department of defence phase 1 – initial assessment …€¦ · 2. incorporates co-ordinating and...
TRANSCRIPT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 1 – INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REPORTING PROCESS MAP
6.1 MODELS:1A (PROPOSED) - LOW RECORDING THRESHOLD AND LOW REPORTING THRESHOLD1B (PROPOSED) - LOW RECORDING THRESHOLD AND HIGH REPORTING THRESHOLD1C (PROPOSED) - HIGH RECORDING THRESHOLD AND HIGH REPORTING THRESHOLD
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Start
5.4
Receive trigger event notification
Refer to Recording and ReportingPolicy to determine recording and
reporting requirements
Review trigger event formTrigger Event Form
Trigger Event Form
5.4
Provide input, direction or makea decision based on service
specific requirements
6.1.65.4
Co-ordinate with DefenceAssessment and Reporting Areaabout involvement in decision-making process and action as
required
5.4
Communicate with Chain ofCommand as required
6.1.5
5.4
Review trigger event form
Has the Commander / LineManager requested for
support outside the Unit orChain of Command?
Yes
6.1.6
Co-ordinate support or actionrequired from Chain of
Command
5.4
Provide ongoing feedback toUnit or Chain of Command about
external support or action
6.1.8
5.4
Use trigger form to determineappropriate level of support or
action required outside the Unitor Chain of Command
5.4
Assess whether theCommander / Line Manager’s
assessment of the trigger eventwas appropriate
6.1.7
Was the Commander / LineManager’s assessment
appropriate?No Yes
Maintain a central repository of reportsto be used for whole-of-Defence
statistical analysis, trend tracking,policy development, monitoring and
audit purposes
End
5.4
Co-ordinate support or actionfrom outside the Unit or Chain of
Command
6.1.6
5.4
Liaise with the Chain ofCommand to determine
appropriate support or actionfrom outside the Unit or Chain of
Command
No
5.4
Complete trigger event formonline or in hardcopy form if
recording threshold met(if access to the online form is
not available)
6.1.2Trigger Event Form
Does the trigger need to bereported to the Defence
Assessment and ReportingArea?
Is external support requiredto manage the event?
Is external support requiredto make the decision?
Model 1A(Everything Recorded is Reported)
- High Level of Recording- High Level Reporting
Model 1B- High Level of Recording- Low Level of Reporting
Model 1C(Everything Recorded is Reported)
- Low Level of Recording- Low Level of Reporting
5.4
Submit trigger event form toDefence Assessment and
Reporting Area and Chain ofCommand
Yes
Yes
Yes
Phase 2No
No
Phase 2No
6.1.3
6.1.4
6.1.4
B5 B7
B1
B2
6.1.1
B3
B4
B9
B6
6.1.9
B8
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
Preventative Control
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
XX
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
G1
G5
G9
G7
G3
G4
G6 G8 G10
G2
5.4
Perform telephone reporting ifrequired
Recording andReporting Policy
5.4
Update record of trigger event
6.1.1 6.1 Models 1A,1B and 1C (Proposed) -
Initial Assessment and Reporting
Consistency Commander / Line Manager (Unit) refer to Recording and Reporting
Policy to determine recording and reporting requirements.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Governed by lawful procedures that are simple and easy to use.
Daily Service Groups Manual Preventative
6.1.2 6.1 Models 1A,1B and 1C (Proposed) -
Initial Assessment and Reporting
Timeliness / Consistency A standard online form is used to capture all trigger events (a hard copy
form is used if access to the online form is not available).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making.
2. Functions effectively in the integrated environment.
Multiple Times per
Day
Commander / Line
Manager
(Unit)
Manual Preventative
6.1.3 6.1 Model 1A (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Consistency All trigger events on the list of subjects are required to be recorded on
the form and submitted to the Defence Assessment and Reporting
Area.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome. Daily Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Preventative
6.1.4 6.1 Model 1B and 1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Consistency External support, outside the Unit, is available to assist in the
management of a trigger event.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Commander / Line
Manager
(Unit)
Manual Preventative
6.1.5 6.1 Models 1A,1B and 1C (Proposed) -
Initial Assessment and Reporting
Communication The Defence Assessment and Reporting Area communicate with the
Chain of Command in the decision-making process to ensure that the
level of involvement required is obtained.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
3. Prevents potential duplication of work required in the decision-making
process.
Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Preventative
6.1.6 6.1 Models 1A,1B and 1C (Proposed) -
Initial Assessment and Reporting
Consistency The Central Assessment and Reporting are available to co-ordinate
support or action from outside the Unit or Chain of Command.
The Chain of Command are available to provide input, direction or to
assist making a decision based on service specific requirements.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates safeguards for individuals.
3. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Preventative
6.1.7 6.1 Models 1A,1B and 1C (Proposed) -
Initial Assessment and Reporting
Consistency Defence Assessment and Reporting Area assess whether the
Commander's / Line Manager’s assessment of the trigger event was
appropriate.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates safeguards for individuals.
3. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Preventative
6.1.8 6.1 Models 1A,1B and 1C (Proposed) -
Initial Assessment and Reporting
Communication The Defence Assessment and Reporting Area provides ongoing
feedback to the Unit or Chain of Command about any external support
or action that is required.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Preventative
6.1.9 6.1 Models 1A,1B and 1C (Proposed) -
Initial Assessment and Reporting
Monitoring The Defence Assessment and Reporting Area maintain and use a
central repository of reports for whole-of-Defence statistical analysis,
trend tracking, policy development, monitoring and audit purposes.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates safeguards for individuals.
3. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Detective
Department of Defence
Initial Assessment and Reporting Process Map
Control Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Responsible AreaManual /
AutomatedPreventative / DetectiveRef. Sub Process Control Type Control Description Control Objective Frequency
6.1 G1 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Consistency The essential components for an optimal system of
inquiry, investigation and review are not reflected in the
system/model utilised by Defence.
The essential components for an optimal system
of inquiry, investigation and review are not
reflected in the system/model utilised by Defence.
Provide guidance as to how the essential components
for an optimal system of inquiry, investigation and
review can be applied to the process.
Daily Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Preventative
6.1 G2 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Timeliness There is no specific timing for when a trigger event
form needs to be completed and submitted by the
Commander / Line Manager.
Commanders / Line Managers may not complete
the trigger event form in a timely manner.
Specify a timeframe for submission of the trigger form
within applicable policies or procedures.
Implement a detective control to identify trigger events
that have not been completed and submitted within the
specified timeframe.
Multiple Times per
Day
Commander /
Line Manager
Manual Detective
6.1 G3 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Consistency The trigger event form may not fit the purposes as
required due to the generic fields and / or language in
the form, as opposed to the information being
incorrect.
The trigger event may not be completed in a
consistent manner as the trigger event form is too
generic.
Implement a detective control to review (quality
assurance) a sample of trigger events to review the
final trigger event recorded against the initial entry
made by the Commander / Line Manager. This is to
highlight any fundamental differences between the
initial complaint and trigger event recorded that are due
to deficiencies in the form.
Multiple Times per
Day
Commander /
Line Manager
Manual Detective
6.1 G4 6.1 Model 1B and 1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Consistency The threshold level for reporting a trigger event is not
treated in a consistent manner by Commanders / Line
Managers (due to the level of judgement required or
lack thereof).
Trigger events may not be treated in a consistent
manner.
Implement a detective control to review (quality
assurance) a sample of trigger events to ensure the
recording of events is completed in a consistent
manner.
Provide regular training on how to treat or apply the
threshold appropriately.
Multiple Times per
Day
Commander /
Line Manager
Manual Detective
6.1 G5 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the recording
and reporting of a trigger event is not communicated
throughout Defence.
The process in relation to recording and reporting
of a trigger event is not understood by APS
employees / ADF members.
Provide guidance as to how the revised model will be
communicated throughout Defence.
Daily Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Preventative
6.1 G6 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Efficiency A single trigger event is recorded multiple times (i.e.
duplicate entries are made for the one trigger event).
The trigger event is recorded multiple times which
results in duplicate reviews and impacts data
integrity for the performance of statistical analysis
of trigger events.
Implement a detective control to identity whether
duplicate trigger events are allocated to a APS
employee / ADF member.
Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Detective
6.1 G7 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Monitoring There is insufficient resourcing to monitor the
mechanism in place to track, manage and / or monitor
the progress of action taken for a recorded and
reported trigger event.
The trigger event is unable to be managed or
reviewed appropriately by the relevant
stakeholder/s and impacts the timeliness of the
process.
Provide guidance as to how trigger events will be track,
managed and monitored by the appropriate
stakeholders through the web-based recording tool.
Daily Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Preventative
6.1 G8 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Consistency There is no proper record or review process in place to
ensure that all trigger events are recorded and
reported.
All trigger events are not recorded and reported. Ensure there is a consistent understanding across
Defence in regards to the recording and reporting
requirements for trigger events, through: face to face or
on-line training.
Maintain a proper record and conduct a regular review
of the trigger event form to ensure that information
recorded and reported is relevant and complete. To
monitor this, implement a detective control to
investigate statistical anomalies in relation to the
number and type of trigger reports.
Daily Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Preventative
6.1 G9 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Monitoring Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part of
the review process are not rectified to ensure the issue
(if due to a systematic error) does not re-occur in the
future.
Lessons learnt are not reflected in an updated
process.
Implement a process which identifies how control
weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in the process,
will be rectified to prevent a re-occurrence.
Daily Defence
Assessment and
Reporting Area
Manual Preventative
Gap Risks Frequency
Department of Defence
Initial Assessment and Reporting Process Map
Responsible
Area
Manual /
Automated
Preventative /
DetectiveReference Sub Process Gap Type Gap Description Recommendations
Control Gaps - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Risk ID Applicable Defence Process Operational Risk Description Significance Likelihood Risk Rating
Control
Activities in
Place?
Risk
Addressed?Control Gap / Weakness
6.1 R1 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
The key difference between the proposed models
(i.e. Model 1A, 1B and 1C) relates to the thresholds
applied for the level of recording and reporting
performed by the Commander / Line Manager of a
Unit.
- Under Model 1A, a low recording and reporting
threshold will mean that a greater number of trigger
event forms will require recording and reporting.
- Under Model 1B, a low recording and high reporting
threshold will mean that a greater number of trigger
event forms will require completion, however fewer
will require reporting (as compared to Model 1A).
- Under Model 1C, a high recording and reporting
threshold will mean a few number of trigger event
forms will require completion (as compared to
Models 1B and 1C) and reporting.
The model selected by Defence will depend on
variety of factors, which include: risk appetite (noting
that Model 1A represents the least risk but also
presents the greatest administration burden) and the
robustness of the data repository Defence wishes to
maintain for whole of Defence statistical analysis,
trend tracking, policy development and audit
purposes.
High
High
High
Low
Moderate
High
Moderate
Moderate
High No - - - - - NoThese risks are inherent to Models 1A, 1B and
1C.
6.1 R2 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
The trigger event form is not flexible enough to cover
all possible subject matters or is unable to operate in
a range of diverse and unique environments.
High Low Moderate Yes 6.1.2 - - - - Yes N/a.
6.1 R3 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
A Commander / Line Manager has not completed
and submitted a trigger event form in a timely
manner (i.e. trigger event forms are left open for an
excessive period of time).
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No detective control is in place to ensure trigger
event forms are completed and submitted in a
timely manner.
6.1 R4 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
The trigger event form is too generic (i.e. a form
submitted for a similar event does not capture
consistent information when completed by different
Commanders / Line Managers). Note: This risk does
not relate to where additional information is
discovered and then captured in the form. Rather it
highlights an event which is treated in a different
manner when handled by two different individuals -
even though the facts presented to both individuals
is exactly the same - due to the form not prompting
for the required information.
High Moderate High Yes 6.1.2 - - - - - Partially No detective control is in place to review
(quality assurance) a sample of trigger events
to review the final trigger event recorded
against the initial entry made by the
Commander / Line Manager - to highlight any
fundamental differences between the initial
complaint and trigger event recorded that are
due to deficiencies in the form.
6.1 R5 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
Trigger events are not treated in a consistent
manner by Commanders / Line Managers (for events
with a similar fact pattern), with regards to the
recording and reporting of events.
High Low Moderate Yes 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.1.4 6.1.5 6.1.7 Partially No detective control is in place to review the
trigger events not reported to the Defence
Assessment and Reporting Area (i.e. those
marked as 'no external support required to
manage the event' or 'no external support
required to make the decision'). Note: This risk
increases as the level of reporting decreases.
6.1 R6 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
Procedural documentation (Recording and Reporting
Policy) in relation to the recording and reporting of a
trigger event are not communicated throughout the
ADF.
Moderate Low Low Yes 6.1.1 6.1.5 - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to
how the documentation will be communicated
throughout the ADF.
6.1 R7 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
Recording and reporting requirements for trigger
events are not easy to understand or are too
complicated to follow.
High Moderate High Yes 6.1.1 6.1.2 - - - Yes N/a.
Department of Defence
Initial Assessment and Reporting
Risk Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Control References
Risk ID Applicable Defence Process Operational Risk Description Significance Likelihood Risk Rating
Control
Activities in
Place?
