department of computer science center for cognitive science rutgers university lewis and the...
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Department of Computer ScienceCenter for Cognitive Science
Rutgers University
Lewis andthe Semantics-Pragmatics
DivideErnie Lepore
Matthew Stone
Outline
Rethinking semantics and pragmatics• coordination (Lewis 1969)• the conversational record (Lewis 1979)Linguistics and the socialImplications for philosophical practice
Background
Last time: Intentions• Intention recognition is an important
ingredient of understanding, collaboration
BUT• Problematic to locate linguistic
knowledge using intentions
Need to look elsewhere to get clear on the scope of linguistic rules as social constructs
Coordination
Situations where agents’ actions must agree
• but no intrinsic reason to prefer one joint strategy over another
Coordination
Examples from Lewis (1969)• Arrange a meeting• Restart an interrupted phone call• Row a boat• Share the road when driving• Perform a search as a group• Collude to set prices• Signal a choice
Coordination as a game
C1 C2 C3
R1 1;1 0;0 0;0
R2 0;0 1;1 0;0
R3 0;0 0;0 1;1
Games and reasoning
If an agent chooses her action deliberately, she must consider her expectations about her partner.
Idealization: equilibrium• no player would change his move,
given the moves the others make
Games and reasoning
We generally expect equilibria in real life• where agents play repeatedly
they can learn to match one anothereven if individual decisions are heuristic
Equilibrium describes regularity in behavior
• Lets us ascribe certain states to agents (perhaps tacit or implicit)
State underlying equilibrium
It’s common knowledge that(1) everyone conforms to R(2) everyone expects everyone else to
conform to R(3) everyone prefers to conform to R on
the condition that others do
Lewis: this is a convention
Objections:• Silent about how conventions are
instituted
That’s the point.• Lewis describes how we can get
convention from salience, precedents and convergence – but this is just one story among many
Games and reasoning
A range of mechanisms explain equilibrium
• Architecture – we’re only biologically capable of one equilibrium
• Salience – we’re so constituted that preferred equilibrium leaps to mind
• Experience – we’ve learned that others follow a given equilibrium
All potentially relevant to language facultyArchitecture: Universal GrammarSalience: Primitive preferences for
particular patterns of interpretationExperience: Acquired lexical items,
syntactic parameter settings, etc.
Lewis: this is a convention
Objections:• We don’t have to know all these things
(Burge)
Fair point – let’s talk about ‘social competence’ instead as whatever lets us solve (certain) coordination problems – not prejudging the actual status of skills, knowledge, choice & alternatives
Lewis: this is a convention
Objections:• Lewis’s conventions are always
followed – this seems too strong (Gilbert, Millikan)
• Examples: handing out cigars, using ‘bank’ to mean financial institution
Lewis: this is a convention
Objections:• Lewis’s conventions have to achieve
preferred outcomes – this seems too strong (Gilbert, Millikan)
• Examples: decorating for Christmas specifically with red and green
Lewis: this is a convention
Objections:• Seems to assume coordination
problem exists antecedently of equilibrium – this seems too strong (Marmor)
• Examples: playing chess by the rules
Response
In keeping with idea of social competence, let’s think of coordination problems are rational reconstructions
Lewis on Signaling
One party produces signal,knowing the state of the world
The other acts,having seen the signal
Explains information carried by signal,but a long way from meaning
Signaling example
‘one if by land, two if by sea’
Sexton hangs certain patterns of lightsconditional on what British are doing
Revere prepares particular pattern of defenseconditional on what lights he sees
They want equilibrium
Signaling games
1L2S 1S2L
1L2S 1;1 0;0
1S2L 0;0 1;1
Problems
Meaning is underdetermined• 1 light: the British are coming by land
or• 1 light: prepare the land defenses!
or• both?
Problems
Meaning only present at equilibrium• So what about coordination that
succeeds through other mechanisms – salience? good luck? partial or tentative precedents?
