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Department of Informatics and Media
Master’s Programme in Social Sciences,
Digital Media and Society specialization
One-year master’s Thesis
Elected Officials’ View on Disinformation
- On a Municipality level
Student: Jenny Björk
Date: June 2020
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Abstract
Many actors in society want to influence the debate and many even want to undermine
Swedish democracy, which for example, happened during the corona crisis progress in the
spring of 2020. It is easy to fool somebody when one does not have to relate to facts, ethics,
and current standards. Disinformation is when misleading and inaccurate information is
deliberately disseminated for one’s own gain. It is not a new phenomenon, but the way
disinformation is spread changes as society develops. Digital media has made it possible for
not only elites to influence the debate, but also private individuals and groups can express
their opinions that can have far-reaching consequences for democracy. The purpose of this
study was to investigate the spread of disinformation in a local context. By mapping a mid-
sized Swedish municipality council’s understanding of disinformation as well as to analyze its
potential impact on local democracy, it is possible to raise awareness among decision-makers.
It also intended to explore the council’s discussion on appropriate measures for counteracting
disinformation. A qualitative interview was chosen, and the goal was to interview one elected
official from each of the eight political parties in the council. Five out of eight political parties
are represented in the study. The interviews provided a large and abundant material.
The study’s theoretical framework consists of three political communication theories,
Habermas’s public sphere theory, Chadwick’s hybrid media system and Lazarfeld’s two-step
flow theory. Through a thorough analysis and help from the theoretical framework, the aim
and research questions of the study could be answered. It turned out that the elected officials
both have awareness and understanding of the phenomenon of disinformation. They
mentioned both traditional media and social media as an intermediate, but that the spread of
disinformation has increased since the birth of social media. Further they felt that spread of
disinformation could be negative for democracy and could lead to tougher debate climate,
social vulnerability, not knowing the original source, not wanting to get involved politically
etc. When counteracting disinformation in their own social media channels, one could note
that respective political parties in the council did not have a clear strategy. And to decrease
disinformation’s influence in the municipality, the elected officials want to see increased
participation to reduce loneliness which was identified as a problem. This study has
potentially raised awareness in a relatively understudied field which may be of interest in the
digital society we live in.
Keywords: Disinformation, municipality, elected officials, public sphere, social media
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Table of Contents 1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Aim .............................................................................................................................. 2
1.2 Delimitations .................................................................................................................... 2
2. Background ........................................................................................................................... 3
2.1 Municipality Structure ...................................................................................................... 3
2.2 Internal Threats ................................................................................................................ 4
2.3 External Threats in a Swedish Context ............................................................................ 4
3. Previous research ................................................................................................................. 5
3.1 Scandinavian Research on the Subject ............................................................................. 5
3.2 International Research on the Subject .............................................................................. 7
4. Theoretical framework ........................................................................................................ 9
4.1 The Public Sphere ............................................................................................................ 9
4.2 The Hybrid Media System ............................................................................................. 10
4.3 Two-Step Flow Theory .................................................................................................. 11
4.4 Theory Reflection ........................................................................................................... 12
5. Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 13
5.1 Choice of Approach ....................................................................................................... 13
5.2 Research Design ............................................................................................................. 13
5.3 Data Collection ............................................................................................................... 14
5.4 Selection of Respondents ............................................................................................... 14
5.4.1 Response Rate ......................................................................................................... 15
5.5 Data Analysis ................................................................................................................. 16
5.6 Validity and Reliability .................................................................................................. 17
5.7 Ethical Aspects ............................................................................................................... 17
5.8 Method Discussion ......................................................................................................... 18
6. Case ...................................................................................................................................... 19
7. Results ................................................................................................................................. 20
7.1 Awareness ...................................................................................................................... 20
7.2 Understanding ................................................................................................................ 21
7.3 Effects ............................................................................................................................. 22
7.3.1 Municipality Experiences of Disinformation .......................................................... 22
7.3.2 Downgrading Democracy........................................................................................ 22
7.4 Municipality Responses ................................................................................................. 23
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7.4.1 Political Party Positions .......................................................................................... 23
7.4.2 Suggestions on how to Counteract Disinformation ................................................. 24
8. Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 25
8.1 Research Question 1: How is the awareness level of elected officials on disinformation?
.............................................................................................................................................. 25
8.2 Research Question 2: What are disinformation’s potential effects on local democracy
according to municipality council members? ....................................................................... 25
8.3 Research Question 3: What are considered appropriate measures for counteracting
disinformation in the municipality? ..................................................................................... 27
9. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 29
9.1 Future Research .............................................................................................................. 30
References……………………………………………………………………………………....
Appendix A- Interview guide ....................................................................................................
Appendix B – Consent form ......................................................................................................
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Table of Figures
Figure 1. Power structure in a municipality……………………………………………………3
Figure 2. Four degrees of response…………………………………………………………….6
Figure 3. Gal-Tan scale, political parties in Sweden 2017…………………………………...16
List of Tables
Table 1. Respondents area of responsibility in the municipality……………………………..15
Table 2. Response rate from the political parties……………………………………………..15
Table 3. Represented political parties and their abbreviations……………………………….20
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Acknowledgement
Thanks to my supervisor at Uppsala University, Cecilia Strand, for your guidance and
commitment throughout the process of the study. I would also like to thank Mats Lindskog at
Västerås Stad for discussing thesis ideas with me and introduced me to the subject. Also, a big
thank you to the elected officials who chose to participate in the study, without you, this study
would not have been possible.
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Definition of terms:
Disinformation- Intentionally spreading false or misleading information
Västmanland – One of Sweden’s counties where the city of residence is Västerås
Abbreviations:
MSB- Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
SKL- Swedish Association for Local Authorities and Regions
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1. Introduction In a democracy, there is a free debate, and many actors try to influence our everyday lives,
such as political parties, commercial actors, journalists, or even private individuals. Actors
share information, knowledge, and perspectives between each other, and Oksanen (2018)
describes a problematic type of influence that is considered illegitimate that can harm society
with misleading information, the spread of disinformation. Over the years, the Swedish
system has been built by an open and permissive dialogue without an actual control of who
contributes to social debate. This can be problematic as there are certain actors whose goal is
to give a negative picture of Swedish society (MSB, 2017).
The corona eruption has led to a global disinformation pandemic and during the corona
crisis’s progress in Sweden in the year of 2020, Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist warned that
disinformation could be spread deliberately from various actors, and specifically addressed
right-wing alternative media as an example. Right-wing media and other actors have the
purpose of diluting the image of Sweden as a country in systemic collapse, who are weak and
lack political strength in decision-making. This, to undermine confidence in the state
authorities and political parties (Kausurinen, 2020).
In 2019, the Swedish Security Service identified potential threats to Swedish society and
claim that the development of technology gives both state and ideological actors increased
capacity to influence Swedish democracy. It is easy to influence people politically through
propaganda and modern technology. These new behaviors provide a picture of today’s
political debate. Through digitalization, the debate also becomes cross-border which leads to a
greater risk of manipulation from foreign states and therefore it is necessary to see increased
awareness generally in society. Russia continues to use military and non-military means of
power to influence (Swedish Security Service, 2019:21), indicating that they want to retain
their position as a superpower. Digitalization has created mutual dependencies that can
contribute to vulnerabilities in society. The unstable political situation in the world today
leads to the need for increased knowledge about how authorities and organizations can
identify, understand and respond to the spread of disinformation. Campaigns to try to
influence community residents have become increasingly sophisticated and is used both in
peacetime and war. Disinformation can be used to exploit vulnerabilities, which can impair
democracy, legal certainty and human rights. This further leads to the deterioration of free
opinion and democratic conversation. Sometimes misleading information can be disseminated
covertly to influence decision-making to increase one's own influence, examples of which
have been identified in presidential elections in both France (2017) and the United States
(2016) (MSB, 2018).
In Sweden it is hard to impose restrictions on the spread of disinformation, the country is a
democracy and has four fundamental laws which are more difficult to change than other laws.
They can only be rescinded if the government makes two similar decisions and between the
decisions, an election should be held. Two of them, The Freedom of the Press Act and
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Freedom of Expression, expresses the freedom of speech for citizens. They emphasize the
right to produce, disseminate and print writings and information without hindrance and
censorship in different channels such as media, television, film and technical recordings
(Regeringen, 2015). The authorities therefore have no opportunity to extinguish information.
These laws are a democratic pillar and are prerequisite for a state to function and not to
violate human rights. However, it makes it difficult in the digital society to identify which
information is correct and which information is false as individuals can spread what
information they want to anybody with a digital device. This leads to Sweden being
vulnerable to the spread of false information. A prerequisite for counteracting it is to spread
awareness and understanding to all actors of society, it creates a defence.
Disinformation can affect community institutions where elected officials and political parties
play a central role. On a local level it is possible to get closer to the citizens, Sweden has 290
municipalities (SKR, 2020), Västerås being one of them and will be analyzed in this study. By
mapping Västerås municipality council's understanding of disinformation, as well as analyze
its potential impact on local democracy will open new perspectives. It will contribute to new
and much-needed input in an understudied field. It will also contribute to increased awareness
of spread of disinformation of different actors in different channels, which may be of interest
in the digital society we live in. Often, community residents take the information they read for
granted and do not think about being source critical. The worse a target group is informed of
the circumstances of a matter, the easier it is to play with their emotions and influence them
(Oksanen, 2018). Thus, there is a general interest in the awareness to the phenomenon as
other municipalities in Sweden face the same problems.