Risk
Addressed?Control Gap / Weakness
Department of Defence
Initial Assessment and Reporting
Risk Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Control References
6.1 R8 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
A single trigger event is recorded multiple times (i.e.
duplicate entries for the single event).
Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 6.1.2 - - - - Partially No detective control is in place to identify
duplicate trigger event entries.
6.1 R9 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
Key stakeholders are unable to track and monitor
the progress of the action taken for a recorded and
reported trigger event.
High Low Moderate Yes 6.1.2 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in regards to
the monitoring functionality contained within the
web based recording tool.
6.1 R10 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
All trigger events are not recorded and reported. High Moderate High Yes 6.1.2 6.1.9 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to
how the documentation will be communicated
throughout the ADF.
6.1 R11 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
There is a lack of external support (outside the Unit)
to assist with the management of a trigger event.
High Low Moderate Yes 6.1.4 6.1.6 6.1.8 - - - Yes N/a.
6.1 R12 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
Deficiencies identified in the online trigger form or
hard copy form are not rectified to ensure the issue
(if due to a systematic error - i.e. common user
misunderstanding of requirements) does not re-
occur in the future.
Moderate Low Low No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
remediation action that will be taken for
deficiencies identified in the recording and
reporting of a trigger event.
6.1 R13 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
A trigger event recorded via a hard copy form is not
correctly or completely captured in the subsequent
event lodged using the online tool.
Moderate Moderate Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
who is responsible for transferring a hard copy
form to the online trigger recording and
reporting tool.
6.1 R14 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
The recording and reporting of all trigger events lead
to an administrative burden on the Central
Administration and Reporting Area which could
reduce the quality of service provided to the ADF.
High High High Yes 6.1.4 6.1.5 - - - - Yes N/a.
6.1 R15 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
Reporting of abuse or complaints may not be
actioned or investigated properly.
High Moderate High Yes 6.1.6 6.1.7 - - - - Partially No detective controls are in place to ensure that
trigger events are appropriately actioned. Refer
to Control Gaps G2, G3, G4, G6 and G9.
6.1 R16 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
Events (including forms of abuse) may not be
reported if:
- leadership does not provide support to those who
report
- the system is ineffective and support mechanisms
do not exist, and
- leaders are not accountable / responsible for
maintaining a framework that facilitates reporting
High Moderate High Yes 6.1.6 6.1.7 - - - - Partially No clear guidance or requirements are provided
regarding:
- Communication - ensuring that APS
employees / ADF members are aware of the
framework that exists
- Training - ensuring that leadership and APS
employees / ADF members are aware of their
rights and obligations under the framework
- Support - ensuring that support mechanisms
exist and are available for APS employees /
ADF members who report.
6.1 R17 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting
(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)
After submission of the trigger form, Commanders/
Line managers may feel that they are absolved of
further responsibility regarding the matter.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No The process does detail any further
responsibility for Commander/Line Manager
after they have submitted the trigger form.
B1 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Timeliness There is no specific timing for when a trigger event form needs
to be completed and submitted by the Commander / Line
Manager.
Specify a timeframe for submission of the trigger form within
applicable policies or procedures.
Implement a detective control to identify trigger events that
have not been completed and submitted within the specified
timeframe.
Timely recording and reporting of trigger
events.
Moderate
B2 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Consistency The trigger event form may not fit the purposes as required due
to the generic fields and / or language in the form.
Implement a detective control to review the final trigger event
recorded against the initial entry made by the Commander /
Line Manager. This is to highlight any fundamental differences
between the initial complaint and trigger event recorded that
are due to restrictions in the form.
Consistent recording of trigger events. Moderate
B3 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Consistency The threshold level for reporting a trigger event is not treated in
a consistent manner by Commanders / Line Managers (due to
the level of judgement required or lack thereof).
Implement a detective control to review (quality assurance) a
sample of trigger events to ensure the recording of events is
completed in a consistent manner.
Provide regular training on how to treat or apply the threshold
appropriately.
Compliance with internal guidelines. Moderate
B4 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the recording and
reporting of a trigger event is not communicated throughout the
ADF.
Provide guidance as to how the revised model will be
communicated throughout the ADF.
Consistent understanding throughout the ADF. Quick Win
B5 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Efficiency A single trigger event is recorded multiple times (i.e. duplicate
entries are made for the one trigger event).
Implement a detective control to identity whether duplicate
trigger events are allocated to a APS employee / ADF
member.
Efficiency in review of action process. Moderate
B6 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Monitoring There is no monitoring mechanism in place to track, manage
and / or monitor the progress of action taken for a recorded and
reported trigger event.
Provide guidance as to how trigger events will be track,
managed and monitored by the appropriate stakeholders
through the web-based recording tool.
Improved monitoring of recorded and reporting
trigger events.
Significant
B7 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Communication There is no proper record or review process in place to ensure
that all trigger events are recorded and reported.
Ensure there is a consistent understanding across the ADF in
regards to the recording and reporting requirements for trigger
events, through: face to face or on-line training.
Maintain a proper record and conduct a regular review of the
trigger event form to ensure that information recorded and
reported is relevant and complete. To monitor this, implement
a detective control to investigate statistical anomalies in
relation to the number and type of trigger reports.
Compliance with internal guidelines. Moderate
B8 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Monitoring Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part of the
review process are not rectified to ensure the issue (if due to a
systematic error) does not re-occur in the future.
Implement a process which identifies how control weaknesses
or deficiencies identified, in the process, will be rectified to
prevent a re-occurrence.
Remediation of systematic errors. Moderate
B9 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial
Assessment and Reporting
Consistency Trigger events recorded in hard copy are not correctly or
completely captured in the subsequent event lodged using the
online tool.
Provide guidance in relation to the individuals responsible for
transferring the information from a hard copy form to the online
trigger recording and reporting tool.
Provide regular training to reduce the number of inappropriate
decisions being made by the Unit.
Consistent recording of trigger events. Quick Win
Department of Defence
Initial Assessment and Reporting Process Map
Reference Sub Process Improvement Type Current Situation Improvement Description Improvement BenefitsLevel of Investment
(Significant, Moderate, Quick Win)
Business Improvements - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Control Type DescriptionCommunication Control assists to provide transparency in processes and outcomes through verbal or written communication.Timeliness Control assists to facilitate timely decision making.Approved Delegate Control is required to operated by an authorised individual.Consistency Control incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure consistency.Transparency Control assists to provide transparency in processes and outcomes through an external review process.
Gap Type DescriptionMonitoring A gap in the process as no monitoring or review activity is performed over the process.Communication A gap in the process as there may be a lack in the transparency of processes and outcomes.Efficiency A gap in the process which may assist to provide efficiencies in the process.Restricted Access A gap in the process which does not safeguard sensitive information.Timeliness A gap in the process which does not facilitate timely decision making.Re-performance A gap in the process which does not allow a decision to be supported at a subsequent point in time.
Department of Defence Control & Risk AssessmentCONTROL and GAP TYPE GLOSSARY
High Moderate Low
High High High Moderate
Moderate High Moderate Low
Low Moderate Low Low
Significance
Likelihood
Department of Defence Control & Risk AssessmentRISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 2 – FACT FINDING (NON-STATUTORY) PROCESS MAP
7.1 FACT FINDING PROCESS
Gro
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Defe
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a
5.4
Receive trigger event notification
5.4
Refer to policy documents forguidance on various ways to
collect information to commencefact finding process
7.1.1
Fact FindingGuidance
5.4
Identify decision-makers to beinvolved in the information
gathering process, includingdecision-makers outside the
Group / Service
Is advice from the DefenceInvestigation Area
required?
7.1.4
Complete fact finding task withinthe Group / Service (with the
assistance of the Chain ofCommand)
No
5.4
Request support from DefenceInvestigation Area
Yes
5.4
Co-ordinate with decision-makers to identify information,resourcing requirements and
priorities
7.1.5
5.4
Co-ordinate with the DefenceInvestigation Area (to complete
the fact finding process)
7.1.7
5.4
Consider Defence priorities andresource constraints
5.4
Co-ordinate with decision-makers to identify information
requirements and priorities
5.4
Consider Defence priorities andresource constraints
5.4
Co-ordinate provision ofprofessional investigators
Yes
No
FC 7.2Model
2A
FC 7.2Model
2B
FC 7.2Model
2C
5.4
Update record of trigger event
Is there sufficient expertisewithin the Group / Serviceto conduct fact finding for
decision?
Yes
5.4
Identify the informationrequirements of decision-makers
5.4
Conduct internal investigation ofservice-related death
5.4
Report service-related deathinvestigation to an external
agency
FC 7.3ServiceRelatedDeaths
5.4
Report to decision-maker onoutcome of investigation
Fact FindingOutcome
5.4
Report to decision-maker onoutcome of investigation
FC 8.1
FC 8.1
No
FC 7.2Model
2A
FC 7.2Model
2B
FC 7.2Model
2C
7.1.2
7.1.3
Can the decision be madewithin the Group / Service
Yes
Should a professionalinvestigator be appointed?(with input from Chain of
Command)
7.1.6
5.4
Refer matter back to originatingGroup / Service and
communicate reasons for themto conduct further fact finding
with their own resources
7.1.2
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
PreventativeControl
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
X.X
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
G3
G1
G4
G2
G3
G7 G8
Start
G9
I1
I1
Start(ServiceRelatedDeath)
5.4
Report death to DefenceInvestigation Area (and DefenceAssessment and Reporting Area)
Internal External
No
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 2 – FACT FINDING (NON-STATUTORY) PROCESS MAP
7.2 MODELS:2A (PROPOSED) – SINGLE INVESTIGATOR POOL2B (PROPOSED) – MULTIPLE INVESTIGATOR POOLS2C (PROPOSED) – HYBRID
Defe
nc
eIn
ve
sti
ga
tio
nA
rea
CIA
’sS
ing
leP
oo
lo
fIn
ve
sti
ga
tors
Se
rvic
eP
oli
ce
FC 7.1Fact
Finding
FC 7.1Fact
Finding
FC 7.1Fact
Finding
MODEL 2ASingle Investigator Pool
MODEL 2BMultiple Investigator Pools
MODEL 2CHybrid
5.4
Determine whether the purposeof the investigation is ‘human’,
‘system’ or both
5.4
Select an appropriateinvestigator(s) based on thepurpose of the investigation
7.2.1
Mu
ltip
leS
pe
cia
lis
tIn
ves
tig
ati
on
Are
as
5.4
Team of investigators withrelevant expertise based onDefence Investigation Area’s
needs is selected
7.2.2
5.4
Co-ordinate this selection fromthe Defence Investigation Area’s
single pool of investigators
5.4
Provide resources (i.e.Investigator) to decision-makerto investigate the trigger event
5.4
Make an authoritative decisionon the primary focus and priority
of the investigation
5.4
Prepare report for decision-maker based on outcome of fact
finding investigation
5.4
Review own resources andpriorities to address the requestfrom Defence Investigation Area
5.4
Co-ordinate with DefenceInvestigation Area to provide
Professional Investigators
7.2.6
5.4
Ensure that appropriateinformation is collected for
sharing with the Specialist Areas
5.4
Co-ordinate Defence’sprofessional investigative
capability with Specialist Areas
7.2.6
Trigger EventInformation
5.4
Ensure ProfessionalInvestigators have received
appropriate training andeducation
7.2.4
5.4
Prepare report for decision-maker based on outcome of fact
finding investigation
5.4
Select appropriate ProfessionalInvestigators at the Specialist
Area’s discretion
7.2.3
5.4
Determine whether the purposeof the investigation is ‘human’ or
‘system’, or both
5.4
Select an appropriateinvestigator(s) based on thepurpose of the investigation
7.2.1
5.4
Co-ordinate with Provost MarshalADF to ensure Service Police haveappropriate training and capacity to
perform the investigation
7.2.4
Is the nature of theinvestigation a low-level
DFDA offence?No
Yes
5.4
Working together with SpecialistAreas, provide Professional
Investigators to decision-makerto investigate the trigger event
5.4
Co-ordinate this selection fromthe Defence Investigation Area’s
single pool of investigators
5.4
Provide investigators to decision-maker to investigate the trigger
event
5.4
Team of investigators withrelevant expertise based onDefence Investigation Area’s
needs is selected
7.2.2 5.4
Prepare report for decision-maker based on outcome of fact
finding investigation
5.4
Conduct low-level investigations
Trigger EventInformation
5.4
Prepare report for decision-maker based on outcome of fact
finding investigation
FC 7.1Fact
Finding
FC 7.1Fact
Finding
FC 7.1Fact
Finding
FC 7.1Fact
Finding
Are investigators availableto conduct low-level
investigation?
Yes
5.4
Refer back to DefenceInvestigation Area
No
7.2.5
7.2.5
B3
B 3
B3B7
B7
B7
B8
B8
B8
B9
B9
B9
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
Preventative Control
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
XX
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
G8G7
G3
G3
G7 G8
G3
G8
G7
G11
B11
B10B10
B10
G10
G10
G10
G6
G5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 2 – FACT FINDING (NON-STATUTORY) PROCESS MAP
7.3 SERVICE-RELATED DEATHS
De
fen
ce
Ex
tern
al
Inte
gri
tyA
ge
nc
y
FC 7.1Fact
Finding
5.4
Review initial assessment ofservice-related death
Conduct an independentinquiry about the death?
