let down by:

e desperate lies o the MPs, the comortable way in which they livewhilst the French ace a multitude o problems such as insecurity,mass immigration and the middle class, who always pay the price.(France Front National)35

One Italian respondent suggested how disillusionmentwith the political class maniested as support or Lega Nord:

I hate politicians; they are all disgusting, especially when they get tothe armchair o power. Since they are all the same, I choose the onesthat deend my homeland. (Italy Lega Nord)36

ant-i

Increasingly, commentators discuss European populistsgrowing hostility towards Islam and Muslims. Respondentswere classied in the anti-Islam category when they criticisedIslam, Muslims or Arabs. An average o 10 per cent (sd=11)o respondents made such criticisms. By ar the highestproportion o anti-Islam responses were given by EDL

e perceived criminality o immigrants also eatured requently:

I am sick o seeing my homeland being ripped apart and the crimerate and rapes going through the roo with this scum coming into mycountry and ripping it apart and no one is doing a thing to stop it.(UK BNP)

A number o respondents lamented immigrantssupposed abuse o the welare system as well as criticisingthem or obtaining employment at the expense o nationals:

I would like to send them back to their homes, rather than havingto maintain them and give them jobs It would be better i they

gave Italians a job rst, or example to me, since I am unemployed.(Italy Lega Nord)32

Immigrants were also viewed by many as posing a threatto national or Western cultural values. One young Frenchrespondent wrote that he had joined the Front Nationalbecause he was worred about:

e loss o French customs, traditions. ere are so many oreignersand we are almost struck with shame to be white and love ourcountry. (France Front National)33

Although many respondents expressed a desire or anoutright ban on immigration or the removal o immigrantsto their countries o origin, others stressed the need orintegration and assimilation:

My ancestry is rom Eastern Europe but my parents taughtme that you go with the practice o the place you move to andrespect the country and integrate. Suddenly other partieswant something completely dierent. It doesnt work in thelong run. I want to live in Sweden, not a multicultural asco.(Sweden Sverigedemokraterna)34


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to speak o the PPAM in a positive light, instead o merelydisplaying a lack o aith in other organisations.

On average 9 per cent (sd=5) o respondents mentionedintegrity in their answers. Nearly one-h (17 per cent) oresponses rom CasaPound Italia (n=424) were classied underintegrity, the highest o any group, whereas only 2 per cent oEDL responses (n=909) were so classied. e gures did notdier signicantly across gender or men there was a pan-European gure o 8 per cent (sd=6) while or women it was 11per cent (sd=10).

O course, many responses ell under both the integrityand disillusionment categories and those who talked o thegroups integrity oen contrasted this with the ailure o others:

Its the only honest party whether you agree or not with what issaid, they tell the truth, not just what you want to hear like otherparties. (UK British National Party)

Because rue Finns are honestly or [the] Finnish cause, anddont conorm [to] other parties consensus policies. rue Finnscan discuss about hard issues, take sides and look or solutions.(Finland Perussuomalaiset (rue Finns))

Some described the courageousness o their group withreerence to the tediousness o mainstream politics:

CasaPound Italia is the only revolutionary answer to thepolitical dullness o these days. Its lie in a land o dead people!(Italy CasaPound Italia)

en

Economic concerns are ound by most contemporaryresearchers to account or a minority o support or PPAMs.Respondents were classied in the economics category whenthey concerned such matters as tax policy, unemployment,poverty, government bailouts, trade policy, globalisation andincome redistribution.

respondents (41 per cent; n=804) while no CasaPound Italiarespondents (n=424) included anti-Islam comments. Menwere slightly more likely to provide anti-Islam responses onaverage 11 per cent (sd=12) did so compared with 8 per cent(sd=10) o women. In contrast to anti-immigration responses,there was little variation with age.

Some responses attacked Muslims directly:

We have to do something about all these Muslims who are takingover our country [I] would happily talk to you about themassive Muslim problem that our whole world is experiencing.(Denmark Dansk Folkeparti)37

Others held somewhat more nuanced views onIslam or example criticising certain aspects o Islamic law ortradition, while denying racist sentiments:

I want to stop the Islamisation o Sweden Prevent the oppressiono Islamic women by banning the burqa in public places.(Sweden Sverigedemokraterna)38

Above all I have joined Die Freiheit because this party ghtsagainst the Islamic ideology and the linked Islamisation withoutbeing racist, meaning that they are not against Muslims,i they are not criminals and i they do integrate themselves.(Germany Die Freiheit)

intrty

It is oen thought that populists disillusionment withmainstream institutions is tied to a belie that theirorganisation is in comparison honourable and trustworthy.e integrity category covered those respondents who spokeadmiringly o the honest, straight-talking and courageousapproach o the group and those who believed they wereconsistent in their convictions. is category diered romthe disillusionment category in that it required respondents