1.1 Aim The study's aim is to map a mid-sized Swedish municipality council's understanding of
disinformation as well as analyze its potential impact on local democracy. It also intends to
explore the council’s discussion on appropriate measures for counteracting disinformation, as
the municipality does not have a clear action plan.
The research questions are:
• How is the awareness level of elected officials on disinformation?
• What are disinformation’s potential effects on local democracy according to
municipality council members?
• What are considered appropriate measures on how to counteract disinformation in the
municipality?
1.2 Delimitations The study is limited to one of Sweden’s municipalities, Västerås, but it could show a
generalizable result similar to other municipalities. The study could also have been made
more extensive by, for example, interviewing more respondents from each political party. But
due to superficial conditions, this demarcation was made. The study therefore only shows the
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perspectives of the interviewed elected officials and does not represent the entire municipality
council.
2. Background
2.1 Municipality Structure In Sweden, elected officials in the municipal council are responsible for making all overall
decisions in the municipality. They manage the financial situation in and control how the
money should be used and decide which areas should be prioritized. The council also has the
responsibility to elect board members that coordinate the work of the committees and ensure
that the council’s decisions are enforced (Västerås stad, 2019). Elected officials should be
equipped to lead a changing society and run a function with great influence from citizens. It is
a meaningful mission that includes wrestling with the everyday life of politics (SKR, 2019).
The power structure in a municipality is presented below in figure 1.
Figure 1. Municipality power structure (Västerås stad, 2019)
As an elected representative in a middle-sized municipality council assembly holds a great
public responsibility with constant interactions with its citizens. This means that they have
great influence and power over a geographical location. Being a representative, one always
must be updated and ready to act. Digital media provides further opportunities for dialogues
between politicians and citizens and gives citizens a chance to make their voices heard.
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and other social media provide what is described as direct
meetings between people. It is considered important that politicians are active on social media
as these platforms provide the most extreme opinions and expressions from people (SKR,
2019:14). Strömbäck and Van Aelst (2013) argue that political institutions and political
parties cannot avoid adapting to the media as they have become more dependent. By using
media proactively and reactively, politicians can incorporate the reactions of the public into
decision-making. The degree in the use of media may also vary between political parties as
parties in opposition possibly have a higher need to adjust to the media logic than parties in
government. The advice from Svergies Kommuner and Regioner (SKR) to politicians is to
always be prepared and have a strategy so that they can respond to others’ posts in a
thoughtful way. Social media has also led to an increased opportunity to spread
disinformation. This can create polarization and threatening confidence in democracy. On
social media, there is no factual review of what is being published which can affect public
decision-making (SKR, 2019:15).
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2.2 Internal Threats Overall, Swedish democracy is strong, there are few individuals who question democracy
within our national borders. All public decision-making must be based on democratic
government. Sweden has one of the highest measurements in the world when it comes to trust
in the democratic institutions, and the media are free to analyze the political power that affects
society. However, one of the challenges in Swedish society is the democratic exclusion which
reflects the part of the population who do not feel involved and expresses that they do not
trust in the state. This may indicate a link between exclusion and social vulnerability and
because of this, SKR proposes in-depth citizen dialogues (SKR, 2019:13). As Oksanen (2018)
mentions, the worse a target group is informed on different matters, the easier they are to
influence and take part of disinformation. Right-wing extreme forces are more often than
others identified when it comes to disinformation. New York Times has examined the right-
wing nationalist machinery and found that ads that are distributed in right-wing websites in
Sweden are links to right-wing extreme websites which is an example of actors in Sweden are
also trying to destabilize society. Further, they also claim that young people in a segregated
area in Stockholm have been offered money by the Russian state to throw stones and burn up
cars in front of the camera. These are examples of different ways of showing a Sweden in
crisis (DN, 2019). Swedish Defence Research Agency has also criticized left-wing groups for
gathering in different groups on social media to spread propaganda. Animal rights activist
groups, anti-fascist action and environment activist groups are mentioned among these as they
have also used violence in the past (Gagliano, 2018).
2.3 External Threats in a Swedish Context It is not only national actors who want to influence Swedish society. According to Oksanen
(2018), Russia is the international actor that is trying to influence Sweden the most at this day.
They do this with the aim of creating chaos and giving the image of a Sweden in disrepair,
preventing Swedish NATO entry, shatter the EU and delaying Swedish military upgrading
(Oksanen, 2018:4). In the spring of 2017, the top commander in chief Michael Bydén and
Peter Hultqvist published an article in Dagens Nyheter. They warned for increased risk of
Russian impact operations before the defence exercises AURORA 17. Russia is designated to
have an active role in spreading disinformation (Hultqvist & Bydén 2017; Holmström 2016).
Thomas (2014) mentions that the strategies of the Russian IT specialists make clear that
Russia is putting more focus into IT as key focus in the conduct of war, both in peace and
wartime. This to uncover vulnerabilities and to conduct espionage. Swedish authorities
therefore require increased understanding of the weaknesses of different social functions and
want to plan collaborations between different sectors. Because of this, MSB has, together with
Lund University on behalf of the Government written a handbook to help authorities
understand, identify and respond to the spread of disinformation (MSB, 2018). This handbook
has proven to be useful not only to state agencies, but also other stakeholders in society.
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3. Previous research ___________________________________________________________________________
The chapter begins by presenting a summary on previous research on disinformation,
beginning with other Scandinavian examples and ending with international research on the
subject. This will allow the reader to understand which direction the thesis will pursue.
3.1 Scandinavian Research on the Subject
In 2018, the municipality of Helsinki published a report to raise awareness about hybrid
threats and spread of disinformation to members of municipal councils and authorities,
because the world is seeing new types of threats. The report is based on studies of literature,
public documents, a survey with members of the council and interviews with experts and is
based on the authors opinions. They believe that it is not only the state actors that should
prepare for threats and spread of disinformation, but also municipal actors, they are not only a
target of influence, they also control many methods to protect cities and its population from
threats. To counteract spread of disinformation and hybrid threats they place great emphasis
on trust in the state apparatus and the municipality. It is these instances that are the closest to
the individual, and trust in these agencies can have a big impact on the state environment,
education and health care centers. High trust can therefore positively affect the city
atmosphere and at the same time avoid being hurt by disinformation. To reach this, state and
municipal bodies should cooperate and at the same time have good communication with
associations and schools. The Finnish population does however have a longstanding culture of
overall security and trust in the state apparatus (Harjanne et al, 2018).
Pamment et al (2018) published a report with collaboration from MSB from a Swedish point
of view to provide an overview of current thinking on how to counteract disinformation. The
report consists of three different chapters which was designed to help communicators at
authorities to become aware of the spread of disinformation by understanding, identifying and
counteracting. To understand the spread of disinformation they present different influence
activities that may occur and explain how it can affect the democratic debate as one needs to
know the meaning of influence before one can identify it. Disinformation can happen at a
societal, group or individual level and the information can either be constructive, disruptive or
distractive. Cognitive hacking is a common way when trying to influence a target. A message
must be cognitively processed to have an effect and cannot be forced upon targets (Pamment
et al, 2018:30). Therefore, its purpose is to activate psychosocial trigger points to be able to
reach a targets vulnerability and emotions and thereby have an influence on them. “Fake
news”, satires, cyber-attacks, bots, trolls are common ways of spreading this type of
disinformation. MSB (2018:17) mainly warns against “fake experts”, incorrect statistics,
manipulated reality and lack of context in messages and posts. To counteract the spread of
disinformation, a great deal of preparation is needed, that includes raising awareness,
debunking, making risk and vulnerability analysis, target audience analysis, strategic
narrating, messaging and social media. When an organization is prepared it is easier to act, the
authors suggest a four-step model including assess, inform, advocate and defend.
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Pamment et al (2018) argue that there is no ready solution to how to handle disinformation
because different organizations face different problems. The authors, therefore, suggest a
model with four different degrees of response depending on the severity of the situation, see
figure 2.
Figure 2: Four degrees of response (Pamment et al, 2018:36-37)
Steps 3 and 4 should be used with caution, and if they are relevant to the situation, the
management should approve it. The measures taken should also be consistent with democratic
principles, freedom of expression and public regulations (Pamment et al, 2018:38). Regarding
social media one must be aware of the logic used there. There is a greater challenge as
information spreads quickly (Pamment et al, 2018:40).
Farkas and Schou (2019) is on the same path and believe that one should take the fight against
disinformation seriously and that the truth should be found without costing democracy. They
consider this possible through transparency and believes that politicians and researchers who
compare fake news with “plague” or “disease” depoliticize the problem of disinformation.
They propose four measures to strengthen democratic resilience to disinformation:
• Politicians and tech leaders must stop chasing the truth at the expense of democracy
by using increased transparency and focus on orchestrated campaigns.
• Decisions must be made closer to the citizens, listen more to the voters.
• Do not underestimate our democratic institutions. Democracy requires trust.
• Limit the influence of companies in politics. For example, by regulating the growing
influence that political advertising has in democracies.
One way to equip citizens against disinformation is increased media literacy. A measure to
improve citizens’ media literacy (MIL) was initiated 2018 in the Nordic countries Denmark,
Norway and Sweden. The initiative includes citizens of all ages and is an important tool to be
able to equip people from being influenced by incorrect information. The idea was to
strengthen democracy, freedom of expression and information literacy and learn how to
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identify hate speech online. Included in the initiative is also a national strategy to maintain a
sustainable democracy, it also refers to a future MIL organization with the aim that everyone
should have the potential to democratic participation (Carlsson, 2018). SKL is one of several
actors working to support municipalities, regions and county councils to take advantage of the
possibilities of digitalization through organizational developments, service and guidance.