5.4
Consult with deceased next ofkin
5.4
Refer to any internal Defencefact finding or other external
investigation already performed
7.3.1 5.4
Make a decision whether theinquiry should be conducted in
public or in private
5.4
Conduct independentinvestigation into the death
7.3.4
Yes
5.4
Protect classified information ifrequired
7.3.3
5.4
Make recommendations basedon investigation
FC 7.1Fact
Finding
No
Is a Coronial inquiry and/orComcare investigation
being conducted?No
5.4
Co-ordinate investigation withComcare and/or State / Territory
Coroner
Yes
FC 7.1Fact
Finding
7.3.2
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
Preventative Control
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
XX
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
7.1.1 7.1 Fact Finding Process Communication &
Consistency
Policy documents provide guidance on the manner in which
information will be collected during the fact finding process.
1. Governed by lawful procedures that are simple and easy to use.
2. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
Daily Group / Service Manual Preventative
7.1.2 7.1 Fact Finding Process Consistency The required expertise is identified and obtained to assist in the fact
finding process.
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision making. Multiple Times per
Day
Group / Service
and Chain of
Command
Manual Preventative
7.1.3 7.1 Fact Finding Process Consistency External support is available from the Defence Investigation Area to
assist the Group / Service.
1. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Group / Service Manual Preventative
7.1.4 7.1 Fact Finding Process Coordination A coordinated process is adopted to complete the fact finding
process.
1. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Group / Service
and Chain of
Command and
Defence
Investigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.1.5 7.1 Fact Finding Process Coordination The Defence Investigation Area co-ordinates with decision-makers
to identify information and resourcing requirements and priorities.
1. Functions effectively in the integrated environment.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Investigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.1.6 7.1 Fact Finding Process Coordination Defence Investigation Area and Chain of Command work together
and determine whether a professional investigator is required.
1. Delivers cost-effective outcomes in an adequately resourced
system.
Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Investigation Area
and Chain of
Command
Manual Preventative
7.1.7 7.1 Fact Finding Process Monitoring The Service Group / Unit or Chain of Command co-ordinate with the
Defence Investigation Area to complete the fact finding process.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Chain of Command Manual Preventative
7.2.1 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Consistency The Defence Investigation Area selects an appropriate investigator
based on the purpose / scope of the investigation.
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision making. Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Investigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.2.2 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Consistency A pool of professional investigators are maintained to ensure the
fact finding process is completed by knowledgeable experts.
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision making. Multiple Times per
Day
CIA's Single Pool
of Investigators
Manual Preventative
7.2.3 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Consistency Ensure that appropriate investigators are selected to meet the
purpose / scope of the investigation.
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision making. Multiple Times per
Day
Multiple Specialist
Investigation Areas
Manual Preventative
7.2.4 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Consistency The Defence Investigation Area ensures that the professional
investigators have received appropriate training and education and
have maintained their knowledge up-to-date.
Specifically in the Hybrid Model (Model 2C), this is co-ordinated with
the Provost Marshal ADF to ensure Service Police training required
for investigation is received.
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision making. Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Investigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.2.5 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Monitoring Service Police determine whether there are investigators available
to conduct low-level investigation.
1. Delivers cost-effective outcomes in an adequately resourced
system.
Multiple Times per
Day
Service Police Manual Preventative
7.2.6 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Communication The Defence Investigation Area communicates with Defence's
specialist professional investigator pools to select the appropriate
type of investigator required.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
3. Prevents potential duplication of work required in the decision-
making process.
Multiple Times per
Day
Defence
Investigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.3.1 7.3 Service Related Deaths Efficiency Any internal Defence or external investigation fact finding already
conducted is utilised in the Defence External Integrity Agency's
review.
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
3. Prevents potential duplication of work required in the decision-
making process.
As required Defence External
Integrity Agency
Manual Preventative
7.3.2 7.3 Service Related Deaths Transparency The Defence External Integrity Agency determines if an independent
inquiry about the death is required.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcomes. As required Defence External
Integrity Agency
Manual Preventative
7.3.3 7.3 Service Related Deaths Confidentiality & Privacy Classified information relating to the service-related death is
protected if required.
1. Incorporates safeguards for individuals. As required Defence External
Integrity Agency
Manual Preventative
7.1 Fact Finding Process
7.2 Models for Fact Finding
7.3 Service Related Deaths
Department of Defence
Fact Finding Process Map
Control Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Responsible AreaManual /
AutomatedPreventative / DetectiveRef. Sub Process Control Type Control Description Control Objective Frequency
Department of Defence
Fact Finding Process Map
Control Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Responsible AreaManual /
AutomatedPreventative / DetectiveRef. Sub Process Control Type Control Description Control Objective Frequency
7.3.4 7.3 Service Related Deaths Consistency External support, outside the Defence Investigation Area is available
to assist in the management of service-related deaths.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
As required Defence External
Integrity Agency
Manual Preventative
7.1 G1 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The essential components for an optimal system ofinquiry, investigation and review are not reflected in thesystem/model utilised by the ADF.
The essential components for an optimal systemof inquiry, investigation and review are notreflected in the system/model utilised by the ADF.
Provide guidance as to how the essential componentsfor an optimal system of inquiry, investigation andreview can be applied to the process.
Annual DefenceInvestigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.1 G2 7.1 Fact Finding Process Consistency The roles and responsibilities between the areas arenot sufficiently defined.
A lack of defined roles and responsibilitiesincreases the risk of poor management of the factfinding process, information not being distributedor captured and reduced level of accountability ofstaff.
Provide guidance on factors which should be consideredwhen overall responsibility for the process needs to bedetermined (for example, when decisions need to bemade by the Group / Service with assistance of theChain of Command).
Annual Group / Service Manual Preventative
7.1 G3 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The guidance provided in policy documents is notflexible and does not allow for judgement.
A lack of flexibility (e.g. minor events require sameprocess as major events) may causeadministrative burdens and delays in the factfinding process.
Provide guidance which is tailored to the risk of theevent (as opposed to a process which designed to be aone size fits all). If the event is rated as a high risk thana more detailed and prescriptive process should befollowed. However, if the event is determined as low riskthan less prescriptive process is required.
Annual DefenceInvestigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.1 G4 7.1 Fact Finding Process
7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) -Models A, B and C
Restricted Access The documentation obtained during the fact findingprocess is not maintained as confidential.
Information which is not secured confidentiallymay have wider ramifications across the ADF,such as loss of confidence in the system andreputational risk for the ADF.
Provide guidance as to how documentation is securedfrom unauthorised access.
Annual DefenceInvestigation Area
Manual /Automated
Preventative
7.1 G5 7.1 Fact Finding Process Consistency The Group / Service does not have the expertise toconduct the fact finding activities.
Without experienced individuals performing thefact finding activities, there is a risk that activitieshave not been performed in a competent andconsistent manner which could have widerramifications across the ADF, such as loss ofconfidence in the system and reputational risk forthe ADF.
Implement a detective control for the DefenceInvestigation Area to review the fact finding activitiesperformed by the Group / Service (Unit) and monitorthis.
Monthly DefenceInvestigation Area
Manual Detective
7.1 G6 7.1 Fact Finding Process Communication The Defence Investigation Area is unable to influencethe allocation of resources adequately or direct thefocus of an investigation.
Without allocating sufficient resources and / orlack of direction during the fact finding process,Commanders / Line Managers might be inclinednot to refer matters to the Defence InvestigationArea.
Provide guidance on quality assurance / performancereviews in the Defence Investigation Area to ensure it isaccountable and capable to deliver its required services.
Multiple Times perDay
DefenceInvestigation Area
Manual Detective
7.1 G7 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The Defence Investigation Area may have a lack ofcontrol over the allocation of resources.
Areas of the highest organisational priority are notbeing targeted and therefore making the processinefficient and ineffective.
Provide guidance as to how the Defence InvestigationArea will liaise with the relevant Specialist InvestigationArea.
Annual DefenceInvestigation Area
/ SpecialistInvestigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.1 G8 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The prioritising of resources by the DefenceInvestigation Area do not align with the type of eventand or operational expectations.
Areas of the highest organisational priority are notbeing targeted and therefore making the processinefficient and ineffective.
Provide guidance on a prioritising model which is flexibleenough for allocating investigative resources to thegreatest areas of concern / organisational risk.
Annual DefenceInvestigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.1 G9 7.1 Fact Finding Process
7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) -Models A, B and C
Monitoring Inconsistent distribution of investigators betweendifferent types of investigations.
Inconsistent distribution of resources could havewider ramifications across Defence, such as: lossof confidence in the system and reputational riskfor Defence.
Implement detective controls to reviewing the allocationof investigators between ADF and APS focusedinvestigations.
Multiple Times perDay
DefenceInvestigation Area
Manual Detective
7.1 G10 7.1 Fact Finding Process
7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) -Models A, B and C
Monitoring Investigators do not have required expertise to conductthe fact finding process.
Without experienced individuals performing thefact finding activities, there is a risk that activitieshave not been performed in a competent andconsistent manner which could have widerramifications across the ADF, such as loss ofconfidence in the system and reputational risk forthe ADF.
Implement detective controls, promote quality assurance/ performance of investigators and establish trainingprograms for investigators to address any performancegaps.
Annual DefenceInvestigation Area
Manual Detective
7.1 G11 7.1 Fact Finding Process Monitoring &Consistency
There is no proper record or review process in place toensure that all trigger events are recorded and reported.
All trigger events are not recorded and reported. Ensure there is a consistent understanding across theADF in regards to the recording and reportingrequirements for trigger events, through: face to face oron-line training.
Maintain a proper record and conduct a regular reviewof the trigger event form to ensure that informationrecorded and reported is relevant and complete.
Annual Group / Service Manual Detective
7.2 G11 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) -Models A, B and C
Efficiency & Consistency The geographic distribution and deployment ofprofessional investigators may not be as cost effectiveas compared to other arrangements such as appointinginternal inquiry officers.
Without guidance, there could be an inefficientallocation of resources and delay in thecommencement of the fact finding process in thesearch for an appropriate investigator that may notbe easily accessible due to geographicdistribution.
Provide guidance in relation to the fact findingprocesses for circumstances where investigators frommultiple specialist investigation areas cannot becontacted or are not available for the DefenceInvestigation Area's needs.
Annual DefenceInvestigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.2 G12 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) -Models A, B and C
Consistency There are no thresholds or guidelines in place for anauthoritative decision to be made on the investigation'sprimary focus and priority.
There is no consistency in what investigator will bechosen for fact finding if there are no commonguidelines to prioritise and categorise its focus andimportance.
Provide thresholds or guidance in relation to the primaryfocus and priority of the investigation.
Annual DefenceInvestigation Area
Manual Preventative
7.1 Fact Finding Process
7.2 Models for Fact Finding
Gap Risks Frequency
Department of Defence
Fact Finding Process Map
Responsible
Area
Manual /
Automated
Preventative /
DetectiveReference Sub Process Gap Type Gap Description Recommendations
Control Gaps - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Risk ID Applicable Defence Process Operational Risk Description Significance Likelihood Risk Rating
Control
Activities in
Place?
Risk
Addressed?Control Gap / Weakness
7.1 R1 7.1 Fact Finding The essential components for an optimal system of
inquiry, investigation and review are not reflected in the
system/model utilised by the ADF.
High Low Moderate Yes All All All All All All Partially This risk is driven by the ability of the existing
control environment to address all identified
operation risks.
7.1 R2 7.1 Fact Finding Fact finding activities are not performed within the
Australian legislative framework.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.1.1 - - - - - Yes N/a
7.1 R3 7.1 Fact Finding The roles and responsibilities between the areas are not
sufficiently defined and as a result causes issues such
as poor management, information not being distributed
or captured and a low level accountability of staff.
High Moderate High No - - - - - - No Guidance should be provided in relation to the
management of fact finding processes (when all
three areas have been engaged in the process).
7.1 R4 7.1 Fact Finding The guidance provided in policy documents is not flexible
and does not allow for any level of judgement (e.g. minor
events require same process as major events) which
causes an administrative burden and delays in the fact
finding process.
High Moderate High Yes 7.1.1 - - - - - Partially Guidance should be provided to demonstrate the
flexibility of policy documentation to facilitate
various fact finding processes.
7.1 R5 7.1 Fact Finding The documentation obtained during the fact finding
process is not maintained as confidential.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to how
the information obtained during the fact finding
process will be maintained in a confidential
manner.
7.1 R6 7.1 Fact Finding The Group / Service does not have the expertise to
conduct the fact finding activities.
High Moderate High Yes 7.1.2 7.1.3 7.1.4 7.1.5 - - Partially No detective control is in place to review the fact
finding activities performed by the Group /
Service (Unit).
7.1 R7 7.1 Fact Finding The Defence Investigation Area is unable to influence the
allocation of resources or direct the focus of an
investigation.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.1.6 7.1.7 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to any
quality assurance / performance reviews on the
Defence Investigation Area to ensure that it is
accountable and capable to deliver its required
services.
