detection of precursors to aviation safety incidents due to human factors i. melnyk, p. yadav, m....
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3 Fatal accidents and onboard fatalities [Boeing Report ’12] IntroductionTRANSCRIPT
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Detection of Precursors to Aviation Safety Incidentsdue to Human Factors
I. Melnyk, P. Yadav, M. Steinbach, J. Srivastava, V. Kumar and A. Banerjee
Department of Computer Science & EngineeringUniversity of Minnesota, Minneapolis
ICDM Workshop on Domain Driven Data MiningDecember 7, 2013
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• Introduction
• Related Work
• Proposed Approach• HMM vs HSMM
• Experimental Results
• Conclusion
Overview
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• Fatal accidents and onboard fatalities 2003-2012 [Boeing Report ’12]
Introduction
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• Estimated two-fold increase in air traffic by 2025 [Sheridan ’06]
• Congestion in air and airports• Load on pilots and traffic controllers• Greater chance to make error
• Our objective• Detect precursors to aviation safety incidents due to human factors
– Analysis and modeling of pilot actions– Data generation and evaluation
Introduction
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• Hidden Markov Models [Srivastava ’05]• Observations modeled using N-dim binary vector (switches in cockpit)• Cluster data to get smaller class of observations; build HMM over reduced data
• Clustering approach [Budalakoti et al. ’09]• Cluster pilot action sequences using k-medoids based on nLCS• Rank order sequences to identify anomalous sequences
• One-class SVM [Das et al. ’10]• Detects anomalies in both continuous and discrete sequences• Employed Multiple Kernel learning: LCS for discrete, SAX for continuous
• Dynamic Bayesian Networks [Saada et al. ’12]
• Hidden nodes – pilot actions; Observable nodes – aircraft sensors• Detects pilot errors in the past given current instrument data
Related Work: Aviation Safety
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• Given database of normal pilot action sequences
• Actions come from finite alphabet:• Examples: “raise landing gear”, “lower flaps”, “decrease throttle”, etc.• Construct model of a normal sequence from data
• Assign anomaly score to a test sequence
• Entire sequence is anomalous (offline anomaly detection)• Specific action is anomalous (online anomaly detection)• Examples: “unusual order of actions”, “forgotten action”, etc.
Problem Formulation
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• Flight phases
• Example: landing phase pilot actions
Analysis of Pilot Actions
Action ID
Time
descent touch down braking on runway
stage duration
time btw actionsNull action
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• Flight phases
• Example: landing phase pilot actions• Simplification: ignore time duration between actions
Analysis of Pilot Actions
Action ID
Time
descent touch down braking on runway
stage duration
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• Hidden states• Stages of aircraft operation• Examples: initial descent, touch down, braking, etc.
• Observations• Pilot actions• Example: initial descent – reduce throttle, lower flaps, lower landing gear, etc.
• Model parameters• Prob. distributions: Transition , observation , prior
• Drawback• Geometric state-duration distribution – encourages fast state switching• Inability to model arbitrary state durations
Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
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• Additional hidden variable• State duration• Forces hidden state to last time steps
• Model parameters• Probability distributions:
• Duration
• Transition
• Observation , initial distributions ,
Hidden Semi-Markov Model (HSMM)
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• Estimate probability distributions (conditional probability tables)• Duration• Transition• Observation• Initial distributions
• Use database of normal pilot action sequences
• Select parameters which maximize likelihood of data
• Non-convex problem without closed-form solution• Use Expectation Maximization (EM) [Dempster et al. ’77]
• Similar to Baum-Welch algorithm for HMM [Baum et al. ’70]
HSMM: Model Parameters Estimation
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• Detect if a test sequence is anomalous
• Entire sequence is anomalous (offline anomaly detection)• Normalized joint log likelihood
• Specific action is anomalous (online anomaly detection) • Conditional probability
• Computational complexity • Computation uses Junction Tree algorithm for inference
• Cost:• For comparison, complexity for HMM:
Anomaly Detection Methodology
- sequence length- number of hidden states- maximum state duration
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• Compared HMM and HSMM to detect duration anomalies• Data:
Results: Synthetic Data
Normal Anomalous
Training 200 0Testing 25 25
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Flight Simulator
• FlightGear flight simulator
• Simulator setup• Landing flight phase• Cessna 172 Skyhawk landing at Half Moon Bay, CA airport• Aircraft controlled using keyboard
• Keystrokes interpreted as pilot actions• 12 commands to control aircraft
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Pilot Actions for Landing
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Flight Simulator Data
• Generated Data
• Types of anomalies• 1 – Throttle kept constant, flaps are not lowered; rest is normal• 2 – No initial throttle increase; rest is normal• 3 – Flaps are not lowered; rest is normal• 4 – At the end of flight brakes are not applied; rest is normal• 5 – Pilot overshoots runway and lands behind it; rest is normal
Normal Anomalous
Type 1 2 3 4 5
# of sequences
110 10 10 10 10 10
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• AUC based on 11-fold cross-validation
• 110 normal sequences split into 11 parts• 10 parts used for training• 1 part + 50 anomalous sequences used for testing• Initialization was fixed across runs• Performance metric: area under ROC curve (AUC)
AUC Results: HSMM vs HMM
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• Dependency of AUC on initialization
• Selected 10 random model initializations• Split of dataset was fixed across runs
• Training: 100 normal sequences• Testing: 10 normal + 50 anomalous sequences
• Performance metric: area under ROC curve (AUC)
Effect of Initialization: HSMM vs HMM
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• Detected anomalies in streaming data1: No initial throttle increase2: Incorrect usage of rudder3: Mistakenly used elevator control after touch down
Offline vs Online Anomaly Detection
Anomaly scoring: Anomaly scoring:
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• Baseline methods [Chandola et al. ’08]
• EFSA: Extended Finite State Automata• t-STIDE: Threshold-based sequence time delay embedding• WIND: Window-based anomaly detection
• Setup• Training: 100 normal sequences; Testing: 60 sequences• Sliding window length (history length) was varied from 1 to 20• Selected model with best AUC on training set; Evaluated on test set
HSMM vs Other Methods
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
HSMM 1.00 0.97 0.77 0.88 1.00HMM 0.87 0.60 0.71 0.95 0.99WIND 0.9 0.60 0.70 0.87 1.00EFSA 0.85 0.67 0.67 0.91 0.98
t-STIDE 0.84 0.67 0.68 0.92 1.00
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• Proposed framework to model discrete pilot actions• HMM
• Hidden states – stages of aircraft operation• Observations – pilot actions• Drawback – inability to model arbitrary state durations
• HSMM• Introduces additional hidden variable to model state durations
• Evaluated model performance• Synthetic data• Flight simulator data• Compared HSMM to HMM and other anomaly detection algorithms
Summary
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