Competence, source critical and film-enhancing efforts through various theme days, lectures
and short courses in MIL for library staff, teachers, cultural staff and managers are developed
and implemented. However, the authors mention that it differs between municipalities how
the work is carried out and whether it exists at all (Carlsson, 2018 :96-97).
3.2 International Research on the Subject
Information war and influence policy is not a new phenomenon. A term sometimes used in
information warfare is “active measures”, this method was widely used by the Soviet Union
during the Cold War (Abrams, 2016:8). The development of technology in a global world has
made the methods even more effective. The digital media landscape has enabled
dissemination of disinformation from many different actors who can be recipients and
distributors at the same time (Abrams, 2016:27). Aro (2016) claims that pro – Russian spread
of disinformation will continue to grow; the Russians are using various measurements to
increase their control over the Internet and are investing money into infowar operations.
Examples exist of Russian actors in Sweden and Finland, such as politicians, academics and
newspapers who perform a role as agents of influence with the purpose of spreading
disinformation. Other Finnish examples show that many citizens counter organized trolling
and disinformation campaigns without realizing what they are facing, which makes it
impossible for security officials to be of any bigger help. It is also important to bear in mind
that information operations against citizens is only one form of warfare, as other cyber
operations and espionage may follow. Aro (2016) suggests that proper information defence
mechanisms are needed in order to counteract the spread disinformation and that the state
should be responsible when citizens are exposed. Otherwise, there is a risk of further
dissemination of false information being spread if citizens are to enlighten themselves.
The European Union also put efforts to protect democracy from the spread of disinformation.
In October 2017, the commission launched a public consultation on online disinformation and
fake news. It ended with an EU wide Code of Practice which was signed by online platforms
such as Facebook and Google. The measures are about ensuring transparency by explaining
how algorithms work and select news and improving the visibility and accessibility of reliable
news (Epthinktank, 2018). These companies have fundamentally changed society. Gelin and
Pettersson (2019) have tried to investigate the transparency of these technology giants and for
them it was impossible to get an interview with Google at their headquarters. Therefore, one
can question how transparent these tech giants really are and the authors claim that it points to
a democratic deficit.
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However, Benkler et al (2018) claims that the Internet as such does not put pressure on
democracy, filter bubbles and echo chambers could not possibly break a society with a well-
functioning public sphere just because digital media is present. Mainstream media is by far
the most powerful voice in producing disinformation. However, they do claim that different
social groups are not equally sensitive to accessing disinformation. Since the 1980’s, liberal
and conservative media consumption has been diverging. While self – identifying liberal and
independent voters tend to follow a variety of news sources and not hold an overrated trust in
any particular source, conservative voters follow a narrower group of news sources
“propaganda” and trust in them to a larger extent. In the American case, they found that the
problem with the right - wing media is that they almost exclusively tell people what they want
to hear. This can lead further to political dilemmas. Benkler et al (2018) do not ignore the
risks of social media sharing disinformation, but traditional media will, in the end, have a
larger impact on democracy. Scaramuzzino et al (2017) did find in the Swedish case that Civil
Society Organizations use social media alongside other strategies to influence politics both on
a local and national level. They claim that the Internet as a channel will strengthen already
elite organizations to become even more powerful, and it will introduce a younger generation
to political debate.
After the presentation of previous research, it can be noted that there are no deeper studies
made at a local level, with Helsinki as an exception, which has taken the problem seriously.
No Swedish studies at a municipal level were found, most of the research is carried through at
a state level with MSB as a client. However, their studies may be applicable on a municipal
level. It is also possible to identify Russian interests on foreign land, Sweden included and
they show how uncomplicated it can be to disseminate information.
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4. Theoretical framework ___________________________________________________________________________
The aim of this study is to map a mid-sized Swedish municipality council’s understanding of
disinformation and to discuss appropriate measures of how to counteract it, as it can
potentially have an impact on local democracy. With this aim, three political communication
theories were chosen. The public sphere is a central theory to democracy and focuses on open
democratic values in society; the hybrid media system applies a holistic approach of new
media logics and the power relations within; two-step flow theory explains increased
vulnerability in the media landscape due to digital media. It is in the open conversation and
communication between different actors that disinformation risk being spread. In the
interaction between political actors and citizens, information can flow in many directions and
different media play an active role as an intermediary.
4.1 The Public Sphere The meaning of the public sphere is that everybody can take part in it, and according to
Habermas (2003) it is not a public sphere if certain social groups are closed out. Thompson
(2008:97) mentions that the bourgeois public sphere explained by Habermas has been
criticized for not including the entire population, as it did not include women and the poor.
The bourgeois public sphere required financial assets and it was educated men at the time who
had strong positions in society. Additionally, Habermas has also been criticized by Calhoun
(1992) who claims that a public sphere should contain four basic requirements in order to
apply to a public:
• Everyone who participates in the public debate must do it under the same conditions
regardless of their affiliation.
• Arguments must be rational at nature and not affected by the social status that cannot
determine the outcome of the debate.
• Issues that are sensitive or considered inappropriate must be able to be discussed in the
public arena.
• Everyone should be able to make their voices heard regardless of social background.
In the bourgeois public sphere from the 1700s onwards, a new public sphere in the western
world began to take shape in salons and coffee houses. There, equal citizens in society
gathered in a public where everyone could take part in free and liberal conversations. This
gave them the opportunity to set their own agenda free of state interference (Habermas,
2003:39). The distinction between public and private appears to be somewhat philosophical
and can be abstract in its meanings. At that time in western societies, the dichotomy between
the two meant that the private consisted of private economy and personal relationships that
the state did not monitor, and the public consisted of state institutions (Habermas, 2003). In
today’s western society, the private has somewhat the same meaning, while the public sphere
also includes state-owned economic organizations, state and semi-state organizations and
social organizations. Thompson (2008:155) includes intermediate organizations such as
political parties, pressure groups, cooperative businesses etc.
As society develops, around 1830 public conversations reduced in terms of quality, and
according to Habermas (2003) it is mainly due to financial interests having greater influence
in the public. At the same time, many argue that the dichotomy between the private and the
public becomes diffuse and is not as clear as it previously was, because of the states’ growing
influence (see for example Habermas (2003) and Thompson (2008)).
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Over time, new forms of public sphere are created as society develops, Thompson (2008:159)
calls it the development towards the mediated public sphere. It is explained to be a complex
network which consists of a variety of actors participating in conversations, due to electronic
media. Today’s public sphere is an arena for the exchange of new ideas, opinions, discussions
and problem-solving. Politicians who are often in the public sphere face these aspects every
day as their profession involves serving the public. Politicians also act on social media as
private individuals, which makes the situation complicated for them as they also must use it
for work purposes. As an elected official today, this can be problematic and limiting as they
may want to share more on social media then they feel safe to do.
Today, digital media has taken over much of the public space. The Internet and social media
have made it possible to participate in public discussions and debates regardless of social
affiliation or status and regardless of time and space. This is a development from the past,
now, everyone with a digital device can access the public space if desired as the accessibility
is improved. The difference between the public and the private has also changed as society
develops in the media space to become more diffuse (Castells, 2013).
As social community and participation in political discussion happen in the public sphere
(Dahlgren, 2002), social media can be seen as an extension of the public sphere for a number
of reasons: the internet allows us to easily obtain all sorts of information; in a democracy,
people are allowed to partake in political discussions as “thinkers” instead of “listeners” as the
internet makes it possible; the internet creates new opportunities to actively mobilize and
coordinate political actions. Through these perspectives, it is considered that social media has
changed the public sphere which has easily led to an increased accessibility. Thus, the public
sphere has been expanded. This leads to the possibility for actors to disseminate false
information that can ultimately harm society and even undermine democracy.
4.2 The Hybrid Media System Political communication has always been central to the policymaking process and is described
by scholars to be an interactive process between politicians, the news media and the public
concerning the transmission of information. The communication process can operate
horizontally between political actors, upwards when governing citizens and downwards when
forming public opinion; it all depends on who is the information source (Norris, 2001).
Since the 1990s, political communication has changed in several ways as many Information
Communication Technology developments have altered the impact on the information flow.
Traditional mass media is still a relevant news source and has been so since the end of the
Second World War. Television broadcasting, radio and newspapers provide citizens with
information daily on what is happening in society, both on a local and global level. However,
there are now alternative ways for different actors to absorb news and spread information, and
the Internet has opened to additional ways of communication which has changed the way we
look at political communication as a theory. Now everyone can spread information, elites to
masses (top-down) and masses to elites (bottom-up) which has been reconstructed by social
media (Hogan & Melville, 2015).
Chadwick (2017) argues the need to reconsider the position that new information technologies
have on political communication. Digital media has induced a chaotic transition period in
western democracies where “old” media is existing alongside “new” media systems. This
requires a need to understand how newer media can adapt and intergrade older media logics
11
and how older media can integrate newer media logics. Logics are referred to as technologies,
genres, norms, behaviors, and organizational forms in between the fields of media and
politics. To make this possible, a holistic approach is considered by Chadwick. Old and new
are relative terms, “New” media and “old” media should not be viewed as two dichotomous
normative and conceptual positions, instead it should be viewed as a hybrid system where all
information is integrated into a nonstop, constantly changing environment. A hybrid approach
in political communication provides an overview of how politics and media overlap,
intermesh and coevolve together in complexity (Chadwick, 2017:5).