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Economic concerns were oen combined with oppositionto immigration, with some respondents viewing immigrants asa drain on the states resources:

Frustration and desire or change or durability and stability inemployment, nance; and especially put a halt on immigration and

stop the social aid which badly aects the wallets o the French withcenturies-old French origin. Put a stop to immigration, benets,exaggerated payouts to the oreigners. And give me a job. ank youvery much. (France Front National)41

ant-eu

With many populist groups campaigning on anti-EUplatorms, it is possible that hostility to the EU is a actor inexplaining populist support. Respondents were classied inthe anti-EU category when they criticised the EU and/or thedecisions made by EU institutions.

Only 3 per cent (sd=4) o respondents on average gavetheir opposition to the EU as a motivation or joining PPAMs.Finnish respondents were most likely to express anti-EUsentiments, with 13 per cent doing so (n=692). However,anti-EU sentiment was expressed by less than 1 per cent oCasaPound Italia (n=424), Lega Nord (n=841), Vlaams Belang(n=464) and Norwegian Progress Party respondents (n=909).Women and men diered little in this category an average o3 per cent o male respondents (sd=5) and 2 per cent o emalerespondents (sd=3) cited it in their responses. ere was noclear correlation between age and anti-EU sentiment.

Concern about the loss o national sovereignty as a resulto increased European integration was one o the key sentimentsexpressed by respondents alling within this category.

sn/dr

Respondents were classied in the secessionism/ederalismcategory when they stated that they supported a PPAMbecause o its commitment to secessionist or ederalistobjectives. An average o 3 per cent o respondents (sd=6)provided responses within this category. Such responses were

An average o just 4 per cent (sd=2) o respondentsmentioned economic motivations or joining a PPAM: 6 percent o respondents across a third o PPAMs cited economicswhile less than 1 per cent o CasaPound Italia (n=424) and BlocIdentitaire (n=128) respondents did so. ere were negligibledierences between men and women an average o 4 percent (sd=2) o male respondents cited economic reasons orjoining PPAMs, compared with 3 per cent (sd=3) o women. Asmight be expected, economic motivations were specied mostrequently by 2125-year-olds (although the pan-Europeanaverage was stil l only 7 per cent (sd=7) or that age category).

Where economic concerns were given as a reason orjoining a PPAM, they were diverse in content, with hightaxation, personal indebtedness and the inability o the state toprovide or working people all eatured within the responses:

e rise in prices, the incapacity to pay our debts, despite myhusband and me working. No perspective on the uture as long asthe state continues to take the little money we earn rom us. eincapacity o the state to look aer the honest people who work anddespite all dont have enough to eat and eed our children at the endo each month. (France Front National)39

eres too much intererence in peoples private lives. Everythinghas high taxes and people should be more ree to choose and do theirown thing. (Norway Norwegian Progress Party)

Respondents also expressed their opposition togovernment cuts and their impact on amilies:

Where is the concern or our children, who are the people whohave to carry our Danish society orward? I dont understand howthere can be so many cuts around children. We all want to livein a welare state but no one thinks about how the people who haveto carry the society orward are being dropped on the foor.(Denmark Dansk Folkeparti)40


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ese results suggest that the vast majority o respondentssupport PPAMs because they identiy with their policyoerings rather than because they desire to shock or protest.

is does not mean, o course, that online membersare satised with mainstream organisations. A substantialproportion o respondents (a pan-European gure o 9 percent) saw PPAMs as honest and straight-talking, a reshalternative to the stale status quo. Many lauded PPAMs orspeaking out about issues that mainstream organisationsare unwilling or unable to address. ese responses oenemphasised PPAMs commitment to action, to working hard toaccomplish change on the ground. is suggests that PPAMsare successully portraying themselves as credible alternativesto political elites who have lost touch with the people they aresupposed to represent.

Our ndings also oer some illumination onimmigration. An average o 17 per cent o responseswas classied as anti-immigration, a signicant but notoverwhelming proportion. is suggests that a successulexplanation o the support or PPAMs must invoke more thanjust negative attitudes towards immigration. Indeed, althoughsome academic literature suggests that the economic threat oimmigration is driving people into these groups, only a verylow proportion o respondents mentioned economic grievancesor preerences o any sort (an average o 4 per cent). Whyyounger respondents were more likely than older respondentsto cite concerns about immigration as a reason or joining aPPAM is not something our data can ully answer, but this iscertainly worthy o urther investigation.