Lewis on Convention
Lewis attempts to generalize to languageby directly understanding truth conditionsas conventions for agents to use certain sentences in certain conditions(namely, when they are true)
Lewis on Convention
This is very cumbersomeAnd doesn’t seem to get at the real
difficulties
Another idea
Language combines social competence with specific institutions targeted at meaning
Specifically: the conversational record (Lewis 1979)
Conversational record
List of propositions associated with discourse
Specifies• interlocutors’ environment• what has been said already• what the purposes and plan is• what standards of meaning are in play• what issues are open• what conversation is committed to(Lewis 1979, Thomason 1990)
Conversational record
Record is dynamic• topic can change• meaning standards can be negotiated• presuppositions can be challenged• interlocutors can commit to new
propositions or rescind previous commitments
Utterances specify updates• generally, as a matter of meaning
Conversational record
Abstraction• Free to specify discourse referents,
standards for vague predicates,other constructs from formal theories
• Need not be tied to interlocutors’ knowledge or belief
Record is arbitrary
In key respects, it’s up to us how the record changes
So it’s natural to think of the record as an object of coordination
Coordinating on the Record
One way of thinking• I have my version of what’s happened• You have your version of what’s
happened• When it lines up, we’ve communicated
Compare Neale’s presentation here
Coordinating on the Record
One way of thinking• I have my version of what’s happened• You have your version of what’s
happened• When it lines up, we’ve communicated
Drawback: describing cases of miscommunication, clarification, etc.
Coordinating on the Record
An indirect way of thinking• Each of us defers to practices• Meanings specify how to update the
record• We coordinate on what we defer to
Coordinating on the Record
An indirect way of thinking• Each of us defers to practices• Meanings specify how to update the
record• We coordinate on what we defer to
Promises a better handle on miscommunication, clarification
The Received View
Semantics• linguistic specification of reference,
truth• settles what the speaker is saying
Pragmatics• general principles of inference and
strategy• settles what speaker is doing
Problems
Fails to describe linguistic knowledge• more linguistic facts than supposes• e.g., rules for indirection,
presupposition, information structure, etc.
Fails to describe interpretive inference• wide range of practices for engaging
with imagery, drawing insights
Overall picture
Key theoretical notion is inquiry• process (normally collaborative)
in which interlocutors settle how things are
Requires• public meanings• open to negotiation, debate
Overall picture
Inquiry privileges conventional meaning• depends on conversational record• depends on coordination
Allows for a broad understanding of meaning
Excludes insight or point of open-ended, idiosyncratic engagement with utterance
Inquiry and CR
Conversational record tracks inquiry• Assertion registers proposition on
recordas commitment of one party
• Enables further follow up, such asclarification questions,arguments for or against,agreement or disagreement by other parties
Record ensures a shared interpretation
How will this affect philosophy?Better arguments, but more difficult
ones.
Close with case study:• Grice versus ordinary language
philosophers
Color: the dialectic
Claim: color supervenes on appearance• Something is red just in case it looks
red under normal conditions to appropriately endowed observers.
Objection (Austin):• Hogwash! You’d only say something
looked red if it wasn’t red!
Color: the dialectic
Reply (Grice):• Well, yes, you wouldn’t say something
looks red unless it wasn’t red.• But, that’s not part of the meaning of
“it looks red”, it’s an implicature.
Us:• Sorry Grice, your linguistics is bogus.
What next?
Us:• Sorry Austin, your linguistics is bogus
too!
Often say “something looks red” when it is:
• His fake tan looks orange.• Contaminated water still looks clear.• The distant shores look green and
inviting.(examples after google
searches)
What next?
Us:• Sorry Austin, your linguistics is bogus
too!
When “it looks red” means it’s not, it’s because of intonation.
No objection to analysis of color,as long as you don’t use that intonation!
Similar cases
Believe and know.Try and succeed.Or and and.
Ordinary language folks: 1st suggests not 2nd
Grice: That’s just an implicature.Us: You’re both wrong.
1st suggests not 2nd if marked elsewherelots of times 1st doesn’t suggest not 2nd.
Basic point
Our theories need to acknowledge the richness and complexity of language and communication.
We can do the linguistics and philosophy we want without unhelpful categories like “conversational implicatures”.