An important aspect of understanding the hybrid media system is power and how it is
generated in different media. Power is wielded by actors who create, tap and manages to steer
information flows in their own directions to gain influence and control while disabling power
of others. Actors who manages to blend new and old media together will be the ones with the
biggest success of gaining power. This can sometimes be problematic for political elites when
wanting to change their agenda and spread information in a particular direction as they have
to perform that alongside ordinary citizens, activists and people engaged in the subject. This
can result in a destabilization of elite-driven political communication environment that was
typical in the earlier days with broadcast television and newspapers. However, this has caused
political elites to rethink their strategies as it is sufficient for politicians to adapt to societal
changes as they happen. As people encounter a great amount of their daily news in alternative
media and social media, it has caused citizens to question their level of trust in political elites.
On the other hand, traditional media are renewing themselves which indicates that the media
landscape is facing major changes. It is not a question of whether social media is destroying
traditional media, it is more like a reorganization (Chadwick, 2017).
Chadwick (2017) suggests that the roles of platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram
are problematic and that the platforms need to be careful about their information environment
as much of the information that is being posted in their channels can be misleading and even
false. However, these platforms also provide positive aspects such as open dialogues which
presents a new public sphere useful for citizens.
4.3 Two-Step Flow Theory Lagerfeld and Katz are the two main researchers who founded the two-step flow theory
(Lazarsfeld et al, 1944; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955), they argue that mass media’s message
reaches the opinion leaders before it reaches the public, it occurs in two steps. The theory
goes against the belief that the media’s message reaches the public directly. The opinion
leaders are explained to be an influential people in our direct geographic network who can be
a family member, friend or colleague. The opinion leader influences the news we receive and
interprets the media message for us. The opinion leader is usually a media consumer and has a
central role in social groups (Katz, 1957:10). Further, this shows that these people act as a
kind of filter as they select news and information and spread them further to people who do
not consume news regularly. The two-step flow theory is thus based on the fact that there is a
part of the population that is not involved politically or interprets the media’s message itself.
As a result, politicians must find a way to reach out to opinion leaders. Opinion leaders are
not limited to physical contact but can interact with people on, for example, social media to
convey their messages. Furthermore, the message is filtered and interpreted by the recipient
(Strömbäck, 2014). Opinion leaders are often familiar to the recipients and are therefore seen
as more credible, the information is not seen as propagandist as it would if it came from a
politician.
12
Due to major technological and social developments around the mid-2000s, some researchers
believe that the two-step flow should evolve into a multi-step flow. Everette and Weaver
(2008) show examples of people taking part in more niche and target-oriented production of
news, as now is proven in the year 2020. Thanks to the internet, millions of people can search
whatever information they want and the communication between the media and private
individuals should become more direct than it was before (Bennett & Mannheim, 2006).
However, Choi, (2015) explains that the two-step flow is still relevant as examples can be
found for example on Twitter where media consumers can access the opinion leaders’
information flows. Some Twitter accounts were even perceived as more credible than others.
Additionally, a Canadian study shows that it was twice as likely that users preferred news
links and recommendations from family members and friends rather than stories directly
presented by news organizations (Hogan & Quan-Hassse, 2010). Sveningsson (2015) presents
the same results in her study when she divides comments on information and news in social
media in three steps where established news comes in third place:
1. Comments on news and information in our own channels and circles
2. Comments on news and information from famous people and the public space
3. Comments on news and information from established news sources
The fact that digital technologies has affected the way we absorb information is no news, it
has changed how opinion leaders and opinion makers disseminate information at the same
time as the public themselves in new ways can spread information. Therefore, there is a
higher risk of disinformation being spread. The two-step flow theory is a model with a clear
sender, which through an established channel reaches opinion leaders who then influences
people in their social network. In this study, the elected officials are perceived as opinion
leaders who want to spread their political parties’ ideas and at the same time to analyze how
the public operates. The model shows the increased vulnerability in the fact that it is
increasingly difficult to know who is the sender when we operate in a multi-flow
environment, as we are not always reached directly by the media landscape when we retrieve
our news from digital media to an increasing extent.
4.4 Theory Reflection Today’s public sphere can be considered expanded due to digital media and because of this, it
can be challenging to control what sort of information is being spread between the actors in
the public. On the other hand, it is important to maintain the public sphere as it describes
fundamental democratic values in society that the elected officials and citizens operate in
together and were open debate is central. Further, Chadwick’s theory shows the impact and
effect the hybrid media system have on todays’ information flow. It explains how power is
wielded between different actors and shows how easy it can be to control an information
stream. It shows the challenges the elected officials face in their everyday life at work. In the
hybrid media system, it is sometimes challenging to know who the original sender is, which
the two-step flow theory shows. And since there is no control over who the source is and
when people choose to consume news in their own social media feeds, it will be more difficult
to develop counter measurements to erase false information.
13
5. Methodology ___________________________________________________________________________
This chapter begins with a description of the research approach, research method and
research strategy used in the study. Thereafter, a presentation of respondents, data collection
technique and analysis method are described. The chapter is concluded with ethical
considerations and reliability and validity.
5.1 Choice of Approach
In regard to the aim, qualitative interview method was chosen. Qualitative methods and
interviews are described to be useful when new information is to be collected and where
experiences from respondents create an understanding to the topic in question (Danielsson,
2012a:163). In quantitative research it is unusual to meet the respondents, it is more common
to send out surveys or analyze data. This further leads to that there is no relation between
researcher and respondent which can be a positive aspect as objectivity can be maintained
(Bryman, 2011). In a qualitative study, the researcher has the opportunity to get close to the
respondent which is desirable in order to be able to get an overall picture of how a situation is
perceived by the respondent. “Being able to see the world with their eyes” (Bryman,
2011:272). One weakness of the qualitative method is that it is not as generalizable as the
quantitative method and can therefore not speak for an entire population. But there are
possibilities to dig deeper into the subject that is being studied, which this study intends to do.
The result will therefore not be considered absolute; it needs confirmation from other research
that can check the reliability. The study can be viewed as a process that can be used in
development of further ideas in the area of disinformation (Denscombe, 2010:69).
For this study, qualitative research is to prefer because the aim is to investigate how elected
officials understand of the spread of disinformation. Thus, personal interviews are appropriate
as it gives decision-makers (politicians) the opportunity to talk about their everyday
environment and relation to disinformation. Another reason qualitative method chosen is that
the content of the collected material is hidden beneath the surface and to gain a deeper
understanding, the text was reworked several times (Esaiasson et al, 2007:237). Furthermore,
the study’s method could possibly have been improved by a supplementary quantitative
survey method, but due to the frameworks that existed, this was not possible.
In relation to theory, it is fundamental in a study that the empirical result obtained is
supported by the theoretical framework. Otherwise, the result tends to be only stand-alone
descriptions of a single problem which has limited value. To avoid this problem, researchers
can choose between a deductive, inductive or abductive approach. This study is abductive,
Denscombe (2014) mentions that abductive method has features from both deductive and
inductive methods but also provides new insights. During the abductive process, theory and
empiricism combine in a circular motion to understand a phenomenon. In this paper, I have
alternated between collected empirical material and previously formulated theories according
to the abductive approach.
5.2 Research Design The overall strategy I chose to integrate is a case study, it is particularly appropriate for
individual researchers because it gives opportunity to study one aspect of a problem in-depth
on a limited time scale. A case study is mostly defined as an intense study of a single unit or a
small number of cases to be able to understand other similar cases that look alike (Gerring,
2007:37). It is crucial that the case has a distinctive identity that allows it to be studied in
14
isolation from other cases. In this case it is a medium-sized Swedish municipality that is
similar to other municipalities in terms of population and area. An advantage of case studies is
its possibility to delve into the subject to be able to explain what is going on in that
environment and why certain events occur. Case studies are a good fit when the focus is on
small spaces to gain new insight and information, my concentration will be on the spread of
disinformation to gain new perspectives of the phenomena. The information from the
conducted case studies are considered valuable as it explains how new aspects are intertwined
(Denscombe, 2010).
5.3 Data Collection To collect the empirical data, interviews were chosen. Interviews can be formulated in three
different ways, structured, semi-structured and unstructured. The difference between them is
how the questions are formulated, if the researcher only wants answers to the questions
included in the interview guide or if one wants open dialogues. If a researcher wants to have a
great deal of control over the situation, they benefit from choosing a structured interview
method as the questions created give limited response options. Unstructured interviews are the
opposite of structured interviews and offers the respondent to talk freely about the subject and
the study focuses on their thoughts completely (Denscombe, 2010; Johannesson & Perjons,
2014). For this study, semi-structured were chosen and it is an intermediate of the two above.
It allows a certain structure as well as it allows for the respondent to speak freely and add
comments that the researcher did not ask for. It offers the possibility of a larger material
which can make the study more comprehensive and the interview more flexible as follow-up
questions can be asked immediately. The interview guide was created with a couple of
prepared questions that allowed the respondent to design their answers in their own ways. In
semi-structured interviews, the researcher does not have to follow the interview guide
completely and can ask other questions during the interview (Bryman, 2011). The interview
questions are supposed to contribute knowledge and information (Kvale, 2014).
According to Kvale (2014), the study is influenced by how well the researcher manages to
establish good contact with the respondent. If the researcher shows interest and attention
while is clear in what he/she wants to know, the respondent will be more open to sharing
his/her experiences. This was considered while the interview guide was being prepared.
The interviews were held at Västerås Stad offices, and before the interviews took place the
researcher made small talk with the respondents and the theme was introduced. The structure
was considered important as it counteracted mistakes and made the interviews go as planned.