An alternative explanation o the underlying causes ohostility towards immigration is ound in the pan-Europeanaverage o 17 per cent o responses classied in the identitycategory the joint second highest rated category alongsideanti-immigration. e considerable number o respondentsplaced in this category suggests that a desire to protect nationaland cultural identity is a more important actor in explainingPPAM support than economic grievances, and is perhaps theprincipal driving orce behind concerns about immigration.

provided almost exclusively by those rom Vlaams Belang(18 per cent o total responses; n=464) and Lega Nord (17per cent o total responses; n=841) parties that campaignrespectively on platorms o Flemish independence andNorthern Italian autonomy.

otr

Some 10 per cent (sd=7) o responses on averageincluded content that could not be classied within theaorementioned categories. Respondents who solely includedcontent o this kind were classied in the category other.Some o the issues raised in these responses included saety,pensions and animal rights.

DnIt is clear rom the range o results within each categorythat national context matters greatly. For example, givenwidespread corruption in Italy, it is not surprising that 17per cent o responses rom the Italian street organisationCasaPound Italia ell under integrity, the highest o anygroup or this category. Nor is it surprising that the responsesrom the Norwegian Progress Party, as the second-largest partyin Norway and part o the mainstream political establishment,eatured so ew responses in this category only 4 per cent.

Our research suggests that online PPAM supporterscannot be accurately characterised as protest voters, whosupport PPAMs to shock and voice discontent with elites,rather than to advance ideological or policy aims. While manyonline PPAM sympathisers are disillusioned with the politicalstatus quo, they do not appear to be primarily motivatedby a desire to protest. Although on average 13 per cent orespondents expressed disillusionment with mainstreampolitical parties and organisations, an average o 38 percent registered broad ideological agreement with the values,principles or aims o their respective organisation. In additionto this general alignment o values, numerous respondentsidentied specic PPAM policy goals as reasons or joining.


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e desire to promote and protect national identity,however, did not merely contribute to immigrationgrievances. Concerns over identity were oen articulatedalongside opposition to Islam rather than immigration: somerespondents expressed ear o Muslims, because o theirperceived extremist views, in terms which suggested that theirnational origin was unimportant.42 In addition, a signicantnumber o respondents spoke o upholding their countriesvalues without expressing hostility to any minority group.While some o these responses seemed to be euphemisticattacks on minority groups, numerous responses emphasisedthe central importance o celebrating respondents ownculture, rather than denigrating that o others. It seems thatjoining a PPAM provided a way or some people to reasserttheir intra-cultural ties and nd a sense o belonging withintheir own communities.

Importantly, a concern with identity need not beunderstood solely in terms o traditional conservat ive values.While there are vague invocations o French values orthe British way o lie, in a number o groups many o themore specic responses reerred to values such as reedom,democracy and human rights. is suggests that, or some,deending liberal values is an integral part o protectingones identity.

Overall, our results suggest that online respondentsdo not see themselves as primarily motivated by economicconcerns; nor do they support PPAMs out o protest. Rather, alarge proportion supports PPAMs because they are concernedabout immigration; concerns which appear to be driven moreby a desire to preserve and protect cultural identity than byany perceived economic threat.

e importance that supporters place on the protectiono this identity also goes some way to explaining both theiranti-Islamic sentiment and the desire to promote traditionalvalues or their own sake.


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4 s nd pt v

As part o the survey we asked respondents a number oquestions regarding their social and political views, whichwere modelled where possible on Eurobarometer or EuropeanValues Survey questions to provide a baseline o comparison.

Tp t bt nrnWe asked PPAM supporters to rank their biggest social andpolitical concerns, taken rom a list o 18 current issues,including immigration, climate change, unemployment andout o touch politicians, among others.

Across our sample, over a third o PPAM supportersput immigration in the top two most important issues,ollowed by a quarter who cited Islamic extremism (table 4).Respondents also recorded concern about crime (17 per cent),the economic situation (16 per cent), rising prices (14 per cent),unemployment (13 per cent), multiculturalism (12 per cent)and out o touch politicians (11 per cent). Comparing theseresponses to the Eurobarometer survey we nd that populistparties and movement (PPAM) supporters are signicantlymore likely to cite immigration and crime. Direct comparisonswith concerns over Islamic extremism are not possible as thisis not included in the Eurobarometer survey. In contrast toPPAM supporters, the most pressing issues or respondents tothe Eurobarometer survey are all economic in nature withrising prices and ination (46 per cent), the economic situation(20 per cent) and unemployment (19 per cent) being the topthree concerns.