7.1 R8 7.1 Fact Finding The prioritising of resources by the Defence Investigation
Area do not align with the type of event and / or
operational expectations.
High Moderate High Yes 7.1.6 7.1.7 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to how
the events will be prioritised and linked to
operational expectations.
7.1 R9 7.1 Fact Finding Inconsistent distribution of investigators between ADF
and APS focused investigations.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.1.6 - - - - - Partially No detective controls are in place to review the
allocation of investigators between ADF and APS
focused investigations.
7.1 R10 7.1 Fact Finding Investigators do not have required expertise to conduct
the fact finding process.
High Moderate High Yes 7.1.6 - - - - - Partially No detective controls are in place for quality
assurance / performance of investigators.
7.1 R11 7.1 Fact Finding External support is not available to the Group / Service
unit from the Defence Investigation Area.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.1.2 7.1.3 7.1.5 7.1.7 - - Yes N/a
7.2 R1 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2A
Fact finding activities are not performed within the
Australian legislative framework.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.2.1 - - - - - Yes N/a
7.2 R2 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2A
Investigators do not have required expertise to conduct
the fact finding process.
High Moderate High Yes 7.2.1 7.2.2 - - - - Yes N/a
7.2 R3 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2A
The geographic distribution and deployment of
professional investigators may not be as cost effective
as compared to other arrangements.
High Moderate Moderate Yes 7.2.1 7.2.2 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to the
fact finding processes in deployed environments.
7.2 R4 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2A
The documentation obtained during the fact finding
process is not maintained as confidential.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided associated to
how the information obtained during the fact
finding process will be maintained in a
confidential manner.
7.2 R5 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2A
Defence priorities are not considered in the fact finding
process.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.2.2 - - - - - Yes N/a
7.2 R6 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2A
Resource constraints do not allow for all investigations to
be carried out in a timely manner (i.e. as both low-level
and high-level offences are investigated by professional
investigators).
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No This is a risk inherent to Model 2A.
7.2 R7 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2B
Fact finding activities are not performed within the
Australian legislative framework.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.2.6 - - - - - Yes N/a
7.2 R8 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2B
Investigators do not have required expertise to conduct
the fact finding process.
High Moderate High Yes 7.2.4 7.2.6 - - - - Yes N/a
7.2 R9 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2B
The geographic distribution and deployment of
professional investigators may not be as cost effective
as compared to other arrangements.
High Moderate Moderate Yes 7.2.3 - - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to the
fact finding processes in deployed environments.
7.2 R10 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2B
The documentation obtained during the fact finding
process is not maintained as confidential.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided associated to
how the information obtained during the fact
finding process will be maintained in a
confidential manner.
7.2 R11 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2B
Defence priorities are not considered in the fact finding
process.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.2.3 - - - - - Partially Defence priorities may not considered in the
assignment of investigators as they are selected
at the discretion of the Specialist Investigation
Area.
7.2 R12 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2B
Resource constraints do not allow for all investigations to
be carried out in a timely manner (i.e. as both low-level
and high-level offences are investigated by professional
investigators).
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No This is a risk inherent to Model 2B.
7.2 R13 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2C
Fact finding activities are not performed within the
Australian legislative framework.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.2.1 7.2.4 - - - - Yes N/a
7.2 R14 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2C
Investigators do not have required expertise to conduct
the fact finding process.
High Moderate High Yes 7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.4 - - - Yes N/a
7.2 R15 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2C
The geographic distribution and deployment of
professional investigators may not be as cost effective
as compared to other arrangements.
High Moderate Moderate Yes 7.2.1 7.2.2 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to the
fact finding processes in deployed environments.
7.2 R16 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2C
The documentation obtained during the fact finding
process is not maintained as confidential.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided associated to
how the information obtained during the fact
finding process will be maintained in a
confidential manner.
7.2 R17 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2C
Defence priorities are not considered in the fact finding
process.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.2.2 - - - - - Yes N/a
7.2 R18 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model 2C
Resource constraints do not allow for all investigations to
be carried out in a timely manner (i.e. as both low-level
and high-level offences are investigated by professional
investigators).
High Low Moderate Yes 7.2.4 7.2.5 - - - - Yes N/a
7.3 R1 7.3 Service Related Deaths The internal review of a service related death is not
conducted appropriately.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.3.1 - - - - - Yes N/a
7.3 R2 7.3 Service Related Deaths The external inquiry does not leverage on the information
gained during the fact finding process.
High Low Moderate Yes 7.3.2 - - - - - Yes N/a
7.2 Models for Fact Finding - Model 2A (Proposed)
7.3 Service Related Deaths
Department of Defence
Fact Finding Process Map
Risk Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Control References
7.1 Fact Finding
7.2 Models for Fact Finding - Model 2B (Proposed)
7.2 Models for Fact Finding - Model 2C (Proposed)
B1 7.1 Fact Finding Process Communication The roles and responsibilities between the areas are
not sufficiently defined.
Provide guidance on factors which should be considered
when overall responsibility for the process needs to be
determined (for example, when decisions need to be made by
the Group / Service with assistance of the Chain of
Command).
Consistent understanding throughout
the ADF.
Quick Win
B2 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The guidance provided in policy documents is not
flexible and does not allow for judgement.
Provide guidance which is tailored to the risk of the event (as
opposed to a process which designed to be a one size fits all).
If the event is rated as a high risk than a more detailed and
prescriptive process should be followed. However, if the event
is determined as low risk than less prescriptive process is
required.
Reduces administrative burden. Moderate
B3 7.1 Fact Finding Process
7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model A, B
and C
Restricted Access The documentation obtained during the fact finding
process is not maintained as confidential.
Provide guidance as to how documentation is secured from
unauthorised access.
Maintains confidentiality over sensitive
information.
Quick Win
B4 7.1 Fact Finding Process Monitoring The Group / Service does not have the expertise to
conduct the fact finding activities.
Implement a detective control to review the fact finding
activities performed by the Group / Service (Unit).
Consistent outcomes are achieved
from the fact finding process.
Moderate
B5 7.1 Fact Finding Process Consistency The Defence Investigation Area is unable to influence
the allocation of resources or direct the focus of an
investigation.
Provide guidance on quality assurance / performance reviews
in the Defence Investigation Area to ensure it is accountable
and capable to deliver its required services.
Consistent understanding throughout
the ADF.
Moderate
B6 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The prioritising of resources by the Defence
Investigation Area do not align with the type of event
and or operational expectations.
Provide guidance on a prioritising model which is flexible
enough for allocating investigative resources to the greatest
areas of concern / organisational risk.
Ensures the process is as efficient as
possible.
Moderate
B7 7.1 Fact Finding Process Monitoring Inconsistent distribution of investigators between ADF
and APS focused investigations.
Implement detective controls to reviewing the allocation of
investigators between ADF and APS focused investigations.
Consistent and timely outcomes are
achieved from the fact finding process.
Moderate
B8 7.1 Fact Finding Process Monitoring Investigators do not have required expertise to
conduct the fact finding process.
Implement detective controls, promote quality assurance /
performance of investigators and establish training programs
for investigators to address any performance gaps.
Consistent and timely outcomes are
achieved from the fact finding process.
Moderate
B9 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model A, B
and C
Efficiency There is no proper record or review process in place
to ensure that all trigger events are recorded and
reported.
Ensure there is a consistent understanding across the ADF in
regards to the recording and reporting requirements for trigger
events, through: face to face or on-line training.
Maintain a proper record and conduct a regular review of the
trigger event form to ensure that information recorded and
reported is relevant and complete.
Consistent and timely outcomes are
achieved from the fact finding process.
Moderate
B10 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model A, B
and C
Efficiency & Consistency The geographic distribution and deployment of
professional investigators may not be as cost effective
as compared to other arrangements.
Provide guidance in relation to the fact finding processes for
deployed environments.
Efficiencies in allocation of resources
and commencement of the fact finding
process.
Moderate
B11 7.2 Models for Fact Finding
(Proposed) - Model A, B
and C
Consistency There are no thresholds or guidelines in place for an
authoritative decision to be made on the
investigation's primary focus and priority.
Provide thresholds or guidance in relation to the primary focus
and priority of the investigation.
Consistent and timely outcomes are
achieved from the fact finding process.
Moderate
Department of Defence
Fact Finding Process Map
Reference Sub Process Improvement Type Current Situation Improvement Description Improvement BenefitsLevel of Investment
(Significant, Moderate, Quick Win)
Business Improvements - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Control Type DescriptionCommunication Control assists to provide transparency in processes and outcomes through verbal or written communication.Timeliness Control assists to facilitate timely decision making.Approved Delegate Control is required to operated by an authorised individual.Consistency Control incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure consistency.Transparency Control assists to provide transparency in processes and outcomes through an external review process.
Gap Type DescriptionMonitoring A gap in the process as no monitoring or review activity is performed over the process.Communication A gap in the process as there may be a lack in the transparency of processes and outcomes.Efficiency A gap in the process which may assist to provide efficiencies in the process.Restricted Access A gap in the process which does not safeguard sensitive information.Timeliness A gap in the process which does not facilitate timely decision making.Re-performance A gap in the process which does not allow a decision to be supported at a subsequent point in time.
Department of Defence Control & Risk AssessmentCONTROL and GAP TYPE GLOSSARY
High Moderate Low
High High High Moderate
Moderate High Moderate Low
Low Moderate Low Low
Department of Defence Control & Risk AssessmentRISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX
Significance
Likelihood
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 3 – REVIEW OF ACTION PROCESS MAP
8.1 ADF INTERNAL REVIEW PROCESS
Ori
gin
al
Dec
isio
n-
Ma
ke
r
Co
mm
an
din
gO
ffic
er
AD
FM
em
be
r
Start
5.4
Notify decision to ADF member
8.1.1
Decision Reasons provided indecision?
5.4
Submit review application form toCommanding Officer within 90
days of original decision, or otherspecified time-frame
8.1.2
Yes
5.4
Request reasons for decisionNo
5.4
Provide ADF member withreasons for decision
Reason for Decision
SupportingDocumentation
5.4
Commanding Officer reviewsapplication (within 14 days)
8.1.3
5.4
Notify ADF member
Does the CommandingOfficer (or their
subordinate) change thedecision?
Review ApplicationForm
5.4
Complete application form toindicate decision is not
supported
Does the CommandingOfficer Support the
Application?
No
5.4
Complete application form toindicate application is supported
Yes
Yes
No
No
5.4
Submit application form to theInternal Review area
8.1.4
Model3A
Model3B
Model3C
5.4
Application received byCommanding Officer
Was the CommandingOfficer (or their
subordinate) the originaldecision maker?
Yes
Does the ADF memberdecide to have the original
decision reviewed?
Yes
No End
Reason for Decision
SupportingDocumentation
Review ApplicationForm (Authorised byCommanding Officer)
G7
G1 G2 G3
G4 G5
G6
G7
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B6
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
Preventative Control
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
XX
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
End
FC 8.1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 3 – REVIEW OF ACTION PROCESS MAP
8.2 MODEL 3A (PROPOSED) – SINGLE INTERNAL REVIEW AREA
Inte
rnal
Rev
iew
Are
a
Serv
ice
or
Oth
er
De
fen
ce
Dele
gate
Does Internal Review areahave delegation to re-make
the decision?
5.4
Refer application form to Serviceor Other Defence Delegate
Should original decision beamended?
5.4
Amend original decisionYes
5.4
Notify member, CommandingOfficer, original decision-maker
and Internal Review area ofoutcome
8.2.10
Amended Decision
5.4
Notify member, CommandingOfficer, original decision-maker
and Internal Review area ofoutcome, if required, advise
member of external review rights
8.2.9
No
Non-AmendedDecision
End
Should application beimmediately rejected due to
discretionary reasons?
5.4
Advise Commanding Officer andADF member of decision, ifrequired, advise member of
external review rights
8.2.7
Yes
Internal ReviewDecision End
No
5.4
Begin assessment(within 28 days)
8.2.4Yes
Amend original decision?
5.4
Amend original decision
5.4
Notify member, CommandingOfficer and original decision-
maker of outcome
8.2.6
Amended InternalReview Decision
5.4
Notify member, CommandingOfficer and original decision-
maker of outcome, if required,advise member of external
review rights
8.2.5
Non-AmendedInternal Review
Decision End
5.4
Review application (APSemployees are reviewed under
Sec 33 Public Service Act 1999)
5.4
Gather extra information
Is further informationrequired?
No
Yes
5.4
Internal Review area receivesthe application
5.4
Internal Review area todetermine if the decision should
be reviewed(within 7 days)
8.2.2
5.4
Delegate’s area to consider theapplication
8.2.8
8.2.1 8.2.3
No
G1
G2
G2
G3
G4G4
G4
G5
G6
G6
G6
G6 G7
G7
G7
G7
G8 G9
B2
B5
B7
B9
B9
B4
B8
B6
B1
B4
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
Preventative Control
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
XX
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
G10
G11
G11
G11
Yes
No
Is further informationrequired?
No
5.4
Gather extra information
Yes
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 3 – REVIEW OF ACTION PROCESS MAP
8.3 MODEL 3B (PROPOSED) – MULTIPLE INTERNAL REVIEW AREAS
Inte
rnal
Rev
iew
Are
a-
Arm
y
FC 8.1Should application be
immediately rejected due todiscretionary reasons?