All interviews followed the same structure and interview guide and the interviews lasted
about thirty minutes each. Everyone who participated chose to complete the interview and it
came to an end when the researcher achieved saturation.
5.4 Selection of Respondents In an interview study similar to this, a so-called “centrality” is sought. This means that the
researcher wants to capture respondents who are centrally located sources (Esaiasson et al,
2007). The aim of the study is to investigate the municipality council’s understanding of
disinformation and how it can possibly affect local democracy. Therefore, the respondents are
strategically selected. To represent the council, themselves and their political parties’
opinions, one elected official of each party were chosen. Those who participated in the study
have areas of responsibility in the municipality that were considered relevant to the study’s
aim. The areas of responsibility are presented in table 1.
15
Table 1. Respondents area of responsibility in the municipality
In the table above it is noticeable that different areas of responsibility are represented by the
respondents, areas that many actors want to influence.
However, case study researchers argue that single case studies can never be statistically
representative, and instead believe that alternative logics are available. Analytical and
theoretical generalization is recommended by letting the theory do the job of generalizing the
result. In this way, it is possible to highlight universal valid aspects that can be expected to be
somewhat significant to related cases in the population (Esaiasson et al, 2007:159).
5.4.1 Response Rate To get in touch with the elected officials, e-mails were sent to each of them in the
municipality council where I explained the aim of the study etc. The aim was to interview one
from each political party in order to achieve a representative dissemination of answers from
the council. Five out of eight parties responded to my e-mails and they all took part in the
study. From the ones that did not take part, nobody answered with a “No”, instead, they chose
not to respond. The response rate is presented in table 2.
Table 2. Response rate from the political parties
From table 2 it appears that those who did not respond to the emails and who chose not to
participate in the study was Vänsterpartiet, Kristdemokraterna and Sverigedemokraterna. The
drop of analysis units usually is no problem in strategic selections as the researcher can
replace involuntary individuals with more willing individuals that are easier to encounter
(Esaiasson et al, 2007:185). However, in this study, all available respondents were given the
opportunity to participate as the purpose was to interview an elected representative from each
party in the council. Therefore, there are no other party members outside of the council who
can represent the population. The response rate was thus not as desired beforehand. Because
of this, a dropout analysis may also be of value for this particular study. Esaiasson et al
(2007:187) mentions that the dropout analysis indicates whether the respondents can represent
the population or not. Three out of eight potential sources of information disappeared which
makes a dropout analysis interesting in this study.
16
The dropout rate in this study may be due to several things. Bryman (2011:112) mentions that
people today are less likely to participate in research and are less willing to answer research
questions and surveys in general which can be one factor in this study. However, it may be
due to other factors. The figure below shows the political parties in government in a gal-tan
scale. GAL stands for Green, Alternative and Libertarian and TAN stands for Traditional,
Authoritarian and Nationalistic. It measures values, people’s basic attitude towards, for
example, internationalization, globalization and multiculturalism. The scale has recently had
greater impact in the debate as the right-left scale has become less relevant over the years
(Haggren, 2018).
Figure 3: Gal-tan scale, political parties in Sweden 2017 (Haggren, 2018)
According to the scale, it is feasible to see that the political parties who did not respond to
take part in this study (Vänsterpartiet, Kristdemokraterna, Sverigedemokraterna) are
positioned at the borders. Parties who are positioned at the borders often tend to have more
radical views on certain issues. On March 20th this year, just as my interviews took place, an
article was published that noted that Kristdemokraterna in Västmanland are spreading right-
wing populist fake news on their Facebook page to attract voters (Bblat, 2020). It may be a
reason not to participate in a study that researches the spread of disinformation.
5.5 Data Analysis According to Perjons and Johannesson (2014), a qualitative study needs a qualitative data
analysis method to draw conclusions about the collected material. Collected data cannot speak
for itself, it must be analyzed. It should be iterative, inductive and it puts the researcher at the
center of attention. The material should move from being specific to being general (Perjons &
Johannesson, 2014). For this study, a qualitative thematic content analysis was chosen.
Content analysis is used when the researcher does not know what the interviews will contain,
and the answers will have to be compared with each other for a general picture to be created.
A content analysis gives the researcher the opportunity to encode the text and divide it into
different themes to be able to categorize the pieces of material relevant to the study, which is
sufficient for a high-quality analysis (Bryman, 2011).
In order to familiarize oneself with every little detail of the material, it is necessary to do a
thorough coding. It can be useful when there are large amounts of data to be able to get an
overview of the material (Kvale, 2014). Krippendorf (1980) mentions that a content analysis
as a research technique developed to be able to make identical hints from data to relevant
17
context. The aim of the research is to get a feel for the entirety, and it is possible if one studies
the small parts in the working process and then integrate them into a holistic perspective.
To finally be able to code, sort and reduce the material from the interviews, it was
predetermined how to encode data to create an index from the information collected. The
index was established based on themes in order to find the essence of the interviews. The
themes were determined based on what was of greatest value to the study and read as follows:
• Awareness
• Understanding
• Effects
- Downgrading democracy
- Examples of disinformation in municipality
• Municipality responses
- Political party positions
- Suggestions on how to counteract disinformation
These themes were given different colors to distinguish them from each other. Using this
method, one can discover whether respondents have different views on the same phenomenon
(Bryman, 2011: 528-530).
5.6 Validity and Reliability Bryman (2011) claims that validity and reliability is hard to define in qualitative research. He
argues that validity should be replaced with the term authenticity with the reason that the
chosen method intends to examine what is really being examined. However, validity is the
consistency that occurs between the theoretical definitions and the operational research
questions. It deals with the absence of systematical errors and verifies that the researcher is
examining what it intends to examine, and this should be shown throughout the research
process and not only in the result section of the paper. The researcher’s reliability, precision,
and skill, therefore, play a significant role in the research process and the result of the study.
In qualitative research there is always a certain subjectivity to take into consideration as it is
the researcher who interprets the theoretical concepts and operationalizes the collected
material. The research process should therefore be carried through with accuracy (Kvale,
2014).
The reliability of the study is determined by the measurement being stable and not exposed to
random effects. At the same time, the interview study should have the same results if it is
carried through by another researcher at another time (Kvale, 2014). This can be achieved if
the study is systematically organized and that the handling of the interviews is analyzed in the
same way. If the researcher keeps a distance not to affect the results by natural occurrence of
events there is a possibility to avoid the observer effect. Johannesson & Perjons (2014)
mentions that it is difficult to completely avoid the observer effect as individuals possess
different experiences and skills. With support of a content analysis, one can reduce the
mistakes that can occur as the process becomes clear and simple.
5.7 Ethical Aspects In social science research, four basic research ethical principles are discussed, the information
requirement, the consent requirement, the confidentiality requirement and the utilization
requirement (Vetenskapsrådet, 2019). During the study, ethical considerations were taken into
mind. The confidentiality requirement is about taking care of personal data properly. In this
18
study, no names are mentioned in the interviews or transcription, but instead which party they
represent. Only the researcher and supervisor take part of the transcribed material.
Bryman (2011) highlights the importance of those who are willing to participate in research,
are doing so voluntarily. A high degree of integrity should exist, and the researcher should
inform the respondents about the study’s purpose and objectives. Before the interviews took
place, the respondents were informed of the aim and were asked to fill out a consent form as
approval to participate. Those who participated had the opportunity to quit if they felt so, as
there is a high risk of being identified. In some studies, there is a risk that reliability will be
lost unless the source is mentioned (Esaiasson, 2007). This study is mainly dependent on
knowing political party names, which then allowed to exclude the respondent’s name. None
of the respondents chose to quit, everybody completed the interview. Some anonymity could
then be obtained. The participants were also informed that they could take part of the study
once it was completed.
5.8 Method Discussion Bryman (2011) discusses whether the quantitative reliability and validity criteria should be
applied to qualitative studies or not. Some researchers suggest alternative criteria that
correspond to the above concepts. However, I chose to use the concepts of reliability and
validity as there are no better alternative as I see it. High validity means that the researcher is
examining what he intends to (Kvale, 2014). Through my interview questions, I hope that I
have been able to answer the research questions and aim of the study as closely as possible to
reach high validity. When the interview guide was created, the purpose was to keep the
questions as open as possible to examine the elected officials’ awareness and understanding of
the topic of disinformation. It was fulfilled even though I later noticed that I could have asked
a certain follow up question at some point to get a deeper understanding. To maintain high
reliability, I have been systematic throughout the process of the study and I have relied on the
empirical material to able for the text to follow a systematic order. Further, the interviews
were analyzed in the same way to maintain a neutral stance and the subjective experiences of
the respondents have been the basis for the answers I received. I also assume that the answers
they gave have been based on how they view the question at this moment and might change
different over time.
However, the interview method is not entirely unproblematic, some factors can influence how
the respondents design their answers. According to Bryman (2011), the researchers’
personality can influence the answers from the respondents, this was taken into consideration.
During the interviews I tried to act in a way that made the respondents feel comfortable.
Another negative aspect of interview method is the so-called “social desirability”, which
means that one wants to give off a positive image of oneself, which does not match reality
(Bryman, 2011, p.141). On the topic of disinformation, one might choose to leave certain
things out when it comes to personal experiences, this could possibly have affected the results
in this study. But all of them found the topic interesting to discuss.
19
6. Case Västerås is a medium-sized city that sees an increased degree of segregation, which can also
be found in other cities in Sweden. Västerås is one of 32 municipalities in the country who
receive financial segregation support from the government. In 2018, Swedish Agency for
Economic and Regional Growth issued a three-year support to municipalities with high
unemployment, low levels of education and low voter turnout (Tillväxtverket, 2019).