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61Social and political views

Across the countries, however, there was signicantvariation in the priority given to certain issues. Concernsover immigration were highest in France, with 67 per cento Bloc Identitaire respondents and 56 per cent o FrontNational respondents citing immigration as a top twoconcern. By contrast, concerns over Islamic extremism werehighest among respondents rom the Netherlands (48 percent), Germany (40 per cent) and Belgium (39 per cent), andlowest among CasaPound Italia (6 per cent) and rue Finnsupporters (15 per cent).

Other parties revealed specic worries. Germanrespondents were signicantly more likely (32 per cent) tocite out o touch politicians as a top two concern. e nextclosest were rue Finn respondents (14 per cent) and BNPrespondents (13 per cent). ere was signicant concern overunemployment among Italian respondents in particular, with24 per cent o CasaPound Italia supporters and 23 per cent oLega Nord supporters citing it as a top two concern. On average,PPAM supporters are less likely to be concerned about theeconomic situation (16 per cent compared with 20 per cent orthe Eurobarometer survey) and unemployment (13 per centcompared with 19 per cent or the Eurobarometer survey).

Pt nd vtnIn addition to specic social and political issues, we askedsupporters about their general views on the ecacy odemocratic politics, the uture o their country and attitudes toviolence in pursuit o political ends (table 5).

Table 4 Prprtn pprtr PPam nd rpndnt

t erbrtr rvy rtd rtn,

i xtr nd r n tr tp

t nrn43

Rtd rtnn tp 2 (%)

Rtd ixtrn tp 2 (%)

Rtd rn tp 2 (%)

PPam erbrtr(ntry %)

PPam N/a PPam erbrtr(ntry %)

Bloc Identitaire 67 3 31 8 10British National Party 45 6 21 8 8

CasaPound Italia 26 8 6 9 8


36 5 21 15 9

Die Freiheit 17 1 40 15 3


21 6 18 21 7


36 17 28

Front National 56 3 17 17 10

Lega Nord 25 8 16 9 8


28 3 48 25 5


33 4 15 9 4


48 6 32 24 7


38 8 39 26 14

Pnerpn vr 37 4 (EU average) 25 17 6 (EU average)



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While support or voting was high, this was mixed withdissatisaction with current politics: only 34 per cent agreedwith the statement politics is an eective way to respond tomy concerns. e most pessimistic were German Die Freiheitsupporters (3 per cent) and Belgian Vlaams Belang supporters(10 per cent). e most optimistic, on the other hand, weresupporters o the Norwegian Progress Party (70 per cent) andthe Sweden Democrats (61 per cent).

We also asked respondents whether they agreedwith the statement violence is acceptable to ensure theright outcome. It is important to stress that agreeing thatviolence is acceptable to ensure the right outcome doesnot necessarily imply that the group itsel or its supportersare violent or are likely to engage in violence. It could, orexample, also encompass agreement with British militaryaction overseas as in Libya, or which there was signicantsupport across the country. While comparisons between thegroups on this question are interesting, there is no baselineEurope-wide data on this question, making inerences aboutthe relevance o this question dicult.

In France and Italy, supporters o street-basedmovements were more likely to agree that violence isacceptable to ensure the right outcome. Supporters oCasaPound Italia were the most likely o all the g roupssurveyed to agree with this statement (47 per cent), withBloc Identitaire supporters a close second at 43 per cent.However, in the UK, there was little dierence betweenEDL and BNP responses to this question. is may bebecause o the high number o BNP respondents whoagreed violence is acceptable. In act, among politicalparties, BNP supporters were most inclined to agreewith this statement (37 per cent), ollowed by Lega Nordsupporters (32 per cent) and Front National supporters(29 per cent). On average, one in our PPAM supportersagreed with the above statement.

Table 5 Prprtn pprtr PPam rd t

ttnt bt vtn, t ftvn pt

nd tr vn ptb t v

t rt t

e majority o respondents did not agree with thestatement it does not matter who you vote or, suggestingthat those drawn to PPAMs are not completely disillusionedwith democratic choices. On average, 16 per cent o PPAMsupporters agreed with the above statement, expressingdisillusionment with the act o voting.

ar tt t dnt ttr y vt r (%)

ar tt pt n ftv yt rpnd t ynrn (%)

ar tt vn ptb tv t rtt (%)