5.4
Advise Commanding Officer andADF member of decision, ifrequired, advise member of
external review rights
8.3.7
Yes
Rejected InternalReview (Army)
Decision End
No
5.4
Begin assessment and reviewapplication
(within 28 days)
8.3.4
Amend original decision?
5.4
Amend original decision
5.4
Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer and original
decision-maker of outcome
8.3.6
Amended InternalReview (Army)
Decision
5.4
Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer and original
decision-maker of outcome, ifrequired, advise member of
external review rights
8.3.5
Non-AmendedInternal Review(Army) Decision
End
Yes
Internal Review area receivesthe application
B2
B5 B7
B8
B4B1
B9
8.3.1 5.4
Internal Review area todetermine if the decision should
be reviewed(within 7 days)
8.3.2
No
Refer to alternate Defencedelegate
Inte
rna
lR
evie
wA
rea
–A
irF
orc
e
Does Internal Review areahave delegation to re-make
the decision?Yes No
8.3.3
B4 B6
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
PreventativeControl
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
X.X
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
G6 G7 G11
G1 G3 G5 G8 G9 G10 G4 G2 G2
G4
G6 G7 G11
G4
G6
G11
End
Is further informationrequired?
No
5.4
Gather extra information
Yes
FC 8.1Should application be
immediately rejected due todiscretionary reasons?
5.4
Advise Commanding Officer andADF member of decision, ifrequired, advise member of
external review rights
8.3.7
Yes
Rejected InternalReview (Army)
Decision End
No
5.4
Begin assessment and reviewapplication
(within 28 days)
8.3.4
Amend original decision?
5.4
Amend original decision
5.4
Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer and original
decision-maker of outcome
8.3.6
Amended InternalReview (Army)
Decision
5.4
Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer and original
decision-maker of outcome, ifrequired, advise member of
external review rights
8.3.5
Non-AmendedInternal Review(Army) Decision
End
Yes
Internal Review area receivesthe application
B2
B5 B7
B8
B1
B9
8.3.1 5.4
Internal Review area todetermine if the decision should
be reviewed(within 7 days)
8.3.2
No
Refer to alternate Defencedelegate
Does Internal Review areahave delegation to re-make
the decision?Yes No
8.3.3
B4 B6
G6 G7 G11
G1 G3 G5 G8 G9 G10 G4 G2 G2
G4
G6 G7 G11
G4
G6
G11
End
Is further informationrequired?
No
5.4
Gather extra information
Yes
B4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 3 – REVIEW OF ACTION PROCESS MAP
8.3 MODEL 3B (PROPOSED) – MULTIPLE INTERNAL REVIEW AREAS
Inte
rna
lR
evie
wA
rea
–N
av
y
Inte
rna
lR
ev
iew
Are
a–
AP
S
FC 8.1Should application be
immediately rejected due todiscretionary reasons?
5.4
Advise Commanding Officer andADF member of decision, ifrequired, advise member of
external review rights
8.3.7
Yes
Rejected InternalReview (Army)
Decision End
No
5.4
Begin assessment and reviewapplication
(within 28 days)
8.3.4
Amend original decision?
5.4
Amend original decision
5.4
Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer and original
decision-maker of outcome
8.3.6
Amended InternalReview (Army)
Decision
5.4
Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer and original
decision-maker of outcome, ifrequired, advise member of
external review rights
8.3.5
Non-AmendedInternal Review(Army) Decision
End
Yes
Internal Review area receivesthe application
B2
B5 B7
B8
B1
B9
8.3.1 5.4
Internal Review area todetermine if the decision should
be reviewed(within 7 days)
8.3.2
No
Refer to alternate Defencedelegate
Does Internal Review areahave delegation to re-make
the decision?Yes No
8.3.3
B4 B6
G6 G7 G11
G1 G3 G5 G8 G9 G10 G4 G2 G2
G4
G6 G7 G11
G4
G6
G11
End
Is further informationrequired?
No
5.4
Gather extra information
Yes
B4
FC 8.1Should application be
immediately rejected due todiscretionary reasons?
5.4
Advise Commanding Officer andADF member of decision, ifrequired, advise member of
external review rights
8.3.7
Yes
Rejected InternalReview (Army)
Decision End
No
5.4
Begin assessment and reviewapplication
(within 28 days)
8.3.4
Amend original decision?
5.4
Amend original decision
5.4
Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer and original
decision-maker of outcome
8.3.6
Amended InternalReview (Army)
Decision
5.4
Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer and original
decision-maker of outcome, ifrequired, advise member of
external review rights
8.3.5
Non-AmendedInternal Review(Army) Decision
End
Yes
Internal Review area receivesthe application
B2
B5 B7
B8
B1
B9
8.3.1 5.4
Internal Review area todetermine if the decision should
be reviewed(within 7 days)
8.3.2
No
Refer to alternate Defencedelegate
Does Internal Review areahave delegation to re-make
the decision?Yes No
8.3.3
B4 B6
G6 G7 G11
G1 G3 G5 G8 G9 G10 G4 G2 G2
G4
G6 G7 G11
G4
G6
G11
End
Is further informationrequired?
No
5.4
Gather extra information
Yes
B4
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
PreventativeControl
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
X.X
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
FC 8.1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 3 – REVIEW OF ACTION PROCESS MAP
8.4 MODEL 3C (PROPOSED) – INSPECTOR GENERAL ADF INTERNAL REVIEW AREA
Inte
rnal
Re
vie
wA
rea
-A
PS
Serv
ice
Ch
ief
Dele
gate
s(A
rmy
,A
irF
orc
ean
dN
av
y)
Ins
pec
tor
Ge
nera
lA
DF
Should application beimmediately rejected due to
discretionary reasons?
5.4
Advise Commanding Officer andAPS employee of decision, ifrequired, advise employee of
external review rights
8.4.7
Yes
Rejected InternalReview (APS)
Decision End
No Amend original decision?
5.4
Amend original decision
5.4
Notify employee, CommandingOfficer and original decision-
maker of outcome
8.4.6
Amended InternalReview (APS)
Decision
5.4
Notify employee, CommandingOfficer and original decision-maker, and if required, adviseemployee of external review
rights
8.4.5
Non-AmendedInternal Review(APS) Decision
End
5.4
Begin assessment and reviewapplication under Sec 33 Public
Service Act 1999(within 28 days)
8.4.4
Yes
No
FC 8.1 Should application beimmediately rejected due to
exception rules?
5.4
Advise Commanding Officer andADF member of decision, ifrequired, advise member of
external review rights
8.4.12
Yes
Rejected InspectorGeneral ADF
Decision End
No
5.4
Recommend to Service Chiefsthat decision should be re-made
8.4.11
Recommend amendmentto original decision?
Yes
Should original decision beamended?
5.4
Amend original decisionYes
5.4
Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer, originaldecision-maker and Inspector
General ADF of outcome
8.4.15
Amended ServiceChief Delegates’
Decision
5.4
Notify ADF member, CommandingOfficer, original decision-maker andInspector General ADF of outcome,
if required, advise member ofexternal review rights
8.4.14
No
Non-AmendedService Chief
Delegates’ Decision
End
Internal Review area receivesthe application
5.4
Internal Review area todetermine if the decision should
be reviewed(within 7 days)
8.4.2
Refer application form to externalagency for review
Does Internal Review areahave delegation to re-make
the decision?
No
Phase 4
Yes
Inspector General receives theapplication
5.4
Inspector General to determine ifthe decision should be reviewed
8.4.9
No
5.4
Notify member, CommandingOfficer and original decision-
maker, if required, advisemember of external review rights
8.4.10
Non-AmendedInspector General
ADF Decision
5.4
Service Chief to consider theapplication and the
recommendation provided by theInspector General ADF
8.4.13
8.4.1
8.4.8
B4
B9
B4
B9
B4 B9
B4
B1
B1
B2 B5 B7 B8
B2 B5 B7 B8
End
8.4.3
B6
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
Preventative Control
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
XX
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
G1 G3 G5 G8 G9 G10
G3 G5 G8 G9 G10
G4 G2
G4 G2G1
G4
G2
G2G1
G6 G7 G11
G6 G7 G11
G6 G7 G11
G6 G7 G11
G6 G7 G11
G2G1
G6 G7 G11
8.1.1 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Communication The original decision maker to notify the ADF member of the decision. 1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making.
2. Provides transparency in processes and outcomes.
Multiple Times per
Day
Original Decision
Maker
Manual Preventative
8.1.2 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Timeliness ADF member is required to submit the review application form to their
Commanding Officer within a 90 day period of when the original
decision was made.
1. Governed by lawful procedures that are simple and easy to use.
2. Delivers cost-effective outcomes in an adequately resourced system.
Multiple Times per
Day
ADF Member Manual Preventative
8.1.3 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Timeliness Commanding Officer has 14 days to review the application. 1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per
Day
Commanding
Officer
Manual Preventative
8.1.4 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Communication Commanding Officer to submit application form to Internal Review
area.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates safeguards for individuals.
3. Functions effectively in the integrated environment.
Multiple Times per
Day
Commanding
Officer
Manual Preventative
8.2.1 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Communication Internal Review area to determine whether the application is to be
immediately rejected due to discretionary reasons (which are
documented).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making.
2. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
3. Delivers cost-effective outcomes in an adequately resourced system.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2.2 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Timeliness Internal review of the decision to be completed within a specific
timeframe (7 days).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2.3 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Approved Delegate The review of action is sent to an authorised delegate to conduct the
review and communicate the outcome.
1. Functions effectively in the integrated environment. Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2.4 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Timeliness Internal Review area to perform assessment within a designated
timeframe (28 days).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2.5 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Communication Internal Review area to notify ADF member, Commanding Officer and
original decision-maker area of outcome.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2.6 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Communication Internal Review area to notify ADF member, Commanding Officer and
original decision-maker area of outcome.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2.7 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Communication Advise Commanding Officer and ADF member of the fact the review
action has been rejected and external review rights.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Governed by lawful procedures that are simple and easy to use.
3. Incorporates safeguards for individuals.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2.8 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Consistency Service area to consider the application. 1. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
2. Functions effectively in the integrated environment.
Multiple Times per
Day
Service or Other
Defence Delegate
Manual Preventative
8.2.9 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Communication Notify ADF member, Commanding Officer, original decision-maker and
Internal Review area of outcome and external review rights.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
3. Governed by lawful procedures that are simple and easy to use.
4. Incorporates safeguards for individuals.
Multiple Times per
Day
Service or Other
Defence Delegate
Manual Preventative
8.2.10 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Communication Notify ADF member, Commanding Officer, original decision-maker and
Internal Review area of outcome.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome. Multiple Times per
Day
Service or Other
Defence Delegate
Manual Preventative
8.3.1 8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple
Internal Review Areas
Communication Internal Review area to determine whether the application is to be
immediately rejected due to discretionary reasons (which are
documented).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making.
2. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
3. Delivers cost-effective outcomes in an adequately resourced system.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3.2 8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple
Internal Review Areas
Timeliness Internal review of the decision to be completed within a specific
timeframe (7 days).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3.3 8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple
Internal Review Areas
Approved Delegate The review of action is sent to an authorised delegate to conduct the
review and communicate the outcome.
1. Functions effectively in the integrated environment. Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3.4 8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple
Internal Review Areas
Timeliness Internal Review area to perform assessment within a designated
timeframe (28 days).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.2 Single Internal Review Area
8.1 ADF Review of Action
8.3 Multiple Internal Review Areas
Department of Defence
ADF Review of Action Process Map
Control Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Responsible AreaManual /
AutomatedPreventative / DetectiveRef. Sub Process Control Type Control Description Control Objective Frequency
Department of Defence
ADF Review of Action Process Map
Control Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Responsible AreaManual /
AutomatedPreventative / DetectiveRef. Sub Process Control Type Control Description Control Objective Frequency
8.3.5 8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple
Internal Review Areas
Communication Advise Commanding Officer and APS employee / ADF member of the
fact the review action has been rejected and if required, advise
member of external review rights.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Governed by lawful procedures that are simple and easy to use.
3. Incorporates safeguards for individuals.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3.6 8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple
Internal Review Areas
Communication Advise Commanding Officer and APS employee / ADF member of the
fact the review action has been rejected and if required, advise
member of external review rights.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Governed by lawful procedures that are simple and easy to use.
3. Incorporates safeguards for individuals.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3.7 8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple
Internal Review Areas
Communication Advise Commanding Officer and APS employee / ADF member of the
fact the review action has been rejected and if required, advise
member of external review rights.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Governed by lawful procedures that are simple and easy to use.
3. Incorporates safeguards for individuals.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.4.1 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Communication Internal Review area to determine whether the application to be
immediately rejected due to discretionary reasons (which are
documented).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making.
2. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
3. Delivers cost-effective outcomes in an adequately resourced system.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - APS
Manual Preventative
8.4.2 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Timeliness Internal review of the decision to be completed within a specific
timeframe (7 days).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - APS
Manual Preventative
8.4.3 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Approved Delegate The review of action is sent to an authorised delegate to conduct the
review and communicate the outcome.