Therefore, it is becoming increasingly important that information spread among the
community's residents in various media is accurate so that local democracy is not adversely
affected. Västerås municipality is Sweden's seventh-largest municipality with a population of
153,000 inhabitants, and in the municipal council assembly, 61 seats are distributed between
Sweden's eight parliamentary parties. Socialdemokraterna have the most mandate but
decreased by two seats in the last election in 2018, while Sverigedemokraterna and
Liberalerna increased by two seats. The municipality has eighteen committees that govern
different business areas and it is common that an elected official is chairman in the
committees (Västerås Stad, 2019). SKR conducted a survey in 2016 where they investigated
how satisfied the citizens in Västmanland were with their local politicians and elected
officials. They find that the elected officials are well-representing to the people and the
foreign proportion is higher than in the rest of the country. This was considered positive by
the researchers as is gives different perspectives in decision making. The results show that the
citizens of Västmanland are satisfied with the democratic system in which they live. However,
they are more dissatisfied with their chances for influence in politics, which lowers the
confidence in the elected officials. The elected officials are found to have lower levels of trust
than the organization itself. This may have to do with the uncomfortable decisions they
sometimes have to make, while the citizens may not always see the link between the overall
responsibility (SKR, 2016:19).
In early 2019 a Russian orthodox church was built only a few hundred meters away from
Västerås Airport, and it is the first one of its kind that was ever built in Sweden. This event
was widely publicized in media and many experts have been critical since its interception,
claiming that it is an activity that favors Russian state interests, a military strategy. The
Russian congregation has close links with the Russian state and because the church is close to
the airport, the Russians can land people there and prevent NATO from landing at the airport.
The airport is close to both Stockholm and Gävle which are important cities in this context
(Vlt, 2019).
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7. Results ___________________________________________________________________________
This chapter presents the results of the interviews that aims to answer the purpose of the
study. Here, a selection process takes place on the part of the researcher, where the focus has
been on reproducing parts of the interview that are relevant to the research questions and
which have the strongest connection to the theoretical framework. This, to facilitate myself in
maintaining high reliability.
The results are presented thematically below based on selected themes that are important for
answering the research questions, the analysis units. It is considered more readily
comprehensible for the reader to be able to orient themselves through the text rather than to
outline each interview which can make it difficult to see patterns. The elected officials are
presented based on the political party they represent in the council, one for each party. Thus,
no names are shown, and in the text, abbreviations are used which are presented down in
table 3.
Table 3: Represented political parties and their abbreviations which are used in the result and analysis
7.1 Awareness
All elected officials agree that there are many different actors who want to influence us in
society, including themselves to reach out with their politics. It was recurring among the
answers that it is important for democracy that people do and should have the right to express
themselves and share their opinions and information. (MP) expresses that even the stupidest
opinions should be visible and claim that it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish what is
commercial and what are news articles in certain platforms. (M) explains that even events that
happen internationally will affect a municipality like Västerås because that is how the world
works today because of its global brilliance.
Information can, according to the officials, be disseminated in various ways, such as debate
articles, advertising in different media, via emails, people you meet, lobby groups, political
opponents and foreign power. (S) defines the spread of information as follows:
“The way I see it is that there is a question, or a topic people can have different
opinions about. It is about angles in different ways in order to promote their
position for a final result”
(M) fills in: ”Everything can affect ones opinion in a certain way and obviously
we are affected all the time, look at social media”
(L) interprets the topic in a negative tone as follows:
21
“When I hear the word just like that without having any background then I think
about trying to disseminate targeted information as in order to influence political
decisions. I think of the US election, Russia’s attempt to interfere in…those
kinds of processes”
(CP)(MP) is on the same track and claims that the spread of disinformation does not make the
world a better place when someone wants to manipulate someone to benefit one’s own needs.
7.2 Understanding Recurring platforms mentioned in the interviews are traditional media and social media which
the officials consider to be well-used platforms where it is easy for anybody to spread
information, not always correct information. (L) mentioned that people always have tried to
influence each other, but the way it is done is constantly changing. During the Second World
War, influence operations were carried out and propaganda spread in traditional media.
Today, spread of disinformation is taking place in digital channels, so the strategies for
counteracting it must follow, it is in constant change. (S) says that all media is good media but
the problem with social media is that it does not have any kind of source reviewing that the
traditional media has. The traditional media has press support and press ethics, on social
media we see a high degree of alleged truths, which makes traditional media more objective.
(M) mentions that it is cheaper and better to buy advertising on social media while it is
possible to reach out to more people. She goes on to say that the material they publish on
social media is not false:
“It is not fake news, it is what we stand for and what we want. It is about
ideology which of course is not the same as research results”
All interviewed parties have a local Facebook group. (MP) feels like the debate climate has
become tougher in recent times. The party itself has experienced that people from the outside
can be evil:
”Some have a caricature image of how an environmentalist is and call us man-
haters, vegans, that we all carry backpacks, etc. even if it is not true, it is
exaggerated.”
(CP) says she has seen Facebook friends whom she has known for years sharing and
commenting on fake news. She has then tried to go in and comment and ask if they have been
source critical with the information they share. She further mentions that a message can
spread quickly through social media which was not possible in the analogue times, when
something, for example, was heard on the radio. Now, messages can lose their original
purpose in a couple of hours. (M) analyses another aspect of social media, search engines
clean your feed so you get a confirmation of your own vision. What you have liked comes up
even more in the feed and in the end, people start to feel like everybody likes what you like. It
is customized so that you get the information that suits your thoughts. (M) claims that this
aspect is dangerous for society.
To conclude, (L) mentions that it can be difficult in which way one should react to the spread
of disinformation at times, as it can also be spread for good causes, for example to help
homeless people.
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7.3 Effects
7.3.1 Municipality Experiences of Disinformation When asked to identify and give examples of when the municipality felt exposed to
disinformation, (L) mentions that he is responsible for housing and properties in the
municipality and therefore meets various construction companies and real estate players.
These actors are good at spreading twisted information which gives him a reason to check the
facts. (S) mentions the same problem, the building and development side have the greatest
economic values and there are two areas in Västerås that are being realized at this day. Many
property owners want to be involved and want different things and will use media for own
purposes:
“Depending on how they react in social media and in the newspaper, it will
affect the political discussion and there are tendencies that one buys media space
to raise their questions”
(CP) Gives a similar example when it was proposed that a municipal land piece would be
used as housing for newly arrived refugees. This further led to an outcry and spread of
disinformation between people in different media in an already segregated society. Somebody
in the building committee even received murder threats.
Looking at disinformation from an international context and whether the elected officials
believe that foreign powers have the purpose of influencing the municipality remained
unclear. Whether or not the Russian Orthodox Church near the airport was a way for the
Russians to increase their position in Swedish society remains unanswered, and none of the
elected officials gave a clear comment on the topic. However, (CP) mentions that recently
attention was paid to the excavation of broadband between Västerås and Eskilstuna. Those
who performed the work were Russians, therefore, attention should be paid to even the
smallest of details. (L) mentioned that Västerås had a collaboration with a city in China in
order to learn from each other, but because of Chinas nondemocratic values and refusal of
free speech, Västerås recently chose to end the collaboration.
7.3.2 Downgrading Democracy All political parties interviewed consider it important to counteract the spread of
disinformation because it can have devastating consequences for democracy. (S) considers it
dangerous that some actors may use resources to buy disinformation for own purposes which
favors capitalism and undermines an open and honest debate.
When asked who is most vulnerable to being exposed to disinformation (CP) (M) answered
that the older generation is most vulnerable because they have grown up with the idea that
what is in the newspaper is true, as well as they have been led to believe that the world works
in a certain way. (S) (L) (MP) mentions socioeconomic background and education level, with
the reason that education gives knowledge. People with a higher level of education often have
administrative jobs which can lead to one being used to managing digital devices and thus
having higher media literacy. (L) gives an example and expresses that he every day sees
people being tricked and manipulated on the internet. He says that these individuals are
usually upset and start a debate, and normally those are people that are not trained in critical
thinking.
A risk to the survival of democracy as we know it was identified. A recurring insight during
the interviews was that few people today want to engage democratically, which can be an
23
effect of the birth of social media. Today, people are engaged in substantive issues in digital
media such as Facebook where groups can be formed for the sole purpose of the actual issue.
(S) says:
“It is hard to get people under 40 to get involved politically, everyone has a hard
time recruiting. I think people want to speak about politics but has a hard time
imagining representing a political party because one can identify with several
parties. It is difficult to decide that now I will go in and work for one party, it is
old fashioned. As an elected official one also has responsibility and risk being
hung out in media which can scare people off”
Citizens involvement in individual political issues can also lead to a lack of interest in
engaging in party politics as we know it. (L) claims that our democratic system is based on
people wanting to take on trust missions. If interest diminishes or if people do not dare
because of the risks, democracy will die. The competence of those who take on assignments
can also lessen which means that unsuitable people can have access to decision-making
positions.
(CP) mentions that, as an elected official as well as people she knows, cannot push animal
rights issues as far as she would have liked because of the fear of being threatened by animal
rights activists on social media and in real life. This is considered tragic in a democracy like
Sweden. Therefore, she is also careful about what images she chooses to post on social media.
As an elected official, one is dependent on voter support and (M) considers it problematic
when something small can have major consequences. (M) has developed new methods to
increase the safety for citizens in Västerås. It went so far that they were called Nazis in digital
media both by citizens and by other politicians, even though it was not meant to be like that at
all.