Bloc Identitaire 19 20 43

British National Party 21 40 37

CasaPound Italia 16 43 47

Danish Peoples Party 10 41 15

Die Freiheit 26 3 12

English Deence League 33 35 34


8 14 17


13 70 14

Front National 21 28 29

Lega Nord 9 45 32


13 29 25


6 55 21


9 61 14


12 10 23

avr 16 35 26



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In the latest Eurobarometer survey in spring 2011,26 per cent on average were optimistic that their lie would bebetter in the next 12 months, 14 per cent thought it would beworse and 57 per cent thought it would stay the same. Usingthis as a baseline measure we ound that, interestingly, PPAMsupporters seemed to be more optimistic about their ownpersonal lives than their compatriots in a number o countries,including Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Italy (CasaPoundItalia supporters). e least optimistic respondents by asignicant margin were French respondents with only 10per cent o Bloc Identitaire and Front National respondentsexpressing optimism about their lives compared to a nationalaverage o 33 per cent.

at optimism, however, dropped signicantly whenit came to their views about the uture o their respectivecountries as a whole. When asked i they agreed that theirnation was on the right track (see table 6), only an averageo 10 per cent o supporters said they agreed. Danish PeoplesParty supporters were the most optimistic or their country with27 per cent agreeing with the statement. e least optimisticwere Vlaams Belang supporters, which had only 3 per cento respondents believing their nation was on the right track,ollowed by 4 per cent o Bloc Identitaire supporters.

Prn nd ntn ptWe also wanted to explore whether PPAM supporters wereoptimistic or pessimistic about their own uture prospects, aswell as the uture o their country (table 6).

Table 6 Prprtn pprtr PPam nd rpndnt

t erbrtr rvy tt tr ntry

n t rt trk nd tt t nxt 12 nt

d b bttr tn t t r t prny

i [yr ntry] nt rt trk?44

w t nxt 12 ntb bttr tn t t ry prny?45

PPam r(%)

erbrtrr (%)

PPam r(%)

erbrtrr (%)

Bloc Identitaire 4 17 10 33

British National Party 12 35 27 34

CasaPound Italia 8 17 30 23


27 44 46 34

English Deence League 5 41 21 21

Die Freiheit 8 35 23 34


11 47 21 19


12 31

Front National 4 17 10 33

Lega Nord 11 17 21 23


19 35 26 32


16 49 27 32


14 56 38 49


3 26 53 33

avr 10 28 (EU average) 27 26 (EU average)

Standard deviation 7 12


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Comparing these responses with those o theEurobarometer survey we nd that PPAM supporters aresignicantly more likely than the general population in theirrespective countries to have negative eelings towards theEuropean Union. When asked what the European Unionmeant to respondents, the top three answers rom theEurobarometer survey were reedom to travel, work and studyat 45 per cent, the euro currency at 38 per cent and waste omoney at 24 per cent. Compared with the answers above, only21 per cent cited bureaucracy, 18 per cent cited not enoughcontrol over external borders, 13 per cent cited more crimeand only 11 per cent cited loss o cultural identity.

It is clear, thereore, that despite some signicantvariation among the dierent countries and group supporters,on the whole PPAM supporters are signicantly moreconcerned about immigration, Islamic extremism, crime andcultural erosion than the Eurobarometer survey responsessuggest is common o the average European.

Table 7 Prprtn PPam pprtr nd erbrtr

rpndnt tt t eu t

ny, dd nt xrt n ntr vr xtrn

brdr nd d d t tr dntty 46

Particularly given the current political climate, it is perhapsno surprise that PPAM supporters were likely to be negativetowards the EU (table 7). When asked to select what the EUmeant to them personally, the most common response was wasteo money (59 per cent), ollowed by not enough control overexternal borders (58 per cent), loss o our cultural identity (56per cent), more crime (46 per cent) and bureaucracy (36 per cent).

mntnd t ny (%)

mntnd ntn ntr vrxtrn brdr (%)

mntnd tr dntty (%)

PPam er-brtr(ntry %)



Bloc Identitaire 46 31 70 24 58 11

British National Party 64 28 60 22 64 19

CasaPound Italia 48 12 46 14 63 11


55 17 53 37 48 14

Die Freiheit 80 43 70 24 69 9


84 48 77 40 72 22


48 47 38

Front National 52 31 55 24 55 11

Lega Nord 32 12 33 14 29 11


68 21 56 21 52 12


74 27 62 13 69 8

Sverigedemokraterna(Sweden Democrats) 63 34 58 17 57 9


57 27 69 22 58 7

avr 59 24 (EU avg.) 58 18 (EU avg.) 56 11 (EU avg.)



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69

5 Trt n ntttn

Our survey also asked about levels o generalised andinstitutional trust. Participants were asked to rate their levelo agreement with a statement suggesting tha

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