1. Functions effectively in the integrated environment. Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - APS
Manual Preventative
8.4.4 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Timeliness Internal Review area to perform assessment within a designated
timeframe (28 days).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - APS
Manual Preventative
8.4.5 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Communication Internal Review area to notify APS employee, Commanding Officer and
original decision-maker area of outcome.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - APS
Manual Preventative
8.4.6 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Communication Internal Review area to notify APS employee Commanding Officer and
original decision-maker area of outcome.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - APS
Manual Preventative
8.4.7 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Communication Internal Review area to notify APS employee, Commanding Officer and
original decision-maker area of outcome.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - APS
Manual Preventative
8.4.8 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Communication Inspector General to determine whether the application to be
immediately rejected due to exception rules (which are documented).
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making.
2. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
3. Delivers cost-effective outcomes in an adequately resourced system.
Multiple Times per
Day
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4.9 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Timeliness Inspector General to determine if the decision should be reviewed. 1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per
Day
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4.10 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Communication Inspector General ADF area to notify ADF member, Commanding
Officer and original decision-maker area of outcome. Advise member
of external review rights.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4.11 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Timeliness Inspector General ADF to provide recommendation to Service Chiefs
that decision should be re-made.
1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per
Day
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4.12 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Communication Inspector General ADF area to notify ADF member, Commanding
Officer and original decision-maker area of outcome. Advise member
of external review rights.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4.13 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Consistency Service Chief to consider the application. 1. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
2. Functions effectively in the integrated environment.
Multiple Times per
Day
Service Chief Manual Preventative
8.4.14 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Communication Service Chief to notify ADF member, Commanding Officer and original
decision-maker area of outcome. Advise member of external review
rights.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Service Chief Manual Preventative
8.4.15 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and Internal Audit
Communication Service Chief to notify ADF member, Commanding Officer and original
decision-maker area of outcome.
1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.
2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
consistency.
Multiple Times per
Day
Service Chief Manual Preventative
8.4 Inspector General ADF Internal Review Area
8.1 G1 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Monitoring No detective control is in place to ensure decisions
are made within the required timeframes.
Decisions may not be made within the required
timeframes.
Implement the performance of an independent review
(quality assurance) over all decisions made (on a
sample basis) to ensure decisions are made within the
required timeframes.
Multiple Times per
Day
Original Decision
Maker
Manual Detective
8.1 G2 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Monitoring Decisions made are not consistent (for events with a
similar fact pattern), regardless of whether the ADF
member requests a review to be performed.
Decisions made are not consistent. Implement the performance of an independent review
(quality assurance) over all decisions made (on a
sample basis) to ensure decisions made are
consistent.
Multiple Times per
Day
Original Decision
Maker
Manual Detective
8.1 G3 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the decision
and review of action process is not communicated
throughout the ADF.
The process in relation to the decision and
review of action process is not understood by
ADF members.
Provide guidance as to how the revised model will be
communicated throughout the ADF.
Annual Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.1 G4 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Re-performance /
Efficiency
Documentation is not retained to support the initial
decision made.
A decision made is difficult to review as the
documentation supporting the decision is not
retained.
Provide guidance as to how documentation to support
the initial decision is retained (which may include the
development of mechanisms for records
management).
Annual Original Decision
Maker
Manual Preventative
8.1 G5 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Communication Decisions made do not reference applicable
guidelines or underlying framework.
Decisions made do not reference applicable
guidelines or underlying framework - resulting in
a lack of understanding for the ADF member of
the original decision.
While commentary has been provided in relation the
positive outcomes (for example, a reduced
administrative burden) of implementing prescribed
formats for the response provided to the ADF member
in regards to the original decision - this has not been
captured in the model.
Annual Original Decision
Maker
Manual Preventative
8.1 G6 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Restricted Access An ADF members request for review and the original
decision made (and supporting documentation) are
not secured as confidential information.
An ADF members information is not secured as
confidential and private information, which may
have wider ramifications across the ADF, such
as: loss of confidence in the system and
reputational risk for the ADF.
Provide guidance as to how ADF member
documentation is secured from unauthorised access.
Annual Original Decision
Maker
Manual /
Automated
Preventative
8.1 G7 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Efficiency The subsequent review performed by the
Commanding Officer (where applicable) does not
consider whether the benefit of the process outweighs
all associated costs.
Decisions made do not consider whether the
benefit of the process outweighs all associated
costs.
Provide guidance in relation to how thresholds (of time
or money spent) have been or are to be applied in
relation to decisions.
Annual Commanding
Officer
Manual Preventative
8.2 G1 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Efficiency The system/model is unable to operate in a range of
diverse and unique environments.
The system/model is unable to operate in a
range of diverse and unique environments.
Provide guidance as to how an ADF members location
will impact the model/system (or lack thereof).
Annual Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2 G2 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Timeliness Internal reviews performed are not made (and
communicated) in a timely manner and are not in
accordance with the timeframes set out in procedural
documentation (taking into account deployed
environments).
Internal reviews performed are not made (and
communicated) in a timely manner.
Implement a detective control to ensure reviews are
performed and communicated within the required
timeframes.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area and Service
or Other Defence
Delegate
Manual Detective
8.2 G3 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Timeliness The system/model does not consider the deployed
environment of the ADF member when
communicating review of action outcomes.
Internal reviews performed are not made (and
communicated) in a timely manner.
Implement a detective control to ensure reviews are
performed and communicated within the required
timeframes.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area
Manual Detective
8.2 G4 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Monitoring Decisions reached by the Internal Review area do not
result in consistent outcomes.
Decisions made are not consistent. Implement the performance of an independent review
over all reviews performed (on a sample basis) to
ensure decisions are made are consistent.
Note: The structure proposed by Model 3A (a single
internal review area) would ideally result in a
consistent review of actions process - as all reviews
would be performed centrally using a common
process.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area
Manual Detective
8.2 G5 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the review
process is not communicated throughout the ADF.
The process in relation to the decision and
review of action process is not understood by
ADF members.
Provide guidance as to how the revised model will be
communicated throughout the ADF.
Annual Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2 G6 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Re-performance /
Efficiency
Documentation is not retained to support the review
performed.
A review of action performed is unable to be
reviewed as the documentation supporting the
outcome is not retained.
Provide guidance as to how documentation to support
the initial decision is retained.
Annual Internal Review
Area and Service
or Other Defence
Delegate
Manual Preventative
8.1 ADF Review of Action
8.2 Single Internal Review Area
Gap Risks Frequency
Department of Defence
ADF Review of Action Process Map
Responsible
Area
Manual /
Automated
Preventative /
DetectiveReference Sub Process Gap Type Gap Description Recommendations
Control Gaps - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Gap Risks Frequency
Department of Defence
ADF Review of Action Process Map
Responsible
Area
Manual /
Automated
Preventative /
DetectiveReference Sub Process Gap Type Gap Description Recommendations
Control Gaps - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
8.2 G7 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Communication Reviews performed do not reference applicable
guidelines or underlying framework and / or do not
provide reasons for the review decision made.
A review of action performed does not reference
applicable guidelines or underlying framework -
resulting in a lack of understanding for the ADF
member of the review performed.
While commentary has been provided in relation the
positive outcomes (for example, a reduced
administrative burden) of implementing prescribed
formats for the response provided to the ADF member -
this has not been captured in the model.
Annual Internal Review
Area and Service
or Other Defence
Delegate
Manual Preventative
8.2 G8 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Restricted Access An APS employee's / ADF member's request for
review and supporting documentation are not secured
as confidential information.
An APS employee's / ADF member's information
is not secured as confidential information.
Provide guidance as to how APS employee / ADF
member documentation is secured from unauthorised
access.
Annual Internal Review
Area
Manual /
Automated
Preventative
8.2 G9 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Efficiency The internal review performed does not consider
whether the benefit of the process outweighs all
associated costs.
Internal reviews performed do not consider
whether the benefit of the process outweighs all
associated costs.
Provide guidance in relation to how thresholds (of time
or money spent) have been or are to be applied in
relation to internal reviews.
Annual Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2 G10 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Monitoring Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part
of the review process are not rectified to ensure the
issue (if due to a systematic error) does not re-occur
in the future.
Lessons learnt are not reflected in an updated
process.
Implement a process which identifies how control
weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in the original
decision process, will be rectified to prevent a re-
occurrence.
Annual Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.2 G11 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
Monitoring An APS employee / ADF member is unable to request
an explanation for a review performed by the Internal
Review area.
The outcome of the review process is not
understood by APS employees / ADF members
and may result in a loss of transparency in the
process and/or outcome.
Provide guidance if follow up action is available to
APS employees / ADF members to request additional
documentation in regards to the review of action
outcome (similar to that available from the original
decision maker).
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area
Manual Preventative
8.3 G1
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Efficiency The system/model is unable to operate in a range of
diverse and unique environments.
The system/model is unable to operate in a
range of diverse and unique environments.
Provide guidance as to how an APS employees / ADF
members location will impact the model/system (or
lack thereof).
Annual Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3 G2
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Timeliness Internal reviews performed are not made (and
communicated) in a timely manner and are not in
accordance with the timeframes set out in procedural
documentation (taking into account deployed
environments).
Internal reviews performed are not made (and
communicated) in a timely manner.
Implement a detective control to ensure reviews are
performed and communicated within the required
timeframes.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Detective
8.3 G3
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Timeliness The system/model does not consider the deployed
environment of the APS employee / ADF member
when communicating review of action outcomes.
Internal reviews performed are not made (and
communicated) in a timely manner.
Implement a detective control to ensure reviews are
performed and communicated within the required
timeframes.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Detective
8.3 G4
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Monitoring Decisions reached by the Internal Review area do not
result in consistent outcomes.
Decisions made are not consistent. Implement the performance of an independent review
over all reviews performed (on a sample basis) to
ensure decisions are made are consistent.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Detective
8.3 G5
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the review
process is not communicated throughout the ADF.
The process in relation to the decision and
review of action process is not understood by
APS employees / ADF member.
Provide guidance as to how the revised model will be
communicated throughout the ADF.
Annual Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3 G6
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Re-performance /
Efficiency
Documentation is not retained to support the review
performed.
A review of action performed is unable to be
reviewed as the documentation supporting the
outcome is not retained.
Provide guidance as to how documentation to support
the initial decision is retained.
Annual Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3 G7
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Communication Reviews performed do not reference applicable
guidelines or underlying framework and / or do not
provide reasons for the review decision made.
A review of action performed does not reference
applicable guidelines or underlying framework -
resulting in a lack of understanding for the APS
employees / ADF member of the review
performed.
While commentary has been provided in relation the
positive outcomes (for example, a reduced
administrative burden) of implementing prescribed
formats for the response provided to the APS
employees / ADF member - this has not been captured
in the model.
Annual Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3 G8
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Restricted Access An APS employee / ADF member request for review
and supporting documentation are not secured as
confidential information.
An APS employees / ADF members information
is not secured as confidential information.
Provide guidance as to how APS employees / ADF
member documentation is secured from unauthorised
access.
Annual Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual /
Automated
Preventative
8.3 G9
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Efficiency The internal review performed does not consider
whether the benefit of the process outweighs all
associated costs.
Internal reviews performed do not consider
whether the benefit of the process outweighs all
associated costs.
Provide guidance in relation to how thresholds (of time
or money spent) have been or are to be applied in
relation to internal reviews.
Annual Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3 G10
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Monitoring Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part
of the review process are not rectified to ensure the
issue (if due to a systematic error) does not re-occur
in the future.
Lessons learnt are not reflected in an updated
process.
Implement a process which identifies how control
weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in the original
decision process, will be rectified to prevent a re-
occurrence.
Annual Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.3 Multiple Internal Review Areas
Gap Risks Frequency
Department of Defence
ADF Review of Action Process Map
Responsible
Area
Manual /
Automated
Preventative /
DetectiveReference Sub Process Gap Type Gap Description Recommendations
Control Gaps - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
8.3 G11
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
Monitoring An APS employee / ADF member is unable to request
an explanation for a review performed by the Internal
Review area.
The outcome of the review process is not
understood by APS employees / ADF members
and may result in a loss of transparency in the
process and/or outcome.
Provide guidance if follow up action is available to
APS employees / ADF members to request additional
documentation in regards to the review of action
outcome (similar to that available from the original
decision maker).
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area - Army, Air
Force, Navy and
APS
Manual Preventative
8.4 G18.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Efficiency The system/model is unable to operate in a range of
diverse and unique environments.
The system/model is unable to operate in a
range of diverse and unique environments.
Provide guidance as to how an APS employees / ADF
members location will impact the model/system (or
lack thereof).
Annual Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4 G28.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Timeliness Internal reviews performed are not made (and
communicated) in a timely manner and are not in
accordance with the timeframes set out in procedural
documentation (taking into account deployed
environments).
Internal reviews performed are not made (and
communicated) in a timely manner.
Implement a detective control to ensure reviews are
performed and communicated within the required
timeframes.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Detective
8.4 G38.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Timeliness The system/model does not consider the deployed
environment of the APS employee / ADF member
when communicating review of action outcomes.
Internal reviews performed are not made (and
communicated) in a timely manner.