7.4 Municipality Responses
7.4.1 Political Party Positions All elected officials interviewed said to have discussed the spread of disinformation within the
party at some point and believe that it is of importance to counteract it for the survival of
democracy. (S) mentioned that the topic is probably already discussed when it reaches the
council.
When it comes to counteracting disinformation in social media, (M) has a political secretary
that tends to discover what is written about them both in their own channels and others. Once
they have identified the disinformation, they discuss within the party on how to deal with it.
(M) consider it important to discuss in groups before acting. (L) considers themselves
prepared on social media. They hired a communications expert during the election campaign
as they discovered trolls in their feeds. With the help from the expert, they set up strategies for
how many times to respond, when it was time to block and when to erase messages in the
feed. (S) often consider themselves attacked by Sverigedemokraterna in social media and
believe that they want to undermine social democracy. When this happens, they take help
from their national organization, as a lot of resources are needed to keep track of everything
that occurs. Often it is members who discover something odd before they contact the elected
officials in the party who then passes the information on to the national organization. (CP)
also claims to have good support from the national organization and also speak a lot about the
spread of disinformation within the party. The party, including others are actively trying to
prohibit leasing premises in the municipality to extremist organizations. They believe it is one
24
thing the municipality can do, not allowing extremists to spread their propaganda. (MP) also
refers to the national organization and claims that their preparedness is excellent. She also
mentions that larger party associations have clear chains to whom to contact and when, when
there is a problem. In smaller municipalities this does not exist.
7.4.2 Suggestions on how to Counteract Disinformation The elected officials were also told to share what they think the municipality needs to do to
counteract disinformation. (CP) wants to see increased participation in society and claims that
social exclusion is a problem that can lead to extreme and not always true opinions. The
municipality is therefore making exciting investments that will promote municipal
development. It includes municipal activities, associations, family centers, leisure clubs and
meeting places for the elderly. (CP) Says:
“Many families and children who grow up in poor conditions can be excluded
otherwise. One must find new ways to include people. Extradition is a big
problem. It should be easy to respond to fake news in a good way, then local
media is important, if traditional media did not exist it would be even easier to
spread disinformation, it is important for democracy. Some political parties even
want to control which art should be displayed which is incredibly wrong.
Demolishing democracy can be easy in that way”
(M) is on the same track and believes that resources should be invested in schools. They
believe it can reduce both social vulnerability and the spread of disinformation.
(L) says that political parties in government have a great responsibility by having a continued
majority in elections, both to stabilize trust and to maintain Freedom of Expression as a
fundamental law, which means that citizens will keep having the right to express themselves.
(S) fills in and proposes legislation to be able to set limits, but there are certain problems with
that too, for example, troll factories abroad cannot be controlled etc. by legislation. To
conclude, there is no easy fix to a problem that is not visible before it is out in the public, it
makes counteracting it even more difficult.
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8. Analysis ___________________________________________________________________________
In this chapter, the study’s research questions will be answered together with theoretical
framework and empirical material that was earlier presented. I chose to analyze the research
questions individually as I felt it would be easier for the reader to follow.
8.1 Research Question 1: How is the awareness level of elected officials on disinformation? The results show that all the elected officials in the municipality council are aware of the
information and disinformation spread in society, and they show a good grade of
understanding on the topic. They show an understanding of the types of vulnerabilities it can
cause, especially in the open debate in different media. According to MSB (2018) the first
step in counteracting disinformation is to be aware of what is happening, this shows how
important it is to analyze what is going on in society. The elected officials identified that
information is spread via many different actors and in different platforms. Traditional media
and social media were brought up the most as an intermediate source of information. Since
the elected officials are also active in social media, they as representatives have a
responsibility to act and set a good example in the open debate. They also face the challenge
in the situation between acting as a private or public person. Should they have to take
responsibility to act as their private self as (CP) has done, in their Facebook feeds? In line
with the public sphere it can be viewed as positive because an act such as this one, protects
democratic values.
In the theory chapter (p.10), social media was analyzed to be an extension of the public sphere
that has developed in later years. And since social media has the most extreme opinions
available, it is important, as SKR (2019) argue, politicians should have a strategy ready so
that they can act when it is time. Especially elected officials, who have a great amount of
power over a geographical area, so for them to be aware of disinformation spread, is of great
importance.
8.2 Research Question 2: What are disinformation’s potential effects on local democracy according to municipality council members? It was considered important that people should have the right to have their own opinions and
speak out because of Freedom of Expression and for an open debate. In the local community
that the elected officials operate and live in, it can be considered that the public meets
Calhoun’s (1992) four basic requirements for how a public sphere should be demonstrated.
Citizens and leaders in society have the same opportunity to influence the debate (citizens are
not only listeners, but also thinkers) through digital media that makes it possible to anyone to
discuss whatever topic they want. The opportunity to discuss sensitive topics is also possible
regardless of social status as people can hide behind a screen, which can make the debate
more self-governing and including. However, as mentioned by (MP), the debate climate has
become tougher and not as straightforward as Chadwick (2017) also suggests in his theory of
the hybrid media system. It is becoming increasingly difficult for politicians to reach out with
their opinions when they must compete alongside ordinary citizens, which can make party
democracy unstable if ordinary citizens can lead the debate. This can lower citizens’
confidence in politicians. However, the survey from SKR (2019) showed that many people in
Västmanland have confidence in democracy, but reduced confidence in elected officials
because they do NOT feel like they can influence the debate and decisions. This leads me to
question the segregating situation in the municipality of Västerås, does the lack of trust in
26
politicians have to do with the fact that many people have grown up in segregated areas and
are not interested in politics, and have grown up with the feeling that it is impossible to make
their voices heard? Through the interviews, it became apparent that the interest in engaging in
party politics is reduced and that people are engaging on their own in social media channels.
Moreover, all elected officials agreed that those most vulnerable to the spread of
disinformation are the elderly and people with a lower degree of education. (CP) believes that
social vulnerability is a threat to local democracy as it can lead to loneliness and hatred
towards society.
Elderly people and people with a lower degree of education often have lower media literacy
(Carlsson, 2018) which is leading to a greater risk of consuming disinformation, but social
media still gives them the opportunity to participate in the public sphere. Sveningsson (2015)
shows in her study that people first choose to consume information on social media that
comes from friends and acquaintances before choosing to consume information from the
outside and from the actual source. Consuming news in this way can affect people’s
confidence in the public, and, at the same time disinformation can spread faster between
people. According to the two-step flow theory, information passes on in two steps. In this
way, it becomes more difficult to know who the original source is, especially if news is shared
between friends on Facebook. This phenomenon creates new vulnerabilities from a
democratic perspective as it becomes difficult to remove false information, both in practice
because of the power of the tech giants, and in theory, due to the fundamental laws which (S)
has realized.
In terms of the multi-step flow theory, people can choose and search for whatever information
they want. The more a person clicks on ads and news in their feeds (often shared by Facebook
friends), the more confirmation they get on their own opinions, which according to (M) can be
dangerous for the open dialogue. The ads people click on are often leased advertising sites
and according to (S), it favors capitalism, and (S)(L) says that construction companies are an
example of actors in the municipality who take advantage of this. One way of interpreting this
in a two-step flow theory is that actors who pay for advertising space then becomes opinion
leaders. It gives them more power in the hybrid media system and public sphere and can
therefore cause disgust between actors.
For this reason, Chadwick (2017) suggests social media platforms need to review their
information environment, and in 2017, the EU signed an agreement with Facebook to review
spread of disinformation in their channels. The question remains whether platforms such as
Facebook are doing enough (Gelin & Pettersson, 2019). Worth mentioning is that Benkler et
al (2018) claim that the internet as such does not put pressure on an already stable democracy
(like Sweden) and can also provide opportunities for certain social groups. The elected
officials stated in the interview that it is difficult to include young people in politics, and
according to Scaramuzzino et al (2017), social media introduces the younger generation to
influencing politics. As suggested, digital media is not only negative for democracy, but it
also contains positive aspects, such as being inclusive of vulnerable groups to participate.
Further, (S) claimed that traditional media is more factual and reliable as a source than social
media and (MP)(CP) deem it important that local newspapers exist for the survival of
democracy. According to Chadwick (2017), traditional media face major challenges, which
means that they must develop if they want to keep their position as an opinion leader from a
two-step flow perspective (Lazarsfeld et al, 1944). For example, newspapers have developed
27
into digital forms which can be considered important to be able to keep a factual debate as
they also compete with actors who spread false information in these channels. According to
Chadwick (2017), actors who blend new and old media together will gain most power in the
information flow. Benkler et al (2018) argue that mass media is the largest disseminator of
disinformation. Especially conservative voters consume a greater share of disinformation and
usually receive confirmation of their own views, while liberal voters read different types of
sources. It may be that conservative voters also share more of these false news sources on
social media.
To conclude, (L) said that the municipality ended a collaboration with a city in China that
stands for non-democratic values, which can be viewed as a sign that they are aware and
protecting democracy and its openness.
8.3 Research Question 3: What are considered appropriate measures for counteracting disinformation in the municipality? According to the city of Helsinki (capital of Finland), it is not only the state that must be
prepared to counter the spread of disinformation, but also the country’s municipalities
(Harjanne et al, 2018). Therefore, a report was created to raise awareness among municipal
workers. According to the empirical material collected, the researchers concluded that high
levels of trust from citizens in the state and municipalities are important as well as state and
municipal bodies should increase cooperation with schools and associations.