Implement a detective control to ensure reviews are
performed and communicated within the required
timeframes.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Detective
8.4 G48.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Monitoring Decisions reached by the Internal Review area /
Inspector General do not result in consistent
outcomes.
Decisions made are not consistent. Implement the performance of an independent review
over all reviews performed (on a sample basis) to
ensure decisions are made are consistent.
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Detective
8.4 G58.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the review
process is not communicated throughout the ADF.
The process in relation to the decision and
review of action process is not understood by
APS employees / ADF member.
Provide guidance as to how the revised model will be
communicated throughout the ADF.
Annual Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4 G68.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Re-performance /
Efficiency
Documentation is not retained to support the review
performed.
A review of action performed is unable to be
reviewed as the documentation supporting the
outcome is not retained.
Provide guidance as to how documentation to support
the initial decision is retained.
Annual Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4 G78.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Communication Reviews performed do not reference applicable
guidelines or underlying framework.
A review of action performed does not reference
applicable guidelines or underlying framework -
resulting in a lack of understanding for the APS
employees / ADF member of the review
performed.
While commentary has been provided in relation the
positive outcomes (for example, a reduced
administrative burden) of implementing prescribed
formats for the response provided to the APS
employees / ADF member - this has not been captured
in the model.
Annual Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4 G88.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Restricted Access An APS employee / ADF member request for review
and supporting documentation are not secured as
confidential information.
An APS employees / ADF members information
is not secured as confidential information.
Provide guidance as to how APS employees / ADF
member documentation is secured from unauthorised
access.
Annual Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual /
Automated
Preventative
8.4 G98.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Efficiency The internal review performed does not consider
whether the benefit of the process outweighs all
associated costs.
Internal reviews performed do not consider
whether the benefit of the process outweighs all
associated costs.
Provide guidance in relation to how thresholds (of time
or money spent) have been or are to be applied in
relation to internal reviews.
Annual Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4 G108.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Monitoring Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part
of the review process are not rectified to ensure the
issue (if due to a systematic error) does not re-occur
in the future.
Lessons learnt are not reflected in an updated
process.
Implement a process which identifies how control
weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in the original
decision process, will be rectified to prevent a re-
occurrence.
Annual Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4 G118.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector
General and ADF
Monitoring An APS employee / ADF member is unable to request
an explanation for a review performed by the Internal
Review area / Service Chief.
The outcome of the review process is not
understood by APS employees / ADF members
and may result in a loss of transparency in the
process and/or outcome.
Provide guidance if follow up action is available to
APS employees / ADF members to request additional
documentation in regards to the review of action
outcome (similar to that available from the original
decision maker).
Multiple Times per
Day
Internal Review
Area APS and
Inspector General
ADF
Manual Preventative
8.4 Inspector General ADF Internal Review Area
Risk ID Applicable Defence Process Operational Risk Description Significance Likelihood Risk Rating
Control
Activities in
Place?
Risk
Addressed?Control Gap / Weakness
8.1 R1 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process
Map
Decisions are not made (and communicated) in a
timely manner and are not in accordance with the
timeframes set out in procedural documentation
(taking into account deployed environments).
Moderate High High Yes 8.1.1 - - - - - Partially No detective control is in place to ensure
decisions are made within the required
timeframes.
8.1 R2 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process
Map
Decisions made are not consistent (for events with a
similar fact pattern), regardless of whether the ADF
member requests a review to be performed.
High Moderate High Yes 8.1.1 8.1.2 - - - - Partially No control is in place to review decisions which
are not referred to the Internal Review area.
8.1 R3 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process
Map
Procedural documentation in relation to the decision
and review of action process is not communicated
throughout the ADF.
Moderate Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
how the revised model will be communicated
throughout the ADF.
8.1 R4 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process
Map
Documentation is not retained to support the initial
decision made.
High Moderate High No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
how the documentation to support the initial
decision is retained.
8.1 R5 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process
Map
Decisions made do not refer to applicable guidelines
or underlying framework - resulting in a lack of
understanding for the ADF member of the original
decision.
Moderate Moderate Moderate No - - - - - - No While commentary has been provided in
relation to the positive outcomes (for example,
a reduced administrative burden) of
implementing prescribed formats for the
response provided to the ADF member in
regards to the original decision - this has not
been captured in the model.
8.1 R6 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process
Map
An ADF member is unable to request an explanation
for a decision made.
High Low Moderate Yes See
Comment
- - - - - Yes The control relates to the follow up rights
available to each ADF member.
8.1 R7 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process
Map
An ADF members request for review and the original
decision made (and supporting documentation) are
not secured as confidential information.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
how ADF member documentation is secured
from unauthorised access.
8.1 R8 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process
Map
The subsequent review performed by the
Commanding Officer (where applicable) does not
consider whether the benefit of the process
outweighs all associated costs.
High Moderate High No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
how thresholds (time spent and $ impact of
decision) have been or are to be applied in
relation to decisions.
8.1 R9 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process
Map
The ADF member is unsure as to the outcome of the
review performed by their Commanding Officer
(review of the decision made by the original decision
maker).
High Low Moderate Yes 8.1.3 8.1.4 - - - - Yes N/a.
8.1 R10 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process
Map
Resources are not sufficient to review a large
volume of decision applications.
Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 8.1.2 - - - - - Yes N/a.
8.2 R1 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
The essential components for an optimal system of
inquiry, investigation and review are not reflected in
the system/model utilised by the ADF.
High Low Moderate Yes All All All All All All Partially This risk is driven by the ability of the existing
control environment to address all identified
operational risks.
8.2 R2 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
The review process is not sufficiently robust (lack of
documented procedures and guidelines or an
immature system/model under which reviews are
performed) to stand up to external scrutiny.
High Low Moderate Yes All All All All All All Partially This risk is driven by the ability of the existing
control environment to address all identified
operational risks.
8.2 R3 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
The system/model is unable to operate in a range of
diverse and unique environments.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
how an ADF members location will impact the
model/system (or lack thereof).
8.2 R4 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Internal reviews are not performed (and
communicated) in a timely manner and are not in
accordance with the timeframes set out in
procedural documentation (taking into account
deployed environments).
Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 8.2.1 8.2.2 8.2.4 - - - Partially No detective control is in place to reviews are
performed and communicated within the
required timeframes.
8.2 Single Internal Review Area
Department of Defence
ADF Review of Action Process Map
Risk Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Control References
8.1 ADF Review of Action
Risk ID Applicable Defence Process Operational Risk Description Significance Likelihood Risk Rating
Control
Activities in
Place?
Risk
Addressed?Control Gap / Weakness
Department of Defence
ADF Review of Action Process Map
Risk Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Control References
8.2 R5 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
The system/model does not consider the deployed
environment of the ADF member when
communicating review of action outcomes.
Moderate Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
how differing subject matters or an ADF
members location will impact the model/system
(or lack thereof).
8.2 R6 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Decisions reached by the Internal Review area do
not result in consistent outcomes.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No control is in place to review decisions made
for consistency with other events with a
similar/consistent fact pattern.
Note: The structure proposed by Model 3A (a
single internal review area) would in itself result
in a consistent review of actions process - as all
reviews would be performed centrally using a
common process.
8.2 R7 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Procedural documentation in relation to the review
process is not communicated throughout the ADF.
Moderate Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
how the revised model will be communicated
throughout the ADF.
8.2 R8 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Documentation is not retained to support the review
performed.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
how the documentation to support the review
performed is retained.
8.2 R9 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Decisions made do not refer to applicable guidelines
or underlying framework - resulting in a lack of
understanding for the ADF member of the review of
action performed.
Moderate Low Moderate No - - - - - - No While commentary has been provided in
relation the positive outcomes (for example, a
reduced administrative burden) of implementing
prescribed formats for the response provided to
the ADF member in regards to the reviewed
performed and the outcome - this has not been
captured in the model.
8.2 R10 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
An ADF member is unable to request an explanation
for a review performed by the Internal Review area.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided as to whether
an ADF member has follow up rights following a
review of action process.
8.2 R11 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
An ADF members request for review and supporting
documentation are not secured as confidential
information.
High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
how ADF member documentation is secured
from unauthorised access.
8.2 R12 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
The internal review performed does not consider
whether the benefit of the process outweighs all
associated costs.
High Moderate High No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
how thresholds (time spent and $ impact of
decision) have been or are to be applied in
relation to reviews performed.
8.2 R13 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
The outcome of a review performed by the Internal
Review area is not consistently communicated to all
parties (ADF member, Commanding Officer and the
original decision maker).
High Low Moderate Yes 8.2.5 8.2.6 8.2.7 8.2.10 - - Yes N/a.
8.2 R14 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Reviews performed are not able to be subject to an
external review.
High Low Moderate Yes 8.2.5 8.2.9 - - - - Yes N/a.
8.2 R15 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part
of the review process are not rectified to ensure the
issue (if due to a systematic error) does not re-occur
in the future.
Moderate Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
control weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in
the original decision process, will be rectified to
prevent a re-occurrence.
8.2 R16 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single
Internal Review Area
Internal reviews are not performed by an approved
delegate.
Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 8.2.3 8.2.8 - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to
control weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in
the original decision process, will be rectified to
prevent a re-occurrence.
B1 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map
8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector General
and Internal Audit
Monitoring No detective control is in place to ensure decisions and internal
reviews are made within the required timeframes and are
consistent (for events with a similar fact pattern), regardless of
whether the APS employees / ADF member requests a review
to be performed.
Implement the performance of an independent review
(quality assurance) over all decisions made and internal
reviews performed (on a sample basis) to ensure
decisions are made within the required timeframes and
are consistent.
Compliance with internal
guidelines.
Moderate
B2 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map
8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector General
and Internal Audit
Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the decision and review
of action process is not communicated throughout the ADF.
Provide guidance as to how the revised model will be
communicated throughout the ADF.
Consistent understanding
throughout the ADF.
Quick Win
B3 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Re-performance /
Efficiency
Documentation is not retained to support the initial decision
made or the internal review performed.
Provide guidance as to how documentation to support
the initial decision and internal review is retained (which
may include the development of mechanisms for
records management).
Ability to re-evaluate decision
made after the fact.
Quick Win
B4 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map
8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector General
and Internal Audit
Communication Decisions made and reviews performed do not reference
applicable guidelines or underlying framework (where
applicable).
While commentary has been provided in relation the
positive outcomes (for example, a reduced
administrative burden) of implementing prescribed
formats for the response provided to the APS
employees / ADF member in regards to the original
decision - this has not been captured in the model.
Reduced administrative burden. Moderate
B5 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map
8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector General
and Internal Audit
Restricted Access An APS employees / ADF members request for review and the
original decision made (and supporting documentation) are not
secured as confidential information.
Provide guidance as to how APS employees / ADF
member documentation is secured from unauthorised
access.
Maintaining confidentiality over
sensitive information.
Quick Win
B6 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map
8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector General
and Internal Audit
Efficiency Decisions made by the original decision maker (and
subsequent review by the Service Delegate / Inspector
General, where applicable) and the internal review performed
do not consider whether the benefit of the process outweighs all
associated costs.
Provide guidance in relation to how thresholds (time
spent and $ impact of decision) have been or are to be
applied in relation to decisions and the internal review of
actions.
Efficiency in review of action
process.
Moderate
Department of Defence
ADF Review of Action Process Map
Reference Sub Process Improvement Type Current Situation Improvement Description Improvement BenefitsLevel of Investment
(Significant, Moderate, Quick Win)
Business Improvements - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Department of Defence
ADF Review of Action Process Map
Reference Sub Process Improvement Type Current Situation Improvement Description Improvement BenefitsLevel of Investment
(Significant, Moderate, Quick Win)
Business Improvements - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
B7 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector General
and Internal Audit
Efficiency The system/model is unable to operate in a range of diverse
and unique environments.
Provide guidance as to how an APS employees / ADF
members location will impact the model/system (or lack
thereof).
Consistent understanding
throughout the ADF.
Quick Win
B8 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector General
and Internal Audit
Monitoring Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part of the
review process are not rectified to ensure the issue (if due to a
systematic error) does not re-occur in the future.
Implement a process which identifies how control
weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in the original
decision process, will be rectified to prevent a re-
occurrence.
Remediation of systematic
errors.
Moderate
B9 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal
Review Area
8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal
Review Area
8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector General
and Internal Audit
Monitoring An APS employees / ADF member is unable to request an
explanation for a review performed by the Internal Review area.
Provide guidance if follow up action is available to APS
employees / ADF members to request additional
documentation in regards to the review of action
process (similar to that available from the original
decision maker).
Reduced administrative burden. Quick Win
Control Type DescriptionCommunication Control assists to provide transparency in processes and outcomes through verbal or written communication.Timeliness Control assists to facilitate timely decision making.Approved Delegate Control is required to operated by an authorised individual.Consistency Control incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure consistency.Transparency Control assists to provide transparency in processes and outcomes through an external review process.
Gap Type DescriptionMonitoring A gap in the process as no monitoring or review activity is performed over the process.Communication A gap in the process as there may be a lack in the transparency of processes and outcomes.Efficiency A gap in the process which may assist to provide efficiencies in the process.Restricted Access A gap in the process which does not safeguard sensitive information.Timeliness A gap in the process which does not facilitate timely decision making.Re-performance A gap in the process which does not allow a decision to be supported at a subsequent point in time.