In this study, the elected officials interviewed felt it was important to counteract the spread of
disinformation. (CP)(M) wants to see increased participation in society to counter social
vulnerability and loneliness as it can lead to distrust in state organs. The municipality has
invested resources to associations, family centers, leisure clubs and meetings for elderly
which can be a well invested initiative and follows Helsinki’s line of recommendations. The
harsh debate climate that (MP) is talks about may also be reduced through inclusion and
meetings outside of social media. It may also lead to the decision-making coming closer to the
citizens as suggested by Farkas and Schou (2019). The power structure identified in the
hybrid media system may also be reduced when people come together in real life.
SKL helps municipalities increase media literacy in schools, libraries, and other institutions
(Carlsson, 2018). This can be one step in the right direction (and is related to the above).
According to the public sphere theory (Habermas, 2003; Thompson, 2008), it is important to
include all citizens in society which can also strengthen democracy and give greater trust to
municipal bodies. Aro (2016) claims that proper defense mechanisms should exist to be able
to identify and counteract disinformation and that the state organs should be responsible when
citizens are at risk. If citizens are to enlighten themselves, the risk of spreading disinformation
is even larger. Therefore, it is reasonable for the municipalities to also begin to identify what
information is being spread about them, and the society around them. (L) says the political
parties have a great responsibility to set a good tone on the political debate, which is also
something to consider. Since the elected officials are also opinion leaders, they should also
think about how they behave in different media as they are party representatives every hour of
the day and whatever they post can affect the debate. This puts them in a complex situation
and (CP) says that she uses to comment on posts her Facebook friends make when she notices
disinformation.
Regarding the parties’ own social media channels, none of them mention that they have a
clear strategy in handling disinformation. However, (L) mentioned that during the election
28
process in 2018 they hired a communications expert who set up a strategy of how often to
respond, to who and when to erase. (MP) (S) (CP) referred to the respective national
organization for help which indicates that their local political organization do not have a
strategy for handling disinformation. MSB’s (2018) elaborated four step model could be
recommended also to political organizations as they face a great deal of disinformation daily.
The more aware and prepared the organization is, the easier it becomes, and this model is
well-developed and relatively easy to follow and fall back on when it is time to act. By also
considering Farkas and Schou’s four measures (see page 8) to counteract disinformation
which also focuses on democracy (2019), it is possible to get closer to the problems that
disinformation creates, lack of trust in the system.
(M) claims that the global affects the local, which means that sources from abroad are also
found within the hybrid media system. There are examples and evidence that, for example,
Russia wants to undermine Swedish democracy. This means that one must also see the
problem of disinformation from a larger perspective than just locally. (L) showed strength in
ending the cooperation with the Chinese city. (S) says that the party likes legislation but
thinks it can be problematic to introduce when trolls abroad wants to influence citizens in
Sweden, it is also problematic due to the two fundamental laws (see above). Managing
international actors is largely the task of the state, but the messages of these trolls can affect
citizens’ cognitive thoughts which they can apply to local society and therefore also harm it.
29
9. Conclusion ___________________________________________________________________________ In this concluding chapter, I summarize the conclusions, I through empirical research
reached. These conclusions are intended to supplement the analysis ‘s answers to the
research questions. Finally, there is a section on alternative approaches to future research
projects.
The study’s aim was to map a mid-sized Swedish municipality council’s awareness and
understanding of disinformation as well as analyze its potential impact on local democracy.
With this aim, three research questions were applied and analyzed in chapter 8. The first
question; how is the awareness level of elected officials on disinformation? It was found that
the level of awareness regarding disinformation among the elected officials is high, and they
observed that the spread of disinformation has increased since the birth of social media. They
also expressed that people with lower levels of education, as well as the elderly, are at highest
risk of encountering disinformation and trusting it. This can be considered to have a negative
impact on local democracy and create larger segregation and a harsher debate climate. Farkas
and Schou (2019) advises politicians to increase their transparency, make decisions closer to
the citizens and limit the influence of companies in politics. This can also increase the trust in
the elected officials. From the interviews, we could see the that construction companies are
one of the main actors trying to gain financial interests in both via social media and traditional
media. By regulating this in innovative ways, people with lower socioeconomic background
can have increased opportunity to be opinion leaders in the media as they would be given
more space. However, it can be considered positive that (L) and (S) were aware of the
influences of construction companies as it is the first step in counteracting disinformation
according to Pamment et al (2018). They also identified financial interests, which according
to Thompson (2008) should not be allowed to affect a debate in the public sphere.
The second question; What are disinformation’s potential effects on local democracy
according to the elected officials:
• Tougher debate climate
• Social vulnerability
• Not knowing the original source
• Social media provide confirmation of ones’ own opinions
• People do not want to get involved politically
The third question, what are considered appropriate measures on how to counteract
disinformation in the municipality? None of the elected officials mentioned that they had a
well-developed strategy for counteracting disinformation in their own social media channels
and claimed to have good feedback from the respective national organization. (L) said that
they worked out a strategy during the election period and it can be interpreted as it is still in
use. Therefore, an advice to the political parties is to develop a strategy to be ready when
disinformation occurs so that as little damage as possible is achieved for the sake of the party,
citizens, and democracy. Information from their own channels can quickly be misinterpreted,
lose its purpose, and be spread further. Pamment et al’s four degrees of response (2018) is to
recommend, with focus on step 1 and 2, to be able to keep citizens’ trust by avoiding
arguments and actions against the attackers. To do that, it is especially important to be
prepared though awareness.
30
(CP)(M) wants to see increased participation in society, which they believe can reduce
loneliness, which in its part can reduce spread of disinformation. These thoughts are in line
with Helsinki’s model, as their research shows that the Finns have high confidence in their
city apparatus. Through initiatives from the municipality and SKR, the local community can
be equipped against the spread of disinformation coming from both national and international
actors. Local politicians as decision-makers play a great part acting near the citizens, and also
to set a good tone in the public conversation.
To summarize, it can be considered important that elected officials understand the
disinformation that spreads in society as they work and have political power over a
geographical area. They also have dialogues with citizens in the hybrid media system and are
therefore exposed daily to all kinds of information streams. They should therefore set a good
example for a factual debate to protect democracy. This study has shown the shortcomings
that exist and demonstrated the importance of developing strategies to counteract a
phenomenon that is difficult to protect against.
9.1 Future Research During the course of the study, ideas were developed for further research in the field. At
present, this area is relatively unexplored, which means that the opportunities are great,
especially on a municipal level. This study collected empirical material from decision-makers
and has given new insight into the idea that politicians have a central role in the dilemma of
disinformation as they counter it regularly in their job. An alternative to further research
would be to collect empirical material from implementers to be able to investigate what the
municipality is currently doing to counteract the spread of disinformation.
Another idea that would be interesting to study concerning disinformation is to study it from
citizens’ perspective through surveys. This could help municipalities in implementing new
measures for counteracting disinformation and help equip society.
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Appendix A- Interview guide
Original version - Swedish:
Vilket parti representerar du?
Hur länge har du varit aktiv i politiken?
________________________________________________________________
Vad är informationspåverkan?
Skulle du säga informationspåverkan ett problem i dagens samhälle?
Har du egna exempel på om kommunen upplevt sig utsatta för informationspåverkan?
- Vilken målgrupp anser du vara mest sårbar och har störst chans att bli utsatt?
Diskuterar ni informationspåverkan inom partiet? (Är det något ni pratar om?) (Har du?)
- Anser du att det är viktigt att motverka informationspåverkan?
- Är ni förberedda inom partiet?
- Vad gör ni om informationspåverkan upptäcks?
- Planerar ni att genomföra nån informationsinsats?
Vilka aktörer anser du vara största hotet mot lokaldemokratin?
- Varför?
- Finns exempel?
- Hur anser ditt parti att samhället ska motverka informationspåverkan?
Anser du att hotbilden mot lokalsamhället förändrats?
Translated version – English
Informationspåverkan- Influence Operations-Euphemism for disinformation
Which party do you represent?
How long have you been active in politics?
___________________________________________________________________________
What is influence operations?
Would you say that influence operations is a problem in today’s society?
Do you have own examples of whether the municipality felt exposed to influence operations?
- Which target group do you consider the most vulnerable and most likely to be
exposed?
Are you discussing influence operations within the party?
- Do you think its important to counteract influence operations?
- Are you prepared within the party?
- What do you do if influence operations are detected?
- Do you plan to implement any information efforts?
Which actors do you consider to be the biggest threat to local democracy?
- Why?
- Are there any examples?
How does your party think society should counteract the spread of disinformation?
Do you think the threat to local community has changed?
Appendix B – Consent form
Samtyckesblankett
Samtycke till att delta i studien som handlar om informationspåverkan i en lokal kontext.
Jag har skriftligen informerats om studien och samtycker till att delta. Jag är medveten om att
mitt deltagande är helt frivilligt och att jag kan avbryta mitt deltagande i studien utan att ange
något skäl. Om du använder pappersenkät: Min underskrift nedan betyder att jag väljer att
delta i studien och godkänner att Uppsala universitet behandlar mina personuppgifter i
enlighet med gällande dataskyddslagstiftning och lämnad information.
………………………………………….
Underskrift
………………………………………….
…………………………………………
Namnförtydligande Ort och datum
☐ Jag väljer att delta i studien och godkänner att Uppsala universitet behandlar mina
personuppgifter i enlighet med gällande dataskyddslagstiftning och lämnad information.
Jenny Björk
Handledare:
Cecilia Strand