Department of Defence Control & Risk AssessmentCONTROL and GAP TYPE GLOSSARY
High Moderate Low
High High High Moderate
Moderate High Moderate Low
Low Moderate Low Low
Department of Defence Control & Risk AssessmentRISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX
Significance
Likelihood
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 4 – EXTERNAL REVIEW
9.1 EXTERNAL REVIEW PROCESS
AD
FM
em
be
rM
eri
tP
rote
cti
on
Co
mm
issio
ne
rA
PS
Em
plo
yee
Start
5.4
Apply to Merit ProtectionCommissioner for review of
decision or action (Note:Termination decisions go to Fair
Work Commission)
5.4
Review decision or action inaccordance with the Public
Service Act 1999
9.1.1 5.4
Make recommendations to theSecretary in relation to the
decision or action under review
5.4
Apply to Administrative AppealsTribunal for review of decision or
action in relation to ADFallowances and benefits
5.4
Inform APS Employee andDefence of outcome of review
9.2.4
Outcome /Recommendations of
Review
De
fen
ce
Do the CDF / ServiceChiefs accept outcome /
recommendations ofreview?
5.4
Implement anyrecommendations from the
review
5.4
Draft reasons for notimplementing recommendations
to table to Parliament
9.1.2
EndYes
No
StartWas original decision
related to ADF allowancesand benefits?
5.4
Apply to External Integrity Agency(Model 4A), Defence Force
Ombudsman (Model 4B) or InspectorGeneral ADF (Model 4B) for review of
decision or action in relation to all otherADF-related decisions
Start
5.4
Receive investigations related to:- Service-related deaths- Complaints about conduct ofprofessional investigators- Scrutiny of Defence actions- Request of a Minister in Defence
FC 9.2Model
4A
Yes
No
FC 9.2Models
4A or 4B
FC 9.2Model
4A
FC 9.2Model
4A
End
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
Preventative Control
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
XX
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
G1B1
5.4
Send to External IntegrityAgency for investigation
I2
5.4
Secretary makes a decision
5.4
Inform APS Employee and MeritProtection Commissioner of
decision (if necessary)
9.2.4
End
5.4
Administrative Appeals Tribunaldecisions are binding on
Defence
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 4 – EXTERNAL REVIEW
9.2 (PROPOSED) MODELS 4A AND 4B - EXTERNAL REVIEW
De
fen
ce
Fo
rce
Om
bu
ds
ma
nIn
sp
ec
tor
Gen
era
lA
DF
Exte
rna
lIn
teg
rity
Ag
en
cy
5.4
Conduct further investigation
Has decision beenreviewed in any other
external review process?
Has the ADF Memberexhausted internal review
options?No
Should application beconsidered?
5.4
Inform ADF Member andDefence of outcome /
recommendations of review
Should an investigation beundertaken
Yes
Yes
No
5.4
Determine outcome and makerecommendations
Yes
No
Should decision be referredto Merit Protection
Commissioner?
Yes
No
FC 9.1ExternalReview
No
FC 9.1ExternalReview
Yes
FC 9.1ExternalReview
5.4
Review action that relates to amatter of administration with
respect to the application
9.2.3 5.4
Determine outcome and makerecommendations
5.4
Inform ADF Member andDefence of outcome /
recommendations of review
9.2.4
MODEL 4BDefence Force Ombudsman and Inspector General ADF
FC 9.1ExternalReview
5.4
Review action that relates tomilitary justice with respect to the
application
5.4
Determine outcome and makerecommendations
5.4
Inform ADF Member andDefence of outcome /
recommendations of review
9.2.4 5.4
Report to Parliament onoutcome / recommendations of
review
9.2.5
MODEL 4AExternal Integrity Agency
9.2.1 9.2.2
FC 9.1ExternalReview
5.4
Review original decision oraction in relation to ADFallowances and benefits
9.2.3
Re-make decision basedon review?
5.4
Inform ADF Member andDefence of outcome
9.2.45.4
Amend original decisionYes
No
Ad
min
istr
ati
ve
Ap
pea
lsT
rib
un
al
End
9.2.4
9.2.3
9.2.3
G1
B2
B2
B3
B3
G1 G2
G2
G3
G3
X.X
X.X
Detective Control
Preventative Control
Database / Storage
Activity / Process
Document
Decision
Legend
Process MapConnection
X.X Control Gap
XX
BusinessImprovement
X.X
InsightsX.X
End
B4
B4
B4
B4
9.2.3
FC 9.1ExternalReview
End
9.1.1 9.1 External Review Process Compliance &
Consistency
Merit Protection Commissioner reviews the decision or action in
accordance with the Public Service Act 1999 .
1. Ensures compliance to the relevant legislative Act when making a
recommendation.
Daily Merit Protection
Commissioner
Manual Preventative
9.1.2 9.1 External Review Process Transparency &
Consistency
Reasons for not implementing a recommendation by the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal, External Integrity Agency, Defence Force
Ombudsman, and/ or Inspector General ADF are tabled to Parliament.
1. Acknowledges that recommendations have been considered, and if
not implemented, are explained and justified in a transparent manner to
Parliament.
Daily Defence Manual Preventative
9.2.1 9.2 Models 4A (Proposed) - External
Review
Efficiency Discretion is available to exclude any complaint, which has been
reviewed externally, for further investigation (on the same facts).
1. Ensure that all external review decisions are final and binding, and
prevents duplication of effort.
Multiple Times per
Day
External Integrity
Agency
Manual Preventative
9.2.2 9.2 Models 4A (Proposed) - External
Review
Efficiency Discretion is available to exclude any complaint, which has been
reviewed externally, for further investigation (on the same facts).
1. Prevent duplication of effort and promotes proper use of resources. Multiple Times per
Day
External Integrity
Agency
Manual Preventative
9.2.3 9.2 Models 4A (Proposed) - External
Review
Consistency There is an independent review of decisions conducted by
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, External Integrity Agency, Defence
Force Ombudsman and Inspector General ADF to ensure decisions
are made consistently.
1. Facilitates consistent review outcomes. Daily External Integrity
Agency / Merit
Protection
Commissioner
Manual Preventative
9.2.4 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
Transparency Provides an external oversight mechanism in relation to the ADF by the
external parties.
1. Facilitates consistent review outcomes and transparency. Daily External Integrity
Agency /
Administrative
Appeals Tribunal /
Defence Force
Ombudsman /
Inspector General
ADF / Merit
Protection
Commissioner /
Secretary
Manual Preventative
9.2.5 9.2 Models 4B (Proposed) - External
Review
Transparency The Inspector General ADF reports to Parliament on the outcome and/
or recommendations of their review.
1. Promotes transparency and independence of the Inspector General's
external review from the ADF.
Daily IGADF / Defence
Force Ombudsman
Manual Preventative
9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) - External Review
9.1 External Review Process
Department of Defence
External Review Process Map
Control Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Responsible AreaManual /
AutomatedPreventative / DetectiveRef. Sub Process Control Type Control Description Control Objective Frequency
9.1 G1 9.1 External Review Process Monitoring There is no subsequent review process in place to
ensure recommendations have been implemented
properly.
Recommendations made by the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal, External Integrity Agency,
Defence Force Ombudsman, and/ or Inspector
General ADF may not be implemented correctly
or appropriately to address the original reason
why a recommendation was made.
A review process should be implemented to monitor
the progress of the implementation of
recommendations made.
Monthly Defence Legal Manual Detective
9.2 G1 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
Timeliness &
Consistency
No guidance on how to facilitate sound and timely
decisions made by applicable agencies.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Merit Protection
Service, External Integrity Agency, Defence
Force Ombudsman and Inspector General ADF
do not provide timely response for ADF to
making decisions on review outcomes.
In the proposed model, outline timeframes in which
each agency is required to provide a response to ADF
and provide regular training to ensure efficient
decision-making is made.
Throughout a year Administrative
Appeals Tribunal,
Merit Protection
Service, External
Integrity Agency,
Defence Force
Ombudsman and
Inspector General
ADF (IGADF)
Manual Preventative
9.2 G2 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
Efficiency No guidance on how this process will promote flexible
options to initiate a review in deployed environments.
ADF members / APS employees may not be able
to initiate an external review due to limited
options available.
In the proposed models, outline how the process will
allow an ADF member / APS employee to initiate the
external review using various methods in deployed
operations.
Once-off Defence Legal Manual Preventative
9.2 G3 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
Monitoring There are no controls in place to co-ordinate and
monitor the progress of external reviews.
Reviews conducted by external parties may not
be appropriate and completed in a timely
manner.
Establish a reporting mechanism that requires
Defence to follow up with external agencies to obtain
status reports on a regular basis.
Monthly Administrative
Appeals Tribunal,
Merit Protection
Service,
External Integrity
Agency,
Defence Force
Ombudsman and
Inspector General
ADF (IGADF)
Manual Preventative
Department of Defence
External Review Process Map
Responsible
Area
Manual /
Automated
Preventative /
DetectiveReference Sub Process Gap Type Gap Description Recommendations
Control Gaps - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
9.1 External Review Process
9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) - External Review
Gap Risks Frequency
Risk ID Applicable Defence Process Operational Risk Description Significance Likelihood Risk Rating
Control
Activities in
Place?
Risk
Addressed?Control Gap / Weakness
9.1 R1 9.1 External Review Process There is a risk that the recommendations may not be
implemented appropriately and/ or in a timely
manner.
Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 9.2.1 9.2.2 - - - - Partially No guidance on how to monitor the
implementation of recommendations in an
appropriate and/ or timely manner.
9.2 R1 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Merit Protection
Service, External Integrity Agency, Defence Force
Ombudsman, and Inspector General ADF do not
provide timely responses to making decisions on
review outcomes.
Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 9.2.1 9.2.2 9.2.3 - - - Partially No guidance on how to facilitate sound and
timely decisions made by applicable agencies.
9.2 R2 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
ADF members / APS employees may not be able to
initiate an external review due to limited options
available.
Moderate Moderate Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance on how this process will promote
flexible options to initiate a review in deployed
environments.
9.2 R3 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
Defence is unable to co-ordinate and monitor
progress of external reviews in progress.
Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 9.2.3 - - - - - Partially There are no controls in place to co-ordinate
and monitor the progress of external reviews.
9.2 R4 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
ADF members / APS employees may not use the
external review process appropriately.
Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 9.2.3 - - - - - No No guidance on how to appropriately use the
external review process.
9.2 R5 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
The privacy of individuals may not be protected. High Low High Yes 9.1.1 - - - - - Yes N/a
9.2 R6 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
The models may be too complex to be used or
applied by individuals.
Moderate Moderate Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance on how to appropriately use the
external review process.
Department of Defence
External Review Process Map
Risk Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Control References
9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) - External Review
9.1 External Review Process
B1 9.1 External Review Process Monitoring There is no subsequent review process in place to ensure
recommendations have been implemented properly.
A review process should be developed to monitor the progress
of the implementation of recommendations made.
Keeping track of recommendations that have
not been implemented correctly or
appropriately allows ADF to remedy these in a
timely manner.
Quick Win
B2 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
Timeliness &
Consistency
No guidance on how to facilitate sound and timely decisions
made by applicable agencies.
In the proposed model, outline timeframes in which each
agency is required to provide a response to ADF and provide
regular training to ensure efficient decision-making is made.
Facilitates sound and timely decision making. Quick Win
B3 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
Efficiency No guidance on how this process will promote flexible options
to initiate a review in deployed environments.
In the proposed models, outline how the process will allow an
ADF member / APS employee to initiate the external review
using various methods in deployed operations.
Promotes flexibility in response options in the
deployed environment.
Moderate
B4 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -
External Review
Monitoring There are no controls in place to co-ordinate and monitor the
progress of external reviews.
Establish a reporting mechanism that requires each agency to
provide status reports on its external reviews on a regular
basis.
Facilitates sound and timely decision making. Quick Win
Department of Defence
External Review Process Map
Reference Sub Process Improvement Type Current Situation Improvement Description Improvement BenefitsLevel of Investment
(Significant, Moderate, Quick Win)
Business Improvements - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process
Control Type DescriptionCommunication Control assists to provide transparency in processes and outcomes through verbal or written communication.Timeliness Control assists to facilitate timely decision making.Approved Delegate Control is required to operated by an authorised individual.Consistency Control incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure consistency.Transparency Control assists to provide transparency in processes and outcomes through an external review process.
Gap Type DescriptionMonitoring A gap in the process as no monitoring or review activity is performed over the process.Communication A gap in the process as there may be a lack in the transparency of processes and outcomes.Efficiency A gap in the process which may assist to provide efficiencies in the process.Restricted Access A gap in the process which does not safeguard sensitive information.Timeliness A gap in the process which does not facilitate timely decision making.Re-performance A gap in the process which does not allow a decision to be supported at a subsequent point in time.
Department of Defence Control & Risk AssessmentCONTROL and GAP TYPE GLOSSARY
High Moderate Low
High High High Moderate
Moderate High Moderate Low
Low Moderate Low Low
Department of Defence Control & Risk AssessmentRISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX
Significance
Likelihood